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ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

ILLUSTRATED WITH

ESSAYS AND NOTES.

BY

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FOURTH EDITION, REVISED.

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I DEDICATE THIS BOOK
TO THE
REV. BENJAMIN JOWETT, D.D., LL.D.,
REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK, MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, AND
VICE-CHANCELLOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD;
THE SOCRATES OF MY YOUTH;
MY UNFAILING FRIEND DURING NEARLY FORTY YEARS;
THE WISEST AND BEST MAN THAT I HAVE EVER KNOWN.

PREFACE

TO

THE FOURTH EDITION.

THE call for a new edition of a book on Aristotle's *Ethics*, after an interval of ten years, gives an opportunity for second thoughts, which indeed are necessitated by the valuable work, in connection not only with this treatise, but with the Aristotelian writings in general, which has been done by scholars in the meantime.

Accordingly, after reading Zeller's¹ learned demonstration that all the great works of Aristotle were known to the world during the last 250 years before the Christian era, I have modified the view, too hastily adopted in former editions, of 'the fate of Aristotle's writings' (see Essay I. p. 10).

A good deal of scrutiny has of late been directed

¹ In the third edition of his *Philosophie der Griechen* (Leipsic, 1879), pp. 147-152.

upon the text of Books V., VI., and VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which has given rise to various opinions being expressed by scholars as to the authorship of these Books. The question has certainly entered a new phase since I first ventured to write on the subject, some twenty-seven years ago. At that time almost everyone in Oxford accepted the three Books, without suspicion, as an integral part of the *Nicomachean* treatise. Spengel, however, had proved to the satisfaction of the Germans that the *Eudemian Ethics* were not by Aristotle, but were a modified copy of Aristotle's treatise, written by his disciple Eudemus; and he had also pronounced Book VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to belong to the *Eudemians*, while he maintained that Books V. and VI. were *Nicomachean* Books. Fischer and Fritzsche had gone further, and had given up Book VI. also as *Eudemian*, while they held to Book V. (with the exception of the last chapter) as belonging to the original work of Aristotle.

It seemed to me then, and it does so now, that an *onus probandi* rests on those who would separate Book V. from Books VI. and VII. and say that it stands on quite a different footing from them. The three Books together form part of the *Eudemian* treatise, with which they agree very well, and this by

itself would seem a *prima facie* ground for supposing that whatever theory you adopt about one or two of them must hold good of them all.

But one common characteristic of these Books, tending to separate them from the other Books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, has lately been brought into prominence—namely, the peculiar condition of their text. Hildenbrand,² who only considers Book V., says that in this Book ‘a number of passages, partly by their construction, partly by their position, excite suspicion,’ and that ‘corruption of the text by external circumstances must have contributed to this, though the *Nicomachean Ethics* are, on the whole, among the best preserved of the Aristotelian writings.’ Rassow³ says: ‘It is incredible that the three Books, in the form in which they come before us, can have been published by Aristotle himself. The faults in these Books are such that they cannot be ascribed to the carelessness of copyists, nor can

² *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* (Leipzig, 1860), vol. i. p. 324.

³ *Forschungen über die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles* (Weimar, 1874). This interesting little work, full of acumen, consists chiefly of suggestions for the amendment of the text. Doubtless if all Rassow's emendations were adopted, the *Ethics* of Aristotle would read more smoothly.

But after all they are conjectures, however happy. Therefore, except in a few cases, where it was a question of changing a letter or two, I have thought it best to adhere to the text of Bekker, in which the difficulties, if sometimes caused by the errors of editors or copyists, are certainly also sometimes due to the carelessness of the original writer.

they be the result of any confusion that took place in the leaves of the original MS.' (pp. 49–50). 'The theory of a Double Recension, of which traces are undoubtedly to be found in these, and also to some extent in the other books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is not sufficient to account for the striking peculiarities of these Books. Undeniably they contain portions which are not of Aristotelian origin' (p. 50). 'The copyists, I think, must be left out of the question, for it would be too remarkable if in Books V., VI., and VII. they had committed more faults than in all the rest of the Books put together. A displacement of the leaves of the original MS. will not do, for no rearrangement succeeds in putting the *disjecta membra* into their proper place' (p. 39).

Ramsauer⁴ says: 'Books V., VI., and VII. have this in common—that there is more corruption and confusion in them than in the seven remaining Books' (p. 641). He also says that 'Book V. is far the most corrupted of all the Books' (*ib.*).

Mr. Cook Wilson⁵ says: 'The Seventh Book of the *Ethics* is not the only one which seems to be a compilation; most of the Books show more or less traces of something of the kind: after the Seventh

⁴ *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*
edidit et Commentario Continuo in-
struxit G. Ramsauer (Leipsic, 1878).

⁵ *Aristotelian Studies* (Oxford,
1879). Part I.

Book the most remarkable is perhaps the Fifth. The resolution is more obvious in the Seventh, the evidence of divers authorship stronger in the Fifth and Sixth' (p. 4).

Rassow having strongly stated, as we have seen, the corrupt condition of the three Books, adds (p. 50): 'No criticisms, however, touch the peculiar kernel of these Books, which wears so much the garb of genuineness that the attempt of Fischer, Fritzsche, and Grant to claim these Books wholly or in part for the *Eudemian Ethics* must be considered a failure. Nothing remains but to suppose that the genuine Books were worked over by some strange hand. This, I believe, is the safe result, to which all inquiry, up to the present time, leads; every step further conducts us into a dark, perhaps never to be enlightened, field, which I decline to tread' (p. 50). 'Besides a double recension, we must suppose numerous interpolations. Allowing that it has been made probable that the suspected portions were taken out of the *Eudemian Ethics*, the question is, whether all the difficulties may not have arisen from the same source—namely, that the genuine Books of Aristotle having perhaps become mutilated, were afterwards completed out of the *Eudemian Ethics*' (p. 51).

Ramsauer gives, only more indefinitely, the same or a similar view. He says (page 641): 'There is only one Aristotelian treatise on the matter contained in the three Disputed Books. Is it not likely that the loss of the one treatise was connected with the corruption of the text of the other? The confusions arose at that time when the one treatise, we know not how, went to ruin (*pessum iret*), and its contents somehow were badly transferred to the other. This you may fancy to have been done by those who thought in this way to preserve what was already mutilated and confused.'

Rassow's theory, it must be observed, gives no explanation of the manner in which the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. came to be introduced into the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He very distinctly pronounces against its having been written by Aristotle, saying (p. 48): 'If one does not wish to attribute to Aristotle that which in other writers one would consider absolutely monstrous, one must agree with those who reject the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. Look at the state of matters. In two Books are found two lengthy treatises on Pleasure, whereof neither makes the slightest reference to the other. The second, incomparably the richer, treatise makes it clear by its opening words that Pleasure has never

been previously treated of. The two treatises differ in the most essential points. In Book X. Pleasure is separated from *ἐνέργεια*, so as to be made to appear a mere quality of the latter ; in Book VII. it is defined as *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*. The treatise in Book X. opposes the view that Pleasure is the chief good ; that in Book VII., as might be expected from its whole way of looking at things, endeavours to make it probable that at least one kind of Pleasure is the *ἄριστον*. This attempt by itself suffices to mark the treatise in Book VII. as ungentuine, since it would impress on the Aristotelian *Ethics* a hedonistic character, which is inconsistent with their other views.'

Rassow agrees with Spengel that the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. is later than that in Book X., and that the author of the former probably had the latter before him. But he declines to accept the inference of Spengel, that if the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. be pronounced un-Aristotelian, the whole Book must lie under the same verdict. Rassow says that this does not follow, because the treatise on Pleasure has no necessary connection with the first half of the Book—it is a mere appendage. This may be so ; but Rassow does not explain how it comes to pass that the unknown editor, who,

according to his theory, wrote over Book VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, introducing into it passages out of the *Eudemians*, came also to append to it a spurious and unnecessary treatise on Pleasure. Surely it is far more natural to suppose that the whole Book was written originally for the *Eudemian Ethics*, and having been transferred to the *Nicomacheans*, brought with it this superfluity.

Rassow's sweeping and somewhat dogmatic assertion, that 'the essential kernel of the three Disputed Books bears the mark of genuineness,' seems based on what has been called *Aristotelisches Gefühl*, and which disdains to explain itself. Everyone would admit that the matter of these Books, even if they were not written by Aristotle, was all derived from Aristotle,—possibly copied or paraphrased from three Books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, now lost; or, if such Books were never written, then made up out of unfinished writings of Aristotle himself, or notes from his oral lectures, or out of conclusions arrived at in his other works,—in short, from the *répertoire* of the Peripatetic School, with so much of originality in the way of developing or modifying particular doctrines as Eudemus showed in his *Ethics*. If the 'kernel' of the Books, then, means their matter, this may be at once conceded to be on the whole

Aristotelian, and yet nothing will have been proved as to the authorship of the Books.

It is a question of form. We require an investigation of the subject in detail, and a theory as to what was the skeleton of each of these supposed *Nicomachean* Books, and where the *Eudemean* interpolations were brought in.

Rassow, without being explicit on this point, gives up the latter half of Book V. as a patchwork by an unskilful hand, containing, however, an excellent chapter on Equity, the work of Aristotle himself.⁶ He also gives up the latter part of Book VI., as evidently written, not by Aristotle, but by one of his school. He holds apparently to the genuineness of the first half of Book VII., though he would say that it had been worked over and interpolated.

But, finally, supposing Rassow's theory to be accepted, it would give rise to the following difficulty: If Books V., VI., and VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* were mutilated, and then made up out of corresponding Books in the *Eudemean Ethics*, how came it to pass that those corresponding *Eudemean* Books went out of existence, and the

⁶ Against this something might be said. The account of Equity in *Eth.* v. x. is very jejune compared with

that in *Rhetoric*, i. xiii., which had been written by Aristotle before he wrote his *Ethics*.

patched up *Nicomachean* Books were put into their place? Also we may add: How did it happen that the patched up *Nicomachean* Books fitted so remarkably well into the *Eudemian* treatise and corresponded by divers references with the remaining Books of the same?

Ramsauer's theory is, as we have seen, vaguely stated—namely, that 'when the one treatise, we know not how, went to ruin, its contents somehow were badly transferred to the other.' This must mean one of two things: either that three Books of the *Eudemian Ethics* having become mutilated, the remaining fragments of them were, with a view to their preservation, ingrafted upon the three corresponding *Nicomachean* Books; or, three *Nicomachean* Books having been nearly destroyed, the fragments which remained were ingrafted upon the *Eudemian* Books. But the former hypothesis seems absurd. What inducement would there be to spoil three finished Books of Aristotle's by interpolating them with fragments of his disciple's far inferior writing? The second hypothesis would imply that these three Books were originally written for the *Eudemian* treatises, but afterwards interlarded with fragments of lost *Nicomachean* Books; which theory I could quite accept, but it would be inconsistent

with Ramsauer's other views, for he distinctly pronounces the three Books to be *Nicomachean*.

Ramsauer's theory seems to differ from Rassow's in this: that he considers the fragments of mutilated Books to have been ingrafted upon the text of entire Books. Whereas Rassow thought that *lacunæ* in mutilated Books were made up out of the text of entire Books.

Ramsauer appears to me to be one of those Aristotelian scholars who are as reluctant to admit that the three Disputed Books may have been composed by some hand other than that of Aristotle himself, as some Theologians are to allow that *Deuteronomy* may be a work of later date than some other parts of the *Pentateuch*. He argues, ὡς θέσιν διαφυλάττων, to save the credit of each of the three Books. About Book V., having admitted that it is the most corrupted of all the Books, he proceeds (p. 641): 'Book VI., which seems to decline from the *Nicomachean* fulness to the meagreness of Eudemus, is much less so. And no wonder. People will less meddle with a book whose parts can be counted on the fingers, than with one in which a difficult matter had to be copiously, and as far as possible artistically, set forth.' But just the opposite might have been argued: it might have been said

that the psychology of the Moral Faculties is a more 'difficult' subject than Justice, and that people would be more likely to try to improve a meagre treatise than one which was copious and artistic.

We have seen that Ramsauer attributes a *Eudemian* character to Book VI. He admits that in this Book Νοῦς and the other Intellectual Excellencies are treated in a manner similar to that in which we find subjects treated in the *Eudemian Ethics*—namely, they are taken up and curtly defined and then suddenly dropt.⁷ And yet, in spite of this, Ramsauer says (p. 368): 'Those who attribute Book VI. to Eudemus should reflect whether the Eudemianisms in the Book, which have led to ascribing it to Eudemus, may not conversely have been borrowed by the disciple from this very Book (the work of his master) and made use of elsewhere.' On which we may remark, that while it is easy to believe that Eudemus might have borrowed particular *formulae* (like ὁρος, see below, page 61) from this Book, if he had it before him, it is difficult to suppose that he can have moulded his whole style on the worst written Book of an Aristotelian treatise.

⁷ This same characteristic, it must be noticed, appears in Book V. Corrective Justice (c. iv.), the theory of Exchange (c. v.), and Equity (c. x.)

are all dropt in the same abrupt manner, without their respective bearing on the main question of the Book being sufficiently worked out.

Ramsauer wavers as to the authorship of Book VI. He says (p. 369): 'It seems to me that the forces (*copias*) by which this Book is to be won for Aristotle or for Eudemus are about equal—neither of them sufficient to carry the day.' But he himself always treats the Book as if it had been won for Aristotle.

With regard to Book VII. he remarks (p. 425), that in no part of the *Magna Moralia* has the author of that compilation so fully reproduced the matter of either the *Nicomachean* or the *Eudemian Ethics* as in his account of *ἐγκράτεια* (cf. *Mag. Mor.* II. iv.–vi. with *Eth. Nic.* VII. i.–xi.). And he infers from this that at the time when the *Magna Moralia* was written there was only one Aristotelian treatise on that subject in existence.

Of course this may only mean that the composition of the *Magna Moralia* was posterior to that literary convulsion in which, according to the theory of Ramsauer, three Books of either the *Nicomachean* or the *Eudemian* treatise were mutilated, and their fragments interpolated into the corresponding Books of the other treatise. But it is at least an equally probable hypothesis that there never was more than one treatise, in literary form, on the subject of *ἐγκράτεια*, and that this (as the treatise on Pleasure,

appended to it, would suggest) was written or made up for the *Eudemian Ethics*,—Aristotle never having completed this part of his Ethical system.

In order to explain the presence of a double treatise on Pleasure in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Ramsauer (pp. 643-4) resorts to an hypothesis of desperate ingenuity. He supposes that Aristotle, intending to give a literary unity to his *Ethics*, wrote his theory of the Chief Good and of Virtue, Books I.-VI., X. vi.-ix., thus completing the treatise all but an intermediate space; and that he afterwards filled up this space (1) by composing a treatise on Continence and one on Pleasure, which together formed Book VII.; (2) by composing a treatise on Friendship, which was suffered to run out to disproportionate length (Books VIII. and IX.), and in the course of which Aristotle arrived at conclusions (IX. ix. 9) distinguishing the consciousness of an *ἐνέπρεια* from the *ἐνέπρεια* itself, which conclusions were inconsistent with his already written treatise on Pleasure, and necessitated its being rewritten. This Aristotle accordingly did (*Eth. Nic.* X. i.-v.), without, however, cancelling the former treatise on the same subject.

Unfortunately for this hypothesis, it does not seem to be supported by internal evidence. I agree with

Ramsauer in believing that Aristotle wrote the first part and the concluding part of his *Ethics*, thus giving the complete literary framework of his system and leaving an intermediate space to be filled in. But it is clear that the concluding part cannot have commenced with the sixth chapter of Book X., *Ειρημένων* ὁ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, because these words imply that Books VIII. and IX. and Book X. i.-v. had been written previously. Therefore I consider that the space left to be filled up corresponded with what is now occupied by Books V., VI., VII., and that, as Spengel supposed, the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. was written later than that in Book X., and was indeed part of the *Eudemian* paraphrase.

Again, if the treatise on Pleasure in Book X. had been written expressly to bring out the distinction between Pleasure and the *ἐνέργεια*, which it accompanies, this point would surely have been made more prominent than it is, and not dismissed, as it is, in a parenthetical and half-disdainful way,⁸ quite at the end of the treatise.

⁸ See *Eth.* x. v. 6-7, where the main proposition is that the Pleasure resulting from an *ἐνέργεια* is more closely connected with that *ἐνέργεια* than the Desire which has preceded

it; and Aristotle adds, 'Nay, the connection of Pleasure with *ἐνέργεια* is so close as to have given rise to a doubt whether they are not identical. But surely Pleasure is not identical

Having pointed out the difficulties which seem to me to beset the theories of recent German critics as to the authorship of the three Disputed Books, I now turn to the scholarlike monograph of Mr. Cook Wilson, *On the Structure of the Seventh Book of the Nicomachean Ethics*, chapters i.-x. Mr. Wilson, following up Torstrik's suggestion that the present order of the context in *De Anima*, Book III., had come from some sort of combination of two parallel versions, minutely examines Book VII. of the *Ethics*, and finds in it traces of not only two, but sometimes three, parallel versions. Some of the pieces of this mosaic, Mr. Wilson thinks, may be attributed to Aristotle; others bear traces of Eudemeanism; while others seem to belong to a post-Eudemean writer, possibly a disciple of Eudemus. Mr. Wilson, without expressly saying so, seems to point to the conclusion that the earlier chapters of Book VII. were certainly not written in their present form by Aristotle for the *Nicomachean Ethics*, nor were they written by Eudemus for his paraphrase; but that they were put together out of divers versions by some Peripatetic later than Eudemus.⁹

with Reasoning, nor with Perception; it would be absurd to say so. But from their being inseparable some think that they are identical.' Ac-

ording to Ramsauer, the whole treatise was written for the sake of bringing in this sentence.

⁹ In one argument Mr. Wilson is

The question as to the composite character of various parts of the 'Works of Aristotle' has yet to be further worked out, and more light may be elicited in the process. In the meanwhile, taking into consideration all the peculiarities of these three Disputed Books, I am still inclined to figure to myself that Eudemus, having paraphrased the seven completed Books of Aristotle's *Ethics*, found that he had a middle space to fill up, and no longer a finished treatise of Aristotle's to copy.

Instead of this, his materials would now consist of posthumous fragments, and the notes of the Peripatetic School. The repetitions in the text which he produced may have partly been caused by carelessness, partly by a reverential wish not to lose any of the *ipsissima verba magistri*, whenever they had been recorded. We see the same kind of literary irregularity in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, which, as tradition says, were posthumously edited by Eudemus. In writing the three Disputed Books, I should imagine that Eudemus was partly editing and preserving

inconsistent with this view. For he suggests (p. 38, note) that *Eth. Eud.* II. xi. was intended for a reconstruction of and improvement upon *Eth. Nic.* VI. xii. 7-10, which would prove that *Eth. Nic.* VI. could not be attributed to Eudemus. But at the same

time it would prove that Books VI. and VII. (for they must surely go together) were composed *earlier* than the *Eudemian Ethics*. But I confess that, on comparing the two passages, I do not derive from them the same impression as Mr. Wilson has done.

Aristotle's doctrine on Justice,¹⁰ the Moral Standard, and perhaps Incontinence, partly completing his own treatise, as the close connection of these Books with it seems to show.

Nothing in the recent discussions seems to me to shake the hypothesis that the Three Books, whatever may otherwise have been their literary history, originally belonged in their present form to the *Eudemian*, and not the *Nicomachean* treatise. Therefore I have not thought it necessary to alter what I formerly wrote on this subject. I would only beg that when I speak of 'Eudemus' with reference to these Books, I may be understood to mean 'Eudemus, whether in his own language paraphrasing or improving upon the ideas of Aristotle, or (as may frequently have been the case) availing himself of the exact words of his Master, from whatever source derived.'

¹⁰ Book V., which has hitherto been unanimously pronounced to be *Nicomachean*, i.e. written by Aristotle, seems to me to owe this character partly to its representing Aristotle's theory of Justice, *as far as he had gone in the subject*, partly to its containing several fragments of Aristotle's writing. For instance, the opening of the Book down to c. i. § 14 appears to me to be essentially *Eudemian*, whereas from § 15 to the end

of the chapter comes in a piece written in the best manner of Aristotle. A good deal of chapters iv. and v. probably consists of Aristotle's exact words, whether written by himself or taken down from his lectures. I do not go further into the question, but I consider the setting of the whole Book to be *Eudemian*, whatever nuggets of Aristotle it may contain.

Out of all the discussions one conclusion seems to emerge—namely, that, to use the words of Ramsauer about the Disputed Books, ‘*In hac Ethices Aristotelicæ parte pro duplici disputatione ne unam quidem habemus satis sanam atque integram.*’ And this is what I have always ventured to maintain—that we could not be certain that we possessed in its entirety Aristotle’s theory of Justice or of the Moral Standard.

EDINBURGH: October, 1884.

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ESSAY I.

On the Nicomachean Ethics, in relation to the other Ethical Writings included among the Works of Aristotle.

THE question of the genuineness and of the literary character of each of the several works which have come down to us under the name of Aristotle, has been mooted and discussed with increasing earnestness during the last half-century. By the diligence of modern critics, for the most part Germans, the whole field of Classical, Patristic, Alexandrian, Byzantine, Arabian, Jewish, and Scholastic literature has been searched, and every fragment, reference, allusion, or mention, however incidental, everything in short bearing even remotely on the question, has been carefully collected and brought to light. Of all this labour we may say, in brief, that the general outcome and result has been to show: *first*, that external authorities are seldom in themselves decisive, but require to be checked in comparison with each other, and to be weighed against internal evidence; *secondly*, that many of the problems which have been started about Aristotle and the Aristotelian writings cannot be resolved with certainty, and must be left in the region of the indeterminate; *thirdly*, that these problems are for the most part comparatively unimportant, as for instance those relating to the character of the 'lost writings' of Aristotle, or to the

genuineness of some of the smaller treatises or of particular portions of works otherwise acknowledged to be genuine; *fourthly*, that a general consensus ratifies, and nothing seriously impugns, the belief, that in the leading portions of the great treatises which make up 'our edition' of Aristotle we possess the thought of the philosopher pretty nearly in the form under which it came from his own mind and was given originally either to his own disciples or to the world.

The several ethical treatises which we find included among 'the works of Aristotle' exemplify in a remarkable way the above-stated conclusions, and an examination of them, with the assistance of all available clues whether internal or external, serves to throw an interesting light upon the philosophical history of the Peripatetic School. But, in order to the due conducting of such an examination, it will be necessary beforehand to briefly sum up and set forth the results of such parts of the controversy upon the writings of Aristotle in general as bear upon the special questions, with reference to the ethical treatises, which we shall find before us.

With regard to the personal life of Aristotle, it is enough for present purposes to observe that we know with tolerable certainty two points,—namely, that Aristotle died Ol. 114. 3 (B.C. 322), being about 63 years old, and that for 13 years previous to that date he had held a school in the Lyceum at Athens.¹ Holding to these points, we may for the present leave in abeyance the various questions which have been

¹ See an extract from the Chronology (Χρονικά) of Apollodorus, given by Diogenes Laertius (v. i. 9). This Apollodorus has been generally considered a trustworthy authority, but of late doubt has been thrown upon his statements regarding Aristotle by

Valentine Rose, who treats all the dates given by him, except those above mentioned, as the mythical filling in of what was really blank (*V. Rose de Aristotelis librorum ordine et auctoritate*. Berlin, 1854.)

mooted about other parts of the life of Aristotle, as for instance whether he passed an irregular or a steady youth; whether he began the study of philosophy early or late; whether he was really a disciple in the school of Plato for twenty years, or for a shorter period, or was only a reader and critic of Plato's writings, and an occasional hearer and personal friend of Plato himself; whether he 'tried his 'prentice hand' in philosophy by writing dialogues² in somewhat weak imitation of Plato's manner of writing, and whether the dialogues of this kind which Cicero read and admired were really written by Aristotle, or were all forgeries. These and other questions of the kind might all be answered either one way or the other without affecting our judgment on the ethical treatises which have borne the name of Aristotle.

With regard to the literary career of Aristotle, we may admit that we have no certain information. But the general opinion has been that those of his works which have been preserved were all composed during the last thirteen years of his life, when he was holding his philosophical school in the Lyceum. And, with regard to the great majority of the extant writings of Aristotle, internal evidence is not opposed to this view. For these books may be stated broadly to be quite homogeneous. They belong to *one* period of the philosopher's mind. Though most of them have all the freshness of original speculations and inquiries, still they are expressed in a settled and peculiar terminology, which must have been beforehand gradually formed and adopted by their author during a long life of thought. It is only in minute points that a development of ideas or of modes of expression can be traced by comparing different parts of these works with each other. And another argument for the

² On this point a word or two will be said in Appendix B.

same hypothesis is to be found in the unfinished character of so much that bears the name of Aristotle.

If we could fancy that Thucydides, instead of writing the history of the Peloponnesian War alone, had undertaken to narrate a dozen different periods in a dozen totally separate works, and had left these at his death almost all unpublished and in different stages of completion, but all indicating by their several openings the grasp which their writer had attained over each of the periods to be treated, we should conceive of such a result in history as would have been analogous to the actual result in philosophy exhibited by the works of Aristotle. We see here vastness of conception, organic distribution of human knowledge into its various departments, the ground plan laid for the complete exposition of each of these several departments, and then the indications of premature arrest stamped upon many of these great designs. But in one point our imagined parallel would fail. For Aristotle must not be represented as a man of letters, composing books within his own study; rather we must picture him as a teacher, all whose multifarious activity, all whose inquiries and conclusions, original and tentative as they often were, all whose summings up of the results of knowledge and thought, were in relation with the daily life of a school engaged in prosecuting under their master's guidance the same lines of philosophical speculation. To remember that Aristotle, during his great period of productiveness, was not only writing but teaching, and that his school was probably meant to be associated, and actually to some extent took part, in the composition of his works, will be an important element towards estimating the character of his remains. We shall return to this consideration, but in the meantime certain *data* of external evidence have to be examined.

The first of these is the celebrated story of the fate of the writings of Aristotle, given first by Strabo,³ and afterwards repeated by Plutarch.⁴ This story is as follows: The library and MSS. of Aristotle came, at his death, into the possession of Theophrastus (who continued for 35 years chief of the Peripatetic School at Athens), and when Theophrastus died, the whole joint collection containing the original works of both philosophers, and all the books of others they had respectively bought, went by bequest to Neleus, a philosophical friend and pupil of Theophrastus, and were by him carried off to his own home at Scepsis in the Troad. A generation after this occurrence, the kings of Pergamus began collecting books for their royal library, and the heirs of Neleus, in order to save the precious collection which was in their possession, but of which they themselves could make no use, from being seized and carried off to Pergamus, concealed it in a cellar, where it remained, a prey to worms and damp, for nearly 150 years. At the end of that time, the Attalid dynasty at Pergamus was at an end (the last of these kings, Attalus, having died in 133 B.C., bequeathing his kingdom to the Romans). The then possessors of the Aristotelian and Theophrastean libraries, having no longer anything to fear from royal requisitions, brought out the MSS. from their hiding place, and sold them for a large sum to Apellicon of Teos, a wealthy man, resident at Athens, and attached to the Peripatetic sect. The precious rolls were now transferred, about the year 100 B.C., to Athens, after having been lost to the world for 187 years. They were found to be in very bad condition, and Apellicon caused copies of them to be taken, himself filling up on conjecture the gaps which now existed in the worm-eaten text. His conjectures,

³ Strabo, XIII. i. 418.

⁴ Plutarch, *Vit. Sulle*, c. 26.

however, were infelicitous, as he was more of a bibliophilist than a philosopher. Soon after his death, Athens was taken by Sylla (86 B.C.), and the library of Apellicon was seized by him and brought to Rome. It was there preserved under the custody of a librarian, and various literary Greeks resident at Rome gained access to it. Tyrannion, the learned friend of Cicero, got permission to arrange the MSS.; and Andronicus of Rhodes, applying himself with earnestness to the task of obtaining a correct text and furnishing a complete edition of the philosophical works of Aristotle, arranged the different treatises and scattered fragments under their proper heads, and getting numerous transcripts made, gave publicity to a generally received text of Aristotle.

The above story comes mainly from Strabo, who gives it in his geographical book as a local fact in connection with the town of Scepsis; he however mentions only Tyrannion as having taken the MSS. in hand. Plutarch repeats the tale in his life of Sylla, and adds the important fact of the recension made by Andronicus. Porphyry, in his life of Plotinus, carries this information still further by stating that Andronicus had 'divided' the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into systems (*πραγματείας*), bringing together, under common heads the speculations that properly belonged to the respective subjects.'

These various statements seem in their origin to start from the very fountain head of contemporary authority. For Strabo was a pupil of the learned Tyrannion, in Rome, about the year 70 B.C., or a little later. There must then, beyond

⁵ Ὁ δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διέειλε τὰς οἰκίας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταῦτὸν συναγαγών. Porphyry says that he himself copied this procedure, in editing the works

of Plotinus, and that he thus with regard to them substituted a logical for a chronological arrangement of the writings.

all doubt, be an element of historical truth in the account which he gives of the library of Apellicon, and which he must originally have got from Tyrannion himself. But still the exact accuracy of all which Strabo says on this subject cannot be depended on. In the first place, even Tyrannion only knew the relations of Apellicon to the MSS. which he had bought in Scepsis, or the amount of alteration introduced by Apellicon into them, by a hearsay tradition going back for a period of nearly twenty years. Secondly, Strabo probably wrote his account of all these matters many years later, without any notes of what he had heard in his youth, and his memory may in some points have played him false. Thirdly, it seems a striking instance either of this kind of forgetfulness, or else of a want of thorough knowledge as to what had been done for the Aristotelian text, that Strabo should have omitted all mention of the recension of Andronicus, of which such striking affirmation was afterwards made.

Tyrannion was the friend of Cicero, and it is remarkable that Cicero should never in his works have referred to so curious a literary anecdote as that of the finding of the Aristotelian MSS., and their ultimately being brought to Rome. But Cicero evidently knew very little of Aristotle. He had in the library of his Tusculan Villa⁶ some of the works of Aristotle as we at present possess them, possibly copies of the recension of Andronicus, but he had not really studied them. When his friend Trebatius asks him what the *Topics* of Aristotle were about, Cicero advises him 'for his own interest' to study the book for himself, or else consult a certain learned rhetorician. Trebatius, however, is repelled by the obscurity of the writing, and the rhetorician,

⁶ Cicero, *Topica* 1. i. *De Finibus*, v. 7. (written 45 and 44 B.C.)

when consulted, confesses his total ignorance of Aristotle. Cicero thinks this no wonder, since even the philosophers know hardly anything about him, though they 'ought to have been attracted by the incredible flow and sweetness of the diction.' He then proceeds to give Trebatius a summary of a few pages of the *Topics* of Aristotle, which he had apparently read up for the occasion. Cicero's remark about the 'sweetness' of Aristotle's diction entirely refers to the rhetorical Dialogues which existed in considerable numbers under the name of Aristotle, and which Cicero often quotes. Whether all or any of these were genuine, may be a question; but at all events they bore only a slight relation to the real philosophy of Aristotle. Cicero referred to by name, and probably possessed, the *Nicomachean Ethics*;—he doubted whether they were by the father or the son; but he misquotes them, and has only superficially studied them, for he praises them as making happiness independent of good fortune. But if Cicero was only superficially acquainted with Aristotle's greater works, he at all events possessed copies of some of them; and if these had been works which, after being lost by a strange destiny for nearly 200 years, had been recently brought to light and for the first time published, Cicero could hardly have failed to make mention of so striking a circumstance.

The reason why Cicero did not tell the tale of the fate of the writings of Aristotle, was, that there was no tale to tell. It is a point of very minor interest that the library of Aristotle, containing, it may be, the original autographs of his works, was bequeathed by Theophrastus to Neleus—(that this was the fact is corroborated by Diogenes Laertius (v. 52), who has preserved the Will of Theophrastus)—and that this collection went to Asia Minor, and was stowed away in a cellar, and was ultimately brought back by Apellicon, and so

gradually got to Rome. All this there is no reason to doubt, but it is of interest for bibliophilists rather than for philosophers. Very different in importance is the assertion that all the great works of Aristotle were, thirty-five years after his death, entirely suppressed and put out of sight, and that the Peripatetic School, and *a fortiori* the rest of the philosophic world, lost all knowledge of them, and that it was by the merest chance that the Aristotelian system of philosophy, by which the history of the Middle Ages and the forms of modern thought have been so profoundly influenced, were ultimately rescued and brought to light.

But the latter statement is actually the one that Strabo made; for he added to his story of Aristotle's library in the cellar of Neleus an account of the consequences which ensued to the Peripatetic School; saying that 'the result was that the earlier Peripatetics, immediately after Theophrastus, being entirely deprived of the works of Aristotle, except a few of the more popular treatises, were debarred from systematic philosophy and were reduced to rhetorical essay-making; while the later members of the school, after these books had been brought to light, though they knew Aristotle better than their predecessors had done, were still obliged to resort to conjecture as to most points of his system, owing to the multitude of errors which had now crept into the MSS.'¹ And Plutarch, in repeating Strabo's story about the library of Aristotle, reproduces also this corollary to it in an emphasised form, saying expressly that it was from no want of personal zeal or ability, but from the want of the text of

¹ Strabo, *l.c.* συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων, τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν, μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν.

τοῖς δ' ὕστερον, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προήλθεν, ἔμεινον μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστοτελίζειν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μέντοι τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν.

Aristotle's writings, that the Peripatetic School had previously declined.

Now, if this statement be literally accepted, the conclusion drawn from it must be that the philosophy of Aristotle underwent extreme risk of total deletion and annihilation. If it be true, as Strabo and Plutarch would imply, that the library purchased by Apellicon contained unique copies of all the works of Aristotle except his Dialogues and popular treatises (which had been previously published), it is clear that the merest chapter of accidents led to the resuscitation, arrangement, and editing of all that we now know as 'the Works of Aristotle.' According to this hypothesis, a few years more of the cellar of Neleus and the work of obliteration would have been completed: Aristotle's philosophy would have been lost, and his Dialogues (genuine or spurious) alone preserved. And thus would have been brought to pass the saying of Lord Bacon: that 'Time like a river, bringing down to us things which are lighter and more inflated, lets what is more weighty and solid sink.' The story of the fate of the writings of Aristotle would thus be a strange eventful tale, full of romantic interest in the history of human thought. In a former edition of the present work the story, viewed under this light, was too hastily accepted and set forth. But the publication by Zeller of the third edition of his *Philosophie der Griechen* (1879) and his exhaustive review of all attainable facts relating to Aristotelian literature during the last two centuries and a half before our era, show that such a fancy is untenable, and that the philosophy of Aristotle was exposed to no such peril as we have supposed; for while the original MSS. of his great works were mouldering at Scepsis, copies of them all were being used, if not by the Peripatetic School, by philosophers of other sects.

In proof of this point, after citing Chrysippus, Critolaus,

Herillus, Panætius, Antiochus, Posidonius, Stilpo, and Hermarchus, as philosophers who showed an intimate acquaintance with Aristotle, Zeller (II. p. 147-8) goes through the list of Aristotle's works, as we possess them, and finds traces of each in catalogues or references previous to the date of Andronicus. And he winds up by saying, 'Altogether out of the genuine works in our edition of Aristotle there are only those on the *Parts*, the *Generation*, and the *Gait*, of *Animals*, and the minor Anthropological treatises, of which there are not distinct evidences or highly probable indications that they were still used after the removal from Athens of the library of Theophrastus. And even with regard to the works mentioned, there is no reason to doubt that they also were used, only we cannot prove it; and this is not at all surprising when we consider our imperfect information as to the post-Aristotelian literature.'

Neither Diogenes Laertius nor any of the Greek Commentators on Aristotle makes any allusion to the supposed temporary loss of his writings. Only Boëthius, who was born as late as 470 A.D., speaks of Andronicus as 'exactum diligenterque Aristotelis librorum et iudicem et *repertorem*,' but this phrase may very possibly have been based upon the statements of Plutarch. Strabo and Plutarch, then, stand alone in their account of what happened, and we can now see that while the first part of their story, as to Neleus taking away the library, was probably correct enough; the second part, as to the consequences of this to the Peripatetic School, was a mere deduction grounded not on fact, but on fancy. We know that after the death of Aristotle, his scholars, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Strato, Phantias, and others, were busily engaged in editing his works or writing works of their own on the same lines. And it is in the highest degree improbable that in the thirty-five years, during which Theophrastus presided over the Peripatetics, they should have had

no copies made of the more important treatises ; or that Theophrastus himself, who in his Will (*see* Diogenes Laertius, v. 52) showed great solicitude for the School, bequeathing money for their gardens, their houses, and their museum, should have alienated (as Zeller says) their most indispensable treasure, the writings of their master, unless they had been well provided with copies of those writings. That there was a rapid decline, almost a sudden collapse, of the Peripatetic philosophy soon after the death of Theophrastus, is true enough, but it was a fanciful deduction on the part of Strabo to say that this was a paralysis of the school caused by the loss of the works of Aristotle.

One point to be remarked is that the Academic School, who certainly had not lost the works of Plato, exhibited an equal deterioration. And with regard to the Peripatetics, they showed from the very outset a tendency to abandon what was deepest, most systematic, and most philosophical in the thought of Aristotle, and to go off in various directions of more popular and easy modes of thinking. Thus they followed out Aristotle's inductive impulse into many fields of inquiry, without much reference to a central philosophical point of view. They collected 'problems' with their answers, such as could be given ; and they contributed monographs on special questions. The *Characteres* of Theophrastus himself, Aristotle's first successor, are an instance of observation without philosophy. Some of the School were content with producing compendia of Aristotle's treatises. Others resorted to the rhetorical sermonizing attributed generally to the sect by Cicero and by Strabo. There seems every reason to believe that after the death of Theophrastus the Peripatetic School had comparatively poor and unworthy adherents, while in the meantime all the philosophic ability round the Ægean Sea was throw-

ing itself into following the fresh impulse of either the Stoic or the Epicurean tenets. The later Peripatetics cannot be justified by the theory of Strabo any more than the earlier ones. In the first place, the greater works of Aristotle, as we know them, do not exhibit any decided traces of those *lacunæ* caused by worms and damp which Strabo attributed to the MSS. rescued by Apellicon. In the second place, if the Peripatetics at Athens were unable to restore, or properly understand, the text when brought to light, how was it that Andronicus some fifty years later was able to bring out a lucid and trustworthy recension? Either he must have had other copies of the Aristotelian writings at his command (which the Peripatetic School might equally have obtained) to collate with the MSS. of Apellicon; or else, he was an able man competent to edit a system of philosophy, the other professed adherents of which had lost all hold of it and all power of understanding it.

Andronicus of Rhodes was the tenth Scholarch of the Peripatetics, in succession to Aristotle. Of his life very little is known, so we cannot tell whether he resided and taught at Rome, because that was now the metropolis of the world and offered better chances of employment, even to philosophers, than the Provinces, or whether he followed thither the library of Apellicon, in order to use it for the purposes of his projected edition of Aristotle. At all events there is no doubt that Andronicus, about 50 years B.C., produced at Rome the first collective edition of the works of Aristotle. And there seems equally no doubt that the epoch-making recension of Andronicus is identical with 'our Aristotle' as Grote called it,⁸ in contrast to 'the Aristotle of the Catalogue'—namely, the catalogue of the Aristotelian writings given by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of the Philosophers* (v. i. 12).

⁸ *Aristotle*, by George Grote, &c., 1872, vol. i. p. 45.

Of the age of Diogenes Laertius nothing certain is known ; he was at least as late as the end of the second century A.D., and may have been considerably later. But internal examination of his work shows him to have been a mere thoughtless compiler from the works of others, without criticism or sufficient knowledge for his task. His 'Life of Aristotle' consists of a farrago of gossiping statements ; of some dates from the Chronology of Apollodorus (which are really valuable) ; of fragments of verse attributed to Aristotle ; of a chapter of *Aristoteliana* or pithy sayings of the philosopher, which have nothing Aristotelian about them ; of the celebrated Catalogue ; and of an attempt at a sketch of the philosophy of Aristotle—full of the most ludicrous misrepresentations. Diogenes says that Aristotle composed an extraordinary number of books, the titles of which he has determined to transcribe, on account of their author's excellence in every subject. He then gives his Catalogue, enumerating 146 distinct titles of works, divided into about 400 'books' or sections. The 'Aristotle' with which we are acquainted consists of about forty works, and these are not only fewer in number than, but also apparently different in kind from, the works specified in the Catalogue. We only know Aristotle as the author of systematic treatises (*πραγματειῶν*) on the great branches of philosophy—logic, physics, metaphysics, politics, ethics, natural history, &c. These are massed together in continuous systems, just as we are told by Porphyry they came forth from the editorial hand of Andronicus. But the 'Aristotle of the Catalogue' appears as the author of a great number of smaller works discussing special questions, rather than as the composer of great philosophical systems. Again, a large number of the works in the Catalogue are evidently quite different in form from the writings which we are accustomed to attribute to Aristotle. For

instance, such names as 'Nerinthus;' 'Gryllus, or on Rhetoric;' 'Sophist;' 'Menexenus;' 'Symposium;' 'The Lover;' 'Alexander, or on Colonies,' &c., remind us at once of the Dialogues of Plato, and we see that here are enumerated some of those half-rhetorical writings, which—whether they were forgeries, or were really the crude philosophic essays of Aristotle written in popular and dialogic form—were certainly read and admired under the name of Aristotle by some not very discriminating generations of antiquity.

When we ask, what is the origin and authority of the Catalogue of Diogenes? it seems not unwarrantable to believe, with Grote, that this catalogue contains the titles of the books existing under the name of Aristotle in the Alexandrian Library during the third century B.C.; that it was originally made by Callimachus, the chief librarian at Alexandria, or by his pupil Hermippus, between the years 240–210 B.C.; that it found its way into some biography of Aristotle, and was thence mechanically copied by Diogenes, in ignorance or disregard of the edition of Andronicus. We need not go so far as to say, with Valentine Rose, that all the works enumerated in this Catalogue and all the so-called 'lost works' of Aristotle were forgeries. Many of them were probably monographs executed during his lifetime by his disciples; others may even have been earlier and more popular philosophical essays by himself; still more probable is it that a large proportion were small works, either epitomizing separate parts of his system, or stating separate ideas belonging to his system in rhetorical and sometimes in dialogic form, which were composed after his death, and which in good faith, or at all events in unconsciousness of fraud, were inscribed with the name of Aristotle by his well-meaning followers. It seems to be indicated by the Catalogue that such as these were

the kind of writings which the Peripatetic School, before Aristotle had been dead for forty years, had come almost exclusively to care for. Thus copies of them were multiplied and became available for the Alexandrian Library; and as they were a class of literature comparatively easy of imitation, a considerable crop of pure forgeries may very likely have grown up and have gone to swell their number. Hence Aristotle's reputation with the ancients as a most voluminous writer,—the author of 400 books!

While there is a great, almost total, discrepancy between the Catalogue of Diogenes and 'our Aristotle,' it would be a mistake to suppose that the Catalogue leaves the impression that none of the Aristotelian philosophy, properly so called, had reached the Library of Alexandria. On the contrary, almost all the existing treatises of Aristotle seem to be there, only with a difference as to form or number of books. For instance, we find mention of nine books of *Prior Analytics* and two of *Posterior Analytics*. Of *Ethics*, five books are mentioned, and these may possibly correspond with what Aristotle first accomplished on the subject, namely, Books I., II., III., IV., and X. of the Nicomachean *Ethics*, the treatise on Friendship (Books VIII. and IX.) having been written later, and Books V., VI., and VII. having been left unfinished, even at his death. In '*Rhetoric* two books' we perhaps have the first part of Aristotle's existing *Rhetoric*, of which the third book was probably written after an interval. We find two books on *Politics* and nine books of a *Political Discourse*, which may or may not answer to 'our' *Politics*. There is a book on *Various Meanings of Words* (περὶ τῶν ποσαχῶς λεγομένων) answering to *Metaphysics* Book IV. There are several books on *Syllogisms*, *Definitions*, *Commonplaces* (τόποι), and other logical matters; books on *Pleasure*, the *Voluntary*, *Friendship*, *Justice*, the *Art of Poetry*, &c. On

Animals nine books. And Aristotle's now lost Τεχνῶν συναγωγή, or *Collection of Systems of Rhetoric*, and *The Constitutions of 158 States*, perhaps referred to *Eth.* X. ix. 23.

Not a single one of the dialogues and exoteric works mentioned in the Catalogue, and often quoted by the ancients, now remains. The specimens of these writings which exist in quotation seem to show that in losing them we have lost what was of comparatively little worth. One question of interest is, what were the causes that produced their complete extinction? And, in answer to this, it seems a highly probable conjecture to attribute that result in the first place to the entire exclusion of the whole class of exoteric writings by Andronicus from his edition of the works of Aristotle. If our edition of Aristotle corresponds with that made by Andronicus, it is clear that these writings were excluded, and it is a remarkable fact that this should have been the case. Plenty of the so-called 'Dialogues of Aristotle' existed in the time of Andronicus and long after him. Cicero, the friend of Tyrannion, speaks of them with enthusiasm and quotes them. And yet Andronicus, when endeavouring to form a complete edition of the works of Aristotle, appears sternly to have excluded them all. If it was the fact that he did so, his motive for doing so must have been one of two things: either his critical judgment led him to set down these writings as forgeries, or else, his philosophic taste condemned such merely rhetorical productions, even if by Aristotle himself, as unsuitable to form part of an edition which was to comprise only systematic treatises. However this may have been, it seems credible that the edition of Andronicus had a great deal to do with the preservation of all the works that were included in it, and with the loss of all those that were not so included. Perhaps copies of the entire recension of Andronicus, stamped with

his authority, were placed not only in the libraries of the Peripatetic schools, but also in great public libraries and in the private collections of rich men. A cohesive permanence would thus be given to this edition as a whole, it would come to be identified with Aristotle, while the outlying and scattered copies of the dialogues and other smaller works inscribed with his name, would be left exposed to diverse and uncertain fate, without sufficient prestige and guarantee to keep them in existence.

Even if the hypothesis be admitted as probable that copies of the great treatises of Aristotle, found in the library of Apellicon, formed the basis of the edition of Andronicus, still it does not follow that Andronicus was confined to the use of the MSS. which had belonged to Theophrastus and which had been for so long shut up at Scepsis. To admit this might lead to the inference that nothing appears in 'our edition' of Aristotle, which was not written within thirty-five years at most after the date of Aristotle's death. Internal considerations are, however, too much opposed to such a view. And it must be remembered that among the contents of the library of Apellicon the 'book-collector' there were not only the Theophrastean MSS., but also, doubtless, a mass of other Peripatetic and miscellaneous writings, got together from various sources. Such of these as were rhetorical, or not in strictly expository form, Andronicus seems to have rejected. But there is reason to believe that he admitted and incorporated with the genuine works others which, though composed long after the death of Aristotle, were yet written in close approximation to his philosophical style and manner. We have, of course, no means of knowing whether Andronicus, by including in his edition such works as that *On the Universe* and the *Great Ethics*, meant to stamp them, under the guarantee of his own critical authority, as

genuine writings of Aristotle,—or whether he admitted these and many other books and portions of books merely as containing Aristotelian thought and as suitable complements of a system which in its exposition had been left incomplete. If we take up the former supposition, we have then to make allowance for a considerable element of conjectural criticism in the procedure of Andronicus, and we must admit that his authority on such questions is not decisive. But the latter seems the most credible of the two alternatives. We know from Porphyry that Andronicus dealt somewhat freely with the Aristotelian writings, rearranging them and bringing together under their proper heads discussions which before existed separately. In several of the important treatises probably no such treatment as this was required. But still we must be prepared to find traces of the editorial hand almost everywhere. For instance, it is a question how far the references from one part of the works to another which appear ever and anon, are to be attributed to the editorship of Andronicus, and to his desire to give solidarity to the system as a whole. And at all events, such works as the *Problems* seem to exhibit decisively signs of having been put together editorially out of partly Aristotelian and partly un-Aristotelian materials. In short, it appears most probable that Andronicus in his edition aimed at giving the system of Aristotle set forth in a clear recension of the genuine systematic writings of Aristotle himself, slightly rearranged and perhaps interpolated with references, but also complemented with some of the more valuable remains of the earlier Peripatetic School.

From these more general considerations we now turn to the ethical treatises which are found placed among the 'Works of Aristotle.' These are four in number: the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Eudemian Ethics*, the *Great Ethics*, and

the treatise *On Virtues and Vices*. It may perhaps be most convenient to state at once the literary conclusions which have been arrived at with regard to these several works, and afterwards to show the grounds for them. The conclusions then are, *first*, that the *Nicomachean Ethics* are, as a whole, the genuine and original work of Aristotle himself, though some special parts of them are open to doubt. *Second*, that the *Eudemean Ethics* are the work of Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle, written either during his master's lifetime or shortly after his death; that they are based entirely on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, being a re-writing of the system contained in the former treatise with some modifications and additions. *Third*, that the *Great Ethics* are the compilation of some considerably later Peripatetic, who had before him the *Ethics* both of Aristotle and of Eudemus, and who gives a sort of abstract of the results of both, but on the whole follows Eudemus more closely than Aristotle. *Fourth*, that the little tract *On Virtues and Vices* is a specimen of those lighter Peripatetic productions, which probably went to make up the bulk of that collection which went under the name of the 'Writings of Aristotle' in the Alexandrian Library.

The first point to be established is one on which general external consent entirely coincides with internal probability—namely, that the *Nicomachean* treatise is to be preferred above the *Eudemean*, as well as above that called the *Great Ethics*. Neither by the Greek scholiasts, nor by Thomas Aquinas, nor by any of the succeeding host of Latin commentators has either of the two latter treatises been deemed worthy of illustration, while the *Nicomachean Ethics* have been incessantly commented on. This tacit distinction between the three works was the only one drawn till the days of Schleiermacher, who mooted the question of their

relation to each other. He at once pronounced that they could not all belong to Aristotle, but by the irregularities which were plain enough in the *Nicomacheans* and *Eudemians* he was unfortunately led to consider the *Great Ethics* to have been the original work and the source of the other two. This conclusion, however, was set aside by the deeper criticism of Spengel,⁹ who, by arguments drawn from internal comparison of the three treatises, vindicated for the *Nicomachean Ethics* the place of honour, as having been the direct production of Aristotle, while the other two works he showed to be respectively a copy, and a copy of a copy, of the *Ethics* of Aristotle. The question is not one of a mere difference of style; indeed, the Peripatetic School had been so thoroughly imbued with the peculiar mannerisms of their master that it would be hazardous to pronounce upon grounds of style alone whether any particular paragraph or section of all that appears in our edition of Aristotle came from his pen or not. But in comparing the three Ethical treatises with each other, we consider the organic structure of each work as a whole; we see the radical difference between them in structure and aims, and then there comes to light a number of minor characteristics attaching to each, and reasonably to be connected with what we are led to conceive must have been the original character of each, of the three works in question.

The *Nicomachean Ethics* naturally take their place beside the great philosophical treatises of Aristotle. This work at its outset shows the true Aristotelian *note* in the shape of a proem. The Peripatetic writers in composing their monographs, or their compilations from Aristotle with

⁹ *Ueber die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen ethischen Schriften* (in den *Abhandl. der philos. philol.*

Klasse der K. Bay. Akad. 1841). Spengel's theory is now universally accepted in Germany.

a foregone conclusion, were accustomed to plunge at once *in medias res*, without preface, and without any general statement of what it was which they were about to discuss, and without any gradual leading up to their subject. But with Aristotle it was different; we see in him a tendency, more or less carried out in all his undoubted writings, to commence each exposition of a fresh branch of philosophy with the announcement of some pregnant universal principle, appropriate to the speculations which are to follow, and containing the germ of many of them within itself. See, for instance, the first sentence of the *Metaphysics*, 'All men instinctively desire knowledge;' or of the *Later Analytics*, 'All teaching and learning by way of inference proceed from pre-existent knowledge.' The same manner appears in the pregnant opening of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: 'Every art and science, each action and purpose, seems to have some good as its object.' This universal proposition is the first step in an elaborate argument which resolves everything practical into means or ends and identifies the Chief Good, or Happiness, with the end, or final cause, of life. This all-important conception of the final cause of life is then proposed for consideration, and the question arises—What science is to treat of it? The answer is given tentatively that it must be treated of by 'a sort of Politics' since the end for the individual and for the State are identical. This answer belongs to the Platonic point of view, and shows that ethics had as yet not acquired an independent position as separate from politics. The qualification, however, here introduced by the words 'a sort of politics,' shows Aristotle in the act of working his way towards the conception of a separate science of ethics. Having posited his main question and the science which is to treat of it, he now proceeds to discuss to some extent the method to be employed, the

amount of exactness to be expected, the kind of evidence to be adduced—in short, the logic of quasi-political, or ethical, science. And in so doing he follows the course elsewhere practised by him, in commencing his treatises by remarks on the logic of the different sciences; as, for instance, see especially the introduction to his work *On the Parts of Animals*. All then in the commencement of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is systematic, original, and thoroughly Aristotelian in character. By regular and methodical development the ground plan of the whole of the rest of the treatise is prepared in Book I. How that plan was actually filled up we shall come back to consider more particularly hereafter. In the meantime we turn from the great Aristotelian prelude of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to examine in comparison with it the characteristics of the other two Peripatetic systems of ethical philosophy.

The *Eudemian Ethics* commence, without any scientific preface, but rather in the form of a literary essay, with the sentence: ‘In the temple of the God of Delos, some one, to show his own opinion respecting the good, the beautiful, and the sweet,—that these are not predicates of the same subject,—has inscribed the following verses on the vestibule of the shrine of Latona :

‘ *Beautiful* ’tis to be just ; and *best* of all things to be healthy ;
 ‘ Yes, but the *sweetest* for man is to obtain his desires.

‘ But we cannot agree with this person ; for Happiness is not only the most beautiful and the best, but also the sweetest of all things.’ The Eudemian writer then goes on to say, ‘ Some questions are practical, others are merely speculative. The latter must be reserved for their own proper occasion. This is the essential principle of our method. The great question for us at present is, In what Good Living consists,

and how it is to be obtained, whether by nature, learning, or chance?' Very evidently in this exordium there is the beginning, not of any original philosophical investigation, but of the exposition of foregone conclusions derived from the *Ethics* of Aristotle. The idea of Happiness, as the chief good for man, and as the leading topic for ethical inquiry, its identification with Good Living, and the predicates to be attached to it,—are here simply taken over, as established results, from Aristotle who had worked them all out separately by argument. We recognise the quotation which is here put so pompously in the forefront, as having occurred in *Eth. Nic.* I. viii. 14. There, however, 'the Delian inscription' is only mentioned in passing as one of the common sayings with which Aristotle compares his definition of the chief good. But here the writer, using the couplet with more circumstance, seems pleased to be able to add particulars about the place where it was inscribed. This kind of amplification is very characteristic of the *Eudemean Ethics*, which often play a useful part in furnishing learned references and more explicit quotations for the *Nicomacheans*. For instance, they give in amplified form the saying of Anaxagoras on Happiness, and of Heraclitus on Anger; and a corrected statement of the doctrine of Socrates on Courage.¹⁰ What was of little moment to Aristotle, carelessly introducing a quotation to illustrate some argument, became of importance to a writer who was reproducing in slightly altered arrangement the contents of an Aristotelian treatise.

For this is in effect the nature of the *Eudemean Ethics*; they are essentially a re-writing of the *Nicomachean* work, so that—

¹⁰ On Anaxagoras cf. *Eth. Nic.* x. ix. 12 with *Eth. Eud.* i. iv. 4. On Heraclitus cf. *Eth. Nic.* ii. iii. 10 with *Eth. Eud.* ii. vii. 9. On Socrates cf. *Eth. Nic.* iii. viii. 6 with *Eth. Eud.* iii. i. 13; and see notes on *Eth. Nic.* *ll. cc. infra*.

Books I. and II. correspond with *Eth. Nic.* I.—III. v.

Book III. corresponds with *Eth. Nic.* III. vi.—IV.

Books IV. V. VI. are word for word identical with *Eth. Nic.* V. VI. VII. (a circumstance to be considered hereafter).

Book VII. contains in a compressed form *Eth. Nic.* VIII. and IX.

Book VIII. is a mere fragment, of which both the beginning and the end are apparently lost. It contains entirely new matter, namely some difficult questions (*ἀπορίαι*) on the possibility of misusing virtue, and as to the nature of good fortune; and a discussion upon the highest state of human excellence, which is here styled *καλοκάγαθία*, or the union of internal and external well-being.

Books I.—VII. of the *Eudemian* treatise generally coinciding with Books I.—IX. of the *Nicomachean* (or as we may say, the Aristotelian) treatise, and only the last fragmentary *Eudemian* book showing a decided divergence from its prototype,—it remains to be seen (leaving aside for the moment the three books common to both) what internal variations and differences between the two treatises can be pointed out. In the first place, then, the point of view is different; the Eudemian writer is not so much an investigator and discoverer, proceeding analytically, as an expositor, synthetically stating conclusions previously arrived at. His subject is Happiness, and he discusses this by means of materials collected from Aristotle's *Ethics*, but in so doing he deserts the Aristotelian, or scientific point of view; he does not regard 'Happiness' as a mere word to be explained by arriving at a conception of the *τελειώτατον τέλος* or ultimate final cause of human life,—by which alone life can be explained, just as every other existence must be explained by its final cause. Nor does he remain true to the Aristotelian conception of *ἐνέργεια*, by which Happiness or the chief good is to be explained as the

development into actuality of what is potential in man. He indeed uses these formulæ (*Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 17-19, II. i. 2-9), borrowing them from Aristotle, but the conceptions do not influence his work throughout, as they do that of Aristotle. Hence he is not led, like Aristotle, to identify theoretic thought with the highest good for man.

In the second place, the Eudemian writer having separated his subject from the metaphysical and logical grounds on which it had been based by Aristotle, separates it also from that wider view under which it had been placed, as belonging to politics, or the science which treats of man not as isolated, but as by nature the member of a community. Thus, in borrowing from Aristotle the saying that the chief good 'falls under politics' he modifies this (*Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 17) by adding 'and economics and practical thought,' calling these 'states of mind,' and thus showing that he had a quite different conception from that entertained by Aristotle—of politics as the master-science for things practical. In fact, with this writer *πολιτικὴ* appears rather as the art of government, than as a science in the proper sense of the term. With all the borrowed plumes of philosophy which he so often displays, this writer evidently treats of Happiness, not in a strictly philosophical or scientific, but in an empirical, spirit. He represents in fact the first step of that course of decadence which led the Peripatetic School ultimately, as Strabo says, to mere moral essay-making devoid of all philosophy. This writer has indeed taken merely the first step, he is himself far from being devoid of philosophy, only he is not able to keep up to the level of Aristotle. He is a very keen and penetrating man, and the author, as we shall see, of many curious investigations, so that he carries many matters in ethical inquiry farther than they had been carried by Aristotle; yet still he represents the commencement of

decline. The next thing to be remarked about him, which is all in accordance with the preceding, is, that while less philosophical, he is more moral and more religious in tone than Aristotle. An instance of the manifestation of that tone may be found *Eth. Eud.* I. v. 10, where in discussing (after Aristotle) the different lives that men lead, he says 'the political man, truly so called, aims at noble actions for their own sake.' This moral connotation given to the term *πολιτικός* does not seem to be based on anything Aristotelian. But the most striking feature of the *Eudemian* system occurs in *Eth. Eud.* II. v. 1 as compared with the conclusion of the fragmentary Book VIII. The writer appears dissatisfied with the vagueness of Aristotle's formula for the mean 'according to the right law and as the thoughtful man would define.' He says, 'this is not explicit enough,' 'we require something definitory (*ῥηρον*) to which to look.' And he announces this in the last sentences which have been preserved of his work, 'Whatever choice and possession of the natural goods, whether bodily goods, or riches, or friends, or whatever else, best promotes the contemplation of God, this is best; and by no nobler standard can goods be judged. But if any choice or possession, either through deficiency or excess, hinders us from serving and contemplating God, it is bad. The same rule holds for the soul, and this is the best standard for the soul, that she should as little as possible be cognisant of her animal half, in its animality. So far then for the standard of perfection, and the object of this world's goods.' This elevated passage, which brings religion into contact with human life, and identifies it with morality, enters upon a subject not discussed by Aristotle.

The words 'serving God' (*θεραπεύειν τὸν θεόν*) imply a different conception of the Deity from what we are accustomed to find in Aristotle, and the connection here made

between moral virtue and theological contemplation is opposed to the broad distinction set up by Aristotle between speculation and practical life, and is more like Platonism. The writer elsewhere entertains the conception of the personality of God more unreservedly than Aristotle. See *Eth. Eud.* vii. x. 23, where it is said that 'God is content if he receives sacrifices according to our means.'

It may have been one object in re-writing the *Ethics* of Aristotle—to bring them rather more into harmony with popular religious views; but another object certainly was that the writer might graft on to them additions and improvements of his own. In several points these additions are very evident and we see a distinct advance beyond the theory of Aristotle. The most conspicuous instance of this kind is to be found in all that relates to the moral will, which is evidently a favourite subject with the *Eudemean* writer, and the questions relating to which he had worked out further than the point arrived at in at all events the earlier books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This writer's forte is psychological observation, which is quite in accordance with the known tendencies of the Peripatetic School. The study of the phenomena of incontinence, or the wavering of the will, has great attractions for him. Even leaving in abeyance the question of the authorship of what stands as *Eth. Nic. Book VII.*, we find the subject of incontinence constantly brought in throughout the *Eudemean Ethics* in connection with other matters, from which it is kept separate by Aristotle. In *Eth. Eud.* ii. xi. 1–6 we find characteristic remarks on the distinction to be made between virtue and continence, and, on the province of the former to give or preserve a conception of the end to be aimed at in action, of the latter, to give or preserve a conception of the means towards that end. In III. i. there is an excellent re-

statement of the doctrine of Courage, with some interesting after thoughts, e.g. 'If the brave man *does not feel* the danger there is nothing very grand in his enduring it.' III. ii. improves the discussion on Temperance (1) by indicating two separate meanings of the word *ἀκόλαστος*, 'uncorrected' and 'incorrigible;' (2) by connecting the subject with the discussion which appears in *Eth. Nic.* VII., and thus not leaving the *ἀκόλαστος* of the table of the virtues quite cut off from the *ἀκόλαστος* of the moral will; (3) by the remark that among the pleasures not leading to intemperance may be reckoned Platonic love (*τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀψέως ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων*). III. v. describes Great-souledness (*μεγαλοψυχία*) as a correct judgment about the great and small in all matters, whether of danger, or expense, or what not, so that it implies all the virtues. This is to the effect that independence of character includes all kinds of goodness—a view similar to that contained in Emerson's essay on Self-reliance. Besides Great-souledness and its two extremes a fourth character is here added,—that of the plain man, who, not having much merit, neither underrates nor overrates the merit which he has. VII. v. 5 introduces a refinement on Aristotle's doctrine of Friendship. Here it is said that in friendship the opposite qualities to one's own are sometimes loved for the sake of the mean. In which case men love the opposite *per accidens*, the mean essentially. Book VIII. gives some interesting remarks on Good-luck, which it divides into two kinds: In the one case the man is unconsciously inspired by God, and thus acts on a right intuition; in the other case he blunders into success and succeeds against reason. Finally, however, chance is eliminated, and all choice of the right in us is attributed to God. How, it is asked, can we begin to think or resolve? thought or resolution cannot furnish the beginning to itself,—this must

come from God. The whole of this last book is very religious. We have seen above how the writer describes his culminating quality of *καλοκάγαθία*, or human perfection, as the sum of internal and external well-being, all tending to the service and contemplation of God.

These are some specimens of the sort of variations from and additions to the *Ethics* of Aristotle, which were introduced by the *Eudemian* writer. With regard to his style and manner, we notice in the first place a very close approximation to the writing of Aristotle. And this is easily explainable; a strongly mannered style like that of Aristotle, in which there was no attempt at elegance of form, and which was full of his own peculiar terminology, was certain to take hold of the minds of his school, and was much more likely to be exactly reproduced by them than a style of lucid beauty, like that of Plato, would have been. For the sake of illustration, if we imagine a set of thinkers and writers to have been trained to think and express themselves after the manner of Mr. Carlyle, it is very easy to believe that the writings of such a school would only have been distinguishable from those of their master by a difference in the intrinsic force and value of the thoughts expressed by them. And so it was with the Peripatetic School. The *Eudemian* writer is more distinguishable from Aristotle by the contents and character of his thoughts, than by his mode of expressing them. He shows indeed a proclivity to indulge in abundance of literary quotations, and he quotes more fully and explicitly than Aristotle; and he is remarkable, throughout his work, for the constant introduction of logical formulæ. The term *ὅρος* to denote definition, differentia, or standard of reference is a peculiar favourite with him. The terms *δῆλον διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς* to denote an appeal to observation, and the phrase *ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐθὲν δὲ σαφὲς* ('this may be true, but it is not

explicit') are of frequent recurrence. But these are small marks. The writing is certainly less clear than that of Aristotle; in many places the compression is excessive and goes beyond the compression of Aristotle. And looking at each book, or section of the subject, as a whole, we miss anything like clear plan and lucid arrangement. Aristotle was remarkable for the separate treatment he gave to each particular topic, working out each head, such as Virtue, the Voluntary, Friendship, Pleasure, and Happiness, by itself, almost without reference to the rest. But his follower very naturally brings together results that Aristotle had left separate. This would have been a considerable merit had the writer possessed the power of creating a clear impression. But this he had not, and therefore we cannot wonder that this second-hand and touched-up system of Aristotelian ethics should never have shown any tendency to supersede the original work.

We have hitherto seen the sort of grounds which there are for believing that the *Eudemian Ethics* were at all events not written by Aristotle himself, who, indeed, with all that he had upon his hands, was very unlikely to have rewritten his own treatise in this way. We shall now see that there is a certain amount of external authority, as well as of general probability, in favour of the hypothesis that this work was, as its name would imply, actually written by Eudemus of Rhodes, the chief disciple of Aristotle after Theophrastus. Of the particulars of the life of Eudemus little is known, but Simplicius¹¹ has preserved an important notice of him in the shape of a passage from the work of Andronicus Rhodius (the great editor) on Aristotle and his writings, which contains a fragment of a letter from Theophrastus to Eudemus,

¹¹ Brandis, *Scholæ in Aristot.*, p. 404, b. 9.

in answer to a request for an accurate copy of a MS. of the 5th Book of Aristotle's *Physics*. This MS. was probably required by Eudemus in course of writing his own book on the same subject. Asclepius¹² records that Aristotle himself had committed his *Metaphysics* in an incomplete state to Eudemus, who was dissatisfied with the form of the work, by which its publication was delayed, and it was ultimately completed out of the other works of Aristotle by his survivors. Ammonius¹³ says that 'the disciples of Aristotle, Eudemus and Phanas and Theophrastus, in rivalry with their master, wrote *Categories*, and *On Interpretation*, and *Analytics*.' Simplicius¹⁴ on the *Physics* says that 'Eudemus, almost paraphrasing the words of Aristotle, lays it down, &c.' Of the writings of Eudemus the following are mentioned by ancient Greek authorities: *On the Angle*, *A History of Geometry*, *A History of Arithmetic*, *A History of Astrology*, *Analytics*, *On Diction*, *On Physics*, and perhaps a work *On Natural History*.¹⁵ We have abundant traces, then, of Eudemus working both as an editor of Aristotle and as a quasi-original author, partly paraphrasing Aristotle, and partly writing in contravention of Aristotle's views. As to the authorship of the *Eudemian Ethics* the testimony of the ancients is divided. Some authorities, perhaps misled by this work having been placed by Andronicus in his edition of Aristotle, speak of it simply as 'Aristotle's.' Thus Atticus Platonius¹⁶ (who lived in the 2nd century), *adversus Aristot.*

¹² Brandis, *Scholia in Aristot.*, p. 519, b. 39.

¹³ *Ib.* p. 28, *note*.

¹⁴ *Ib.* p. 431, a. On the other hand, Simplicius, on the *Posterior Analytics*, often quotes Eudemus as differing from Aristotle.

¹⁵ The authorities for these works

are given by Fritsche in his edition of *Eth. Eud.* (Ratisbon, 1851), *Prolog.* p. xv.

¹⁶ Simplicius (on the *Categories*, fol. 43, b.) in just the same way refers to what 'Aristotle says in the *Eudemian Ethics*.'

apud Eusebium *Præpar. Evang.* xv. 4, says, 'The treatises of Aristotle on these subjects—the *Eudemians* and *Nicomacheans*, and those entitled the *Great Ethics*—all contain a petty, a mean, and a vulgar conception of virtue.' Porphyry, in his *Prolegomena*, enumerates the ethical writings of Aristotle as 'those addressed to Eudemus his disciple, those addressed to Nicomachus his father (the *Great Nicomacheans*), and those addressed to Nicomachus his son (the *Little Nicomacheans*).' This view, that 'Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια (or Εὐδήμια) meant *ethics addressed to Eudemus*, has been sometimes followed in later times; thus Casirius, in his *Bibliotheca Arab. Hist.* i. p. 306, mentions 'ethicorum quæstiones minores Eudemo inscriptæ;' and Samuel Petit thought that this Eudemus was probably not the disciple of Aristotle, but one of the Archons of Athens. Porphyry's explanation of the name 'Great Ethics' as 'the Ethics addressed to Nicomachus the greater,' that is, to the father of Aristotle, as opposed to the ethics inscribed to Nicomachus the son, was probably a mere conjecture, based on the assumption that 'Eudemian' and 'Nicomachean' meant 'to Eudemus' and 'to Nicomachus.' There is, however, no good instance to justify this interpretation of such adjectives. And it need hardly be said that there is nothing in the books themselves which at all bears out the idea of their having been so addressed or inscribed. Such dedication was alien from the mode of writing which we find in Aristotle. And he would hardly have inscribed to his son a book upon a subject of which he says (*Eth. Nic.* i. iii. 5) that a young man is not a fit student.

On the other hand, Aspasius (On *Eth. Nic.* fol. 141, a.) speaks of Eudemus as an original writer on ethics. He says, 'Both Eudemus and Theophrastus tell us that unequal, as well as equal, friendships are contracted for the sake of

either pleasure, utility, or virtue.' The reference, so far as Eudemus is concerned, is, to *Eth. Eud.* VII. x. 9. And a notable Scholium discovered by Brandis in the Vatican (see *infra*, note on *Eth.* VII. iii. 2) conjecturally attributes the discussion on Pleasure which follows that on Incontinence to Eudemus, as differing essentially from the doctrine of Aristotle. These are, it must be confessed, meagre testimonies in favour of assigning to Eudemus the *Ethics* which bear his name. But, after all, there is no one else to whom they can with any probability be assigned. To have any external authority whatever in favour of an hypothesis so strongly supported, as this is, by internal evidence, is a great matter, since it is clear that the world in general, during the first centuries of our era, accepted whatever they found in the edition of Andronicus as being the work of Aristotle.

We will now glance at the treatise entitled 'Ἡθικά Μεγάλα—*Magna Moralia*, or *Great Ethics*. The exordium of this work does not give a high expectation of what is to follow; the writer says: 'Since we purpose to speak on ethics (ὑπὲρ ἠθικῶν), we must first consider of what the moral character (ἦθος) is a part. In a word, then, it seems to be a part of naught else but politics. For it is not possible to act in political matters without exhibiting some moral quality, as, for instance, goodness. Now goodness consists in possessing the different virtues. And one ought, if one is to act in political matters, to be good in character. Therefore the scientific consideration of human character (ἡ περὶ τὰ ἦθη πραγματεία) would seem to be a part, and in fact the beginning, of politics.' This passage exhibits what may be called the etymological fallacy, for the writer, taking up the etymology of the word ἠθικά, goes on to misapply it, and to speak as if *first* the moral character, and *secondly* the scientific consideration of character, were identical with

ethics.¹⁷ Passing this over, we see that the intention is, though feebly executed, to reproduce the Aristotelian idea of the hierarchy of the practical sciences, which Eudemus had endeavoured to modify by giving to ethics a more independent position. But the statement here is both shallow and confused; no real reason is adduced to prove that ethics is a subordinate branch of politics; and we do not find any further carrying out of this idea in subsequent parts of the work.

This writer frequently employs formulæ which would imply a claim to independence of thinking, such as *δοκεῖ δέ μοι*, &c. At other times he speaks as if representing the Peripatetic School, as, for instance, I. xxxv. 26, *ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ὥς ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν*. But on examination his work presents uniformly the appearance of a *résumé* of foregone conclusions drawn from both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics*. The writer, however, appears to have had not only these two treatises before him, but also some of the ethical writings of Theophrastus.¹⁸ At least it seems reasonable to suppose that there was some such source for the not unfrequent novelties which occur ever and anon throughout the work, and which we shall now specify, together with a few other points which strike one as characteristic in reading through the *Great Ethics*. In I. i. 4-11 we find a jejune summary of the previous history of moral science; in I. i. 10, ii. 7-11, an expanded statement of the import of the word *τάχαθόν*, which in its arid logical clearness forms a

¹⁷ His argument seems also to confound political matters (*τὰ πολιτικά*) with the science of politics (*πολιτική*).

¹⁸ Referred to by Aspasius, see above p. 32, and also by Cicero, *De Finibus*, v. 5. Why these writings,

if, as seems probable, they survived to the time of Andronicus, were not included by him in his edition of the Aristotelian works, we have no means of knowing.

sort of scholium upon Aristotle. In I. iv. 9-11 a restricted moral meaning is put upon the term *ἐνέργεια*, as if implying self-determination and will (*ὁρμή*). It is said, that a fire will burn if supplied with fuel, but has no power of taking fuel for itself; therefore it has no *ἐνέργεια*, and the same is the case with the nutritive part of the soul. From the same restrictive point of view it is said, I. v. 3, that no one is *praised* for being wise or philosophic, in short, that the intellectual qualities are not virtues (which is in direct opposition to *Eth. Nic.* I. xiii. 20). I. ix. 8-xi. 5 asserts free will against the doctrine of Socrates, and argues that though you cannot will to be best, you can always will to be better than you otherwise would have been. I. xxi. 12, following Eudemus, lays it down that a man is not courageous unless he *fears* while enduring. I. xxxv. 26 gives a formula slightly different from that found in the two former treatises, *ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ὥς ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν, τὸ μετὰ λόγου εἶναι τὴν ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὸ καλόν*. This shows that the Peripatetic School had by this time adopted the word *ὁρμή* denoting 'impulse,' 'inclination,' 'act of the will,' and we find this word in constant and characteristic use throughout the *Great Ethics*. II. iii. 3-20 moots some new difficulties (*ἀπορίαι*) on the nature of Justice and Virtue, namely: Does the just man award his due to every one in *society* (*τῇ ἐντεύξει*)? This is rather the part of the flatterer. If the unjust man injures others knowingly, he must *know the good*, and therefore must be thoughtful (*φρόνιμος*), which he is not. Can we be unjust towards a bad man, in depriving him of rule and authority, since he is not fit to possess them? If we cannot be just and brave at the same time, which should we select? Answer, *φρόνησις* will tell you, arbitrating between the *φυσικαὶ ὁρμαί*. Can we have too much virtue? Answer, virtue is *μεσότης*, we cannot have

too much moderation. The account of pleasure in II. vii. is taken from the treatise in Book VII. of *Eth. Nic.* but improved from the treatise in Book X. Some of the arguments on pleasure are verbal, e.g. worms and beetles are *φαῦλα* (lower creatures); pleasure is a return to one's nature; therefore their pleasure must be a return to *φάυλη φύσις* and therefore bad. The argument here turns on the word *φάυλος*, used equivocally. To say that pleasure is a return or restoration (*κατάστασις*) was Aristotle's earlier and less scientific view. II. vii. 21 contains a novel illustration: Those who do not know nectar think wine the sweetest of all things; so also those who have only known sensual pleasure. II. vii. 23 says that it is jealousy to wish to keep a thing all to oneself, therefore we must not argue against pleasure on account of its being shared by all. The account of good-luck in II. viii. is taken from Eudemus, but is less theological than his view. The author here distinguishes objective from subjective good-luck; making the first an unexpected turn in external things, the latter a blind *ὁρμή* within the soul to take the course which will turn out best. Arguing against what Eudemus had said, he excludes the idea of Providential interference from good-luck as being beneath the notice of the Deity. In II. ix. he borrows the summing up of the virtues in *καλοκάγαθία* from Eudemus, adding the definition that the *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς* is he to whom the goods of the world (*τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ*) are really goods and whom they do not corrupt. In II. xv. 3-5 he takes (against Eudemus) a positive view of theology, dismissing as beyond solution the question whether God contemplates Himself.

In all this and in the *Great Ethics* generally we see, with some exceptions, a nearer affinity to the point of view of Eudemus than to that of Aristotle. In detail, that is to say

in the order and manner of treating the different subjects, the writer follows the lead of Eudemus, from whom he draws most of his conclusions, appearing to use Aristotle rather as an authority of appeal and a source from which to correct Eudemus. At the beginning of Book I. indeed he seems about to follow Aristotle, but afterwards he changes and adheres closely to Eudemus. He certainly exercises his own judgment throughout in selecting between these two, and also in drawing from that other third source which it appears probable that he had before him. He is, as we have seen, less religious than Eudemus, but, like Eudemus, he is more practically moral and less philosophical than Aristotle. A striking instance of this is in I. i. 4-8, where he wishes to confine the term *ἐνέργεια* to functions implying moral consciousness and an act of the will. He uses new psychological terms to express the phenomena of volition, and asserts free will more dogmatically than Eudemus had done. These characteristics reflect the position of the Peripatetic School at the time when the work was written. The evidences of decline in philosophy are manifold, but in this respect it must be remembered that the Peripatetic School of this period shared in a general change which was passing over the mind of Greece (see *infra*, Essay VI.). The transition to the modern point of view, in which the moral *ego* was to be made the central consideration, was now taking place. Zeno arrived at Athens not long after the death of Aristotle, and it is not impossible that by the time when the *Great Ethics* were written, even the Peripatetics had to some extent felt the influence of his spirit. In fact, Spengel points out that in the *Great Ethics*, II. xi. 7, we find a distinction which was unknown to Aristotle and first introduced by the Stoics, namely, that between *φιλητὸν* and *φιλητέον*, *βουλητὸν* and

βουλευτέον, &c.¹⁹ This leads to the consideration of the time when the work was written, but for even an approximate answer to this question there are no *data*. The general structure and manner of the whole shows that the work is a compendium later than the time of Aristotle, to which small points of usage, such as ὑπὲρ ἠθικῶν instead of περὶ ἠθικά, bear witness; but, so far as the writing goes, it need not have been much later than Theophrastus. Spengel, however, thinks that the *Great Ethics* stand on the same level of data and manner as the treatise *On the Universe*, which was probably a comparatively late composition. One final remark must be made about the *Great Ethics*, namely, that if they were written more than thirty-five years after the death of Aristotle, that is, after the carrying off of the library of Theophrastus to Asia Minor, copies both of the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian* treatise must have been still available to the Peripatetics, else this dry compilation, based on the two, could never have been written.²⁰

Besides the three treatises on Ethics, we find also among the 'Works of Aristotle' a little tract *On Virtues and Vices*. Whether this was included by Andronicus in his edition, and

¹⁹ Cf. Stobæus, *Eclog. Eth.* II. 7, p. 140. διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσι (i.e. the Stoics) τὸ αἰρετὸν καὶ τὸ αἰρετέον—αἰρετὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὸ πᾶν, αἰρετέον δὲ ὠφέλιμον πᾶν—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἐστὶν ὑπομενετὰ καὶ ἐμμενετὰ—τὰ δὲ ὠφέλιμα πάντα ὑπομενετέα καὶ ἐμμενετέα. The above is given on the authority of Spengel, but it does not seem certain that Aristotle may not have been aware of this unimportant distinction. See *Eth.* III. i. 10. νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶνδε αἰρετὰ, . . . ποῖα δ' ἀπὸ τῶν αἰρετέων, οὐ βέβαιον ἀποδοῦναι.

²⁰ It used to be fancied that in one place (I. v. 4) the *Great Ethics* quoted the *Nicomacheans*. "Ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἔνδεα καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ φέρεται, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν. Spengel, however, acutely conjectures that the true reading must be ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, which is confirmed by Stobæus, who says, with regard to the Peripatetic ethics, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τούτων τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μαρτυροῖς χρῶνται. This writer then in the above passage is only paraphrasing, not quoting, *Eth.* *Nic.* II. ii. 6.

if so, why? we cannot tell. It is a pleasing but decidedly un-Aristotelian production. In it the names of the chief virtues and vices are borrowed from Aristotle's list (*Eth. Nic.* II. vii.), but they are not explained as mean states and excesses; there is nothing said about their formation; they are regarded externally, and their chief marks are noted in an inductive or observant spirit. The whole tract is in its aims and manner a good deal similar to the *Characters* of Theophrastus, and shows the same tendency of the Peripatetic School to desert philosophy for physiognomical observation.

Plato's division of the soul into reason, spirit, and desire being accepted, it is here said that Thought (*φρόνησις*) is the virtue of the first; Mildness and Courage of the second; Temperance and Continence of the third. Other virtues are then enumerated without reference to this classification. It is said that of various kinds of Justice the first is towards the gods, the next towards demons, the next towards fatherland and parents, the next towards the dead. The Liberal man is described as clean in his garments and his house, given to collect curiosities and to keep animals which have something peculiar or remarkable about them. Small-souledness (*μικροψυχία*) is well characterised as easily elated, as well as easily depressed; as petty, complaining, despondent, and abject. Virtue in general is said to create a good disposition of the soul, which feels quiet and orderly emotions, is in harmony with itself, and is the type of a well-ordered State. Such are the most noticeable features of this little essay, which gives a specimen of the aftermath of Aristotelian ethics, not necessarily later than the time of Theophrastus.

From these inferior Peripatetic works we may now turn back to examine the structure of that great treatise, which is our immediate concern, and which comes to us entitled *Nicomachean Ethics*, or *Ethics of Nicomachus*. Of Nicomachus

himself scarcely anything is known. Eusebius (*Præp. Evang.* xv. 2) quotes the following notice from Aristocles²¹ the Peripatetic: 'After the death of Pythias, the daughter of Hermeias, Aristotle married Herpyllis of Stageira, by whom was born to him a son—Nicomachus. This son is said, when left an orphan, to have been brought up by Theophrastus, and while still a youth to have died in war.' The tradition, however, of the early death of Nicomachus, 'in war,' is not consistent with the notice of him by Suidas (*sub voce*), which speaks of him as a philosopher, the scholar of Theophrastus, and the author of six books of Ethics, and of a commentary on his father's physical philosophy. These 'six books of Ethics' may in all probability be a confused reference to our *Nicomachean* treatise. In Diogenes Laertius also the title of this work seems to have caused a confusion with regard to the authorship. See *Diog. Laert.* VIII. viii. 2. 'Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, says that he (Eudoxus) considered Pleasure to be the chief good,' where the reference is to the mention of Eudoxus, *Eth. Nic.* x. ii. 1. Cicero (*De Finibus*, v. 5) says, 'Let us hold fast to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus, whose scientific treatise on morals is said indeed to have been the work of Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been a match for the father.'²² This passage is very valuable, not for the opinion of Cicero, which

²¹ This Aristocles is reputed to have been the teacher of Alexander Aphrodisias, in which case he lived at the beginning of the third century A.D. Among other works he appears to have written a History of Philosophy. But his authority for facts about Aristotle and his son must be considered very slight.

²² 'Quare teneamus Aristotelem et ejus filium Nicomachum; cujus ac-

curatescripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristotelis; sed non video cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius.' This judgment of Cicero's is not based on critical examination, for he here is referring to the *Nicomachean Ethics* for a doctrine not to be found in them, so that it is probable he only knew the character of the work by hearsay.

is worthless, but for the evidence which it affords that during or just after the process of recension by Andronicus, Cicero had heard the *Ethics* 'of Nicomachus' talked of by name, and also attributed to Aristotle. This one fact seems sufficient to dispel the notion which was apparently started at a far later and less well-informed period (see above, page 33) that the *Nicomachean Ethics* were 'addressed to Nicomachus.' In this matter we may safely go back to the belief entertained in the age, and we may even say in the circle, of Tyrannion and Andronicus, that the title of the work indicated that it was written by Nicomachus, but that it was really by Aristotle. We may safely adopt this belief of a particular period of antiquity, because it is so thoroughly borne out by internal evidence. None among all the works of Aristotle is more definitely marked with all the signs of genuineness than the greater part of this treatise. We have here all the qualities of an original work, the merits and faults of a fresh inquiry; style, manner, the philosophy, the relation to Plato, all bespeak for this book the actual composition of Aristotle himself, except in certain disputed portions. The question then arises, why it was entitled *Ethics of Nicomachus*, to which only a conjectural answer can be offered. The simplest explanation is that this was originally a mere name of contradistinction. The *Ethics of Eudemus* were probably so called because they were actually written by Eudemus, either during the lifetime of Aristotle, or soon after his death. The *Great Ethics* may have been so entitled from the vanity of their author,²³ who fancied that he had achieved a combination which united all the merits of the other two treatises. The genuine work of Aristotle may have been placed by Theo-

²³ In the list of Diogenes we find | tics' (*ἀναλυτικῶν ὑστέρων μεγάλων*
enumerated 'Great Posterior Analy- | α', β').

phrastus in the hands of Nicomachus for such amount of editing and arrangement as may have been required for a probably not altogether finished and complete treatise; and then to distinguish it from the *Eudemean Ethics*, perhaps by this time already written, the name of the son who edited the book may have been used to designate it, while the name of the father, who had written it, was superseded. In short, it may not improbably have been the exigencies of the Peripatetic school-library, and the necessity of distinguishing by some external mark first two and afterwards three rolls on the same subject, and not much differing in size, that led to the particular naming of the three treatises. This, however, is mere conjecture. We shall now endeavour to see what traces of an editorial hand the *Nicomachean* treatise exhibits.

Reading straight on with this object in view, we arrive at the end of Book IV. without having our suspicions aroused or our attention arrested by any breaks in the composition. All might, speaking generally, be considered to have been written consecutively by the same hand. But in the last chapter of Book IV. we come to a check. This chapter ought to have treated of the two virtuous feelings, Modesty and Indignation. But the latter of these is left out, and the discussion on the former is unfinished. What is apparently an ingenious editorial interpolation of two lines and a half serves here to wind up Book IV. and to connect it with Books V. and VII. After the statement that Modesty cannot be considered, strictly speaking, a virtue, it is here added: 'Neither is Continence a virtue, but a sort of mixed quality. We shall treat of it subsequently; at present let us speak of Justice.' And then Book V. opens with the sentence: 'But about Justice and Injustice we must consider with what sort of actions they are concerned, and what sort of a

mean state is Justice, and between what extremes the Just is a mean.'

The three books, V., VI., VII., which follow are common to both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemean* treatise, and their authorship is a question to be discussed presently; but looking at the composition of the three books externally there is nothing *prima facie* to prevent us believing that they were written consecutively, though it is true that a piece either of mal-arrangement or of unskilful editorship shows itself in the last chapter of Book V., which appears to be superfluous.

Book VII. ends with a piece of editorial joining: 'We have treated of Continence and Incontinence, Pleasure and Pain; it remains for us to speak of Friendship.' Book VIII. begins: 'Next in order after the foregoing would come the investigation of Friendship.' And then Books VIII. and IX. are consecutively written down to the last line of the latter book, which looks as if it had been interpolated by the editor: 'On Friendship, then, we have said our say; the next point to discuss will be Pleasure.' For Book X., which is consecutive and complete in itself, ignores the previous ending and commences with the words: 'Perhaps it follows next to treat of Pleasure.'

These collisions, or repetitions, where the last sentence of one book is ignored or repeated by the first sentence of the succeeding book, are not only in themselves highly in-artistic, but they are not in the manner of Aristotle.²⁴ In

²⁴ No instance of this sort of thing occurs all through the *Organon*, the *Physics*, the treatise *On the Heavens*, that *On the Soul*, that *On the Generation of Animals*, or the *History of Animals*,—that is to say, all through the more finished of Aristotle's com-

positions. In the *Metaphysics*, which are known to have been left incomplete, there is a repetition in the beginning of Book VI. of the words at the end of Book V. In the *Politics* (also unfinished) the beginning of Book II. repeats to some extent the

the *Eudemian Ethics* the same sort of collision occurs between Books I. and II., Books III. and IV., and Books VI. and VII. But in none of these cases is the awkwardness quite so glaring as in the transition between Books VII.-VIII., IX.-X. of the *Nicomacheans*. It seems, however, allowable to conjecture that Eudemus first set the example of this mode of writing, according to which each book or section of a treatise takes, as it were, a fresh start, and recapitulates in its opening sentence the point in the discussion which had been arrived at. This looks very like a reminiscence of oral lectures. Supposing a book to coincide in matter and in length with an oral lecture on the same subject, it is easy to suppose the lecturer concluding his address for the day by saying: 'I have now given you my views on Friendship, the next subject in our course will be Pleasure;' and then the following day he would quite naturally open his lecture with the words, 'The next subject in our course is Pleasure.' And it is comprehensible that the disciples of Aristotle, accustomed to oral endings and beginnings of this kind, should have inappropriately applied them to the divisions of literary composition. Eudemus having exhibited this practice, Nicomachus (or the unknown editor, whoever he was) appears to have adopted it with the view of giving unity to the different parts of the treatise put together by him, or arranged, or revised.

If these joinings at the ends respectively of Book IV., Book VII., and Book IX. be considered to be editorial interpolations, they would appear to indicate that the *Nicomach-*

end of Book I. And in the *Rhetoric*, the third book of which seems incomplete, the opening of that third book repeats a long sentence from the end of Book II. We cannot say that in either of these cases the writing had

received the last hand of Aristotle. He probably, in each case, began the latter book in forgetfulness of the end of the former one, and never revised the writing as a whole.

chean Ethics are made up of four separate portions, written at different times from each other, and yet having all a common scope and a reference to a common ground plan previously sketched out for a system of morals in which each portion was (more or less roughly) adapted to find its place. At one time, indeed, there was a theory—but this has been now abandoned—that the work was resolvable into small isolated tracts, whose names appear in the Catalogue of Diogenes, and which had been amalgamated by an editor into the treatise as we now possess it. Such names as the following suggested this hypothesis: *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης δ'. περὶ ἡδονῆς α'. περὶ τἀγαθοῦ γ'. περὶ φιλίας α'. ἠθικῶν ε'. περὶ ἡδονῆς α' (repeated). περὶ ἐκουσίου α'. θέσεις φιλικαὶ β'. περὶ δικαίων β'.* Some colour was given to the notion that these separate works, or *opuscula*, were the materials out of which the *Nicomachean Ethics* were afterwards put together, by the peculiar separate treatment which Aristotle gave to the Voluntary, Friendship, and Pleasure, when dealing with these subjects in the course of his system. But the impression of organic unity which the work leaves upon the mind, dispels the idea that the parts can have been, in the way suggested, prior to the whole. We see that the plan of the whole was present to the author's mind at starting, and was carried out to the end, and that all the parts were worked out in subordination to this general plan. Of the works mentioned in the Catalogue we know nothing certain, but we have endeavoured (above, page 15) to form a probable conception of their nature. And it seems, on the whole, doubtful whether any of them exactly correspond with any part of the writings which have come down to us under the name of Aristotle.

We give up, then, the attempt to resolve the *Nicomachean Ethics* into a *congeries* of minor works. But, at the same

time, we may allow that there are internal reasons for believing that the work, though conceived as a whole, was not executed all together at one time. We have already seen traces of an editor putting together four separate portions: let us now examine these. The first portion (Books I.-IV.) starts the question, What is the End-in-itself or Practical chief good? gets an answer involving the term Virtue; then by the analytical process is led on to a theory of the function and nature of Virtue; then, as its definition brings in a term indicating deliberate action of the Will, this is analytically followed up, and a little treatise on the Voluntary in its various forms (probably written for the place which it occupies) is introduced, and then the law of Virtue, as a state of balance, is exemplified in application to all the separate virtues, recognised as such by the Greeks. Thus far we see Aristotle to have written; if he wrote further, his MS. at this point was mutilated, and something was lost. Or, he may, from some cause, have put aside his writing at this point, while, in the meantime, he took up the working out of his ethical system from another starting place. This first portion (Books I.-IV.) remained, at all events, analytically consecutive, and almost complete in itself—with the exception that in four places it postponed certain matters for future inquiry; namely, I. v. 7 defers the consideration of the philosophic life in respect of its capacity for producing happiness; I. vii. 7 promises a renewed discussion on the question within what limits a man's independent happiness is affected by social relationships; II. vii. 16 indicates that a separate disquisition is to be expected on Justice, divided into two species; II. ii. 2 promises an account of the Right Law as given by the Intellect (*ὁρθὸς λόγος*) and its relation to the different virtues.

The unfinished last few lines of Book IV. are eked out by

an editorial allusion, and then follow Books V., VI., and VII., of which we may say at once that they were either written at a later period, and in a different vein, by Aristotle; or else they were the work of Eudemus, in whose *Ethics*, *verbatim*, they reappear.

Leaving this question, for the moment, in abeyance, we proceed to the third portion of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, namely, the treatise on Friendship contained in Books VIII. and IX. The only evidence for this having been composed quite separately—that is to say, that Book X., commencing with the treatise on Pleasure, was not a consecutive part of the same composition—is found in that little line which finishes Book IX., and which makes the beginning of Book X. read so awkwardly (see above, p. 44). But this by itself would not be sufficient to establish such an hypothesis, for the editor might have introduced this, out of mere false taste, into a perfectly consecutive writing of Aristotle's, through unwillingness to see a Book concluded²⁵ with a fragment of poetical quotation, thus: 'Whence the saying,

"Good you will learn from the good."

And it seems not unlikely that the same editor introduced a similarly unnecessary tag to wind up Book VIII. (see VIII. xiv. 4 and note). There is, however, an appearance of separateness about the treatise on Friendship, for in three places (VIII. ix. 1, VIII. xiii. 1, IX. iii. 1) it uses the phrase *ἐν ἀρχῇ*, 'at the outset,' in reference to the earlier chapters of Book VIII., which shows that Aristotle in these passages only carried back his mind to the beginning of the present piece of writing. Again, when he commences by describing

²⁵ That Aristotle was not averse to such endings we see from the conclusion of Book XI. of the *Metaphysics*,

τὰ δὲ ὅντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεῦσθαι
κακῶς.
οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίῃ· εἰς κοίρας
ἔστω.

Friendship as 'a sort of virtue, or implying virtue,' he ignores altogether that more superficial quality which he had mentioned in his list of the virtues (*Eth. Nic.* II. vii. 13) under the name—Friendship. This would suggest that Aristotle had taken up the present subject at some little interval after writing his first ethical book, and indeed, while writing these pages, seems to have had his mind very much concentrated upon an effort to solve the problems which occur in the *Lysis* of Plato, and to the solutions of which he brought his own analytic method and philosophical forms. At the same time, while writing this treatise to some extent in a separate way, he evidently wrote it to form part of his ethical system. The very first words of Book VIII. show this, for he says, 'After this, it would follow to treat of Friendship, for it is a sort of virtue, or implies virtue.' And besides general expressions of the author's purpose to confine himself to an ethical point of view (see VIII. i. 7, IX. ii. 2), we find two direct references to the earlier books of the *Ethics* (compare IX. ix. 5 with *Eth. Nic.* I. viii. 13, and IX. iv. 2 with III. iv. 5).

A reference forward to Book X., which occurs in IX. ix. 8, cannot be with absolute certainty pronounced to be an interpolation. And there is a reference back from X. ix. 1 to these books. Book IX. is written in Aristotle's best manner and in the same tone as Book X. So, on the whole, it seems likely that the awkward joining between Books IX. and X. does not indicate a break in the MS., but is merely the result of editorial officiousness in dealing with a continuous piece.

If so, the *Nicomachean Ethics* are resolved not into four, but into three portions—namely, the earlier books, the disputed middle books, and the three concluding books taken as a whole. Book X. rounds off the treatise; it answers in the

most decisive way the question started at the commencement of Book I., and Aristotle then says (x. ix. 1), that, 'having sufficiently treated in outline of Happiness, the Virtues, Friendship, and Pleasure, his design might be considered to have been completed,' but that for the realisation of all which he has indicated social institutions, both private and public, will be required; and he thus ends his *Ethics* with a transition to the *Politics*.

That Aristotle, in summing up what he thought might be considered a complete ethical system, should have specified the leading topics of Books I.-IV. and VIII.-X. of his treatise, and should have omitted any mention of the subjects dealt with in Books V.-VII., seems a strong argument to prove that, at all events when he was writing Book X., he had not written the disputed middle books. Another argument in the same direction is, that while the three concluding books of the *Ethics* refer abundantly to Books I.-IV., they never make a single reference to Books V.-VII., though there was much opportunity for their doing so. For instance, it seems peculiar that in all which is said about Justice in Book VIII., there should be no allusion to the discussions of Book V., and that contemplation (*θεωρία*) should be treated of in Book X., without any recapitulation of what was said of the nature of Philosophic Wisdom (*σοφία*) in Book VI. That the treatise on Pleasure could have been written as it stands at the beginning of Book X., if Aristotle had previously written that other treatise on the same subject for what was to form Book VII. of the same work, is utterly impossible.

These observations are the first which strike us with reference to that middle portion of the *Nicomachean Ethics* which we have hitherto left unconsidered. Aristotle had not written it, at the time when he wrote what were to be

the concluding paragraphs of his treatise. Yet while he wrote these, he cannot have considered his work, from a literary point of view, to have been finished. For he had given promises in the earlier part of it, which were as yet unfulfilled. We have seen how (*Eth.* II. vii. 16) he had promised a separate discussion 'on the two kinds of Justice, and in what sense each of these might be considered to be a mean state.' Now we might conjecture what actually occurred to have been this: Aristotle went on writing about the different virtues until he came to the place where it would have been natural to fulfil his promise and discuss the nature of Justice. But here the thought entered his mind to what an extent Justice was externally determined, that is to say, was dependent on social and political conceptions. He perhaps felt, like Plato, that to treat of Justice was to treat of Society. At all events, it is easy to understand that he resolved to defer the special consideration of Justice, till he could give his mind to it in connection with the more purely political part of the investigations before him. For he does not separate ethics from politics, but calls ethics from the outset 'a sort of politics.' Laying aside, then, his discussion of the Virtues before he had completed it by a discussion on Justice, he went on with his ethical system at a point where he could see his way beforehand, and proceeded to analyse Friendship, and afterwards Pleasure, and the Supreme Good, as identified with Contemplation. When these matters were worked out, he probably still deferred the ethical investigation of Justice, and went on, after an interval, to the composition of his *Politics*. In the meantime he had thrown out, in Book VIII., many thoughts and suggestions on Justice and Political Constitutions, which were afterwards matured in the *Politics*.

The *Politics* of Aristotle have come down to us as quite

an unfinished work, and the question then arises, Did he ever go back to finish his *Ethics* by supplying the middle part? We may fairly conjecture that he had not only settled in his own mind pretty much what this middle part should consist of, but had also orally imparted this to his school, to whom he may even have entrusted to some extent the working out of his views. But the question is, Did Aristotle himself ever fill up by his own writing the *lacuna* which he had left in his *Ethics*? Some think that this point is settled at once by apparent references to *Eth. Nic.* v. vi. vii. to be found in the *Politics* and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. The passages are :

(1) *Pol.* II. ii. 4. Διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον.

(2) *Pol.* III. ix. 3. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίσιν, καὶ διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς.

(3) *Pol.* III. xii. 1. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μέχρι γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν· τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναι φασιν.

(4) *Metaphys.* I. i. 17. Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τίς διαφορά τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὐ δ' ἔνεκα νῦν ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον, τοῦτ' ἐστίν. κ.τ.λ.

At first sight these four passages might seem to furnish powerful evidence in favour of the disputed books having been written by Aristotle himself, but a closer examination of them greatly diminishes the force of their testimony. No. (1) is supposed to refer to *Eth. Nic.* v. v. 6, but it does not even agree with it. For while *Pol.* II. ii. 4 says that 'equal retaliation preserves the State,' *Eth. Nic.* v. v. 6 says that 'Retaliation is a bond of union provided that it be on

principles *not of equality*, but of proportion.' In fact the remarks on Retaliation in the *Ethics* have all the appearance of being a development and improvement of those in the *Politics*. And the same impression is produced by comparing No. (2) with *Eth. Nic.* v. iii. 4, which it is supposed to quote. The latter passage discusses the law of Distribution in States (though a purely political question) with additional refinements beyond what we find in the *Politics*. But if internal evidence of this kind leads us to think that Book V. (as it stands) of the *Ethics* was written later than the *Politics* and was partly based on them, what becomes of these supposed references in the *Politics* to that Book? In a question of the kind, internal evidence resting on the character of the thought in one treatise as compared with that in another treatise must always prevail over evidence consisting in a few isolated words, which might most naturally have been interpolated. And against this as a canon of Aristotelian criticism it is of no use to point to a *consensus* of MSS. For it must be remembered that the works of Aristotle not only shared with other ancient writings all the risks of corruption from the vagaries of successive copyists, from the Christian era till the invention of printing,—but also had in many cases previously gone through two distinct processes of editing, first by the disciples of Aristotle, soon after his death, and secondly by Andronicus of Rhodes about 50 B.C. Appeal to MSS. therefore, unless we could get MSS. of the fourth century B.C., can never, in such a question, be final. Applying these considerations to the passages before us, we do not hesitate to pronounce a belief that the words 'as has before been said in the *Ethics*' in Nos. (1) and (2) are, in each case, the interpolated addition of either an editor or a copyist. Looking to passage No. (3) we find that it contains no reference to any

particular part of the *Ethics*, but only an assertion that, with regard to justice, people in general ²⁶ agree to a certain extent with those theories which have been formed by philosophers upon ethical subjects.

Passage No. (4) undoubtedly refers either to *Eth. Nic.* Book VI., or else—supposing that book to have been written by Eudemus—to some lost book which bore the same relation to that book which the *Nicomachean Ethics* generally bear to the *Eudemian*. The passage refers to a comparison between Wisdom, Art, and Science, as having been made ‘in the *Ethics*,’ but this does not necessarily identify Book VI. as we now have it. The words might equally well apply to the original section of the *Ethics*, now lost, of which Book VI. was a sort of paraphrase. We are left to internal evidence in deciding which of the two cases seems the more probable. The passage itself even if written by Aristotle would only prove that something answering to Book VI. had been composed by him for his *Ethics*. But there is another hypothesis possible with regard to this passage, which we cannot forbear suggesting, even though we should be charged with temerity for so doing. It is this: We have seen above (page 32) that a tradition is recorded by Asclepius to the effect that Eudemus had the MS. of the *Metaphysics* entrusted to him, and that he was dissatisfied with the form of the work, and kept it back, and finally edited it, after the death of Aristotle, completing parts of it by introducing extracts from other of Aristotle’s writings. This tradition suggests the idea of considerable liberty of editorship; and if this was the case, it seems not impossible that Eudemus

²⁶ This passage might be compared with *Eth. Nic.* i. iv. 2, where it is said that ‘refined thinkers and the many are both agreed in giving the name of Happiness to the highest of prac-

tical goods.’ ‘Ὁνόματι μὲν οὖν σχέδον ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαριεστεροὶ λέγουσιν.

may have introduced the whole of this passage from *Εἰρηται μὲν οὖν* down to *ποιητικῶν μᾶλλον*, in express reference to his own account of *σοφία* (written originally for his own *Ethics*, but afterwards incorporated also with the *Ethics* of Aristotle), and with the object of reconciling the differences between that account and the description of *σοφία* to be given in the *Metaphysics*, and of indicating that the point of view in the two accounts was different, since in the *Metaphysics* the term *σοφία* was to be taken in a restricted sense, merely as the science of causes.²⁷ The passage contains the words, 'the reason for our at present treating of the subject is, &c.,' and these are naturally thought to be the words of Aristotle, speaking in his own person. But they may, quite possibly, have been the words of Eudemus, speaking in the person of the Peripatetic School. The work of that school seems to have been a good deal co-operative, and the results of it to have been treated as common property.

(5) There is yet another passage in the *Politics* (iv. xi. 3) which is thought by some to guarantee the Aristotelian genuineness of the most disputed part in the Disputed Books,—the treatise on Pleasure at the end of *Eth. Nic.* Book VII. It runs thus: *Εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον.* This place is triumphantly claimed as referring to *Eth. Nic.* vii. xii. 3, and vii. xiii. 2, since in no other part of the *Nicomachean Ethics* does the word *ἀνεμπόδιστος* occur. The word itself indeed does not occur—yet still a further examination of the passage above quoted will show that it does not necessarily refer to *Eth. Nic.* Book VII. and does not relieve us from the task of trying the whole case by internal evi-

²⁷ See note on *Eth.* vi. vii. 3.

dence. The premiss of the argument in the *Politics* consists in a summary of conclusions drawn from Books I., II., and X. of *Eth. Nic.* By a comparison of the way in which Aristotle elsewhere in the *Politics* uses the results arrived at in his *Ethics*, we learn with what a free hand, and in what a large manner he deals with them, often summing up in a word or two, and stating in a better way, conclusions which he had before laboriously attained. The same has been done here, and by the word *ἀνεμπόδιστος* he sums up all that he had said about Happiness being *τέλειος*, and all the subsidiary discussions about the *βίος τέλειος*, and the necessity for favourable circumstances, because the want of these (*Eth. Nic.* I. x. 12) *ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις*. (See also *Eth. Nic.* I. viii. 15.) In one word he here expresses all this, and says that 'the Happy Life is an unimpeded life in accordance with virtue.' He is not referring at all to Book VII., but is stating with a new formula the conclusions of Book I. On the other hand, the writer of the Disputed Books, who is throughout much influenced by the *Politics* of Aristotle, seizes on this new word, *ἀνεμπόδιστος*, and uses it in the places mentioned, giving *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος* as his definition of Pleasure.

This seems a far more probable account of the relation between *Pol.* IV. xi. 3 and *Eth. Nic.* VII. xii. 3, xiii. 2 than it would be to suppose that the former passage was written in reference to the latter ones, which were only concerned with Pleasure, and not with 'the Happy Life' at all.

It appears, then, so far as we have seen, that there is not sufficient external evidence in the shape of undoubted references to Books V., VI., VII. of *Eth. Nic.* made by Aristotle himself in other parts of his writings, to establish their genuineness. Let us endeavour to see what can be gathered as to this point from an examination of the books themselves. They are found in both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemean*

treatise. The question is, to which treatise they originally belonged. And the first thing that strikes us is, that if these Disputed Books be read as IV., V., VI. of the *Eudemian Ethics*, there is nothing in them which interferes with the continuity of that work; the books appear as if in their natural place. On the other hand, if read as V., VI., VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that treatise is at once marred by many irregularities: *first*, by the appearance of two separate discussions on Pleasure, quite irrespective of each other; *secondly*, by a system of forced joinings of which the result is, that Aristotle is made to say (VII. xiv. 9), 'Having treated of Pleasure, we may now treat of Friendship;' and a few pages later (IX. xii. 4), 'Having treated of Friendship, it follows for us to treat of Pleasure;' *thirdly*, by a strange ignoring in Books VIII.–X. of matters discussed in Books V. and VI., to which it would have seemed natural to refer.

We next proceed to note the references backwards made in these three books, and an examination of these shows that they correspond more closely with places in the earlier books of the *Eudemian Ethics*, than to similar places in the earlier books of the *Nicomachean* treatise (compare *Eth. Nic.*²⁸ v. i. 2 with *Eth. Eud.* III. v. 1–3; *Eth. Nic.* v. viii. 3 with *Eth. Eud.* II. viii. 10, and II. ix. 1; *Eth. Nic.* vi. i. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* II. v. 1; *Eth. Nic.* vi. i. 4 with *Eth. Eud.* II. iv. 1; *Eth. Nic.* vi. viii. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 18; *Eth. Nic.* vi. xii. 10 with *Eth. Eud.* II. xi. 4; *Eth. Nic.* VII. iv. 2 and VII. vii. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* III. ii. 6; *Eth. Nic.* VII. xi. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* I. v. 11; *Eth. Nic.* VII. xi. 2 with *Eth. Eud.* II. iv. 2–4; *Eth. Nic.* VII. xiv. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* I. v. 11).

²⁸ The words *Eth. Nic.* are used, here and subsequently, merely for the sake of convenience, to indicate those books which now stand as V., VI., VII.,

in the *Nicomachean* treatise, not as giving an opinion that they originally so stood; for, of course, the contrary conclusion is being pointed at.

We have seen above (page 47) that Aristotle promised (*Eth. Nic.* II. vii. 16) to treat 'of the two kinds of Justice, and in what sense each of these is a mean state,' and (II. ii. 2) to treat 'of the Right Law, and its relation to the different virtues.' These, however, are general promises, and are only to a certain extent fulfilled in Books V. and VI. Much more particular promises are to be found in the *Eudemian Ethics*. See II. x. 19, where after speaking of the legal distinction between voluntary and deliberate acts, the writer says, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἱροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει, and this promise is exactly carried out in *Eth. Nic.* v. viii. 6-12. Again, in *Eth. Eud.* II. v. 8 it is said, τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον, which minutely and verbally corresponds with *Eth. Nic.* VI. i. 1-3. Again, *Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 17, 18 gives a very precise anticipation of *Eth. Nic.* vi. viii. 1-4; the words are, "Ὡστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτῶν. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. Αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ φρόνησις. Διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὐταὶ αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τῷ τοιαῦται εἶναι· πρὸς δ' ἀλλήλας εἴ τι διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον λεκτέον. *Eth. Eud.* III. vii. 10, by the words ἐστι γὰρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ὕστερον, ἐκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως, anticipates that doctrine about the raw material of virtue being completed by conjunction with Thought, which is given in *Eth. Nic.* VI. xiii., but of which no trace appears in the earlier *Nicomachean* books. In II. xi. 1 the *Eudemian* writer after starting the question whether it is the province of Virtue to keep the Will straight, or the Reason straight, says that the latter is the province of Continence. "Ἔστι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. Λεκτέον δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν παρέχειν ἢ ἀρετὴ, τοῦτο αἴτιον.

He says that people confound Continence with Virtue, and that he must show the distinction between them. The discussion is taken up again in *Eth. Nic.* VII. i. 4. That Virtue keeps straight the Will and the conception of the End to be aimed at, is a characteristic Eudemean doctrine, which reappears in *Eth. Nic.* VI. xii. 8, but this is a refinement in psychology not to be met with in Aristotle's undoubted ethical books. There is no promise of a discussion upon Continence or Incontinence in *Eth. Nic.* I. iv. The interpolated words (IV. ix. 8) Οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον are apparently an editorial attempt to weld together Aristotle's original conclusions with subsequent Peripatetic developments. On the other hand, *Eth. Eud.* III. ii. 3 gives valuable indication of the ambiguity of the term ἀκολασία (which has a different meaning in the table of the Virtues and in *Eth. Nic.* VII.), and then III. ii. 15 promises a more exact discussion on the class of pleasures with which Intemperance is concerned: Ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. This is fulfilled in *Eth. Nic.* VII. iv. Finally, there is in *Eth. Eud.* I. v. 11 a passage which refers us forward to the treatise on Pleasure at the end of *Eth. Nic.* VII., and at the same time sketches out the intermediate subjects to be treated of. After discussing the Three Lives (political, philosophical, and voluptuary), the writer says, Τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστ' οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτὰς (i.e. bodily pleasures) ἀλλ' εἰ συντείνουσιν τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι, καὶ πότερον, εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ ζῆν καλὰς ἡδονὰς τινὰς, ταύτας δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἔτεραι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως οἶονται

τὸν εὐδαιμόνα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον, περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν. The question here started is one not touched upon in the undoubted Aristotelian books, namely: Assuming that there are higher pleasures, and that pleasure of the highest kind is identical with Happiness and the chief good, is there no place left in a moral system for the lower, or bodily, pleasures,—are not these to be admitted as contributories to Happiness, or are they to be stigmatised as absolutely evil? This question is taken up, and to some extent answered, in *Eth. Nic.* vii. xiv.

The Disputed Books are not afterwards alluded to in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but their contents are not without recognition in subsequent books of the *Eudemian* treatise. For instance, see *Eth. Eud.* vii. x. 10, where proportion in Friendship is illustrated by the joining of the diagonal of a square. This illustration was worked out with some detail in *Eth. Nic.* v. v. 8; it is here cursorily mentioned, the understanding of what is meant being assumed: Ὁ δὲ ὑπερεχόμενος τὸν ἀντιόν στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν. And the same chapter, § 26, asks, Πῶς γὰρ κοινωνήσῃ γεωργῶ σκυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα; which takes us back to the discussions on value and price in *Eth. Nic.* v. v. *Eth. Eud.* viii. iii. 1 says, Καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ' εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλά, καὶ τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα. This is a reference to *Eth. Nic.* vii. xii., beginning Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.

The system of references backward and forward, above quoted, seems to show a very close connection between the Disputed Books and the other books of the *Eudemian Ethics*. But, beside this, there is also a remarkable coincidence between the style and manner of these Books, and that which

we find consistently employed by the *Eudemian* writer. We have already (above, page 24) remarked on his peculiarly explicit mode of introducing literary quotations, and this peculiarity is found in the Disputed Books. (See *Eth. Nic.* v. ix. 1, 'As Euripides strangely wrote;' v. ix. 7, 'As Homer says that Glaucus gave to Diomedes;' vi. ii. 6, 'Wherefore rightly Agathon;' vi. iv. 5, 'As also Agathon says;' vi. vii. 2, 'As Homer says in the *Margites*;' vi. ix. 1, 'Wherefore Euripides;' vii. i. 1, 'As Homer has described Priam saying of Hector;' vii. vi. 3, 'As Homer says of Aphrodite;' vii. x. 3, 'As Anaxandrides jested;' vii. x. 4, 'As Evenus also says.' Throughout these Books there are only three verses given without their author's name; one is mentioned as 'a proverb,' v. i. 15; one is called 'the principle of Rhadamanthus,' v. v. 1; one alone is given without name or note, vii. xiii. 5. Even where there is no quotation this literary explicitness sometimes exhibits itself, as in vii. ii. 7, 'Neoptolemus in the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles;' and vii. vii. 6, 'The *Philoctetes* of Theodectes when bitten by the snake, or Cercyon in the *Alope* of Carcinus.' On the other hand, in the seven undoubted ethical books of Aristotle there are altogether sixteen places where verses are quoted, of these twelve are without any indication of authorship or source; in two places the name of Homer is mentioned; in one the name of Hesiod, and one couplet is given as 'the Delian inscription.') Taken by itself this would be not worth mentioning, but when taken with a number of other things which all testify in the same direction, it may be allowed consideration among the mass of cumulative evidence.

But far more important than this is the agreement of philosophical phraseology between the Disputed Books and the *Eudemian Ethics*, of which a striking instance is to be found in the use of the word *ōpos*, to express a 'standard,'

'definition,' or 'differentiating mark.' This formula does not once occur in the undoubted ethical books of Aristotle, but apparently some time after he had written these he began to write his *Politics*, and in the meantime he had found out its convenience for the discussions which he had in hand; so, accordingly, in the *Politics* *ὁρος*, in this logical sense, very frequently occurs.²⁹

The *Eudemian Ethics* were clearly written subsequently to the *Politics* of Aristotle, and the writer of them takes up the formula as being by this time in vogue in the Peripatetic School. We have seen how in *Eth. Eud.* II. v. 8 he starts the question *πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὁρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον*, 'to what ultimate standard we ought to look in fixing the mean.' And we have seen, too, how in the last remaining paragraph of the work (*Eth. Eud.* VIII. xii.) the phrase occurs: *καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὁρος κάλλιστος . . . Τίς μὲν οὖν ὁρος καλοκἀγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον*. The word *ὁρος*, then, in the sense of 'ultimate standard' had taken an important place in the *Eudemian* philosophy. But in the Disputed Books it is also noticeable. (See VI. i. 1, *τίς ἐστὶν ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων*. VI. i. 3, *τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὁρος*. VII. xiii. 4, *πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὁρος αὐτῆς*.)

The doctrine of the Practical Syllogism (see Essay IV.) does not appear in *Eth. Nic.* I.–IV., VIII.–X., but in Aristotle's treatise *On the Soul*, written probably later, the syllogistic form is used to express the process gone through by the mind in forming a practical resolution (see *De An.* III. xi. 4). This application of the syllogism was worked out a good

²⁹ See *Pol.* II. vi. 9: *Ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὁρος τὸ σωφρόνως καὶ λευθέρως*. II. vii. 16: *Ἰσως οὖν ἄριστος ὁρος τὸ μὴ λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι*. IV. viii. 7:

ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὁρος ἀρετῆ, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δ' ἐλευθερία. And so on in about sixteen similar places.

deal among the Peripatetics, as may be inferred from the treatise *On the Motion of Animals*, placed among Aristotle's works, but probably not genuine. The *Eudemian* writer had evidently become familiarised with the application of the syllogism to the theory of moral action, and had perhaps himself helped to develop the doctrine. At all events, he makes considerable use of it. See *Eth. Eud.* II. xi. 4: ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τότε ἰγυαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξει, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τριγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. The Practical Syllogism appears in the Disputed Books, and, indeed, it is used as the great analytical instrument for resolving the phenomena of Incontinence in Book VII. But it is worthy of notice how strikingly similar some of the phrases used in these Books are to the passage above quoted from the *Eudemian Ethics*. See *Eth. Nic.* VII. iii. 9: ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς (where *ποιητικαῖς* is used in the same peculiar way as above); VII. viii. 4: ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ μὲν φθείρει, ἡ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις.

There is another minor formula in the use of which the Disputed Books show an agreement with the *Eudemian Ethics*, but not with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which it does not appear; namely, the formula τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά. This occurs, as before quoted, in the winding up of the last remaining part of the *Eudemian* work, τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον. It is introduced in *Eth. Nic.* v. i. 9, where the 'goods of fortune' are specified, 'which are always good absolutely, but not always so ³⁰ to the indi-

³⁰ It is added that 'men pray for these and seek after them, but they should not; they should pray that the absolute goods may be goods to them

vidual.' In v. v. 18 τὸ ἀπλῶς ὠφέλιμον is mentioned. In v. vi. 6 the just ruler, οὐ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ. In v. ix. 17 Justice is said to exist among those οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν. In vii. vi. 1, τὰ ἀπλῶς ἡδέα are mentioned (cf. *Eth. Eud.* viii. iii. 1, above quoted), and in v. i. 10, vii. xiii. 1, we find a mention of τὰ ἀπλῶς κακά. It is observable that even in the *Politics* of Aristotle this formula does not appear to exist.

That the Disputed Books contain a later development of several points in ethical and psychological philosophy than can be found in other parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and that in this respect they perfectly agree with the *Eudemian Ethics* will be shown in detail in the notes to the Books themselves. And it will be shown also that they exhibit in common with the latter a certain indistinctness of exposition and certain departures from the Aristotelian point of view. Perhaps enough has been said for the present to justify the conclusion to which we come that Books V., VI., VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* were written by the author of the *Eudemian* treatise as an integral part of that work, from which they were taken and transferred *verbatim* into the *Ethics* of Aristotle,³¹ either to fill up a gap caused by the loss of corresponding Aristotelian books, or else to supplement or complete a work which Aristotle himself had never finished. Which of the two alternatives is more credible, there are hardly grounds sufficient to enable us to pronounce. In either case we must assume that Aristotle had, in his oral teaching, led the way to almost all the conclusions contained

individually, and that they should choose what is good for themselves.' This is in the same style with *Eth. Eud.* vii. xii. 17: τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ εὐχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους. But to say what men 'ought to pray for' is not

after the manner of Aristotle.

³¹ We do not undertake to say whether this transference was made by Nicomachus, or some other early editor, or long afterwards by Andronicus.

in the books in question. The appearance which we find in Books V. and VI. of direct borrowing from other works of Aristotle's, such as the *Politics* and the *Organon*, would rather favour the supposition that the compiler of these books had not before him any written exposition of this part of Aristotle's ethical system.

With regard to previous opinions upon the subject of the Disputed Books, it may be mentioned that Casaubon threw out the suggestion that the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. was written by Eudemus. This suggestion means that all the rest of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is by Aristotle, but that this treatise on Pleasure has been imported into its present place. This is, in short, an attempt to save the credit of the *Nicomachean* work by removing from it an obvious excrescence. But the hypothesis is untenable, for though we can understand Book VII. as a whole being for some reason or other imported from the *Eudemean Ethics*, and bringing with it a superfluous disquisition,³³ it is impossible to believe that any of Aristotle's editors would have brought into his ethical work this superfluous disquisition out of the writings of a disciple—by itself, to confuse and spoil the rest.

Some have entertained the view that this treatise on Pleasure may have been an earlier essay by Aristotle himself, found among his MSS., and introduced, in order to preserve it, into its present place. But close examination of the treatise shows that it is not earlier, but later, than the treatise on the same subject in Book X., on which it is based in the same way as other parts of the *Eudemean Ethics* are

³³ It is, however, surprising that the editor, whoever he was, in transferring Book VII. should not have stopped short at the end of the discussion on Incontinence. By going mechanically to work and transferring

the Book bodily, he marred the symmetry of the *Nicomachean* work, but at the same time furnished an important piece of evidence towards deciding the authorship of the Disputed Books.

based on Aristotle's writing. It chiefly follows Book X., but also to some slight extent it tries to improve upon the conclusions of Aristotle.

Fritzsche, the learned editor of the *Eudemian Ethics*, while conceding that VI. and VII. of the Disputed Books were the work of Eudemus, maintains that Book V. is the writing of Aristotle, with the exception of the last chapter, which he considers to be a fragment from a corresponding book on Justice by Eudemus, now lost. This theory would imply a system of mutual accommodation,—it would imply that the *Eudemian Ethics* had lost a book on Justice, which was supplied out of the *Nicomacheans*, and that the latter treatise had lost, or wanted, a book on the Intellect in relation to morals, and a book on Continence and Incontinence, both which books were supplied out of the *Eudemians*. This seems a rather too elaborate hypothesis, but we cannot altogether deny its possibility. The genuineness, or otherwise, of *Eth. Nic.* v. must be considered on the reasons which can be urged either for or against it. Fritzsche's arguments are a little far-fetched. In the first place he goes to the *Great Ethics*, which are allowed to follow the *Eudemian* treatise very closely, and looking at the string of difficult questions on Justice (*Mag. Mor.* ii. iii. 3–30) which we have already mentioned (page 36), he asks—Whence can these difficulties have been derived?—and concludes that they must have originally been started in the *Eudemian* Book on Justice, now lost. This reasoning, however, seems very unsatisfactory; for the difficulties referred to are not exclusively connected with Justice, some of them are general questions of casuistry: again, the writer of the *Great Ethics* does not introduce them while discussing the subject of Justice, but after his discussion upon the Intellectual Virtues; and furthermore we have above seen reason to believe that this writer had a

third source besides the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* from which he drew his matter (see page 35), and from which he may, very likely, have drawn the special matter in question. This first argument then may surely be discarded. Fritzsche in the second place points to the last existing chapter of *Eth. Eud.* (VIII. iii. 1), where mention is made of 'that culmination of the Virtues' *ἣν ἐκαλούμεν ἤδη καλοκαγαθίαν*. No prior place in the *Eudemian* treatise answers to this, and so he at once concludes that the passage referred to must have existed in the (supposed) lost book on Justice. But there is no obvious connection between *καλοκαγαθία* and Justice; on the other hand there are doubtless several *lacunæ* in the *Eudemian Ethics*,³³ even the beginning of Book VIII. is wanting, and the passage referred to may very well have existed there. If Book VIII. was originally of the same length as the other *Eudemian* books, a considerable number of chapters at its commencement must have dropped out, and it seems extremely probable that some of these were devoted to the consideration of a Virtue which was the result of all the other Virtues, and which the writer called *καλοκαγαθία*. Fritzsche's third argument is derived from Book V. itself (ii. 11) where there occurs a promise of a subsequent discussion on the question whether the moral education of the individual belongs to Politics or not (*περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἑκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτ' ὁ ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί*). This, says Fritzsche, is fulfilled in *Eth. Nic.* x. ix. 9 sqq. and *Pol.* III. iv. and III. xviii., which proves that the above passage was written by Aristotle and not by Eudemus. When, however, we examine

³³ As, for instance, *Eth. Eud.* III. 3 refers back to something lost from the preliminary catalogue of the Virtues :

διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν.

the places referred to we do not find that they answer to the promise given, and so far from establishing that the passage in question was written by Aristotle, they induce a contrary conclusion. In *Eth. Nic.* x. ix. 9 sqq. Aristotle lays it down as strongly as possible that all education must be dictated by the State; he admits that there must be a special treatment of individuals, in education as in medicine, but in each case he considers that the special treatment is only the skilful application of general laws belonging to the general science, whether of Medicine or of Politics. There is not a word about the moral education of the individual standing apart from Politics and belonging to some separate science. This in fact was the *Eudemean* view, which, as we have seen (page 26), tried to separate Ethics from the more general science of Politics. Aristotle afterwards, *Pol.* viii. i. 3, decisively pronounces that education should all be public, under State control, and reduced to one standard. In the passages of the *Politics* to which Fritzsche refers us we find—not a fulfilment of the above promise, but rather the source which suggested to the *Eudemean* writer to attempt a refinement upon Aristotle. In *Pol.* iii. iv., iii. xviii. the question is started whether the virtue of the Man and of the Citizen is identical. It is answered that States vary, but in the Best City the same education and habits produce the good man and the citizen with constitutional qualities. The writer of *Eth. Nic.* Book V. gets a suggestion from this discussion and promises to investigate, as a part of his ethical treatise, whether the moral education of the individual does not belong to a sphere separate from Politics. The *Eudemean Ethics* were mutilated or unfinished; the part answering to the latter half of *Eth. Nic.* x. is lost, or was never written; so we cannot tell whether this promise was ever fulfilled in the *Eudemean* treatise,—it certainly never was in the *Nico-*

machean. Fritzsche is doubtless right in saying that the last chapter in Book V. is out of its proper place, but there is nothing to show that it is written by a different hand from the rest of the book. Nor have we thus far seen anything to invalidate the opinion that the three Disputed Books must go together and that they originally formed part of the *Eudemian Ethics*.

Those, therefore, who hold that these books were written by Aristotle, must be prepared also to maintain that Aristotle wrote the whole of the *Eudemian* treatise: that is to say, that at a time when he had several great works, unfinished, on his hands, such as certainly the *Politics*, the *Metaphysics*, and the *Poetic*; and was engaged in carrying on the most multifarious researches in natural history and other sciences of observation; and had promised works²⁴ *On the Physiology of Plants*, and *On Disease and Health so far as belongs to Physical Philosophy*, which had never been executed, he set himself to re-write his own work on *Morals*, serving up his old materials again in a sort of paraphrase. One peculiarity of this would be that Aristotle, if he did this thing, made the statement of his ethical system so much worse, instead of better, than it was originally. In the *Politics* he frequently re-states conclusions arrived at in the *Nicomachean Ethics*; whenever he does so we are struck by the breadth, the freedom, and the firmness of his handling. But in the *Eudemian* treatise the opposite qualities are discernible; the writer of this treatise, even when stating Aristotle's conclusions without variation, seems to cloud them over, so that we require to go back to Aristotle to get a clear impression. And when

²⁴ See *De Sensu*, iv. 14. *De Gen. An.* i. ii. 1. *De Long. Vit.* i. 4, vi. 8. In *Hist. An.* v. i. 4. ὥστερ εἰρηται ἐν

τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῇ περὶ τῶν φυτῶν, is probably a mis-reading for εἰρησεται.

he treats, as in the Disputed Books, of subjects otherwise unexpounded, we do not feel that we know exactly what the views of Aristotle on these subjects really were. This argument against the *Eudemean Ethics* having been written by Aristotle, based on their obvious inferiority in point of execution, is not answered, as some appear to think, by pointing to the *Laws* of Plato, which are now accepted as a genuine re-writing of the *Republic*, though far inferior to that work in dramatic force, and in philosophic power. The cases are not parallel; for the *Laws* are considered to have been a senile production, written when Plato was between eighty and ninety years of age, whereas Aristotle did not live to be more than sixty-three years old, and the works on which he was apparently engaged at the very end of his life are in his most vigorous and best manner. The *Eudemean Ethics* are unequal to these later writings in power and clearness, and they are unlike them not only in style, but also in matter, for the theology of the *Eudemean Ethics* is clearly different from that of *Metaphysics*, Book XI. But there is not only ground for believing that Aristotle did not write the *Eudemean Ethics*, but also much reason to believe that Eudemus did. We have positive testimony (above, page 32) that Eudemus wrote paraphrases of the works of Aristotle; we see that it was the custom of the Peripatetic School to do this, and that a second paraphrase called the *Great Ethics* was constructed on the top of the *Eudemians*; even those who defend the genuineness of the Disputed Books will hardly go the length of saying that this third treatise was also written by Aristotle. And furthermore, all the variations and divergences from Aristotle's views as before expressed by him, which occur in the *Eudemean Ethics*, in theology, in psychology, in a tendency to physical explanations of moral phenomena, and at the same time in a tendency towards a peculiarly practical

morality, are such as are in accordance with the direction known to have been followed by the Peripatetic School, and therefore would have been natural for Eudemus to exhibit. These are the considerations which have to be met by those who still think that Books V., VI., and VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are the genuine work of Aristotle.

It would be tedious to sum up or repeat the conclusions arrived at in the foregoing pages. As we said at first, many questions must be left undeterminate or with a merely conjectural answer. We have before us in *Eth. Nic.* I.-IV., VIII.-X., an unfinished, or mutilated, treatise, which so far as we possess it came straight from the hand of Aristotle. What is wanting in this treatise is supplied from other works on the same subject written by members of the Peripatetic School. These works claim, with slight variations, to express the ideas of Aristotle himself, and for this reason probably they were included among the writings of Aristotle. Without considering these works to be entitled, on the ground of genuineness, to the position which they thus hold, we may be glad that they have been preserved. On the one hand they furnish a general conception of Aristotle's views on several particular points; on the other hand they testify to a system of co-operation among the Peripatetic scholars, which Aristotle probably encouraged during his lifetime, and which the school continued to practise after his death.³⁵

³⁵ In justification of some of the opinions and conjectures put forward in the foregoing Essay, we will subjoin here a few particulars as to the order and sequence of some of Aristotle's extant writings, so far as can be determined from internal evidence. This internal evidence does not consist merely in references from one book to another (for these are not always re-

liable—in some cases they are almost certainly interpolated), but still more in comparison of the thought in different books and the various degrees of maturity exhibited by the same conception occurring in different books. For instance, in the first chapter of the *Prior Analytics*, the *Topics* are referred to; therefore, either the *Topics* were written first, or else this

reference is spurious. But—the doctrine of the syllogism is worked out with far more precision in the *Analytics* than in the *Topics*, therefore the former hypothesis must be accepted. A similar combination of verbal and real internal evidence is used by Mr. Poste (in *Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, with a Translation and Notes*, London, 1866, p. 204 sq.) to show that the *Topics*, with the exception of the eighth book, were first written of all the extant works of Aristotle; next the *Analytics* (*Prior and Posterior*); next the eighth book of the *Topics*; next the *Rhetoric*, Books I. and II.; and then the *Sophistical Refutations*.—After this Aristotle appears to have gone on to write his *Ethics* (which later obtained the name of *Nicomachean*); and then the *Politics*; and next the treatise *On Poetry*; from which he went back to add on the third book to his *Rhetoric*. Now, this sequence, if it be accepted, greatly strengthens the hypothesis which was submitted above (p. 51), that Aristotle when he came in the course of his *Ethics* to the consideration of Justice, deferred this till a more convenient season. We can now see how he did what was similar on other occasions;—how, for some reason or other, he left the eighth book of the

Topics unwritten till he had finished the *Analytics*; how he went on to compose his *Rhetoric* before writing the *Sophistical Refutations*, which properly belong to the *Topics*; how he deferred writing the third book of his *Rhetoric* (on Style), and went on to his *Ethics*; how from the *Ethics* he proceeded to the *Politics*, but broke off writing them in the middle of his treatise on Education, in order to write a treatise on *Poetry*, which was a cognate subject; how the treatise on *Poetry* was left a mere fragment, while Aristotle went back to write his book on Style for the completion of his *Rhetoric*. All this shows a certain mode of procedure in writing. There is no reason to believe that the *Politics* or the *Art of Poetry* was ever completed. In the meantime Aristotle went on to the series of his Physical works, two of which (*On the Physiology of Plants* and *On Disease and Health so far as belongs to Physical Philosophy*) were promised by him, but, so far as we know, never executed. Other works, such as the *Meteorology*, do not appear to have received the last hand. And to the list of Aristotle's unfinished productions we are inclined to add the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

ESSAY II.

On the History of Moral Philosophy in Greece previous to Aristotle.

IN the *Ethics* of Aristotle there are but few direct allusions to moral theories of other philosophers. Plato's theory of the idea of good, viewed in its relation to *Ethics* (I. vi.); Socrates' definition of Courage (III. viii. 6); Eudoxus' theory of Pleasure (X. ii. 1); and Solon's paradox (I. x.), are perhaps the only ones which are by name commented on.¹ There are constant impersonal allusions to various opinions (the λεγόμενα on the subject in hand); some of these Aristotle attributes to 'the few,' that is, the philosophers; others he speaks of as stamped with the consent of 'the many and of ancient times' (I. viii. 7). But there is no connected history of ethical opinions or ethical systems to be found in this work. The reason for this is partly to be found in the fact that Aristotle appears to have only grown gradually into the habit (if so we may call it) of prefacing each science or branch of philosophy with a history of what had been accomplished previously towards the solution of its problems. Thus in the *Organon* there is no history of previous logic, only a brief remark in conclusion that nothing had

¹ In the *Eudemian* books we find references (VI. xiii. 3) to Socrates' definition of Virtue; (VII. ii. 1) to

his opinion on Incontinence; and (V. v. 1) to the Pythagorean definition of Justice.

been done before Aristotle to explain the syllogistic process. In the *Rhetoric*, it is merely said generally that previous writers had too exclusively devoted themselves to treating of appeals to the passions. After these works the *Ethics* were probably written. Then came the *Politics*, which contain an important review of some previous leading systems of political philosophy, but not exactly a history of these. The *Physical Discourse* and treatise *On the Soul* each commence with a collective statement of the opinions of previous philosophers; and Book I. of the *Metaphysics* (probably Aristotle's latest work) consists of a history of metaphysical philosophy from Thales to Plato, in which it is endeavoured to be shown how each system was occasioned by its predecessor.

When Aristotle commenced his *Ethics* he had apparently not accustomed himself to taking that sweeping historical point of view, which more and more became characteristic of him. Else a sketch of the development of moral ideas in Greece, analogous to his sketch of the development of metaphysics, might have been essayed by him, and would have been of the highest interest. But there was another cause to prevent this, namely, the fact that morals had never yet been clearly separated from politics. Aristotle himself calls his ethical system 'a sort of politics,' and it was only by writing his own *Ethics* that he, tentatively and yet surely, established the limits separating the one science from the other. With this tentative attitude, he was not likely to attempt following out the thread of previous moral theory, as separate from the concrete of politics, duty to the State, and the like. And, at all events, he did not do so.

But the Peripatetic School gradually laid hold of the distinct nature of ethics, and the author of the *Great Ethics* prefixes to his book the following brief outline of the

previous progress of the science. 'The first to attempt this subject was Pythagoras. His method was faulty, for he made virtue a number, justice a cube, &c. To him succeeded Socrates, who effected a great advance, but who erred in calling virtue a science, and in thus ignoring the distinction between the moral nature (*ἡθικός καὶ ἡθικός*) and the intellect. Afterwards came Plato, who made the right psychological distinctions, but who mixed up and confused ethical discussions with ontological inquiries as to the nature of the chief good.' In a shadowy way this passage represents the truth; for it is true that in the pre-Socratic philosophy, of which the Pythagorean system may stand as a type, ethical ideas had no distinctness, they were confused with physical or mathematical notions. Also the faults in the ethical systems of Socrates and Plato are here rightly stated. But it is a confusion to speak of Pythagoras as a moral philosopher, in the same sense that Socrates and Plato were so, or to speak of Socrates succeeding Pythagoras in the same way that Plato succeeded Socrates. And even were the account more accurate, every one will acknowledge that it is too barren to be in itself very useful.

In the following pages, then, we shall endeavour to carry considerations of this kind a little further, and to indicate, to some extent, the steps by which pre-Aristotelian moral theory developed itself in Greece. To do this is indeed necessary, since the views of Aristotle himself, as of any other philosopher, can only be rightly understood in relation to their antecedents.

Moral philosophy is a comparatively late product of national life. It presupposes the long, gradual, silent formation of Morals, which are the concrete of the nation's practical habits and ideas of life. Morals, like language, are anonymous in their origin (*οὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου 'φάνη*);

except in the case of one or two legislators, who by their laws may to some extent have moulded the life of the nation, or in the case of the founders of religions, who by the force of their intuitions may have expounded some new and organising principles of action,—no individual names are connected with the building-up of morality. Moral philosophy does not create; it only explains, and perhaps criticises, moral ideas. Moral philosophy itself dawns gradually into existence out of reflection upon the generally accepted morality. In its first form it is the ordinary morality codified and formulated. Afterwards, it becomes more critical, and finally it may react upon and change morality itself.

Renouncing any attempt to trace a succession of systems of moral philosophy (which indeed did not exist), until we come to the limited period of development between Socrates and Aristotle, let us take a broader view of the subject, and divide morality into three eras; first, the era of popular or unconscious morals; second, the transitional, sceptical, or sophistic era; third, the conscious or philosophic era. These different stages appear to succeed each other in the national and equally in the individual mind. The simplicity and trust of childhood is succeeded by the unsettled and undirected force of youth, and the wisdom of matured life. First, we believe because others do so; then, in order to obtain personal convictions, we pass through a stage of doubt; then we believe the more deeply but in a somewhat different way from what we did at the outset. On these three distinct periods or aspects of thought about moral subjects, much might be said. The first thing to remark is, that they are not only successive to each other if you regard the mind of the most cultivated and advanced thinkers of successive epochs, but also they are contemporaneous and in

juxtaposition to each other, if you regard the different degrees of cultivation and advancement among persons of the same epoch. In Plato's *Republic* we find the three points of view represented by different persons in the dialogue. The question, What is justice? being started, an answer to it is first given from the point of view of popular morality in the persons of Cephalus and of his son Polemarchus, who define it to be, in the words of Simonides, 'paying to every one what you owe them.' To this definition captious difficulties are started,—difficulties which the popular morality, owing to its unphilosophical tenure of all conceptions, is quite unable to meet. Then comes an answer from the sophistical point of view, in the person of Thrasymachus, that 'justice is the advantage of the stronger.' This having been overthrown, partly by an able sophistical skirmish, partly by the assertion of a deeper moral conviction,—the field is left open for a philosophical answer to the question. And this accordingly occupies the remainder of Plato's *Republic*, the different sides of the answer being represented by different personages; Glaucon and Adeimantus personifying the practical understanding which is only gradually brought into harmony with philosophy, Socrates the higher reason and the most purely philosophical conception. Almost all the dialogues of Plato, which touch on moral questions, may be said to illustrate the collision between the above-mentioned different periods or points of view, though none so fully as the *Republic*. Some dialogues, which are merely tentative, as the *Euthyphro*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, &c., content themselves with showing the unsatisfactoriness of the popular conceptions; common definitions are overthrown; the difficulty of the subject is exposed; a deeper method is suggested; but the question is left at last without an answer. In others,

as in the *Hippias Major*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Euthydemus*, various aspects of the sophistical point of view are exposed (on which we shall find much material for discussion hereafter); in all the dialogues a glimpse, at all events, of true philosophy is suggested; in a few only, as in the *Philebus*, is there anything like a proportion of constructive to the destructive dialectic.

Plato's wonderful dramatic pictures hold up a mirror to the different phases of error and truth in the human mind, so that we turn to his dialogues as to real life. But all reasonings on morality must exhibit the distinction existing between the popular, the sophistic, and the philosophical points of view. This distinction will be found marked in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, only Aristotle is less hostile than Plato to the popular conceptions, and rather considers them as the exponents of a true instinct with which his own theories must be brought into harmony. Also, being more concerned with the attainment and enunciation of truth than with recording its *genesis*, he does not dwell on the relation of the sophistical spirit to morality. He touches on certain sceptical and arbitrary opinions concerning morals which may be considered as the remnants of sophistry. But among these we must not reckon philosophical opinions with which he disagrees, since philosophy may be mistaken and yet be philosophy, if its spirit be pure.

Without laying too much stress on our three divisions, we may at all events regard them as convenient chronological heads. And let us now proceed to make some remarks on the characteristics of the first period of Grecian Ethics.

I. It has been said that 'before Socrates there was no morality in Greece, but only propriety of conduct.'² This

² Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, | waren sittliche, nicht moralische Men-
 ii. 43: 'Die Athener vor Socrates | schen.'

sentence conveys the same meaning as the argument in Plato's *Phædo* (p. 68 D), that 'without philosophy there is no morality, for the popular courage is a sort of fear, and the popular temperance a sort of intemperance.' It rightly asserts that the highest kind of goodness is inseparable from wisdom, from a distinct consciousness of the meaning of acts—from a sense of the absoluteness of right in itself. 'Morality' according to this view only exists when the individual can say, 'I am a law to myself, the edicts of the State and of society are valid to me because they are *my* edicts—because they are pronounced by the voice of reason and of right that is in me.' It, however, puts perhaps too great a restriction upon the term 'morality,' as if nothing but the highest moral goodness were 'morality' at all. It seems absurd to characterise as mere 'propriety of conduct' the acts of generosity, patriotism, endurance, and devotion, which were done, and the blameless lives that were led, long before there was any philosophy of right and wrong. Indeed there is something that seems *more* attractive about instinctive acts of nobleness, than about a reasoned goodness. To some the innocent obedience of the child appears more lovely than the virtue of the man. Still instinct is inferior to reason, the child is less than the man; and if God makes us what we are in childhood, we must re-make ourselves in maturer age; and it is the law of our nature that what was at first only potential in us, and only dimly felt as an instinct, should become realised by us and present to our consciousness. The very word 'conscience,' on which right so much depends, is only another term to express 'consciousness,' and a man differs from a machine in this, that the one has a law in himself,—is moved, as Aristotle would say, *κατὰ λόγον*; the other is moved *μετὰ λόγου*, has the law both in and for himself.

Without entering into speculations on the origin of society, we may safely assert that, as far as historical evidence goes, the broad distinctions between crime and virtue seem always to have been marked. National temperament, organisation, climate, and a certain latent national idea that has to be gradually developed—these go some way to mould the general human instincts of right and wrong, and these produce whatever is special in the national life and customs and code of laws (for occasion calls forth legislation, and so a code of laws grows up) ; and thus men live and do well or ill, and obtain praise or blame, are punished and rewarded. But as yet there is no *rationale* of all this. It is an age of action rather than of reflection—of poetry rather than analysis. To this succeeds a time when the first generalisations about life, in the shape of proverbs and maxims, begin to spring up. These are wise, but they do not constitute philosophy. They seldom rise above the level of prudential considerations, or empirical remarks on life, but they serve the requirements of those for whom they are made. Later, however, poetry and proverbs cease to satisfy the minds of thinkers ; the thoroughly awakened intellect now calls in question the old saws and maxims, the authority of the poets, and even the validity of the institutions of society itself. After this has come to pass, the age of unconscious morality, for cultivated men at least, has ceased for ever. In the quickly ripening mind of Greece, the different stages of the progress we have described succeed each other in distinct and rapid succession. In Christendom, from a variety of causes, it was impossible that the phenomenon should be re-enacted with the same simplicity.

To give an adequate account of morality in Greece, before the birth of moral philosophy, would be nothing less than giving as far as possible an entire picture of Hellenic

life. Customs, institutions, and laws, whether local or universal; recorded actions of States or individuals; remains of song or oratory; sentiments of writers; and the works of art,—would all have to be put in evidence. One would have, in short, to do for the Grecian States from the beginning of history what Mr. Lecky³ has done for the Roman Empire. But to do this is not necessary for a comprehension of Aristotle, and it is not our present purpose,—which is only to show how moral philosophy in Greece took its rise out of the general morality. Still, we have to remember that Aristotle *takes for granted* the general Hellenic morality, and that this is always in the background of all that he says. We have therefore to take account of it, and if possible do it justice.

It has been well said⁴ that ‘to suppose that the Greeks were not a highly moralised race is perhaps the strangest misconception to which religious prejudice has ever given rise. If their morality was æsthetic and not theocratic, it was none the less on that account humane and real.’ ‘As a necessary condition of artistic freedom, the soul of man in Greece was implicit with God or nature in what may be called an animal unity. Mankind, as sinless and simple as any other race that lives and dies upon the globe, formed a part of the natural order of the world. The sensual impulses, like the intellectual and moral, were then held void of crime and harmless. Health and good taste controlled the physical appetites of man, just as the appetites of animals are regulated by an unerring instinct. In the same way a standard of moderation determined moral virtue and intellectual excellence. But beyond this merely protective check

³ *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, by W. E. H. Lecky. (London, 1868.)

⁴ *Studies of the Greek Poets*, by John Addington Symonds (London, 1873), pp. 417-419.

upon the passions, a noble sense of the beautiful, as that which is balanced and restrained within limits, prevented the Greeks of the best period from diverging into Asiatic extravagance of pleasure. Licence was reckoned barbarous, and the barbarians were slaves by nature, φύσει δούλοι: Hellenes, born to be free men, took pride in temperance. Their σωφροσύνη, co-extensive as a protective virtue with the whole of their τὸ καλόν, was essentially Greek—the quality beloved by Phœbus, in whom was no dark place or any flaw.' To these remarks we may add that the Greeks did not leave Temperance to stand alone as the guide of life, but to Temperance they added Courage, and to Courage Justice, and to Justice Wisdom. Under Courage was summed up much of what we call 'duty,' i.e. duty to the State, a feeling which pervaded Hellenic life. The death of the heroes of Thermopylæ was a typical instance of duty under the name of Courage. Justice again was the Greek summary of 'duty to one's neighbour,' afterwards supplemented by the conception of Equity, in which a fine and tender charity was inherent (see note on *Eth.* v. x. 1). And Wisdom, even according to popular notions, implied calmness and elevation of soul (see *Eth.* i. iv. 3). It is obvious that such a code as this could only arise among an essentially moral and noble people.

But a popular morality arising out of noble instincts, whatever be its substantial merits, must still have the defect that it can give no account of itself, and that, if asked for such an account, it tends to base itself on inadequate grounds. This displeases the philosophers, and hence in the dialogues of Plato we find a disparaging picture of the popular morality of Greece. The following are the chief characteristics attributed to it: (1) It is shown to be based upon the authority of texts and maxims, and these maxims

appear to be merely prudential. (2) It is shown to be apt to connect itself with a superstitious and unworthy idea of religion, such as was set forth in the mysteries, and which constituted the trade of juggling hierophants.

With regard to the former point, nothing is more marked than the unbounded reverence of the Greeks for the old national literature. Homer, Hesiod, and the Gnostic poets, constituted the educational course. Add to these the saws of the Seven Wise Men and a set of aphorisms of the same calibre, which sprang up in the sixth century, and we have before us one of the main sources of Greek views of life. It was perhaps in the age of the Pisistratidæ that the formation and promulgation of this system of texts took place most actively. In the little dialogue called *Hipparchus*, attributed to Plato, but of uncertain authorship, we find an episode (from which the dialogue is named) recounting a fact, if not literally, at all events symbolically true. It relates that Hipparchus, the wisest of the sons of Pisistratus, wishing to educate the citizens, introduced the poems of Homer, and made Rhapsodes recite them at the Panathenæa. Also, that he kept Simonides near him, and sent to fetch Anacreon of Teos. Also, that he set up obelisks along the streets and the roads, carved with sentences of wisdom, selected from various sources, or invented by himself, some of which even rivalled the 'Know thyself,' and other famous inscriptions at Delphi.

It is obvious how much the various influences here specified worked on the Athenian mind. The mouths of the people were full of these maxims, and when Socrates asked for the definition of any moral term, he was answered by a quotation from Simonides, Hesiod, or Homer. The same tendency was not confined to Athens, but was doubtless, with modifications, prevalent throughout Greece. With regard

to the worth of the authorities above specified, a few words may be said, taking each separately. The morality in Homer is what you would expect. It is concrete, not abstract; it expresses the conception of a heroic life rather than a philosophical theory. It is mixed up with a religion which really consists in a celebration of the beauty of the world, and in a deification of the strong, bright, and brilliant qualities of human nature. It is a morality uninfluenced by a regard to a future life. It clings with intense enjoyment and love to the present world, and the state after death looms in the distance as a cold and repugnant shadow. And yet it would often hold death preferable to disgrace. The distinction between a noble and an ignoble nature is strongly marked in Homer, and yet the sense of right and wrong about particular actions seems very fluctuating. A sensuous conception of happiness and the chief good is often apparent, and there is great indistinctness about all psychological terms and conceptions. Life and mind, breath and soul, thought and sensation, seem blended or confused together. Plato's opinion of Homer was a reaction against the popular enthusiasm, and we must take Plato's expressions not as an absolute verdict, but as relative to the unthinking reverence of his countrymen. He speaks as if irritated at the wide influence exercised by a book in which there was so little philosophy.

If we consider Homer in his true light, as the product and exponent, rather than as the producer of the national modes of thought, Plato's criticisms will then appear merely as directed against the earliest and most instinctive conceptions of morality, as a protest against perpetuating these and treating them as if they were adequate for a more advanced age. Socrates says (*Repub.* p. 606 E), 'You will find the praisers of Homer maintaining that this poet has educated all Greece, and that with a view to the direction and cultivation

of human nature he is worthy to be taken up and learnt by heart; that in short one should frame one's whole life according to this poet. To these gentlemen,' continues Socrates, 'you should pay all respect, and concede to them that Homer was a great poet and first of the tragic writers (*ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν*); but you should hold to the conviction that poetry is only to be admitted into a State in the shape of hymns to the gods and encomia on the good.' The point of view from which this is said is evidently that, in comparison with the vast importance of a philosophic morality, everything else is to be considered of little value and to be set aside. The faults that Plato finds with Homer in detail are, that he recommends justice by the inducements of temporal rewards (*Repub.* pp. 363 A, 612 B), thus turning morality into prudence; that he makes God the source of evil as well as of good (*Repub.* p. 379 C); that he makes God changeable (p. 381 D); that he represents the gods as capable of being bribed with offerings (p. 364 D); that he gives a gloomy picture of the soul after death, describing the future world in a way which is calculated to depress the mind and fill it with unmanly forebodings (p. 387); that he represents his heroes as yielding to excessive and ungoverned emotion, and that even his gods give way to immoderate laughter (pp. 388-9); and that instances of intemperance, both in language, and in the indulgence of the appetites, often form a part of his narrative (p. 390). In the *Ethics* of Aristotle the poems of Homer are frequently referred to for the sake of illustration as being a perfectly well-known literature. Thus the warning of Calypso—or, as it should have been, Circe (*Eth.* II. ix. 3); the dangerous charms of Helen (II. ix. 6); and the procedure of the Homeric Kings (III. iii. 18); are used as figures to illustrate moral or psychological truths. Again, instances of any particular

phenomenon are hence cited; as for example, Diomede⁵ and Hector are cited as an instance of political courage (III. viii. 2). In other places Aristotle⁶ appeals to the words of Homer, in the same way that he does to the popular language, namely, as containing a latent philosophy in itself, and as bearing witness to the conclusions of philosophy. Thus Homer's calling Agamemnon 'shepherd of the people' (VIII. xi. 1), and his physical descriptions of courage (III. viii. 10), are appealed to as containing, or testifying to, philosophical truths.

Turning from Homer to Hesiod, we discover at once a certain change or difference in spirit, and in the views that are taken of human life. In the *Works and Days* those that fought at Troy are represented as 'a race of demi-gods and beatified heroes,' dwelling in the 'happy isles' free from care or sorrow; whereas with Homer, these personages are merely illustrious mortals, subject to the same passions and sufferings as their descendants, and condemned at their death to the same dismal after life of Hades, so gloomily depicted in the *Odyssey*.⁷ Not only does this difference point to a development in the Grecian mythology, indicating the matured growth of the popular hero-worship; it also shows a feeling which characterises other parts of Hesiod, a sense that a bright period is lost, and 'that there had passed away a glory from the earth.'

The poet is no longer carried out of himself in thinking of the deeds of Achilles and Hector. He laments that he has fallen on evil days, that he lives in the last and worst of the Five Ages of the World.⁸ He finds 'all things full of

⁵ So in the *Eudemian* book (v. ix. 7) Glaucus and Diomede are referred to.

⁶ Cf. also the *Eudemian* books, vi. vii. 2, vii. i. 1, and vii. vi. 3.

⁷ Mure's *Literature of Greece*, Vol. II. p. 402.

⁸ V. 172 sqq.

μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' ὤφειλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοις μετεῖναι

labour.' He is conscious of a Fall of Man, and accounts for this by two inconsistent episodes, the one⁹ representing mankind, through the fatal gift of Pandora, blighted at the very outset; the other¹⁰ describing a gradual decadence from the primeval Golden Age. Once the gods dwelt upon earth, but now even Honour that does no wrong, and Retribution that suffers no wrong (*Αἰδώς καὶ Νέμεσις*), the last of the Immortals, have gone and left us.¹¹ Mixed up with this sad and gloomy view of the state of the world, we find indications of a religious belief which is in some respects more elevated than the theology of Homer. Hesiod represents the messengers of Zeus, thirty thousand *dæmons*, as always pervading the earth, and watching on deeds of justice and injustice.¹² A belief in the moral government of God is here indicated, though it is expressed in a polytheistic manner, and there is a want of confidence and trust in the divine benevolence. The gods are only just, and not benign. Hesiod's book of the *Works and Days* is apparently a cento, containing the elements of at least two separate poems, the one an address to the poet's brother Perses, with an appeal against his injustice; the other perhaps by a different hand, containing maxims of agriculture, and an account of the operations at different seasons. Into this part different sententious rules of conduct are interwoven, which may be rather national and Boeotian than belonging to any one

ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρόσθε θανεῖν, ἢ
ἔπειτα γενέσθαι

νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστὶ σιδήρεον· οὐδέ
ποτ' ἤμαρ
παύσονται καμάτων καὶ δίζυος, οὐδέ τι
ρύκτωρ.

φθειρόμενοι· χαλεπὰς δὲ θεοὶ δάσσυσι
μερίμνας.

⁹ Vv. 48-105.

¹⁰ Vv. 108-171.

¹¹ Vv. 195-199.

¹² V. 250 sq.

τρεῖς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυ-
βοτείρῃ
ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων·
οἳ βα φυλάσσουσιν τε δίκας καὶ σφέλεια
ἔργα
ἡέρα ἐσσάμενοι, πάντη φοιτῶντες ἐπ'
αἶαν.

particular author. The morality of Hesiod, whatever its origin, contains a fine practical view of life. It enjoins justice, energy, and, above all, temperance and simplicity of living. Nothing can be finer than the saying¹³ quoted by Plato (cf. *Repub.* p. 466 C; *Laws*, p. 690 E), 'How much is the half greater than the whole! how great a blessing is there in mallows and asphodelus!' Plato finds fault with Hesiod that his is a merely prudential Ethics, or eudæmonism, that he recommends justice by the promise of temporal advantage (*Repub.* p. 363 A). Many of his maxims are indeed not above the level of a yeoman's morality, consisting in advice about the treatment of neighbours, servants, &c. One of these Aristotle alludes to (*Eth.* ix. i. 6). It is the recommendation that, even between friends, wages should be stipulated and the bargain kept. Of a different stamp, however, is that passage of Hesiod, which has been so repeatedly quoted.¹⁴ It contains the same figure to represent virtue and vice, which was afterwards consecrated in the mouth of Christ: 'The road to Vice may easily be travelled by crowds, for it is smooth, and She dwells close at hand. But the path of Virtue is steep and difficult, and the gods have ordained that only by toil can She be reached.' And this truth is rendered still deeper, by the addition, that 'He is best who acts on his own convictions, while he is second-best who acts in obedience to the counsel of others.' Aristotle cites this latter saying (*Eth.* i. iv. 7), which contains more than, in all probability, its author was conscious of. He

¹³ V. 40 sq.

νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅπως πλέον ἤμισυ
παντός,
οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μάλαχρ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ
μεγ' ὄνειαρ.

¹⁴ Xen. *Memorab.* ii. i. 20. Plato, *Repub.* p. 364 C. *Laws*, p. 718 E. *Protagoras*, p. 340 D, &c.

also quotes from Hesiod another most acute remark,¹⁵ which is to the effect that society is constructed upon a basis of competition,—that a principle of strife which makes ‘potter foe to potter’ (*Eth.* viii. i. 6), produces all honourable enterprises. It may truly be said that if Hesiod was no moral philosopher, he was a very great moralist.

Passing on now to the ‘Seven Wise Men,’ the heroes of the sixth century B.C., who are separated from Hesiod by we cannot tell how wide a chronological interval, we do not find any great advance made beyond him in their moral point of view, but rather a following out of the same direction. We find still a prudential Ethics dealing in a disjointed, but often a forcible and pregnant manner, with the various parts of life. Of the ‘Seven,’ it was well said by Dicaearchus (ap. Diog. Laert. i. 40) that ‘they were neither speculators nor philosophers (*οὔτε σοφούς οὔτε φιλοσόφους*, N.B. *σοφούς* is here used in a restricted and Aristotelian sense), but men of insight, with a turn for legislation (*συνετούς δέ τινες καὶ νομοθετικούς*).’ They belonged to an era of political change, which was calculated to teach experience and to call forth worldly wisdom, the era of the overthrow of hereditary monarchs in Greece. All the sages were either tyrants, or legislators, or the advisers of those in power. The number seven is of later date, and probably a mere attempt at completeness. There is no agreement as to the list, but the names most generally specified are Thales, Solon, Periander, Cleobulus,

¹⁵ V. 11 sqq.

οὐκ ἔρα μόνον ἔην ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ’
ἐπὶ γαῖαν
εἰσι δύν. τὴν μὲν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοή-
σας,

ἡ δ’ ἐπιμωμητή, κ.τ.λ.

. . . ἀγαθὴ δ’ ἔρις ἤδε βρο-
τοῖσι
καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεὶ κοτέει, καὶ τέκτονι
τέκτων.

Chilon, Bias, Pittacus. Of these Thales ought to be exempted from the criticism of Dicæarchus, for though many adages are attributed to him, he was no mere politician, but a deep thinker, and the first speculative philosopher of Greece. What was most distinctive in Thales does not belong to the level of thought which we are now considering. Of the rest of the Sages it was said by Anaximenes (ap. Diog. Laert. *l.c.*), that they 'all tried their hand at poetry.' This is characteristic of a period antecedent to the formation of anything like a prose style. Of the poems of Solon, considerable passages are preserved to us; they consist of elegies, in which the political circumstances of Solon's lifetime are recorded, and into which sufficient general reflections on human nature are interwoven to entitle him to be called a Gnostic poet. Solon's views of life, as far as they appear in his poetry, are characterised by a manliness which contrasts them with the soft Lydian effeminacy of Mimnermus, to one of whose sentiments Solon made answer. Mimnermus having expressed a wish for a painless life and a death at the age of sixty, Solon answers: 'Bear me no ill will for having thought on this subject better than you—alter the words and sing, "May the fate of death reach me in my *eightieth* year."' In one passage of his works Solon divides human life into periods of seven years, and assigns to each its proper physical and mental occupations (*Frag.* 14); in another the multifarious pursuits of men are described, and their inability to command success, because fate brings good and ill to mortals, and man cannot escape from the destiny allotted to him by the gods (*Fr.* 5). Let us now compare these two last sentiments with that saying which is always connected with the name of Solon, and which was thought worthy of a careful examination by

Aristotle (*Eth.* i. x. xi.), the saying, that 'One must look to the end,' or that 'No one can be called happy while he lives.' The story of Solon's conversation with Croesus, as given by Herodotus, is in all probability totally without historical foundation. It has the aspect of a rhetorical *ἐπίδειξις* dressed up by some Sophist to illustrate the *gnome* of Solon. However, the beauty of the story as related by Herodotus, no one can deny. The *gnome* itself in its present form has this merit, that it is perhaps the first attempt to regard life as a whole. It denies the name of happiness to the pleasure or prosperity of a moment. But its fault is, as Aristotle points out, that it makes happiness purely to consist in external fortune, it implies too little faith in, and too little regard for, the internal consciousness, which after all is far the most essential element of happiness. Moreover, there is a sort of superstition manifested in this view, and in the above-quoted verses of Solon. It represents the Deity as 'envious' of human happiness. This view is elsewhere reprobated by Aristotle (*Metaphys.* i. ii. 13); it was a view, perhaps, natural in a period of political change and personal vicissitude, previous to the development of any philosophy which could read the permanent behind the changeable.¹⁶

The remainder of the 'Seven' hardly need a mention in detail. The sayings attributed to them are too little connected to merit a criticism from a scientific point of view. 'The uncertainty of human things, the brevity of life, the

¹⁶ Mr Symonds attributes an un-Greek origin to this and other ideas. He says (*Studies of the Greek Poets*, p. 417): 'The blood-justice of the Eumenides, the asceticism of Pythagoras, the purificatory rites of Empedocles and Epimenides, the fetichistic

belief in a jealous God, and the doctrine of hereditary guilt in Theognis, Herodotus, and Solon, are fragments of primitive or Asiatic superstition unharmonised with the serene element of the Hellenic spirit.'

unhappiness of the poor, the blessing of friendship, the sanctity of an oath, the force of necessity, the power of time, such are the most ordinary subjects of their *gnomes*, when they do not reduce themselves to the simple rules of prudence.¹⁷ However, some of the utterances of this era of proverbial philosophy stand conspicuous among the rest, containing a depth of meaning of which their authors could have been only half conscious. This meaning was drawn out and developed by later philosophers. The *Μηδὲν ἄγαν* of Solon and the *Μέτρον ἄριστον* of Cleobulus passed almost into something new in the *μετρίότης* of Plato; and the *Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν* (of uncertain authorship), which was inscribed on the front of the temple at Delphi, became in the hands of Socrates the foundation of philosophy. In the *Ethics* of Aristotle, proverbs of this epoch, as, for instance, *πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσε* (VIII. v. 1), *ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, κ.τ.λ.* (II. vi. 14), *κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, κ.τ.λ.* (I. viii. 14), are occasionally quoted, without any author's name.¹⁸

Two more poets may be mentioned who will serve to complete our specimens of the sixth century thought on moral subjects. These are *Theognis* and *Simonides*. They both were great authorities, as is evinced by their being so frequently cited in the writings of the ancients. They both have this in common that their verse betrays a constant reflectiveness on human life. But the tone is to some extent different. *Theognis* draws a darker picture than *Simonides*. *Theognis* exhibits traces of a harassed and unfortunate life, and the pressure of circumstances. *Simonides*, who lived through the Persian wars, writes in a more

¹⁷ Renouvier, *Manuel de Phil. Anc.* I. p. 127.

¹⁸ Eudemus (v. i. 16) attributes the saying, 'Office shows the man,' to Bias.

manly strain, as if inspired by the times and the glorious deeds of his countrymen, which he celebrated in his poetry. Theognis appears to have lived during the latter half of the sixth century. His writings are chiefly autobiographical, and consist of reflections caused by the political events of his life and of his native city Megara. He seems to have belonged to the aristocratic party and to have suffered exile, losing all his property and barely escaping with his life. His feelings of indignation are constantly expressed in his poems—in which perhaps the greatest peculiarity is, that in them the terms *ἀγαθοί* and *ἱσθλοί* are used to designate his own party, the nobles, while the commons are called *κακοί* and *δειλοί*. It must not be supposed that these terms had hitherto no ethical meaning, though of course scientific ethical definitions had as yet never been attempted. But the words *ἱσθλός* and *κακός* occur in Hesiod in quite as distinctive a sense, as the terms ‘good man,’ and ‘bad man,’ are used in general now. It is the extreme of political partisanship expressing itself in a *naïve* and unconscious manner which causes Theognis to identify goodness with the aristocratic classes, and badness with the commonalty of his city. We find in his writings a strange intermixture and confusion of political and ethical thoughts. In the celebrated passage which dwells on the influence of associates, he begins by saying, ‘You should eat and drink with those who have great power’ (i.e. the nobles), ‘for from the good you will learn what is good, but by mixing with the bad you will lose what reason you have.’ Here an undeniable moral axiom is made to assume a political aspect, which indeed impairs its force. Plato, in the *Meno*,¹⁹ quotes

¹⁹ Οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοὶ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ· τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδασκόν, τοτὲ δ' οὐ,

ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεόγνῳ τὴν ποιητὴν οἷός ἐστι ταῦτα ταῦτα λέγει; M. Ἐν πολεῖς ἔπεισιν; Σ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις, οὐ λέγει

this passage and shows that it is 'contradicted by another passage of Theognis, which declares education to be of no effect. Theognis appears to have felt at different times with equal force the two points of view about education. At one time education appears to be everything, at another time, nothing.

All the expressions of Theognis, as indeed of the other Gnostic poets, seem characterised by perfect naturalness, if such a word might be used. They contain no attempt to reduce life to a theory; they flow from the heart of the individual according as he feels joy or sorrow. They exhibit no striving to be above circumstances,—rather the full, unrestrained wail of one who bitterly feels the might of circumstances. They do not seek to be logical; on the contrary, they are full of inconsistencies. In one place Theognis says (173-182), 'if one is poor it is better to die than live; one should cast oneself from some high cliff into the sea.' In another place (315-318), 'Many of the bad are rich, and the good poor, yet one would not exchange one's virtue for riches.' In the views of Theognis, as we saw before in those of Solon, there may be traced a superstitious feeling of the resistless power, and at the same time

καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε καὶ μετὰ
τοῖσιν

Ἴζε καὶ ἀνθάνε τοῖς ὄν μεγάλης δύνα-
μης.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξαι, ἦν
δὲ κακοῖσιν

συμμίσγης, ἀπολείς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα
ν' οὐν.

οἷσθ' ὅτι ἐν ταῦτοισ μὲν ὥς διδακτοῦ
οὐσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει; M. φαίνεται
γε. Σ. Ἐν ἑλλοις δὲ γε ὀλίγον μετα-
βάς, εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητὸν, φησί, καὶ ἐνθετον
ἀνδρὶ νόημα λέγει πως ὅτι

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους
ἔφερον

οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ

οὐ ποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο
κακός,

πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαφροσιν, ἀλλὰ δι-
δάσκων

οὐ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἀνδρ'
ἀγαθόν.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν τὰναντία λέγει; 95 C sqq.

Both of these passages of Theognis
are alluded to by Aristotle in the
Ethics (ix. ix. 7, x. ix. 3).

the arbitrary will of the gods. As to the standard of duty in his poems, such a conception must needs be held to have been very wavering in him who could write (363 sq.), 'Flatter your enemy, and when you have got him into your power, wreak your vengeance, and do not spare him.' It is obvious that the elegiac form adopted by Theognis gave an air of universality to maxims which were only suitable to his own troubled times, and his own angry spirit. To accept the cynicism and the complaints of Byron as if of universal applicability, would be almost a parallel to what actually took place in Greece, when the verses of Theognis were quoted as an authority in morals. That this could ever have been the case, shows how great was the want of a more fixed standard, and almost justifies the sweeping attacks made by Plato upon the poets.

In the verses of Simonides of Ceos there is, as we have said, a more healthy spirit. His life (B.C. 556-467) was prosperous, and was spent in different courts, especially those of Hipparchus at Athens, of the Aleuads and Scopads in Thessaly, of Hiero at Syracuse. If Theognis be compared to Byron among the moderns, Simonides may, in some respects, be compared to Goethe, though Goethe exhibits no parallel to his spirited and even impassioned songs on the heroic incidents of the war. But the courtly demeanour of Simonides, to which he seems to have somewhat sacrificed his independence, his worldly wisdom, his moderation of views, his realistic tendencies with regard to life, and his efforts for a calm and unruffled enjoyment, remind one a little of the great German. Beyond heroism in war, Simonides does not appear to have held any exalted notions of the possibilities of virtue. There is a very interesting discussion in the *Protagoras* of Plato (pp. 339-346), on the meaning of some strophes in one of the Epinician

odes of Simonides. This discussion has the effect of exhibiting the critical ability of Socrates as superior to that of Protagoras. The import of the passage criticised appears to be, that, 'while absolute perfection (*τετράγωνον ἀνευ ψόγου γενέσθαι*) is well-nigh impossible, yet Simonides will not accept the saying of Pittacus, "it is hard to be good,"—for misfortune makes a man bad and prosperity good; good is mixed with evil, and Simonides will be satisfied if a man be not utterly evil and useless;—he will give up vain and impracticable hopes, and praise and love all who do not voluntarily commit base actions.' These expressions are very characteristic of Simonides. We may remark in them (1) the criticism upon Pittacus, which shows the advance of reflective morality; (2) the point of view taken, namely, a sort of worldly moderation. Simonides complains that Pittacus has set up too high an ideal of virtue, and then proclaimed the difficulty of attaining it. Simonides proposes to substitute a more practical standard.

In thus discussing one of the gnomes of the Seven Sages, Simonides approaches in some degree to the mode of thought of the Sophists, but in later times he was taken as the representative of the old school, in contradistinction to 'young Athens,' with its sophistical ideas. Thus in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (1355-1362), Strepsiades calls for one of the *Scolia* of Simonides, while his son treats them with contempt. A sort of sententious wisdom appears to have been aimed at by this courtly poet; a specimen of this is given in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 331 E), where justice is defined, according to Simonides, to consist in 'paying one's debts.' It is easy to show this definition inadequate, and yet it was a beginning. The quickly developing mind of Greece could not long remain in that stage to which Simonides had attained; it was imperatively necessary that it should break

away, and by force of questioning, obtain a more scientific view. We might say of the aphoristic morality of the poets and sages of the sixth century B.C. what Aristotle says of the early philosophers, namely, that 'without being skilled boxers, they sometimes give a good blow' (*Metaphysics*, I. iv. 4).

During the fifth century B.C. poetry in Greece continued to represent, or contribute to, the popular beliefs in morals, while as yet moral philosophy was not. The great poetical figures of this time were of course Pindar (522-443 B.C.), and the Attic Tragedians, who succeeded each other at brief intervals, since Æschylus gained his first prize in 484 B.C., Sophocles his first in 468 B.C., Euripides his first in 441 B.C. Of Pindar, Mr. Symonds well says: 'The whole of his poetry is impregnated with a lively sense of the divine in the world. Accepting the religious traditions of his ancestors with simple faith, he adds more of spiritual severity and of mystical morality than we find in Homer. Yet he is not superstitious or credulous. He can afford to criticise the myths like Xenophanes and Plato, refusing to believe that a blessed god could be a glutton.²⁰ In Pindar indeed we see the fine flower of Hellenic religion, free from subservience to creeds and ceremonies, capable of extracting sublime morality from mythical legends, and adding to the old joyousness of the Homeric faith a deeper and more awful perception of superhuman mysteries. The philosophical scepticism which in Greece, after the age of Pericles, corroded both the fabric of mythology and the indistinct doctrines of theological monotheism, had not yet begun to act.' Pindar held indeed to the Hellenic religion, but he vivified and elevated it by the introduction of an element drawn

²⁰ The reference here is to *Olymp. i.*

from Orphic or Pythagorean sources. His pictures of the rewards and punishments beyond the grave form a great advance upon the creed of both Homer and Hesiod. The Hades of Homer was a gloomy negation, and the 'happy isles' of Hesiod were peopled by the heroes of Troy. But Pindar connects the torments or blessings of the soul in a future state with its moral actions upon earth; and (introducing the Oriental conception of Metempsychosis) he opens Paradise to those souls which during three successive lives have kept themselves pure from crime. It can hardly be doubted that the lyric strains of Pindar, embodying this doctrine, did much to influence the thought of Plato and to produce his sublime conceptions (set forth in *Phædo*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*) of a future life of the soul dependent on the moral purity and the philosophic wisdom attained by it in this world. And if so, Pindar has played an important part in the history of Eschatology²¹ in Europe. His views of the present life are distinguished by a certain God-fearing sobriety. While celebrating the wealth, the strenuous effort, and the good fortune (*δλβος, ἀρετή, εὐτυχία*) of the Victors of the games, he does not fail to admonish them of the

²¹ The following is Mr. Symonds' prose translation of Pindar *Olymp.* ii.: 'Among the dead, sinful souls at once pay penalty, and the crimes done in this realm of Zeus are judged beneath the earth by one who gives sentence under dire necessity. But the good, enjoying perpetual sunlight equally by night and day, receive a life more free from woe than this of ours; they trouble not the earth with strength of hand, nor the water of the sea for scanty sustenance; but, with the honoured of the gods, all they who delighted in the keeping of their oath pass a tearless age; the others suffer

woe on which no eye can bear to look. Those who have thrice endured on either side the grave to keep their spirits wholly free from crime journey on the road of Zeus to the tower of Cronos: where round the islands blow breezes ocean-borne; and flowers of gold burn—some on the land from radiant trees, and others the wave feeds; with necklaces wherewith they twine their heads and brows, in the just decrees of Rhadamanthus, whose father Cronos has for a perpetual colleague, he who is spouse of Rhea throned above all gods.'

fleeting character of life and prosperity, and to preach moderation and continence (*εὐκοσμία, σωφροσύνη, μηδὲν ἄγαν*). He chooses for himself a middle status in society and deprecates the lot of kings (*Pyth.* xi. 50). The following is his conception of a *summum bonum* upon earth (*Pyth.* x. 22): 'That man is happy and song-worthy by the skilled, who, victorious by might of hand or vigour of foot, achieves the greatest prizes with daring and with strength; and who in lifetime sees his son, while yet a boy, crowned happily with Pythian wreaths. The brazen heaven, it is true, is inaccessible to him; but whatsoever joys we race of mortals touch, he reaches to the farthest voyage.'

The Attic Dramatists are the exponents of the spirit of the Athenian people quickened by the sense of their triumphant delivery from the great national peril of the Persian invasions. They represent successively the rapidly succeeding phases of the Athenian mind. Their great theme, the fundamental idea of their tragedies, as indeed of the Greek legends on which they were based, was Nemesis—Retribution either for crime committed, or for insolent prosperity and pride of life.

Mr. Symonds (*Studies of the Greek Poets*, pp. 190-205) has well analysed the different forms of this idea as it appears in Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. In Æschylus Retribution (*δράσαντι παθεῖν τριγέρων μῦθος*) is the revelation of an offended Deity; in Sophocles it is rather the exhibition of a moral law: our attention is drawn to the human character of the guilty man, and we see how he brings terrible consequences on himself. 'In Euripides it degenerates into something more akin to a sense of vicissitudes; it becomes more sentimental—less a religious or moral principle than a phenomenon inspiring fear and pity.' A similar progress with regard to all moral questions may be traced in the

dramatists: in Æschylus morality is identified with religion; in Sophocles it is a noble intuitive sense of right and wrong; in Euripides it is a casuistical and sophisticated reasoning upon all moral questions. Euripides does not belong to the unconscious period of morals; the influence of law-courts, rhetoricians, and sophists upon the Athenian mind has been too rapidly disintegrating to admit of this. Even in Sophocles we see the beginnings of casuistry in the collision brought out in the *Antigone* between a decree of the State and the eternal sense of right and wrong (οὐ γάρ τι νῦν τε κἀχθὲς ἀλλ' αἰεὶ πότε ζῆ ταῦτα) in the human mind. But this collision is not worked out by Sophocles, as it would have been by Euripides, in a sophistical spirit, so as to produce scepticism in the validity of both the conflicting authorities. The impression which is left is rather that that most tragical position of all has been produced, where both parties are justifiable and are in the right. But, doubtless, the *Antigone* of Sophocles was partly a result of, and partly a contribution to, these discussions of the opposition between Law and Nature which played so conspicuous a part in the sophistical period of Hellenic thought.

Besides adherence to proverbs and saws from the poets, there was another element specified by Plato in his picture of the popular morality of Greece, which we have hitherto left unnoticed, namely, the tendency to accept unworthy conceptions of religion, such as would essentially interfere with the purity and absoluteness of any ideas of right and wrong. Not only was there prevalent a belief in the enviousness and *Nemesis* of the Deity, such as forms the constant theme of the reflections of Herodotus; not only was there a superstitious hankering after signs and oracles, which tended to disturb the manly calmness of the mind; not only was there a mean and anthropomorphic conception of God, which

reduced religion to hero-worship, and really stood quite beside, and distinct from, all morality ; but also there was a direct tampering with morality itself on the part of certain religious hierophants. These were the professors of mysteries, respecting whom Adeimantus is made to say in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 364 B sq.), 'The most astonishing theories of all are those which you shall hear about the gods and about virtue—that the gods themselves have actually allotted to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, and to the bad a directly opposite lot. On the other hand, seers and jugglers come to the doors of the rich, and persuade them that they have a power given them by the gods of expiating by offerings and charms all offences, whether committed by a man's self or his ancestors, and this quite pleasantly—merely by holding a feast ; and if any one wants to be revenged on an enemy, they will, for a trifling cost, do the fellow a harm (they say) whether he be a good man or a bad man—by forcing the gods with their incantations and spells to serve them. They cite the poets as authorities for their assertions, to prove that the path of vice is easy, and that of virtue rugged and difficult. They prove from Homer that the gods are not inexorable, but may be turned by the prayers and offerings of men. And they adduce a whole swarm of the books of Musæus and Orpheus, the kinsmen (as they say) of Selene and of the Muses, according to which they perform their rites, and persuade not only individuals, but whole States, that actually by means of feastings and pleasure, expiations and releases may be provided both for the living and also for the dead, which will free men from all the penalties of the future life ; but that for any one not using their rites a most horrible fate remains.'

Of the Orphic mysteries here alluded to, and of the other mysteries in general, it will not be necessary for our present

purpose to say much. They appear to have originally possessed an Oriental character, and to have been in themselves not without a deep meaning. They were a protest against Grecian anthropomorphism. They seem to have contained the assertion of two deep ideas, the immortality of the soul, and the impurity of sin, which required expiation. That they had become debased before becoming popular, we learn from this account of Plato. A perverted religion that offered 'masses for the soul,' and a preference to the rich over the poor—joined with the traditional, unreflecting, and prudential morality that was rife in Greece—produced a state of feeling that made Plato say in the person of Adeimantus—

'The only hope is, either if a person have a sort of inspiration of natural goodness, or obtain a scientific apprehension of the absolute difference between right and wrong.' (πλὴν εἴ τις θεία φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ. *Repub.* p. 366 C.)

The relation of the *Ethics* of Aristotle to the popular morality was, as we have said, rather different from that of Plato. Aristotle considers the opinion of the many worth consideration, as well as that of the philosophers. He constantly appeals to common language in support of his theories, and common tenets he thinks worthy of either refutation or establishment. There are certain points of view with regard to morals, which are not exactly philosophical in Plato's sense of the word, but which have a sort of philosophical character, while, at the same time, they were common property; and these are made use of by Aristotle. Such are especially the lists and divisions of good, which seem to have been much discussed in Greece; as, for instance, the threefold division into goods of the mind, the body, and external (*Eth.* i. viii. 2); again, the division into the admirable (τῆμα) and the praiseworthy (*Eth.* i. xii. 1). One list of goods, not mentioned by

Aristotle, pretended to give them in their order of excellence, thus,—wisdom, health, beauty, wealth. The conception of a chief good seems to have been vaguely present before people's minds, and this no doubt determined primarily the form of the question of Aristotle's *Ethics*. This was the natural question for a Greek system of Ethics; both Plato and Aristotle tell us how wavering and inconsistent were the answers that common minds were able to give to it, when in an utterly unsystematic way it was presented to them (*Repub.* p. 505 B; *Ethics*, I. iv. 2).

Before taking leave of this period of unphilosophic morals, we must ask—How fared the philosophers in it? The author of the *Magna Moralia*, as we have seen, attributed to Pythagoras certain mathematical formulæ for expressing ethical conceptions. That the Pythagoreans adopted these we know from other sources, but at how late a date it seems difficult to say,²²—perhaps not before the time of Philolaus. Of the other philosophers it may be said generally that ethical subjects did not form part of their philosophy, they made no attempt to systematise the phenomena of human society and human action. And yet they had deep thoughts on life and stood apart from other men. This standing apart was indeed their characteristic attitude. Philosophic isolation was the

²² A quantity of spurious Pythagorean fragments have come down to us. Patricius, in his *Discussiones Peripateticæ* (Vol. II. Book VII.), quotes these to prove that Aristotle plagiarised from the Pythagoreans. If the fragments were genuine, they would indeed prove wholesale plagiarism. But they are plainly mere translations of Aristotle into Doric Greek. The following is attributed to Archytas. οὐδὲν ἔτερόν ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' ἡ χρᾶσις ἀρετῶν ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ. Able as the

work of Patricius is, it labours under the disadvantages of his era, criticism having as yet hardly an existence. As a specimen of his judgment—he calls it 'a lie' on the part of Aristotle to attribute the authorship of the Ideas to Plato, since this doctrine had been known before Plato, to the Pythagoreans, Orpheus, the Chaldeans, and the Egyptians! His authorities are such works as *Iamblichus*, *Pselus*, &c.

chief result of their reflections upon the world. The same thing, as M. Renouvier says, expresses itself in the symbolic tears of Heraclitus and the symbolic laughter of Democritus—a doctrine of despair and of contempt. A deep feeling pervades the utterances of Heraclitus, but it is a feeling of the insignificance of man. ‘The wisest man,’ he says, ‘is to Zeus as an ape is to man.’ In the ceaseless eddy of the creation and destruction of worlds, which he pictured to himself, individual life must have seemed as the motes in the sunbeam. He was called *ὀχλολοῖδος*, from his philosophic exclusiveness. Democritus, though a pre-Socratic philosopher, yet lived into and was influenced by the thought of the Sophistic era. He seems to have considered the human will as something apart in the world, and thus while subjecting the atoms to the power of necessity, he is reported to have said, ‘Man is only a half-slave of necessity.’ The chief good he considered to be *Ἀταραξία* or an unruffled serenity of mind. In a similar spirit Anaxagoras affirmed that ‘he considered happiness something different from what most men supposed, and that they would be astonished to hear his conception of it’ (cf. *Eth.* x. viii. 11), meaning that it consisted not in material advantages, but in wisdom and philosophy. The moral doctrines of these early philosophers come before us in general in the form of aphorisms, they seem to belong rather to the personal character of the men than to the result of their systems.

II. The unconscious period of morality in Greece was succeeded by an interval of sceptical thought upon moral subjects. This was the era (commencing about 450 B.C.) in connection with which the word ‘sophistical’ was first used; it was, in short, the era of the famous ‘Sophists’ of the fifth and fourth centuries. Who and what were these ‘Sophists’ (whose name became a byword, and was converted into an

adjective with so invidious a connotation) is a question of much interest in itself; and the interest has been increased since Grote, thirty-four years ago, in the 67th chapter of his *History of Greece*, undertook to vindicate the Sophists from the aspersions which had up to that date rested upon them, and to show that the word 'sophistical' in its modern sense is a fossilised injustice, being merely the expression of Plato's prejudice against a respectable set of men. Grote's bold paradox naturally excited opposition in various quarters, and the first edition of the present Essay (1857) contained a sort of protest against it. Time and reflection and the remarks of various scholars who have taken part in the controversy, would seem to necessitate the modification of that protest,—not to the extent of acknowledging that 'the main substance of Grote's conclusions' is 'as clear and certain ²³ as anything of the kind can possibly be,'—but to the extent of acknowledging that Grote has done valuable service in mooted his views, supported as they are by his usual rich learning and his strong manly sense. The 'main substance of Grote's conclusions' would surely be this: that Plato was unjust in attributing 'sophistry' to the Greek Sophists. This plea, as urged in favour of the Sophists and against Plato, we are still unable to accept. Grote's other and, as we should call them, secondary conclusions, e.g. that the Sophists were not a sect but a profession; that among their ranks honourable men were included; that, as the educators of youth, they did much to promote the civilisation of Greece and the development of certain arts and sciences; and that many of the German commentators and historians of philosophy have been too hasty and sweeping in their condemnation of them,—we willingly accept as capable of absolute demonstration. But

²³ This is the opinion of Mr. H. Sidgwick, expressed in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. iv. p. 288.

the question is whether Grote, after justly exposing and refuting certain ill-considered statements of modern writers, has not gone too far, in his zeal of advocacy, in attempting to completely turn the tables on some of the greatest of the ancients. If there was no sophistry (in the now accepted sense of the word) properly chargeable on the Sophists, then one of the chief lessons which Plato thought that he had to teach the world—a lesson which, if it be a true one, is applicable not only to the popular teachers of the fifth century in Greece, but also to the analogous teachers of all ages—would fall to the ground as unmeaning. What we have to do is to see what Plato and Aristotle and others of the ancients really said, and to endeavour to interpret and criticise their sayings rightly.

The question begins with the history of a word. At first the word σοφιστής was used in an intermediate sense to denote any one 'who by profession practised or exhibited some kind of wisdom or cleverness;' thus it was applicable to philosopher, artist, musician, and even poet.²⁴ Æschylus makes Hermes apply the term with sarcasm to Prometheus (P.V. 944), but the sneer consists in addressing Prometheus as σὲ τὸν σοφιστήν—'you the craftsman'—when in so helpless a situation. In the same play, v. 62, it occurs without any such irony:

Ἰνα

μάθῃ σοφιστὴς ὦν Διὸς νωθέστερος,

—'duller in his art than Zeus.' In one of the fragments of Æschylus σοφιστής is applied to Orpheus, denoting 'musician,' or 'master.'

Herodotus (i. 29) mentions that Solon ἄλλοι τε οἱ πάντες

²⁴ Cf. Diogenes Laertius, i. 12: Οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ἐκαλοῦντο. Καὶ οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ σοφισταί.

Καθὰ καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν Ἀρχιλόγῳ τοὺς περὶ Ὀμήρον καὶ Ἡσίοδον ἑταιρῶν οὕτως καλεῖ.

ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σοφισταί, οἱ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτίγχανον ἰόντες, visited Sardis when at the zenith of its prosperity. This probably means 'all others who at that time in Greece were noted for or professed any kind of intellectual ability,'—'all the wits of Greece.' Philosophers, artists, poets, and statesmen, might equally be included. In II. 49, he speaks of οἱ ἐπιγενόμενοι τούτῳ (Melampus) σοφισταί, and in IV. 95, he calls Pythagoras Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ, —in both passages the term merely means 'philosopher.'

In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (acted 423 B.C.), the word σοφιστῆς appears for the first time in an invidious sense, and the invidiousness consists in an association attached to it partly of over-subtle, vapourish, speculation, partly of charlatantry. Thus (V. 331) the clouds are said to be 'the maintainers of many such professors'²⁵—soothsayers from Thurium, quacksalvers, idle fellows with long hair and rings to their finger-tips,—where it is clear that the term 'Sophist,' though now bearing a shade of contempt, has not yet reached the limited Platonic sense of 'paid instructor in rhetoric and philosophy.' In V. 361, Socrates and Prodicus are spoken of as the chief amongst the crew of 'transcendental Sophists (τῶν νῦν μετεωροσοφιστῶν).' In V. 1111 sq. we see expressed a popular opinion of the Sophist, as a pale and attenuated student (σοφιστήν—ὠχρὸν—καὶ κακοδαίμονα). And in V. 1306 sq. the term is applied to Strepsiades, in the sense of 'trickster,' in allusion to his cheating of his creditors. In Aristophanes, then, the word 'Sophist' is still indeterminate; it has become uncomplimentary, but only as conveying the popular feeling about the profession of out-of-the-way accomplishments, just

²⁵ οὐ γὰρ μὰ Δί' οἷσθ' ὅτι κλειστοὺς αὐταὶ βόσκουσι σοφιστάς, θουριόμαντες, λατρούχνας, σφραγιδονυχαρροκομήτας.

These splendid impostors must have been the Cagliostro of Greece.

as the term 'professor' is sometimes used in a slightly sneering way in modern times. Aristophanes has evidently no consciousness of any particular class of Sophists who were the philosophical antagonists of Socrates. He couples Socrates and Prodicus together as among the most 'speculative sophists' of the day. He speaks quite *ab extra*, knowing nothing of the interior of philosophical circles, and only represents a general popular suspicion of all philosophers or 'professors,' not troubling himself to make distinctions between them.

Thucydides writing at the end of the fifth century B.C. uses the word *σοφισταί* in a sense nearer to that of Plato than Aristophanes had done, to denote those professional orators who made displays of rhetoric (*ἐπιδείξεις*) before a set audience.²⁶

By Xenophon (born about 431 B.C.) the word is used both in its indeterminate and in its limited sense. In *Memorabilia*, iv. ii. 1, he speaks of *γράμματα πολλὰ ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων* ('the most famous sages'), in the same sense in which (*Ib.* i. vi. 14) he speaks of *τοὺς θησαύρους τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκείνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες*. In *Cyropædia* he speaks of a 'sophist' to whom he attributes the most elevated and noble character. Cyrus is represented in the fiction as asking Tigranes, son of the chief of Armenia, what had become of 'the sophist,' with whom on former occasions he had seen him associating? 'He is no more,' said Tigranes, 'for my father here put him to death.' 'What crime,' asked Cyrus, 'did he find him committing?' 'He said that he corrupted me,' answered Tigranes; 'and yet, Cyrus, so noble and excellent a man was he, that when he was going to die, he sent for me

²⁶ *Bel. Pelop.* iii. 38: ἀπλῶς τε | θεαταῖς εὐκότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ ἀκοῇς ἢ δονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν | περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.

and told me not to bear my father the least ill-will for putting him to death, because he was not doing it out of malice, but out of ignorance, and whatever faults men commit through ignorance ought to be considered involuntary.' Whether 'sophist' here is to be taken in the limited sense of paid instructor, or merely in the more general sense of 'philosopher,' this remarkable passage shows that at the time when Xenophon wrote his *Cyropædia*, he knew nothing of an absolute antagonism and contrast between Socrates and 'the Sophists,' else he would not have drawn a picture of 'a sophist' suffering the same fate as Socrates, martyr of the same ignorant prejudice, and expressing sentiments worthy of the most noble mood of Socrates. In *Mem.* I. vi. 1, Xenophon speaks of Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστήν. It is uncertain whether Antiphon of Rhamnus, the master of Thucydides, is here meant. Whoever is the person alluded to, he is described as taunting Socrates on his bare feet and scant clothing—the same in winter as in summer—on his spare diet and on the general wretchedness of his mode of life. 'If Philosophy,' he proceeded, 'be your mistress, you get from Her a worse maintenance than any slave would put up with from his master. It is all because you will not take money—money that cheers the recipient, and enables him to live in a more pleasant and gentlemanlike way. You act as if your instructions had no value, else why should you give them for nothing?' Socrates replies that there are two things, which to sell is prostitution—namely, personal beauty and wisdom. 'Those who sell their wisdom for money to any that will buy, men call "Sophists," or, as it were, a sort of male *demi-monde* ;²⁷ whereas whoso, by imparting knowledge to another whom he sees well qualified to learn, binds that

²⁷ Τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν | σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνοις ἀποκαλοῦ-
ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, | σιν, κ.τ.λ., § 13.

other to himself as a friend, does what is befitting to a good citizen and a gentleman.' Here the name 'sophist' is used in its distinctly limited sense to denote a teacher who takes pay, and it is also implied that, on this very account, the name is considered to convey a certain amount of reproach with it.

At the end of Xenophon's treatise on Hunting (*Cynegeticus*, c. xiii.), there appears a moral peroration, in which the writer preaches a sermon on the excellence of the practice of hunting as preparing a man to serve his country. Then he goes on to the worth of toilsome pursuits in general, and though Virtue is toilsome, says that mankind would not shun the pursuit of Her if they could only *see* in bodily form how beautiful She is. This train of thought reminds him of 'the so-called Sophists' of his time. He says, 'They pretend to teach virtue, but their teaching is a mere pretence.'²⁸ He has never seen any one made a good man by the teaching of a Sophist. He says, 'Many beside me find fault with the Sophists, and not with the philosophers, because the former are subtle in words and not in thoughts.'²⁹ 'They seek only reputation and gain, and do not, like the philosophers, teach with a disinterested spirit.'³⁰

This passage, if it could be accepted as independent

²⁸ Θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν καλομένων ὅτι φασὶ μὲν ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ἀγειν οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς νέους, ἄγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τούναντίον· οὔτε γὰρ ἄνδρα που ἐωράκαμεν ὄντιν' οἱ νῦν σοφισταὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν, οὔτε γράμματα παρέχονται ἐξ ὧν χρὴ ἀγαθοὺς γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ματαίων πολλὰ αὐτοῖς γέγραπται ἀφ' ὧν τοῖς νέοις αἱ μὲν ἡδοαὶ κεναί, ἀρετὴ δ' οὐκ ἔστι.

²⁹ Ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται καὶ οὐκ

ἐν τοῖς νόημασιν.

³⁰ Οἱ σοφισταὶ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἐξαπατῆν λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἑαυτῶν κέρδει καὶ οὐδένα οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἐκάστῳ σοφιστῇ κληθῆναι, ὃ ἔστιν ὕψιστος παρὰ γε τοῖς εὖ φρονούσι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν σοφιστῶν παραγγέλματα παραινῶ φυλάττεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐνθυμήματα μὴ ἀτιμάζειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοφισταὶ πλουσίου καὶ νέου θηρώνται, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι πᾶσι κοινοὶ καὶ φίλοι.

testimony, would go far to prove that the strongest terms of censure ever used by either Plato or Aristotle, were only a reflection of the general opinion of enlightened men in Greece, when contrasting 'Sophists' with 'philosophers.' But the passage is out of harmony with that quoted above from the *Cyropædia*; and again it is like an afterthought unnecessarily appended to the treatise *On Hunting*. We know that Xenophon, who was not born much before Plato, lived to a great age; and it seems reasonable to conjecture that, at some time or other—after reading Plato's *Sophistes*, in which the sophist is defined as one who hunts after rich young men—he added on this frigid peroration to his lively and technical discourse on hunting. If so, it is merely a coarse echo of Plato, just as the *Symposium* of Xenophon looks like a poor copy of Plato's *Symposium*. All that can be said, in that case, is that Xenophon, who is not in the least a discriminating or trustworthy authority on philosophical matters, endorses the charge, by whomsoever made, against the Sophists (as a recognised class of teachers)—that their ethical teaching was hollow and rhetorical, and their whole spirit mercenary and self-seeking. And he appears also to indicate that enlightened public opinion was in the same direction.

The next testimony we have to cite is that of Isocrates, who was born 436 B.C., and was thus seven years older than Plato. He seems to have been to some extent the pupil of Socrates, but he maintained himself afterwards by keeping a school of rhetoric, which was attended by the most distinguished pupils. His direction was entirely practical, as is evinced by frequent passages of his works, in which he expresses contempt or dislike of the speculative spirit. On the one hand he uses the term 'Sophist' in its received meaning of professional teacher, and on the other hand he is in the

Isocrates the habit of employing it loosely and vaguely to apply to *literati* or philosophers in general. Isocrates was totally incapable of appreciating the philosophic spirit, and from his point of view, which regarded practical success as alone worth having, he ignored altogether any distinction between the philosopher and the Sophist. His aversion to speculation vents itself in a confused and indiscriminate carping at the literary profession and the philosophers. His oration κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν, which is fragmentary, contains an attack on 'those who undertake to teach.' He ridicules the magnitude of their promises,—their imposture in offering to impart to youths virtue and the art of attaining happiness; and the absurdity of their demanding, in return for those inestimable advantages, the paltry sum of three or four minæ. This class of teachers he calls the disputants (οἱ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατρίβοντες); from them he passes on to censure those that

(1) offer to impart political discourses, being all the while themselves incompetent, and speaking as if such discourses had no relation to particular occasions, but could, like the art of writing, be acquired once for all. The reproaches he makes use of are some of them identical with those to be found in the dialogues of Plato, as, for instance, that the Sophists cannot trust those very pupils to whom they are undertaking to teach justice. He laughs at their affecting to despise wealth, and says that their mean condition, and adherence to mere verbal distinctions, has made many prefer to remain unscientific, as despising such a kind of exercise.

(2)

What Isocrates upholds, however, in contrast to this is not a deeper philosophy, but a more polished rhetoric, and he names mental qualifications for it, which are precisely such as Plato thought most undesirable. Ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς, καὶ δοξαστικῆς, ἔργον εἶναι. In another passage (*Philippus*, § 12), Isocrates uses

the term Sophist with what seems to be an undeniable allusion to Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*. Speaking of the futility of abstract political speculations, he says, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἄκυροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις. In his oration, *De Permutatione* (§ 235), he says that Solon, through his attention to rhetoric, 'came to be called one of the Seven Sophists, and took the appellation now dishonoured and censured by you,' and in § 313, he affirms that Solon was the first of the Athenians to be called a Sophist.³¹ This last statement is at variance with that of Plato, who makes Protagoras to have been the first who accepted the appellation 'Sophist.' The discrepancy depends on the ambiguity and change of meaning in the term. Solon may have been the first Athenian who was called Sophist, in the old sense of the word, i.e. philosopher.³² Protagoras was the first who adopted the name in its later sense, i.e. professional teacher of philosophy.

We see, then, that the word 'Sophist,' having first had a merely general signification, denoting 'philosopher,' 'man of letters,' 'artist,' &c., acquired a special meaning after the middle of the fifth century, as the designation of a particular class of teachers. And then men began to talk of 'the Sophists,'—referring to this class. But the word retained both its significations, even in the pages of the same author. The word in its earlier sense might be applied in a neutral, or in a sneering, way. Thus Xenophon describes 'a Sophist,' who was a most exalted character; and on the other hand,

³¹ Οὐκ οὖν ἐπὶ γε τῶν προγόνων οὕτως εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς καλουμένους Σοφιστὰς ἐθαύμαζον καὶ τοὺς συνόντας αὐτοῖς ἐζήλουν. Σόλωνα μὲν γὰρ, τὸν πρῶτον τῶν πολιτῶν λαβόντα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταύτην προστάτην ἤξιωσαν τῆς πόλεως

εἶναι.

³² The allusion here may be merely to that passage of Herodotus (i. 29) quoted above, where it was said that 'Solon and all the other sophists of the day' came to Sardis.

Isocrates sneers at 'the *Republics* and *Laws* composed by Sophists,' thus applying the name in a general but uncomplimentary sense to Plato himself. But it may safely be said that for 150 years after 450 B.C. it is rare to find the word 'Sophist' used without some shade of disparagement. Aristophanes satirises philosophers generally under this name; Thucydides opposes Sophists, as deliverers of rhetorical discourses, to statesmen in earnest about some question; Xenophon perhaps copies Plato, but also as a soldier and a gentleman he expresses his contempt for a class of paid teachers, who had nothing but verbiage to impart; Isocrates speaks of the class with the bitterness of a rival teacher. If the 'Sophists' of the fifth century made money out of their contemporaries, they seem, on the other hand, to have been hardly used by them (whether deservedly or not) in respect of reputation. We have hitherto looked at 'the Sophists' from their external side, as they appeared to contemporary writers. Passing on now to Plato, we shall first be able to gain much additional information from him as to this same external side of the Grecian Sophists; afterwards we shall learn from him to appreciate the inner essence of that spirit which he calls *ἡ σοφιστική*, and which may undoubtedly be looked upon as an actual phase of human thought, by no means confined to the age of Socrates.

It has been a common mistake to understand, under the name of 'the Sophists,' certain particular individuals, Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Polus, Thrasymachus, and one or two others, who figure in the Dialogues of Plato. Enough has been said to show that in earlier writers the name is never used to indicate a sect in philosophy, and it is equally true that in Plato it is the name of a profession, not of a sect; nor is it ever restricted by him to the above-mentioned individuals, who are merely eminent members of

what was indeed a very wide-spread profession. In the *Meno*, p. 91 E, Socrates is made to speak as if Protagoras was not by any means even the first of the Sophists, καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. And by a still more remarkable mode of speaking, in the *Ethics* of Aristotle ix. i. 5-7, Protagoras appears to be in a sort of way contrasted with the Sophists.³³ It is true that Plato represents Protagoras to have been the first to assume openly the name of Sophist (cf. *Protag.* p. 317), but he also gives a humorous picture in the same dialogue, p. 314 D, of the crowds of Sophists flocking to the house of Callias, so that the porter, mistaking Socrates and Hippocrates for members of the profession, would scarcely open the door to them.³⁴ Within the house they find a conclave of persons, 'most of them foreigners whom Protagoras, like another Orpheus, had drawn after him from their own cities'—amongst others, 'Antimærus the Mendaean, the most famous of the pupils of Protagoras, who was learning with professional objects, meaning to be a Sophist' (*ἐπὶ τέχνη μαυθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος*). Protagoras takes great merit to himself for openly declaring his art, for he confesses 'that a certain amount of envy attaches to it; that, going about drawing away youths from their kindred and connections under the promise of making them better if they associated with him—he was likely to be assailed with hostility; old as he is, however, no

³³ 'Ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ' ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. "Ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἄδηποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον.—Οἱ δὲ προλαβόντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἴτα μὴθὲν ποιοῦντες ὡν ἔφασαν, διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως

ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὁμολόγησαν. Τοῦτο δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μὴθένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὡς ἐπίστανται.

³⁴ "Ἐα, ἔφη, σοφισταὶ τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ.—'Ἀλλ' ὃ 'γαθὲ, ἔφη, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἤκομεν οὔτε σοφισταὶ ἐσμεν, ἀλλὰ θάρβει.

harm has ever come to him on account of his candour' (pp. 316, 317).

It is interesting to trace in Plato the indications of general opinion about the Sophists. In spite of their great success he represents them to have been held in dislike and suspicion by persons of honour, who at the same time made no pretensions to philosophy. This feeling is instinctively expressed by the young Hippocrates (*Protag.* p. 312 A), who being asked whether he is going to Protagoras in order himself to become a Sophist, confesses that he should consider this a great disgrace.³⁵ By Callicles, in the *Gorgias* (p. 519 E), a sweeping contempt is expressed for 'those who profess to teach virtue;' Socrates asks, 'Is it not absurd in them to find fault with the conduct of those whom they have undertaken to make virtuous?' Callicles replies, 'Of course it is; but why should you speak about a set of men who are absolutely worthless?' Socrates answers, 'Because I find the procedure of the Sophist and the Rhetorician identically the same.' In the *Meno* the question being, Is virtue teachable? Socrates argues that if it be so, there must be teachers of it, and inquires of Anytus, 'To whom shall we send Meno to learn virtue from? Whether to the Sophists?' Anytus repudiates the idea, since 'these corrupt all who come near them.'³⁶ Socrates, in reply to this,

³⁵ Σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύναισιν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἶπερ γε ἂ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν. This expression is too strong to be explained away, as Grote proposes, by saying that it is only analogous to an English boy's being unwilling to have it thought that, when grown up, he was going to be a schoolmaster.

³⁶ P. 91 B. σκόπει παρὰ τίναν ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὁρθῶς πέμπομεν. ἢ δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἔρτι λόγον, ὅτι παρὰ τοὺτους τοὺς ὑπίσχυονμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὐτοὺς κοινούς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθάνειν, μισθὸν τοῦτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους; ΑΝ. Καὶ τίναν λέγεις τούτους, ὃ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Οἶσθα δῆπου καὶ σὺ ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἷους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

urges, 'How is it possible this should be true of the Sophists;—a cobbler who professed to mend shoes but made them worse, would be found out in less than thirty days, how then could Protagoras have remained undetected and maintained so great a reputation and made so great a fortune, deceiving the whole of Greece for more than forty years? At all events, must we not concede that if they do harm to others, they do so unconsciously, and are like men insane?' To this Anytus answers, 'that *they* are insane who give money to the Sophists, and still more so the States who allow them to practise their art.' Socrates says, 'Some one of the Sophists must have wronged you, Anytus, or you would not be so bitter.' Anytus says, 'No, I never had anything to do with them.' Socrates asks, 'How then can you know what they are like?' Anytus says, 'Oh, I know well enough what they are like without having had anything to do with them.' Socrates implies that Anytus is speaking not from knowledge but prejudice. He dismisses the subject by adding, 'After all, there is perhaps something in what you say' (*καὶ ἔσως τι λέγεις*, *Meno*, p. 92 D).

In this discussion it is observable that the abuse of the Sophists is put into the mouth of Anytus (the accuser of Socrates), who may be looked at as the representative of conservative feeling in Athens. Full justice is done in the dialogue (*Meno*, p. 90 A) to the eminence of his position, his wealth, and political influence. But afterwards, dramatically, his arbitrary, narrow, and unfair turn of mind comes out. Evidently we cannot say that in the *Meno* Plato calumniates the Sophists, or vilifies them as opponents and

AN. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὃ Σώκρατες.
μηδὲνα τῶν συγγενῶν, μήτε οἰκείων
μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων,
τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τοῦ-

τους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοι γε
φανερὰ ἐστὶ λάβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν
συγγινομένων.

rivals of Socrates. Rather he makes it appear that there is something hasty and inconsidered in the popular feeling against them (which is a true, but blundering instinct), and that the philosopher must consider their claims, their tendencies, and the phenomena of their success from a deeper point of view.

To a similar purport Socrates is made to speak in the *Republic* (p. 492 A), where he says to Adeimantus, 'Perhaps you think with the multitude that youths are corrupted by Sophists, and do not perceive that Society is itself the greatest Sophist, educating and moulding young and old. What Sophist or private instructor could withstand the powerful voice of the world? Don't you see that the so-called Sophists do nothing else but follow public opinion? They teach nothing else but the popular dogmas. They are like the keepers of a wild beast, who, when they have studied his moods and learned to understand his noises, call this a system and a philosophy.' The common accusation had been that the Sophists unsettled young men's opinions, and turned them away from the established beliefs. Socrates implies, 'I am willing to exonerate them from this. Rather I have to complain that the Sophists are too unsophisticated, that they are too much merely echoes of the popular voice; that they have "*plus que personne l'esprit que tout le monde a.*"'

Viewed externally the Sophists presented the appearance of a set of teachers, such as first appeared in Greece towards the middle of the fifth century B.C. (Protagoras was born about B.C. 480, and began to practise his art in his thirtieth year, but there were others before him). They were for the most part itinerant teachers, going from city to city. They would make displays of their rhetoric (*ἐπιδείξεις*), and then invite the youths of their audience to come and receive

instruction with a view to becoming able men in the State (*δεινοί, habiles homines, &c.*). Their instructions were various, rhetoric and dialectic, ethics, music, and physical science. Some, such as Hippias, professed a pantological knowledge; others, as Gorgias, confined themselves to rhetoric. Their profits no doubt varied with their success; some must have been ill-paid and wretched, as is represented by Aristophanes and Isocrates. The leading members of the profession seem to have made large sums of money. On this point, however, Isocrates is at direct issue with Plato. Socrates says in the *Meno*, p. 91 D, that 'he knew of Protagoras gaining greater wealth by his profession than Phidias and ten other sculptors put together.' And in the *Hippias Major* (pp. 282, 283) Prodicus is said to have made immense sums;²⁷ Hippias is made to boast that 'when quite a young man he made in Sicily, in a short space of time, more than 150 minæ (600*l.*), and that in one little village, Inycus, he made more than 20 minæ' (80*l.*). He adds, however, 'that he supposes he has made more than any two Sophists put together.' In contradiction to this picture, Isocrates gives a much more limited account of the pecuniary success of the Sophists. He says (*De Permutatione*, 155, 156), 'Not one of the so-called Sophists will be found to have amassed much money. Some of them lived in small, others in very moderate circumstances. Gorgias of Leontium made the most on record. He lived in Thessaly, where people were very rich; attained a great age; was long given up to his business; had no settled habitation in any State; paid no taxes nor contribution; had no wife nor children, and so was free from this the most continual tax of all—and with these advantages beyond others for acquiring a fortune, he only left

²⁷ Τοῖς νέοις συνὼν χρήματα ἔλαβε θαυμαστὰ δόσα. Cf. Xen. *Symp.* i. 5, 17, 62.

behind him at the last 1,000 staters' (125*l.*?). This oration was written in the eighty-second year of Isocrates' life, and probably much later than the above-mentioned Dialogues of Plato; the fame of the achievements of the Sophists was therefore less fresh. Isocrates, being himself a paid teacher, was complaining of the difficulty of making enough, he was therefore not likely to take a sanguine view of success in this department; also, it is credible that the Sophists did, as is usually the case with persons whose gains are irregular, not save much or leave much behind them. Hence we need not find a great difficulty in the discrepancy of the two statements. Plato represents popular rumours and external surprise at the success of a new profession; Isocrates, taking the other side, goes into details and shows that in the long run there was nothing so very wonderful effected after all.

With regard to the reproach against the Sophists, that their teaching for money at all was something discreditable—an argument has been raised, that this is really no reproach, as the practice of so many respectable men among the moderns may serve to testify. But we should endeavour to put ourselves into the position of the ancients, and the following considerations may help us to do so. (1) The practice of the Sophists was an innovation, and jarred on men's feelings. There was something that to the natural prejudices of the mind seemed more beautiful in the old simple times, when wisdom, if imparted, was given as a gift. As soon as the Sophists began their career, the fine and free spirit of the old philosopher seemed gone. When Hippias boasts of his gains, Socrates ironically replies, 'Dear me, how much wiser men of the present day are than those of old time. You seem to be just the reverse of Anaxagoras. For he is said to have had a fortune left him and to have lost it all, such a poor Sophist was he (*οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφί-*

ζῆσθαι), and other such stories are told of the ancients.' (*Hipp. Major*, p. 283 A.) (2) With the Sophists systematic education began for the first time. Undoubtedly this was a necessity. But it is equally true that about the administration of systematic education there is something that appears at first sight slavish and mechanical. The Greeks had not yet learned those principles according to which a sense of duty will dignify the meanest tasks. They tested things too exclusively in reference to the standard of the fine and the noble (καλόν). (3) But it was not simply the office of the paid schoolmaster that was disliked in the Sophist. We do not find that the teachers of gymnastics or of harp-playing were held in disrepute. Those who kept schools for boys were looked down upon, it is true,³⁸ but were not identified with the Sophists. The latter taught not boys, but youths; again, they taught not the necessary rudiments, but something more pretentious—wisdom, philosophy, political skill, virtue, and the conduct of life. To make a market of the highest subjects and of divine philosophy seemed to men like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, little less than a sort of simony.³⁹ There was a charlatanism in the offer to teach these things to all comers, which was from different causes equally offensive to ordinary men and to the philosophers. Men like Anytus and Aristophanes complained that the Sophists corrupted youth by teaching them subtleties and unsettling their opinions. In this complaint there was a part of the truth. The philosophers added the other side, by complain-

if there was a
notion that
"who pays the
paper may call
the least":

³⁸ Cf. Demosthenes *de Coronâ*, p. 313.

³⁹ The severity of this principle appears not to have been long maintained in the post-Socratic, or at all events the post-Aristotelian schools. Aristippus, whose worldly spirit puts

him into a sort of revolt against Socrates, his master, taught as a Sophist (*Diog. Laert.* ii. 62), and appears to have lived upon his gains. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, according to Quintilian, mercedos acceptaverunt.

ing that the Sophists were shallow and rhetorical, that they flattered popular prejudices instead of displacing them. The Sophists were vilipended by the philosophers not merely as paid teachers, but as paid charlatans.⁴⁰

The most characteristic and prominent creation of the early Sophistic era was, in one word, rhetoric. But as rhetoricians, the Sophists were themselves the creatures of their times. Circumstances were ripe in the Greek States for the development of this new direction of the human mind, and it came. Cicero (*Brutus*, c. 12) quoting from Aristotle's lost work, the *Συναγωγή τεχνῶν*, tells us that Rhetoric took its rise in Sicily, 'when after the expulsion of the tyrants (i.e. Thrasybulus, B.C. 467), many lawsuits arose with regard to the claims of citizens now returning from banishment and who had been dispossessed of their property. The incessant litigation which this led to, caused Corax and Tisias to draw up systems of the art of speaking; (for before this time there had been careful speaking and even written speeches, but no fixed method or *rationale*). Hence also Protagoras came to write his commonplaces of oratory and Gorgias his encomia.' Everywhere in Greece circumstances were analogous to those in Sicily. Personal freedom gave rise to the contests of the law courts. Nothing was more necessary than that a citizen should be able to defend his own cause. The demand for instruction in rhetoric, and for the development of all its arts, means, and appliances, was met everywhere by the Sophists.

Hence the impression they produced on the national speech and thought was almost unspeakably great. To trace the technical changes and advances in the various systems from Corax to Isocrates belongs to the history of rhetoric.

⁴⁰ Καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὖσης. Aristotle, *Soph. Elench.* ii. 6.

It will suffice for the present purpose to make a few remarks on the Sophistical rhetoric in its relation to life and modes of thought. Two separate tendencies seem to have manifested themselves from the very outset among the masters of composition. On the one hand, the Sicilian school, represented by Gorgias of Leontium, Polus of Agrigentum, and their follower, Alcidas of Elæa, in Asia Minor, aimed at *εὐέπεια*, 'fine speaking.' On the other hand, the Greek school, led by Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, devoted themselves more especially to *ὀρθοέπεια*, 'correct speaking.' From these opposite but concurrent tendencies arose that which may be called 'style' in Greece, and which did not exist before the middle of the fifth century.

The achievements of Protagoras and the 'Greek' rhetoricians seem to have amounted to no less than the foundation of grammar, etymology, philology, the distinction of terms, prosody, and literary criticism. In judging of the so-called verbal quibbles of the Sophists, we have to transport ourselves to a time anterior to the commonest abstractions of grammar and logic. Protagoras was the first to introduce that thinking upon words which was one manifestation of the subjective tendencies of the day. His work, entitled *Ὀρθοέπεια* (which is mentioned by Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 267 C), most probably contained a variety of speculations, as well philological as grammatical. And even his *Ἀλήθεια* appears from Plato's *Cratylus* (p. 391 C) to have touched upon etymological questions. From Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, III. v., we learn that Protagoras was the first to classify the genders of nouns, calling them *ἄρρενα*, *θήλεα*, and *σκεύη*. From *Soph. Elench.* xiv. § 1, we learn that he considered the terminations *-is* and *-ης* ought to be appropriated to the masculine gender, so that to say *μῆνιν οὐλομένην* would be a solecism. In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (v. 668-692),

Socrates is ludicrously introduced as following out these ideas, and wishing to alter the termination of *κάρδοπος* and *ἀλεκτρυών* to suit the feminine gender. Another of the grammatical performances of Protagoras was the classification of the *λόγος* or 'form of speech,' into question, answer, command, and prayer (Diogenes Laert. ix. 53), a classification which seems to have had some affinity with that of the moods of verbs. The allusions in the *Clouds* to the art of metres, versification, and rhythms, seem to imply the practice of similar studies in the school of Protagoras. Lastly, his speculations in etymology and language seem to have been made in support of his philosophical doctrine of 'knowing and being,'—*πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου* (cf. Plato's *Cratylus*, l.c.).

Prodicus, who is said to have been the master of Socrates (cf. *Protagoras*, p. 341 A, *Hippias Major*, p. 282 C), was famous for his distinctions between words of cognate signification and apparently synonymous. He is reported to have said 'that a right use of words is the beginning of knowledge' (*πρῶτον γὰρ, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ*, *Euthydem.* p. 277 E). In Plato's *Protagoras*, p. 337, a speech is put into his mouth, which exhibits an amusing caricature of his style. Every sentence contains a verbal refinement, and is thrown back on itself, in order to furnish out some antithetical distinction in language. 'We must be impartial, but not indifferent listeners (*κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι, ἴσους δὲ μὴ*). The speakers should dispute, not wrangle (*ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μὴ*). So they will gain our esteem, rather than our applause (*εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε*), and we shall feel rather joy than pleasure (*εὐφραينوίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα*).'

In themselves, many of the distinctions drawn by Prodicus were probably of little value—many were overstrained,

and even false; cf. *Charmides*, p. 163, where a distinction is given which is said to be after the manner of Prodicus: it is between *ποίησις* and *πράξις*—*πῶξις* is defined to be *ποίησις τῶν ἀγαθῶν*. But we must acknowledge the merit of this first attempt at separating the different shades of language, and fixing a nomenclature. The powerful influence of this example (not always a healthy one) may be traced in the style of Thucydides. And its full development was attained in the accurate terminology of Aristotle.

The short speech assigned to Hippias in the *Protagoras* of Plato (p. 337), and that in *Hipp. Maj.* p. 282, being obvious caricatures, give us still a conception of his manner. He appears to have united some of the splendour of the Sicilian school to the self-conscious and introverted writing of the Greek rhetoricians. This combination gives the sentences attributed to him a shadowy resemblance to the style of Thucydides, as, for instance, the following: *ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφύνασθαι* (*Protag.* 337 D). Of course here the pomp of the words covers vapidity of thought, but one can see the outward husk and hollow shell of style.

The influence of Gorgias upon the writers of Greece probably exceeded that of any other Sophist. After his first essays in speculation, he appears to have renounced philosophy, and to have proclaimed himself a teacher of rhetoric. He was chosen by his countrymen, the Leontines, to come as ambassador to Athens in the year 427 B.C., asking aid against Syracuse. Thucydides (III. 86), with his usual reserve on all matters the least extraneous, makes no men-

tion of his name. Diodorus (xii. 53) has the following remarks on this event: 'At the head of the envoys was Gorgias the rhetorician, a man who far surpassed all his contemporaries in oratorical skill; he also was the first inventor of the art of rhetoric. He amazed the Athenians, quick-witted and fond of oratory as they were (*ὄντας εὐφυεῖς καὶ φιλολόγους*), by the strangeness (*τῷ ξενίζοντι*) of his language, by his extraordinary *ἀντίθετα*, and *ἰσόκωλα*, and *πάρισα*, and *ὁμοιοτέλευτα*, and other figures of the same kind, which at that time from the novelty of their style were deemed worthy of adoption, but are now looked upon as affected and ridiculous when used in such nauseous superabundance.' The speeches of Gorgias were thus most elaborately constructed, and, in addition to their almost metrical character, bordered upon poetry also in their use of metaphors and of compound words. Aristotle comments upon the fault of writing prose as if it were poetry, and he severely says that this was done by the first prose writers because they observed how great was the success of poets in covering by their diction the emptiness of their thoughts.⁴¹ Aristotle in another place quotes from Gorgias and from Alcidamas, his follower, several instances of what he calls 'frigidity' (*ψυχρότης*, *Rhet.* iii. iii. 1), produced by pompous or poetical words and compounds. He also mentions two of the rhetorical tricks of Gorgias. One was that Gorgias boasted he could never be at a loss in speaking, 'for if he is speaking of Achilles, he praises Peleus,' i.e. he will go off from his subject into something collateral (*Rhet.* iii. xvii. 2). The other device was one full of shrewdness: he said, 'You should silence your adversary's earnestness

⁴¹ *Rhet.* iii. i. 9. 'Ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τήνδε τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο

ποιητικῇ πρώτῃ ἐγένετο λέξις, ὅσον ἡ Γοργίου.

with jest, and his jest with earnest.'⁴² Among the imitators of Gorgias were Agathon and Isocrates. The speech of Agathon in the *Symposium* of Plato is an example of the extreme of the flowery style. Socrates remarks at its conclusion, that he has been almost petrified by the speaking Gorgias (i.e. Gorgon's) head which Agathon has presented to him. The influence of Gorgias may also be extensively detected in the antitheses (often forced), the balance of sentences, and the occasionally poetical diction of Thucydides.

Rhetoric, viewed historically, considered as a thinking about words and the possibilities of language, was by no means, as we have seen, coeval with the origin of States and of human thought. It was a somewhat late product of civilisation. But it was a path which there was an inherent necessity for opening and exploring. From this point of view, thanks are due to the more eminent Sophists for their contributions towards the formation of Grecian prose style, for developing the idea of the *period*, and bringing under the domain of art that which before was left uncultivated. If in their own writing ornament was overdone, they may be considered in this, as in other things, to occupy a transition place, and to have served as pioneers to others.

But there is yet another aspect in which rhetoric must be regarded, and that is, not merely as an affair of words and sentences, but as a direction and phase of thought itself. It consists in attention to form, producing neglect of matter—in striving for the brilliant and the plausible, instead of for the true—in decking out stale thoughts with a fresh outer garment of words—in enforcing a conclusion without

⁴² *Rhet.* iii. xviii. 7. Καὶ δεῖν ἔφη | τῶν ἀναγνῶν γέλωτι, τὸν δὲ γέλωτα
Γοργίας τὴν αὐτὴν σπουδὴν διαφθελεῖν | σπουδῇ.

having tested the premisses. This takes up the arts of the lawyer into the philosopher's or the teacher's chair; it covers its ignorance with a cloak of verbosity; it will never confess there is anything it does not know. This most truly keeps the key of knowledge, and will neither enter in itself nor let other men come in. It speaks things which it does not feel; its utterances come from the fancy, and not from the heart; its pictures are not taken from nature; its metaphors are unnecessary; its pathos is hollow. If language be looked on as not separate from thought, but identical with it, then is rhetoric false thought, as opposed to true. There are, no doubt, various degrees and stages of rhetorical falsehood. The lightest kind is that which consists in some slight exaggeration in a word or an expression. This often takes place in cases where a speaker or writer fully and sincerely believes the general import of what he is asserting; but in setting forth the separate parts he allows himself to quit the stern simplicity of what he actually feels. Again, when a foregone conclusion has lost its freshness, rhetoric is called in in the hope of enlivening it. The most flagrant rhetorical falsity would, of course, consist in the advocacy of propositions which the speaker not only did not believe (in the sense of not feeling or realising them), but absolutely disbelieved. As men are not fiends, this is extremely rare. Rhetoric usually juggles the mind of the speaker as well as of his audience. It takes off the attention of both from examining the truth. It is, for the most part, well-meaning, and is much rather a defender than an impugner of the common orthodox opinions. Hence it was that Plato defined rhetoric to be a trick of flattering the populace. Hence, also, he said that the Sophists studied the humours of society, as one might study the temper of a wild beast. In the practice of the Sophists, Plato saw Rhe-

toric and Sophistry⁴³ identical. Sophistry consisted in substituting rhetoric for philosophy, words for thoughts (*ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασι*, Xen. *Cynaget. l.c.*). With Plato, philosophy was a higher kind of poetry, in which reason and imagination both found their scope. With the Sophists, it was an harangue (*ἐπίδειξις*) upon any given subject, with figures and periods to catch applause. Aristotle, indeed, was enabled afterwards to look at rhetoric in a mere abstract way, as the art of composition, and so to separate the Rhetorician from the Sophist, since it was not necessary that Rhetoric should be used in a Sophistical spirit. But Plato always regards Rhetoric as a false impulse in human thought; he always considers it in the concrete, and never as a mere instrument to be used and abused. And that the rhetorical spirit is a reality, attaching itself above all to the highest subjects, to philosophy and religion, and, like the 'bloom of decay,' luxuriantly overgrowing them, — this the experience of all ages and of every thinking man can testify.

But hollow rhetoric is not the only feature of Sophistry, either according to modern acceptance, or in the pictures drawn by Plato. An even more prominent association connected with it is—fallacious reasoning. From the original meaning of the word *σοφίζεσθαι*, 'to devise cleverly,'—'sophism' naturally stands for a trick in language or thought, and Sophistry becomes identical with paralogism used for a dishonest purpose. But this is not merely an association derived from etymology. Plato and Aristotle both directly accuse the Greek 'Sophists,' or professional teachers, of the practice of consciously using fallacious arguments to suit their own purposes. It has of late been ingeniously dis-

⁴³ Cf. *Gorgias*, p. 520 A. ταῦτόν, ὃ μακάρι', ἐστὶ σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ.

covered and pointed out⁴⁴ that at a particular point a change comes over the spirit of Plato's treatment of Sophists, that the dialogues in which the Sophists are mentioned fall into two groups, 'and that in each of these the being called Sophist exhibits a strongly marked character, so different from that of his homonym in the other group, that if they had not been called by the same name, no reader would have dreamt of identifying them.

The earlier group of dialogues consists of *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*, in which the great characteristics attributed to the leading Sophists, who are introduced as *dramatis personæ* (Protagoras, Polus, Hippias, Gorgias, Thrasymachus), are—their wordiness, their habit of declaiming and making long speeches, their ignorance of the art of argumentation, their inability to discuss a subject by means of short questions and answers. These personages, widely differing in many important points, both of doctrine and attitude, are represented as having one thing in common, which may be represented positively as a rhetorical and declamatory tendency, and negatively as an incapacity for close reasoning. In *Meno*, in which the Sophists are mentioned and half-defended against Anytus, Socrates alludes to the Eristics (p. 75 D) as if a distinct class from the Sophists and by no means identical with them. But when we come to the second group of dialogues, consisting of *Euthydemus*, *Sophistes*, and *Theætetus*, a great change is observable, for the Sophists are now represented as the practitioners of perverse dialectic, as putting captious questions to people and inveigling them into contradictions by means of verbal quibbles, as professors of the art of ἐπιστηνική. In *Euthydemus* two Sophists are represented as practising this art on an

⁴⁴ By Mr. H. Sidgwick in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. iv. p. 294 sqq.

ingenuous youth, who is rescued from their clutches by Socrates. In *Sophistes* the Sophist, with his short questions and answers, is expressly contrasted with both the statesman and the Rhetorician. In *Theætetus* (p. 154 E) the adverb σοφιστικῶς⁴⁵ is used summarily to designate the method of captious Eristic, which has no regard to truth, but only to victory, as opposed to honest Dialectic, whose object is the discovery of truth.

There appears, then, to have been a strongly marked change of front in Plato's attack on the Sophists. The only difficulty in explaining this arises from the doubt whether *Euthydemus* was not one of the earlier dialogues of Plato (as indeed it is generally supposed to have been). Mr. Sidgwick, however, thinks that from the nature of its contents it may be placed in chronological juxtaposition with *Sophistes*.

However this may be, the difference in view between *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*, on the one hand, and *Euthydemus* and *Sophistes*, on the other hand, seems to point to an historical change that occurred in the characteristics of the Greek Sophists. While the early and greater Sophists were mainly rhetoricians and declaimers, the later Sophists, those of the fourth century B.C., were mainly eristics, or perverse dialecticians. Mr. Sidgwick is of opinion that this arose from the example of the Socratic mode of disputation—that Socrates, by showing his triumphant *elenchus*, or refutation of opinions and conclusions which he considered unsound, is responsible for the *sophistici elenchi*, or fallacies, those unfair arguments which Aristotle tells us were used with the view of astounding the listener, in order that out of this triumph reputation, and out of reputation

⁴⁵ ξυνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους ἐκρούμεν.

gain, might accrue; ⁴⁶ in short, that Socrates was the father of Eristic in all its forms. This is an interesting suggestion, and a certain amount of acceptance must be accorded to it. Doubtless in the half-century which succeeded the death of Socrates a very great impulse was given in Athens to the practice of Dialectic, and thence of Eristic. This appears in the post-Socratic philosophical schools; in the captious arguments invented by the Megarians; in the Platonic Dialogues themselves, which are composed throughout on a dialectical, often on an eristical, basis. But still more this tendency must have manifested itself in Athenian society, as we learn from the *Topics* of Aristotle, which work was written in order to give rules for the intellectual game of Dialectic, as practised at Athens.⁴⁷ Socrates may have given the start to this sort of thing; but it just suited the lively and intellectual Athenians, and we may conceive of them at this period as a society possessed by an insatiate appetite for discussion and controversy, whether with a view to truth or to mere victory over an opponent. The Sophists were always rather the creatures than the creators of their age; and as in the fifth century they followed the impulse of the times, and became rhetoricians, and in some cases made contributions to Rhetoric and its subsidiary arts, so in the fourth century they appear merrily swimming with the tide of Dialectic, and drawing profit to themselves out of it,—working out the possibilities of Eristic, and inventing their own fallacious refutations to match the *elenchus* of Socrates. Their procedure was caricatured by Plato in the *Euthydemus*, but Aristotle gravely assures us as a matter of fact

⁴⁶ *Soph. El.* xi. 5. Οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμὸν

σοφιστικοί.

⁴⁷ See Grote's *Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 386.

that the kind of fallacies therein represented were habitually employed by the Sophists.⁴⁸ As collected and analysed by Aristotle, these *Sophistical Refutations* may claim the honour of having well-nigh exhausted the possibilities of error in human reasoning. Modern logicians have hardly been able to add any new fallacies to the list.

Aristotle says that 'Plato gave no bad definition of Sophistry in making it to be concerned with the non-existent. For the arguments of almost all the Sophists may be said to be concerned with the accidental (i.e. that which has no absolute existence); as, for instance, their question whether Coriscus, the musician, is the same as plain Coriscus; whether, by becoming musical, one absolutely comes into being,' &c. (*Metaphys.* v. ii. 4). Plato had said (*Sophist*, p. 254 A), that 'while the philosopher is ever devoted to the idea of the absolutely existent, and thus lives in a region which is dark from excess of light, the Sophist, on the other hand, takes refuge in the murky region of the non-existent.' This 'non-existent' was, as Aristotle explained it, the sphere of the accidental, the conditional, the relative, as contrasted with absolute being. Elsewhere we find that it was a trick of the Sophists to avail themselves of a traditional piece of dialectic 'older than Protagoras,' and to argue that to speak falsely was impossible, for that would be no less than uttering the non-existent, whereas the non-existent has no existence in any sense whatever, and therefore to conceive or utter it is impossible (*Euthydem.* pp. 284-286). Plato maintains against this argument, and against the doctrines of the Eleatics, that in some sense 'not-being' has an existence. We see then that to set the

⁴⁸ *Soph. Elench.* i. 8. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν | τοιαύτης ἐφίενται δυνάμειος οὗτος καλοῦ-
 ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον λόγων γένος, καὶ ὅτι | μεν σοφιστὰς, δῆλον.

relative meaning of a word against its absolute signification, to play off the accidental against the essential, formed a main part of the 'Eristic' art.

The view here taken, then, is that while it is true that Eristic was only fully developed by the post-Socratic Sophists, it was not derived by them at first hand from Socrates himself, but came to them through the active dialectic tendencies now spread throughout society, which tendencies they, as professors of the art of disputation, restless in intellect and without earnestness about consequences, appear certainly to have perverted. The birth and prevalence of fancy no doubt gave birth to a sounder logic, which was necessary as a counteraction to the Sophists, and which their clever manipulation of language suggested. Thus, historically, their vicious practice was advantageous, though this can hardly be reckoned to them as a merit. Independently of the valuable distinction drawn by Mr. Sidgwick between the characteristics of the first and second generation of Sophists, we may still ask whether a certain bias towards fallacy did not exhibit itself even in the first and most eminent members of this profession. Mr. Sidgwick argues justly that Protagoras can hardly have been, as Diogenes Laertius suggests, the inventor of Eristic, else Plato would never have represented him as a perfect child in anything like close dialectic argument. But on the other hand, when we read of the boast of Protagoras (*τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα*) that 'he could make the worse cause the better,' which Aristotle says that men were indignant at, and when we read of the devices of Gorgias (mentioned above, p. 126), we can hardly exonerate the rhetoric even of these worthies from being too facile in the direction of not unconscious fallacy.

Grote repeatedly, and rightly, argues that the Sophists were not a philosophical sect, and had no common philo-

sophical doctrines. Yet the two most eminent among those who first consented to espouse the profession and to accept the name of Sophists, had been beforehand not inconsiderable philosophers, and as such had each their respective connection with previous schools of philosophy. Thus Sophistry may be said to have had a philosophical pedigree of its own. As represented in the persons of the two most eminent Sophists, it sprang almost simultaneously from the north and the south. Also it may be said to have derived its origin more or less immediately from two directly opposite schools of previous thinkers. Protagoras of Abdera starts from the principle of Heraclitus that all is becoming; Gorgias of Leontium took up the Eleatic principle of absolute unity. Both Protagoras and Gorgias may be considered to have held their character as philosophers in some measure distinct from their professional character as rhetoricians and teachers, and yet the results of their philosophising coloured their teaching. The philosophy of the two can never be said to have amalgamated, and yet it exhibits a common element. An accurate statement of the doctrine of Protagoras appears in the *Theætetus* of Plato, which is intended to refute it, but which at the same time treats its author with all respect. We see at once that it was a profound doctrine, and of the greatest importance as a 'moment' in philosophy. Heraclitus had said that all is motion, or becoming,—Protagoras analyses this becoming into its two sides, the active and the passive, in other words the objective and subjective. Nothing exists absolutely, things attain an existence by coming in contact with and acting on an organ of sensation, that is, a subject. Thus all existence is merely relative, and depends in each case on a relation to the individual percipient; and therefore 'man is the measure of all things, of the existent that they exist, and of things non-existent that they

do not exist.' This proposition on the one hand contains the germ of all philosophy, on the other hand it renders philosophy impossible by reducing all knowledge and existence to mere sensation. It contains the germ of all philosophy by asserting that all knowledge, and therefore all existence, as far as we can conceive it, consists in the relation between an object and a subject, that every object implies a subject and every subject an object. This cannot be gainsaid, and it is in short one of the main purposes of philosophy to lift men out of their common unreflecting belief in the *absolute* existence of external objects into so much idealism as this. But the principle of Protagoras falls short in its misconception and too great limiting of the subjective side of existence. Objects exist only in relation to a subject, but not necessarily in relation to individual perceptions. If individual perception is the measure of all things, the same object will be capable of contradictory qualities at the same moment according as it *appears* different to different individuals; a thing can then be and not be at the same time; the distinction between true and false will be done away; even denial (*ἀντιλέγειν*) must cease. Protagoras acknowledged these results; he said, 'What appears true to a person is true to him. I cannot call it false, I can only endeavour to make his perceptions, not truer but better, i.e. such as are more expedient for him to entertain.'

Man is indeed the measure of all things, not the individual man with his changeable and erring perceptions, but the universal reason of man, manifesting itself more or less distinctly in the deepest intuitions of those who are pure and wise, and who attain most nearly to the truth. The principle of Protagoras, by calling attention to the subjective side of knowledge, led the way to what has been called 'critical' philosophy, to a critic of cognition itself; and this

was a great advance upon former systems, which regarded knowledge and existence too much as if absolutely objective. But Protagoras himself rested in sensationalism, and becoming from his own system sceptical about truth altogether, he seems to have returned (as above mentioned) to mere principles of expediency. His sensational theory and his scepticism about knowledge are not to be regarded as Sophistical, in the Platonic sense of the word. But with this sceptical foundation to all theories, to commence teaching virtue; to have thus reduced virtue to a matter of expediency for daily life—to have combined such acute penetration with so little moral or scientific earnestness—after exploding philosophy to have fallen back upon popular and prudential Ethics—this indeed was to exhibit many of the essential features of that Sophistry against which Plato directed all his strength. We see traces of the same spirit—of acute and active intellect combined with a certain trifling and unreality upon the gravest subjects—in the well-known sentence of Protagoras on the gods: ‘Respecting the gods, I neither know whether they exist or do not exist; for there is much that hinders this knowledge, namely, the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life.’⁴⁹ This scepticism, as far as we can conjecture its tendency, does not consist in denying the Grecian Polytheism in order to substitute in its place some deeper conception. It cannot, therefore, be considered parallel to the philosophical contempt of Xenophanes and others for the fables of Paganism. Protagoras despairs of a theology, and proclaims his despair, and falls back upon practical success.

The celebrated thesis of Gorgias, which formed the sub-

⁴⁹ Diog. Laert. ix. 51, Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* ix. 56.

ject of his book 'On Nature, or the Non-existent,' and of which a sketch is preserved in the Peripatetic treatise, called Aristotle's, *De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiâ*, and also in Sextus Empiricus (*ad Math.* vi. 65), is one of the most startling utterances of antiquity. It consists of three propositions. (1) Nothing exists. (2) If it does exist, it cannot be known. (3) If it can be known, it cannot be communicated.⁵⁰ The extravagant character of this position was denounced by Isocrates in the opening of his *Helen*. He is speaking of the inveterate habit of defending paradoxes which had so long prevailed, and he asks, 'Who is so behind-hand (*ὀψιμαθής*) as not to know that Protagoras and the Sophists of that time left us compositions of the kind I have named, and even more vexatious? for how could anyone surpass the audacity of Gorgias, who dared to say that nothing of existing things exists?' Isocrates adds to the name of Gorgias, those of Zeno and Melissus; he had before specified as ridiculous paradoxes the theses that 'it is impossible to speak falsehood'—that 'it is impossible to deny'—that 'all virtue is one'—that 'virtue is a science.' Elsewhere (*De Permutat.* § 268), he mentions as the 'theories of the old Sophists,' that 'the number of existences was, according to Empedocles, four; according to Ion, three; according to Alcmaeon, two; according to Parmenides and Melissus, one; according to Gorgias, absolutely none.' We see then that the point of view which Isocrates takes is that of so-called common sense and practical life—that he declines to enter upon philosophical questions at all. He regards the absolute Nihilism of Gorgias as belonging to the same sphere of thought, only a more flagrant development of it, as the doctrine, 'all virtue is a science.' It is always easy to set

⁵⁰ Οὐκ εἶναι φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ δ' ἔστιν, | σὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις. Arist.
ἄγνωστον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνο- | *De Xenophane, &c.* c. v.

aside philosophical views as repugnant to common sense, as mere subtleties and useless paradoxes. But if we enter on philosophy at all, we must accept the dialectic of the reason. The difficulties into which it may lead us must not be rejected as subtleties, but acknowledged, and if possible reconciled with the views of common sense.

Philosophy, before Gorgias, had been occupied with an abstract conception of Being, whether as One or Many. The dialectic of the Eleatics had been directed to establish, against all testimony of the senses, that the only existence possible is one immutable Being. On the other hand, the Ionics maintained the plurality of existences; and Heraclitus especially held the exact contrary to the Eleatic view, that there was no permanence or unity, but all was plurality and becoming. The dialectic of Gorgias coming in here explodes all philosophy by a demonstration that 'nothing exists.' This part of his position he appears to have maintained by bringing Eleatic arguments against the Ionic hypothesis, and Ionic arguments against the Eleatic hypothesis.⁵¹ 'If there is existence (*εἰ δ' ἔστι*), it must be either Not-being or Being. It cannot be Not-being, else Being will be identical with Not-being. It cannot be Being, for then it must be either One or Many, either created or uncreated. It cannot be One, for One implies divisibility, i.e. plurality. It cannot be Many, for the Many is based upon the unit of which it is only the repetition, and is so essentially One. Again, it cannot be created, for it must either be created out of the existent or the non-existent. It cannot be the former, else it would have existed already. It cannot be the latter, for

⁵¹ Καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, συνθεῖς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα, ὅσοι περὶ τῶν ὄντων λέγοντες, τὰναντία, ὥς δοκοῦσιν, ἀποφαίνονται αὐτοῖς· οἱ μὲν, ὅτι ἐν καὶ οὐ

πολλὰ· οἱ δὲ αὖ, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ οὐχ ἓν· καὶ οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἀγέννητα οἱ δὲ ὥς γενόμενα ἐπιδεικνύοντες, ταῦτα συλλογίζεται κατ' ἀμφοτέρων. Arist. *De Xen. &c. l.c.*

nothing can come from the non-existent. Nor can it be Uncreate, for that implies its being Infinite, and the Infinite can have no existence in space.' These arguments are not to be looked at as a mere wanton sporting with words. Rather they contain a very penetrating insight into some of the difficulties which beset the most abstract view of existence. The same difficulties have been felt by other philosophers; thus, in the *Parmenides* of Plato, great obstacles have been set forth to considering existence either as One or as Many. And Kant represents it as one of the antinomies of the reason, that the world can neither be conceived of as without a beginning, nor as having had a beginning. No blame can possibly attach to Gorgias for these speculations, nor for the conclusions to which they led. Plato himself, in the *Parmenides* (p. 135 D), urges and exhorts the young philosopher to follow out this sort of dialectic. 'You should exercise yourself while yet young,' says Parmenides to Socrates, 'in that which the world calls waste of time (τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας), else truth will escape you.' What, then, is this method? It consists in the following out of contrary hypotheses, the one and the many, the like and the unlike, motion, rest, creation, destruction; not only supposing the existence of each of these separate ideas, but afterwards also their non-existence; follow out the consequences in each case, and see what comes of the antinomy. All praise, then, is due to Gorgias, from Plato's point of view, for his stringent dialectic. To the popular mind, such reasonings appear absurd or repugnant. But the philosopher is only stimulated by them to seek for a higher ground of vision, whence these seeming contradictions and difficulties may be seen to be reconciled. We can only regret that we do not possess the entire work of Gorgias, in order to know more accurately

its exact purpose; whether his arguments were meant to have a universal validity, or whether they were only relative to the Ionic and Eleatic philosophies. The latter would seem to be actually the case, whatever was meant by the author himself; for the destructive arguments of Gorgias, while they are of force against previous philosophy, do not touch the universe of Plato, in which there was a synthesis of the one and the many, of being and not-being.

The two remaining theses of Gorgias—that being if existent could not be known, and if known could not be communicated—contain the strongest form of that subjective idealism afterwards repeated by Kant. They place an impassable gulf between things in themselves and the human mind. We can never know things in themselves; all we know is our thought, and the thought is not the thing. Still less could we communicate them to others, for by what organs could we communicate things in themselves? How by speech could we convey even the visible? In this part of the dialectic of Gorgias we trace an affinity to the doctrines of Protagoras. They each exhibit a tendency to a disbelief in the possibility of attaining truth. The scepticism, however, does not constitute Sophistry. It was not peculiar to the Sophists, but is a characteristic universally of the close of the Pre-Socratic era of philosophy. Aristotle speaks against it very strongly, but he does not call it Sophistry, he attributes it to several great names (*Metaphys.* III. c. iv.-v.). After arguing against the saying of Protagoras, he mentions that Democritus said ‘there is no truth, or it is beyond our finding’ (*Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἥτοι οὐθέν εἶναι ἀληθές ἢ ἡμῖν γ’ ἄδηλον*); that Empedocles said ‘thought changes according as men change;’ that Parmenides said in the same way, ‘thought depends on our physical state;’ that Anaxagoras said ‘things are according as men conceive them.’ Aristotle

remarks, 'It is surely an evil case, if those who have attained truth most, as loving it best, and seeking it most ardently, hold these opinions. It is enough to make one despair of attempting philosophy. It makes the search after truth a mere wild-goose chase. The cause of these opinions is that men, while speculating on existence, have considered the sensible world to be the only real existence. And this latter is full of what is uncertain and merely conditional' (*Metaphys.* III. v. 15, 16). Sophistry then is not constituted by any theories of cognition or existence. It consists in a certain spirit, in a particular purpose with which philosophy, or the pretence of philosophy, is followed. 'Sophistry and dialectic,' says Aristotle, 'are conversant with the same matter as philosophy, but philosophy differs from both the others; from the one in the manner of its procedure, the other in the purpose which guides its life. Dialectic is tentative about those subjects on which philosophy is conclusive, and Sophistry is a pretence, and not a reality.'⁵²

No other members of the Sophistic profession, so far as we know, dealt with metaphysical questions. They were rhetoricians, grammarians, teachers of mathematics and of what was then known of physical science, teachers of music, teachers of virtue and of politics, and of the art of success in citizen-life, dialecticians, disputants, and experimenters in logic. But it was one of Plato's chief grounds of complaint against them that, while they were by their professional procedure brought into contact with so many of the higher subjects,—they were not philosophers.

We now come to that which is, for our present purpose,

⁵² Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ

προαίρεσει. "Ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστικὴ, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὐσα δ' οὐ. *Metaphys.* III. II. 20.

the most important question with regard to the Sophists,—What was their influence upon ethical thought? In the first place, then, they obviously must have affected moral ideas in Greece simply by talking very much about them. Socrates is commonly spoken of as the first moral philosopher, and in the pages of Xenophon we find him constantly discoursing on moral topics. But as in nature, so in the progress of the human mind, nothing is done per saltum; that which is great and conspicuous in any line is often called ‘the first,’ while its precursors are left out of sight, but without those precursors it would not have come into existence. This was in all probability the case with regard to the ethical philosophy of Socrates; it was suggested by, and to some extent may be considered to have arisen out of, the manifold lecturings and disputations of the Sophists. We do not gather from Xenophon that there was any marked antagonism or polemic between the real Socrates and the whole profession of the Sophists of his day. It is only the dramatic Socrates of Plato’s fancy that is used as the vehicle of Plato’s own disapprobation of certain tendencies which he considered to have been manifested by the profession. But the historical Socrates is represented by Xenophon as adopting and using a discourse of Prodicus; and great as may be the differences which to the philosophic eye reveal themselves between the essential spirit of Socrates and that of the Sophists, to the uncritical eyes of most of his contemporaries Socrates doubtless appeared undistinguishable from the other professional talkers on virtue, except by the one circumstance that he did not accept fees. Thus it was only natural that Aristophanes should, uncritically, include Socrates in what was with him a very wide class of persons, and should couple Socrates and Prodicus together as chief ‘in wisdom and gnostic thought, of the transcendental Sophists of the day.’

The historical Socrates had really much in common with the Sophists; he is the leading figure in a new era of conscious morality which they had gradually inaugurated.

The very first characteristic that is predicated of the Sophists by Xenophon, Isocrates, and Plato is, that they 'undertook to teach virtue.' To this rule, however, Gorgias was an exception. Meno, in Plato's dialogue, praises him 'because he was never heard to make any pretence of the kind, but used to ridicule those who made it,—he himself thought that men ought to be made clever in speaking.' Socrates on this asks Meno, 'What, don't you then really think that the Sophists can teach virtue?' to which Meno replies, 'I know not what to say, Socrates, for I feel like most men on this question. Sometimes I think that they can teach it, and sometimes that they cannot.' (*Meno*. p. 95 C.) A nearer definition of what this 'teaching virtue' meant is put into the mouth of Protagoras, who boasts (*Plato, Protag.* p. 318 E) that 'he will not mock those who come to him by teaching them mere specialities against their will, as the other Sophists do, such as dialectic, astronomy, geometry, and music. They shall learn from him nothing except what they came to be taught. His teaching will be, good counsel, both about a man's own affairs, how best to govern his own family, and also about the affairs of the State, how most ably to administer and to speak about State matters.' Socrates says, 'You appear to me to mean the art of Politics, and to undertake to make men good citizens.' 'This is just what I undertake,' says Protagoras. To attempt to discover in this proposal anything insidious or subversive of morality would be quite absurd. Protagoras is represented by Plato throughout the dialogue as exhibiting an elevated standard of moral feelings. Thus he repudiates with contempt the doctrine that injustice can ever be good sense (p. 333 C), and from

grounds of cautious morality he declines to admit that the pleasant is identical with the good (p. 351 D). There is little reason to doubt that Protagoras may have conveyed to those who sought his instructions much prudent advice, and many shrewd maxims on the conduct of life and on the art of dealing with men in public and private relations. Of the hortatory morality of the Sophist, we have further means of forming a judgment from the celebrated composition (*Σύγγραμμα*) of Prodicus, commonly called 'The Choice of Hercules.' It is preserved for us by Xenophon (*Memorab.* II. i. 21-34), who represents it as being quoted by Socrates with a view of enforcing the advantages of temperance and virtue. It was the most popular of the declamations of Prodicus (*ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται*), and has since constantly found a place in books of elegant extracts and moral lessons. It would be easy to criticise and find fault with this fable. It does not adequately represent the real trial and difficulty of life. If, at the period of transition from boyhood to youth (*ἀπὲρ ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἡβην ὠρμῶτο*), one might go forth to a place of retirement (*ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι*), and there see presented Vice and Virtue, the one meretricious in dress and form, the other beautiful, and dignified, and noble; and if, when Vice had opened her alluring offers, Virtue immediately exposed their hollowness, substituting her own far higher and greater promises of good; and if, there and then, one might choose *once for all* between the two, who is there that would hesitate a moment to accept the guidance of Virtue? It may be said almost universally that all youths aspire after what is good. If it depended on a choice made once for all at the opening of life, all men would be virtuous. But man's moral life consists in a struggle in detail; and this the figure of Prodicus fails to represent.

Again, parables of this kind never adequately represent, in all its complexity, the moral truth which they are intended to convey. The 'Choice of Hercules' would make it appear as if the allurements of vice were exterior to us, as if 'Hercules' had merely to select, to the best of his judgment, between two external objects offered to him. But this leaves out of consideration the enemy within the camp, the *ἐνθῆρατον αὐτὸν* mentioned by Aristotle (*Eth.* III. i. 11), the fact that temptation is in ourselves, and consists in our own nature, which does not leave us free to make cool judgments and to act upon them. All such psychological refinements had, however to be developed later.

Several parts of the exhortation which Prodicus puts into the mouth of Virtue are full of merit; a noble perseverance and manliness of character are inculcated; and in the denunciation of vice the following fine sentence occurs: 'You never hear that which is the sweetest sound of all, self-approbation; and that which is the fairest of all sights you never see, a good deed done by yourself!' There is something rather rhetorical in the complexion of this discourse, even as it is given by the Socrates of Xenophon, and he concludes it by saying, 'Prodicus dressed up his thoughts in far more splendid language than I have used at present.' But against the moral orthodoxy of the piece not a word can be said, and we may safely assert, that had all the discourses of the Sophists been of this character, they would not have fallen into such general bad repute as teachers.

Plato never represents the Sophists as teaching lax morality to their disciples. He does not make sophistry to consist in the holding wicked opinions; on the contrary, he represents it as only too orthodox in general, but capable occasionally of giving utterance to immoral paradoxes for the sake of vanity. Sophistry rather tampers and trifles with

the moral convictions than directly attacks them. It is easy to see how this came about. Greece was now full of men professing to 'teach virtue.' They were ingenious, accomplished, rivals to each other, above all things desirous of attracting attention. Their talk was on a trite subject, on which it was necessary to say something new. The procedure of the Sophists was twofold, either it was rhetorical or dialectical. They either (1) tricked out the praises of justice and virtue with citations from the old poets, with ornaments of language, and with allegories and personifications. Of this latter kind of discourse we have a specimen in the 'Choice of Hercules,' and again we have the sketch or skeleton of a moral declamation which Hippias, in Plato's dialogue (*Hipp. Major*, p. 286), says he has delivered with great success, and is about to deliver again. The framework is simple enough. Neoptolemus, after the fall of Troy, is supposed to have asked Nestor's advice for his future conduct. Nestor replies by suggesting many noble maxims. 'Tis a fine piece,' says Hippias complacently, 'well arranged, especially in the matter of the language.' Such like compositions of the Sophists form a sort of parallel to the popular preaching of the present day. Or else (2) they gave an idea of their own power and subtlety, by skirmishes of language, by opening up new points of view with regard to common every-day duties, and making the old notions appear strangely inverted. All the while that they thus argued, no doubt they professed to be maintaining a mere logomachy. But to an intellectual people like the Greeks there would be something irresistibly fascinating in this new mental exercitation. Aristophanes represents the conservative abhorrence which this new spirit awakened. He depicts in a caricature a new kind of education in which everything is sophisticated, that is, tampered with by the intellect. A

sort of casuistry must have been fostered throughout Greece by various concurrent causes ; by the drama, which represented, as for instance in the *Antigone*, a conflict of opposing duties ; by the law courts, in which it was constantly endeavoured to ' make the worse side seem the better ; ' and lastly, as we have seen, by the Sophists, who, in discoursing on the duties of the citizen, did not refrain from showing that there was a point of view from which ' the law ' appeared a mere convention, while ' natural right ' might be distinguished from it.

To be able to view a conception from opposite points of sight ; to see the unsatisfactoriness of common notions ; to feel the difficulties which attach to all grave questions—these are the first stages preparatory to obtaining a wise, settled, and philosophical conviction. Thus far the dialectic of the Sophists and that of Socrates coincide. But the Sophists went no further than these first steps ; the positive side of their teaching consisted in returning to the common views for the sake of expediency. That there is danger incurred by the dialectical process, in its first negative and destructive stages, no one has felt more strongly than Plato. He wishes, in his *Republic*, that dialectic, as a part of education, may be deferred till after thirty, because ' so much mischief attaches to it,' because ' it is infected with lawlessness.' ' As a supposititious child having grown up to youth, reverencing those whom he thought to be his parents, when he finds out he is no child of theirs, ceases his respect for them and gives himself up to his riotous companions ; so it is with the young mind under the influence of dialectic. There are certain dogmas relating to what is just and right, in which we have been brought up from childhood—obeying and reverencing them. Other opinions recommending pleasure and licence we resist, out of respect for the old hereditary maxims. Well,

then, a question comes before a man ; he is asked, what is the right ? He gives some such answer as he has been taught, but is straightway refuted. He tries again and is again refuted. And when this has happened pretty often, he is reduced to the opinion, that nothing is more right than wrong ; and in the same way it happens about the just and the good and all that he before held in reverence. On this, naturally enough, he abandons his allegiance to the old principles and takes up with those that he before resisted, and so from a good citizen he becomes lawless' (*Repub.* pp. 537, 538). It is obvious that the process of dialectic here described consists in nothing more than starting the difficulties, in other words, stating the question of morals. Plato does not here attribute antinomian conclusions to the teachers of dialectic ; he speaks of the disciple himself drawing these, from a sort of impatience, having become dissatisfied with his old moral ideas, and not waiting to substitute deeper ones.

Throughout his dialogues Plato does not attribute lax or paradoxical sentiments to the greater Sophists ; he puts these in the mouths of their pupils, such as Callicles, the pupil of Gorgias, or of the inferior and less dignified Sophists, as Thrasymachus. Sophistry consists for the most part in outward conformity, with a scepticism at the core ; hence it tends to break out and result occasionally in paradoxical morality, which it is far from holding consistently as a system. We shall have quite failed to appreciate the true nature of Sophistry, if we miss perceiving that the most sophistical thing about it is its chameleon-like character. One of the most celebrated 'points of view' of the Sophists was the opposition between nature and convention. Aristotle speaks of this opposition in a way which represents it to have been in use among them merely as a mode of arguing, not as a

definite opinion about morals. He says (*Sophist. Elench.* xii. 6), 'The topic most in vogue for reducing your adversary to admit paradoxes is that which Callicles is described in the *Gorgias* as making use of, and which was a universal mode of arguing with the ancients,—namely, the opposition of "nature" and "convention;" for these are maintained to be contraries, and thus justice is right according to convention, but not according to nature. Hence they say, when a man is speaking with reference to nature, you should meet him with conventional considerations; when he means "conventionally," you should twist round the point of view to "naturally." In both ways you make him utter paradoxes. Now by "naturally" they meant the true, by "conventionally" what seems true to the many.' Who was the first author of this opposition is uncertain. Turning from the Sophists to the philosophers, we find the saying attributed to Archelaus (Diog. Laert. II. 16), 'That the just and the base exist not by nature, but by convention.'⁵³ This Archelaus was the last of the Ionic philosophers, said to be the disciple of Anaxagoras and the master of Socrates. 'He was called the Physical Philosopher,' says Diogenes, 'because Physics ended with him, Socrates having introduced Ethics. But he, too, seems to have handled Ethics. For he philosophised on laws, and on the right and the just; and Socrates succeeding him, because he carried out these investigations, got the credit of having started them.' About the same period Democritus is recorded to have held that 'the institutions of society are human creations, while the void and the atoms exist by nature.'⁵⁴ He also said, that the perceptions of sweet and bitter, warm and cold, were νόμῳ, that is, what we

⁵³ Καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.

⁵⁴ Ποιητὰ δὲ νόμῳ εἶναι. φύσει δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν. Diog. Laert. IX. 45.

should call 'subjective.' These reflections indicate the first dawn of Ethics. They show that philosophy has now come to recognise a new sphere; beyond and distinct from the eternal laws of being there is the phenomenon of human society, with its ideas and institutions. The first glance at these sees in them only the variable as contrasted with the permanent, mere convention as opposed to nature. Ethics at its outset by no means commences with questions about the individual. It separates 'society' from 'nature,' as its first distinction. This was because in Greece the man was so much merged into the citizen; even Aristotle says 'the State is prior to the individual;' the individual has no meaning except as a member of the State. It is a subsequent step to separate the individual from society: first sophistically, for the sake of introducing an arbitrary theory of morals; at last, philosophically, to show that right is only valid when acknowledged by the individual consciousness, but at the same time that the broad distinctions of right and wrong are more objective and permanent than anything else, more absolutely to be believed in than even the logic of the intellect.

Looking at the Sophists rather as the promulgators than as the inventors of this opposition between *φύσις* and *νόμος*, we see it applied in the person of Callicles, their supposed pupil (*Gorgias*, pp. 483, 484), to support crude, paradoxical, and anti-social doctrines; to maintain that nature's right is might, while society's right (which is unnatural, and forced upon us for the benefit of the weak) is justice and obedience to the laws. It is a carrying out of exactly the same point of view, to say, as Thrasymachus is made to do in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 338 C), that justice is 'the advantage of the stronger.' This position is there treated as a mere piece of 'Eristic.' It is met by arguments that are themselves

partly captious and sophistical. These applications of the principle are of course dramatic and imaginary in Plato's pages, but we may fairly conceive them analogous to what was occasionally heard uttered in Athenian society. Another ethical topic with which the Sophists would be sure to deal was the question, What is the chief good? We have before observed that this was a leading idea in the early stages of Grecian morals. In the discourses of the Sophists various accounts would be given of the matter. Sometimes, as in the fable of Prodicus, happiness, or the chief good, would be represented as inseparable from virtue; at other times a rash and unscrupulous Sophist, like Polus in the *Gorgias* of Plato (p. 471), would be found to assert that the most enviable lot consists in arbitrary power, like that of a tyrant, to follow all one's passions and inclinations. This assertion of arbitrary freedom for the individual, though, of course, not consistently maintained by the Sophists, was yet one of the characteristics of their era.

We have already incidentally referred to several of Aristotle's views of the Sophists and Sophistry. He does not, any more than Plato, speak of definite doctrines belonging to the Sophists, as if they were a school of philosophers with their own metaphysical or ethical creed. He speaks repeatedly of their *practice*, of their *method*, of certain tricks in argument commonly used by them; he says (*Eth.* x. ix. 20) that in their teaching they put Rhetoric on a level with Politics; (*Rhet.* i. i. 14) that the Sophist differs from the Rhetorician in the purpose or aim (*τῆ προαίρεσει*) with which he uses the artifices of Rhetoric; (*Soph. El.* xxxiii. 11) that Sophistry is the near neighbour of Dialectic; (*ib.* xi. 5) that it differs from Eristic pure and simple in employing fallacy for the purposes of gain. These utterances, which in different forms are often repeated,

have all the air of being based on or confirmed by independent observation. Aristotle in all that he says about the sophistical spirit no doubt accepts, analyses, and reduces to method much that is to be found in the Platonic Dialogues. But it would be against historical evidence to consider Aristotle's statements on this subject to have been a mere blind repetition of certain calumnies or hostile caricatures.

On the whole, then, we must conclude that Grote's defence of the Sophists is good against the too sweeping denunciations of them which have often been expressed in modern times, and which exaggerate and misrepresent the subtle and discriminating pictures drawn by Plato,—but is not good against Plato himself, when we read his words aright. Grote has made too much of the fact that the word 'Sophist' had a twofold meaning, and that in its more general and indeterminate sense it was often applied by the ancients, with a shade of sneering, to those who were philosophers and not 'sophists' in the limited sense of being professional teachers; and that it was so applied even to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle themselves. From this it does not follow that there was no distinct class of men who were 'sophists' in the limited sense, or that this class did not exhibit certain common characteristics and a certain common spirit. Again, because several of the profession were respectable and even dignified men, and more like popular preachers than teachers of antinomianism, it does not follow that they did not sin against philosophy, or that they were worthy of the same respect as the philosophers, or that there was nothing in the tendencies of their thought against which Plato was right to warn his countrymen. The spirit which Plato was the first to detect in the professional teachers of Greece, reappears under changed conditions in every cultivated age; it re-

appears in literature and in the pulpit. Wherever men set themselves up as teachers of the highest subjects, and in lieu of being devoted to truth for its own sake exhibit a tinge of worldly self-interest, there is a reappearance of the 'Sophistic' spirit.

In the relation of the Sophists to society in general, the question has been raised, Did they impair the morality of Greece? The answer must be a mixed one. Owing to the influence of the Sophists, and also to other causes, thought was less simple in Greece at the end of the fifth century than it had been at the beginning. Between the age of Pisistratus and that of Alcibiades, the fruit of the tree of knowledge had been tasted. Men had passed from an unconscious into a conscious era. All that double-sidedness with regard to questions, which is found throughout the pages of Thucydides, and which could not possibly have been written a hundred years before, is a specimen of the results of the Sophistical era. The age had now become probably both better and worse. It was capable of greater good and of greater evil. A character like that of Socrates is far nobler than any that a simple stage of society is capable of producing. The political decline of the Grecian States alone prevented the full development of what must be regarded as a higher civilisation. The era of the Sophists, then, must be looked upon as a transition period in thought—as a necessary, though in itself unhappy, step in the progress of the human mind. The subjective side of knowledge and thought was now opened. Philosophy fell into abeyance for a while, under the scepticism of Protagoras and Gorgias, but only to find a new method in Socrates and Plato. Ethics had never yet existed as a science. Popular moralising and obedience to their laws, was all the Greeks had attained to. But now discussions on virtue, on the laws, on justice, on happiness, were heard in every corner; at times

rhetorical declamation; and at times subtle difficulties or paradoxical theories. If physical philosophy begins in wonder, Ethics may be said to have begun in scepticism. The dialectical overthrow of popular moral notions, begun by the Sophists and characteristic of their times, merged into the deeper philosophy and constructive method of Socrates.

III. The personality of Socrates (to whom we now turn) has perhaps made a stronger impression upon the world than that of any other of the ancients, and yet, as soon as we wish to inquire accurately about him, we find something that is indeterminate and difficult to appreciate about his doctrines. Socrates, having contributed the greatest impulse that has ever been known to philosophy, was himself immediately absorbed in the spreading circles of the schools which he had caused. Cynic, Cyrenaic, and Platonic doctrines stand out each more definitely in themselves than the philosophy of Socrates. The causes of this are obvious, for the fact that he wrote no philosophical treatises gave rise to a twofold set of results. (1) On the one hand, his philosophy, being in the form of conversations with all comers, restricted itself for the most part to a method—to a way of dealing with questions—to an insight into the difficulties of a subject—to a conception of what was attainable, and what ought to be sought for in knowledge. It was therefore free from dogmatism, but also wanting in systematic result. Taking even the conversations of Socrates, as they are given by Xenophon, we can find in them certain inconsistencies of view. (2) From the absence of any actual works of Socrates, we are left to the accounts of others. And here we are met with the well-known discrepancy between the pictures drawn of him by his different followers, a discrepancy which can never be reconciled nor exactly estimated. We can never know exactly how far Xenophon has told us too little, and Plato too much.

However, by a cautious and inductive mode of examination we may succeed in establishing a few points at all events about Socrates, and in discerning where the doubt lies about others. There seems to be no reason whatever against receiving in their integrity the graphic personal traits which Plato has recorded of his master. The description of him, which is put into the mouth of Alcibiades at the end of the *Symposium*, seems to have in view the exhibition, in the concrete, of those highest philosophic qualities which had before been exhibited in the abstract. Plato does not shrink from portraying the living irony which there was in the appearance of Socrates, his strange and grotesque exterior covering, like the images of Silenus, a figure of pure gold within. Other peculiarities of the man have a still deeper significance, being more essentially connected with his mental qualities. Not only did he excite attention by a robustness and versatility of constitution which could bear all extremes, but also by another still more strange idiosyncrasy; he seems to have been liable to fall into fits of abstraction, almost amounting to trances. During the siege of Potidæa, while on service in the Athenian camp, he is recorded to have stood fixed in one attitude a whole night through, and when the sun rose to have roused himself and saluted it, and so returned to his tent. It has been observed that the peculiar nervous constitution which could give rise to this tendency, and which seems to have an affinity to the clairvoyance of Swedenborg and others among the moderns, was probably connected with that which Socrates felt to be unusual in himself, that which he called τὸ δαιμόνιον, 'the supernatural,' an instinctive power of presentiment which warned and deterred him from certain actions, apparently both by considerations of personal well-being, and the probable issue of things, and also by moral intuitions as to right and wrong.

This 'supernatural' element in Socrates (which he seems to have believed to have been shared, in exceedingly rare instances, by others) cannot be resolved into the voice of conscience, nor reason, nor into the association of a strong religious feeling with moral and rational intuitions, nor again into anything merely physical and mesmeric, but it was probably a combination, in greater or less degrees, of all. There are other parts of the personal character of Socrates which are also parts of his philosophical method; for his was no mere abstract system, that could be conveyed in a book, but a living play of sense and reason; the philosopher could not be separated from the man. Of this Xenophon gives us no idea. But in Plato's representation of the irony of Socrates we have surely not only a dramatic and imaginative creation, but rather a marvellous reproduction (perhaps artistically enhanced) of the actual truth. To this Aristotle bears witness, in stating as a simple fact that 'Irony often consists in disclaiming qualities that are held in esteem, and this sort of thing Socrates used to do' (*Eth.* iv. vii. 14). The irony of Socrates, like any other living characteristic of a man, presents many aspects from which it may be viewed. It has (1) a relative significance, being used to encounter, and tacitly to rebuke, rash speaking, and every kind of presumption. It was thus relative to a Sophistical and Rhetorical period, but has also a universal adaptability under similar circumstances. (2) It indicates a certain moral attitude as being suitable to philosophy, showing that in weakness there is strength. (3) It is a part of good-breeding, which by deference holds its own. (4) It is a point of style, a means of avoiding dogmatism. (5) It is an artifice of controversy, inducing an adversary to expose his weakness, maintaining a negative and critical position. (6) It is full of humour; and this humour consists in an intellectual way of dealing

with things, in a contrast between the conscious strength of the wise man and the humility of his pretensions, in a teacher coming to be taught, and the learner *naïvely* undertaking to teach. Such are some of the most striking features in the mien and bearing of Socrates, not only one of the wisest, but also one of the strangest beings that the world has ever seen ; who moved about among men that knew him not. One man alone, Plato, knew him, and has handed down to us the idea of his life. When now we come to his doctrines, Plato, as is acknowledged, ceases to be a trustworthy guide. The sublime developments of philosophy made by the disciple are with a sort of pious reverence put into the mouth of the master. We are driven then to criticism, in order to assign to Socrates, as far as possible in their naked form, his own attainments.

The statements of Aristotle would seem to furnish a basis for an estimate of the Socratic doctrine ; but even these cannot be received without a scrutiny, for Aristotle was so imbued with the writings of Plato, that he seems at times to regard the conversations depicted in them as something that actually had taken place. He speaks of the Platonic Socrates as of an actual person. A remarkable instance of this occurs in his *Politics* (II. vi. 6), where, having criticised the *Republic* of Plato, he proceeds to criticise the *Laws* also, and says, ‘Now, all the discourses of Socrates exhibit genius, grace, originality, and depth of research ; but to be always right is, perhaps, more than can be expected.’⁵⁵ ‘The discourses of Socrates’ here stand for the dialogues of Plato, which is the more peculiar in the present case, since in the *Laws* of Plato, the dialogue under discussion, Socrates does not appear at all as an interlocutor. In other places, however, we may judge

⁵⁵ Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες | καὶ τὸ καινотόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν,
οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν | καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπὸν.

from Aristotle's manner of speaking that he refers to the real Socrates (see note on *Eth.* vi. xiii. 5), and not to the Socrates of literature. The most important passages of this kind are where he draws a distinction between Socrates and Plato, and states their relation to each other; cf. *Metaphys.* i. vi. 2, xii. iv. 3-5. The second of these passages contains a repetition and an expansion of the former; it may, therefore, be quoted alone. Aristotle is relating the history of the doctrine of Ideas. He tells us how it sprang from a belief in the Heraclitean principle of the flux of sensible things, and the necessity of some other and permanent existences, if thought and knowledge were to be considered possible. He proceeds, that Socrates now entered on the discussion of the ethical virtues, and was the first to attempt a universal definition of them—definition, except in the immature essays of Democritus and the Pythagoreans, having had no existence previously. 'Socrates was quite right in seeking a definite, determinate conception of these virtues (*εὐλόγως ἐξήτει τὸ τί ἐστι*), for his object was to obtain a demonstrative reasoning (*συλλογιζεσθαι*), and such reasonings must commence with a determinate conception. The force of dialectic did not yet exist, by means of which, even without a determinate conception (*χωρὶς τοῦ τί ἐστι*), it is possible to consider contraries, and to inquire whether or not there be the same science of things contrary to one another. There are two things that we may fairly attribute to Socrates, his inductive discourses (*τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους*) and his universal definitions. These universals, however, Socrates did not make transcendental and self-existent (*χωριστά*), no more did he his definitions. But the Platonists made them transcendental, and then called such existences Ideas.'

This interesting passage assigns to Socrates, first, his subjects of inquiry, namely, the ethical virtues; second, his

philosophical method, which was to fix a determinate conception or universal definition of these, by means of inductive discourses, by an appeal to experience and analogy. His definition was an immense advance on anything which had gone before, and yet it fell far short of the Platonic point of view. The reasoning of Socrates was demonstrative or syllogistic, and therefore one-sided. His conceptions were definitely fixed so as to exclude one another. He knew nothing of that higher dialectic, which, setting aside the first limited and fixed conception of a thing, from which the contrary of that thing is wholly excluded, asks, Is there not the same science of things contrary to each other? Is not a thing inseparable from, and in a way identical with, its contrary? Is not the one also many, and the many one? In another point also the conceptions formed by Socrates differed from the Ideas of Plato—that they had no absolute existence, they had no world of their own apart from the world of time and space. We see, then, the gulf which is set by this account of Aristotle's between the historic Socrates and the Socrates of Plato. The historic Socrates was quite excluded from that sphere of contemplation on which the Platonic philosopher enters (*Repub.* p. 510), where all hypotheses and all sensible objects are left out of sight, and the mind deals with pure Ideas alone. According to Aristotle, Socrates had not attained to the higher dialectic which Plato attributes to him. No doubt, however, Plato discerned in the method which Socrates employed in his conversations,—in his inquiring spirit, in his effort to connect a variety of phenomena with some general law, in his habit of testing this law by appeals to fresh experience and phenomena,—hints and indications of a philosophy which could rise above mere empirical generalisations. The method was not so much to be changed as carried further, it need only pass on in the same direction out of subordinate into higher genera.

Aristotle always says about Socrates that he confined himself to ethical inquiries.⁵⁶ This entirely coincides with the saying of Xenophon, that 'he never ceased discussing human affairs, asking, What is piety? what is impiety? what is the noble? what the base? what is the just? what the unjust? what is temperance? what is madness? what is a State? what constitutes the character of a citizen? what is rule over man? what makes one able to rule?' (*Memor.* I. i. 16.) In all this we see the foundation of moral philosophy as a science, and hence Socrates is always called the first moral philosopher. But we have already remarked (see above, pp. 143 and 150) that the way was prepared for Socrates by Archelaus, by the Sophists, and by the entire tendencies of the age. There is another saying about Socrates which is a still greater departure from the exact historical truth, namely, that he divided science into Ethics, Physics, and Logic. It is quite a chronological error to attribute to him this distinct view of the divisions of science. He never separated his method of reasoning from his matter, nor could he ever have made the method of reasoning into a separate science. In Plato even, Logic has no separate existence; there is only a dialectic which is really metaphysics. And we may go further, and say that in Aristotle Logic has no one name, and does not form a division of philosophy. Again, Socrates probably never used the word Ethics to designate his favourite study. If he had used any distinctive term, he would have said Politics. With regard to Ethics also, we may affirm that in Plato they are not as yet a separate science, and in Aristotle only becoming so. As to Physics, Socrates appears rather to have denied their possibility, than to have established their

⁵⁶ Περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδέν. *Met.* I. vi. 2.

existence as a branch of philosophy. The above-mentioned division is probably not older than the Stoics.

Pursuing our negative and eliminatory process with regard to the position of Socrates in the history of thought, we may next ask what was his hold upon that tenet which in Plato's Dialogues appears not only closely connected with his moral and philosophical views in general, but also is made to assume the most striking historical significance in connection with his submission to the sentence of death—his belief in the immortality of the soul. But on this point also we can only say that a different kind of impression is left on our minds by the records of the last conversations of Socrates, as severally furnished by Plato and by Xenophon. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Apologia Socratis*³⁷ Socrates is asked whether he has prepared his defence. He answers that 'His whole life has been a preparation, for he has never acted unjustly.' It is possible that this answer might have had a double meaning: on the one hand a literal meaning—that his conduct was the best answer to his accusers; on the other hand a religious meaning—that his life had been a *preparatio mortis*; but Xenophon, or his imitator, appears only to have understood the saying in the former and literal sense. When reminded that the judges have often condemned those that were really innocent, Socrates replies that he has twice been stopped by the supernatural sign when thinking of composing a defence—that God seems to intimate to him that it was best for him to die—that if he is condemned he will meet with an easy mode of death—at a time when his faculties are still entire—whereas, if he were to live longer, only old age and infirmities and loss of his powers would await him—that

³⁷ The genuineness of this work has been doubted, and Zeller pronounces it to be certainly spurious.

But it was at all events some ancient writer's view of Socrates. *Valent quantum.*

he knows good men and bad are differently estimated by posterity after their deaths—and that he leaves his own cause in the hands of posterity, being confident they will give a right verdict between him and his judges. The only sentence recorded by Xenophon (besides the one above mentioned) that admits the possibility of being referred to a future life, is where Socrates is mentioned to have said in reference to Anytus, ‘What a worthless fellow is this, who seems not to know that whichever of us has done best and most profitably for all time (*εἰς τὸν αἰὲν χρόνον*), he is the winner.’ In this saying, Plato might have discovered a reference to immortality,⁵⁸ but Xenophon takes it to mean merely ‘the long run,’ applying it to the bad way in which the son of Anytus afterwards turned out. If we separate from the speeches recorded by Xenophon the allusion which Socrates makes to his ‘supernatural sign,’ which shows a sort of belief in a religious sanction to the course he was taking;—the rest resolves itself into a very enlightened calculation and balance of gain against loss in submitting to die. The *Phædo* of Plato has elevated this feeling into something holy; it puts out of sight those parts of the calculation which consisted in a desire to escape from the pains of age by a painless death, and in a regard to the opinion of posterity; and it makes prominent and all-absorbing the desire for that

⁵⁸ Zeller points out that even in the *Apology* of Plato (which is probably the most historical of all Plato's delineations of Socrates), Socrates expresses himself with doubt and caution on the subject of the immortality of the soul (p. 40 C). At the same time Zeller calls attention to the discourse on immortality put into the mouth of the dying Cyrus in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, as probably representing the mind of Socrates,

‘so that we are fain to suppose that he considered the existence of the soul after death to be probable, although he did not pretend to any certain knowledge on the point.’ (See *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, translated from the German of Dr. E. Zeller by O. J. Reichel, &c. London, 1868.) Zeller's account of Socrates is admirable and exhaustive. The above pages, written many years ago, only aim at giving a suggestive outline.

condition on which the soul is to enter after death. Were it not for Plato, we should have had an entirely different impression of the death of Socrates, an entirely different kind of sublimity would have been attached to it. Instead of the almost Christian enthusiasm and faith which we are accustomed to associate with it, we should only have known of a Stoical resignation and firmness—an act indeed which contains in itself historically the germ of Stoicism. The narrative of Xenophon no doubt misses something which Plato could appreciate, but it at all events enables us to understand how both the Cynic and Cyrenaic morality sprang from the teaching and life of Socrates.

One more point is worth notice in the Xenophontean *Apology* of Socrates. It is the way he answers the charge of corrupting youth. Having protested against the notion of his teaching vice to any, when Melétus further urges, 'Why, I have known those whom you have persuaded not to obey their parents;' Socrates replies, 'Yes, about education, for this is a subject they know that I have studied. About health people obey the doctor and not their parents; in State affairs and war you choose as your leaders those that are skilled in these matters; is it not absurd, then, if there is free trade in other things, that in the most important interest of all, education, I should not be allowed to have the credit of being better skilled than other men?' The fallacy of this reasoning is obvious, for had Socrates claimed to be chosen 'Minister of Education' by the same persons who voted for the Archons and the Generals, or had he succeeded in persuading the fathers that he was the best possible teacher for their sons, nothing could have been said against it. But the complaint against him was that he constituted youths, who were unfit to judge, the judges of their own education, and thus inverted all the natural ideas

of family life. One can well understand the invidiousness which would be encountered by one undertaking such a position and defending it in the words recorded. Viewing this attitude of Socrates merely from the outside, one can justify, in a manner, the caricature of it drawn by Aristophanes. We see from this point of view how Socrates was a Sophist, and must have exhibited a merely Sophistical appearance to many of his contemporaries. But from another point of view, looking at the internal character and motives of the man, his purity and nobility of mind, his love of truth, his enthusiasm (*Schwärmerei*, as the Germans would call it), his obedience to some mysterious and irresistible impulse, and his genius akin to madness,—we must call him the born antagonist and utter antipodes of all Sophistry. There is an opposition and a contradiction of terms in all great teachers. While they are the best men of their times, they seem to many wicked, and the corrupters of youth. The flexibility and ardour of youth make the young the most ready disciples of a new and elevated doctrine. But this goes against the principle that the children should honour the parents. Hence a great teacher sets the ‘children against the fathers;’ and the higher morality which he expounds, being freer and more independent of positive laws; being more based on what is right in itself, and on the individual consciousness and apprehension of that right—tends also in weaker natures to assume the form of licence. This is one application of the truth, that new wine cannot safely be put into old bottles.

The positive results that are known to us of the ethical philosophy of Socrates are of course but few. Aristotle’s allusions restrict themselves virtually to one point—namely, the theory that ‘*Virtue is a science.*’ This doctrine is mentioned in its most general form, *Eth.* vi. xiii. 3. Its

application to courage is mentioned, *Eth.* III. viii. 6—that Socrates said courage was a science. And the corollary of the doctrine, that incontinence is impossible, for it is impossible to know what is best and not do it—is stated by the author of *Eth.* VII. ii. 1. These allusions agree equally with the representations of Plato and of Xenophon, we may therefore treat them as historical. It remains to ask what was the occasion,, the meaning, and the importance of this saying that ‘Virtue is a science.’ The thought of Socrates was so far from being an abstract theory, it was so intimately connected with life and reality, that we are enabled to conceive how this proposition grew up in his mind, as a result of his age and circumstances. (1) It was connected with a sense of the importance of education. This feeling was no doubt caused in part by the procedure of the Sophists, which had turned the attention of all to general cultivation, and especially to ethical instruction. The question began now to be mooted, whether virtue—e.g. courage, could be taught? (cf. Xen. *Memor.* III. ix. 1.) Socrates appears on this question to have taken entirely the side of the advocates of education. The difficulties which are shown to attach to the subject in the *Meno* of Plato we may consider to be a later development of thought, subsequent even in the mind of Plato to *Protagoras*, *Laches*, &c. We may specify three different stages of opinion as to the question, Can virtue be taught? The Sophists said, ‘Yes,’ from an over-confidence of pretensions, and from not realising the question with sufficient depth. Socrates said ‘Yes,’ giving a new meaning to the assertion; wishing to make action into a kind of art, to make self-knowledge and wisdom predominate over every part of life. Plato said ‘No,’ from a feeling of the deep and spiritual character of the moral impulses. He said, ‘Virtue seems almost to be an inspiration

from heaven sent to those who are destined to receive it.’⁵⁹ Aristotle, taking again the human side, would say, ‘Yes,’ implying, however, that the formation of habits was an essential part of teaching, and allowing also for some differences in the natural disposition of men. (2) This doctrine was connected with the inductive and generalising spirit of Socrates, it was an attempt to bring the various virtues, which Gorgias used to enumerate separately (cf. Plato, *Meno*, p. 71, Aristot. *Politics*, I. xiii. 10), under one universal law. Thus the four cardinal virtues, justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom, he reduced all to wisdom. (3) The doctrine had two sides. It on the one hand contained implicitly the theory of ‘habits,’ but was at the same time a sort of empiricism. ‘Courage consists in being accustomed to danger.’ (This is the expression of the doctrine given, Xen. *Memorab.* III. ix. 2, and Aristot. *Eth.* III. viii. 6.) On the other hand, it implied rather self-knowledge, and a consciousness of a law; which is quite above all mere acquaintance with particulars. This is drawn out in the *Laches*, where courage is shown to consist in the knowledge of good and evil; and in the *Republic* it is described as that highest kind of presence of mind, which maintains a hold of right principles even amidst danger. (4) We have said that Socrates wished to make action into a kind of art. It seems to have been a favourite analogy with him to remark that the various craftsmen studied systematically their own crafts; but that Politics (which would include the direction of individual life) was not so learned. Out of this analogy, no doubt, sprang the further conclusion that human life must

⁵⁹ ὅτι μολὶς παραγυγμένη ἀνεν νοῦ, οἷς δὲ παραγίγνεται. *Meno*, p. 99 E. Afterwards (*Repub.* 518. E) he said

‘All the cardinal virtues can be acquired, except Wisdom (φρόνησις), which is innate.’

have its own proper function (*ἔργον*, cf. *Repub.* p. 353). Virtue, then, according to the point of view of Socrates, became the science of living. So expressed, the doctrine easily takes a utilitarian and somewhat selfish turn; as, indeed, it does in the *Protagoras*, where virtue is made the science of the good, but 'the good' is identified with pleasure. Under this aspect the doctrine presents an affinity to Benthamism, and also to the practical views of Goethe, and at the same time enables us to understand how it was possible for the Cyrenaic philosophy to spring out of the school of Socrates.

(5) It lays the foundation for conscious morality, by placing the grounds of right and wrong in the individual reason. It forms the contradiction to the Sophistical saying, 'justice is a convention' (*νόμος*), by asserting that 'justice is a science,' that is, something not depending on society and external authority, but existing in and for the mind of the individual. The Peripatetics improved upon this—pointing out that Socrates, instead of identifying virtue with the rational consciousness, should have said it must coincide with the rational consciousness; in other words, that his formula ignored all distinction between the reason and the will.

This defect in the definition of Socrates exhibits one of the characteristics of early Ethics, namely, that they contain extremely little psychology. At first men are content with the rudest and most elementary mental distinctions; afterwards greater refinements are introduced. Plato's threefold division of the mind into Desire, Anger, and Reason, was the first scientific attempt of the kind. But even in Plato, the distinction between the moral and the intellectual sides of our nature was hardly established. Partly we shall see that this was a merit, and consciously admitted in order to elevate action into philosophy; partly, it was a defect proceeding from

the want of a more definite psychology. Socrates identified the Will with the Reason. We can understand this better, if we remember that the practical question of his day always was, not, What is Right? but, What is Good? Socrates argued that every one would act in accordance with his answer to this question; that no man could help doing what he conceived to be good. Hence incontinence was impossible. The argument, however, is a fallacy because it leaves out of sight the ambiguity of the word 'good.' Good is either means or end. All men wish for the good as an end; that is, good as a whole, as a universal. All wish for happiness and a good life. But good as a means does not always recommend itself. The necessary particular steps appear irksome or repulsive. Hence, as it is said, *Eth.* vii. iii. 5, a distinction must be drawn with regard to this phrase, 'knowing the good.' In one sense a man may know it, in another not. Undoubtedly, if a perfectly clear intellectual conviction of the goodness of the end, and of the necessity of the means, is present to a man, he cannot act otherwise than rightly.

There was another paradox connected with the primary doctrine of Socrates. It was that injustice, if voluntary, is better than if involuntary. This startling proposition appears to gainsay all the instincts of the understanding, and its contradictory is assumed in the *Ethics* (vi. v. 7). But it is stated by Socrates, and supported by arguments (*Xen. Memorab.* iv. ii. 20), and it is again maintained dialectically, though confessed to be a paradox, in Plato's dialogue called *Hippias Minor*. The key to the paradox is to be found in this, that the proposition asserts, that *if it were possible* to act with injustice voluntarily, this would be better than if the same act were done involuntarily. But by hypothesis it is impossible for a man really to do wrong knowingly. It

would be a contradiction in terms, since wrong is nothing else than ignorance. Therefore the wise man can only do what is seemingly wrong. His acts are justified to himself and are really right. The effect of this proposition is to enforce the principle that wisdom and knowledge are the first things, and action the second. The same is expressed in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 382 B), where it is asserted that the purest and most unmixed lie is not where the mind knows what is true and the tongue says what is false, but where the mind thinks what is false. *Mutatis mutandis*, we might compare these tendencies in the Socratic teaching to the elevation of Faith over Works in theological controversy.

The dialectical difficulties of morality characteristic of the Sophistical era appear from Xenophon's account to have frequently occupied the attention of Socrates. Thus Aristippus is recorded to have assailed him with the question whether he knew anything good. Whatever he might specify, it would have been easy to show that this was, from some points of view, an evil. Socrates, being aware of the difficulty, evaded the question by declining to answer it directly. He said, 'Do you ask if I know anything good for a fever? or for the ophthalmia? or for hunger? For if you ask me if I know any good, that is good for nothing, I neither know it, nor wish to know it' (Xen. *Memorab.* III. viii. 3). This answer implies the relative character of the term good. The puzzle of Aristippus was meant to consist in playing off the relative against the absolute import of 'good.' Other subtleties Socrates is mentioned to have urged himself, as for instance in the conversation with Euthydemus (*Memorab.* IV. 2), whose intellectual pride he wished to humble, he shows that all the acts (such as deceiving, lying, &c.) which are first specified as acts of injustice, can in particular cases appear to be just. In fact, the unsatisfactoriness of the common conceptions of

justice is suggested here just as it is in the *Republic* of Plato. It is probable that the historic Socrates would really have advanced in the argument on justice as far as the conclusion of the first book of *Republic*. For the development of the later theory he perhaps furnished hints and indications which Plato understood and seized, and buried in his mind. Thence by degrees they grew up into something far different from what Socrates had consciously attained to. The dialectic of Socrates had an element in common with that of the Sophists, namely, it disturbed the popular conceptions on moral subjects. It had this different from them, and which constituted its claim to be not merely a destructive, but also a constructive method—it always implied (1) that there was a higher and truer conception to be discovered by thought and research; (2) it seized upon some permanent and universal ideas amidst the mass of what was fluctuating and relative; (3) it left the impression that the most really moral view must after all be the true one.

The many-sided life of Socrates gave an impulse, as is well known, to a variety of schools of philosophy. It is usual to divide these into the imperfect and the perfect Socraticists; the Megarians, who represented only the dialectic element in Socrates, and the Cynics and Cyrenaics, who represented each a different phase of his ethical tradition, being considered as the imperfect Socraticists; and Plato being esteemed the full representative and natural development of all sides of his master's thought. Plato is so near to Aristotle, and is such a world in himself, that we may well leave his ethical system in its relation to Aristotle for separate consideration. An account of the Megarian school belongs rather to the history of Metaphysics. The Cynics and Cyrenaics then alone remain to be treated of in the present part of our sketch of the pre-Aristotelian morals.

The Cynical and Cyrenaic philosophies were each, as has been remarked, rather a mode of life than an abstract theory or system. But as every system may be regarded as the development into actuality of some hitherto latent possibility of the intellect, so these modes of life may be regarded each as the natural development of a peculiar direction of the feelings. Nor do they fail to reproduce themselves. That attitude of mind which was exhibited first by Antisthenes and Diogenes has since been over and over again exhibited, with superficial differences, and in various modifications by different individuals. And many a man has essentially in the bias of his mind been a follower of Aristippus. Each of these schools was an exaggeration of a peculiar aspect of the life of Socrates. If we abstract all the Platonic picture of the urbanity, the happy humour, and at the same time the sublime thought of Socrates, and think only of the barefooted old man, indefatigably disputing in the open streets, and setting himself against society, we recognise in him the first of the Cynics. Again, if we think of him to whom all circumstances seemed indifferent, who spoke of virtue as the science of the conduct of life, and seemed at times to identify pleasure with the good, we can understand how Aristippus, the follower of Socrates, was also founder of the Cyrenaic sect. Several points these two opposite schools seem to have had in common. (1) They started from a common principle, namely, the assertion of the individual consciousness and will, as being above all outward convention and custom, free and self-responsible. (2) They agreed in disregarding all the sciences, which was a mistaken carrying out of the intentions of Socrates. (3) They stood equally aloof from society, from the cares and duties of a citizen. (4) They seemed both to have upheld the ideal of a wise man, as being the exponent of universal reason, and the only standard of right and wrong. This ideal was no doubt

a shadow of the personality of Socrates. We find a sort of adaptation of it by Aristotle in his *Ethics* (II. vi. 15), where he makes the *φρόνιμος* to be the criterion of all virtue. The same conception was afterwards taken up and carried out to exaggeration by the Roman Stoics.

Cynicism implies sneering and snarling at the ways and institutions of society ; it implies discerning the unreality of the shows of the world and angrily despising them ; it implies a sort of embittered wisdom, as if the follies of mankind were an insult to itself.

We may ask, How far did the procedure of the early Cynics justify this implication ? On the whole, very much. The anecdotes of Antisthenes and Diogenes generally describe them as being true 'Cynics,' in the modern sense of the word. Their whole life was a protest against society : they lived in the open air ; they slept in the porticos of temples ; they begged ; Diogenes was sold as a slave. They despised the feelings of patriotism : war and its glory they held in repugnance ; 'Thus freed,' says M. Renouvier, 'from all the bonds of ancient society, isolated, and masters of themselves, they lived immovable, and almost divinised in their own pride.' Their hard and ascetic life set them above all wants. 'I would rather be mad,' said Antisthenes, 'than enjoy pleasure.' They broke through the distinction of ranks by associating with slaves. And yet under this self-abasement was greater pride than that against which they protested. Socrates is reported to have said, 'I see the pride of Antisthenes through the holes in his mantle.' And when Diogenes exclaimed, while soiling with his feet the carpet of Plato, 'Thus I tread on Plato's pride,' 'Yes,' said Plato, 'with greater pride of your own.' The Cynics aimed at a sort of impeccability ; they were equally to be above error and above the force of circumstances. To the infirmities of age, and even to death

itself, they thought themselves superior; over-doing the example of Socrates, they resorted to a voluntary death when they felt weakness coming on, and such an act they regarded as the last supreme effort of virtue. As their political theory, they appear to have maintained a doctrine of communism. This seems to have been extended even to a community of wives—a point of interest, as throwing light upon the origin of Plato's ideal *Republic*. Such notions may really have been to some extent entertained by Socrates himself. At all events we find them in one branch of his school. A life like that of the ancient Cynics presents to us a mournful picture, for we cannot but deplore the waste of so much force of will, and that individuals should be so self-tormenting. The Cynic lives by antagonism; unless seen and noticed to be eccentric, what he does has no meaning. He can never hope to found an extended school, though he may be joined in his protest by a few disappointed spirits. In the Cynical philosophy there was little that was positive, there was hardly any contribution to Ethical science. But the whole Cynical tone which proclaimed the value of action and the importance of the individual Will was an indication of the practical and moral direction which thought had now taken, and prepared the way for the partial discussion of the problems of the Will in Aristotle, and for their more full consideration among the Stoics. Crates, the disciple of Diogenes, was the master of Zeno.

Personally, the Cyrenaics were not nearly so interesting as the Cynics. Their position was not to protest against the world, but rather to sit loose upon the world. Aristippus, who passed part of his time at the court of Dionysius, and who lived throughout a gay, serene, and refined life, avowed openly that he resided in a foreign land to avoid the irksome-

ness of mixing in the politics of his native city Cyrene. But the Cyrenaic philosophy was much more of a system than the Cynic. Like the *Ethics* of Aristotle, this system started with the question, What is happiness? only it gave a different answer. Aristotle probably alludes to the philosophy of Aristippus amongst others, saying (*Eth.* i. viii. 6), 'Some think happiness to consist in pleasure.' But it has been observed that he chooses not Aristippus, but Eudoxus, as the representative of the doctrine formally announced, that 'pleasure is the Chief Good' (*Eth.* i. xii. 5, x. ii. 1). This points to the fact that Aristippus did not himself entirely systematise his thoughts. He imparted them to his daughter Arete, by whom they were handed down to her son, the younger Aristippus (hence called *μητροδιδάκτος*), and in his hands the doctrines appear first to have been reduced to scientific form. If then we briefly specify the leading characteristics of the Cyrenaic system, as it is recorded by Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, &c., it must be remembered that this is the after growth of the system. But though we cannot tell to what perfection Aristippus himself had brought his doctrines, there are many traces of their influence in the *Ethics* of Aristotle.

Cyrenaic morals began with the principle, taken from Socrates, that happiness must be man's aim. Next they start a question, which is never exactly started in Aristotle, and which remains an unexplained point in his system, namely, 'What is the relation of the parts to the whole, of each successive moment to our entire life?' The Cyrenaics answered decisively, 'We have only to do with the present. Pleasure is *μονόχρονος*,⁶⁰ *μερική*, an isolated moment, of this alone we

⁶⁰ Here we trace something similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, that 'Pleasure is like a monad, or a point,

complete in itself, perfect without relation to time' (*Eth.* x. iv. 4).

have consciousness. Happiness is the sum of a number of these moments. We must exclude desire and hope and fear, which partake of the nature of pain, and confine ourselves to the pleasure of the present moment.'

In this theory it must be confessed that there is considerable affinity to Aristotle's doctrine of the *τέλος*; and some have thought that Aristotle alludes to Aristippus (*Eth.* x. vi. 3-8), where he argues that amusement cannot be considered a *τέλος* (cf. *Politics*, VIII. v. 13). In short, the *τέλος* of Aristotle is only distinguished from the *μονόχρονος ἡδονή* of Aristippus by the moral earnestness which characterises it. The Cyrenaics further asking, What is Pleasure? answered by making three states of the soul possible; one, a violent motion, or tempest, which is pain; another, a dead calm, which is the painless, or unconscious state; the third, a gentle, equable motion, which is pleasure. Pleasure was no negative state, but a motion. This doctrine seems to be alluded to in the *Philebus* of Plato (p. 53 C),⁶¹ where Socrates, in arguing against the claims of pleasure to be the chief good, returns thanks to a certain refined set of gentlemen for supplying him with an argument, namely, their own definition of pleasure, that it is not a permanent state (*οὐσία*), but a state of progress (*γένεσις*). It is generally thought that the Cyrenaic school are here meant. In the *Eudemian* book (*Eth.* VII. xii. 3), there appears to be another allusion to this same definition, in a way which, without some explanation, it is excessively hard to understand. Eudemus in discussing pleasure, says, 'Some argue that pleasure cannot be a good, because it is a state of becoming' (*γένεσις*). He afterwards denies that pleasure is a *γένεσις*, except in certain

⁶¹ Ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν
ὥς αἰεὶ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ
τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ

τινες αὐτοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι
μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν εἶχειν.

cases. And then he proceeds to explain how it was that pleasure came to be called a *γένεσις*. He says⁶² 'it was from a confusion between the terms *γένεσις* and *ἐνέργεια*—it was thought to be a *γένεσις*, because essentially a good, to express which the term *ἐνέργεια* would have been appropriate.' At first sight it appears a strange contradiction to say pleasure is thought not to be a good, because it is a *γένεσις*; it is thought to be a *γένεσις*, because it is good. The explanation is, that the two clauses do not refer to the same set of opinions. The former part refers to the Platonists, who argued, as in the *Philebus*, against pleasure, because it was not a permanent state; the latter part refers to the definition of the Cyrenaics, that pleasure is a state of motion, or, as it is here called, a *γένεσις*. It is obvious that the Cyrenaic definition of pleasure, as far as we are aware of it, will not bear a comparison, as a scientific account, with the theory of Aristotle. Aristippus appears to have made the senses the only criterion of pleasure, and pleasure, again, the measure of actions. All actions, in themselves indifferent, were good or bad according to their results, as tending or not tending to pleasure. The Cyrenaics, however, adapting themselves to circumstances, allowed that their wise man would always maintain an outward decorum in obedience to established law and custom.

The selfishness of this system at once condemns it in our eyes. For even acts of generosity and affection, according to such a system, though admitted by it to be excellent, are excellent only on this account, because, by a reflex power, they occasion pleasure to the doer. What

⁶² *Eth.* VII. xii. 3. Δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις | ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἰοῦνται εἶναι, ὥστε δ' τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ | ἑτέρον.

in other systems is only concomitant to good acts is here made the primary motive, by which all morality is debased. The maintainers of such a philosophy are, perhaps, half-conscious to themselves that it never can be generally applicable, that they are maintaining a paradox. Looked into closely, this is seen to be a philosophy of despair. Those who cannot put themselves into harmony with the world, who cannot find a sphere for any noble efforts, nor peace in any round of duties, who have no ties and no objects, may easily, like Horace, 'slip back into the doctrines of Aristippus.' The profound joylessness which there is at the core of the Cyrenaic system showed itself openly in the doctrines of Hegesias, the principal successor of Aristippus. Hegesias, regarding happiness as impossible, reduced the highest good for man to a sort of apathy; thus, at the extremest point, coinciding again with the Cynics. It is instructive to see the various points of view that it is possible to take with regard to life. In the Cyrenaic system we find a bold logical following out of a particular view. In this respect the system is remarkable, for it is the first of its kind. The Sophists had trifled with such views, and not followed them out. In the prominence given to the subject of pleasure, in the Ethical systems both of Plato and Aristotle, we may trace the effects of the Cyrenaic impulse.

ESSAY III.

On the Relation of Aristotle's Ethics to Plato and the Platonists.

WE have already traced in outline the characteristics of moral philosophy in Greece down to the death of Socrates, and have made brief mention of two of the schools of 'one-sided Socraticists,' as they have been called, the Cynics and Cyrenaics. It remains to resume the thread of the progress of ethical thought in Plato, compared with whom all previous philosophers sink into insignificance. In him all antecedent and contemporary Greek speculation is summed up and takes its start afresh. Especially in relation to any part of the system of Aristotle, a knowledge of Plato is of the greatest importance. To explain the relation of any one of Aristotle's treatises to Plato is almost a sufficient account of all that it contains. If one were asked what books will throw most light upon the *Ethics* of Aristotle, the answer must be undoubtedly, 'the Dialogues of Plato.'

These Dialogues represent the successive phases, during a long life, of a mind pre-eminently above all others rich in philosophic thought and suggestion. In many respects they are totally unlike the works of Aristotle. For, instead of being written all together as the mature result of inquiries long previously made and of conclusions gradually obtained and stored up, they were thrown out from time to time,

beginning with Plato's early youth, just as poems are thrown out to relieve the mind of the poet. And in another respect also they were like poems, for in them form was always considered of coequal importance with matter; not only in style were they consummate masterpieces of writing, but also they had this *note* of poetry—that each part of them was treated as an end in itself and yet was duly subordinated to the whole, and they were thus perfect works of art. Being written from time to time they reflected the gradual growth and alteration of Plato's own mind, as well as the different influences of philosophy to which he was successively subjected. The earlier dialogues, such as *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, &c., exhibit a simple Socratic dialectic, by which the ordinary views of moral subjects are shown to be insufficient, and more adequate definitions are sought for, but not enunciated. Afterwards, as in *Phædrus* and *Republic*, a Pythagorean influence manifests itself; a delight in the symbolism of numbers appears, and the doctrine of the transmigration of souls plays an important part. Then again, as in *Parmenides*, *Theætetus*, and *Sophistes*, a Megarian or Eleatic influence is perceptible, and the most abstract conceptions of Being are discussed. Thus the dialogues contain many varieties of the point of view, and even many inconsistencies. These incongruities, however, such as they were, were veiled and mitigated, *first* by the dramatic form into which everything was thrown, and by which only the views of the speakers for the time being seemed to be guaranteed, and *secondly* by the graceful absence of dogmatism in the Platonic Socrates, the chief personage in most of the dialogues. A common spirit, however, is plainly discernible through the whole; and, for the rest, the Dialogues of Plato show us the progress of a philosophic mind, of an inquiring spirit, of 'a great original genius struggling with unequal conditions of

knowledge.¹ If we ask, At what point of his fifty years of authorship was Plato most himself? In which of the dialogues can we put our finger on the most essential features of his philosophy?—the answer must be, Nowhere and everywhere. Plato is to be regarded as a dynamical force, rather than as the setter forth of a system; and in modern times we may feel that to imbibe, if possible, his spirit, is of more value than to garner his conclusions. But the reason why we can now afford to be comparatively indifferent to the conclusions of Plato upon particular points,—is, that these conclusions have become incorporated, so far as they were valid, in the thought of Europe. And they became so incorporated through having been gathered up and stated afresh by Aristotle, who was Plato's lineal successor in the history of Philosophy, though not so in the leadership of the Academic School.² Plato's rich and manifold contributions

¹ *The Dialogues of Plato translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions*, by B. Jowett, M.A., Master of Balliol College, &c. (Oxford, 1871), Preface, p. ix. Prof. Jowett says of Plato (*ib.*) 'We are not concerned to determine what is the residuum of truth which remains for ourselves. His truth may not be our truth, and nevertheless may have an extraordinary value and interest for us.'

² Valentine Rose, *De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate* (Berlin, 1854), p. 112, impugns as a fiction the statement of Apollodorus (*apud* Diog. Laert. see above, page 2) that Aristotle was the pupil of Plato for twenty years. The grounds of this scepticism are (1) that Aristotle would have been more thoroughly Platonised had the statement been true; (2) that the roundness of the number has a suspicious appearance.

Such reasons are quite insufficient. It is consistent with all known facts to believe that Aristotle was Plato's pupil, but that he gradually asserted the independence of his own mind, and declared a dissent from and a polemic against some of the metaphysical views entertained by Plato's school, and thus was passed over in the election of a Scholarch for the Academy, on Plato's death. This led to Aristotle's leaving Athens for a time, and afterwards setting up in the *ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰς*, or covered walks, of the Lyceum his own separate school, which hence got the name of Peripatetic. These details perhaps cannot be proved; but we know one thing for certain,—that almost every page of Aristotle's Logical, Rhetorical, Ethical, Political, and Metaphysical writings bears traces of a relation to some part or other of Plato's Dialogues.

to logic, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, politics, and natural religion (so many of which have become part of the furniture of our every-day thoughts), were too much scattered up and down in his works, too much overlaid by conversational prolixity, too much coloured by poetry or wit, sometimes too subtly or slightly indicated, to be readily available for the world in general, and they thus required a process of codification. Aristotle, with the greatest gifts for the analytic systematising of philosophy that have ever been seen, unconsciously applied himself to the required task. He treated the Platonic Dialogues as quarries out of which he got the materials wherewith to build up in consolidated form all the departments of thought and science so far as they could be conceived by an ancient Greek. He thus codified Plato, and translated him into the prose of dogmatic theory, at the same time that he carried further and completed many of his results and suggestions. It must be confessed that he did all this somewhat ungraciously, seeming to dwell by preference on the differences of view between Plato and himself; and he did it, as we have said, unconsciously—apparently not perceiving how much the substance of his own thought, in all his non-physical inquiries, was derived from Plato and only re-stated and carried out by himself. Aristotle, however, was the natural complement of Plato, as Plato was the complement of Socrates; and it is to a considerable extent through Aristotle that ‘the residuum of truth’ in Plato has already become part of the thought of the world. The attitude and aims of the two writers were, of course, different, for, while Plato was a Dialectician and a Poet, Aristotle aimed especially at being a man of Science,—at collecting all that could be known on each subject, and stating it in the most precise terminology. Each of the two had his own peculiar earnestness: Plato’s was a moral earnestness, he seems never

to have left out of sight the overwhelming importance of everything by which the human soul might be improved or deteriorated; Aristotle's was a scientific earnestness, showing itself in a desire to sift and examine everything and to state the naked truth, as it appeared to him, regardless of consequences.³

Plato as the successor of Socrates appears to have carried forward all the many-sided tendencies of his master. By imagining Socrates still on earth, and in perpetual conversation on the highest subjects, Plato developed the different phases of his own idealistic philosophy. But at present we are only concerned with the ethical portion of this; the question is, What contribution did Plato make to the growth of moral theory in Greece? We must conceive him starting with the results at which Socrates had arrived: namely, that in the affairs of human life it is absolutely necessary to obtain universal conceptions; that, to arrive at these a suitable dialectic, and the refutation of inadequate notions, are requisite; and that it is the general outcome of all such inquiries to show that 'Virtue is a science.' Now, the course which Plato seems to have followed was, to take up these principles and see how they were to be reconciled with the current ideas of Greek morality. If there be four cardinal virtues, Wisdom, Temperance, Courage, and Justice, how do these stand related to the doctrine that 'Virtue is a science'? Is each of them a science, and how? Or, if virtue is one, how are these sepa-

³ Plato's deep feeling of the importance of morality cannot be properly indicated by a few references, but see Prof. Jowett's Introductions to his Translations of the Dialogues, *passim*. Aristotle's keenness for the hard and precise truth may be illustrated by *Elh.* i. vi. 1, δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς

ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναρτῶν. *Elh.* x. i. 3, where he blames those who from moral good intentions have pronounced Pleasure to be evil. *Politics*, ii. viii. 1, where he says of a particular question — ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκείον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν.

rate names to be accounted for? Again, if Virtue is a science, can it be taught? Furthermore, if Virtue is a science, then does it not follow that Vice is ignorance? From which, as no one can be blamed for errors committed in ignorance, it would result that no man is willingly bad. These are the problems which, arising out of the Socratic principles, Plato had to encounter, and he discusses them directly in *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, and *Republic*; less directly and incidentally they are touched upon in many of the other dialogues. In order to find an answer to them Plato called in the aid of Psychology, and he was thus the first to propose for ethics a psychological foundation. In *Republic*, in answer to the question, 'What is Justice?' he sets himself to construct an elaborate system of individual ethics,⁴ by means of an analogy drawn between the human soul and an ideal city. And the foundation of this analogy is made to consist in a division of the soul into Reason, Anger (*θυμός*), and Desire, answering to the three ranks of the rulers, the soldiers, and the working classes. This psychological division, rudimentary as it may now appear, was an important contribution towards the scientific theory of morals. One immediate result of the division was to lead Plato to distinguish Wisdom from the other cardinal virtues, and to put it into a class by itself. Wisdom, or Thought on moral subjects (*φρόνησις*) evidently enters as a guiding principle into all the other virtues; none of them can exist without it. And, on the other hand, this quality, when looked at more closely, is found to be identical with one of the tripartite divisions of the soul; it is Reason itself, an intuitive faculty, not admitting of degrees, possessed by all men, but yet capable of misdirection, obscuration, and

⁴ See *Essays on the Platonic Ethics*, by Thomas Maguire, LL.D., &c. (Dublin, 1870), p. 36. Dr. Maguire

in these Essays has well discussed the subject of the present pages.

eclipse. Hence comes one answer to the question, Is Virtue teachable? The Virtue of Wisdom, or Thought, is not; the other Virtues are.⁵ This conclusion is stated in *Republic* VII. p. 518 C—E, where *φρόνησις* is called ‘the eye of the soul,’ which only requires to be directed aright. ‘And hence,’ it is said,⁶ ‘while the other qualities (i.e. Courage, Temperance, and Justice) seem to be akin to the body, being infused by habit and exercise and not originally innate, the virtue of wisdom is part of a divine essence, and has a power which is everlasting, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable, and is also capable of becoming hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is taken into the service of evil, and he is dangerous in proportion to his intelligence?—Very true he said.—But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from the leaden weights, as I may call them, with which they are born into the world, which hang on to sensual pleasures, such as those of eating and drinking, and drag them down and turn the vision of their souls about the things that are below—if, I say, they had been released from them and turned round to the truth, the very same faculty in these very same persons would have seen the other as keenly as they now see that on which their eye is fixed.’ In this passage is also indicated the relation of at least one other of the cardinal virtues, namely Temperance, to the virtue of Wisdom or Thought. ‘Had sensual indulgence,’ says Plato, ‘been checked in many a man when he

⁵ See Dr. Maguire's *Essays*, p. 14.

⁶ Prof. Jowett's Translation, vol. ii. p. 352.

was young, his innate divine power of thought would have turned round to the idea of the Good, instead of fastening itself upon evil.' Thus Temperance conserves Wisdom, and is a necessary condition to it. But Courage, according to Plato, is steadiness not only in the face of danger, but also in the face of pleasure and temptation (*Laws*, p. 633, D, E), therefore this quality also must play a similar part with Temperance in preventing the disturbance and misdirection of Thought. But these qualities, however, while they are means and conditions to the proper functions of Thought, derive all their ethical value from Thought itself, and without it would be mere blind instincts towards the good, or would be the result of worldly and non-moral motives (*Phædo*, p. 68, d). Thus the three cardinal virtues, Wisdom, Temperance, and Courage, instead of standing apart, as in the popular Greek notion of morality, are found mutually to imply one another, and to grow together into one whole. And this whole may be called Virtue, or, to use the language of Plato's *Republic*, it may be figured as Justice—that quality which in the individual soul is analogous to a perfectly wise 'division of labour' in a State—in other words supreme regularity, good order, and sanity, reigning over all the functions of the individual soul. Such, in the barest outline, was Plato's moral scheme, but, even as thus stated, we can see how much deeper it was than anything which had preceded it in Greece; how, following the Socratic direction, it discarded as inadequate such definitions of Justice as 'giving all men their due,' or of Courage as 'willingness to go forward in battle;' how it looked alone to the internal motive of each quality, and in so doing discovered its necessary relation to all the various parts of the soul, and thus expanded the conception of Virtue as a science into that of Virtue as a harmony of the appetitive and emotional im-

pulses under the direction of Reason or Thought, which they at once obeyed and supported.

But yet, according to Plato, Virtue is always coincident with Knowledge; it implies the choice of the higher pleasures and of that course to which the balance of advantages inclines. To act otherwise than in accordance with the balance of advantages, is to act as Ignorance would prompt. And no one, except in error and through Ignorance, chooses evil in place of good. 'Ignorance,' however, does not mean the mere negative absence of knowledge; it means, as explained by Plato in this context, rather something positive—'the influence of any opinion or impression which is at variance with the ultimate reality'—any disturbing influence which may tend to weaken the force of ulterior interests—'all sentiments, passions, and emotions which lead us to put out of sight the consideration of our permanent interest.' With this proviso it is maintained that no wrong action is done except through Ignorance; and, as it is emphatically stated in *Laws*, p. 860 C, 'All bad men are always involuntarily bad.' But this is no fatalistic view of life. Unjust men would not have been unjust, as we have already seen, if early good habits had given its proper scope to the innate vision of their souls. And in succeeding pages of *Laws* it is shown that Legal Punishments must take their course with such men, as a reformatory and curative process for themselves, and as a vindication of those whom they have injured. Plato's theory of Punishment is essentially the corrective theory—that punishment is for the good of the person punished. But in his pictures⁸ of the future life, drawn under Pythagorean influences and no doubt partly

⁷ See Dr. Maguire's *Essays*, p. 31, and *Protagoras*, p. 358 sq.

⁸ See *Phædo*, pp. 113, 114, *Gorgias* 523-525, and *Republic*, 614-620.

derived from Pindar (see above, page 98), Plato indicates three possibilities for the individual soul—either eternal blessedness for those who have been purified by virtue and philosophy; or, a state of purgatory, to be followed by metempsychosis and a fresh probation on earth; or, for some, final condemnation without further hope of redemption. He conceives that the sentence of eternal punishment would be the fate of those great malefactors of mankind, such as the worst tyrants and other utterly lawless spirits, who should have rendered themselves incurable and incapable of improvement. This belief adds force to the consideration of the great importance of habits in the soul, for it supposes that the immortal soul by evil habits can become degraded past the possibility of improvement. It is then figured that eternal retributive punishment, as a warning to others, would become its lot. Though Plato does not make the details⁹ of his Eschatology necessary matters of faith, and by no means wishes (like a modern divine) to order the whole of life in reference to them, yet still the belief in the immortality of the soul was deeply rooted in his mind, and was variously expressed in different parts of his writings. He connected it with the metaphysical priority of Reason to Matter, and also with the grave importance of Morals. He pictured the whole of life as an education, and sometimes spoke of education as a process only begun in this life and to be carried on in a subsequent state of existence (see *Republic*, p. 498 D, E). All this gave greatness and depth, and a human interest valid for all times, to the ethical scheme of Plato.

⁹ See *Phædo* (p. 114 E). 'I do not mean to affirm that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true; a man of sense hardly ought to say that. But I do say that, inasmuch as the

soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily that something of the kind is true.' Prof. Jowett's Translation, vol. i. p. 465.

The works of Aristotle, that is to say those that we possess, were probably all composed between fourteen and twenty-seven years after the death of Plato. If Plato could have come to life again and seen these works, he would have found philosophy all mapped out and divided into separate branches, and great analytic clearness thus imparted to the whole; he would have found a settled philosophical terminology employed throughout—in many cases words that he had himself been in the habit of using in an ordinary way, now restricted and limited in their connotation and made technical terms of logic or metaphysics¹⁰—in other cases new and somewhat uncouth terms that had been introduced by Aristotle 'for the sake of precision;' ¹¹ and he would have found manifold suggestions of his own on all the different subjects of philosophy taken up and in many cases made more definite and carried out, so that a concentrated essence of many of his own thoughts, stated in widely different form from his own, would have been presented to his view. If we might go on indulging this fancy, it would be not unnatural to conceive that Plato, with his great candour and breadth of mind, would have acknowledged with admiration the additions to knowledge and thought which in many respects had been made by Aristotle, but that he also would have felt (even setting aside the somewhat captious antagonism to himself which occasionally appeared) that something had been lost, as well as gained, to Philosophy by the rigidly analytic method of his successor.

Taking now the unfinished (or mutilated) *Ethics* of Aristotle, with their Peripatetic complement, Books V., VI., and

¹⁰ As for instance, συλλογισμός, which merely meant 'computation' with Plato; προαίρεσις = a 'preference'; δύναμις = 'power,' &c.

¹¹ Cf. *Eth.* II. vii. 11, περὶ αὐτῶν ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἔνεκεν. The result was—terms like ἐντελέχεια, or forms like τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

VII., we shall find that they abundantly illustrate the conception just given of the relation of Aristotle's works in general to Plato. In order to see at a glance how much of the substance of this treatise is taken from, or suggested by, the Platonic Dialogues, let us synoptically enumerate, and then add a few remarks upon, the following heads: (1) The conception of moral science as a whole—that it is a sort of Politics which is the science of human happiness. (2) The conception of the practical Chief Good—that it is *τέλειον* and *αὐταρκες* and incapable of improvement or addition. (3) The conception that man has an *ἔργον* or proper function, that man's *ἀρετὴ* perfects this, and that his well-being is inseparable from it. (4) The conception of Psychology as a basis for Morals. (5) The doctrine of *Μεσότης*, which is only a modification of the *Μετρίότης* of Plato. (6) The doctrine of *Φρόνησις*, which is an adaptation, with alterations, of the Socratico-Platonic view. (7) The theory of Pleasure, its various kinds, and the transcendency of mental pleasures. (8) The theory of Friendship, which is suggested by questions started, but not answered, in the *Lysis* of Plato. (9) The Agnology, or theory of Ignorance, in Book VII.—to explain how men can act against what they know to be best—which appears to have been considerably suggested by Platonic discussions. (10) The practical conclusion of Ethics—that Philosophy is the highest good and the greatest happiness, being an approach to the nature of the Divine Being. On these separate heads we may remark:

(1) Not only is the general point of view—that the individual is inseparable from the State—taken from the *Republic* of Plato, but also the special description of Politics as the science of human happiness appears unmistakably borrowed from the *Euthydemus*. It is interesting to compare the conception of Politics, and its relation to the sciences, which

is expressed in *Eth.* i. ii. 5, 6, with the following description (*Euthydem.* p. 291 B): ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοπούμενοι αὐτήν, εἰ αὕτη εἴη ἢ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπεργαζομένη—ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν ἢ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἢ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἢ αὕτη εἶναι—ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ ἢ τε στρατηγικῇ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι παραδιδόναι ἄρχειν τῶν ἔργων, ὧν αὐταὶ δημιουργοὶ εἰσιν, ὥς μόνῃ ἐπισταμένη χρήσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἐδόκει ἡμῖν αὕτη εἶναι, ἣν ἐζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἢ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου ἱαμβεῖον μόνῃ ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνῶσα καὶ πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν. While, however, accepting this conception of Politics, Aristotle does so in a wavering way—he says that his science will be ‘a sort of Politics’ (*πολιτικὴ τις*, *Eth.* i. ii. 9); as elsewhere he had spoken as if it were rather a stretch to call the science of moral subjects Politics.¹² He treats Ethics in such a way as virtually to separate them from Politics, a separation which was completed by the Peripatetic School and by the Stoics.

(2) In *Eth.* i. vii. 3–6, Aristotle, in laying down his own conception of the chief good, which is to be the ἀρχή for Ethics, says that it must be τέλειον and αὐταρκες. These same qualities are attributed to the chief good in the *Philebus* (p. 20 C), a dialogue to which Aristotle seems often to refer, and from which the present doctrine is probably taken. The words are as follows: τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλειον ἢ μὴ τέλειον εἶναι; Πάντων δὴ που τελεώτατον, ὃ Σώκρατες. Τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τἀγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; κ.τ.λ. It is to be observed, however, that Aristotle analyses the term τέλειον, and gives it a more philosophical import than Plato had done. Plato probably meant nothing more than ‘the

¹² *Rhet.* i. ii. 7. Τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πραγματείας ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν.

perfect.' Aristotle analyses this into 'that which was never a means,' 'that which is in and for itself desirable.' He accepts also from the *Philebus* another doctrine, which is the corollary of the former, namely, that the chief good is incapable of addition. He directly refers to the *Philebus*, *Eth.* x. ii. 3, saying, 'Plato used just such an argument as this to prove that pleasure is not the chief good—for that pleasure, with thought added to it, is better than pleasure separately; whereas, if the compound of the two is better, pleasure cannot be the chief good; for that which is the absolute chief good cannot be made more desirable by any addition to it. And it is obvious that nothing else can be the chief good, which is made better by the addition of any other absolute good.' The reference is to *Philebus*, pp. 20–22. Aristotle implies the same thing, *Eth.* i. vii. 8, by saying that, 'When we call happiness the most desirable of all things, we can only do so on the proviso that we do not rank it with other goods, and place it in the same scale of comparison with them' (μὴ συναριθμουμένην, see *infra*, note on this passage); 'else we should come to the absurdity of considering it capable of improvement by the addition of other goods to it, which, if we consider it as the ideal good for man, is impossible.'

(3) The whole argument by which, from the analogy of the different trades, of the different animals, and of the separate parts of the body, the existence of an *ἔργον* or proper function for man is proved (*Eth.* i. vii. 11) comes almost verbatim from the *Republic* (p. 352–3); as also does the account of the connection between the *ἀρετή* of anything with its proper function, which is given *Eth.* ii. vi. 2. The object selected as an illustration is in each case the same—namely, the eye.¹³

¹³ Cf. *Repub.* p. 353 B. Ἄρ' ἂν ποτε | σαιτο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν
δμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργά- | ἀρετήν; κ.τ.λ.

(4) The psychology of Aristotle's *Ethics* is based on that of Plato, but it is also a development of it, and contains one essential difference, in the greater prominence, namely, that is given to the will. This, it is true, is virtual rather than expressed, but it lies at the root of the separation of 'practical virtues' from philosophy, and from 'excellences of the reason.' Plato divides the mind into the following elements: τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές (*Repub.* p. 440). Aristotle gives a more physical account of the internal principle (see below, Essay V.), and divides the mind into that which possesses reason and that which partakes of reason.¹⁴ This answers at first sight to the division of Plato, since the λόγου μετέχον includes both θυμός and ἐπιθυμία. But Aristotle pushes the analysis farther, dividing the reason into practical and speculative (which is a great discrepancy from Plato), and not attributing the same separate and important character to θυμός as it has in the *Republic*, where it is made to stand for something like the instinct of honour, or the spirited and manly will, which, as Plato says, is generally on the side of the reason in any mental conflict. In Aristotle's discussions upon βούλησις, βούλευσις, &c., we see an attempt to found a psychology of the will, thus supplying what was a deficiency in Plato, but the theory does not appear to be by any means complete.

(5) The principle of *Μεσότης*, so prominent in Aristotle's theory of moral virtue, is a modification of Plato's principle of *Μετρίότης* or *Συμμετρία*. As, however, the history of the doctrine of *Μεσότης* will form part of the subject of the following essay, no more need at present be said upon it.

(6) Aristotle's doctrine of *φρόνησις*, as far as we can understand it in the Eudemian exposition, which alone remains to

¹⁴ Λόγον ἔχον and λόγου μετέχον. *Εἰλ.* i. xiii.

us, seems to be partly an adoption and partly a correction of a Socratico-Platonic doctrine of similar import. This doctrine, beginning with the form that 'Virtue is Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), or Thought (*φρόνησις*),' and being afterwards developed by Plato into the form that 'Virtue is, or implies, Philosophy,' is accepted, with two corrections, by Aristotle. He denies the identification of 'Thought' with Virtue, saying instead—Virtue must 'be accompanied by' Thought; and he distinguishes and divides Thought or Moral Wisdom (*φρόνησις*) from Philosophy (*σοφία*). The former of these corrections was directed more against Socrates than against Plato; the latter, we shall see, is an important correction of the system of Plato, one that is connected with differences as to the whole view of Ethics. Plato speaks quite decisively of the necessity of *φρόνησις* to make moral action of any worth. In a celebrated passage of *Theætetus* (p. 176 A), he says, 'We should strive to fly from the evil of the world; the flight consists in as far as possible being made like to God; and this "being made like" consists in becoming just and holy with thought accompanying' (*ὁμολώσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι*). In *Phædo* (p. 69 B), he descants upon the worthlessness of moral acts if performed without *φρόνησις*: he says, 'Such virtue is a mere shadow and in reality a slavish quality, with nothing sound or true about it.'¹⁵ But a little further on (p. 79 D) he defines *φρόνησις* to be the contemplation of the absolute.¹⁶ We see then that Plato requires that every act should be accompanied

¹⁵ Χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις βῆ ἢ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὀγιές οὐδ' ἀληθές ἔχουσα.

¹⁶ "Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ (ἡ ψυχὴ) καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκείσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ

καθαρόν τε καὶ αἰὲν ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ αἰὲν μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅταν περ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ—καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται.

by an absolute consciousness—and this absolute consciousness he does not separate from that which takes place in speculation and philosophy. The Peripatetic account is that a moral consciousness must accompany every act, a sort of wisdom which is the centre to all the moral virtues (*Eth.* vi. xiii. 6), but this kind of consciousness is quite distinct from the philosophic reason, it deals with the contingent and not with the absolute. The doctrine that Temperance preserves Thought (*σώζει τὴν φρόνησιν*, *Eth.* vi. v. 5) and that Thought without Virtuous habits may degenerate into cunning, is taken from *Republic*, p. 518 D, E (quoted above, p. 185).

(7) Of the two treatises on Pleasure contained in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, we may assume (see above, p. 65), that the one which appears in Book VII. is the work of Eudemus. It has then a totally different kind of interest from that in Book X. It illustrates, not so much Aristotle's relation to Plato, as rather the growth of the Peripatetic school. It is in its main outline borrowed from the treatise in Book X., but it also contains some peculiarities belonging to the views of Eudemus, of which the chief are a practical, and at the same time a materialistic tendency. It is antagonistic to the views of 'some' who argued that no pleasure could be a good, because it is a state of becoming (*γένεσις*). This argument is refuted by Aristotle himself in Book X. Eudemus criticises and overthrows other arguments for the same position, not mentioned in Book X. None of these, however, are to be found in *Philebus*, or in any dialogue of Plato. They are, in all probability, to be attributed to the Platonic school. There is a direct mention, in connection with one of the arguments, of the name of Speusippus (*Eth.* vii. xiii. 1). Turning now to Book X., we find the question as to the nature of pleasure opened by the statement of two extreme views on the subject; one, that of the Cynics—that pleasure

was 'entirely evil' (*κομιδῇ φαῦλον*)—the other, that of Eudoxus, that pleasure was the chief good. The first view Aristotle sets aside as having rather a moral and practical than a speculative character; and as being, though well-intentioned, at all events an over-statement of the truth. He specifies four arguments of Eudoxus to prove that pleasure is the chief good. (a) All creatures seek it. (b) It is contrary to pain. (c) It is sought for its own sake. (d) Added to any good, it makes that good better. He then mentions the objections (*ἰνστάσεις*) made to each of these four, and shows that none of the objections is valid, except that brought against the last of the arguments. He shows from Plato (see above, p. 192), that the fact that pleasure can be added to other goods *disproves*, instead of proving, its claim to be considered the chief good. Aristotle now mentions other general arguments that have been brought against pleasure—namely, that it is not a quality; that it is indefinite (*ἀόριστον*); that it is a motion, a becoming, or a replenishment (*κίνησις, γένεσις, ἀναπλήρωσις*); again, that there are many disgraceful pleasures. He answers all these objections, and having accepted the Platonic position that pleasure is, at all events, not the chief good, he proceeds to give his own theory of its nature, considering it to be, except in certain cases, a good, and analysing its character more accurately than had hitherto been done. In all this we cannot trace anything like a direct antagonism to the *Philebus* or to any other part of Plato's works. Far rather, as we shall have an opportunity of seeing more distinctly in the next Essay, Aristotle, while perfectly coinciding with and accepting Plato's general theory of pleasure, the division of its different kinds, the distinction between bodily pleasures which are preceded by desire and a sense of pain, and the mental pleasures which are free from this; while accepting, that is,

the whole theory in its moral and practical bearing, refines and improves upon it as a speculative question, substituting a more accurate and appropriate definition of pleasure than is to be found in Plato.

(8) We cannot doubt that Aristotle's attention was turned to the consideration of the subject of friendship by the importance that Plato attributed to it, and the interesting part which he makes it play in his system. Both *Lysis* and *Phædrus* are devoted to the discussion of friendship. In the former dialogue little more is done than starting the difficulties, some of which are taken up and restated in the beginning of Aristotle's treatise (*Eth.* viii. i. 6); 'Whether does friendship arise from similarity, or from dissimilarity? Does it consist in sympathy, or in the harmony of opposites?' In *Phædrus* a passionate and enthusiastic picture of friendship is given, which renders it not distinguishable from love; its connection with the highest kind of imagination, and with the philosophic spirit, is dwelt upon at length. In Aristotle nothing of this kind is to be discovered. The picture is colder, but at the same time more natural and human. In the ninth chapter of Book IX. a fine philosophic account of the true value of friendship is to be found, on which more will be said in the succeeding Essay. The whole of this subject is treated with depth and also with moral earnestness, which renders it one of the most attractive parts of Aristotle's *Ethics*. We see throughout that on every point of the question the analysis has been pushed farther than Plato carried it.

(9) The position that 'Virtue is a science' and that it is only through ignorance that a man could choose other than the Good, naturally gave importance to the question as to the nature of Ignorance itself, and the problem, How does it happen that knowledge of the Good is sometimes in abey-

ance? These questions which were suggested in *Protagoras* (pp. 358 sqq.) appear to have been worked at in the Peripatetic school, and, with the help of the Practical Syllogism (see Essay IV.), an answer was given to them in the *Eudemian* Book VII. A cognate discussion, far less mature in character, on the voluntariness or involuntariness of Vice, entirely suggested by Plato, appears in Book III. of Aristotle's *Ethics*.

(10) The burden of all the Platonic Dialogues is the same, the excellence of philosophy, and its extreme felicity. Most completely does Aristotle reproduce this feeling when (*Eth. x. vii.*) having, as it were, satisfied the claims of common life by his analysis of the 'practical virtues,' he indulges in his own description of that which is the highest happiness—when he says, 'Philosophy seems to afford wonderful pleasures both in purity and duration' (*Eth. x. vii. 3*), and 'We need not listen to the saying, "Men should think humanly," rather as far as possible one should aspire after what is immortal, and do all things so as to live according to what is highest in oneself' (*Eth. x. vii. 8*). We are reminded generally of the enthusiastic descriptions of philosophy in the *Republic*, the *Phædo*, and the *Symposium* of Plato. One particular passage of the last-named dialogue seems probably to have suggested to Aristotle the saying (*Eth. x. viii. 13*), that 'The philosopher will surely be most under the protection of heaven (*θεοφιλέστατος*), because honouring and cherishing that which is highest and most akin to God—namely, the reason.'

Such are the leading ethical conceptions and topics for which Aristotle's treatise is manifestly indebted to the Dialogues of Plato, and they go far towards furnishing its entire skeleton. But besides these there was many a minor suggestion of Plato's, which has been taken up into this work, as

the notes in subsequent pages will testify. The very metaphors used by Aristotle seem often to have been inherited. That of the 'bowmen' (*Eth.* i. ii. 2) occurs in *Republic*, p. 519 C. That of the 'Aristeia for pleasure' (*Eth.* i. xii. 5) comes from *Philebus*, p. 22 E. The analogy between the political philosopher and an oculist (*Eth.* i. xiii. 7) is from *Charmides*, p. 155 B. The comparison of mental extremes to excesses in gymnastic training (*Eth.* ii. ii. 6) occurs in *Erastæ*, p. 134. The metaphor of 'straightening bent wood' (*Eth.* ii. ix. 5) is from *Protagoras*, p. 325 D. The comparison of those who have made their own fortune to poets and mothers, who love their offspring (*Eth.* iv. i. 20, ix. vii. 7), is from *Republic*, p. 330 C. This list of examples might doubtless be increased.

We have now seen the close connection of succession, inheritance, and development between the *Ethics* of Aristotle and the writings of Plato. It remains to point out the diversities of doctrine, as well as of tone and manner, which are also manifest between the moral systems of the two philosophers. At the very outset of his treatise, having started the question, What is the Good for man? Aristotle stops himself with the logical consideration that it will be necessary to inquire first the nature of this universal term—Good—and to state in what sense it is predicated, and what is its relation to the particulars which fall under it,¹⁷ 'although,' as he adds, 'an inquiry of this kind is rendered disagreeable' owing to those who are our friends having introduced their doctrine of Ideas.' Adopting, however, a saying which Plato had himself employed in reference to judging of Homer,¹⁸ he

¹⁷ *Eth.* i. vi. 1. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφεῖσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσῶντους τῆς τοιαύτης

ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη.

¹⁸ *Repub.* x. p. 595 c. ἀλλ' οὐ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἄνθρωπος.

decides that 'personal considerations must be sacrificed to the interests of truth;' and accordingly he proceeds to detail a set of arguments against the logical or metaphysical validity of the Platonic 'Idea of Good.' We may admit the general necessity for the logic of ethics of this discussion as to the realistic or nominalistic import to be attributed to the term—Good, and we may admit also the courteous terms in which it is introduced. But yet we shall find something unsatisfactory, and requiring explanation, in the arguments themselves which Aristotle proceeds to adduce. In form the controversy appears rather to be with the Platonists, with the rival school in the Academia, than with Plato himself; but yet so much prominence is given to the 'Idea of Good' in Plato's *Republic*, a work which was, beyond doubt, constantly present to the mind of Aristotle when he was writing his *Ethics*, that we cannot but think that the present passage has reference not only to the logic of the Academy generally, but also to the ethical applications of the 'Idea of Good' made by Plato himself.

The doctrine of 'Ideas' is much less settled and constant in Plato's writings than may be ordinarily supposed. In regard to this, as to many other questions, Plato may be said to have had no system, but to have been constantly inquiring. We find that the transcendental existence of the 'Ideas,' that is, their existence apart from the human mind, is only asserted, together with the doctrine of our 'recollecting' them (*ἀνάμνησις*), in mythical and imaginative passages of *Meno*, *Phædrus*, and *Phædo*; that in later dialogues, as *Republic*, and *Philebus*, they are treated in a more sober spirit; that in *Theætetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Laws*, the 'Ideas' are mentioned much as Universals would be spoken of in modern books; lastly, what is most remarkable of all, we find in *Parmenides* a criticism on the doctrine of Ideas,

in which the weak points of the doctrine and the difficulties attendant on it are pointed out. Socrates, who is represented in the dialogue as a promising young man, defends the supposed orthodox view of the Ideas, but he is refuted by the venerable Parmenides, who lectures him on his want of practice in dialectic. And it is a curious fact that the arguments here put by Plato into the mouth of Parmenides are 'nearly if not quite'¹⁹ those used by Aristotle in attacking Plato, or at all events that which he enunciates as the Platonic system. It appears then that Plato, at one period of his life, when deeply plunged in the study of Eleatic philosophy, saw that his own doctrine of Ideas required revision, and in the dialogue of *Parmenides* he at once put out what he had arrived at. These considerations open to us a different view of Plato's relation to the doctrine of Ideas from what we should have gathered from Aristotle in the not unfrequent places²⁰ in which he criticises this doctrine. Yet, since Plato did at all events sometimes put forward the doctrine in strong and enthusiastic terms, it may be as well to endeavour to trace its general meaning, even if in so doing we incur the same charge that Aristotle has incurred—of turning poetry into prose and making dogmatic that which was never meant to be such.

Aristotle tells us²¹ that Plato's doctrine of Ideas rose from a union between the universal definitions of Socrates and the Heraclitean doctrine of the fleeting character of all objects of sense. To put this a little more clearly, the position is as follows: we desire some permanent and certain knowledge. Let us take some object and try to know it, e.g. 'this man.'

¹⁹ See Prof. Jowett's Introduction to *Parmenides* (vol. iii. pp. 227 sqq.), where the arguments are analysed.

²⁰ *Metaphys.* i. vi., vi. xiii., xii.

iv.—v. *Post Analyt.* i. xi. &c.

²¹ *Metaphys.* i. vi. 2, xii. iv. 2, 3, and see above, page 159.

' Looking closely into it we find at once that, in 'this man,' we are in possession of a conception made up of two elements, a universal and a particular. 'Man' is universal, 'this' is particular. Now 'this' may be infinitely various. It is purely relative, entirely changeable. It baffles all attempts at knowledge. The more we analyse 'this,' the more it escapes us, and comes to actually nothing. What constitutes 'this' man? Particular time and place, particular qualities, such as form, colour, size, and the like. But time and place, form, colour, and size are all in themselves universal. 'This' man is determined by 'this' time, place, form, &c. But, again, what is 'this time'? The particular element in 'this time' is equally unknowable and unexpressible with the particular element in 'this man.' Hence Heraclitus said, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Let us now take the other side, and look at the universal element, 'man.' This is something permanent and stable; this constitutes a unity in the midst of plurality; this the mind can rest in contemplating. We give to this universal element the name of form or idea (*εἶδος, ἰδέα*), a name borrowed probably from Democritus, who spoke of the 'forms' of things being emanations from things themselves, and constituting our knowledge of the things. And now another step has to be taken; we must throw out all distinction between knowledge and existence. Since things exist for us solely through our knowledge of them, and we cannot conceive them existing at all, except as either for our minds or for some other minds, we must give up entirely that dualism which would suppose two terms standing opposite each other, namely, the object and the mind, and we must speak now of one term alone. Nothing exists except what we know. Knowledge and existence are identical, since, as Protagoras said (only in an altered sense), the mind is 'the measure of

all things; of existing things that they exist, of non-existent things that they do not exist.' Taking as established the identity of knowledge and existence, we may use one term to express this identity, namely, 'truth' (*ἀλήθεια*), which equally implies reality of existence in things, and the right apprehension of them in the mind.

What is it that possesses truth, or reality? Not particulars, which, as we saw before, are (in so far as they are particulars) unknowable, but the universal, the idea. The universal element, or idea, may hence be said to be the only real existence, while the particulars have only a sort of illusory, or mock existence; when we look closely into them we find they are mere shadows of reality. Hence Plato, following out this train of thought, said, by a forcible metaphor, that common persons who fancy the particulars to be real existences are like men in a dimly lighted cave, taking the shadows on the wall to be realities. By an equally strong metaphor, which Aristotle speaks of as mere poetry (*Metaphys.* i. ix. 12), Plato called the Ideas archetypes (*παράδειγμα*) of sensible things. In this metaphor several points are expressed. (1) That knowledge is rather prior to experience than derived from it. Experience is the occasion, and not the cause of knowledge. This Plato expressed by saying that all our knowledge is 'reminiscence.' Things in the world are constantly reminding us of, and calling up, the reminiscence of the Ideas which we saw in their pure state, before we were born. (2) That the forms of the mind are permanent, while the material world is fleeting. The mind is always prior to, and greater than, the world. This points, as Plato argued in *Phædo*, to the immortality of the soul. (3) The Eleatics had denied the existence of motion, plurality, change; in short, the whole sensible creation. Plato does not go so far as this; though infinitely less real

than the Ideas, he allows that the external world has some share of reality. Metaphorically he says, 'it partakes of the Ideas.' The Ideas are archetypes of things; in other words, in the midst of the unknowable, the fleeting, the chaotic, the movable—there is law, unity, form, order, symmetry, the permanent, and the absolute, existing not materially, but as ideas, dimly seen by the mind, because it is not pure enough; seen more distinctly, according to the purity and elevation of the mind, and always more or less suggested.

We are now brought to that part of Plato's doctrine where he spoke of the 'Idea of good.' Of this he says (*Repub.* p. 509 B), that 'As the sun affords to all visible objects not only the power of being seen, but also growth, increase, and nourishment; so is there afforded to all objects of knowledge by the good not only the being known, but also their very being and existence. The good is not existence, but is above and beyond existence (*ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*) in dignity and power.' In *Philebus* (p. 65 A), it is said that 'the good cannot be comprehended in one idea alone, but it may be taken in three manifestations; beauty, symmetry, and truth.' We see what a metaphysical world we have now to deal with. It is not the material world immediately, but the world of pure cognitions (*τὰ γνωσκόμενα*), that depend on the Good for their existence. Every cognition must have the Idea of good present in it. We cannot conceive anything existing except as being good. Evil, in the shape of disease, crime, pain, &c., Plato, from this point of view, would call the non-existent; it is the negation of existence, the want of existence in some way or other; it is the chaotic, the formless, that which has no universality or absoluteness, that which the mind cannot deal with. The Idea of good in the world of thought Plato compared to the sun in the material world; following out this metaphor, evil would be as the

shadows which are the mere negation of light, and yet they are necessary to relieve the light, for were all light, nothing would be visible; and so too evil, as the negation of good, may be said to be necessary to its existence. 'Good,' says Plato, 'is the cause of existence and knowledge.' This opens a sublime conception, on the one hand, of a world in which all things are very good; on the other hand, of a philosophy whose method of the deepest knowledge consists in no mere abstract investigations, nor any mere accumulation of experience, but in apprehending with enthusiasm and joy the all-pervading idea of Good, as it manifests itself under the three forms of beauty, symmetry, and truth. The Idea of Good, Plato would by no means confine to metaphysics, as if it had no application to the other sciences. On the contrary, his great object was to raise Morals and Politics above all mere empiricism into Philosophy properly so called. Hence he says that 'States will never prosper till philosophers are kings;' again, he says, 'The guardian of the State must know with certainty that which all vaguely seek and aspire after—namely, what is the Good' (*Repub.* p. 505-6). The Idea of Good, then, according to Plato, is to be a principle influencing human action, and necessarily forming a part of any system of Politics or Morals worthy of being called so.

With this position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the theory in the following words (*Eth.* i. iv. 3), 'Some have thought that besides all these manifold goods upon earth, there is some other absolute good, which is the cause to all these of their being good;' he proceeds to criticise the tenability of such a conception, and concludes his argument by saying, 'But we may dismiss the Idea at present, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, or transcendental (*χωριστόν*) and absolute, it obviously can neither be realised nor possessed by man, whereas something of this latter kind

is what we are inquiring after' (*Eth.* I. vi. 13). He follows up those remarks by saying that 'Perhaps some may think the knowledge of the idea may be useful as a pattern (*παράδειγμα*) by which to judge of relative good.' Against this he argues that 'There is no trace of the arts making any use of such a conception; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general, all pursue their vocations without respect to the Absolute Good, nor is it easy to see how they could be advantaged by apprehending it.'

This criticism is a direct denial of Plato's point of view. Plato, who had expressed himself utterly dissatisfied with the empirical and prudential morality of his countrymen, and who wished to raise morality and Politics (which with him was but morality on an extended scale) into something wise, philosophical, and absolute—made certain requisitions for this. He demanded that a full philosophic consciousness should govern everything. He required that a knowledge of the good-in-itself should be present to the mind. He acknowledges, it is true, that the philosopher, after dealing with sublime speculations, may seem dazzled and confused when he is suddenly confronted with the petty details of life, the quibbles of law courts, &c. But on the other hand he seems to have considered, not only that philosophy was indispensable to morality, but also that the mind, by contemplating the Idea of good, would be conformed to it. This Idea, then, was not merely an object for the abstract reason; it was an object for the imagination also, and an attraction for the highest kind of desires. It was not only an idea, but also an ideal. Aristotle, in a clearer and more analytic way, regards the Idea as something out of all relation to action (*οὐ πρακτέον*), as a metaphysical conception simply, if, indeed, it could be entertained at all. He then entirely separates it from Ethics. He considers that the guiding principle (*ἀρχή*)

for Ethics must be not this absolute transcendental good, but a practical good, which he envisaged as Happiness, or the end for man. These two views must stand for ever apart, and on each side there seems to be some degree of merit, and some degree of fault. Fine as is Plato's conception of science, it must be confessed that there is some degree of vagueness about it. We need not put ourselves in the position of Plato's contemporaries, those of whom the story is related that 'They went to him expecting to hear about the chief good for man, but they were disappointed, for he put them off with a quantity of remarks about numbers and things they could not understand.' But even taking Plato as 'a philosopher for philosophers,' there seems to be something not quite explained in his system. Infinitely rich as he was in invention and suggestion, we might almost say that he required an Aristotle as his successor to give definiteness to his conceptions. When then we turn to Aristotle, we find the power that is gained by a division of the sciences. We find no longer an effort to attain to that highest point of union for all knowledge and all existence, which is far above the ordinary ken, and which can hardly be viewed otherwise than by occasional glimpses—but rather an effort after clearness and completeness, after the arrangement of all experience under appropriate and separate leading conceptions. It is easy to see what an immense field is at once laid open. Rapid indeed and wonderful were the achievements of a mind like that of Aristotle. But when all is done, one feels also that something has also been lost by this separate treatment of different subjects. One desires again to see Ethics not dissevered from Theology and Metaphysics.

Had Aristotle in the present case contented himself with denying the appropriateness of the 'Idea of Good,' or, in other words, of the *νοητὸν ἀγαθόν*, as an *ἀρχή* for moral :

and Political science, the reasonableness of such a view must have been admitted. But he goes farther, and undertakes to disprove offhand the tenability, even as part of a metaphysical system, of the 'Idea of Good,' in the sense in which it was held by Plato or by the Platonists. And for this purpose he states his arguments, which are briefly as follows: (1) The Platonists themselves allow that where there is an essential succession (*τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον*) between any two conceptions, these could not be brought under a common Idea. But this succession occurs in different kinds of good. Good in relation, e.g. the useful, is essentially later than good in substance, and therefore cannot fall under the same Idea. (2) If all good were one, it ought to be predicated under only one category, whereas it can be predicated under all. (3) If it were one, it would be treated of by only one science. (4) The Idea is only a repetition of phenomena, for with these it is really identical. (5) Even the most essential and undoubted goods seem incapable of being reduced to one Idea.—Everyone has felt the unsatisfactoriness of these arguments; they seem captious, verbal, unreal, and not to touch the point at issue. Let us examine them separately. Argument (1) seems to beg the question. It refers to the Platonic doctrine of the ideal numbers (referred to *Metaphys.* XII. vi. 7), which they held to stand in absolute and immutable succession to each other, and to be incapable of being brought themselves under one common Idea. To this Aristotle compares the relation between relative and absolute goods; he says the one stands in immutable succession to the other, therefore there can be no common idea of them. A Platonist might reply, that this is a mere assumption; that in the case of the ideal numbers, Unity and Duality, for instance, stand in such essential contradistinction to each other, that they are Ideas themselves, and therefore

there cannot be Ideas of them. But with regard to the goods, all that is relative in them is merely the particular, the non-existent, which the philosophical reason cannot deal with. It is absurd to make the relativity of the relative good an immutable and permanent quality, which is for ever to distinguish it from the good in itself. (2) The second argument is a mere repetition of the first. Aristotle takes certain categories, namely, substance, quality, quantity, relation, time and place, &c. (*καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα*), and shows that there are different modes of the good under these different categories. Now these categories might all be reduced to substance and relation, and then the argument is, 'You have good in substance, and good in different relations: can these be considered the same?' (3) The argument of the sciences is a carrying out of the same objection. Aristotle argues that the sciences point to a still greater subdivision of good. For good, in relation to time, for instance—that is, opportunity, may be treated of by strategics, or by medicine; and so on with good under the other categories; the sciences still more minutely subdivide it.

Plato might well complain of this subdivision of the sciences being brought as an argument against him, when he had so anxiously urged (*Repub.* p. 534 E) that in dialectic all sciences united, and dialectic was the science of the Idea of Good.

The fourth argument, which appears also in the *Parmenides* of Plato, is one of which Aristotle seems fond—that the Idea (*αὐτοκαστον*) is a mere repetition of phenomena, exhibiting the same law as the particulars, indistinguishable from them, and therefore perfectly useless. This objection is expressed in the *Metaphysics* (I. ix. 1) by saying that 'The Ideas are as if one was unable to count a few things, and thought it would be easier to count them

'when they were more.' It would seem, however, to be a misstatement of Plato's view, for it assumes the reality, the substantive and absolute existence of the particulars, and then speaks of the Idea or the Universal being appended to the end of the row, in order to explain them. Whereas Plato might surely say the particulars disappear out of sight; on looking into them I find they have no existence, while the universal grows more and more in reality, and absorbs all the attention of the mind. Instead of 'multiplying phenomena,' Plato might say, 'The Idea reduces phenomena to unity.' Aristotle's account represents the universal or absolute existence as if it was gained inductively from a set of particulars, and added to the end of them; whereas Plato's point of view rather is that the Idea is prior to all the particulars; we do not obtain it inductively, we are reminded of it, but we saw it before we were born, or, in other words, it is innate in the soul and only evoked by experience. Another most captious objection, almost unworthy of the gravity of a philosopher, Aristotle here adds: it is that 'Perhaps the Idea of Good may be said to be distinguished from the number of phenomenal goods by being eternal. But in short this is no difference, the Good is not any more good for this. Length of duration does not constitute a distinction between identical qualities. A white thing is not more white if it lasts long than if it only lasts for a day.' Perhaps this argument need only be stated for its weakness to be seen. Plato would never have consented to this confusion between length of duration (*πολυχρόνιον*) and eternity (*αἰδιον*). It is true that in popular thinking we picture to ourselves the eternal under the form of duration of time, but the philosophical conception of the eternal is the necessary (*causa sui*), the absolute, the unconditional, the uncreate and indestructible (*Eth.* III.

iii. 3, vi. iii. 2), that which is out of all relation to time. Aristotle's argument, then, consists in setting the popular way of thinking against the philosophical. He represents the Idea to be a copy taken from the particular and made lasting. Whereas Plato meant—that without which we cannot know the particular or conceive it to exist; that which is independent of this or that particular, though the particulars depend on it; that which is independent of yesterday, or to-day, or a thousand years hence.

At this point of the discussion Aristotle seems to have become conscious to himself (*Eth.* i. vi. 8) that the Platonists may complain of his attempting to disprove the unity of good by always setting relative goods in opposition to those that are good in themselves. He proposes then to take certain specimens of things good in themselves, and to make these the test of the theory. The specimens he adduces are 'thought, sight, and some pleasures and honours;' he adds that 'If these be not esteemed good in themselves, nothing else but the pure Idea will remain to be called a good in itself; thus the Idea as a universal or class will lose all its meaning, having no individuals ranked under it.'²² The question then is, Do these goods, which are sought for their own sake, exhibit the same, or different laws of good? To answer this question would require a very deep and subtle investigation; this Aristotle does not enter upon, but he merely gives a summary assertion that 'The laws exhibited by honour, thought, and pleasure, viewed as goods, are distinct and different from one another.' This appears to be mere dogmatism and a trifling with the question. For we might urge that honour is not properly speaking a good sought for its

²² "Οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.

own sake (cf. *Eth.* I. v. 5), and that thought, sight, and pleasure, are all of them *ἐνέργειαι* and therefore do according to the Aristotelian views exhibit the same law of good.

Aristotle winds up his polemic by assuming as concluded, that there is no realistic unity in the good.²³ He asks, 'What is the account then of this one word good? It cannot surely have risen from a mere chance coincidence in language. It must be either that all goods proceed from one source or tend to one end—or rather that they are analogous to one another.' He substitutes then arbitrarily, without proof or discussion (for he says these belong to metaphysics), a nominalistic theory for the realism of Plato. His view is apparently, that men inductively from a set of similar particulars formed the universal 'good,' and by analogy, where cases were analogous, came to extend the same term to dissimilar particulars. Plato's view was that by experience of a particular there is awakened in the mind the knowledge of a universal, which existed there prior to the particular, and is the law of the existence of that particular, and that by many different particulars we 'are reminded' of this same law or idea, and that hence arises sameness of name²⁴ by reason of a sameness of law under different relative circumstances and modifications. Realism makes the universal prior to and more real than the particular. Nominalism makes the particulars more real than the universal. Aristotle is by no means consistently a nominalist, though here he avows a sort of nominalism for the time.

There is a tradition of the ancients that Aristotle, as a young man, while his vehicle for philosophising was still the dialogue, commenced a pertinacious attack on the doctrine of

²³ Οὐκ ἔστιν ἓνα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. | συνανόμενον τοῖς εἰδεσιν. — *Ατ. Μετα-*
phys. I. vi. 3.

²⁴ Κατὰ μέθεξιν εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν

Ideas. Proclus, quoted by Philoponus (ii. 2) speaks of him ²⁵ as 'proclaiming loudly in his dialogues that he was unable to sympathise with this doctrine, even though his opposition to it should be attributed to a factious spirit.' It is thought by some that the various places of his extant and maturer works which attack the Platonists on this subject, contain rather a *résumé* of arguments which had been before stated by Aristotle in his early writings, than the results of fresh logical or metaphysical thought. This theory, if accepted, would explain to some extent the very crude and apparently superficial character of the arguments themselves. That such a procedure should have been adopted in a work like the *Ethics* seems not unlikely, when we consider the way which this work was, apparently, written. It was part of a great task which Aristotle had assigned himself—no less than that of constructing afresh the whole of philosophy (with physical science to follow). Setting himself to this task, Aristotle constructed his *Organon*, and then went on in rapid succession to grapple with Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, the Art of Poetry, and Metaphysics. All his works on these subjects were more or less incomplete, and all must have been composed under a certain pressure. In these circumstances it is easy to fancy their author repeating his earlier arguments on a particular question, in lieu of excogitating the matter anew. But it must be observed that one of the arguments here used is expressed in Aristotle's maturer terminology, for it appeals to the 'categories,' or heads of predication. Anyhow, we cannot escape the conclusion that these arguments misrepresent the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, so far as we know it, and do not contain really valid grounds for its rejection.

²⁵ Καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα | τῷ συγκαθεῖν, καὶ τις αὐτὸν οἶται διὰ
κεκραγὸς μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τοῦ- | φιλονεικίαν ἀντιλέγειν.

When we compare the moral system of Aristotle in its general scope with that of Plato, we are at once struck by a remarkable difference. Plato's was a unifying system; he took the four cardinal virtues of Greece and reduced them to one quality under different aspects—to the complete regularity and harmony of all the faculties and impulses of the individual soul, under the guidance of wise and philosophic thought. 'Justice' with him was another word for this harmony; 'Temperance' was the subservience of the passions to the reason. 'Courage' was remembering the general principles of the reason in the hour of danger or temptation. The Reason or thought which was to permeate the moral nature was also, with Plato, the contemplation of the absolute. The tendency of Aristotle is in the opposite direction, that of analytical division and separation. Philosophy and its organ, the scientific reason, he put quite apart from morals. Justice, so far as we can learn from the *Eudemian* book on the subject, he treated, not in a general sense as co-extensive with Virtue, but as a special quality tending to the fulfilment of legal obligations in respect of property. Instead of unifying the virtues he rather multiplied them. In his *Politics*²⁶ (I. xiii. 10) he approves of the method of Gorgias, in enumerating the virtues in detail, saying that 'People deceive themselves by general definitions, as that virtue consists in a good condition of the soul, or again in uprightness of action (*ὀρθοπραγεῖν*), or some such thing.' And in the same spirit he says (*Eth.* II. vii. 1) that 'While general theories are of wider application' (*κοινότεροι*, see *infra*, the note on this passage), 'those that go into detail have more reality, since action consists in detail,' &c. Accordingly he proceeds to give a list of virtues which contain an exemplification of his principle of *Μεσότης*. This

²⁶ The allusion is to the *Meno* of Plato, p. 71.

list does not appear to have been formed on any scientific basis, it does not start afresh with any new psychological classification. It seems first to accept, in a way, the list of cardinal virtues, placing courage and temperance in the front of its ranks, reserving justice as being something peculiar, and dividing wisdom into practical and speculative. It then adds to these, different qualities, some of them sufficiently external, which were held in honour among the Greeks. In this procedure there is something which must be called empirical. Aristotle has two sides, the one speculative and profoundly penetrating and philosophic; the other side tending to the accumulation of details and of experience, regardless of a philosophic point of view, content with a shallow system of classification. His list, when formed, Aristotle seems to have believed in as complete. He had beforehand given the same in his *Rhetoric* (i. ix. 5) with the omission of three of the virtues here mentioned.

We have seen already the separation made by Aristotle between Ethics and Metaphysics. The same of course holds good of Theology, this being with Aristotle but another name for Metaphysics. Practical theology was not a conception that Aristotle could have admitted. His great divergence from Plato on this head may be seen in the fact that while Plato speaks of 'being made like to God, through becoming just and holy, with thought and consciousness of the same' (*loc. cit.*, see above, p. 194), Aristotle, on the contrary, speaks of moral virtue as being impossible of attribution to the gods (*Eth.* x. viii. 7). With regard to Aristotle's opinion on the question of a future life we shall speak in Essay V., but at present we may safely say that Aristotle's ethical system differs from that of Plato in being conceived totally without reference to any such consideration. If we compare the tone in which the two philosophers write, it will appear that

while Aristotle is far more scientific, he is on the other hand wanting in the moral earnestness, the tenderness, and the enthusiasm of Plato. Such ideas as that 'the whole of life is an education' are not present with him. But again, he is more safe than Plato; he is quite opposed to anything unnatural (such as communism, for instance) in life or institutions. He recognises admiringly the worth and beauty of moral virtue, without the incessant demand which Plato made, that this should be accompanied by philosophy. And on all questions he endeavours to put himself into harmony with the opinions of the multitude, to which he thinks that a certain validity must be ascribed. On the other hand, Aristotle is less delicate and reverent than Plato in his mode of speaking of human happiness, especially as attained by the philosopher. In Plato there seems often, if not always, present, a sense of the weakness of the individual as contrasted with the eternal and the divine. If Plato requires philosophy to make morality, he also always infuses morality into philosophy; the philosopher in his pictures does not triumph over the world, but rather is glad to seize on 'some tradition' 'like a stray plank,' to prevent his being lost; he feels that his philosophy on earth is but 'knowing in part.' Aristotle, on the contrary, rather over-represents the strength of philosophy. And in his picture of the happiness of the philosopher we cannot but feel that there is over-much elation, and something that requires toning down. In the manner of the writing it is obvious that we miss the art, the grace, the rich and delicate imagination of Plato. Above all, we miss the subtle humour which plays round all the moral phenomena. Aristotle does not show any trace of archness. There are sayings in the *Ethics* which might cause a smile, but they are apparently given unconsciously, in illustration of the point in question. In *Eth. x. v. 8*, to show that the

different creatures have each their different proper pleasures, Aristotle quotes from Heraclitus the saying that 'An ass likes hay better than gold,' without any sense of anything ludicrous in the illustration.²⁷ The same thing occurs in one of the Eudemian books (vii. vi. 2), where it is mentioned to illustrate the hereditariness of hot temper, that 'A father being kicked out by his son, begged him to stop at the door, for he said *he* had kicked *his* father as far as that.' This is mentioned with perfect gravity among a list of arguments. Aristotle's rich and manifold knowledge of human nature exhibits itself in his *Ethics*. It might be doubted whether Plato would have written the masterly analytical account of the various virtues in Books III. and IV. These are not living dramatic portraits such as Plato would have made, there is nothing personal or dramatic about them; but they are a wonderful catalogue and analysis of very subtle characteristics.

The chief of the school of Plato was Speusippus, nephew to Plato himself, and successor to him in the leadership of the Academy. One of the Pythagoreising opinions of Speusippus is alluded to by Aristotle, *Eth.* i. vi. 7. 'The Pythagorean theory on the subject seems more plausible, which places unity in the rank of the goods; to which theory Speusippus too seems to have given in his adhesion.' The question adverted to is the identity of 'the One' with 'the Good.' The Pythagoreans appear to have placed 'the One' among the various exhibitions of good, whether as causes or manifestations. Among the Platonists, as we are told (*Metaphys.* xiii. iv. 8), there arose a difference, a section of them identifying 'the One' with 'the Good,' the others not considering unity identical with, but an essential element of, goodness.

²⁷ But see notes on *Eth.* i. iv. 6, viii. vi. 4.

They saw that if 'the One' be identical with 'the Good,' it must follow that multitude, or, in other words, matter, must be the principle of evil. To avoid making 'the many' identical with evil, they found themselves forced to abandon the identification of 'the One' with 'the Good.' Of this section Speusippus was leader. He seems to have adopted a Pythagorean formula, saying, that 'the One must be ranked among goods.' Aristotle gives a sort of provisional preference to this theory over the system of Plato. Elsewhere, however (*Metaphys.* xi. vii. 10), he attacks and refutes the view of 'the Pythagoreans and Speusippus,' that 'Good is rather a result of existence than the cause of it, as the flower is the result of the plant.'

In morals, Speusippus seems to have continued the arguments begun by Plato, against the Hedonistic theory of Aristippus. In the list of his works given by Diogenes²⁸ the following are mentioned—*περὶ ἡδονῆς α'*. '*Ἀριστιππος α'*'. His polemic appears to have been one-sided, and his views extreme. One of his arguments on the subject of Pleasure is alluded to by Aristotle, *Eth.* x. ii. 5, and expressly mentioned with his name by Eudemus, vii. xiii. 1. It seems very probable that other arguments against Pleasure, which are refuted by Aristotle and Eudemus, may have occurred in the treatise on Pleasure written by Speusippus. Another Platonist, with exactly opposite views on Pleasure, was Eudoxus. Of him hardly anything is known. He appears to have been an astronomer, and his personal character is highly praised by Aristotle, *Eth.* x. ii. 1.

Out of the school of Plato, Aristotle appears to have had a close personal friend, namely, Xenocrates, who accompanied

²⁸ Also he seems to have written on Justice, The Citizen, Legislation, and Philosophy.

him to Atarneus, on the death of Plato. He was a voluminous writer, and seems to have endeavoured to carry out the system of Plato on particular points, and to give it a more practical direction. Besides many treatises on dialectic, the Ideas, science, genera and species, divisions, thought, nature, the gods, &c., Diogenes also attributes to him two books on Happiness, two on Virtue, one on the State, one on the Power of the Law, &c. The ancients ascribed to him a high moral tone of thought, saying that he considered virtue as alone valuable in itself. He seems, however, to have allowed the existence of a *δύναμις ὑπηρετική* in external fortune, which is, perhaps, alluded to by Aristotle.³⁹ His disciples, Polemo and Crantor, appear to have had almost exclusively an ethical direction. We must regret the loss of the writings of these early Academics, for we should, no doubt, find common to them much that is to be found in the system of Aristotle. And yet, so far as we can tell, none of the Platonists appears individually to have been of sufficient importance to have greatly influenced Aristotle either in the way of communication or of antagonism.

³⁹ Ἐτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαλαμβάνουσιν.—*Εἰλ.* i. viii. 6.

ESSAY IV.

On the Philosophical Formulæ in the Ethics of Aristotle.

THE advance which Philosophy made under the hands of Aristotle, consisted in its becoming scientific. That is to say, it was divided into separate branches, or departments (*πραγματείας*), and each of these was a *μέθοδος*, or orderly setting forth of appropriate principles and the deductions to be made from them; and the instrument for this exposition was a precise terminology. The Dialogues of Plato almost invariably exhibited philosophy in the process of being worked out in conjunction with unphilosophical personages, so the point of departure in them is the ordinary thought of refined and cultivated, but not scholastic, circles, and the language is as much as possible that of the purest literary Greek. Yet even Plato, owing to the nature of his subjects, could not keep clear of abstract, highly philosophical, and technical terms. In fact he was always tending to create such; the 'Ideas,' 'Dialectic,' 'Thought' (*φρόνησις*), the 'Reason' and the 'Understanding' (*διάνοια*), 'Being' and 'Not being,' the 'One' and the 'Many,' 'Division,' and other names for logical processes, the names for the constituent parts of the soul, &c., are instances of the kind. But Plato dealt freely with language, as he did with thought, and never bound himself by fixed terms any more than by a fixed system. With

Aristotle the case was different ; his object was to be, as far as possible, exhaustive and final on all the great questions of philosophy, and to express his results in precise and permanent phraseology. Thus, the more general forms of thought which he gradually worked out for himself became with him a language which was never laid aside, and which was applied to all subjects. In comparing any Aristotelian treatise with the works of Plato, one sees in it the accumulation of experience and the carrying out of analysis, but still more, one sees the constant recurrence of these forms of thought, which seem brought in to explain everything. The forms indeed frequently become modified through their application to special branches of inquiry ; they no longer remain mere logical or metaphysical abstractions, but become concrete ideas. We shall find this abundantly exemplified in the *Ethics* ; and it is the object of the present Essay to isolate and examine the formal element of the Aristotelian moral system—to trace the origin and full philosophical meaning of some of the leading terms used, and to follow them out into their ethical application. The formulæ to be discussed are : (1) Τέλος, or the End-in-itself, as connected with Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes ; (2) Ἐνέργεια, or the Actual, which Aristotle so constantly contrasted with the Potential ; (3) Μεσότης, or the Law of Quantity, a term with wide philosophical associations ; (4) the Practical Syllogism, a form borrowed from the Aristotelian Logic, and applied by Aristotle himself, and still farther by the Peripatetic school, to explain the phenomena of the human will.

I. Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes arose probably from a combination and modification of conceptions which occur separately in Plato, namely, the contrast of matter and form, of means and end, of production and existence. Every individual object might be said to be the meeting-point of

these oppositions ; it is what it is by reason of the matter out of which it has sprung, the motive cause which gave it birth, the idea or form which it realises, the end or object which it was intended to attain. Thus knowledge of anything implies knowing it from these four points of view, or knowing its four causes. The End or final cause, however, as is natural, rises to an eminence beyond the other conceptions, and though it must always stand opposed to matter, it tends to merge the other two causes into itself. The end of anything, that for the sake of which anything exists, can hardly be separated from the perfection of that thing, from its idea and form ; thus the formal cause or definition becomes absorbed into the final cause (*ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει*, *Eth.* III. vii. 6).

In the same way the End mixes itself up with the efficient cause, the desire for the end gives the first impulse of motion, the final cause of anything becomes identical with the good of that thing, so that the end and the good become synonymous terms. And this is not only the case with regard to individual objects, but all nature and the whole world exist for the sake of, and in dependence on, their final cause, which is the Good. This, existing as an object of contemplation and desire, though itself immovable, moves all things.¹ And so the world is rendered finite, for all nature desiring the Good and tending towards an end is harmonised and united.

In this way is the unity of nature conceived by Aristotle, it is a unity of idea. The idea of the Good as final cause pervades the world, and the world is suspended from it. In the same form his ethical philosophy presents itself. Human life and action are rendered finite by being directed to their end or final cause, the good attainable in action. The ques-

¹ Κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε· τὸ ὁρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῆς ἀρα ἀρχῆς ἡρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ῥητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα.—Ἐκ τοι- ἡ φύσις.—*Μεταφρ.* xi. vii. 2-6.

tion of the *Ethics* is, *Τί ἐστι τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*; And we might say, altering the words quoted from the *Metaphysics*—From this principle, from the End of action, the whole of human life is suspended.

An end or final cause implies intelligence, implies a mind to see and desire it. The appearance of ends and means in nature is a proof of design in the operations of nature, and this Aristotle distinctly recognises (*Nat. Ausc.* II. viii.). When we come to *Ethics*, What is meant by an End of human action? For whom is this an end? Is it an end fixed by a higher intelligence? In short, is the principle of Aristotle the same as the religious principle, that man is born to work out the purposes of his Maker? To this it must be answered, that Aristotle is indefinite in his physical theory as to the relation of God to the design exhibited in creation. And so, too, he is not explicit, in the *Ethics*, as to God's moral government of the world. On the whole, we may say at present that 'moral government,' in our sense of the words, does not at all form part of Aristotle's system. His point of view rather is, that as physical things strive all, though unconsciously, after the good attainable by them under their several limitations, so man may consciously strive after the good attainable in life. We do not find in the *Ethics* the expression *τέλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, but *τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος* (I. vii. 8), *τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τέλος* (x. vi. 1), *τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* (I. xiii. 5). It is best, therefore, to exclude religious associations (as being un-Aristotelian) from our conception of the ethical *τέλος*, and then we may be free to acknowledge that it is evidently meant to have a definite relation to the nature and constitution of man. Thus Aristotle assumes that the desires of man are so framed as to imply the existence of this *τέλος* (*Eth.* I. ii. 1). And he asserts that man can only realise it in the sphere of his own proper functions (*ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*,

I. vii. 10), and in accordance with the law of his proper nature and its harmonious development (*κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν*, I. vii. 15).

Is man, then, according to this system, to be regarded similarly to one of the flowers of the field, which obeying the law of its organisation springs and blooms and attains its own peculiar perfection? This is no doubt one side, so to speak, of Aristotle's view. But there is also another side. For, while each part of the creation realises its proper end, and, in the language of the Bible, 'is very good,' this end exists not *for* the *inanimate* or unconscious creatures themselves, it only exists *in* them. But the ethical *τέλος* not only exists *in* man, but *also for* man; not only is the good realised in him, but it is recognised by him as such; it is the end not only of his nature, but also of his desires; it stands before his thoughts and wishes and highest consciousness as the absolutely sufficient, that in which he can rest, that which is in and for itself desirable (*ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἀεί*, I. vii. 4). The ends of physical things are for other minds to contemplate, they are ends objectively. But ends of moral beings are ends subjectively, realised by and contemplated by those moral beings themselves. The final cause, then, in *Ethics*, is viewed, so to speak, from the inside. Or rather the peculiarity is, that the objective and subjective sides of the conception both have their weight in Aristotle's system, and are run into one another. The *τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν*, or absolute end of action, has two forms, which are not clearly separated; in the first place it is represented subjectively as happiness, and in the second place objectively as the morally beautiful.

It has been said that the ancient Ethical systems were theories of the Chief Good, rather than theories of Duty. And Kant brings against Aristotle the charge that his system

is one of mere eudæmonism. We shall have an opportunity in a future Essay of touching upon the relations of this conception 'duty' to the ancient systems. At present it will suffice to show that there is some unfairness in the charge brought by Kant, and that it ignores the true characteristics of Aristotle's Ethical doctrine. It is unfair to charge Aristotle with mere 'eudæmonism' simply on account of his making a definition of 'happiness' the leading principle of his *Ethics*. The word 'happiness' is only a popular way of statement; Aristotle tells us that it is the popular word for the chief good (*Eth.* I. iv. 2). Again, during his whole discussion on the virtues, and on moral actions, there is no mention of happiness as connected with these, as if good acts were to be done for the sake of happiness. There is only one place, and that is in the discussion on happiness itself, where he speaks of it as 'The end and prize of virtue.'² Elsewhere he speaks of 'the beautiful' as being the end of virtue.³ But again the 'happiness' which Aristotle defines as the chief good does not seem immediately, but only inferentially, to imply pleasure. Pleasure (as we shall see hereafter) is rather argued and proved to belong to happiness by a sort of after-thought, and is not with Aristotle a primary part of the conception. Happiness with Aristotle is something different from what we mean by it; so from this point of view, above all, the charge of eudæmonism falls to the ground.

Aristotle's question is, What is the chief good for man? But this he resolves into another form, What is the τέλειον τέλος? What in human life and action is the End-in-itself? How deep is the moral significance of this conception—the absolute end! Can anything small or frivolous, or anything

² Τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὄθλον καὶ τέλος.—
Eth. I. ix. 3.

³ Τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος
τῆς ἀρετῆς.—*Eth.* III. vii. 2.

like mere pleasure and enjoyment come up to its requirements, and appear in the deepest depths of the human consciousness to be something beyond which we cannot go—the absolute satisfaction of our nature? Essentially and necessarily, that only can be called a *τέλος* which has in itself a moral worth and goodness. This also Aristotle says ‘has a sweetness and pleasure of its own, but one quite different from that which springs from any other sources. Men rarely attain to it; but desiring the satisfaction it affords, they seize in its place the pleasure derived from amusements, on account of this latter having some sort of resemblance to the satisfaction which the mind feels in moral acts which are of the nature of an end.’⁴

The deep moral pleasure which attaches to noble acts, Aristotle describes as triumphing even over the physical pain and outward horrors which may attend the exercise of courage.⁵ And he acknowledges that in many cases this may be the *only* pleasure attending upon virtuous actions.⁶

We see in these passages how the objective and subjective import of the *τέλος* are blended together. The end and the consciousness of the end are not separated. In the pleasure which Aristotle speaks of as attaching to the moral *τέλος* we see something that answers to what we should call ‘the approval of conscience.’ Only to say that Aristotle meant this, would be to mix up things modern and ancient. It is better to keep before us as clearly as possible his point of view, which is, that a good action is an End-in-itself, as being

⁴ *Politics*, VIII. v. 12. 'Ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίγνεσθαι. . . . Συμβέβηκε δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδίας τέλους· ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονὴν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν· ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν

πράξεων ἔχειν ὁμοιωμὰ τι. Cf. *Eth.* x. vi. 3.

⁵ *Eth.* III. ix. 2. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ.

⁶ *Eth.* III. ix. 5. Οὐ δὲ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδύς ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.

the perfection⁷ of our nature, and that for the sake of which (οὐ ἕνεκα) our moral faculties before existed, hence bringing a pleasure and inward satisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest pleased and acquiescent; something which possesses the qualities of being καλόν, ὀρισμένον, and ἐνέργεια τελεία.

We observe how in the separate parts of life, in the development of each of the various faculties, Aristotle considers an end to be attainable; how he attaches a supreme value to particular acts, and idealises the importance of the passing moment; how he attributes to each moment a capability of being converted out of a mere means, and mere link in the chain of life, to be an End-in-itself, something in which life is, as it were, summed up. But if in action, and in an exercise of the moral faculties, an end is attainable, this is, according to the system of Aristotle, only faintly and imperfectly an end, compared with what is attainable in contemplation by the exercise of the philosophic thought.

In both senses of the word τέλος, both as perfection and as happiness, Aristotle seems to have placed virtue below philosophy. Philosophy is in the first place the highest human excellence; it is the development of the highest faculty.⁸ In the second place, it contains the most absolute satisfaction, it is most entirely desirable for its own sake, and

⁷ In another passage (*Eth.* iii. vii. 6), Aristotle seems to use the term τέλος in a more purely objective sense to denote perfection. He says, 'The τέλος of every individual moral act is the same with that of the formed moral character' (τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν). The whole passage is a difficult one; it seems to come to this—An individual act can only be said to have attained

perfection when it exhibits the same qualities as the formed moral character—e.g. a brave act is only perfectly brave when it is done as a brave man would do it, consciously for its own sake, or for the sake of the beautiful (καλοῦ ἕνεκα), &c.

⁸ *Eth.* x. vii. 1. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου, κ.τ.λ.

not as a means to anything else.⁹ Whereas the practical virtues are all in a sense means to this. Courage is for war, which is for the sake of the fruition of peace; and in what does this consist? If the practical side of our nature be summed up in the one faculty Thought (*φρόνησις*), this may be regarded after all as subordinate and instrumental to Philosophy (*σοφία*), the perfection of the speculative side.¹⁰ So too in Politics, the end, or in other words the highest perfection and the highest happiness, being identical for the State and the individual, in what is this constituted? Not in the busy and restless action of war or diplomacy, not in means and measures to some ulterior result, but in those thoughts and contemplations which find their end and satisfaction in themselves. Philosophy, therefore, and speculation are, according to Aristotle, the end not only of the individual, but also of the State.¹¹ 'If it be true to say, that happiness consists in doing well, a life of action must be best both for the State, and for the individual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of action implies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts which are concerned with the results of action; but far rather we must consider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have their end in themselves, and which are for their own sake.'

A moment of contemplative thought (*θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια*) is most perfectly and absolutely an end. It is sought for no result but for itself. It is a state of peace, which is the

⁹ *Εἰς* x. vii. 5. Δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτῇ μόνῃ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι.

¹⁰ *Εἰς* vi. xiii. 8. Ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ.

¹¹ *Πολ.* vii. iii. 7. 'Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετόν, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄριστος

βίος ὁ πρακτικὸς. Ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ὑἄλλον τὰς αὐτοτέλεις καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις.

crown of all exertion (*ἀσχολούμεθα ἵνα ἀχολάζωμεν*). It is the realisation of the divine in man, and constitutes the most absolute and all-sufficient happiness,¹² being, as far as possible in human things, independent of external circumstances.¹³

This, then, constitutes the most adequate answer to the great question of Ethics, What is the Chief Good? or *τί ἐστι τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*; as far as a separate and individual moment of life is concerned. But a difficulty suggests itself with regard to life viewed as a whole. 'Philosophic thought,' says Aristotle, 'will be absolutely perfect happiness if extended over a whole life. For in happiness there must be no shortcoming.'¹⁴ But, as we shall see more clearly with regard to *ἐνέργεια*, it cannot actually be so extended. What then is the result? If Aristotle accepts the absolute satisfaction and worth of a moment as the end of life, his principle becomes identical with the *μονόχρονος ἡδονή* of the Cyrenaics (see above, p. 175). If, again, he requires an absolute *τέλος* of permanent duration, his theory of human good becomes a mere ideal. Here, then, is a dilemma between the horns of which Aristotle endeavours to steer, on the one hand acknowledging (*Eth.* I. vii. 16), that 'A single swallow will not make a summer;' on the other hand urging objections against the saying of Solon (*Eth.* I. x.), that 'No man can be called happy as long as he lives.' He says the chief good must be *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*, not a perfect life, but *in a perfect life*—indicating by this expression that the absolute good, as it exists in and for the consciousness, is independent

¹² *Eth.* x. viii. 7. 'Ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία θεωρητικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια.

¹³ *Eth.* x. vii. 4. 'Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστα ἐν εἴῃ.

¹⁴ 'Ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἐν εἴῃ ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μήκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. *Eth.* x. vii. 7.

of time and duration; but still, as we belong to a world of time and space, that this inner supreme good must have its setting in an adequate complete sphere of external circumstances. About this word *τελειω* there is an ambiguity of which probably Aristotle, himself, was half conscious; its associations of meaning are twofold, the one popular, conveying the notion of the 'complete,' the 'perfect,' the other philosophic, implying that which is in itself desirable, that in which the mind finds satisfaction, the absolute. Taking a signification between the two, we may conceive Aristotle to have meant, that the chief good must be an absolute mode of the consciousness, and that this must be attained in a sphere of outward circumstances themselves partaking of the nature of absolute perfection. Aristotle's conception, then, of the chief good has two sides, the one internal, ideal, out of all relation to time, which speaks of happiness as the absolute good, as that end which is the sum of all means, as that which could not possibly be improved by any addition (*Eth.* i. vii. 8); the other side, which is external and practical, goes quite against the Cyrenaic principle of regarding the present as all in all, and also against the Cynic view which would set the mind above external circumstances (*Eth.* i. v. 6). This part of the theory considers happiness as compounded of various more or less essential elements, and shows how far the more essential parts (*τὰ κύρια τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*) can outbalance the less essential. It requires permanence of duration, but it looks for this in the stability of the formed mental state, which is always tending to reproduce moments of absolute worth.

The End-in-itself renders life a rounded whole, like a work of art, or a product of nature. The knowledge of it is to give definiteness to the aims, 'So that we shall be now like archers knowing what to shoot at' (*Eth.* i. ii. 2). In the realisation

of it, we are to feel that there need be no more reaching onwards towards infinity, for all the desires and powers will have found their satisfaction (*Eth.* I. ii. 1). Closely connected, then, is this system with the view that what is finite is good. 'Life,' says Aristotle, 'is a good to the good man, because it is finite' (*Eth.* ix. ix. 7). At first sight these sayings suggest the idea of a cramped and limited theory of life, as if all were made round and artistic, and no room were left for the aspirations of the soul. It must be remembered, however, that that which is here spoken of as making life finite, is itself the absolutely sufficient—that, above and beyond the outside of which the mind can conceive nothing. And this absolute end is yet further represented as the deepest moments either of the moral consciousness, or of that philosophic reason which is an approach to the nature of the divine being. It must be remembered also that 'the finite' (τὸ ὀρισμένον) does not mean 'the restricted,' as if expressing that in which limits have been put upon the possibilities of good, but rather the good itself. Good and even existence cannot be conceived except under a law, and the finite is with Aristotle an essentially positive idea. Only so much negation enters into it as is necessary to constitute definiteness and form in contradistinction to the chaotic. Truly we cannot in our conceptions pass out of the human mind; that which is absolute and an end for the mind cannot be a mere limited and restricted conception; but rather nothing can be conceived beyond it. Something might be said on the relation of the Ethical τέλος to the idea of a future life, but this can be better said hereafter.

II. 'Actuality' is perhaps the nearest philosophical representative of the ἐνέργεια of Aristotle. It is derived from it through the Latin of the Schoolmen, 'actus' being their translation of ἐνέργεια, out of which the longer and more abstract

form has grown. The word 'energy,' which comes more directly from *ἐνέργεια*, has ceased to convey the philosophical meaning of its original, being restricted to the notion of force and vigour. The employment of the term 'energy,' as a translation of *ἐνέργεια*, has been a material hindrance to the proper understanding of Aristotle. This is especially the case with regard to the *Ethics*, where there is an appearance of plausibility, though an utterly fallacious one, in such a translation. To substitute 'actuality' in the place of 'energy' would certainly have this advantage, that it would point to the metaphysical conception lying at the root of all the various applications of *ἐνέργεια*. But 'actuality' is a word with far too little flexibility to be adapted for expressing all these various applications. No conception equally plastic with *ἐνέργεια*, and at all answering to it, can be found in modern thought. And therefore there is no term which will uniformly translate it. Our only course can be, first to endeavour to understand its philosophical meaning as part of Aristotle's system, and secondly to notice its special applications in a book like the *Ethics*. Any rendering of its import in the various places where it occurs must be rather of the nature of paraphrase than of translation.

1. 'Ενέργεια is not more accurately defined by Aristotle, than as the correlative and opposite of δύναμις. He implies, that we must rather feel its meaning than seek to define it. 'Actuality' may be in various ways opposed to 'potentiality,' and the import of the conception depends entirely on their relation to each other.¹⁸ 'Now *ἐνέργεια* is the existence of a

¹⁸ *Metaphys.* viii. vi. 2. Ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα, μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δύναμις. Λέγομεν δὲ δύναμις, οἷον, ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἂν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα,

ἂν δυνατός ᾖ θεωρηθῆσαι· τὸ δὲ ἐνέργεια δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ, ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παρὰ τὸν ὅρον ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνέλεγον συνορᾶν—ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορῆς πρὸς

thing not in the sense of its potentially existing. The term "potentially" we use, for instance, of the statue in the block, and of the half in the whole (since it might be subtracted), and of a person knowing a thing, even when he is not thinking of it, but might do so; whereas *ἐνέργεια* is the opposite. By applying the various instances our meaning will be plain, and one must not seek a definition in each case, but rather grasp the conception of the analogy as a whole—that it is as that which builds to that which has the capacity for building; as the waking to the sleeping; as that which sees to that which has sight, but whose eyes are closed; as the definite form to the shapeless matter; as the complete to the unaccomplished. In this contrast, let the *ἐνέργεια* be set off as forming the one side, and on the other let the potential stand. Things are said to be *ἐνεργεία* not always in like manner (except so far as there is an analogy, that as *this* thing is in this, or related to this, so is *that* in that, or related to that), for sometimes it implies motion as opposed to the capacity for motion, and sometimes complete existence opposed to undeveloped matter.'

The word *ἐνέργεια* does not occur in Plato, though the opposition of the 'virtual' and the 'actual' may be found implicitly contained in ¹⁶ some parts of his writings. Perhaps there is no genuine passage ¹⁷ now extant of any writer pre-

τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὄρῳ πρὸς τὸ μῦον μὲν, ὅψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὅλης πρὸς τὴν ὅλην, καὶ τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀέργαστον. Ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θατέρου μέρους ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη, θατέρου δὲ τὸ δυνατόν. Λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργεία οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τῷδε· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν, τὰ δ' ὡς οὐσία πρὸς τινα ὅλην.

¹⁶ Cf. *Theaetetus*, p. 157 A. Οὐτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι, κ.τ.λ.

¹⁷ For the fragment of Philolaus, apud Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* i. xx. 2, is very suspicious. It is as follows: Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν κόσμον ἡμῶν ἐνέργειαν ἀΐδιον θεῷ τε καὶ γενέσιος κατὰ συνακολουθίαν τᾶς μεταβλητικᾶς φύσεως.

vious to Aristotle in which it occurs. It is the substantive form of the adjective *ἐνεργής* which is to be found in Aristotle's *Topics*, I. xii. 1. But Aristotle, by a false etymology, seems to connect it immediately with the words¹⁸ *ἐν ἔργῳ*. To all appearance the idea of its opposition to *δύναμις* was first suggested by the Megarians, who asserted that 'Nothing could be said to have a capacity for doing any thing, unless it was in the act of doing that thing.'¹⁹ This assertion itself was part of the dialectic of the Megarians, by which they endeavoured to establish the Eleatic principles, and to prove by the subtleties of the reason, against all evidence of the senses, that the world is absolutely one, immovable, and unchangeable. We cannot be exactly certain of the terms employed by the Megarians themselves in expressing the above-quoted position, for Aristotle is never very accurate about the exact form in which he gives the²⁰ opinions of earlier philosophers. We cannot be sure whether the Megarians said precisely *ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι*. But at all events they said something equivalent, and Aristotle taking the suggestion worked out the whole theory of the contrast between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, in its almost universal applicability.

At first these terms were connected, apparently, with the idea of²¹ motion. But since *δύναμις* has the double meaning of 'possibility of existence' as well as 'capacity of action,'

¹⁸ Cf. *Metaphys.* VIII. viii. 11. Διδὸν καὶ τοῖονα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντελεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν.

¹⁹ *Met.* VIII. iii. 1. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν.

²⁰ Cf. *Metaph.* XI. ii. 3. Καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτος φησιν, ἥν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει,

ἐνέργεια δ' οὐ. XI. vi. 7. Διδὸν ἐνιοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων. In these passages Aristotle expresses the ideas of his predecessors in his own formulæ.

²¹ *Metaph.* VIII. iii. 9. Ἐλήλυθε δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῖονα, ἡ πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα, δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι.

there arose the double contrast of action opposed to the capacity for action; actual existence opposed to possible existence or potentiality. To express accurately this latter opposition Aristotle seems to have introduced the term *ἐντελέχεια*, of which the most natural account is, that it is a compound of *ἐν τέλει ἔχειν*, 'being in the state of perfection,' an adjective ²² *ἐντελεχής* being constructed on the analogy of *νουνεχής*. But in fact this distinction between *ἐντελέχεια* and *ἐνέργεια* is ²³ not maintained. The former word is of comparatively rare occurrence, while we find everywhere throughout Aristotle *ἐνέργεια*, as he says, *πρὸς ἐντελεχείαν συντιθεμένη* 'mixed up with the idea of complete existence.' As we saw above, it is contrasted with *δύναμις*, sometimes as implying motion, sometimes as 'form opposed to matter.'

In *Physics* *δύναμις* answers to the necessary conditions for the existence of anything before that thing exists. It thus corresponds to *ὑλη*, both to the *πρώτη ὑλη*, or matter absolutely devoid of all qualities, which is capable of becoming any definite substance, as, for instance, marble; and also to the *ἰσχύτη ὑλη*, or matter capable of receiving form, as marble the form of the statue. Marble then exists *δυνάμει* in the simple elements before it is marble. The statue exists *δυνάμει* in the marble before it is carved out. All objects of thought exist either purely *δυνάμει*, or purely *ἐνέργεια*, or both *δυνάμει* and *ἐνέργεια*. This division makes an entire chain of all the world. At the one end is matter, the *πρώτη ὑλη*, which has a merely potential existence, which is necessary as a condition, but which, having no form and no quali-

²² *De Gen. et Corr.* II. x. 11. Συνεπλήρωσε τὸ δλον ὁ θεὸς ἐντελεχῇ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν.

²³ Cf. *Metaph.* VIII. i. 2. 'Ἐπὶ πλεον

γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν. *Eth.* VII. xiv. 8. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσεως.

ties, is totally incapable of being realised by the mind. So it is also with the infinitely small or great; they exist always as possibilities, but, as is obvious, they never can be actually grasped by the perception. At the other end of the chain is God, *οὐσία ἀίδιος καὶ ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*, who cannot be thought of as non-existing,²⁴ as otherwise than actual, who is the absolute, and the unconditioned. Between these two extremes is the whole row of creatures, which out of potentiality spring into actual being. In this theory we see the affinity between *δύναμις* and matter, *ἐνέργεια* and form. Thus Aristotle's conceptions are made to run into one another. Another affinity readily suggests itself, and that is between *ἐνέργεια* and *τέλος*. The progress from *δύναμις* to *ἐνέργεια* is motion or production (*κίνησις* or *γένεσις*). But this motion or production, aiming at or tending to an end, is in itself imperfect (*ἀτελής*), it is a mere process not in itself and for its own sake desirable. And thus arises a contrast between *κίνησις* and *ἐνέργεια*, for the latter, if it implies motion, is a motion desirable for its own sake, having its end in itself. Viewed relatively, however, *κίνησις* may sometimes be called *ἐνέργεια*. In reference to the capacity of action before existing, the action calls out into actuality that which was before only potential. Thus, for instance, in the process of building a house there is an *ἐνέργεια* of what was before the *δύναμις οἰκοδομική*. Viewed, however, in reference to the house itself, this is a mere process to the end aimed at, a *γένεσις*, or if it be called *ἐνέργεια*, it must strictly speaking be qualified as *ἐνέργειά τις ἀτελής*.²⁵ In short, just as the term *τέλος* is relatively applied to very subordinate ends, so too

²⁴ It might be said that the being of God cannot be fully grasped or realised by our minds; but, according to the views of Aristotle, the everlasting

existence of God is an *ἐνέργεια* for His own mind. He is above all, the in and for Himself existing.

²⁵ *Metaph.* x. ix. 11.

ἐνέργεια is relatively applied to what is from another point of view a mere *γένεσις* or *κίνησις*. This we find in *Eth.* I. i. 2, *διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά.*

Having traced some of the leading features of this distinction between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, we may now proceed to observe how this form of thought stamped itself upon Ethics. We may ask, How is the category of the actual brought to bear upon moral questions, and how far is it reacted upon by moral associations? At the very outset of Aristotle's theory it appears. As soon as the proposition has been laid down that the chief good for man is only attainable in his proper work, and that this proper work is a peculiar kind of life, *πρακτικὴ τις (ζωὴ) τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος*, Aristotle proceeds to assume (*θετέον*) that this life must be no mere possession (*καθ' ἔξιν*) of certain powers and latent tendencies, but 'in actuality, for this is the distinctive form of the conception.'²⁶ He then transforms the qualifying term *κατ' ἐνέργειαν* into a substantive idea, and makes it the chief part of his definition of the supreme good.²⁷ Thus the metaphysical category of *ἐνέργεια*, which comes first into Ethics merely as a form of thought, becomes henceforth material. It is identified with happiness.²⁸ In short, it becomes an ethical idea.

In this connection (like its cognate *τέλος*;) *ἐνέργεια* becomes at once something mental. It takes a subjective character, as existing now both in and for the mind. Moreover, in an exactly parallel way to the use of *τέλος*, it receives a double application. On the one hand it is applied to express moral action and the development of the moral powers, on the other

²⁶ Διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. *Εἰλ.* I. vii. 13.

²⁷ Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον, κ.τ.λ.—εἰ δ' οὐτω

τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν. *II.* 14, 15.

²⁸ *Εἰλ.* I. xiii. 1. 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν. Cf. I. x. 2, ix. ix. 5, x. vi. 2.

hand to happiness and the fruition of life. It is in its latter meaning that *ἐνέργεια* is most purely subjective. Taken as a formula to express Aristotle's theory of virtue, we may consider it as applied in its more objective and simpler sense, though even here it is mixed up with psychological associations. We shall see how, under newly invented metaphysical forms, Aristotle accounts for the moral nature of man.

Aristotle divides *δυνάμεις* into physical and mental.²⁹ Of these mental *δυνάμεις* it is characteristic that they are equally capacities of producing contraries, while the physical are restricted to one side of two contraries. The capacity of heat, for instance, is capable of producing heat alone; whereas the *δύναμις ἰατρική*, as being a mental capacity, and connected with the discursive reason, can produce indifferently either health or sickness. From this Aristotle deduces the first step of the doctrine of free-will, namely, that the mind is not bound by any physical necessity. For he argues that, given the requisite active and passive conditions, there is a necessity for a physical *δύναμις* to act or suffer in a particular way; but since the mental *δύναμις* is equally a capacity of contraries, if there were any necessity for its development, it must be necessitated to produce contraries at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore there must be some other influence which controls the mental *δύναμις*, and determines into which side of the two contraries it shall be developed, and this is either desire or reasonable purpose.³⁰ Connected with this point is another of still greater importance for the ethical theory. Not only in the use and exercise of a moral *δύναμις*

²⁹ *Metaph.* viii. ii. 1. 'Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ

μὲν ἔσονται ἁλογοί, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγον.

³⁰ 'Ανάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον. Λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτε ὅτε ἢ προαίρεσιν. *Metaphys.* viii. v. 3.

is the individual above the control of mere external or physical circumstances, but also the very acquirement of these *δυνάμεις* depends on the individual. For the moral capacities are not inherent, but acquired.

In considering how this can be, we may follow the logical order of the question according to Aristotle, and ask which exists first, the *δυνάμις* or the *ἐνέργεια*? The answer is, that as a conception, in point of thought (*λόγῳ*), the *ἐνέργεια* must necessarily be prior; in short, we know nothing of the *δυνάμις*, except from our knowledge of the *ἐνέργεια*. In point of time (*χρόνῳ*) the case is different; each individual creature exists first *δυνάμει*, afterwards *ἐνέργειᾳ*. This assertion, however, must be confined to each individual; for, as a necessity of thought, we are led to refer the potential existence of each thing to the actual existence of something before (a flower, for instance, owes its potential existence in the seed to the actual existence of another flower before it); and so the world is eternal, for an *ἐνέργεια* must be supposed as everlastingly pre-existing. But even in the individual there are some things in which the *ἐνέργεια* seems prior to the *δυνάμις*; there are things which the individual seems to have no 'power of doing' until he does them; he acquires the power, in fact, by doing them.³¹ This phenomenon gives rise to a classification of *δυνάμεις* into the physical, the passive, and the inherent on the one hand, and the mental or acquired on the other.³² The merely physical capacities of our nature exist indepen-

³¹ *Metaphys.* viii. viii. 6. Διδὲ καὶ δοκεῖ ἄδύνατον εἶναι οἰκοδόμον εἶναι μὴ οἰκοδομήσαντα μηθέν, ἢ καθαριστὴν μηθέν καθαρίσαντα· ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων καθαρίζειν καθαρίζων μανθάνει καθαρίζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

³² *Metaphys.* viii. v. 1. Ἀπασῶν δὲ

τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν, οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων· τῶν δὲ ἔθει, οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν· τῶν δὲ μαθήσει, οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προεργήσαντας ἔχειν ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ· τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη.

dent of any act or effort on the part of the individual.³³ And so, also, is it with the senses.³⁴ But the contrary is the case with regard to moral virtue, which does not exist in us as a capacity (*δύναμις*); in other words, not as a gift of nature (*φύσει*), previous to moral action.³⁵ We acquire the capacity for virtue by doing virtuous things. It will be seen at once that a sort of paradox is here involved. 'How can it be said that we become just by doing just things? If we do just things, we are just already.' The answer of Aristotle to this difficulty would seem to be as follows:

1. Virtue follows the analogy of the arts, in which the first essays of the learner may by chance, or by the guidance of his master (*ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου*), attain a sort of success and an artistic appearance, but the learner is no artist as yet.

2. These 'just acts,' by which we acquire justice, are, on nearer inspection, not really just; they want the moral qualification of that settled internal character in the heart and mind of the agent, without which no external act is virtuous in the highest sense of the term. They are tendencies towards the acquirement of this character, as the first essays of the artist are towards the acquirement of an art. But they are not to be confounded with those moral acts which flow from the character when developed and fixed.

3. The whole question depends on Aristotle's theory of the

³³ *Eth.* i. xiii. 11. Τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς (τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι) ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τρεφομένοις θεῖται τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις--δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μῦριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη.

³⁴ *Eth.* ii. i. 4. Τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομίζομεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. This doctrine is

opposed to some of the modern discoveries of psychology, as, for instance, Berkeley's 'Theory of Vision.' It is corrected, however, in some degree by Aristotle's doctrine of κοινή αἴσθησις.

³⁵ *Ibid.* Τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνερῆσαντες πρότερον, ὥστερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.

ἔξις, as related to *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*. There can be no such thing, properly speaking, as a *δύναμις τῆς ἀρετῆς*. As we have before seen, a *δύναμις*, except it be merely physical, admits of contraries. And therefore in the case of moral action there can only be an indefinite capacity of acting either in this way or that, either well or ill, which is therefore equally a *δύναμις* of virtue and of vice. The *ἐνέργεια* in this case is determined by no intrinsic law of the *δύναμις*—(*ἀνάγκη ἄτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον*, *Met.* VIII. v. 3), but by the desire or the reason of the agent. The *ἐνέργεια*, however, is no longer indefinite; it has, at all events, some sort of definiteness for good or bad. And by the principle of habit (*ἔθος*), which Aristotle seems to assume as an acknowledged law of human nature, the *ἐνέργεια* reacts upon the *δύναμις*, reproducing itself. Thus the *δύναμις* loses its indefiniteness, and passes into a definite tendency; it ceases to be a mere *δύναμις*, and becomes a *ἔξις*, that is to say, a formed and fixed character, capable only of producing a certain class of *ἐνέργειαι*. Briefly then, by the help of a few metaphysical terms, does Aristotle sum up his theory of the moral character. *Καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται*. And it is quite consistent with his entire view of these metaphysical categories, that he defines virtue to be not on the one hand a *δύναμις*, else it would be merely physical, nor on the other hand a *πάθος* (which is here equivalent to *ἐνέργεια*), else it would be an isolated emotion—but a sort of *ἔξις*. The *ἔξις*, or moral state, is on the farther side, so to speak, of the *ἐνέργειαι*. It is the sum and result of them. If *ἔξις* be regarded as a sort of developed *δύναμις*, as a capacity acquired indeed and definite, but still only a capacity, it may naturally be contrasted with *ἐνέργεια*. Thus in the above-quoted passage, *Eth.* I. vii. 13, *διττῶς ταύτης λεγομένης* means *καθ' ἑξιν* and *κατ'*

ἐνέργειαν, as we may see by comparing VII. xii. 2, VIII. v. 1. From this point of view Aristotle says, that 'it is possible for a *ἔξις* to exist, without producing any good. But with regard to an *ἐνέργεια* this is not possible.' (I. viii. 9.) On the other hand, however, the *ἔξις* is a fixed tendency to a certain class of actions, and, if external circumstances do not forbid, will certainly produce these. The *ἐνέργεια* not only results in a *ἔξις*, but also follows from it, and the test of the formation of a *ἔξις* is pleasure felt in acts resulting from it. (II. iii. 1.) When Aristotle says, that there is nothing human so abiding as the *ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετὴν—διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταξῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους*, he implies, of course, that these *ἐνέργειαι* are bound together by the chain of a *ἔξις*, of which in his own phraseology they are the efficient, the formal, and the final cause. It is observable, that the phrase *ἐνέργειαι τῆς ἀρετῆς* occurs only twice in the ethical treatise. (III. v. 1, X. iii. 1.) This is in accordance with the principle that virtue cannot be regarded as a *δύναμις*. Therefore Aristotle seems to regard moral acts not so much as the development of a latent excellence, but rather as the development or action of our nature in accordance with a law (*ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετὴν*). Virtue then comes in as a regulative, rather than as a primary idea; it is introduced as subordinate, though essential, to happiness.

When we meet phrases like this just mentioned, we translate them, most probably, into our own formulæ, into words belonging to our own moral and psychological systems. We speak of 'moral acts,' or 'virtuous activities,' or 'moral energies.' Thus we conceive of Aristotle's doctrine as amounting to this, that 'good acts produce good habits.' Practically, no doubt, his theory does come to this; and if our object in studying his theory be *οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις*, no better or more useful principle could be deduced

from it. But in so interpreting him, we really strip Aristotle of all his philosophy. When he spoke of *ἐνέπτεια κατ' ἀπερίην*, a wide range of metaphysical associations accompanied the expression. He was bringing the mind and moral powers of man into the entire chain of nature, at one end of which was matter, and at the other end God. He had in his thoughts, that a moral *ἐνέπτεια* was to the undeveloped capacities as a flower to the seed, as a statue to the block, as the waking to the sleeping, as the finite to the undefined. And he yet farther implied that this *ἐνέπτεια* was no mere process or transition to something else, but contained its end in itself, and was desirable for its own sake. The distinctness of modern language, and the separation between the various spheres of modern thought, prevent us from reproducing in any one term all the various associations that attach to this formula of ancient philosophy. As said before, we must rather feel, than endeavour to express them.

Hitherto we have only alluded to those conceptions which *ἐνέπτεια*, as a universal category, imported into Ethics. We have now to advert to those which necessarily accrue to it by reason of its introduction into this science. It is clear that a psychical *ἐνέπτεια* must be different from the same category exhibited in any external object. Life, the mind, the moral faculties, must have their 'existence in actuality' distinguished from their mere 'potentiality' by some special difference, not common to other existences. What is it that distinguishes vitality from the conditions of life, waking from sleeping, thought from the dormant faculties, moral action from the unevoked moral capacities? In all these contrasts there is no conception that approaches nearer towards summing up the distinction than that of 'consciousness.'

Viewed from without, or objectively, *ἐνέργεια* must mean an existence fully developed in itself, or an activity desirable for its own sake, so that the mind could contemplate it without seeing in it a means or a condition to anything beyond. But when taken subjectively, as being an *ἐνέργεια* of the mind itself, as existing not only *for* the mind but also *in* the mind, it acquires a new aspect and character. Henceforth it is not only the rounded whole, the self-ending activity, the blooming of something perfect, in the contemplation of which the mind could repose; but it is the mind itself called out into actuality. It springs out of the mind and ends in the mind. It is not only life, but the sense of life; not only waking, but the feeling of the powers; not only perception or thought, but a consciousness of one's own faculties as well as of the external object.

This conscious vitality of the life and the mind is not to be considered a permanent condition, but one that arises in us.³⁶ Oftenest it is like a thrill of joy, a momentary intuition. Were it abiding, if our mind were capable of a perpetual *ἐνέργεια*, we should be as God, who is *ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*. But that which we attain to for a brief period gives us a glimpse of the divine, and of the life of God.³⁷ 'The life of God is of a kind with those highest moods which with us last a brief space, it being impossible that they should be permanent, whereas with Him they are permanent, since His ever-present consciousness is pleasure itself. And it is because they are vivid states of consciousness that waking and perception and thought are the

³⁶ *Elh.* ix. ix. 5. γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὡς περ κτήμα τι.

³⁷ *Melaph.* xi. vii. 6. Διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν ὅστω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκείνὸ ἐστὶν (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ

ἀδύνατον) ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐνέργεια τοῦτου· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐργήγοις αἰσθήσις νόησις ἡδιστον, ἐλπιδες δὲ καὶ μνήμαι διὰ ταῦτα.

sweetest of all things, and in a secondary degree hope and memory.'

This passage seems of itself an almost sufficient answer to those who would argue that Aristotle did not mean to imply consciousness in his definition of happiness. If our happiness, which is defined as *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, gives us a conception of the blessedness of God, which is elsewhere defined as the 'thinking upon thought,' we can hardly escape the conclusion, that it is the deepest and most vivid consciousness in us that constitutes our happiness. The more this idea is followed out, the more completely will it be found applicable to the theory of Aristotle; the more will it justify his philosophy and be justified by it. But here it is necessary to confess, that in using the term 'consciousness' to express the chief import of *ἐνέργεια*, as applied to the mind and to the theory of happiness, we are using a distinct modern term, whereas the ancient one was indistinct; we are making explicit what was only implicit in Aristotle; we are rather applying to him a deduction from his principles than exactly representing them in their purest form. Aristotle never *says* 'consciousness,' though we see he meant it. But one of the peculiarities of his philosophy was the want of subjective formulæ, and a tendency to confuse the subjective and the objective together. About *ἐνέργεια* itself Aristotle is not consistent; sometimes he treats it purely as objective, separating the consciousness from it; as, for instance, *Eth.* ix. ix. 9, *ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργούμεν*. 'There is somewhat in us that takes cognisance of the exercise of our powers.' Again x. iv. 8, *τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος*. 'Pleasure is a sort of superadded perfection, making perfect the exercise of our powers.' But this is at variance with his usual custom; for Happiness is universally defined by him as *ἐνέργεια*, and Eudemus, following

this out, defined Pleasure as *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*. And if we wish to see the term applied in an undeniably subjective way, we may look to *Eth.* ix. vii. 6. 'Ἡδεΐα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἢ μνήμη, where we can hardly help translating, 'the actual consciousness of the present,' as contrasted with 'the hope of the future,' and 'the memory of the past.' In a similar context, *De Memor.* i. 4, we find Τοῦ μὲν παρόντος αἰσθησις, κ.τ.λ.

In saying that the idea of 'consciousness' is implied in, and might almost always be taken to represent, Aristotle's Ethical application of *ἐνέργεια*, we need not overshoot the mark, and speak as if Aristotle made the Summum Bonum to consist in self-consciousness, or self-reflection; that would be giving far too much weight to the subjective side of the conception *ἐνέργεια*. Aristotle's theory rather comes to this, that the chief good for man is to be found in life itself. Life, according to his philosophy, is no means to anything ulterior; in the words of Goethe, 'Life itself is the end of life.' The very use of the term *ἐνέργεια*, as part of the definition of happiness, shows, as Aristotle tells us, that he regards the chief good as nothing external to man, but as existing in man and for man—existing in the evocation, the vividness, and the fruition of man's own powers.³⁸ Let that be called out into 'actuality' which is potential or latent in man, and happiness is the result. Avoiding then any overstrained application of the term 'consciousness,' and aiming rather at paraphrase than translation, it may be useful to notice one or two places in which the term *ἐνέργεια* occurs. *Eth.* i. x. 2. *Αρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; Ἡ τοῦτό γε*

³⁸ *Εἰλ.* i. viii. 3. 'Ὅρθως δὲ καὶ οὕτως | τέλος, οὕτως γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν
πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ | γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.

παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; 'Is a man *then* happy, after he is dead? Or is not this altogether absurd, especially for us who call happiness a conscious state?' I. x. 9. Κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. 'Happiness depends (not on fortune, but) on harmonious moods of mind.' I. x. 15. Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργούντα, κ.τ.λ. 'What hinders us calling him happy whose mind is moving in perfect harmony?' VII. xiv. 8. Διὸ ὁ Θεὸς αἰετὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσις. 'God is in the fruition of one pure pleasure everlastingly. For deep consciousness is possible, not only of motion, but also of repose.' IX. ix. 5. Μονῶτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶον. 'Now to the solitary individual life is grievous; for it is not easy to maintain a glow of mind by one's self, but in company with some one else, and in relation to others, this is easier.'

The formula we are discussing is applied by Aristotle to express the nature both of Pleasure and of Happiness. By examining separately these two applications of the term, we shall not only gain a clearer conception of the import of ἐνέργεια itself, but also we shall be in a better position for seeing what were Aristotle's real views about Happiness. 1. The great point that Aristotle insists upon with regard to Pleasure is, that it is not κίνησις or γένεσις, but ἐνέργεια (*Eth.* x. iii. 4, 5, x. iv. 2). What is the meaning of the distinction? In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*,³⁹ which contains his earlier and less scientific view, we find Pleasure defined in exactly the terms here repudiated, namely, as 'a certain

³⁹ *Rhet.* i. xi. 1. Ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰστασιν ἁθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν

εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τούναντίον.

motion of the vital powers, and a settling down perceptibly and suddenly into one's proper nature, while Pain is the contrary.' This definition corresponds with that given in Plato's *Timæus*.⁴⁰ It seems to have been originally due to the Cyrenaics; for these are said to be referred to by Socrates in the *Philebus* of Plato (p. 53 C) under the name of 'a refined set of men (*κομψοί τινες*), who maintain that pleasure is always a state of becoming (*γένεσις*), and never a state of being (*οὐσία*)' (see above, p. 176). Now in all essential parts of their views on pleasure Aristotle and Plato were quite agreed. Both would have said,⁴¹ pleasure is not the chief good; both would have made a distinction between the bodily pleasures, which are preceded by desire and a sense of pain—and the mental pleasures, which are free from this; both would have asserted the pleasure of the philosopher to be higher than all other pleasures. The difference between them resolves itself into one of formulæ. Plato has no consistent formula to express pleasure, he calls it 'a return to one's natural state,' 'a becoming,' 'a filling up,' 'a transition.' But all these terms are only applicable to the bodily pleasures, preceded by a sense of want. Plato acknowledges that there are pleasures above these, but he seems to have no word to express them. Therefore he may be said to leave the stigma upon pleasure in general, that it is a mere state of transition. Aristotle here steps in with his formula of *ἐνέργεια*, and says, pleasure is not a transition, but a fruition. It is not imperfect, but an End-in-itself. It does not arise from our coming to our natural state, but from our employing it.'⁴²

⁴⁰ Cf. Plato, *Timæus*, p. 64 D. Τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βλαίον γιγνόμενον ἄθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεῖνόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πάλιν ἄθρόον ἡδύ.

⁴¹ Cf. Plato, *Philebus*, p. 22 E, *Eti.*

x. iii. 13.

⁴² So Eudemos, *Eti.* vii. xii. 3. Οὐ γινόμενον συμβαίνουσι, ἀλλὰ χρωμένον.

Kant⁴³ defines pleasure to be 'the sense of that which promotes life, pain of that which hinders it. Consequently,' he argues, 'every pleasure must be preceded by pain; pain is always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continued advancement of vital power, but a speedy death for joy? Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another; but, between the one and the other, some pain must have place. It is the slight depressions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, which together make up a healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously felt state of well-being; whereas, this condition consists only of pleasurable feelings, following each other by reciprocation, that is, with continually intervening pain. Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life; without it an inanimate state would ensue.' In these words the German philosopher seems almost exactly to have coincided with Plato. The 'sense of that which promotes life' answers to *ἀναπλήρωσις*, and Plato appears to have held, with Kant, the reciprocal action of pleasure and pain (cf. *Phædo*, p. 60). Kant's formulæ, like Plato's, are only applicable to the bodily sensations, and do not express pleasures of the mind.

Aristotle in defining Pleasure as *ὁ τελειοὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, makes it, not 'the sense of what promotes life,' but rather the sense of life itself; the sense of the vividness of the vital powers; the sense that any faculty whatsoever has met its proper object. This definition then is equally applicable to the highest functions of the mind, as well as to the bodily organs. Even in the case of pleasure felt upon the supplying of a want, the Aristotelian⁴⁴ doctrine with regard to that

⁴³ Kant's *Anthropology*, p. 169. The above translation is given by Dr. Badham in an Appendix to his

edition of Plato's *Philebus*. London, 1855.

⁴⁴ Cf. *Etih.* x. iii. 6. *Ὅδ' ἐστὶν ἔρα*

pleasure was, that it was not identical with the supply, but contemporaneous; that it resulted from the play and action of vital powers not in a state of depression, *while* the depressed organs were receiving sustenance. To account for the fact that Pleasure cannot be long maintained, Aristotle would not have said, like Kant, that we are unable to bear a continuous expansion of the vital powers; but rather, that we are unable to maintain the vivid action of the faculties.⁴⁵ Pleasure then, according to Aristotle, proceeds rather from within than from without; it is the sense of existence; and it is so inseparably connected with the idea of life, that we cannot tell whether life is desired for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life.⁴⁶

2. If Happiness be defined as *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, and Pleasure as *ὁ τελειοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, what is the relation between them? Perhaps it is unfair to Aristotle to bring the different parts of his (probably unfinished) work thus into collision. Probably he worked out the treatise on Pleasure in Book X. without much regard to the theory of Happiness, but merely availing himself of the formulæ which seemed most applicable. It is only in Book VII. (viii. 2)—which we have seen reason to consider a later work, and the compilation of Eudemus—that Pleasure and Happiness are brought together on the grounds that they both consist in ‘the free play of conscious life’ (*ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*). This is a carrying out of Aristotle’s doctrine beyond what we find in Books I. and X. Aristotle

ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδονή' ἔν τις. vii. xiv. 7. Λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα τὰ λατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει λατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένουτος ὀγιούσιν πρῶτοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι, i.e. that it is the play, in some sort, of the undepressed vital functions, while those that were depressed are being

recruited.

⁴⁵ *Elh.* x. iv. 9. Πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.

⁴⁶ *Elh.* x. iv. 11. Συνεφεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐδέχασθαι· ἔνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

had prepared the way in these for the identification of Happiness with the highest kind of Pleasure, but had not himself arrived at it. However, we can find no other distinction in his theory between Pleasure and Happiness, than that the latter is something ideal and essentially moral (τέλος καὶ τέλειον πάντῃ πάντως), and extended over an entire life (λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τελείου), and implying the highest human excellence, the exercise of the highest faculties (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην ἀρετὴν). We have before alluded to the ideal character of Happiness as a whole. This is shown especially by the fact, that while on the one hand Aristotle says that Happiness (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς) must occupy a whole life, on the other hand he speaks of brevity of duration as necessarily attaching to every human ἐνέργεια. A δύναμις, he argues, is not only a δύναμις of being, but also a δύναμις of not-being. This contradiction always infects our ἐνέργειαί, and, like a law of gravitation, this negative side is always tending to bring them to a stop. The heavenly bodies, being divine and eternal, move perpetually and unweariedly,⁴⁷ for in them this law of contradiction does not exist. But to mortal creatures it is impossible to long maintain an ἐνέργεια—that vividness of the faculties, on which joy and pleasure depend. Happiness then, as a permanent condition, is something ideal; Aristotle figures it as the whole of life summed up into a vivid moment of consciousness; or again, as the aggregate of such moments with the intervals omitted; or again, that these moments are its essential part (τὸ κύριον μέρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας), constituting the most blessed state of the internal life (ζωὴ μακαριωτάτη), while the framework

⁴⁷ Μεταφ. viii. viii. 18. Διὸ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτε στῇ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. Οὐδὲ γὰρ

μνεί τοῦτο δρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἡ κίνησις.

for these will be the *βίος αἰρετώτατος*, or most favourable external career (*Eth.* ix. ix. 9). In what then do these moments consist? Chiefly in the sense of life and personality; in the higher kind of consciousness, which is above the mere physical sense of life. This is either coupled with a sense of the good and noble, as in the consciousness of good deeds done (*Eth.* ix. vii. 4); or it is awakened by friendship, by the sense of love and admiration for the goodness of a friend, who is, as it were, one's self and yet not one's self (*Eth.* ix. ix. 10); or finally it exists to the highest degree in the evocation of the reason, which is not only each man's proper self (*Eth.* ix. iv. 4, x. vii. 9), as forming the deepest ground of his consciousness, but is also something divine, and more than mortal in us.⁴⁸

III. Turning now to the consideration of *Μεσότης*, we shall see that it is only one application of this formula, to use it in reference to moral subjects; that it is indeed a most widely applicable philosophical idea, and has a definite history and development previous to Aristotle. It would seem not to require a very advanced state of philosophy in order for men to discover the maxim, that 'moderation is best,' that 'excess is to be avoided.' Thus as far back as Hesiod we find the praise of *μέτρια ἔργα*. The era of the Seven Sages produced the gnome, afterwards inscribed on the temple of Delphi, *Μηδὲν ἄγαν*. And one of the few sayings of Phocylides which remain is *Πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα, μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι*. Now all that is contained in these popular and prudential sayings is of course also contained in the principle of *Μεσότης*, which is so conspicuous in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. But Aristotle's principle contains something

⁴⁸ The Peripatetics seem to have refined upon Aristotle's use of *ἐνέργεια*, and to have tried to give it a restricted ethical sense as implying self-determination and will. See above, p. 36.

more—it is not a mere application of the doctrine of moderation to the subject-matter of the various separate virtues. We see traces of a more profound source of the idea in his reference to the verse *ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί*. For here we are taken back to associations of the Pythagorean philosophy, and to the principle that evil is of the nature of the infinite and good of the finite.⁴⁹

To say that what is infinite is evil, that what is finite is good, may seem an entire contradiction to our own ways of thinking. We speak of 'man's finite nature,' or of 'the infinite nature of God,' from a contrary point of view. But by 'finite' in such sentences we mean to express limitations of power, of goodness, of knowledge, each limitation implying an inferiority as compared with a nature in which such limitation does not exist. But the Pythagoreans were not dealing with this train of thought, when they said 'the finite is good.' They were expressing what was in the first place a truth of number, but afterwards was applied as a universal symbol; they were speaking of goodness in reference to their own minds. The 'finite' in number is the calculable, that⁵⁰ which the mind can grasp and handle; the 'infinite' is the incalculable, that which baffles the mind, that which refuses to reduce itself to law, and hence remains unknowable. The 'infinite' in this sense remained an object of aversion to the Pythagoreans, and hence in drawing out their double row of goods and evils, they placed 'the even' on the side of the bad, 'the odd' on the side of the good. This itself might seem paradoxical, until we learn that with even numbers they

⁴⁹ *Εἰλ.* II. vi. 14. Τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπειροῦ, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἰκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου.

⁵⁰ Cf. Philolaus, apud Stob. *Ecl.* *Phys.* I. xxi. 7. Καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὲν τὰ

γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι, οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτου. Whether this fragment be genuine or not, it expresses the doctrine.

associated the idea of infinite subdivision, and that even numbers added together fail to produce squares; while the series of the odd numbers if added together produce a series of squares; and the square, by reason of its completeness and of the law which it exhibits, is evidently of the nature of the finite. The opposition of the finite and the infinite took root in Greek philosophy, and above all in the system of Plato. Unity and plurality, form and matter, genus and individuals, idea and phenomena, are all different modifications of this same opposition. The Pythagoreans themselves appear to have expressed or symbolised matter under the term τὸ ἄπειρον, and Plato⁵¹ seems to have yet more distinctly conceived of this characteristic of matter or space, saying that it was an 'undefined duad,' that is, that it contained in itself an infinity in two directions, the infinitely small and the infinitely great.

Assuming, therefore, that the principle of the finite, or the limit (πεπερασμένον or πέρας), may be considered as identical with that of form or law, we may now proceed to notice what appears to be the transition from the idea of fixed law or form (εἶδος), to that of proportion or the mean (μεσότης), that is, to law or form become relative. It is to be found in the *Philebus* of Plato, pp. 23—27. Socrates there divides all existence into four classes: first, the infinite (ἄπειρον); second, the limit (πέρας); third, things created and compounded out of the mixture of these two (ἐκ τούτων μικτὴν καὶ γεγεννημένην οὐσίαν); fourth, the cause of this mixture and of the creation of things. The infinite is that class of things admitting of degrees, more or less, hotter and colder, quicker and slower, and the like, where no fixed notion of quantity has as yet come in. The limit is this fixed notion of quan-

⁵¹ Cf. *Ar. Metaphys.* I. vi. 6.

tity, as, for instance, the equal or the double. The third or mixed class exhibits the law of the *πέρας* introduced into the *ἄπειρον*. Of this Socrates adduces beautiful manifestations. Thus in the human body the infinite is the tendency to extremes, to disorder, to disease, but the introduction of the limit here produces a balance of the constitution and health. In sounds you have the infinite degrees of deep and high, quick and slow; but the limit gives rise to modulation, and harmony, and all that is delightful in music. In climate and temperature, where the limit has been introduced, excessive heats and violent storms subside, and the mild and genial seasons in their order follow. In the human mind, 'the goddess of the limit' checks into submission the wild and wanton passions, and gives rise to all that is good.

Both in things physical and moral these two opposites, the finite and the infinite, are thus made to play into one another, and to be the joint causes of beauty and excellence. Out of their union an entire set of ideas and terms seems to spring up, symmetry, proportion, balance, harmony, moderation, and the like. And this train of associations seems to have been constantly present to the mind of Plato. It suited the essentially Greek character of his philosophy to dwell upon the goodness of beauty, and the beauty of goodness, on the morality of art, and the artistic nature of morality; so that words like *μετρίότης* and *συμμετρία* become naturally appropriated to express excellence in life and action.⁵²

This Platonic principle, then, Aristotle seems to have taken up and adopted, slightly changing the formula, however,

⁵² Cf. *Republic*, p. 400 E. Ἔστι δὲ γέ που πλήρης μὲν γραφικὴ αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη δημιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὕφαντική καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία καὶ πᾶσα αὐτὴ τῶν ἑλλων σκευῶν ἐργασία, ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῶν σωματικῶν φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἑλλων

φυτῶν· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἐνεσιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀβυσθμία καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοσθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σόφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἡθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα.

and speaking of *μεσότης* instead of *μετριοτής*. The reason for this change may have been, that the formula became thus more exact and more capable of a close analytic application to a variety of instances, and at the same time gave scope for expressing that which is with Aristotle the complement of the theory, namely the doctrine of extremes and their relation to the mean. Aristotle does not ignore the physical and artistic meanings of the principle. On the contrary, the whole bearing of his use of the term *μεσότης* is to show that moral virtue is only another expression of the same law which we see in nature and the arts. Life has been defined to be 'multeity in unity,' in other words, it is the law of the *πέρας* exhibited in the *ἄπειρον*. The first argument made use of by Aristotle to show that virtuous action consists in a balance between extremes is drawn from the analogy of physical life; 'For about immaterial things,' he says, 'we must use material analogies.' 'Excess and deficiency equally destroy the health and strength, while what is proportionate (*τὰ σύμμετρα*) preserves and augments them' (*Eth.* II. ii. 6). Again, he points out that all art aims at the mean, and the finest works of art are those which seem to have realised a subtle grace which the least addition to any part or diminution from it would upset (*Eth.* II. vi. 9). 'And moral virtue,' he adds, 'is finer than the finest art.' But it is by a mathematical expression of the formula, by reducing it to an absolutely quantitative conception, that Aristotle's use of *Μεσότης* is chiefly distinguished. He says, that all quantity, whether space or number (*ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαίρετῳ*), admits of the terms more, less, and equal. On making these terms relative, you have excess, deficiency, and the mean. The mean, then, is in geometrical proportion what the equal is in arithmetical progression. The middle term arithmetically is that which is equidistant from the terms on each

side of it. Geometrically, the mean is not an absolute mean, but a relative mean, that is, if applied to action, it expresses the consideration of persons and of circumstances (*Eth.* II. vi. 4, 5). This opposition of the mean to the too much and too little becomes henceforward a formula of almost universal application. It is no mere negative principle, not the mere avoiding of extremes, but rather the realisation of a law. When Aristotle says that the *μεσότης* must be *ὀρισμένη λόγῳ*, he means that our action must correspond to the standard which exists in the rightly ordered mind. What is subjectively the *λόγος*, law or standard, that is objectively the *μεσότης* or balance. 'Each of our senses,' says Aristotle, 'is a sort of balance (*μεσότης*) between extremes in the objects of sensation, and this it is which gives us the power of judging.'⁵³

Thus again he says of plants, that they have no perceptions, 'because they have no standard' (*διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα*, *De An.* II. xii. 4). Again, he defines pleasure and pain to consist in 'the consciousness, by means of the discriminating faculty (*τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι*) of the senses, of coming in contact with good or evil.'⁵⁴ Each of the senses then is, or contains, a sort of standard of its proper object. And it is clear that Aristotle attributes to us a similar critical faculty in regard of morals. He says, that 'It is peculiar to man, as compared with the other animals, that he has a sense of good and bad, just and unjust.'⁵⁵ He seems to have regarded this 'moral sense' as analogous to the musical ear,

⁵³ *De Animâ*, II. xi. 17. 'Ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶον μεσότητός τινος οὐσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. Τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν.

⁵⁴ Καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς

τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾧ τοιαῦτα.—*De An.* III. vii. 2.

⁵⁵ *Pol.* I. ii. 12. Τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθησιν ἔχειν.

which in some degree is almost natural to all men, but again exists in very different degrees in different men, and also may be more or less cultivated. Thus (*Eth.* ix. ix. 6) he speaks of the good man being 'pleased at good actions, as the musical man is at beautiful tunes.' And in *Eth.* x. iii. 10 he says that 'It will be impossible to feel the pleasure of a just man if one is not just, as it will be to feel the pleasure of a musical man if one is not musical.' In the *Ethics*, its proper objective sense is preserved to *Μεσότης*, which accordingly means a 'balance,' and not the 'standard' for determining that balance, which is expressed by the term *λόγος*. A moment's consideration of this point will give an answer to the somewhat superficial question, Why does not Aristotle make the intellectual virtues mean states? In the original form of the principle of *Μεσότης* we have seen that it consisted in the introduction of the law of the *πέρας* into the *ἄπειρον*. The passions and desires are the infinite; moral virtue consists in introducing limit (*πέρας*) into them—in bringing them under law (*λόγῳ ὀρίζειν*)—in making them exhibit balance, proportion, harmony (*μεσότητα*), which is the realisation of the law. On the other hand, reason is 'right law' (*ὀρθὸς λόγος*), i.e. is another name for the law itself. It is the standard, and therefore does not require to be regulated by the standard. The intellectual virtues are not *μεσότητες*, because they are *λόγοι*.

The worth and validity of Aristotle's principle of the mean has been much canvassed and questioned. Kant has been very severe on Aristotle for making 'a merely quantitative difference between vice and virtue.' Some have thought the theory practically true, but scientifically untenable; others, on the contrary, that scientifically and abstractedly it is true, but that practically it gives an unworthy picture of morality, that it fails to represent the

absolute and awful difference between right and wrong. Aristotle himself seems to have anticipated this last objection, by remarking⁵⁶ that 'It is only according to the most abstract and metaphysical conception that virtue is a mean between vices, whereas from a moral point of view it is an extreme (i.e. utterly and extremely removed from them).' Aristotle acknowledges that the formula of the mean does not adequately express the *good* of virtue; that when thinking of virtue under the category of good, and regarding it as an object for the moral feelings and desires, as an object to be striven after, we should rather seek some other formula to express its nature. In the same way it might be said in accordance with modern views, that 'the mean' does not adequately express the *right* of virtue in relation to the will and conscience.

The objections to Aristotle's theory arise from a partial misconception of what the term *Μεσότης* really conveys. Kant for 'the mean' substitutes 'law.' But we have already traced the identity or correlation of *Λόγος* and *Μεσότης*, and we have seen that *Μεσότης* really implies and expresses exactly what is meant by 'law'—properly so called. The only advantage which the term 'law' can have over *Μεσότης*, as an ethical principle, comes to it unfairly. For there is a sort of ambiguity between the two meanings of the word law; on the one hand it may denote a general principle, or harmony, or idea in nature; on the other hand, an authoritative command of the State. In applying the word to morals the associations of both meanings are blended together, and 'the law of right' accordingly expresses not only something harmonious, the attainment of an idea in action, but

⁵⁶ *Εἰκ.* II. vi. 17. Κατὰ μὲν τὴν λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

also there is a sort of association of authority conveyed, of the 'must,' of something binding on the will.

Supposing, then, we take the word 'law' or 'idea' as being the real representative of *Μεσότης*, it may still be asked whether a quantitative term be a fit and worthy expression for so deep a moral conception. The Pythagoreans would not have understood this objection. They thought numbers the most sublime and the only true expression for all that was good in the physical and moral world. They would have used in reference to number the exact counterpart of Wordsworth's praise of Duty—'And the most ancient heavens by thee are fresh and strong.' They would have delighted to say that virtue is a square and vice an uneven-sided figure. When we look to the arts, following the analogy that Aristotle pointed out, we see clearly how the whole of beauty seems from one point of view to depend on the more and the less. It does not derogate from a beautiful form, that more or less would spoil it. We still think of beauty as something positive, and that more or less would be the negations of this. By degrees, however, we come to figure to ourselves beauty rather as repelling the more and the less, than as being caused by them. The capacity for more and less is matter, the *ἄπειρον*, the *ἀόριστος* *δυάς* of Plato. The idea coming in stamps itself upon this, we now have the harmonious and the beautiful, and all extremes and quantitative possibilities vanish out of sight. Matter is totally forgotten in our contemplation of form. So it is also with morals. We might fix our view upon the negative side of virtue, look at it in contrast to the extremes, and say it is constituted virtue by being a little more than vice and a little less than vice. But this would be to establish a positive idea out of the negation of its negations.

To look at anything in its elements makes it appear

inferior to what it seems as a whole. Resolve the statue or the building into stone and the laws of proportion, and no worthy causes of the former beautiful result seem now left behind. So, also, resolve a virtuous act into the passions and some quantitative law, and it seems to be rather destroyed than analysed; though, after all, what was there else that it could be resolved into? An act of bravery seems beautiful and noble; when we reduce this to a balance between the instincts of fear and self-confidence, the glory of it is gone. This is because the form is everything, and the matter nothing; and yet the form, without the matter as its exponent, has no existence. It is, no doubt, true that the beauty of that brave act would have been destroyed had the boldness of it been pushed into folly; and equally so had it been controlled into caution. The act, as it was done, exhibits the law of life, 'multeity in unity;' or, in other words, the law of beauty. This is, then, what the term *Μεσότης* is capable of expressing; it is the law of beauty. If virtue is harmony, grace, and beauty in action, *Μεσότης* perfectly expresses this.

That beauty constituted virtue, was an eminently Greek idea. If we run through Aristotle's list of the virtues, we find them all embodying this idea. The law of the *Μεσότης*, as exhibited in bravery, temperance, liberality, and magnanimity, constitutes a noble, free, and brilliant type of manhood. Extend it also, as Aristotle does, to certain qualifications of temper, speech, and manners, and you have before you the portrait of a graceful Grecian gentleman. The question now is, are there other virtues which exhibit some other law than this law of beauty, and to which, therefore, the *Μεσότης* would be inapplicable? Let us take as instances, truth, humility, charity, forgiveness of injuries, and ask what is the case with these. 'Truth' is treated of in a remarkable way

by Aristotle; under this name he describes a certain straightforwardness of manner, which he places as the mean between boastfulness and over-modesty. That deeper kind of truth which, as he says, is concerned with justice and injustice, he omits to treat of. When we come to the Peripatetic theory of justice—taking this as an individual virtue—we find it imperfectly developed. Now, truth itself seems expressible under the law of the *Μεσότης*; it is a balance of reticence with candour, suitable to times and seasons. But the impulse to truth—the duty of not deceiving—the relation of the will to this virtue, seems something quite beyond the formula of the Mean.

So, also, with the other virtues specified; humility, charity, and forgiveness of injuries being Christian qualities, are not described by Aristotle; but if we ask if they are ‘mean states,’ we find that they are all beautiful; and, in so far as that, they all exhibit a certain grace and balance of the human feelings. There is a point at which each might be overstepped; humility must not be grovelling, nor charity weak; and forgiveness must at times give place to indignation. But there seems in them something which is also their chief characteristic, and which is beyond and different from this quality of the mean. Perhaps this might be expressed in all of them as ‘self-abnegation.’ Now, here, we get a different point of view from which to regard the virtues; and that is, the relation of Self, of the individual Will, of the moral Subject to the objective in the sphere of action. This point of view Aristotle’s principle does not touch. *Μεσότης* expresses the objective law of beauty in action, and, as correlative with it, the critical moral faculty in our minds, but the law of right in action as something binding on the moral subject it leaves unexpressed. To some extent this want is supplied by Aristotle’s doctrine of the *τέλος*, which raises a

beautiful action into something absolutely desirable, and makes it the end of our being.

But still the theory of 'Duty' cannot be said to exist in Aristotle, and all that relates to the moral will is with him only in its infancy. *Μεσότης*, we have seen, expresses the beauty of good acts, but leaves something in the goodness of them unexpressed. In conclusion, we must remember that 'Αρετή with Aristotle did not mean quite the same as 'virtue' with us; he meant the excellence, or perfection of man, just as he spoke elsewhere of the 'Αρετή of a horse. It is no wonder then that with his Greek views he resolved this into a sort of moral beauty.

IV. Aristotle prided himself,⁵⁷ not unnaturally, on having been the first to work out the laws of the Syllogism; later on in his literary career he appears to have seen that the syllogistic formula might be useful for expressing other psychological phenomena, besides those involved in arriving at a deductive conclusion. Accordingly in his treatise *On the Soul* (III. xi.) he applies it to explain the process of arriving at a resolution or determination to act. He says that this process is only possible in the animals which possess the power of calculation (*ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς*); that it implies a power of combining two or more impressions into one (*δύναται ἐν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν*); that this syllogistic conviction (*τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ δόξαν*) contains on the one hand perception and it may be desire, and on the other hand a universal element—wish for the generally good (*βούλησις*, see note on *Eth.* III. iv. 1), or a general intellectual conception of the reason (*ἡ καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος*); that sometimes the wish for the generally good conquers the particular

⁵⁷ Cf. *Sophist. Elench.* xxxiii. 18. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ρητορικῶν ὑπάρχει πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ

τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παρτελῶς οὐδὲν εἶχομεν ἄλλο λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἡ τριβὴ ζητοῦντες πολλὸν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν.

desire of the moment, and sometimes the contrary takes place (*νικᾷ δ' ἐνίοτε [ἡ ὀρεξις] καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν· ὅτε δ' ἐκείνη ταύτην*); and that, though the general proposition, or major premiss, asserts that 'such or such a person ought to do such or such an act'—it is the minor premiss 'I am such or such a person and this in the present moment is such or such an act' which sets the faculties in motion (*ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου*).⁵⁸ This passage, which was probably written long after the discussions on Wish and Deliberation in the third book of the *Ethics*, comes in, as it were incidentally, in treating of the ascending series of souls throughout nature. The suggestion which it contains of explaining the psychology of the human will by means of the formula of the syllogism does not appear to have been pursued further by Aristotle in his extant writings, but it was evidently taken up by the Peripatetic school, and we find it made much use of (1) in the *Eudemian Ethics*, and (2) in the treatise *On the Motion of Animals*, which is placed among the works of Aristotle, but is now generally attributed to a later follower of his school.⁵⁹ For a clear exposition of the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism, as held by the Peripatetics, let us refer at once to the summary account of it which is given in the last-mentioned treatise.

The Practical Syllogism depends on this principle, that
 'No creature moves or acts, except with a view to some end.'⁶⁰
 What therefore the law of the so-called 'sufficient reason' is

⁵⁸ See note on *Eth.* vi. xii. 10, where the latter part of the above passage is quoted.

⁵⁹ See Valentine Rose, *De Arist. Lib. Ord. et Auct.* pp. 162-174. Rose shows that this little treatise contains medical doctrines belonging to a school of medicine later than

Aristotle; and it has all the marks of being an able cento and compendium of various parts of Aristotle's physical and physiological works.

⁶⁰ Πάντα τὰ ζῷα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἐνεκὰ τινος, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς πάσης τῆς κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα.
 —*De Mot. An.* vi. 2.

to a proposition of the understanding, that the law of the final cause is to an act of the will. 'Under what conditions of thought is it,'⁶¹ asks the writer, 'that a person at one time acts, at another time does not act; at one time is put in motion, at another time not? It seems to be much the same case as with people thinking and reasoning about abstract matter, only *there* the ultimate thing to be obtained is an abstract proposition, for as soon as one has perceived the two premisses, one perceives the conclusion. But here the conclusion that arises from the two premisses is the action; as, for instance, when one has perceived, that Every man ought to walk, and I am a man, he walks immediately. Or again, that No man ought now to walk, and I am a man, he stops still immediately. Both these courses he adopts, provided he be neither hindered nor compelled. . . . That the action is the conclusion, is plain; but the premisses of the practical syllogism are of two kinds, specifying either that something is good, or again, how it is possible.'⁶² This then may shortly be said to be the form of the practical syllogism:

either (1) Major Premiss. Such and such an action is universally good.

Minor Premiss. This will be an action of the kind.

Conclusion. Performance of the action.

⁶¹ *De Mot. An.* vii. 1. Πῶς δὲ νοῦν ὅτι μὲν πράττει ὅτι δ' οὐ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὅτι δ' οὐ κινεῖται; "Ἔοικε παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων διανοουμένοις καὶ συλλογιζομένοις. 'Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος (ὅταν γὰρ τὰς δύο προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνόησε καὶ συνέθηκεν), ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίγνεται ἢ πράξις, οἷον ὅταν νοήσῃ ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστέον

ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἂν δ' ὅτι οὐδενὶ βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, εὐθὺς ἡρεμεί· καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφω πράττει, ἂν μὴ τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ.

⁶² *De Mot. An.* vii. 4. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ πράξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διὰ τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ.

or (2) Major Premiss. Such and such an end is desirable.

Minor. This step will conduce to the end.

Conclusion. Taking of the step.

In other words, every action implies a sense of a general principle, and the applying of that principle to a particular case; or again, it implies desire for some end, coupled with perception of the means necessary for attaining the end. These two different ways of stating the practical syllogism are in reality coincident; for assuming that all action is for some end, the major premiss may be said always to contain the statement of an end.⁶³ And again, any particular act, which is the application of a moral principle, may be said to be the means necessary to the realisation of the principle. 'Temperance is good,' may be called either a general principle, or an expression of a desire for the habit of temperance. 'To abstain now will be temperate,' is an application of the principle, or again, it is the absolutely necessary means towards the attainment of the habit. For 'it is absurd,' as Aristotle tells us, 'when one acts unjustly to talk of not wishing to be unjust, or when one acts intemperately of not wishing to be intemperate.'⁶⁴

The distinction between end and means, which plays so important a part throughout the moral system of Aristotle, comes out, as might be expected, very prominently in Book III., where what must be called a sort of elementary psychology of the Will is given. But no application is there made of the scheme of the syllogism. Indeed a mathematical formula seems used in Book III., where a logical formula is

⁶³ *Εὐλ.* vi. xii. 10. Οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.

⁶⁴ *Εὐλ.* iii. v. 13. "Ἐτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον.

in Book VI.; for in the former, the process of deliberation is compared to the analysis of a diagram (*Eth.* III. iii. II); in the latter, error of deliberation is spoken of as a false syllogism, where the right end is attained by a wrong means, that is, by a false middle term.⁶⁵

It is to Books VI. and VII. that we must look to see the use made of the practical syllogism. It is applied, first, to the explanation of the nature of Thought (*φρόνησις*), which is shown to contain a universal and a particular element.⁶⁶

2. To show the intuitive character of moral judgments and knowledge.⁶⁷ 3. To prove the necessary and inseparable connection of wisdom and virtue.⁶⁸ 4. In answer to the

question, how is it possible to know the good, and yet act contrary to one's knowledge? In short, how is incontinence possible? This phenomenon is explained in two ways; either the incontinent man does not apply a minor premiss to his universal principle, and so the principle remains dormant, and his knowledge of the good remains merely implicit; or, again, desire constructs a sort of syllogism of its own, inconsistent with, though not directly contradictory to, the arguments of the moral reason.⁶⁹ Incontinence therefore implies knowing the good, and at the same time not knowing it. It would be impossible to act contrary to a complete syllogism which applied the knowledge of the good to a case in point; for the necessary conclusion to such a syllo-

⁶⁵ *Eth.* vi. ix. 5. 'Ἄλλ' ἔστι καὶ τοῦτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ δὲ μὴν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι.

⁶⁶ *Eth.* vi. vii. 7. Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν, κ.τ.λ. vi. viii. 7. Ἐτι ἡ ἀμαρτία ἡ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευσασθαι ἡ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἡ γὰρ ἐτι πάντα τὰ βα-

ρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἡ ἐτι τοῦ διβαρύσταθμον.

⁶⁷ *Eth.* vi. xi. 4. Καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα, κ.τ.λ.

⁶⁸ *Eth.* vi. xii. 10. Ἐστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις . . . ἀρχάς.

⁶⁹ *Eth.* vii. iii. 6. Ἐτι ἐπεὶ . . . οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. vii. iii. 9, 10. Ἐτι καὶ ὧδε . . . κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

gism would be good action. But there is broken knowledge and temporary moral obliviousness in the mind of the incontinent man, and the practical syllogism gives a formula for expressing this.

The foregoing references serve to show, that in itself this formula is only a way of stating certain psychological facts. The question whether people do really go through a syllogism in or before every action, is much like the question whether we always reason in syllogisms. Most reasonings seem to be from particular to particular, that is to say, by analogy; and yet some sort of universal conception, if it be only the sense of the uniformity of nature, lies at the bottom of all inference. And so too in action, most acts seem prompted by the instinct of the moment, and yet some general idea, as for instance, the desire of the creature for its proper good, might be said to lie behind this instinct. This theory acknowledges⁷⁰ that the mind constantly passes over one of the premisses of the practical syllogism, as being obvious; that we act often instantaneously, without hesitation, just because we see an object of desire before us. Thus it is merely a way of putting it, to say that we act by a syllogism. But granting the formula, it becomes immediately a powerful analytic instrument. It seems to suggest and clear the way for a set of ulterior questions, in which important results would be involved. For now that action has been as it were caught, put to death, and dissected, and so reduced to

⁷⁰ *De Mot. An.* vii. 4, 5. "Ὡς περ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτῶντων ἐνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἐτίραν πρότασιν τὴν δῆλην οὐδ' ἡ διανοία ἐφιστάσα σκοπεῖ οὐδὲν ὅσον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει. Διὸ καὶ ὅσα μὴ λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺ πρᾶττομεν. Ὅταν γὰρ ἐνεργήσῃ ἡ τῇ αἰ-

σθήσει πρὸς τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ τῇ νῦν, οὐ ὁρέγεται, εὐθὺς ποιεῖ· αὐτ' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἡ νοήσεως ἡ τῆς ὁρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. Ποτέον μοι, ἢ ἐπιθυμία λέγει· τοῦ δὲ ποτέον, ἡ αἰσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἡ ὁ νοῦς· εὐθὺς πίνει.

the level of abstract reasoning, it seems that we have only to deal with its disjointed parts in order to know the whole theory of human Will. We have only to ask what is the nature of the major premiss, and how obtained? What is the nature of the minor premiss, and how obtained? The answer to these questions in the *Ethics* is not very explicit. This is exactly one of the points on which a conclusive theory seems to have been least arrived at. With regard to our possession of general principles of action, there appear to be three different accounts given in different places.

- (1) They are innate and intuitive (vi. xi. 4, vii. vi. 6, 7).
- (2) They are evolved from experience of particulars (vi. viii. 6).
- (3) They depend on the moral character (vi. xii. 10, vii. viii. 4).

These three accounts are not, however, incompatible with one another. For as in explaining the origin of speculative principles (*Post. An.* ii. xix.) Aristotle seems to attribute them to reason as the cause and experience as the condition; so in regard to moral principles, we might say that they were perceived by an intuitive faculty, but under the condition of a certain bearing of the moral character, which itself arises out of and consists in particular moral experiences. This reconciliation of the statements is not made for us in the *Ethics*. There the different points of view stand apart, and there is something immature about the whole theory. So too with regard to the minor premiss in action; on the one hand we are told that it is a matter of perception (vi. viii. 9), as if it belonged to everybody; on the other hand we are told that the apprehension of these particulars is exactly what distinguishes the 'thoughtful' man.⁷¹ But it is unnecessary to

⁷¹ Πρακτικός γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἰσχυάτων τις. *Εἰλ.* vii. ii. 5.

attempt to go beyond the lead of the *Ethics* in answering these questions, for we should ourselves most probably state them in an entirely different way.

We see in these applications of the Practical Syllogism by the Peripatetics the progress of psychology, and the tendency now manifesting itself to give attention to the phenomena of the Will. The manner in which the theory is stated, abstractedly, and with a full belief in logical formulæ, rather than an appeal to life and consciousness—shows something of the scholastic spirit. To reduce action to a syllogism dogmatically is a piece of scholasticism. Plato would have put it in this way for once, and would then have passed on to other modes of expression. But it is remarkable that this formula is one of those that remains most completely stamped upon the language of mankind. When we talk of 'acting on principle,' or speak of a man's 'principles,' perhaps we do not reflect that this expression is a remnant of the Practical Syllogism of the Peripatetics. 'Principle' is no other than the Latinised form (*principium*) of ἀρχή, or the major premiss of a practical syllogism. And this, as we saw above, is in Aristotle's language 'a universal conception affirming that one ought to do (or not to do) some kind of thing.' ⁷²

⁷² *De An. l.c.* ἡ μὲν καθόλος υπόληψις καὶ λόγος . . . λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν.

ESSAY V.

On the Physical and Theological Ideas in the Ethics of Aristotle.

ALTHOUGH Aristotle endeavoured completely to separate Practical from Theoretic philosophy; and though in the present treatise he professed to adhere exclusively to an ethical (or, as he called it, a political) point of view; and though on this account he postponed, as belonging to another branch of philosophy, the consideration of several important questions¹—yet still it was perhaps impossible for a system of morals to be composed bearing no trace of the writer's general views of the Universe, the Deity, and the Human Soul. And accordingly, we find more than one passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* influenced by and indicating such general views. To understand these, and to obtain possession of that which in the mind of Aristotle must have been the setting of the entire piece, we have to follow him to some extent beyond the limits of his Practical writings. To collect a few of Aristotle's more salient dicta on Nature, God, and the Soul, will be an interesting task, but we must not be

¹ As, for instance, the metaphysical question concerning the good, as a universal, *Eth.* i. vi. 13. The question of Divine Providence in relation to happiness, i. ix. 13. The question whether, scientifically speaking, the

Soul is divisible into parts, i. xiii. 8-10. The question whether in nature, as a general principle, the like seeks the like, or each thing seeks its opposite, viii. i. 7, &c.

expected to set forth a complete and definite system on these subjects, for in regard to them Aristotle's extant writings are far from containing entirely definite results, and it may even be doubted, whether in his own mind he ever succeeded in arriving at such.

In deducing Aristotle's opinions on any question from his extant works, we must not leave out of consideration the probable order and mode of composition of these works, as indicated by internal evidence (see above, p. 71, *note*). It seems highly probable that Aristotle—having during the previous course of his life thought out the divisions of philosophy, the leading ideas of each department, and the phraseology in which everything was to be expressed, and having also collected great stores of materials on all the subjects which his predecessors had treated of—set to work, when about fifty years old, to make his exposition of the whole, as a settlement of questions and a *κρῆμα εἰς ἀσὶ* for the world. He appears to have commenced with that which was not part of Philosophy, but was a necessary prelude to Philosophy, namely, the discussion of Method under the two forms of Dialectic, or the Logic of Probability, and Analytic, or the Logic of Science. His treatises on these subjects were collectively entitled by his editors² *Organon*, or the Instrument of Philosophy. Collaterally, and almost simultaneously with these, he appears to have composed his *Rhetoric*, as treating of a subject closely allied to Dialectic. And an easy transition led him on to deal next with the remaining branches of Practical and Productive philosophy in his *Ethics*, *Politics*, and *Art of Poetry* (see p. 71, *note*). Leaving all these more or less unfinished, he seems to have

² See Grote's *Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 78, and Brandis' *Schol. ad Arist.* p. 259, a. 48, &c.

gone on to the composition of his great series of Physical treatises. Of these probably the first to be written was the *Physical Discourse*,³ which contained, as Hegel said, 'the Metaphysic of Physics,' being an account of what Aristotle conceived under the terms 'Nature,' 'Motion,' 'Time,' 'Space,' 'Causation' (or the Four Causes), and the like. After these *prolegomena* to Physics, he proceeded to treat of the Universe⁴ in orderly sequence, beginning with the divinest part, the periphery of the whole, or outer Heaven, which, according to his views, bounded the world, being composed of ether,⁵ a substance distinct from that of the four elements and identical with that which constitutes the vital principle and reason in the creatures of the earth. This region was the sphere of the Stars; and below it, in the Aristotelian system, was the planetary sphere, with the seven Planets (the sun and moon being reckoned among the number) moving in it. Both Stars and Planets he seems to have regarded as conscious, happy beings, moving in fixed orbits, and inhabiting regions free from all change and chance; and these regions formed the subject of his treatise *On the Heavens*. Next to this he is thought⁶ to have composed his treatise *On Generation and Corruption*, in order to expound those principles of physical change (dependent on the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry) which in the higher parts of the Universe had no existence. This work formed the transition to the sublunary sphere,

³ φυσικῆς ἀκρόασις A, B, κ.τ.λ. *Ακρόασις* means a scientific, as opposed to a popular, discourse or lecture.

⁴ The treatise *On the Universe* (Περὶ Κόσμου) which appears among the works of Aristotle, is spurious, being the compilation of some later

Peripatetic.

⁵ *De Cælo*, i. iii. 13, &c.

⁶ See Spengel, *Ueber die Reihenfolge der naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles*, in the Transactions of the Royal Academy of Bavaria, 1848.

immediately round the Earth, in which the meteors and comets moved, which was characterised by incessant change and by the passing of things into and out of existence, and which formed the subject of his *Meteorologics*. The last book of this treatise brings us down to the Earth itself, and indeed beneath its surface, for it discusses, in a curious theory, the formation of rocks and metals. From this point Aristotle would seem to have started afresh with his array of physiological treatises, the first written of which may very likely have been that *On the Parts of Animals*, as containing general principles of Anatomy and Physiology. Next it seems probable that the work *On the Soul* was produced. This, as Spengel points out, was not intended in the first instance to be a treatise on Psychology, but a physiological account of the vital principle as manifested in plants, animals, and men. A set of 'appendices,' as we should now call them, on various functions connected with life in general, such as Sensation, Memory, Sleep, Dreaming, Longevity, Death, &c., were added by Aristotle to his work *On the Soul*. Afterwards the ten books of *Researches on Animals*,⁷ and the five books *On the Generation of Animals*—together with the minor treatise *On the Progression of Animals*, and with a collection of *Problems*,⁸ which Aristotle probably kept by him, and added to from time to time—made up the series of Aristotle's Physiological and Physical writings, so far as he lived to complete them. Treatises *On the Physiology of*

⁷ *Περὶ τὰ Ζῷα Ἱστοριῶν* A, B, κ.τ.λ. The work is always referred to under this title by Aristotle. The Latin name *Historia Animalium* is therefore a mistranslation. Out of this mistranslation, however, the term 'Natural History,' to denote a particular department of science, seems to have risen.

⁸ Prantl, in the Transactions of the Royal Academy of Munich, 1852, shows that while there is probably an Aristotelian nucleus to the collection of *Problems* which have come down to us under the name of Aristotle, the great bulk of the collection is by a variety of Peripatetic hands, and is full of inconsistencies.

Plants and *On Health and Disease* had been promised by him, but were never achieved (see above, p. 69). Simultaneously with some of the works now mentioned, but in idea last of all his writings, the *Metaphysics* were probably in progress of composition when the death of Aristotle occurred. It seems strange that Valentine Rose should strenuously have argued⁹ in favour of the hypothesis that the *Metaphysics* were composed before the Physical writings of Aristotle. For, against this we may say that in four places of the *Physical Writings*¹⁰ questions are reserved to be discussed in the *Metaphysics*; that in twelve places of the *Metaphysics*¹¹ the Physical writings are referred to; that in no work of Aristotle's are the *Metaphysics* quoted; that the very name *Tὰ μετὰ τὰ Φυσικὰ* embodies a strong tradition of antiquity, that Aristotle's *Prima Philosophia*, or Theology, followed his *Physics* both in idea and in order of composition; and finally, that there was another tradition of the ancients (see above, p. 32) to the effect that the *Metaphysics* were edited by Eudemus after the death of Aristotle, and indeed patched together by him, parts having been lost, or, as we might with probability conjecture, never having been completed. Such, or some such, having been the order in which the works of Aristotle were composed, we may observe, by comparing the probably subsequent with the probably prior writings, the following peculiarities: (1) All the more general forms of the philosophy, such as the four causes, the opposition of the potential and the actual, the laws of the syllogism, the conception of the method of statement, &c., were pretty well cut and dried before the writing of any of the extant books commenced. (2) Even a consider-

⁹ *De Ar. Lib. Ord. et Auct.* pp. 135-232.

¹⁰ Quoted by Bonitz, *Ar. Metaphys.* vol. ii. p. 4.

¹¹ *Ib.* p. 5.

able portion of the special matter of the special treatises was stored up ready beforehand. Thus there is a rich instalment of ethical matter in the *Rhetoric*, of political matter in the *Ethics*, of metaphysical matter in the *Physical Discourse*, &c.; (3) But when Aristotle came to concentrate his mind on a particular subject he invariably made a great advance in the conception of it: thus the analysis of ethical phenomena in the *Ethics* goes far beyond that arrived at in the *Rhetoric*; ¹² (4) Out of an ostensible regard for strict orderly arrangement and the due apportionment of subject-matter to the separate sciences, Aristotle constantly put off the solution of particular questions for 'another' or 'a later' inquiry. We say *ostensible*, because in some cases it looks as if the excuse were a convenient one for postponing questions to which he was not prepared with an answer. On the other hand, either from neglecting his own rules of method, or from not having as yet seen the limits of a particular science, and from having to write tumultuously and under pressure—he sometimes launches out into not strictly appropriate discussions. Thus in the *Art of Poetry* he goes on into questions of Style, which belonged properly to the *Rhetoric*, and even into elementary questions of Grammar, which rather should have had a treatise to themselves. And in the work *On the Soul*, which is professedly a physiological ¹³ treatise, he transcends the limits of Physiology or Physics, and introduces discussions on the theory of Knowledge, on the relation of Subject to Object, on the

¹² As, for instance, in the theory of the nature of Pleasure. See above, p. 246.

¹³ *De An.* i. i. 15. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὴ φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρεῖσθαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης, ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης, i.e. in so far as its functions are dependent on ma-

terial conditions. It is elsewhere implied that some functions of the soul may be not so dependent, and that these will be treated of by metaphysics (*Ib.* § 19). ἢ δὲ κεχωρισμένα δὲ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος.

Active and Eternal Reason, &c., which, so far as they go, are anticipations of his *Prima Philosophia*, or metaphysics. But these last-mentioned discussions are only partly anticipations, they are not complete or satisfactory in themselves, they are only fragmentary indications, and they stand to the entire metaphysical system which was afterwards to be expounded, as the forestalments of ethical doctrine in the *Rhetoric* stand to the completion of that doctrine in the *Ethics* themselves. But the difference is, that the metaphysical system of Aristotle was, so far as we know, never completed. And thus the result of an examination of the works of Aristotle as a whole, seems to be, that while he was engaged in finishing off, according to his views, the exposition of each separate science, he was constantly deferring the greatest and deepest questions of all for final exposition in a system of *Metaphysics*, which was to form the key-stone of the entire arch. But of this final exposition only a fragment has reached us; probably no more than this fragment was ever composed, and the appearance it presents is such as to suggest the belief that Aristotle while composing it, at the end of his life, was still only feeling his way to a theory of the relation borne by God to Nature, the Universe, and the Human Soul.

With Aristotle's faults or merits as a Physicist we are not, for the present purpose, much concerned, for they do not affect his ethical system either one way or the other. But it may be mentioned here, in passing, that Aristotle's Physical Philosophy has been made the subject both of the most extravagant eulogy, and also of extreme disparagement.¹⁴

¹⁴ See *Aristotle: a Chapter from the History of Science*, by G. H. Lewes (London, 1854), pp. 154, 155, where a specimen of these eulogies is given. Mr. Lewes himself furnishes

an example of the opposite extreme, making the case against Aristotle's failures in physical science far worse than needs be.

On the one hand he has been spoken of as if he had anticipated many of the discoveries of modern times; on the other hand he has apparently been blamed for not having done so. But it should surely have been remembered that 'Truth is the daughter of Time,' and that this is especially the case with regard to the Sciences of Observation, which creep on from one vantage point to another. Aristotle, then, ought not personally to be blamed for the erroneous views of Astronomy, or even of Physiology, which he puts forth. In these he only represents a particular point in the general history of Science, arrived at more than 2,000 years ago. He doubtless added considerably, by his industry in collecting and storing up facts, to the knowledge of Natural History and Physiology previously existing, and by his masterly mapping out of the whole field of science he opened the way to a distinct and lucid inquiry into all parts of nature. It was only owing to political causes—to the influence of the Stoical and Epicurean schools taking men's minds in a different direction, to the decline of the Greek nation, and to the inferiority of the Roman intellect—that his example was not more fruitfully followed. Aristotle has been accused of 'explaining Nature by means of the syllogism:'¹⁵ but no one could have made this accusation who had ever read his works. He has also been accused of 'preaching Induction, while neglecting to practise it;'¹⁶ but this is far more undoubtedly true of Lord Bacon himself, who, however, gets boundless glory for what he preached, and no blame for his mistakes and failures in such small scientific inquiries as he essayed to make. Another fallacy of this kind consists in supposing that the early philosophies of Greece¹⁷ were superior as explanations

¹⁵ Bacon, *Novum Organum*.

¹⁶ By Professor Tyndall, in his Opening Address to the Meeting of

the British Association at Belfast, August 1874.

¹⁷ Bacon, *Nov. Org.*

of Nature to the philosophy of Aristotle. The early systems were mere guesses based on some slight analogy of superficial facts. Thus, though they curiously anticipated by their conjectures some of the modern theories, yet they had no solidity or power of self-demonstration. They were a kind of 'false dawn' which appeared and faded away again. Thus the anticipation of the Nebular Theory by Anaximander, that of the Solar System by the Pythagoreans, that of the Atomic Theory by Democritus, and something like that of the theory of Natural Selection by Empedocles—were rejected by the general voice of Greece and by Aristotle. Aristotle's theories of an eternal universe, with the earth as its centre, and closed in by the periphery of the Heavens, were neither worse, nor better, than these. All Cosmologies in the fourth century B.C. were equally incapable of verification. Aristotle longed for Science, and strove after it; but the conditions of Science, as yet, did not exist. And yet, there are certain ultimate questions about the Universe in regard to which the thoughts of Aristotle have a value, even at the present day.

The most interesting notices of Aristotle's general views of Nature may be gathered from the second book of his *Physical Discourse*. He speaks of 'nature'¹⁸ as 'a principle of motion and rest implanted and essentially inherent in things, whether that motion be locomotion, increase, decay, or alteration.' 'It is absurd¹⁹ to try to prove the existence of nature; to do so would be to ignore the distinction between self-evident and not self-evident things.' 'Nature²⁰ may be said

¹⁸ *Nat. Ausc.* II. i. 2. 'ὡς οὐσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινος καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρῶτως καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

¹⁹ *Nat. Ausc.* II. i. 4. 'ὡς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι, γελοῖον' . . .

οὐ δυναμένου κρίνειν ἐστὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὸ γινώριμον.

²⁰ *Nat. Ausc.* II. i. 8. "Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἐκδοτὴ ὑποκειμένη ὅλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς,

in one way to be the simplest and most deep-lying substratum of matter in things possessing their own principle of motion and change; in another way it may be called the form and law of such things.' That is, nature is both matter or potentiality and form or actuality. It is also the transition from one to the other. 'Nature,'²¹ says Aristotle, 'spoken of as creation is the path to nature.' Again, 'Nature'²² is the end or final cause.' In relation to this system of causation, it remains to ask what place is to be assigned to chance or the fortuitous, to necessity and to reason? 'Some'²³ deny the existence of chance altogether, saying that there is a definite cause for all things.' 'Others,'²⁴ again, have gone so far as to assign the fortuitous as the cause of the existence of the heaven and the whole universe.' 'Others'²⁵ believe in the existence of chance, but say that it is something mysterious and supernatural, which baffles the human understanding.' With none of these opinions does Aristotle seem exactly to agree. He will not hear of attributing the existence of 'the heaven'²⁶ and the divinest things that meet our eyes 'to blind chance. Again, while allowing the existence of chance as an undefined or incalculable principle of causation, and awarding to it a certain sphere, namely, things contingent, he does not appear to have believed in anything supernatural attaching to it. He distinguishes 'the fortuitous' from 'chance,' considering 'chance' (or 'luck') to be only a species of the

ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἢ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος
τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

²¹ *Nat. Ausc.* II. i. 11. "Ἐτι δ' ἡ
φύσις ἢ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδὸς ἐστὶν
εἰς φύσιν.

²² *Nat. Ausc.* II. ii. 8. 'Ἡ δὲ φύσις
τέλος καὶ οὐ διῆκα.

²³ *Nat. Ausc.* II. iv. 2. "Ἐνιοὶ γὰρ
καὶ εἰ ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ ἀποροῦσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ
γίνεσθαι ἀπὸ τύχης φασίν, ἀλλὰ πάντων

εἶναι τι αἰτίον ὁρισμένον.

²⁴ *Nat. Ausc.* II. iv. 5. Εἰσι δέ τινες
οἱ καὶ τοῦρανοῦ τοῦδε καὶ τῶν κοσμικῶν
πάντων αἰτιῶνται τὸ αὐτόματον.

²⁵ *Nat. Ausc.* II. iv. 8. Εἰσι δέ τινες
οἷς δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰτία μὲν ἡ τύχη, ἔδηλος
δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ ὡς θεῖον τι οὐσα
καὶ δαιμονιώτερον.

²⁶ *Nat. Ausc.* II. iv. 6. Τὸν οὐρανὸν
καὶ τὰ θεϊότατα τῶν φανερῶν.

former, and restricted to the sphere of human actions.²⁷ As a proof of this he alleges that 'good fortune is held to be the same or nearly so with happiness; now happiness is a kind of action, i.e. doing well.' Where there is no action, there is no chance. Hence no inanimate object, nor beast, nor child, does anything by chance, because it has no choice; nor have these either good or bad fortune, except metaphorically, in the same sense that Protarchus said 'the stones of the altar were fortunate, because they were honoured.' The fortuitous and chance both are merely accidental, and not essential principles of causation; they therefore presuppose the essential, since the accidental is posterior to and dependent on the essential. Therefore²⁸ of whatever things chance may be the cause, it necessarily follows that nature and reason, which are essential causes, should be presupposed—that they should be in short the causes of the universe.

Has necessity, then, a conditional²⁹ or an absolute sway in relation to nature? To say that it had an absolute sway, would be equivalent to assigning as the cause of the existence of a wall that the heavy stones *must* be put at the bottom and the light stones and earth a-top. In reality, however, this necessity in regard to the wall is only a necessary³⁰ condition, not a cause, of the making of the wall. Given a certain end, and certain means to this are necessary; thus far and no

²⁷ *Nat. Ausc.* II. vi. 1. Διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἦτοι ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἢ εὐτυχίᾳ ἢ ἐγγύς, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρῶξις τις· εὐπραξία γάρ.

²⁸ *Nat. Ausc.* II. vi. 8. "Τοτερον ἔρα τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ νοῦ καὶ φύσεως· ὥστ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αἰτίον τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀνάγκη πρότερον νοῦν καὶ φύσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τοῦδε παντός.

²⁹ *Nat. Ausc.* II. ix. 1. Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πρότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἀπλῶς; Νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἀν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς.

³⁰ *Nat. Ausc.* II. ix. 2. Οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐχόντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ὡς ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἕνεκά του.

farther has necessity a sway in regard to nature. But the end is the real cause, the necessary means are a mere subordinate condition.

Lastly, What is the position of design or intelligence in relation to nature? Some reduce all nature to a mechanical principle; if they recognise any other principle at all (as Empedocles spoke of 'love and hatred,' and Anaxagoras of 'reason'), they just touch it and let it drop.³¹ They say it rains, not that the corn may grow, but from a mechanical necessity, because the vapours are cooled as they are drawn up, and being cooled are compelled to fall again, and by coincidence this gives growth to the corn.³² 'Why should it not also be by accident and coincidence, they ask, that in the teeth of animals, for instance, the front teeth grow sharp and suitable for cutting, while the hind teeth grow broad and suitable for grinding?' Hence their theory is, that whenever blind necessity did not hit by coincidence on results as perfect as if they had been designed, its products perished, while the lucky hits were preserved; and thus Empedocles says that whole races of monsters perished³³ before a perfect man was attained.

Aristotle says, 'It is impossible that this theory can be true;³⁴ our whole idea of chance and coincidence is something irregular, out of course of nature, while nature is the regular and the universal. If, then, the products of nature are either according to coincidence or design, it follows that they must be according to design. We see how a house is built; if that house were made by nature, it would be made in exactly the same way, i.e. with design, and according

³¹ *Nat. Ausc.* II. viii. 1. Καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ἑλλήν αἰτίαν εἴπωσιν, ὅσον ἀψάμε-
μοι χαίρειν εἴωσιν, ὁ μὲν τὴν φιλίαν καὶ
τὸ νεῖκος, ὁ δὲ τὸν νοῦν.

³² *Nat. Ausc.* II. viii. 2.

³³ *Nat. Ausc.* II. viii. 4. "Ὅσα δὲ
μὴ οὕτως, ἀπόλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, κα-
θάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ
ἀνδρόσπερα.

³⁴ *Nat. Ausc.* II. viii. 5-10.

to a regular plan. The same adaptation of means to ends we see in the procedure of the animals which makes some men doubt whether the spider, for instance, and the ant do not work by the light of reason or an analogous faculty. In plants, moreover, manifest traces of a fit and wisely planned organisation appear. The swallow makes its nest and the spider its web by nature, and yet with a design and end; and the roots of the plant grow downwards and not upwards, for the sake of providing it nourishment in the best way. It is plain, then, that end and design is a cause of natural things. And if nature be figured both as matter and as end, we may surely regard the matter as a mere means to an end, and the end itself as really and essentially the cause. The failures of nature, the abortions and monsters which Empedocles spoke of as if they were the normal products of nature, are in reality its mere exceptions. They are mistakes and errors, exactly analogous to the failures in art. It is absurd to doubt the existence of design because we cannot see deliberation actually taking place. Art does not deliberate. If the art of ship-building were inherent in the wood, ship-building would be a work of nature. Perhaps the best conception we can have of nature is, if we think of a person acting as his own doctor and curing himself.²⁵

On these views of Aristotle's several observations at once suggest themselves. They contain a recognition quite as strong as that in Paley's *Natural Theology* of the marks of design in creation. But we see that it is possible to recognise these marks of design, and to be led by them to a different view from that of Paley; that Aristotle does not discover in them, as it were, the works of a watch, and proceed immediately to infer the existence of a watchmaker;

²⁵ *Nat. Ausc.* II. viii. 15. Μάλιστα δὲ ὁ λόγος ὅταν τις ἰατροῦν αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν· τοῖτον γὰρ ἔοικεν ἢ φύσει.

but rather that the products of nature appear to him according to the analogy of a watch that makes itself. If we ask, how is it that the watch makes itself? Aristotle would reply, that all things strive after the good; that on the idea of the good, as seen and desired, the whole heavens and all nature depend. Aristotle views the world with a kind of natural optimism. He says (*Eth.* i. ix. 5), 'All things in nature are constituted in the best possible way.' If we ask what is it that perceives the good—what gives to nature this eye of reason to perceive an idea and to strive after it?—on this head Aristotle is not explicit. He says there is something divine in nature. 'Even²⁶ in the lower creatures there is a natural good above their own level, which strives after the good proper for them.' We see the indistinctness of this phrase. He speaks of 'the natural good' striving after 'their proper good.' If it be said that Aristotle's theory is Pantheism, this would not be exactly true, for Aristotle does not identify God with nature, nor deprive Him of personality. But what the relation is of 'the divine' in nature to God, it must be confessed that Aristotle does not make clear. We only see that Aristotle, while tracing design, beauty, and harmony in the world, is not led to figure to himself God as the artist or architect of this fair order, but as standing in a different relation to it. If we ask, how can the beginning be accounted for, how did the watch begin to make itself? Aristotle would say, in looking back we do not find in the past merely the elements (*δύναμις*) of a watch, we find of necessity the idea and the actuality (*ἐνέργεια*) of the watch itself (see above, p. 239). A perfect watch must always precede the imperfect one. It is impossible to think

²⁶ *Εἰλ.* x. ii. 4. Ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρείττον ἢ καθ' αὐτὰ, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ αἰκίου ἀγα-

θοῦ. A similar doctrine is given in the Eudemian Book, vii. xiii. 6.

of nature as having had a beginning. 'The universe is eternal' (*Eth.* III. iii. 3). 'The parts³⁷ may be regarded as changeable, but the whole cannot change, it is increate and indestructible' (*De Cælo*, I. x. 10).

One of the most interesting points to notice in this part of the subject is the way in which Aristotle regards man in relation to nature as a whole. His view appears to be two-fold; on the one hand he regards man as a part of nature. He says,³⁸ 'You may call a man the product of a man, or of the sun.' He looks at the principle of human life as belonging to the whole chain of organised existence. Man has much in common with the animals and the plants. On the other hand, he looks at the human reason and will as a principle of causation, which is not part of nature, but distinct. 'Man,' he says, 'is the cause of his own actions.' Thus he classifies causation into 'nature, necessity, chance, and again reason and all that comes from man' (*Eth.* III. iii. 7). 'In art³⁹ and in action the efficient cause rests with the maker or doer, and not as in nature with the thing done.' Aristotle's Ethical theory depends on this principle, that the moral qualities are not by nature; i.e. self-caused, but produced in us in accordance with the law of our nature, by the exercise of will, by care, cultivation, and in short the use of the proper means. We have already observed (see above, p. 151) that one of the first steps of Grecian Ethics, as exhibited in the philosophy of Archelaus and Democritus, consisted in severing man and human society from the general framework of nature. This Aristotle follows out in his *Ethics*, and he seems so easily to content himself with the

³⁷ "ὅστ' εἰ τὸ δλον σῶμα συνεχές ἐν ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως ὁτὲ δ' ἐκείνως διατίθεται καὶ διακεκδμήται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ δλου σύστασις ἐστὶ κόσμος καὶ οὐρανός, οὐκ ἂν δὲ κόσμος γίγνοιτο καὶ φθείροιτο, ἀλλ' αἱ

διαθέσεις αὐτοῦ.

³⁸ *Nat. Aesc.* II. ii. 11. "Ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος.

³⁹ So Eudemus, *Éth.* vi. iv. 4.

practical assumption of freedom for man, as to give a narrow and unphilosophical appearance to part of his writing.

While, however, assuming freedom for human actions, Aristotle seems to do so, not so much from a sense of the deep importance of morality, but rather from an idea of the slightness of man and of his actions in comparison with nature, and what he would call the 'diviner parts' of the universe. There is a strange passage in his *Metaphysics* (XI. x. 2, 3), which is obscure indeed, but it seems to bear on the question. He says,⁴⁰ 'All things are in some sort ordered and harmonised together, fishes of the sea, birds of the air, and plants that grow, though not in an equal degree. It is not true to say that there is no relation between one thing and another; there is such a relation. All things are indeed arranged together towards one common centre; but as in a household the masters are by no means at liberty to do what they please, but most things, if not all, are appointed for them, while the slaves and the animals do but little towards the common weal, and mostly follow their own fancies. For so the nature of each of the different classes prompts them to act.' This curious metaphor seems to represent the universe as a household. The sun and stars and all the heaven are the gentlemen and ladies, whose higher aims and more important positions in life prevent any time being left to a merely arbitrary disposal; all is filled up with a round of the noblest duties and occupations. Other parts of the universe are like the inferior members of the family, the slaves and domestic animals, who for most part of the

⁴⁰ Πάντα δὲ συντέτακται πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτὰ· ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θατέρον μηθέν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τι. Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς

ἐλευθέροις ἡκιστα ἔξιστιν ὃ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὃ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἐκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἢ φύσις ἐστίν.

day can sleep in the sun, and pursue their own devices. Under this last category it seems almost as if man would be here ranked. Aristotle does not regard the unchanging and perpetual motion of the heavenly bodies as a bondage, but rather as a harmonised and blessed life. All that is arbitrary (*ὅπως ἔτυχε*) in the human will, Aristotle does not consider a privilege. And man (especially in regard of his actions, the object of *φρόνησις* and *πολιτικὴ*) he does not think the highest part of the universe; he thinks the sun and stars 'far more divine.' This opinion is no doubt connected with a philosophical feeling of the inferiority of the sphere of the contingent, in which action consists, and with which chance intermixes, to the sphere of the absolute and the eternal. In this feeling Plato shared, but in Plato's mind there was set against it, what Aristotle seems deficient in, a deep sense of the even eternal import of morality. To the heavenly bodies both Plato and Aristotle appear to have attributed consciousness, which explains in some degree the sayings of Aristotle. We see, however, that there was necessarily something peculiar, contrasted with our views, in the way Aristotle approached Ethics. He might, indeed, seem to coincide with the utterance of the Psalmist, 'What is man in comparison with the Heavens?' But with him the Heavens were not a mere physical creation; rather the eternal sphere of Reason, the abode of pure Intelligences, the source of all emanations of Reason and Intelligence throughout the world. Compared with this higher sphere individual man, with his practical and moral life, appeared insignificant; and yet the End-in-itself, even for the individual, Aristotle acknowledged to be worth an effort, while man in organised societies, in the city or the nation, he recognised as affording scope for the realisation of something more noble and divine

⁴¹ So Eudemus, *Εἰς* vi. vii. 4.

(*Eth.* i. ii. 8, ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ [i.e. τὸ τέλος], κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεϊότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν). But again, the individual man, according to Aristotle, shared in that Reason which is the divinest part of the Universe, and by development of this into philosophy he could become like to God (see *Eth.* x. vii. 8). Thus there were two human things about which Aristotle could be enthusiastic—the life of an ideally well-ordered State, and the moments of philosophical consciousness in the mind of an individual thinker.

We can never, perhaps, adequately comprehend Aristotle's philosophical conception of the Deity. The expression of his views that has come down to us seems so incomplete, and contains so much that is apparently contradictory, that we are in great danger of doing Aristotle injustice. Even had we a fuller and clearer expression, there might be yet something behind this remaining unexpressed, as an intuition in the mind of the philosopher. The first thing we may notice is Aristotle's idea of 'Theology' as a science. In classifying the speculative sciences, he says (*Metaphys.* x. vii. 7), 'Physics are concerned with things that have a principle of motion in themselves; mathematics speculate on permanent, but not transcendental and self-existent things; and there is another science separate from these two, which treats of that which is immutable and transcendental, if indeed there exists such a substance, as we shall endeavour to show that there does. This transcendental and permanent substance, if it exists at all, must surely be the sphere of the divine—it must be the first and highest principle. Hence it follows that there are three kinds of speculative science—physics, mathematics, and theology.' In the same strain he speaks in the succeeding book (*Metaphys.* xi. viii. 19), as if the popular polytheism of Greece were a mere perverted fragment of this deeper and truer 'Theology,' which

he conceives to have been, in all probability, perfected often before in the infinite lapse of time, and then again lost. He says,⁴² 'The tradition has come down from very ancient times, being left in a mythical garb to succeeding generations, that these (the heavens) are gods, and that the divine embraces the whole of nature. And round this idea other mythical statements have been agglomerated with a view to influencing the vulgar, and for political and moral expediency; as, for instance, they feign that these gods have human shape and are like certain of the animals; and other stories of the kind are added on. Now, if anyone will separate from all this the first point alone—namely, that they thought the first and deepest grounds of existence to be gods—he may consider it a divine utterance. In all probability, every art and science and philosophy has been over and over again discovered to the farthest extent possible, and then again lost, and one may conceive these opinions to have been preserved to us as a sort of fragment of those lost philosophies. We see, then, to some extent the relation of the popular belief to those ancient opinions.' Aristotle having thus penetrated to a conception, which he imagined to lie behind the external and unessential forms of the Grecian religion, that is, the conception of a deep and divine ground for all existence, proceeds now to develop it

⁴² Παραδίδεται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπалаίων ἐν μύθου σχήματι καταλειμμένα τοῖς ὑστερον ὅτι θεοὶ τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσήκται πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρήσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ ταύτοις ἑτερακόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Ὅν εἰ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸν λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοὺς φοντο τὰς πρώτας

οὐσίας εἶναι, θεῶν δὲ εἰρησθαὶ νομίσαιεν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος πολλὰς εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων ὡς λείψανα περισσεῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πάτριος δόξα καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσούτων ἡμῖν φανερά μόνον. Cf. *Pol.* II. viii. 21, and Plato, *Politicus*, 270, *Laws*, 677 A: Τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γιγνόμεναι κατακλισμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχὺ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος.

for himself, and in doing so, he lays down the following positions (*Metaphys.* xi. vi.-x.).

(1) It is necessary to conceive an eternal immutable existence, an actuality prior to all potentiality. According to this view, all notions of the world having sprung out of chaos must be abandoned. God is here represented as the eternal, unchangeable form of the whole, immaterial (*ἀνευ δυνάμεως*), and free from all relation to time.

(2) With this idea it is necessary to couple that of the source of motion, else we shall have merely a principle of immobility. We must therefore conceive of a ceaseless motion; this motion must be circular, no mere figure of philosophy,⁴³ but actually taking place. Thus the highest heaven with its revolutions must be looked on as eternal. In this we make a transition to the world of time and space. The succession of seasons and years flows everlastingly from the motion of the circumference of the heavens. It would seem as if we were thus attributing local and material conditions to the Deity himself, if we say that God moves the world by moving the circumference of the heaven. But here, again, Aristotle is saved from this conclusion by merging physical ideas into metaphysical. He says, 'The mover⁴⁴ of all things moves them without being moved, being an eternal substance and actuality, and he moves all things in the following way: the object of reason and of desire, though unmoved, is the cause of motion.'

(3) God has been thus represented as the cause of all things by being the object of contemplation and desire to nature and the world. In this doctrine, as before mentioned, there is something unexplained; for to attribute thought and rational desire, as well as the power of motion, to nature,

⁴³ Καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν | οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ' ἔργῳ δηλον. xi. vii. 1.
ἀπαυστον, αὕτη δ' ἡ κύκλῳ· καὶ τοῦτο | ⁴⁴ See above, p. 222, note.

seems really to place the Deity in nature as a thinking subject, as well as outside nature in the form of the object of thought and wish. Aristotle, however, does not explicitly do so; in relation to nature he seems to represent God only as an object, and he now passes on to depict God in relation to Himself as a subject, as a personal being, possessing in Himself conscious⁴⁵ happiness of the most exalted kind, such as we can frame but an indistinct notion of, by the analogy of our own highest and most blessed moods. This happiness is everlasting, and God 'has or rather is' continuous and eternal life and duration.⁴⁶

(4) Aristotle next reverts to the impersonal view of God, and asks whether these principles are one or manifold? Whether there be one highest heaven or more than one? He concludes that there can be one only, for multitude implies matter, and the highest idea or form of the world must be absolutely immaterial.⁴⁷

(5) But again, figuring to ourselves God as thought; on what does that thought think? Thought thinking upon nothing is a contradiction in terms; thought with an external object is determined by that object. But God as the supreme and best cannot be altered or determined by an external object. With God, object and subject are one; the thought of God is the thinking upon thought.⁴⁸

(6) Lastly, how is the supreme good of the world to be represented—whether as existing apart from the world, like the general of an army, or as inherent in the world, like the

⁴⁵ See above, p. 244, note.

⁴⁶ *Metaphys.* xi. vii. 9. Καὶ ζῶν δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζῶν, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὔτην ἐκείνου ζῶν ἀρίστη καὶ ἀίδιος· φανερὸν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶν ἀίδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζῶν καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ

ἀίδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ. τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

⁴⁷ *Metaphys.* xi. viii. 18. Τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὅλην τὸ πρῶτον· ἐντελέχεια γάρ.

⁴⁸ *Metaphys.* xi. ix. 4. Αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ ἕπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κρᾶτιστον· καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.

discipline of an army?⁴⁹ In other words, are we to hold that the Deity is immanent or transcendent? Aristotle gives no direct answer to this question; but seems to say that God must be conceived of both ways, just as the army implies both discipline and general, but it is the general who produces the discipline. In these speculations we see an attempt made by Aristotle to approach from various sides the metaphysical aspect of the existence of the Deity. All metaphysical views of God are entirely foreign to most minds. The profound difficulty of them may be appreciated, if we set before ourselves this question, for instance, If the Deity be immaterial, how can He act upon a material universe? Aristotle does not appear to make any endeavour to obtain a complete view, or to reconcile the contradictions between his different statements—between the impersonal view of God as the chief good and object of desire to the world, and the personal view of Him as a thinking subject. He acknowledges these two sides to the conception, ‘the discipline in the army’ and ‘the general ruling the army,’ but does not attempt to bring them together.

In the *Ethics* there are several popular and exoteric allusions to ‘the gods,’ as, for instance, that ‘It would be absurd to praise the gods’ (I. xii. 3); ‘The gods and one’s parents one cannot fully requite, one must honour them as much as possible’ (IX. ii. 8), &c. There are also some traces of Aristotle’s thoughts as a metaphysician; for instance, he speaks of ‘the good under the category substance’ being ‘God and reason’ (I. vi. 3). And he gives an elaborate argument (x. viii. 7) to demonstrate that speculative thought and the

⁴⁹ *Metaphys.* I. x. I. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον πεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στρα-

τευμα. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν.

exercise of the philosophic consciousness is the only human quality that can be attributed to the Deity. In this argument it is observable that he first begins by speaking of 'the gods,' saying, 'We conceive of the gods as especially blessed and happy. What actions can we attribute to them? whether those of justice? but it would be absurd to think of their buying and selling,' &c. He then argues that 'If life be assigned to them, and all action, and still more, all production, be taken away, what remains but speculation?' And he concludes, 'The life of God then, far exceeding in blessedness, can be nothing else than a life of contemplation.' Thus he reverts to a monotheistic form of speaking, though he says again afterwards, 'The gods have all their life happy, man's life is so, in as far as it has some resemblance to the divine consciousness of thought.' This passage then contains a sort of transition from exoteric to philosophical views. Aristotle attributes to 'the gods' that same mode of existence, which in his own metaphysical system he attributed to God, according to the deepest conception that he had formed of Him.⁵⁰ It is true, however, that in assigning speculative thought to the Deity, there is no mention made of the distinction which exists between the thought of the philosopher where object is distinct from subject, and the thought of God in which subject and object are one.

The passage to which we are referring in the *Ethics* contains not only a positive assertion with regard to the nature of God, but also a negative one. It asserts that all moral virtue is unworthy of being attributed to God. This, as we have before noticed (see above, p. 215), was a total departure

⁵⁰ The same point of view is maintained in the *Eudemian Book*, vii. xiv. 8. 'Hence God enjoys ever one and the same pleasure; that is, the deep

consciousness of immutability.' In the *Magna Moralia*, ii. xv. 3-5, there is a reaction against these speculations. See above, p. 37.

from the view of Plato. Still more opposed is this view of Aristotle to modern ideas. We are accustomed to feel that however great may be the metaphysical problems about the nature of God, the deepest conception of Him that we can attain to is a moral one.

There are yet two other passages in the *Ethics* where theological considerations are entertained. These are both connected with the question of a divine providence for and care of men. The first is where it is asked (*Eth.* i. ix. 1) whether happiness comes by divine allotment (*κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν*) or by human means. The second is where the philosopher is spoken of (x. viii. 13) as being most under the favour of God (*θεοφιλέστατος*). With regard to Aristotle's general views of the question of providence, it is often argued that he must have denied its existence, inasmuch as he attributes no objective thought to God. But Aristotle does not himself argue this way; when the question comes before him, he does not appeal to his own *a priori* principle, and pronounce contrary to the general belief—rather he declines to pronounce at all. In the former of the two passages mentioned, he says, 'One would suppose that if anything were the gift of God to men, happiness would be so, as it is the best of human things. But the question belongs to another science. Happiness, if not sent by God, but acquired by human means, seems at all events something divine and blessed.' The latter part of this argument partly seems to be a setting-aside of the question, partly to be a sort of reconciliation of the existence of a providence (*θεῖόν τι*) with the law of cause and effect. In the second passage Aristotle repeats from Plato the assertion that the philosopher is under the favour of heaven (*θεοφιλέστατος*). He says, 'If there is any care of human things by the gods, as there is thought to be (*ὥσπερ δοκεῖ*), we may conclude that they take pleasure

in the highest and best thing, reason, which is most akin to themselves, and do good to those who cherish and honour it.' In these words there may possibly be an esoteric sense, meaning that the philosopher in the exercise of his thought realises something divine. Aristotle may imply that the popular doctrine of providence admits a deeper explanation, but he by no means here or elsewhere denies it. Nor can we presume to tell what Aristotle would include in his conception of the subject-object thought of God. As we saw before, he is not explicit as to the relation of God to nature, neither is he as to the relation of God to man.

If we ask now, What were Aristotle's opinions as to the nature of the human soul, so far as we can gather them? we find that (advancing, as he shows us, upon the more or less indistinct views of his predecessors) he conceives of the *ψυχή* as a vital principle manifesting itself⁵¹ in an ascending scale through vegetable, animal, and human life. To this scale of life Aristotle appeals in the *Ethics* (I. vii. 10-12). He there argues that man must have some proper function. 'This cannot be mere life in its lowest form, i.e. vegetable; nor again merely sensational, i.e. animal life; there remains therefore the moral and rational life.' From this point of view man is regarded as part of the chain of nature. Aristotle doubts, but on the whole concludes, that the *ψυχή* is the proper subject of physical science.⁵² This he justifies by the fact⁵³ that the psychical phenomena, anger, desire, and the like, are inseparable from the body, and from material conditions. Reason itself, if dependent on conceptions derived from the sense (*μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας*), will fall under

⁵¹ *De Animā* II. iv. 2.

⁵² *De Animā*, I. i. 18.

⁵³ *De Animā*, I. i. 11. φαίνεται
δὲ τῶν πλείστων οὐδὲν ἄνευ σώματος

πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὑργίζεσθαι,
θαῤῥεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅπως αἰσθάνεσθαι.
Cf. I. i. 15. τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἐνυλοὶ εἰσιν

the same head. Following out this direction of thought, Aristotle defines the *ψυχή* to be 'The simplest actuality of a physical body, which potentially possesses life, that is, of an organic body.' Of the meaning of the word *ἐντελέχεια*, used here, we have spoken above (see p. 235); the whole of this definition we see accords with Aristotle's physical philosophy in general, which conceived great and beautiful results coming out of physical conditions, not by any mechanical system of causation, rather that these ends necessitated the means; the whole was prior to and necessitated the parts. The *ψυχή*, says Aristotle, is to the body as form to matter,⁵⁵ as the impression to the wax, as sight to the eye. It is the essential idea of the body (*τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιοῦτὶ σώματι*). It is as the master⁵⁶ to the slave, as the artist to the instrument. It is the efficient, the final, and the formal cause of the body. It is impossible to treat of the *ψυχή* without taking account of the body; 'as to the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls, they might as well speak of the carpenter's art clothing itself in flutes. For a soul⁵⁷ can no more clothe itself in a foreign body, than an art can employ the instruments of some foreign art.' While maintaining this close connection between the *ψυχή* and the body, as between end and means, Aristotle was kept aloof by the whole tenor of his philosophy from anything like materialism. He sums up this part of his reasonings in the following words: 'That the *ψυχή*, therefore, is inseparable from the body is clear, or at all events some of its parts, if it be divisible. Nothing,⁵⁸ however, hinders that some of its

⁵⁵ *De Animā*, II. i. 6. Διὸ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζῆν ἐχοντος. Τοιοῦτο δέ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν.

⁵⁶ *De Animā*, II. i. 7.

⁵⁸ *Eth.* VIII. xi. 6.

⁵⁷ *De Animā*, I. iii. 26. Παραπλήσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὅσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργανοῖς, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι.

⁵⁸ *De Animā*, II. i. 12. Οὐ μὲν ἄλλ'

parts may be separable from the body, as not being actualities of the body at all. Moreover, it is not certain whether the *ψυχή* be not the actuality of the body in the same way that the sailor is of the boat.'

Here, then, is the point at which the interest in Aristotle's conception of the *ψυχή* begins for us. As long as the soul is described as bearing the relation to the body of sight to the eye, of a flower to the seed, of the impression to the wax, we may be content to consider this a piece of ancient physical philosophy. Our interest is different when the soul is said to be related to the body 'as a sailor to his boat.' But here is the point also where Aristotle becomes less explicit. Having once mooted this comparison, he does not follow it up. The only further intimations of his opinion that he affords us are to be found in the places where he speaks of 'those parts of the *ψυχή* which are not actualities of the body at all.' A striking notice on this subject is to be found in his treatise *De Generatione Animalium*⁵⁹ (II. iii. 10), where he argues that 'The reason alone enters in from without, and is alone divine; for the realisation of the bodily conditions contributes nothing to the realisation of its existence.' We have had before a contradictory point of view to this, in the saying that 'Reason may be looked on as dependent on conceptions derived from the senses,' which is also elsewhere repeated. But this contradiction is reconciled in Aristotle's account of the two modes of reason, the receptive or passive (*νοῦς παθητικός*), and the creative or active (*νοῦς ποιητικός*). 'These two modes,' he says, 'it is necessary should be opposed to each other, as matter is opposed everywhere to form, and to all

ἐνὶ γὰρ οὐθὲν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθεὶς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελέχειας. "Ἐτι δὲ ἔδηλον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου.

⁵⁹ Λέγεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θάρσεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια.

that gives the form. The receptive reason,⁶⁰ which is as matter, becomes all things by receiving their forms. The creative reason gives existence to all things, as light calls colour into being. The creative reason transcends the body, being capable of separation from it, and from all things; it is an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with matter, or affected by it; prior and subsequent to the individual mind. The receptive reason is necessary to individual thought, but it is perishable, and on the other hand the higher and immortal reason carries no memory with it, because it is unimpressible (*οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές*).

In the *Ethics* this distinction between the Active and the Passive Reason is not entertained. The reason is there spoken of in its entirety, as containing in itself the synthesis of the two opposite modes. It is spoken of as constituting in the deepest sense the personality of the individual.⁶¹ On the other hand, it is spoken of as something divine, and akin to the nature of God.⁶² The evocation of this into consciousness constitutes what Aristotle calls 'the divine' in happiness; it gives us, according to him, a momentary glimpse of the ever-blessed life of God.

But the above-quoted passage from the third book of the *Treatise On the Soul* has made more sensation in the world than all the rest of the writings of Aristotle put together. After slumbering quietly, as much as if buried in the cellar at Scepasis, this sentence was brought out into

⁶⁰ *De An.* III. v. 2. Καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῇ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῇ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξισ τις, ὅλον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. Καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμνηστὴς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνεργείᾳ.—Ἡ κατὰ δόξαν (ἐπιστήμη) χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῇ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐ

χρόνῳ· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. Χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ἑπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίον· οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐδὲν νοεῖ.

⁶¹ *Εἰλ.* IX. iv. 4, x. vii. 9.

⁶² *Εἰλ.* x. viii. 13.

prominence by Alexander of Aphrodisias, at the end of the second century A.D., and gave rise to innumerable controversies, which lasted not only during the final centuries of Greek philosophy, but also all through the Middle Ages. Averroes and his followers in the Arabian school made it the basis of a doctrine of *Monopsychism*, to the effect that the Active Reason is one, undivided, substance: that it is one and the same in Socrates, Plato, and all other individuals; whence it follows that individuality consists only in bodily sensations, which are perishable, so that nothing which is individual can be immortal, and nothing which is immortal can be individual. These doctrines spread from the Arabs to the Jews of Spain, and from them to the Christian schools, and Averroism became a leaven in the Scholastic philosophies, causing, as might be expected, the most virulent strife between the opponents and supporters of the theory of Monopsychism.⁶³ This all arose from a pushing out an isolated sentence of Aristotle's to its extreme logical consequences.

The same text has of late again been made to furnish hard and dogmatic conclusions, coinciding almost verbally with those of Averroes. Grote, in his *Aristotle* (vol. ii. p. 233), says, 'The theorising Noûs, as it exists in Socrates, Plato, Demokrites, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, Xenokrates, &c., is individualised in each, and individualised differently in each. It represents the result of the *Intellectus Agens* or Formal Noûs, universal and permanent, upon the *Intellectus Patiens* or noëtic receptivity peculiar to each individual; the co-operation of the two is indispensable to sustain the theorising intellect of any individual man. But

⁶³ See M. Renan's *Averroes et l'Averroïsme* (Paris, 1852), in which the history of this episode in theo-

logical philosophy is most interestingly traced.

the *Intellectus Putiens*, or *Receptivus*, perishes along with the individual. Accordingly the intellectual life of Socrates cannot be continued farther. It cannot be prolonged after his sensitive and nutritive life has ceased; the noëtic function, as it exists in him, is subject to the same limits of duration as the other functions of the soul. The intellectual man is no more immortal than the sensient man,' &c.

These conclusions, however, have been drawn *for* Aristotle and never *by* him. In the passage now referred to, the words *οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές* were probably only meant as an argument, in passing, against Plato's doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*. This doctrine, says Aristotle, cannot be true, because the Active Reason which existed elsewhere before our birth, receives no impressions, therefore we cannot be said to recollect things seen by the Reason in its antenatal state. Logically, of course, this argument may be carried farther, and it may be said that, according to Aristotle, the Reason in surviving death will carry no recollections, i.e. no individuality with it.

Only Aristotle himself does not say so. When at the beginning of the treatise *On the Soul* he says 'All Nature yearns after immortality, but, being unable to attain this in the individual, she attains it in the species'⁶⁴ he is writing, as a physiologist, of the whole animated kingdom of nature. The question of what we mean by the immortality of the soul, was one for metaphysics, or as he called it 'theology.' And such questions he was always putting off. Therefore we are left in doubt as to his views, or as to whether he had decided views. And people are accordingly at liberty to

⁶⁴ *De An.* II. IV. Ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μὴδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταῦτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν,

ἢ δύναται μετέχειν ἑκάστου κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ — καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτό, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἔν, εἰδεί δ' ἔν.

believe a good deal as they may wish on the subject. Spengel thinks that too much stress should not be laid on the 'brief and obscure' intimations regarding the *διανοητικὴ ψυχὴ* which occur in a treatise on *ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τῶν ζῴων* and he approves of the saying of an unknown ancient (*Anonym. de vitâ Pythag.* p. 112), 'Plato and Aristotle equally declare the soul to be immortal, however much some, who do not fathom the mind of Aristotle, think that he pronounces it to be mortal.'⁶⁵ This, however, is going farther than any data warrant us in following. Torstrik, in his critical edition of the *De Animâ*,⁶⁶ thinks that he discerns a Platonising spirit in the editors or copyists of the treatise, and that this has caused the introduction of a spurious negative in the passage above quoted (see page 298, note), *ἀλλ' τοῦχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ, ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ*. Such a spirit seems to show itself in the dictum cited by Spengel. Taking Aristotle as we find him, he 'pronounces' nothing as to the immortality of the soul. In his lost dialogue entitled *Eudemus*, said to have been written when he was about 30 years of age, he appears to have discoursed on the subject.⁶⁷ Eudemus of Cyprus, an early friend of Aristotle (and not to be confounded with his scholar and posthumous editor, Eudemus of Rhodes), being sick at Pheræ, received in a vision three prophecies, (1) that he should recover, (2) that Alexander the tyrant of Pheræ would shortly die, (3) that in five years he would be restored to his home. The first two prophecies having been at once fulfilled, Eudemus and his friends looked out for some chance which should restore him to Cyprus, whence he had been exiled; but at the end of the appointed five years he fell in

⁶⁵ "Οτι Πλάτων, φησί, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀθάνατον ὁμοίως λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν, κἄν τινες εἰς τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους νοῦν οὐκ ἐμβαθύνοντες θνητὴν νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν λέγειν.

⁶⁶ *Ar. De An.* recensuit A. Torstrik (Berlin, 1862), p. 185.

⁶⁷ See Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1863), pp. 21, 143.

battle, and thus in another sense was 'restored to his home.' This story was made the subject of the dialogue in question, of which the fragments seem to show that it argued the independence of the doctrine of immortality from Plato's theory of Ideas. From so early a production, if indeed we could be certain of its genuineness, we can conclude nothing, except that when it was written Aristotle could not have 'pronounced the soul to be mortal.' When we turn to the *Ethics* we find him unwilling (I. xi. 1) even to affirm that the dead cannot be affected and made more or less happy by the fortunes of their descendants and friends upon earth, because 'this would seem a heartless doctrine and opposed to general belief' (*λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον*). Aristotle thus shows great tenderness in dealing, or affecting to deal, with an important question. But in the end, having allowed, as a concession to popular feeling, that the dead may be affected by the fortunes of the living, he argues that this effect on them must be almost unappreciable, and he reminds us, in conclusion, of the extreme doubtfulness⁶⁶ as to whether the dead do share at all in the interests of the world. In this discussion one phrase occurs in which the real feeling of Aristotle, for the moment at least, seems to be let out. He asks (*Eth.* I. x. 2), 'Can Solon have meant that a man is happy when he has died?' and replies, 'This would be an absurdity, especially since we consider happiness to be an *ἐνέργεια*.' However we translate *ἐνέργεια*, whether as the exercise of the powers, the consciousness of life, or however else (see Essay IV.), it is clear that we have here a brief indication that death destroys those potentialities that result in happiness. It would seem then that the only immortality which is left possible by this belief is a Buddhist nirvâna.

⁶⁶ *Eth.* I. xi. 4. See notes on this passage.

Aristotle, however, in his *Ethics* was not entering on such a question. It may be that, like many other men who have lived and died, he did not see his way to a clear opinion on the subject. He did not, like Plato, base a belief upon grounds of faith. Nothing that he says about man's moral nature seems to have any connection with the idea of a future life. His doctrine of the End-in-itself seems indeed rather to supersede such an idea; it does not contradict it, but rather absorbs all consideration of time and space, of present and future, in itself, as being the absolutely sufficient for men's thoughts.

ESSAY VI.

The Ancient Stoics.

DOWN to the time of Aristotle, Greek philosophy may be said to have lived apart. It contained within itself a gradual progress and culmination of thought, but the great philosophers who were the authors of this progress moved on a level far above the ordinary modes of comprehension. After the death of Aristotle a new spectacle is presented—philosophy no longer an exclusive and esoteric property of the schools, but spreading its results over the world.

The immediate cause which brought about this change—which turned philosophy into a universal leaven, leavening, under one form or another, the thoughts of all cultivated men—must be sought for in the changed position of Ethics in relation to the other parts of philosophy. In spite of the exclusive attention of Socrates to ethical investigations, in spite of the exclusive effort of the Cynics and Cyrenaics to promulgate respectively a conception of practical life for the individual, in spite of the moral earnestness of Plato and the brilliant contributions to anthropology, in the way of accumulation, analysis, and classification of data, made by Aristotle—Ethics had hitherto continued to occupy a really subordinate position in the mind of Greece. With Socrates the paramount interest had been the attainment of universal

conceptions; with him Ethics were rather the field for scientific experiments in method, than an ultimate end to which all else was to be subordinated. The one-sided Socraticists' had been regarded as merely exceptional and paradoxical non-conformists to the ordinary mode of life. In the mind of Plato Ethics blended themselves with aspirations after a perfectly ordered State, and to him 'the contemplation of all time and all existence' under the light of idealism was as dear as was the education of the individual soul. Aristotle, in the process of reconstructing all the departments of thought and knowledge, took Ethics, so to speak, in his stride. He allotted to man, as a practical being, an important position in the scale of the universe, but still he said that the good attainable in a life of moral virtue was 'secondary' to that attainable in a life of philosophy (*Eth.* x. viii. 1); that 'the end-in-itself' for a State was more beautiful and divine than that for an individual (i. ii. 8); and (as Eudemus expressed it, *Eth.* vi. vii. 4), that 'there are in the universe many things diviner than man.' Such sayings imply that Ethics are inferior in practical interest to Politics, and in intellectual interest to the speculative branches of philosophy. But after Aristotle, the order which he had given to the hierarchy of the sciences became subverted. All considerations of the State now dropped out of sight, as of a subject no longer capable of being entertained; Ethics came to the fore-front, as if the practical interests of the individual were of paramount and absorbing importance; and all other departments of inquiry, whether logical, metaphysical, or physical, were cultivated only as subsidiary to the one great object of obtaining a theory for the regulation of individual life.

These features were equally characteristic of the two great post-Aristotelian schools, the Stoic and the Epicurean.

To account for them it does not seem quite sufficient to refer, with Zeller,¹ to the political condition of Greece. The loss of independence in the Greek States might reasonably account for the abandonment of Politics as a science; but the times do not seem to have been dangerous and oppressive, such as would force the mind by fears and interruptions away from philosophical inquiry. Political freedom does not appear to be an absolute necessity for freedom of speculation, for in Germany the greatest achievements in philosophy were made at a time when the liberties of the people were most scanty. And in Athens during the third century B.C., there was a vast amount of active philosophising on almost all the great subjects, though these now received a peculiar turn in their mode of treatment. And Plutarch² speaks of the early Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, as living at Athens 'as though they had eaten of the lotus, spell-bound on a foreign soil, enamoured of leisure, and spending their long lives in books, and walks, and discourses.' Athens was still a genial home for philosophy 'native To famous wits, or hospitable, in her sweet recess.' And other causes, besides political circumstances, must be sought for the peculiar character of the philosophical schools that now arose within her walls. That they exhibited a decline in force of thought, is indubitable: but in this world it appears as if a succession of great geniuses can never be long maintained. In Germany the great idealistic systems of philosophy were succeeded by a strong reaction in the direction of materialism. And in Greece the same phenomenon presented itself after the death of Aristotle. Zeno and Epicurus displayed an equal aversion to that idealism which characterises the

¹ *The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, translated from the German of Dr. E. Zeller, by O. J. Reichel, &c.

(London, 1870), p. 16 sq.

² *De Repugnantibus Stoicis*, c. 2.

thought of Aristotle no less than Plato; each denied the existence of anything immaterial; and each reverted to the physical system of a pre-Socratic philosopher as a more reasonable explanation of the world than that which Plato or Aristotle had given. Zeno thus espoused the physics of Heraclitus, and Epicurus those of Democritus. Besides this reaction towards pre-Socratic materialism, there was another reaction in which both these philosophers shared, namely, towards the pre-Aristotelian individualism of the Cynics and Cyrenaics. The character of the times certainly favoured the rehabilitation and development of this principle; the scope for public life and action was gone, and thus individuality supplanted the idea of citizenship. To find out the way of happiness for the individual soul, became now, not one problem among many, but the one great problem for philosophy, to which all others were to be secondary and subordinate. Thus a new era of thought commenced with Zeno and Epicurus, in which Ethics was elevated to the first place and became the architectonic science. And the causes for this, so far as we have reviewed them, were common to both Zeno and Epicurus, consisting in a decline of personal ability and philosophic power, in an inability to keep up to the level of the speculative and idealistic systems, and also in the circumstances of the times, which encouraged a monkish exclusiveness of attention to the subjective and practical well-being of the individual soul.

But there was another special cause which contributed greatly to give its peculiar character to the Stoical school, and which is the source of much of the interest that attaches to the history of that school. In a former edition of this Essay it was suggested that the striking features and attitude exhibited by the Stoical doctrine were attributable to the Race from which its founders sprang. This idea has

subsequently been accepted and worked out,³ and may be now considered to have been established. If we cast our eyes on a list of the early Stoics and their native places, we cannot avoid noticing how universally the leaders of this school came from the East to Athens, how many of them came from Semitic towns or colonies. Zeno was from Citium, a Phœnician colony in Cyprus, and himself belonged to the Semitic race, as is testified by the *sobriquet* of 'the Phœnician' ⁴ commonly applied to him. Of his disciples, Persæus came also from Citium; Herillus was from Carthage; Athenodorus from Tarsus; Cleanthes from Assus in the Troad. The chief disciples of Cleanthes were Sphærus of the Bosphorus, and Chrysippus from Soli in Cilicia. Chrysippus was succeeded by Zeno of Sidon, and Diogenes of Babylon; the latter taught Antipater of Tarsus, who taught Panætius of Rhodes, who taught Posidonius of Apamea in Syria. There was another Athenodorus, from Cana in Cilicia; and the early Stoic Archedemus is mentioned by Cicero as belonging to Tarsus. The names of Nestor, Athenodorus, Cordylion, and Heraclides, may be added to the list of Stoical teachers furnished by Tarsus. Seleucia sent forth Diogenes; Epiphania Euphrates; Scythopolis Basilides; Ascalon Antibiis; Tyre Antipater; Sidon Boëthus; Ptolemais Diogenes. We see then what an Oriental aspect this catalogue presents. Not a single Stoic of note was a native of Greece proper. From Tyre and Sidon, and Ptolemais and Ascalon and Apamea, from Babylon and Carthage, the future 'doctors

³ See especially the interesting 'Dissertation' on 'St. Paul and Seneca' given by the Rev. Canon Lightfoot, D.D., &c., now Lord Bishop of Durham, in his edition of the *Epistle to the Philippians* (1st ed. London, 1868), pp. 268-326.

⁴ Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 114, Ζήνωνα τὸν Φοίνικα, vii. 3, where Crates says to him, τί Φεύγεις, ὦ Φοινικίδιον; § 25. Φοινικικῶς, § 30. εἰ δὲ πάλιν Φοίνισσα τίς ὁ Φόβος; § 7. ἀνταποκρίντο δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἐν Σιδῶνι Κιττιεῖς.

of the Stoic fur' come flocking to Athens ('in Ilisum defluxit Orontes'). No country more Greek than Rhodes or Phrygia, is the home of any. On the whole, Cilicia and the Semitic colony in Cyprus are the chief head-quarters whence the leaders of this sect were derived.

These facts give us an insight into the fundamental and essential character of Stoicism. Its essence consists in the introduction of the Semitic temperament and a Semitic spirit into Greek philosophy.

The meeting of Eastern and Western ideas had been prepared by the conquests of Alexander, and the production of Stoicism was one of its first fruits. We moderns have all been imbued with the Semitic spirit in its highest manifestations by the pages of Holy Writ. Other manifestations of that spirit, as for instance the Mahomedan religion, exhibit it as an intense, but narrow, earnestness, averse on the whole to science and art, but tending to enthusiasm and even fanaticism for abstract ideas of religion or morality. The Semitic spirit found a new and favourable field for its development in Athens at the close of the fourth century B.C. If philosophy in general was then tending from other causes to the exaltation of Ethics over Metaphysics, this tendency just suited the Semitic moral earnestness. Ethics were taken up by the Phœnician Zeno, and came out from his hands with a new aspect. A phase of thought now appears for the first time on Hellenic soil, in which the moral consciousness of the individual—the moral *ego*—is made the centre and starting-point. Such a point of view, with various concomitant ideas, such as duty and responsibility, and self-examination, and the sense of shortcoming, and moral self-cultivation, is familiar to us in the Psalms of David and afterwards in the writings of St. Paul, but it was not to be found in the conversations of Socrates, nor in the

dialogues of Plato, nor in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. It was alien indeed from the childlike and unconscious spirit of the Hellenic mind, with its tendency to objective thought and the enjoyment of nature. Our own views in modern times have been so much tinged with Hebraism, that the highest degree of moral consciousness seems only natural to us, and thus Stoicism, which introduced this state of feeling to the ancient Hellenic world, may be said to have formed a transition step between Greek philosophy and the modern ethical point of view. So it is that in many modern books of morals, and even in many practical sermons, we come upon much that has a close affinity with the modes of thinking of the ancient Stoics, while with the modes of thinking of Plato and Aristotle such productions have rarely any affinity at all. And this is the secret of the interest that Stoicism has for modern times.

Epicurus, the son of Athenian parents, handled the problem of his epoch—that of the well-being of the individual soul—in a sense widely different from that of Zeno. Much as the two schools, Stoicism and Epicurism, had originally in common, they each followed out their fundamental tendencies so as to diverge ultimately into the strongest contrast and to stand in the sharpest antithesis to each other. If we ask on what does this antithesis rest? we shall find that it rests on the twofold essence of man, as a thinking and as a feeling subject; as consisting, on the one hand, of spirit, or free and self-determined thought; and, on the other hand, of nature, or an existence determined by physical laws expressing themselves in the sensuous feelings and desires. These two sides of man's being may often stand in opposition to each other; or again, they may be harmonised so as to give either the one side or the other the precedence and authority. Either we may say 'a thing is good because it

is pleasant,' and thus refer the decision to the natural feelings; or we may say 'it is pleasant because it is good,' and thus refer the decision to the inner spirit or reason. How far these two sentences actually express the leading principles of the Stoic and the Epicurean schools, we may best see by considering the ideal of man which they each proposed to themselves. The Epicurean ideal was a being moving harmoniously according to natural impulses; one, in short, in whom the spirit and thought should rather form a part of the natural life than prominently control it. The Stoic ideal, on the contrary, was a being in whom the natural impulses and desires should be absolutely subjected to the laws of abstract thought. Epicurism is essentially Greek and essentially Pagan; the beautiful and genial Greek mythology is but a deification of the natural powers and impulses. Stoicism is a reaction against this; it consists in an inner life, in a drawing away from the body, and in disregarding as worthless and of no moment the 'law in the members.' Epicurism and Stoicism both received as an inheritance the results of Grecian speculation, but in both, the moral attitude was what was essential. Of both it has been truly said that they were less and more than philosophy. Less, because they were thoroughly unspeculative in their character, and indeed consisted in the popularising of speculation; more, because they were not mere systems of knowledge, but a principle for the whole of life. They soon lost their local and restricted character as schools; they assimilated to themselves more and more broadly human thought, and became 'the two great confessions of faith of the historical world.'⁵ Thus were these two ideas set against each other. Regarding, however, Stoicism, with its weak-

⁵ Braniss, *Uebersicht des Entwicklungsganges der Philosophie* (Breslau,

1842), p. 218, whence several points of this comparison are taken.

ness and its strength, as far the more interesting and important, as it is, of course, also far the higher tendency of the two, we shall henceforth, in tracing its history, only incidentally allude to the fortunes of its rival.⁶

In the history of Stoicism, the following parts of the subject seem naturally to stand apart from each other, and to demand in some sort a separate treatment: First, the period of the formation of the Stoical dogma in Athens, from Zeno to Chrysippus; second, the period of the promulgation of Stoicism and its introduction to the knowledge of other civilised nations; third, Stoicism in the Roman world, its different phases, and its influence on individual thought and on public manners and institutions. I. The first period of Stoicism takes us down to the year 207 B.C., which was the date of the death of Chrysippus. The chronology of the commencement of this period is difficult to fix. Zeno probably lived till after the year 260 B.C., and he may have been born rather before 340 B.C. It is uncertain whether he came to Athens in his twenty-second or his thirtieth year. On the whole, we may assume that he did not arrive there till after the death of Aristotle, which took place in the year 322 B.C. Chrysippus may possibly in early youth have heard some of the discourses of Zeno; but Cleanthes, who succeeded Zeno as leader of the Porch, was the true link between them. By these three the Stoical doctrine, properly so called, received its completion. Nothing was afterwards added to it, except

* Among the posthumous papers published in the Appendix to Grote's *Aristotle*, we find (pp. 434-443) a short and lucid account of 'Epikurus.' Grote's editors tell us that he aimed 'at setting in its true light a much-maligned system of thought.' The same generous spirit which made him the apologist of the Sophists induced him to become the vindicator

of Epicurus. But he does not exactly tell us whether he considers the system of Epicurus to be one that it would be desirable for the majority of men to follow. This paper and Grote's fragment on the Stoics are worth consulting; but all detail of accurate information in these schools must be sought in Zeller's account of them, referred to in note 1.

the eclectic amalgamation of other doctrines. These three personages come before us with great distinctness. The anecdotes that have been handed down about them, though perhaps in some cases mythical, are at all events highly symbolical, and give us a very definite conception of their separate characteristics. Zeno is described⁷ as a slight, withered little fellow, of a swarthy complexion, and with his neck on one side. The story goes, that in trading to Athens he was shipwrecked at the Piræus, and was thus 'cast on to the shores of philosophy.' Going up to the city, he sat down at the stall of a bookseller, where he read the second book of the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, and asked with enthusiasm 'where such men lived.' Crates, the Cynic, happened to be passing at the moment, and the bookseller cried, 'Follow him.' Zeno then studied under Crates, but held himself aloof from the extravagant unseemliness of Cynicism. He is also said to have studied under the Megarians, Stilpo, Cronus, and Philo, and under the Academicians, Xenocrates and Polemo. After twenty years, he opened his school in the Stoa Pœcile, the porch adorned with the frescoes of Polygnotus. Zeno appears to have impressed the Athenians with the highest admiration for his character. Their treatment of him was a contrast to their treatment of Socrates. It is perhaps an apocryphal tradition which relates that they deposited the keys of their citadel with him, as being the most trustworthy person; but it may be true that they decreed to him a golden crown, a brazen statue, and a public entombment. In extreme old age he committed suicide. Cleanthes, the disciple of Zeno, was perhaps the most zealous disciple that a philosopher ever had. He is said to have been originally a boxer, and to have come to Athens with four drachmas in his possession.

⁷ Diog. Laert. vii. i. 1.

By his strength, his endurance, and his laborious life, he acquired the name of 'the New Hercules.' 'Falling in with Zeno,'⁸ it is said, 'he took the philosophy most bravely.' He wrote notes of his master's lectures on potsherds and the bladebones of oxen, not being able to afford to purchase tablets. He was summoned before the Areopagus to give an account of his way of living, since his whole days were passed in philosophy, and he had no ostensible calling nor means of support. He proved to his judges that he drew water by night for a gardener, and ground the corn for a flour-dealer, and thus earned a maintenance. The story goes on that his judges, on hearing this account, voted him ten minæ, which the rigid Zeno forbade him to accept. There is something quaint about the whole personality of Cleanthes. He was nicknamed 'the Ass,' for his stubborn patience. He seems to have left the impression that it was this indomitable perseverance, rather than the superiority of his genius, that gave him precedence over other noteworthy disciples of Zeno. 'High thinking,' however, appears to have accompanied the 'plain living' of Cleanthes. His reflections on Destiny, and his *Hymn to Jupiter*, will best be treated of hereafter. When asked,⁹ 'What is the best way to be rich?' he answered, 'To be poor in desires.' No reproaches or ridicule ever ruffled the sweetness and dignity of his presence. His calm bearing, when satirized on the stage by the comic poet Sositheus, caused the spectators to applaud him and to hiss off Sositheus. The idea of death seems to have been long present to his mind. Being taunted with his old age, he said, 'Yes, I am willing to be gone, but when I see myself sound in every part, writing and reading, I am again tempted to linger.' The story of his death is characteristic. Having suffered from an

⁸ Diog. Laert. vii. v. 1.

⁹ Stobæus, *Florileg.* xciv. 31.

ulcer on the tongue, he was advised by his physician to abstain from eating for a while in order to facilitate the cure. Having fasted for two days he was completely cured, and his physician bade him return to his usual course of life, but he said that 'Since he had got so far on the road, it would be a pity not to finish the journey;' so continuing his abstinence, he died.

Hardly any personal details of the life of Chrysippus have come to us. On the other hand, we have more fragments of his actual writings than of those of all the early Stoics put together. In Chrysippus the man seems swallowed up in the writer and disputer. He is said¹⁰ to have been slight in person, so that his statue in the Cerameicus was totally eclipsed by a neighbouring equestrian figure, and from this circumstance Carneades nicknamed him Crypsippus. His literary activity was most unrivalled: he wrote above seven hundred and five works on different subjects. Epicurus alone, of the ancient philosophers, outstripped him in voluminousness of writing. He is said to have been keen and able on every sort of subject. He told Cleanthes that he 'only wanted the doctrines and he would soon find out the proofs.' This boast appears to betray a want of earnestness as to the truth, and somewhat too much of the spirit of a dialectician. In this respect Chrysippus must have differed widely from his two distinguished predecessors, with whom Stoicism was above all things a reality and a mode of life. However, there is no doubt that Chrysippus did great service to the Stoic school by embodying their doctrines and stating them in manifold different ways. Hence the saying, 'But for Chrysippus, the Porch would never have been.' He developed Stoicism on its negative and antagonistic side by

¹⁰ Diog. Laert. vii. vii. 4.

arguing with trenchant dialectic against Epicurus and the Academy. We shall see that he really mooted and boldly strove to reconcile some of the deepest and most difficult contradictions of human thought—difficulties which are ever present in modern metaphysics, but which had never truly occupied the ancients before the death of Aristotle. We know most about Chrysippus from Plutarch's book *On the Inconsistencies of the Stoics*. It consists really of the inconsistencies of Chrysippus, extracted from various parts of his voluminous writings. This interesting book gives the impression that Plutarch is unphilosophical, though we are not able to exonerate Chrysippus from inconsistency. Such rapid and extensive writing, such a warm spirit of advocacy, such an attempt to round off and complete a doctrine in spite of all difficulties, such a various controversialism, such an elevated theory, paradoxical even in the grandeur of its aims, combined, on the other hand, with an extremely practical point of view—could not fail to give rise to manifold inconsistencies. Chrysippus was inconsistent, just as Seneca afterwards was inconsistent, because it suited the genius of Stoicism to abandon the stern simplicity and unity of a scientific principle. Stoicism became learned, complex, and eclectic; embracing in its grasp a far greater variety of problems than the philosophy of Plato or Aristotle had done, it treated these more loosely, and often oscillated between mere empiricism and a more philosophical point of view.

Taking now the Stoical doctrine as it gradually formed itself during the entire course of the third century B.C., we may proceed to trace its essential features, though in the lack of direct writings¹¹ of the successive masters of the

¹¹ No fragment even, of any length, belonging to the early Stoics, has come down to us, except the hymn of

Cleanthes. Our main sources of information with regard to them are Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus,

school we must give up attempting to fix their several contributions, and their differences from each other. Early Stoicism consisted of two elements—the one might be called dynamical: it was the peculiar spirit, tendency, and mental attitude assumed; the other element was material, being an adaptation of the results of existing philosophy. The material side of Stoicism was comparatively unimportant. This it was, however, which caused Cicero ¹² to make the mistaken observation that Zeno was no real innovator, but only a reproducer of the Peripatetic doctrines. And indeed it is sufficiently striking at first sight of the Stoical compendia, that their ethic seems a patchwork of Peripatetic and Platonic formulæ; their logic, a development of the doctrine of the syllogism; and their physic, a blending of Heraclitus with Aristotle. Yet, in spite of all this, Zeno was no mere eclectic; all that was Peripatetic in his system was the outward, and not the inner and essential part. And in short, the vestiges of previous Greek philosophy existing in Stoical books may be said, *mutatis mutandis*, to bear the same relation to Stoicism as the vestiges of Jewish and of Alexandrian ideas existing in the New Testament bear to Christianity. What we have called the dynamical element of Stoicism constitutes its real essence. This it derived partly from the idiosyncrasy and perhaps the national characteristics of its founder, partly from the peculiarities of the Cynical school in which it was nurtured.

Zeno agreed with Crates, and Stoicism coincides with the Cynic view thus far, that it makes the starting-point of all thought to be the conception of a life. The setting of this

Diogenes Laertius, and Stobæus. We have the reflection of their doctrine in the writings of the Roman Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius; and numberless scattered allu-

sions to them in the later literature of antiquity may be easily combined into a complete and tolerably certain view.

¹² *De Fin.* iv. ii. 3, iv. xxvi. 72.

moral and practical conception above all speculative philosophy separates Zeno from the previous schools of Greece. We have now to ask, What is it that distinguishes him from Crates?—what is the essential difference between the Stoic and the Cynic creeds? This is generally stated as if the former were merely a softened edition of the latter. The Cynic said, 'There is nothing good but virtue; all else is absolutely indifferent.' The Stoic said, 'Yes, but among indifferent things some are preferable¹³ to others; health, though not an absolute good, is, on the whole, preferable to sickness; and this, though not an evil, is, on the whole, to be avoided.' Again, it is said that Cynicism is unseemly and brutal, and tramples upon society; Stoicism is more gentle, and outwardly conforms with the world. But this comparison does not go sufficiently deep, and does not explain the facts of the case, for the Stoics were often as paradoxical as the Cynics in denying that anything was a good besides virtue; and if they were outwardly less ferocious, we want to know what was the inward law of their doctrine that made them so. Perhaps we nearest touch the spring of indifference, by observing that Cynicism is essentially mere negation, mere protest against the external world; while Stoicism is essentially positive, essentially constructive, and tends in many ways to leaven the external world. Cynicism despised the sciences, disdained politics, exploded the social institutions, and ridiculed patriotism or the distinctions of country. Zeno, on the contrary, rearranged the sciences according to his views: he enjoined the wise to mix in affairs; and he conceived not a mere negation of patriotic prejudices, but

¹³ This was the famous Stoical distinction between things *προηγμένα* and *ἀνοπροηγμένα*; see Diog. Laert. VII. i. 61. It was a compromise

between the paradox that 'nothing is good but virtue,' and the practical facts of life. Stoicism is forced to be full of such compromises.

the positive idea of cosmopolitanism. Cynicism, therefore, is a withdrawal from the world into blank isolation, while Stoicism is the withdrawal into an inner life, which forms to its votaries an object of the highest enthusiasm. Hence the elation, often hyperbolic, which tinges the Stoical austerity; hence the attractiveness of the doctrine and its spread over the world. And connected, too, with the positive and constructive impulse of Stoicism, we may reckon its plastic character, its external eclecticism, and its tendency to be influenced and modified by the course of surrounding civilisation.

Lists have been preserved ¹⁴ for us by the ancients of the different formulæ in which the Stoical masters expressed the leading principle of life. They are all modifications of the same idea, that 'the end for man is to live according to nature.' Nature here means that which is universal—the entire course of the world, as opposed to individual and special ideas and impulses. Until we remember this interpretation, the Stoical formula appears surprising; for how could *they* enjoin life according to nature, whose whole endeavour was to be superior to nature—to overcome and subdue desire, sorrow, pain, the fear of death, and all that in another sense we are accustomed to call the natural instincts? If 'nature' were taken to mean the involuntary and immediate impulses, then the phrase 'follow nature' would express not the Stoical, but the Epicurean, principle. The Stoical 'nature' was the conception of an abstract and universal order, and was to be apprehended by the discursive Reason. This clear-sightedness and authority of the Reason is, of course, only slowly arrived at, and the Stoics explained their theory by saying that 'all our duties come from nature,

¹⁴ Stobæus, *Eccl.* ii. 134; Clemens Alexandrinus, *Strom.* ii.; Diog. Laert. vii i. 53.

and wisdom among the number. But as, when a man is introduced to anyone, he often thinks more of the person to whom he is introduced than of him who gave the introduction—so we need not wonder that, while it was the instinctive impulses of nature that led us to Wisdom, we hold Wisdom more dear than those impulses by which we arrived at her.¹⁵ In order to avoid seeming to approximate to the Epicureans, they denied that pleasure and pain are among the principles of nature. In short, starting from nature, the Stoics came round utterly to supplant Nature (in the usual sense), and to substitute in her room pure thought and abstract ideas.

The phrase 'follow nature,' to express the highest kind of life, has never yet established itself in language. 'One touch of nature makes the whole world kin'—that is, any perfectly simple and instinctive feeling, the very opposite of anything abstract or cultivated. Again, the 'natural man,' as opposed to the 'spiritual man,' denotes something utterly different from the Stoical idea of perfection. Thus, common parlance retains its own associations connected with the term nature, and rejects those of the Stoics. But it is interesting to observe that Bishop Butler has espoused their formula, and has argued that 'nature' does not mean single impulses or desires, but the idea of the constitution of the whole, reason and conscience as regulative principles being taken into consideration. Butler's object in maintaining this position was obviously one relative to his own times. As in appealing to a selfish age he thought it necessary to assert that virtue was not inconsistent with the truest self-love, so also he argued that virtue was not against nature, but in reality man's natural state. He here takes up, just like the Stoics, an

¹⁵ Cicero, *De Fin.* III. vii. 23.

abstract ideal of nature; for he makes the basis of his reasoning a proviso that the moral rules of conscience not only exist, but that they have authority—that is, that they control, as they *ought* to do, the rest of the human principles.

The commonest ideal of virtue according to nature is the picture of mankind in a state of innocence, whether the scene be laid in some far-off island, or remote in point of time, in the golden age of the world. To imagine a primitive and pastoral existence, in which every impulse is virtuous and every impulse is to be obeyed—this is an easy reaction from a vitiated and over-refined civilisation. Some have supposed that the Stoics made this ideal of uncorrupted nature part of their views; but in reality it would not suit the genius of Stoicism to do so. Though they railed at the actual state of the world, their remedy was placed rather in the power of the will, in the effort to progress, than in dreams of a bygone state of innocence. The only allusion which we can trace in their fragments to this conception is a saying of the later Stoic, Posidonius, that ‘in the golden age the government was in the hands of the philosophers.’¹⁶ The context, however, of this remark, makes it appear rather as a rhetorical praise of philosophy than as a serious piece of doctrine. Seneca, in one of whose epistles it is quoted, comments upon it in an interesting manner. After echoing for a while the strain of Virgil, and praising those times of innocence ‘before the reign of Jupiter,’ when men slept free and undisturbed under the canopy of heaven, he returns to the true Stoical point of view, and asserts that in those primitive times there was, in fact, no wisdom. If men did wise things, they did them unconsciously. They had not even virtue; neither justice, nor prudence, nor temperance, nor fortitude. It is

¹⁶ Seneca, *Ep.* xc.

a profound truth that Seneca perceives—namely, that the mind and the will evoked into consciousness and perfected even by suffering, are greater possessions than the blessings, if they were attainable, of a so-called golden age and state of nature.

The Stoical principle of 'life according to nature' would have been a blank formula, were it not for the further exposition of their doctrine which they have left us in their ideal of the Wise Man. This ideal exhibits not the pursuit of wisdom for its own sake—not the excellence of philosophy in and for itself, as Plato and Aristotle used to conceive it, but rather the results of wisdom in the will and character—results which Zeno summed up in the terms an 'even flow of life.'¹⁷ The notion that equanimity is the most essential characteristic of a philosopher is perhaps traceable to this conception of the Stoics; according to whom the Wise Man is infallible, impassive, and invulnerable.¹⁸ And while possessing this external immunity from harm, he is in himself full of divine inspirations—he is alone free, alone king and priest, alone capable of friendship or affection. These and other splendid and exclusive attributes did the Stoics attach to their imaginary sage, till Chrysippus, becoming conscious in one place¹⁹ of the paradoxical character of the picture, allows that he 'may seem, through the pre-eminent greatness and beauty of his descriptions, to be giving utterance to mere fictions, things transcending man and human nature.' At the Stoical paradox Horace laughed. Plutarch wrote a book (now lost, but of which the outlines remain) to prove that it surpassed the wildest imaginations of the poets. But in truth 'the curtain was the picture;' the paradox was an essential part of the doctrine. For of

¹⁷ *Ἐξομα τοῦ βίου*. Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 138.

¹⁸ Diog. *Lært.* vii. i. 64.

¹⁹ Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.* c. xv.

necessity these pictures of the inner life are paradoxical. They speak of a boundless freedom and elevation, with which the narrow limits of external reality come into harsh contrast. And in the vaunts of the Stoics we only see what is analogous to one side of Lord Bacon's famous 'character of a believing Christian, drawn out in paradoxes and seeming contradictions.' 'He is rich in poverty, and poor in the midst of riches; he believes himself to be a king, how mean soever he be; and how great soever he be, yet he thinks himself not too good to be servant to the poorest saint.'

Some of the qualities of the Stoic ideal seem inferior to the conception of goodness afterwards developed by the school. The Wise Man of Zeno was represented as stern and pitiless, and as never conceding pardon to any one. This forms a great contrast with the gentle and forgiving spirit of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Such harsher traits of the picture are Semitic in tone; they were afterwards discarded during subsequent transmutations of the Stoical principle. More inward meaning is there in the saying, paradoxical as it might appear, that nothing the Wise Man can do would be a crime. Cannibalism, and incest, and the most shocking things, are said to be indifferent to the sage. This, however, though stated so repulsively, can only have meant something resembling the principle that 'whatever is of faith is no sin.' One of the interests of the Stoical ideal consists in the parallel it affords at many points to different phases of religious feeling. Such for instance is the tendency, more or less vaguely connecting itself with the Stoic doctrine, to divide all the world into the good and the bad, or, as they expressed it, into the wise and the fools—an idea evidently belonging to the inner life, and hard to bring into conformity with external facts. Entirely in the same direction, the Stoics said that short of virtue—in other words,

short of the standard of perfection—all faults and vices were equal. Chrysippus, indeed, tried to soften down this assertion; but in its extreme form it only reminds us of certain sayings which have been heard in modern times, about the ‘worthlessness of morality.’ In the presence of a dazzling idea of spiritual perfection, the minor distinctions of right and wrong seem to lose their meaning.

The Stoics, after portraying their Wise Man, were free to confess that such a character did not exist, and indeed never had existed. With small logical consistency, but with much human truth, while they allowed their assertions about the worthlessness of all except absolute wisdom to remain, and always held up this unattained and unattainable ideal, they admitted another conception to stand, though unacknowledged, beside it—namely, the conception of ‘advance.’²⁰ Zeno and the rest, though they do not claim to be wise, yet claimed to be ‘advancing.’ This notion of conscious moral progress and self-discipline is too familiar now for us easily to believe that it was first introduced into Greece in the third century B.C. It may be said, indeed, to be contained implicitly in Aristotle’s theory of ‘habits;’ but it is in reality the expression of a new and totally different spirit. By this spirit we shall find the later Stoics deeply penetrated. It constituted perhaps the most purely ‘moral’ notion of antiquity, as implying the deepest associations which are attached to the word ‘moral.’

Another great idea, of which the introduction is generally attributed to the Stoics, is the idea of ‘duty;’ but on consideration, we shall perceive that this, entirely conformable as it was with their point of view, was not all at once enunciated by them, but was only gradually developed in or by

²⁰ προκοπή, προκόπτειν (Diog. Laert. vii. i. 54). In Latin, *profectus, proficere* (Seneca, *Ep.* 71).

means of their philosophy. There were two correlative terms introduced by the early Stoics, signifying the 'suitable'²¹ and the 'right.' The 'right' could only be said of actions having perfect moral worth. The 'suitable' included all that fitted in harmoniously with the course of life—everything that could on good grounds be recommended or defended. This term, 'the suitable,' seems to fall short of the moral significance of what we mean by duty; and yet it is remarkable that this term became translated into Latin as *officium*, and thus really stands to our word 'duty' in the position of lineal antecedent. So much casuistical discussion took place upon what was, or was not, 'suitable,' that a train of associations became attached to the word, associations which were inherited by the Romans. Thus the idea of duty grew up, more belonging, perhaps, to the Roman than to the Greek elements in the Stoical spirit, fostered by a national sternness and a love of law, and ultimately borrowing its modes of expression from the formulæ of Roman jurisprudence.²²

The most prominent conception in the Stoical system being the effort to attain a perfect life in conformity with universal laws, we may now ask what forms the background to this picture. Aristotle and Plato would certainly have conceived to themselves a limited state, essentially Greek in character, the institutions of which should furnish sufficiently favourable conditions for the life of the Wise Man. But in the third century B.C. these restricted notions had become

²¹ καθήκον and κατέρθημα, Stob. *Eccl.* ii. 158. Cicero's *De Officiis* is taken, with but little alteration and addition, from the work of Panætius, περὶ τῶν καθήκόντων. Cicero complains that Panætius gave no definition of his subject (*De Off.* i. ii. 7). Thus we see that the Greek Stoics had really no formula to express what we mean by

duty.

²² For instance, the word 'obligation' is a Latin law term. The word 'law' itself is employed with a moral meaning, and on consideration it will be found that our notions of duty ('what is owing') are intertwined inextricably with legal associations.

exploded. Zeno now imagined, what surpassed the *Republic* of Plato, a universal state, with one government and manner of life for all mankind. This admired polity,²³ which Plutarch calls 'a dream of philosophic statesmanship,' and which, he rhetorically says, was realised by Alexander the Great, owed, no doubt, its origin to the influence upon men's minds produced by the conquests of Alexander. This influence, partly depressing—in so far as it diminished the sense of freedom, and robbed men of their healthy, keen, and personal interest in politics—was also partly stimulating, since it unfolded a wider horizon, and the possibility of conceiving a universal state. Thus were the national and exclusive ideas of Greece, as afterwards of Rome, changed into cosmopolitanism. The first lesson of cosmopolitanism, that said, 'there is no difference between Greece and barbarians—the world is our city,' must have seemed a mighty revelation. To say this was quite natural to Stoicism, which drawing the mind away from surrounding objects, bids it soar into the abstract and the universal. By denying the reality and the interest of national politics, the moral importance of the individual was immensely enhanced. Ethics were freed from all connection with external institutions, and were joined in a new and close alliance to physics and theology.

The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics was a cosmopolitanism in the widest etymological sense, for they regarded not the inhabited earth alone, but the whole universe, as man's city. Undistracted by political ideas, they placed the individual in direct relation to the laws of the Cosmos. Hence Chrysippus said,²⁴ that 'no ethical subject could be rightly approached except from the preconsideration of entire nature and the ordering of the whole.' Hence his regular preamble to every

²³ Plutarch, *De Alexandri Magni*
fortunâ aut virtute, c. vi.

²⁴ *Ap.* Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoicis*,
c. ix.

discussion of good, evil, ends, justice, marriage, education, and the like, was some exordium about Fate or Providence. So close and absolute a dependence of the individual upon the Divine First Cause was asserted by the Stoics, that their theological system reminds us, to some extent, of modern Calvinism, or of the doctrines of Spinoza. Body, they said, is the only substance. Nothing incorporeal could act upon what is corporeal, or *vice versa*. The First Cause²⁵ of all is God, or Zeus—the universal reason, the world-spirit, which may also be represented as the primeval fire, just as the soul of man, which is an emanation from it, consists of a warm ether. God, by transformation of his own essence, makes the world. All things come forth from the bosom of God, and into it all things will again return, when by universal conflagration the world sinks into the divine fire, and God is again left alone. The universe is a living and rational whole; for how else could the human soul, which is but a part of that whole, be rational and conscious? If the Cosmos be compared to an individual man, then Providence is like the spirit of a man. Thus all things are very good, being ordered and preordained by the divine reason. This reason is also destiny, which is defined to be²⁶ ‘the law according to which what has been, has been; what is, is; and what shall be, shall be.’ The round world hangs balanced in an infinite vacuum. It is made up of four elements—fire and air, which are active powers; water and earth, which are passive materials. Within it are four classes of natural objects—inorganic substances, plants, animals, and rational beings. First and highest among rational beings are the sun and the stars and

²⁵ For the particulars of their physical and theological system, and the authorities which establish the various parts of the doctrine, see Zeller's

account.

²⁶ Plutarch, *De Placitis Philosophorum*, i. 28.

all the heavenly bodies, which, as Plato and Aristotle used to say, are conscious, reasonable, and blessed existences. These, indeed, are created gods, divine but not eternal. They will at last, like all things else, return into the unity of the primeval fire. Other gods, or rather other manifestations of the one divine principle, exist in the elements and the powers of nature, which, accordingly, are rightly worshipped by the people, and have received names expressive of their different attributes. Heroes, also, with divine qualities, are justly deified; and the Wise Man is divine, since he bears a god within himself. In this city of Zeus, where all is holy, and earth and sky are full of gods, the individual man is but a part of the whole—only one expression of the universal law.

Abstractedly, the theology of the Stoics appears as a materialistic pantheism; God is represented as a fire, and the world as a mode of God. But, practically, this aspect of the creed is softened by two feelings—by their strong sense, first, of the personality of God; and secondly, of the individuality of man. These feelings express themselves in the hymn of Cleanthes, the most devotional fragment²⁷ of Grecian antiquity. In this hymn, Zeus is addressed as highest of the gods, having many names, always omnipotent, leader of nature, and governing all things by law.

‘Thee,’ continues the poet, ‘it is lawful for all mortals to address. For we are thy offspring, and alone of living creatures possess a voice which is the image of reason. Therefore, I will for ever sing thee and celebrate thy power. All this universe rolling round the earth obeys thee, and follows willingly at thy command. Such a minister hast thou in thy invincible hands, the two-edged, flaming, vivid, thun-

²⁷ Preserved by Stobæus, *Ecl. Phys.* i. 30.

derbolt. O King, most high, nothing is done without thee either in heaven or on earth, or in the sea, except what the wicked do in their foolishness. Thou makest order out of disorder, and what is worthless becomes precious in thy sight; for thou hast fitted together good and evil into one, and hast established one law that exists for ever. But the wicked fly from thy law, unhappy ones, and though they desire to possess what is good, yet they see not, neither do they hear, the universal law of God. If they would follow it with understanding, they might have a good life. But they go astray, each after his own devices—some vainly striving after reputation, others turning aside after gain excessively, others after riotous living and wantonness. Nay, but, O Zeus, giver of all things, who dwellest in dark clouds, and rulest over the thunder, deliver men from their foolishness. Scatter it from their souls, and grant them to obtain wisdom, for by wisdom thou dost rightly govern all things; that being honoured we may repay thee with honour, singing thy works without ceasing, as is right for us to do. For there is no greater thing than this, either for mortal men or for the gods, to sing rightly the universal law.'

In this interesting fragment we see, above all, a belief in the unity of God. This, Plato and Aristotle had most certainly arrived at. Even in the popular ideas it probably lay behind all polytheistic forms, as being a truth necessary to the mind. But Monotheism here, as in the early Hebrew Scriptures, is co-existent with a mention of other gods besides the one highest God. These are represented as inferior to Zeus, and singing his praises. The human soul is here depicted as deriving all happiness from wisdom and a knowledge of God. The knowledge of God and a devotional regard to Him are mentioned as needs of the human soul,

though the knowledge spoken of appears partly under the aspect of an intuition into the universal and impersonal law. When Cleanthes speaks of 'repaying God with honour,' we see a strong assertion of the worth of the individual. Heraclitus had said of old that 'Zeus looks on the wisest man as we look on an ape.' But now the feeling about these things was changed, and Chrysippus²⁸ even went so far as to say, that 'the sage is not less useful to Zeus than Zeus is to the sage'—a saying which is rendered less offensive by taking it partly in a metaphysical sense, to mean that the individual is as necessary to the universal law as *vice versa*.

As strong an assertion as this would seem almost required to counterbalance the absorbing necessarian element in early Stoicism. At first it excites surprise that a system putting so great store on the moral will should on the other hand appear to annihilate it. If all proceeds by destiny, what scope is left for individual action, for self-discipline and moral advance? But we must leave this contradiction unresolved. Other systems with a profoundly moral bearing have also maintained the doctrine of necessity. And it was plainly the intention of the Stoics that the Wise Man, by raising himself to the consciousness of universal necessity, should become free, while all those who had not attained to this consciousness remained in bondage. 'Lead me, Zeus, and thou Destiny,'²⁹ says Cleanthes, in another fragment, 'whithersoever I am by you appointed. I will follow not reluctant; but even though I am unwilling through badness, I shall follow none the less.' Yet still with the Stoics the individual element remained equally valid; the individual

²⁸ Plutarch, *Adversus Stoicos*, 33.

²⁹ ἔγουν θέ μ' ὁ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ἡ Πρωμένη,
ἄποι ποθ' ὁμῶν εἰμι διατεταγμένος,

ὡς ἔψομαι γ' ἄοκνος· ἦν δὲ μὴ θέλω
κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἔψομαι.
These verses are translated by Seneca.

consciousness was the starting-point of their thought; and hence the difficulty arose, as in modern times, how to reconcile the opposite ideas of individual freedom, and of a world absolutely predetermined by divine reason. To the task of this reconciliation Chrysippus devoted himself, and Cicero describes him as 'labouring painfully to explain how all things happen by Fate, and yet that there is something in ourselves.'³⁰ To effect this, he drew a distinction between 'predisposing' and 'determinant' causes, and said that only the 'predisposing' causes rested with Fate,³¹ while the 'determinant' cause was always in the human will. This distinction will hardly bear much scrutiny. When Chrysippus was confronted with what philosophers called the 'lazy argument'³²—namely, the very simple question, Why should I do anything, if all is fated? Why, for instance, should I send for the doctor, since, whether I do so or not, the question of my recovery is already fixed by fate?—to this he replied, It is perhaps as much fated that you should send for the doctor, as that you should get well; these things are 'confatal.' In other words, the fate of the Stoics was, of course, a rational fate, acting, not supernaturally, but by the whole chain of cause and effect. The reasonings of Chrysippus are interesting historically, as being the first attempt to meet some of the difficulties of the doctrine of human freedom; and much that he urges has been repeated in after times. We have already seen the optimism of Cleanthes expressed in his hymn. He says on the one hand, that nothing is evil in the hands of God; God fits good and evil together into one frame. On the other hand, he says that

³⁰ Fragment of Cicero, *De Fato*, ap. Aul. Gell. vii. ii. 15.

³¹ Plut. *De Repug. Stoic.* xlvii. : οὐκ ὑποτελῇ τούτων αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ προκα-

ταρτικὴν μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν Εἰμαρμένην.

³² ἀργὸς λόγος (Cicero, *De Fato*, xii. xiii.).

'God does all that is done in the world, except the wickedness.' Chrysippus, touching on the existence of evil and the afflictions which happen to good men, says that the existence of evil is necessary, as being the contrary to good;³³ without it, good could not exist. Again, that as in a large family a little waste must occur, so in the world there must be parts overlooked and neglected. Again, that the good are afflicted not as a punishment, but 'according to another dispensation.' Again, that evil demons may preside over some parts of the world. Of these inconsistent arguments the first is, perhaps, the most philosophical. It is taken from Heraclitus, according to whom all things exist by the unity of contradiction. Plutarch objects to this argument, that if good can only exist by implying evil, what will become of the good after the conflagration of the world, when Zeus is all in all? If evil is destroyed, then good will be destroyed also; an objection hard to answer from the point of view of Chrysippus.

The Stoics generally professed themselves on the side of the 'common notions.' They accepted the popular theology in an allegorising spirit, as being a slightly perverted expression of the truth. Though denying the marvellous and the supernatural, and being quite unable to attribute to God a meddling in the *minutiae* of human affairs, they yet declared³⁴ for the reality of omens, oracles, and portents. They explained their belief by saying that there was no special revelation, but that certain signs were universally preordained to accompany certain events. The portent and the thing to be signified were 'confatal.' Thus the world was full of divine coincidences, if men could but discern them. We can well fancy that this theme would suit the subtle intellect of Chry-

³³ Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.* xxxv.-xxxvii.

³⁴ Cicero, *De Divinatione*, i. iii. &c. Seneca, *Quest. Nat.* ii. 52.

sippus, who appears to have written two books on Divination, one on Oracles, and one on Dreams. But a difference on the subject afterwards arose in the school, and Panætius expressed his doubts as to the reality of divination. With regard to the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, the Stoics were opposed to the general belief. Chrysippus finds fault with Plato for having, in the person of Cephalus, adopted such a vulgar bugbear.³⁵ But they asserted the moral government of the world, saying that the good alone are happy, and that misfortunes happen to the wicked by Divine Providence. The Stoics would seem excluded by their theological system from holding the immortality of the soul. If all the world by conflagration sinks into the essence of God, how can the individual soul continue to exist? But Cleanthes and Chrysippus spoke of the continuance of the souls of the wise, and the possible continuance of all souls, until the next conflagration. And, as Zeller³⁶ says, 'since the Stoics thus admitted a future existence of limited, but yet indefinite, length—the same practical results followed from their belief as from the current belief in immortality. The statements of Seneca that this life is a prelude to a better; that the body is a lodging-house, from which the soul will return to its own home; his joy in looking forward to the day which will rend the bonds of the body asunder, which he, in common with the early Christians, calls the birthday of eternal life;³⁷ his description of the peace of the eternity there awaiting us, of the freedom and bliss of the heavenly life, of the light of knowledge which will there be shed on all the secrets of nature;³⁸ his language on the future recognition and happy

³⁵ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῇς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῇς Ἀλφειτοῦς, δι' ὅν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχελεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσι.—Plut. *De Repug. Stoic.* c. xii.

³⁶ Zeller's *Stoics and Epicureans*, English translation, pp. 207–209.

³⁷ Seneca, *Ep.* 102, 22.

³⁸ *Consol. ad Marc.* 24, 3.

society of souls made perfect;³⁹ his seeing in death a great day of judgment, when sentence will be pronounced on everyone;⁴⁰ his making the thought of a future life the great stimulus to moral conduct here;⁴¹ even the way in which he consoles himself for the destruction of his soul by the thought that it will live again in another form hereafter⁴²—all contain nothing at variance with the Stoic teaching, however near they may approach to Platonic or even Christian modes of thought. Seneca merely expanded the teaching of his school in one particular direction, in which it harmonises most closely with Platonism.’

In like manner we see the Roman Cato fortifying his last hours with arguments and ideas drawn not from the orthodox authorities of Stoicism, but from the *Phædo* of Plato. It was but natural that in the history of Stoicism a tendency should be evinced to sympathise with Plato in exalting the idea of a future life. If there be any principle in the human mind, short of revelation, which could lead men to trust and believe in their own immortality, it must assuredly be that principle which so largely animated the Stoics, the principle of aspiration, of moral energy, of a life above all ordinary pleasures and interests. And the working of this principle belied and neutralised the logical conclusions of a pantheistic materialism.

The culminating act of self-abnegation with the Stoics was suicide. The first leaders of the school, by their precept and example, recommended the wise, on occasion, to ‘usher themselves out’⁴³ of life. If suicide, thus dignified by a name, were an escape from mere pain or annoyance, it

³⁹ *Consol. ad Marc.* 25, 1.

⁴⁰ *Ep.* 26, 4.

⁴¹ *Ep.* 102, 29.

⁴² *Ep.* 36, 10.

⁴³ ἐξέλκειν ἑαυτοῦς—ἐξάγειν is the regular word with the Stoics for suicide.—*Diog. Laert.* vii. i. 66.

would be an Epicurean act; but as a flight from what is degrading—as a great piece of renunciation, it assumes a Stoical appearance. The passion for suicide reached its height in the writings of Seneca, under the wretched circumstances of the Roman despotism; but, on the whole, it belongs to immature Stoicism—Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius dissuaded from it. In saying this, we cannot for a moment pretend that the Stoical principle ever entirely became clear of alloy; it was too wanting in objective elements—it had too little to draw men out of themselves ever to satisfy the human spirit, ever to be otherwise than very imperfect. Stoical pride will always be a just subject of reproach; for the development of the subjective element of morality necessary to the deepening of the thoughts of the world was overdone by the Stoics, and they supplied nothing in counterbalance. It is not as a complete system, or with any inherent capacity for completeness, certainly not as a rival to Christianity, that we regard the Stoical Idea; but only as a strange and interesting doctrine which has played an important part in the history of the world.

II. The Stoical doctrine was not destined to remain the property of a mere school in Athens; owing to the active intercommunion of nations round the shores of the Mediterranean which took place after the conquests of Alexander, this influence, as well as others, rapidly spread. We have seen how Stoicism owed its origin to the East, and upon the East it apparently reacted at a very early period. This is especially exemplified in the history of the Jews. There seems little doubt that during the third century B.C. many of the Jews became indoctrinated with the teaching of one or other of the two great Greek schools, the Stoic and the Epicurean. The original founder of the sect of the Sadducees was Antigonus of Socho (the master of Zadok), who taught

that men should not serve God like hirelings, for a reward. This Antigonus appears to have lived during the former half of the third century, and he is the first Jew who is recorded to have borne a Greek name. It is conjectured⁴⁴ that he had travelled in Greek cities, and through admiration for Greek philosophy and culture, adopted a Greek name, and that he had heard Epicurus, or one of his followers, at Athens, and that his subsequent theological teaching became modified by the Epicurean repudiation of future rewards and punishments. However this may be, it is, to say the least, remarkable that the sect of the Pharisees should have arisen about this time, bearing a relation to that of the Sadducees so much analogous to the relation of the Stoics to the Epicureans. Josephus (*Antiq.* XVIII. i. 2) says that the Jews had had for a long time three kinds of philosophy, and (*Vita*, 2) that the sect of the Pharisees came very near that of the Stoics (ἡ παραπλήσιός ἐστι τῇ παρ' Ἑλληνσι Στωικῇ λεγομένη). And in describing the Pharisaic doctrines he uses terms that seem borrowed from Stoicism; he says (*Bell. Jud.* II. viii. 14) that 'the Pharisees ascribe all things to Fate and God' (εἰμαρμένη τε καὶ θεῷ προσάπτουσι πάντα);⁴⁵ that (*Ib.*) according to them 'to act what is right or the contrary lies principally in the power of men, although Fate does co-operate in every action;'⁴⁶ that (*Ib.*) they teach that 'the souls of good men only are removed into other bodies;' and that (*Antiq.* XVIII. i. 3) those who have lived virtuously will

⁴⁴ See *Ecclesiastes; a Contribution to its Interpretation*, by Thomas Tyler, M.A. &c. (London, 1874). The Greek name of the Jew Antigonus may remind us of the Greek names borne by the Phœnician, Babylonian, Syrian, and Carthaginian founders of the Stoic school (see above, page 308). These must all have been

names of adoption, out of compliment to Athens, in lieu of Semitic, or 'barbarous,' appellations. This fact may account for the repetitions of the same name which occur, e.g. Zeno, Diogenes, Antipater, Athenodorus, &c.

⁴⁵ Compare the saying of Cleanthes, quoted above, page 330.

⁴⁶ See above, page 331.

have liberty to live again (*ῥαστώνην τοῦ ἀναβιοῦν*), which seems to be a modification of the Stoical eschatology. It is said by the author lately referred to ⁴⁷ that the *Chasidim*, or Assideans of Maccabean times, invested their conservative Judaism 'to some extent with a Stoic garb,' and that the Fourth Book of *Maccabees* 'exhibits to us Stoicism associated and interwoven with Judaic legalism.' It is the object of the same writer to prove that the Book of *Ecclesiastes*, to which he assigns a date about 200 B.C., contains references to both Stoical and Epicurean tenets,⁴⁸ and was written with the object of dissuading from the study of both these philosophies, which at the time 'were exerting among the theocratic people an influence adverse to the ancient faith of Judaism.' The relation of Stoicism to the Talmud is a question which, if worked out, might probably furnish some interesting results. And of the influence produced by the Stoical modes of thought and phraseology ⁴⁹ upon the mind of St. Paul, his epistles furnish ample evidence.

St. Paul was born at Tarsus, a meeting point between the East and the West, the congenial soil and chief fatherland of Stoicism. Six of the eminent Stoic teachers had their home there, Chrysippus and Aratus belonged to the neighbouring Soli, and three other leaders of the sect to

⁴⁷ Mr. Tyler's *Ecclesiastes*, page 45.

⁴⁸ Mr. Tyler finds the Stoical doctrine of 'following Nature' in the passage on 'Times and Seasons,' *Eccl.* iii. 1-8; the Stoical doctrine of Fate in 'Time and Chance happen unto all,' *Eccl.* ix. 11, 12; the Stoical doctrine of Cycles in 'whatever hath been, it had been long before,' *Eccl.* iii. 15; the Stoical identification of Folly with Madness, in the frequent conjunctions of these terms 'madness and folly,' *Eccl.* i. 17, ii. 12, vii. 25, ix. 3, x. 13; the Epicurean doctrine

that men are but as beasts in *Eccl.* iii. 18-20; and the Epicurean conception of Pleasure as the chief good in *Eccl.* v. 18-20. M. Renan, however, in his monograph on *Ecclesiastes*, takes a different view, and refuses to find in that book any reference to Greek ideas.

⁴⁹ This point has been most ably investigated by Bishop Lightfoot, in his *Dissertation* on 'St. Paul and Seneca,' and of his conclusions we avail ourselves.

Mallos, which was also a Cilician town. St. Paul was brought up as a Pharisee, in a sect which had a natural, and probably an historical, affinity with the Stoical doctrines. His master was Gamaliel, 'the most liberal teacher of the day, who had no dread of Greek learning.' St. Paul's writings show him to have imbibed the current Greek cultivation. When he came to Athens, after encountering certain philosophers of the Epicureans and of the Stoics, he 'stood up in the midst of Mars' Hill' and addressed the multitude. While speaking to the mass of the Athenians, and making its popular superstition his starting-point, St. Paul appears to appeal to the philosophic part of his audience, weaving in their ideas into his speech, referring to their literature, and producing 'a studied coincidence with their modes of expression.' Thus the cosmopolitan theory of the Stoics seems distinctly assumed,⁵⁰ and both Aratus and Cleanthes may be comprehended under the terms 'certain of your own poets have said;'⁵¹ and in the saying that 'God dwelleth not in temples made with hands' St. Paul agrees remarkably with the expressions of Zeno (ap. Plutarch *De Repug. Stoic.* c. 2). But it was not merely when he was addressing an Athenian audience that St. Paul made use of Stoical forms of expression. 'As the speculations of Alexandrian Judaism had elaborated a new and important theological vocabulary, so also to the language of Stoicism, which itself likewise had sprung from the union of the religious sentiment of the East with the philosophical thought of the West, was due an equally remarkable development of moral terms and images. To the Gospel, both the one and the other paid their tribute. As St. John (nor St. John alone) adopted the terms of Alexandrian theosophy

⁵⁰ 'God hath made of one blood all nations of men,' &c., Acts xvii. 26.

⁵¹ In Aratus the words are *Toû*

γάρ καὶ γένος ἑμῆν, in the hymn of Cleanthes (see above, page 328), *Ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἑμῆν*.

as the least inadequate to express the highest doctrines of Christianity, so St. Paul (nor St. Paul alone) found in the ethical language of the Stoics expressions more fit than he could find elsewhere to describe in certain aspects the duties and privileges, the struggles and triumphs, of the Christian life.⁵² Instances of 'the characteristic commonplaces of Stoic morality' emerging in the writings of St. Paul are as follows: (1.) The Stoical ideal of the wise man (so full of paradox, see above, page 322), with his perfect self-sufficiency—who alone is free, alone is happy, alone is rich, alone is king and priest—was a topic that furnished to St. Paul many a passage both of irony and earnestness. 'Even now are ye full,' he says to the Corinthians,⁵³ 'even now are ye rich, even now are ye made kings without us;' 'we are fools for Christ, but ye are wise in Christ: we are weak, but ye are strong: ye are glorious, but we are dishonoured.'⁵⁴ 'All things are yours.'⁵⁵ And of himself he speaks 'as being grieved, yet always rejoicing; as beggars, yet making many rich; as having nothing and yet possessing all things.'⁵⁶ 'In everything at every time having every self-sufficiency (*αὐτάρκειαν*), in everything being enriched.'⁵⁷ 'I have learnt, in whatsoever circumstances I am, to be self-sufficing. I have all strength in him that giveth me power. I have all things to the full and to overflowing.'⁵⁸ (2.) The Stoical cosmopolitanism, the idea of a city coextensive with the universe (see above, page 326), furnished another set of images to St. Paul. 'Our citizenship is in heaven.'⁵⁹ 'Therefore ye are no more strangers and sojourners, but fellow-citizens with the saints and members of God's house-

⁵² Bishop Lightfoot's *Philippians* (1st ed.), page 302.

⁵³ 1 Cor. iv. 8.

⁵⁴ *Ib.* iv. 10.

⁵⁵ *Ib.* iii. 22.

⁵⁶ 2 Cor. vi. 10.

⁵⁷ 2 Cor. ix. 8, 11.

⁵⁸ *Phil.* iv. 11, 13, 18.

⁵⁹ *Phil.* iii. 20.

hold.'⁶⁰ 'Fulfil your duties as citizens worthily of the gospel of Christ.'⁶¹ 'We being many are one body in Christ, and members one of another.'⁶² 'There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither bond nor free; there is no male or female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.'⁶³ 'Not Greek and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond, free: but Christ is all things and in all.'⁶⁴ Such was the noble use that St. Paul made of Stoical ideas and forms of thought; with him the spirit of Christianity purifies these ideas from their alloy and turns them into pure gold. But it cannot be doubted that Stoicism, by the early and not uncongenial influence which it had produced upon the mind of St. Paul, contributed something to the form under which Christian doctrine was set forth by its greatest expositor. On the other hand there are no good grounds for believing that Stoicism ever received any influence from Christianity. The hypothesis of an intercourse between St. Paul and Seneca has no historical foundation. And internal evidence forbids our supposing that either Seneca, or any other Stoical writer, borrowed from, or was acquainted with, the Christian doctrines.

Having now traced some indications of the effect produced by Stoicism on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, let us turn to watch its promulgation in the West and throughout the Roman world in general, where it was destined to play the part of, to some extent, a regenerating element in the last days of Pagan civilisation. There was a direct succession, as we have seen above (p. 308), in the lists of the Stoic doctors from Chrysippus to Posidonius, and Posidonius was master to Cicero. During the interval

⁶⁰ *Ephes.* ii. 19.

⁶¹ *Phil.* i. 27.

⁶² *Rom.* xii. 5.

⁶³ *Gal.* iii. 28.

⁶⁴ *Col.* iii. 11.

spanned by these successive teachers (from 200 B.C. to 50 B.C.), many circumstances turned the tide of philosophy towards Rome, and commenced the intellectual subjugation of the victors in the domain of thought as well as of imaginative literature. The first awakenings of the national curiosity are somewhat obscured. Aulus Gellius records a decree of the Senate, of the date B.C. 161, for banishing from Rome philosophers and rhetoricians, at the instance of M. Pomponius, the prætor. This fact appears to stand in isolation. Six years later (B.C. 155), we hear of the famous embassy of the philosophers sent from Athens to Rome to obtain the remission of a fine. Doubt⁶⁵ has been thrown on the reality of this event. But independently of the constant oral tradition from Scipio and Lælius down to Cicero, the historical certainty of the embassy is established by a reference which Cicero makes⁶⁶ to the writings of Clitomachus, a Carthaginian philosopher who settled at Athens, and was disciple to Carneades immediately after the date assigned to the embassy, and who therefore is an undoubted authority for the facts. However, we may easily believe that the story has been decked out and improved. In some accounts, Carneades the Academic, and Diogenes the Stoic, are mentioned as the envoys; but other accounts, probably for completeness' sake, add Critolaus the Peripatetic. And hence it came to be said⁶⁷ that these three represented the three styles of oratory—the florid, the severe, and the moderate. Cicero⁶⁸ tells us of a philosophic party at Rome, in compliment to whom these particular ambassadors were sent; while, on the other hand, Cato the Censor viewed with impatience their favourable reception, and urged upon

⁶⁵ Mr. Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, ii. p. 511, note.

⁶⁶ *Academica*, ii. xlv.

⁶⁷ Aulus Gellius, vii. xiv. 3.

⁶⁸ *De Oratore*, ii. xxxvii.

the Senate their speedy dismissal. The most interesting anecdote connected with this embassy is that quoted from the works of Clitomachus,—that A. Albinus, the prætor, said to Carneades in the Capitol, before the Senate, ‘Is it true, Carneades, that you think I am no prætor because I am not a wise man, and that this is no city, and that there is no true state in it?’ To which Carneades replied, ‘I don’t think so, but this Stoic does.’ This story amusingly represents the confusion in the mind of the Roman prætor, who did not distinguish between the philosophical schools, but was struck by the great paradox he had heard, and was not able to comprehend that inner point of view from which it was said that mighty Rome was no city, and the august prætor had no real office or authority at all.

The anti-philosophical party seem to have continued their exertions at Rome, and under the date 93 B.C. we read⁶⁹ of a decree of the censors Domitius Ænobarbus and Licinius Crassus against the schools in which a new sort of learning was taught by those who called themselves Latin rhetoricians, and where youths wasted their whole days in sloth. This decree is in fine grand Roman style; it says, ‘these things do not please us.’ But it was in vain to attempt resisting the influx of Greek philosophy, when the leading and most able men warmly welcomed it. Africanus, C. Lælius, and L. Furius were extremely pleased at the embassy, and always had learned Greeks in their company. A little later than 150 B.C., no one was more instrumental in recommending Stoicism to the Romans than Panætius of Rhodes, whose instructions in Athens were attended by Lælius and his son-in-law, C. Fanucius, and also by the conqueror of Carthage. Panætius accompanied the latter on his famous mission to

⁶⁹ Aulus Gellius, xv. xi.

the courts in Asia Minor and Egypt. He is always spoken of as the friend and companion of Scipio and Lælius. He is recorded to have sent a letter to Q. Tubero, on the endurance of pain. Not only by personal intercourse did Panætius influence the cultivated Romans, but also still more by his books. These seem to have been of a character eminently fitted for the comprehension of the Romans, being extremely practical, avoiding the harshness and severity of the early Stoics, and being free from 'the forms of dialectic.'⁷⁰ One peculiarity above all, while it made Panætius a worse Stoic, made him at the same time a more attractive expositor of philosophy, and was only a fulfilment, after all, of the destiny of Stoicism—namely, his tendency to eclecticism. He constantly had Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, Dicaearchus, in his mouth; he was always speaking⁷¹ of Plato as divine, most wise, most holy, and the Homer of philosophers. We can form a very good conception of his writings from Cicero's work *On Offices*, which is taken almost exactly from Panætius' *On Things Suitable*. An extract *verbatim*, from the latter, is preserved by Aulus Gellius. It recommends those who are mixed up in affairs to be on their guard, like pugilists, against every sort of attack. It is in rhetorical style, and full of a sensible worldly prudence. Such prudence is no more alien from a particular phase of Stoicism, than it is from a particular phase of religion.

Posidonius (B.C. 135–50) maintained the same intercourse with the Romans, and the same eclectic tendencies as his master. After the death of Panætius (B.C. 112), he made some extensive travels for the sake of physical inquiry. At Cadiz he spent some time in observations on the sunset; he visited Sicily, Dalmatia, and other countries, and finally

⁷⁰ Cicero, *De Fin.* iv. xxviii. 79.

⁷¹ Cicero, *Tusculan. Disputat.* i. xxxii. 79.

settled in Rhodes. Strabo, with a sympathy for his geographical knowledge, called him 'the most learned philosopher of the day.' In the year 86 B.C. he was sent as ambassador to Rome, and became acquainted with Marius. Pompey visited Posidonius twice in Rhodes (67 and 62 B.C.); and the story goes that on one of these occasions, Posidonius, having a bad fit of the gout, discoursed from his bed to Pompey on the topic 'that virtue is the only good, and that pain is no evil.' Cicero also studied under him in Rhodes; and finally, coming to Rome in his old age (B.C. 51), he died there a short time afterwards, having had as his hearers C. Velleius, C. Cotta, Q. Lucilius Balbus, and probably Brutus. Posidonius wrote a commentary on the *Timæus* of Plato, apparently to reconcile it with the Stoical physics. He approximated in some things to Aristotle, and even, it is said, to Pythagoras. On divination, however, he reverted to the old Stoical view, abandoning the scepticism of Panætius. The ancients make mention of the elegance of his style; and Cicero, while dissenting from his opinions on fate and other subjects, speaks of him at the same time with the greatest respect.

Besides those Stoics who were of eminence and originality enough to advance, though only by amalgamation, the traditional doctrine, there were by this time many others who received it merely and adopted it as an article of faith, without thinking of addition or change. Such was probably Antipater of Tyre, who became the friend and instructor of Cato the younger. And now we find, in the last half-century before Christ, frequent instances of a new fashion in Rome—namely, for a great man to maintain a philosopher in his house, as in modern days a private confessor. Of this custom Cato⁷² of Utica was himself an instance, for he is reported

⁷² Plutarch, *Cato Minor*, c. x.

to have made a journey to Pergamus with the express object of inducing the famous Stoic Athenodorus, surnamed Cordylion, to accompany him to Rome, in which mission he succeeded, and brought back the sage in triumph, who ended his days in the house of Cato. After this, at Utica, Cato appears to have had among the members of his family Demetrius a Peripatetic, and Apollonides a Stoic. On the night before Cato's suicide, they disputed with each other on the paradox that the Wise Man only is free, Cato warmly supporting the Stoical side. Another⁷³ Athenodorus, of the same sect, but surnamed Cananites, was highly honoured by the great Augustus. Attracting the notice of the Emperor at Apollonia, where he held a school, he was invited to Rome, and had the young Claudius placed under his instruction. In his old age returning to Tarsus, he seems to have procured some advantages for his country through his influence with Augustus. Among the few works attributed to him there is one with an eminently Stoical title, *On Earnestness and Education*.

Arguing by analogy from these external indications, we may imagine the Roman nation at this period imbibing Greek philosophy, or so-called philosophy, at every pore. The Romans, indeed, had not the slightest stomach for metaphysics, and in no one of their writers do we find any trace of a real acquaintance with the systems of Plato or Aristotle. But we can find abundant traces of an acquaintance with Epicurus and Chrysippus, and Panætius and Posidonius. The inducement of the Romans in taking up with this kind of literature was twofold: first, a natural affinity for practical moralising and maxims of life; second, a rhetorical necessity—the desire to turn sentences, to be terse, apposite, and

⁷³ Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography*, sub voce.

weighty. The constant practice of declamation gave an immense stimulus to the sermonising tendency of the day, and as the despotism of the Empire shut up other subjects, declamation became more and more exclusively moral. Instruction under some Greek rhetorician became part of the education of a Roman youth, and in Athens, Rhodes, Marseilles, and Alexandria, everywhere throughout the great Roman world, Sophists and declaimers might be heard setting forth the theses of the different schools, among which the florid paradoxes of the Stoics were no doubt most striking and attractive.

The Romans who took any side in philosophy invariably became either Epicureans, Stoics, or Academics, or else, as was not unfrequent, they combined the Academical opinions on knowledge with the Stoical morals or some admixture of the Stoical physics. This was the case with L. Lucullus, with M. Brutus, and Terentius Varro. Cicero's creed we know to have been a learned and sensible eclecticism, a qualified Stoicism with a use of the Academic arguments, and an approach in some things to the Peripatetic views. Such a compound was suitable to a statesman and a man of letters; it exhibits acuteness, refinement, breadth of view, and an affinity to what is elevated in the different systems: but at the same time it avoids all extremes, and shuns that unity of principle on which philosophy, properly so called, depends. When such a balance as this was wanting, the Romans joined the opposite ranks of the Stoics or the Epicureans. To either side they had certain elements that inclined them. Their capacity for the physical enjoyment of life, their taste for rural ease and the delights of their beautiful villas, and that healthy realism which we find expressed by Lucretius, all tended to recommend the Epicurean doctrine to the Romans. And added to these predisposing causes

was the fact that the first book of philosophy written in the Latin language was the work of one Amafinius,⁷⁴ setting forth Epicurism. This treatise, though of no merit according to Cicero, had immense influence, and brought over the multitude to adopt its views. 'Other works of a similar character followed, and through their popular style took possession of the whole of Italy.' Of this phase of feeling hardly any trace remains to us, if we except the splendid poem of Lucretius, and the record of one or two great names among the Roman Epicureans, such as Atticus, the friend of Cicero, Cassius, the murderer of Cæsar, L. Torquatus, and C. Velleius. Perhaps its most lasting result was the spread of 'a wisdom,' as Livy calls it, 'which had learned to despise the gods.' Epicurism was transient in Rome, like Sentimentalism in England, because alien to the national characteristics; for on the whole the Romans were far more disposed to energy and sublime virtue, and the conquest of external circumstances, than to easy and harmonious enjoyment. Without a great intellectual capacity for the apprehension of the universal, there was yet something abstract about their turn of mind; this is shown in their love of law, and in the sternness of the high Roman mood. It has been often said that the old Roman worthies were unconscious Stoics. And now, from Cato to M. Aurelius, we find through the Roman empire an immense diffusion of Stoical principles and of the professors of Stoicism.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iv. iii.; *Acad. Post.* ii.

⁷⁵ Among the most celebrated of these is to be named Q. Sextius, contemporary with Julius Cæsar, who founded a school. This school, Seneca tells us (*Quest. Nat.* vii. xxxii.), began with great *éclat*, but soon

became extinct. He says of Sextius that he was 'a great man and a Stoic, although he himself denied this.' Sextius appears to have followed Pythagoras in some points, and to have enjoined abstinence from animal food. Sotion, the disciple of Sextius, was Seneca's master, and induced him

III. These professors assumed, it appears, not only distinctive principles, but also certain external marks and badges of their sect. We read in Juvenal⁷⁶ of the 'long robe' as synonymous with Stoicism; in Persius we read of their close-cropped hair,⁷⁷ and their look of having sat up all night; in Tacitus,⁷⁸ of their set countenances and gait expressive of virtue. Like their Jewish counterpart, the Pharisees, they were formal, austere, pretentious, and not unfrequently hypocritical. Under the mask of asceticism, they appear sometimes to have concealed gross licentiousness,⁷⁹ and under their sanctimonious face the blackest heart. With bitter indignation does Tacitus⁸⁰ record the perfidy of Publius Egnatius Celer, the Stoic philosopher, the client, the instructor, and the false friend of Barea Soranus, whom, with his daughter, he betrayed to Nero, by giving the lying evidence which procured their deaths. Such cases as this, however, are to be regarded like stories of the corruption of priests and monks, and to be judged apart, as giving no sufficient clue to the working of the system. Partly they illustrate the maxim that 'that corruption is worst which is the corruption of the best;' partly they show that an elevated and spiritual creed is apt, by the very nobleness of its appearance, to attract unworthy followers. We may also

to practise this kind of asceticism at one time; but after a year's trial of it, he was persuaded by his father, who 'hated philosophy,' and who dreaded the imputation of certain foreign superstitions, to return to the common mode of diet (*Ep. cviii.*). What is most remarkable about Sextius is his daily habit, according to Seneca (*De Ira*, iii. xxxvi.), of self-examination. This shows the spirit of the times.

⁷⁶ 'Facinus majoris abollæ.'—*Sat.* iii. 115.

⁷⁷ 'Insomnis . . . et detonsa juven-
tus.'—*Sat.* iii. 54.

⁷⁸ 'P. Egnatius . . . auctoritatem
Stoicæ sectæ præferebat, habitu et
ore ad exprimendam imaginem
honesti exercitus.'—*Annal.* xvi. 32.

⁷⁹ 'Frontis nulla fides, quis enim
non vicus abundat
Tristibus obscenis?'

Juv. Sat. ii. 8.

⁸⁰ *Ann.* xvi. 32, 33.

add that, beside the antinomian tendencies which might logically be connected with this creed,⁸¹ there was a narrowness in the intensity of Stoicism, and an abstract unreality about its ideas, not favourable to the development of the more human virtues. Acknowledging these things, we may turn away from this ungracious side of the system, and leave it to the tender mercies of the satirists. For even externally, Stoicism, on the whole, presented a better aspect and won a better opinion than this from intelligent observers during the early Roman empire. Nothing can be more significant than the accusation brought against C. Rubellius Plautus⁸² by Tigellinus. This Plautus was son of Julia, and great-grandson of Tiberius. Becoming an object of suspicion to Nero, he retired—not from the Roman world, for that was impossible, but from the Court—to Asia, where he lived in the pursuit of the Stoic philosophy. Tigellinus, to stir up Nero's hatred against him, declared, 'That man, though of immense wealth, does not even pretend a wish for enjoyment, but is always bringing forward the examples of the ancient Romans. And he has now joined to these ideas the arrogance of the Stoics—a philosophy which makes men turbulent and restless.' It is easy to see that this accusation was a panegyric. It was followed up by an order sent from Nero that Plautus should be put to death. His friends counselled resistance, but Cæranus and Musonius Rufus, two philosophers who were with him, preached the doctrine of resignation and fortitude; and, armed with their suggestions, he met his death unmoved. This manner of death and life was not confined to Plautus: the reigns of Claudius and Nero exhibit a constellation of noble characters, formed on the

⁸¹ See above, p. 323.

⁸² Tacitus, *Annal.* xiv. 57. Cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Cleom.*—"Ἐχει τι ὁ Στωικός λόγος πρὸς τὰς μεγάλας καὶ

ὀξείας φ' ἵσεις ἐπισφαλὲς καὶ παράβολον·
βαθεὶ δὲ καὶ πρῶν κεραυνύμενος ἦθει·
μάλιστα εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδίδωσι.

model of the younger Cato, and showing the same republican front and the same practical conception of Stoicism as he did. Such were Cæcina Pætus and his heroic wife Arria, who died at the command of Claudius. Such was Soranus Barea, already mentioned, and such Thræsea, and his son-in-law Helvidius. Seneca, too, in his death, at all events, must be added to the list—a list of martyrs at a time when all good eminence was sure to attract the stroke. There is something perhaps theatrical and affected about the record of these death-scenes. When we think of Cato arguing on the freedom of the wise man, and then reading the *Phædo* through the night, before he stabs himself; when we think of Thræsea pouring out a libation of his own blood to Jupiter the Liberator, and discoursing in his last moments with the Cynic Demetrius on immortality—it seems as if these men had played somewhat studied parts. Such scenes appeal to the rhetorical faculty, rather than to the imagination and the heart. But it is the privilege of certain unhappy periods to be rhetorical. It is the privilege of patriots in miserable days to be excited, strained, unnatural. And hence we can understand how it was that from the Girondists in France the Roman Stoics obtained such sympathy and admiration.

And now let us take some notice of the character and the thought of Seneca, a man who has been most differently estimated, according to the temperament of his judges, and according as he has been taken at his best or his worst. Probably we may admit almost all the accusations against him, and yet end without judging him too hardly. When just rising into success, Seneca was banished by Claudius, on an obscure charge preferred by Messalina. From Corsica, his place of banishment, he addressed what was called a ‘Consolation’ to Polybius, the freedman of the Emperor, on the death of his brother. Seneca’s object in this ‘Consolation’

was to effect his own recall, and the means he used were the most fulsome and cringing terms of flattery towards Claudius. His mean adulation quite failed in obtaining his pardon; and he was only recalled, after eight years' exile, through the influence of Agrippina, who made him tutor to her son Domitius, the future emperor Nero. In the museum at Naples one sees frescoes brought from Pompeii, which represent a butterfly acting as charioteer to a dragon. These designs were meant to caricature the relationship of Seneca to his pupil Nero. No doubt he was drawn violently and without the power of resistance through much that was unseemly by his impetuous charge. No doubt he tried, with the help of Burrus, to keep the reins straight. But he was obliged to connive and even assist at things which made people say, with natural surprise, 'This is a strange part for a Stoic to play.' The poor painted butterfly behind the dragon could not choose what part he should play. Other things that have been complained of in Seneca are his violent reaction of spite against Claudius, shown in the satire which he wrote upon his death; his reputed avarice, and the enormous fortune which in a short time he actually amassed under Nero; certain scandalous intrigues, with regard to which there really is not evidence enough to enable us to say whether Seneca was guilty of them or not; and lastly, his possible complicity in the murder of Agrippina. Seneca was no Roman, but a Spaniard,²³ and we can fancy how the milk of his flattery towards Claudius turned sour during his eight years' exile, and how deep resentment settled in his heart. With regard to his accumulating wealth when it was in his

²³ Bishop Lightfoot thinks that Seneca may have had Semitic blood in his veins, as his native province, Bætica, had been thickly populated

with Phœnician settlers, and the name *Σεnekās* appears in a list of Jewish names. This, however, is mere conjecture.

power to do so, we may perhaps explain it to ourselves, by remembering that many ecclesiastics professing a still more unworldly creed than Stoicism have done the same. With regard to his privity to the death of Agrippina, all that can be said is that Seneca was, towards the end of his career, so thoroughly scared by Nero, that all power of independent action was taken from him. Physically timid and gentle by nature, Seneca was not born to play a consistent and unyielding part. Considering his hideous position, we may well condone his offences. If we study his writings, and especially his letters, we shall see that he possessed one essentially Stoical characteristic—namely, the intense desire for advance and improvement. The picture of the inner life of Seneca, his efforts after self-discipline, his untiring asceticism, his enthusiasm for all that he esteems holy and of good report—this picture, marred as it is by pedantry, and rhetoric, and vain self-conceit, yet stands out in noble contrast to the swinishness of the Campanian villas, and is in its complex entirety very affecting.

The works of Seneca are over-harshly judged by those who have no taste except for metaphysical philosophy, or who, expecting to find such in Seneca, have been disappointed. But if we approach these writings from a different side, and look at them historically and psychologically as the picture of the times and the man, we find them full of interest. If we can endure being a little cloyed with excess of richness in the style, if we can pardon occasional falsity and frequent exaggeration, we shall discover in them a most fertile genius, and a vein of French wit, so to speak, which is always neat and clever, and often surprising, on the tritest moral subjects. Of all sets of letters that have ever been preserved, there is none that exhibits better and more vividly the different phases of a peculiar idiosyncrasy—of a mind under the dominion

of a peculiar kind of thought—than the *Epistles* of Seneca. Let us take a glance at the more striking features of their contents, and see what sort of a working in the heart was produced by Stoicism under the circumstances of the case. The *Epistles* of Seneca consist of one hundred and twenty-four letters, written almost continuously in the old age of their author, and all addressed to a person of the name of Lucilius. The first point to be noticed about them is their entire abstraction from all public events of the day, an abstraction very Stoical in itself, and very significant also of the ungenial atmosphere of the political world. Only one allusion is there to Nero, where Seneca takes occasion (*Ep.* 73) to find fault with the opinion that philosophers are necessarily turbulent and refractory, and despisers of the ruling power. ‘On the contrary,’ he says, ‘none are more grateful to him who affords them security and tranquillity of life. They must regard the author of these blessings in the light of a parent.’ ‘Like Tityrus, they must say that a god has provided them tranquillity, and left their cattle to roam and themselves to play the pipe.’ ‘The leisure thus granted them is indeed godlike, and raises them to the level of the gods.’ In such terms does Seneca appreciate the hours of gilded oppression and treacherous reprieve which were conceded him. Most naturally the topics of his correspondence were not political. His letters were uniformly didactic and moral. In them we see developed the passion for self-improvement and for the cultivation of others. Both by nature and from the influences of Stoicism, Seneca was essentially a schoolmaster; it was evidently the foible of his life to be bringing some one on; he was a pedagogue to himself, and he wanted somebody else whom he might lecture. Of this tendency Lucilius was made the victim. On one occasion he seems to have remonstrated, and to have reminded Seneca

that he was forty years of age, and rather old for schooling (*Ep.* 25). But Seneca will not be deterred. He says it shall not be his fault if his friend does not improve, even though the success be not very brilliant. In every shape and from every side he urges upon him cultivation, and once fairly tells him he cannot remain on the footing of friend unless he cultivates himself and improves (*Ep.* 35). He hails his good deeds with triumph; rejoices to hear that Lucilius lives on terms of familiarity with his slaves (*Ep.* 47)—‘are they not,’ he asks, ‘men like ourselves, breathing the same air, living and dying like ourselves?’—praises a book he has written, lectures him on the economy of time (*Ep.* 1); tells him to be select in his reading (*Ep.* 2); bids him examine himself to see whether he is progressing in philosophy or in life, since only the latter is valuable (*Ep.* 16); above all, exhorts him without ceasing to get rid of the fear of death, ‘that chain which binds us all’ (*Ep.* 26), though he is half afraid, as in one place he naïvely confesses (*Ep.* 30), that Lucilius may come to dread his long-winded letters more even than death itself. However, as a compensation, he promises his friend that these epistles shall insure him a literary immortality, just as the letters of Cicero had made the name of Atticus immortal (*Ep.* 21).

Such is a specimen of the didactic element in the letters of Seneca; the indications of his own self-discipline and conscious self-culture are equally pregnant and still more characteristic. One sentence of his might be taken as the summary and expression of his entire spirit. In speaking of the state of the ‘advancing man’ as distinguished in Stoical parlance from the ‘wise man,’ he says (*Ep.* 71), ‘It is a great part of advance to will to be advancing. Of this I am conscious to myself; I will to advance, nay, I will it with my whole heart.’ In the will thus fixed and bent there is often

a sort of unreal triumph, independent of actual success or failure. Seneca does not conceal from us his failures in realising his conception of philosophic behaviour. But while he confesses, he is never humbled. Rather he seems proud of detecting his own falling off. On one occasion (*Ep.* 87) he relates an excursion which he made into the country with a friend, and in which he says they spent 'two delightful days.' They took very few slaves, and one rustic vehicle. On meeting with persons riding in grander equipages, he tells us, he could not refrain from blushing, and secretly wished that they should not think that this sordid conveyance belonged to *him*. 'I have made but little progress as yet,' he sighs, 'I dare not yet openly assume frugality. I mind the opinions of passers-by.' Whereupon he proceeds to lecture down this weakness in the grandest terms, and occupies many pages of a letter in proving that riches are not a good. On another occasion he recounts a voyage which he had undertaken from Naples to Puteoli (*Ep.* 53). In these few miles the sea became rough, and the philosopher grew sick, and, unable to endure the horrible sufferings of his position, he commanded the pilot to set him ashore. 'As soon as I had recovered my stomach,' he says, 'I began to reflect what a forgetfulness of our defects follows us about.' Pursuing this train of reasoning, he enters upon the praises of philosophy, and soaring far above sea-sickness, he exclaims, 'Philosophy sets one above all men, and not far behind the gods. Indeed, in one point the wise man might be said even to surpass the Deity; for the Deity is fearless by the gift of nature, but the wise man by his own merits.' This last saying, which is often quoted against Seneca, is perhaps the most foolish thing he ever said, and must not be taken as an average specimen of his thoughts. One failure which he ascribes to himself may be justly reckoned as a merit; for

while dissuading Lucilius (*Ep.* 63) from overmuch grieving at the loss of a friend, he says, 'I myself so immoderately wept for Annæus Serenus, that I must rank among the bad examples of those who have been overcome by grief.' And he reflects that the reason of this weakness must have been that he had not sufficiently considered the possibility of his friend dying first. We may also attribute it to the existence in Seneca of an affectionate heart, which had not been entirely supplanted by the abstractions of Stoicism, not entirely 'sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought.' After alluding to cases where Seneca confessed to have fallen from the philosophic height, it is surely fair not to leave unrecorded an occasion where he effected an important triumph of the will. The kind of self-discipline chosen was somewhat surprising; it is related in the Fifty-sixth Epistle, where Seneca tells his friend that he had taken lodgings 'over a bath.' He details with minuteness the various mixed and deafening sounds by which his ears were perpetually assailed. He could hear distinctly the strong fellows taking their exercise—throwing out their hands loaded with the dumb-bells—straining and groaning—hissing and wheezing—breathing in every kind of unnatural way—at another moment some one having his shoulders slapped by the shampooer—a hue and cry after a thief—a man practising his voice in the bath—people leaping and splashing down into the water—the various cries of the piemen and sellers of baked meats, as they vended their wares—and several other sounds, to all of which Seneca compelled his mind to be inattentive, being concentrated on itself. The power of abstraction gained by such a discipline he seems to have thought very valuable. At the end of his letter, he declares that as the experiment is quite successful, and as the sounds are really abominable, he has now determined to change his quarters.

About such moral peddling as this there is of course nothing great. But the spirit which actuates it is in its origin deep and good, and is only not admirable when it becomes perverted. The conscious desire for moral progress becomes unfortunately very easily perverted; it degenerates too often into small self-analysis, and that weak trifling which is most utterly opposed to real progression. We find Seneca remaining in his moral nature a strange mixture of the pedant and the schoolboy; on the one hand always teaching himself, and on the other hand with everything to learn; and yet still, with all its imperfections, we may question whether this attitude is not more human and better than anything like an Epicurean acquiescence and content in one's nature as it is. That self-reflection, that communing of man with his own heart, which the tendencies of Stoicism and the course of the world's history had now made common, produced in Seneca occasionally intuitions into the state of the human race, which he expresses in language curious to meet with in the writings of a Pagan. He says (*De Clementia*, I. vi.):

‘Conceive in this vast city, where without cease a crowd pours through the broadest streets, and like a river dashes against anything that impedes its rapid course—this city, that consumes the grain of all lands—what a solitude and desolation there would be if nothing were left save what a severe judge could absolve of fault! We have all sinned (*peccavimus omnes*), some more gravely, others more lightly, some from purpose, others by chance impulse, or else carried away by wickedness external to them; others of us have wanted fortitude to stand by our resolutions, and have lost our innocence unwillingly and not without a struggle. Not only we *have* erred, but to the end of time we shall continue to err. Even if anyone has already so well purified his

mind that nothing can shake or decoy him any more, it is through sinning that he has arrived at this state of innocence.'

Those who have been anxious to obtain the authority of Aristotle for the doctrine of 'human corruption' will find on consideration that this idea, which was historically impossible for a Greek of the fourth century B.C., came with sufficient vividness into the consciousness of persons in the position of Seneca, but not till much later than Aristotle, probably not before the beginning of our era. On the other hand, we are not to fancy that the thoughts of Seneca received any influence from Christianity. We learn from passages like that above quoted, not that Seneca had any acquaintance with Christian doctrines, but that some of the thoughts and feelings which St. Paul had about the world were held also by Pagans contemporaneous with him.

There is one more characteristic of the letters of Seneca which ought not to be left unmentioned, and that is, the way in which they are perpetually overshadowed by the thought of death. The form assumed by this *meditatio mortis* is a constant urging of arguments against fearing to die. These arguments are, as might be expected, infinitely varied and ingenious. 'Death,' he says, 'lurks under the name of life. It begins with our infancy.' 'It is a great mistake to look forward to death, since a great part of it is already over. We die daily' (*Ep.* 1). Death is no punishment, but the law of nature.' 'Children and idiots do not fear death, why cannot reason attain to that security which folly has achieved?' (*Ep.* 36). 'Death is the one port in a stormy sea—it is either end or transition (*aut finis est aut transitus*)—it brings us back to where we were before birth—it must be a gain or nothing.' 'The apparatus of death is all a cheat; if we tear off the mask, there is nothing fearful.'

‘ Behind fire and steel and the ferocious crowd of executioners there is death hiding—merely death, which my slave or my waiting-maid has just despised ’ (*Ep.* 24). Not content with bringing forward these considerations dissuasive of terror, Seneca in other places does all he can to familiarise the mind with the idea of suicide. He says, ‘ There is nothing more contemptible than to wish for death. Why wish for that which is in your power?—die at once, if you wish to do so ’ (*Ep.* 117). He relates with approbation the suicide of his friend Marcellinus, who, being oppressed with a long and troublesome invalidism, was recommended by a Stoic to give up the trivial round of life ; whereupon, having distributed his goods among his weeping slaves, he effected death by a three-days’ abstinence from food, betaking himself to a hot bath when his body was exhausted, wherein he fainted and died (*Ep.* 77). Other instances of self-destruction are scattered through the letters of Seneca, some of which give a sad illustration of the unhappiness of the times. It seems to have been not uncommon for the wretched captives who were doomed to the conflicts of the arena to steal themselves away, sometimes by the most revolting modes of death. And it is surely a miserable sign when cultivated men of the day look on such deeds with pleasure and admiration. So great was the tendency to suicide under Claudius and Nero, that even Seneca on one occasion acknowledges that it is excessive. He says, ‘ We ought not to hate life any more than death, we ought not to sink into that mere life-weariness to which many are prone who see nothing before them but an unvarying routine of waking and sleeping, hungering and eating.’ But the majority of Seneca’s arguments are in the other direction. They are the results of a deep sense of unhappiness and insecurity, which existed side by side with his philosophic self-complacency. They

were connected, on the one hand, with a timidity of nature and a real love of life; on the other hand, with a presentiment of evil and a sense of the necessity of preparing for the worst. When death suddenly and actually came upon Seneca—like Cicero, he met it with fortitude, in spite of his timidity, and probably not on account of his previous reasonings, but from an innate elevation of mind called out on emergency. We have observed that Seneca spoke of death as ‘either end or transition;’ this sums up his views of the future under an alternative. But his real tendency was to Platonic⁸⁴ visions of the soul freed from the trammels of the body and restored to freedom. He is unwilling that Lucilius should arouse him from the ‘pleasant dream’ of immortality. He likes to expatiate on the tranquillity of mind and absolute liberty which await us ‘when we shall have got away from these dregs of existence into the sublime condition on high.’⁸⁵

It is a great contrast if we turn from Seneca to Epictetus. It is going from the florid to the severe, from varied feeling to the impersonal simplicity of the teacher, often from idle rhetoric to devout earnestness. No writings of Epictetus remain, but only (what is perhaps equally interesting for us) records of his didactic conversations, preserved as near as

⁸⁴ See above, page 334, where in an extract from Zeller we have anticipated the mention of Seneca’s fondness for dwelling on the imagination of a future state.

⁸⁵ We have not entered upon the analysis of Seneca’s philosophical works, because, in short, they are not speculative and philosophical, but of the same moralising stamp as his letters. It is, however, just to pay a tribute to the force of imagination shown by him in preconceiving the

physical discoveries of future ages (see his *Naturales Quaestiones*, vii. xxxi.). ‘Quam multa animalia hoc primum cognovimus sæculo! quam multa negotia ne hoc quidem! Multa venientis ævi populus ignota nobis sciet. Multa sæculistunc futuris, cum memoria nostri exoleverit, reservantur.’ Through his vividness of mind, this Spaniard of the first century has got the credit of predicting elsewhere, in terms remarkably coincident, the discovery of America.

possible in his own words by Arrian, the historian, who studied under him at Nicopolis. Epictetus was a lame slave, the property of Epaphroditus, who was himself the freedman and the favourite of Nero. While yet a slave, Epictetus was won over to the Stoic doctrine by Musonius Rufus.⁸⁶ Obtaining his freedom, he taught in Rome, and afterwards, when the philosophers were banished from the city by Domitian, in Nicopolis of Epirus. What is most striking about his discourses is their extremely religious spirit, and the gentle purity of the doctrines they advocate. In them Stoicism reached its culmination, and attained an almost entirely un-pagan character; its harsher traits were abandoned, and while Epictetus draws the picture of the wise man under the name of Cynic, there is hardly a trace of anything cynical in the life which he recommends. To mention the subjects of some of his discourses may serve to give an idea of their nature. The following headings strike the eye: 'On things in our power and not in our power.' 'How to preserve one's own character in everything.' 'How to follow out the conception that God is Father of mankind.' 'On moral advance.' 'On Providence.' 'On equanimity.' 'How to do all things pleasing to the gods.' 'What part of a sin is one's own.' 'On moral training.' As might be conjectured, there is nothing speculative in these discourses. Epictetus both received and imparted philosophy as a fulfill-

⁸⁶ Musonius Rufus, whom we have noticed before as the companion of Rubellius Plautus in Asia, 'returned from exile on the accession of Galba; and when Antonius Primus, the general of Vespasian, was marching upon Rome, he joined the ambassadors that were sent by Vitellius to the victorious general, and going among the soldiers of the latter, descanted upon the bless-

ings of peace and the dangers of war, but was soon compelled to put an end to his unseasonable eloquence. (Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Biog.*) He afterwards obtained the condemnation of Publius Celer, the traducer of Barea. (Tac. *Hist.* iii. 81; iv. 10, 40.) Fragments of his philosophy are preserved by Stobæus.

ing of the needs of the soul, not as a mere development of the intellect. His words on this and other subjects present very often a strange coincidence with the language of the Gospel. He says (*Dissert.* II. xi. 1), 'The beginning of philosophy is the consciousness of one's own weakness and inability with regard to what is needful.' 'The school of the philosopher is a physician's house; you should not go out from it pleased, but in pain. For you come not whole, but sick—one diseased in his shoulder and another in his head' (*Dissert.* III. xxiii. 30). 'Young man, having once heard these words, go away, and say to yourself, "Epictetus has not spoken them to me (from whence came they to him?), but some kind god by his means. It would not have come into the mind of Epictetus to say these things, since he is not accustomed to reason with anyone. Come, then, let us obey God, lest we should move God to anger."'⁸⁷ 'The true Cynic should recollect that he is sent as a messenger from Zeus to men, to declare to them concerning things good and evil, and to show them that they seek good where it is not to be found, and where it is to be found they do not desire it' (*Dissert.* III. xxii. 23).

With regard to the manifestations of Providence, Epictetus says (*Dissert.* i. 16, 19): 'What, then; since ye are all blind, is there not need of one who should fill up this place, and sing in behalf of you all the hymn to God? Of what else am I capable, who am a lame old man, except to sing the praises of God? Were I a nightingale, I would do as the nightingale; were I a swan, I would do as the swan. But now, since I have reason, I must sing of God. This is my office, and I perform it, nor will I leave my post, as far as in me lies, and I exhort you to join in the same song.'

⁸⁷ ἵνα μὴ θεοχόλωτοι ᾖμεν (*Dissert.* III. i. 36).

‘If anyone will properly feel this truth, that we are all especially born of God, and that God is the father of men and gods, I think that such a one will henceforth allow no mean or unworthy thoughts about himself. If Cæsar were to adopt you, would not your pride be unbearable; and now that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated?’ (*Dissert.* i. 3, 1).

Such sayings as these are a specimen of the vein of piety which runs through the teachings of Epictetus. In moral life, he exhorts to purity, equanimity, and forgiveness of injuries. He draws a broad line of distinction between things in our power and things out of our power. Within our power are the will and our opinion of things; beyond our power, the body, possessions, authority, and fame. The will itself nothing can touch; bonds, imprisonment, and death itself, do not impair the internal freedom of the will. Lameness impedes the leg, but not the will. True wisdom and happiness consist in placing all one’s thoughts and hopes on things within our power—that is to say, on the will itself and the internal consciousness. This attitude will render happiness impregnable, for the wise man will enter no contest save where he is sure of the victory.

In an exaltation of the will, and in thus withdrawing into its precincts, the Stoicism of Epictetus declares itself. To some extent he provided an objective side for his thought, by the pious and theological reflections which he introduced into his philosophy. But they were not sufficiently made to pervade his whole system, and with regard to the question of immortality he contented himself, as far as we know, with certain brief remarks, implying the utter resolution of personality after death. ‘Come,’ he says, ‘but whither?—to nothing dreadful, but only to what is near and dear to thee, to the elements whence thou hast sprung’ (*Diss.* III. xiii.

14). 'This is death, a mighty change, not into the non-existent, but into what is now non-existent. "Shall I then not exist?" No, *thou* wilt not exist, but something else of which the universe has need' (*Diss.* III. xxiv. 94). While placing the will in our own power, Epictetus at the same time adopted an entirely necessarian scheme. He followed Plato in making vice the result of ignorance, and he considered that men differed from brutes, not in freedom, but only in consciousness (*Diss.* II. viii. 4).

The same spirit as that of Epictetus the slave expresses itself in Marcus Aurelius the emperor, whose thoughts have come down to us in the shape of a monologue in twelve books. These last two great Stoical writers appear both to have been influenced by Neo-Platonic views, for which Stoicism, on its spiritual side, had a considerable affinity. The weakness of humanity is a leading idea with M. Aurelius.

'Of human life,' he says (ii. 17), 'the duration is a point; the substance is fleeting; the perception is dim; the fabric of the body is corruptible, the soul is an idle whirling; fortune is inscrutable, and fame beyond our judgment. In short, all that there is of the body is a stream, and all that there is of the soul is a dream and a smoke. Life is a war, and a lodging in a strange country; the name that we leave behind us is forgetfulness. What is there, then, that can conduct us? Philosophy alone. . . . Oh, my soul! wilt thou ever be good, and simple, and one, and naked, and more transparent than the body which clothes thee? Wilt thou ever be full and without a want, desiring nothing, hankering after nothing, whether animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasure, but content with thy present condition?' (x. i.)

Such are the mystical ecstasies into which Antoninus rises in communing with himself. With these, honest self-examinations and humility of feeling are often combined, and

the whole is tempered by a cold spirit of Stoical resignation. Of the philosophy of the Emperor we need not add anything further beyond one slight point—namely, that we find in him⁸⁸ the same psychological division of man into body, soul, and spirit, as had also been employed by St. Paul. We may take our leave of the monologue of Antoninus by quoting from it his feeling about the Christian martyrs. ‘The soul,’ he says, ‘when it must depart from the body, should be ready to be extinguished, to be dispersed, or to subsist a while longer with the body. But this readiness must proceed from its own judgment, and not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians; it must be arrived at with reflection and dignity, so that you could even convince another without declamation’ (xi. 3).

In Marcus Aurelius we appear at first sight to have the desire of Plato fulfilled. We see a philosopher on the throne. But even absolute power does not give influence or sway. Plato wished the whole State to bend and turn under the control of omnipotent wisdom, as the limbs of a man would follow the impulses of his mind. But very far was Marcus Aurelius from being gifted with that sort of electric force which could put itself out and transform the world, even if the Roman empire were not too huge and too corrupt for such a process. Philosophy in general must be considered as something incapable of coming immediately into contact with politics and practical life, and the philosophy of Antoninus consisted peculiarly in a withdrawal from the world, in self-examination, moral progress, and thoughts about God. While

⁸⁸ “Ο τί ποτε τοῦτό εἰμι σαρκα ἐστὶ καὶ πνεῦματιον καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν (ii. 2). Cf. iii. 16. Σῶμα, ψυχὴ, νοῦς xii. 3. Τρία ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκες, σμάδιον, πνεῦματιον, νοῦς. Cf. St.

Paul, *Thessal.* i. v. 23. Τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα. The πνεῦμα of St. Paul answers to the νοῦς or ἡγεμονικόν of Antoninus.

the Emperor was thus busied more with his own soul than with penetrating State reforms, the world enjoyed a halcyon time. The ruler was mild, just, and forgiving; he had only one deficiency, but that the greatest which could possibly attach to him, namely, an utter want of insight into character. The sole exception to his clemency was that, excited probably by the narrow malignance of his fellow Stoics—he condescended to persecute the Christians. The adoration of the people showed how much the gentleness of Marcus Aurelius was appreciated—but it is not the mild monarchs who leave permanent blessings to their country. Among his most public tastes seems to have been a fondness for jurisprudence; he produced several volumes of *Constitutions*. This province of industry was the one most attractive of the day. In the absence of literature, Roman jurisprudence is the one great and lasting product of the age of the Antonines.

And now a word must be said upon an often mooted and never thoroughly discussed subject—the influence of the Stoic philosophy upon Roman law. Acquaintance with Grecian philosophy in general began at Rome contemporaneously with a change in the laws. The first epoch of Roman law was an epoch of rigid forms, and a narrow but coherent system, exclusively adapted to Roman citizens. Commerce and conquest made it necessary that law should widen so as to embrace the inhabitants of the Italian States. Hence the growth of the prætor's adjudicating power. By degrees the decisions of the prætors in regard to the hitherto over-exclusive laws of property, and the rights of persons born out of the Roman city, grew up into a body of equity by the side of the civil law. This body of equity, which was framed on the principles of natural reason, of course reflected the highest general enlightenment and the most cultivated ideas of the jurisconsults of the day. We have already seen that during

the first and second centuries B.C. the most eminent Romans attached themselves to the direct study of Greek philosophy. To the list of the disciples of the Stoics we may add some names more immediately connected with jurisprudence. Q. Mutius Scævola (as well as Q. Ælius Tubero) appears to have been among the hearers of Panætius. C. Aquilius Gallus and Lucilius Balbus, distinguished jurisconsults of the time of Cicero, studied again under Scævola; and Balbus, who in Cicero's *De Naturâ Deorum* is made the expositor of the Stoical view, was teacher of Servius Sulpicius. Equity attained in the eyes of such persons an immense preference over the civil law. To this tendency of opinions Cicero gave a great stimulus, maintaining, as he did always, that justice must be based on humanity and reason, and 'that the source and rule of right were not to be sought in the laws of the Twelve Tables, but in the depths of the human⁹⁹ intelligence.' Now, if we wish to form an idea to ourselves of the sort of way in which philosophy at Rome influenced jurisprudence, we may think of the philosophy of Cicero, that is, a philosophy not exclusively Stoical, but eclectic, practical, and human. Even the philosophers of the Stoic school themselves were by this time, as we have seen, all eclectic. Much more, then, would the lawyers avoid any rigid adherence to one set of formulæ; they would be sure to accept a certain mixture and modification of views. A number of humane and enlightened principles were now diffused, and it is perhaps true that the most noble of these ideas were due primarily to Stoicism—as, for instance, the cosmopolitan thought, that the world is our State, and that mankind are of one race, being all the children of God. But it is true also that the general course of history had tended to foster and develop this and other ideas which Stoicism forcibly enunciated.

⁹⁹ Mr. Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. ii. p. 528.

In the growth, then, of the Roman 'Jus Gentium,' and in the amelioration and softening of many austere legal usages (as, for instance, the absolute authority of fathers over their children), we see not simply and solely the influence of Stoicism, but of a generally enlightened practical philosophy, in which Stoicism was not more than an important element. But besides the material alterations which occurred in the spirit of the Roman laws, besides the era of the Jus Prætorium, we must look in another direction—to the era of 'codification,' if we wish to trace philosophical influences. An eminent authority maintains that 'the Stoical philosophy was to Roman jurisprudence what Benthamism has been to English law'—namely, a directing influence that came into play in the absence of any absolutely determining causes. These two principles of action might be said to be diametrically opposite to each other; for Benthamism, which looks to utility, commences with the concrete; while it is the essence of Stoicism to take an abstract point of view. The writings of Zeno and Chrysippus on the 'universal state' are lost, so we know not its details as conceived by them, but we may be sure that if Stoicism had had the framing of the laws for the Roman empire entrusted to its hands, there would have been a logical deduction from the principle of the natural freedom and equality of the whole human race. But what do we find? That slavery, even under Justinian, was mitigated, and not abolished; that men of different ranks were not equal in the sight of the law; that the civil incapacity of women (which Zeno had denied) still remained; that the application of cruel punishments, and even of torture, was treated by the new codes in a way which showed more a respect for existing usage and for the old statutes than a disposition to legislate synthetically from philosophical principles. 'Gaius, Ulpian, Papinian, and Paulus, appear very timid by the side of

Seneca and Epictetus.⁹⁰ Perhaps this belongs of necessity to the progress of jurisprudence, that it must not break too hastily with the past: but we are obliged, if this view be correct, to confine the influence of Stoicism on Roman law to the introduction of an idea of form, to the endeavour to bring the actual under the scope of certain abstract formulæ. We must not expect to find the logical and systematic development of these formulæ, but rather we must recognise a frequent antithesis between abstract principles and the details to which one might have expected them to be applied. And yet again it appears, if we look a little further, that the philosophical ideas to which the Jurists appealed, though not immediately triumphant over all other considerations in the Roman Code, did yet in some cases come into direct application; and what is of far more importance, that these principles, being enunciated with reverence, were held up for the admiration of posterity, and so came to exert an influence on the whole bearing of subsequent jurisprudence. When we read in the *Digest* the stately preamble concerning the Jus Naturale—which nature has taught all animals, and which is prior even to the Jus Gentium prevailing among the human race—we are apt to be most struck with the abstract and, we might almost say, futile appearance of such a principle, followed out afterwards with so little consistency. But the idea of the ‘Law of Nature,’ enunciated here and elsewhere in the Roman Code, being taken up by Grotius and the Continental Jurists, became a leading idea of jurisprudence, the characteristic principle of a particular school, and the antithesis of Benthamism. What is the meaning of this conception, the ‘Law of Nature,’ and whether it has

⁹⁰ M. Denis, *Histoire des Théories et des Idées Morales dans l'Antiquité*, vol. ii. p. 215. Paris, 1856.

any reality or value as separate from, or opposed to, utility and experience, is a matter of keen debate amongst philosophical Jurists. It is not the province of the present Essay to enter upon this question. That which is our concern we may dismiss with only two remarks of recapitulation : First, the idea of the Law of Nature, as introduced into the Roman law, was not by any means purely Stoical, but was the result of the general growth of ideas in the first century B.C., and was vividly apprehended by the eclectic and practical Cicero ; second, this idea, though subsequently so influential, was not by any means uniformly applied in the details of the Corpus Juris.

Whatever fragments of Stoicism were preserved in the Roman law descended, no doubt, as a contribution not only to modern law, but also to modern morals. In other channels the direct connection of our own thoughts with the ancient Stoics is hard to trace, because, long before modern thought began a separate existence, Stoicism had sunk into the world, and had influenced the ideas of men far beyond its own immediate school. But in acknowledging the influence of ancient civilisation at all, in acknowledging the impress of Cicero and Tacitus, and even of the Fathers of the Church, we acknowledge to an appreciable extent a debt to Stoicism. This, while arising in a form of a Greek philosophy, was at the same time a reaction, from a Semitic point of view, against the Grecian and the philosophical spirit. Hence its affinity to modern feelings. We have seen how it held up the delights of an inner life as preferable to all tangible and palpable enjoyments, however innocent they might be ; we have seen how it drew the mind away from external realities into an abstract ideal ; how it delighted in the conception of moral progress and the triumph of will ; how it developed the thought of duty and the responsibility of the individual ;

how, deserting the restrictions of national politics, it raised itself to conceive of all mankind as one brotherhood, each member standing in direct relation to God; finally, we have seen how, following its natural tendencies, Stoicism became more and more exclusively theological in its views. To some extent, then, this doctrine supplied the needs of the human soul and the wants of a spiritual religion. Running parallel with Christianity, and quite uninfluenced by it, it yet exhibited the development of pure, gentle, and unworldly thoughts in the mind. It showed us how high it was possible for the Pagans to reach. At the same time it bore upon its face its own imperfection, its onesidedness, and its unnatural and paradoxical character.

ESSAY VII.

On the Relation of Aristotle's Ethics to Modern Systems.

IT was not by means of his Ethical Treatise that Aristotle obtained his great and lasting influence over the mind of Europe. We have seen how, almost immediately after the death of Aristotle, Ethics in Greece were constructed afresh—from a Greek point of view by Epicurus, and in a Semitic spirit by Zeno and the Stoics. Henceforth the Platonico-Aristotelian moral system may be said to have been superseded. Systems less philosophical and artistic, but which responded more directly to the wants of the individual soul, now occupied the attention of antiquity. When we come to Cicero, who may be regarded as a fair representation of the philosophical culture of the first century B.C., we find that he knows nothing about Aristotle's *Ethics*, while he is deeply imbued by many of the Stoical writings. Afterwards the tribe of professional Sophists increased and multiplied, so that Lucian said that 'it would be easier to fall into a ship without touching timber, than to go into any town without encountering a Sophist.' These persons—who were different in many ways from their predecessors of the fifth century B.C., and of whom Dion Chrysostomus was one of the highest specimens—were like modern popular preachers, and often

itinerant, like the mendicant orders of friars. They mixed up the sometimes incompatible theories of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, and Epicurus, and compounded out of them a moral doctrine for the people. In the meanwhile philosophy proper (as it then existed), under the forms of Stoicism or Neo-Platonism, was always becoming more and more theological; and a scientific, but limited, system of ethics, like that of Aristotle, which treated Man as the happy citizen of a Greek republic, and which excluded all metaphysical and theological considerations, can have had no attractions for even thoughtful minds under the Roman Empire. 'Then came the inundation of Barbarians, with whose uncultivated and instinctive natures a wise and refined philosophy had nothing in common. The tale of Christianity appealed to their child-like imaginations, and its simple morals to their unsophisticated hearts, and throughout the Middle Ages a religion inspired with a divine spirit, but whose outward materials consisted of a mixture of Jewish with Greco-Latin traditions, reigned supreme over men's minds. Happiness, which the philosophers had sought to find in this world in the practice of virtue, was postponed to a life to come, and Pain became the ideal of man upon earth. But as this ideal was insufficient for the conduct of society, primitive Christianity appropriated to itself the fragments of ancient wisdom which had survived the shipwreck, and the teaching of the Gospel spread them abroad.'¹ Thus Aristotle, too, was saved from oblivion. Owing, probably, to the labours of Andronicus, his works as a collective whole were still in existence. At first excommunicated as 'atheistical' and kept aloof by the Church, he was afterwards received and adopted for the sake of his method, and then almost incorporated with

¹ *L'Année Philosophique ; études générales*, par M. F. Pillon (Paris, 1868), p. 145.

Christianity. His Greek and philosophical point of view was utterly ignored, but his words were used to set forth the ideas of ecclesiastics and schoolmen, and his peculiar formulæ—logical, metaphysical, and ethical—became stamped to a remarkable extent upon the language of the world. But it must not be supposed that Aristotle, even in any sense, was read and known throughout the Middle Ages. For some centuries it appears that only the *Categories* and the treatise *On Interpretation* (neither of them, probably, a genuine work of Aristotle) were studied by the schoolmen, and these only in the Latin translations of Boëthius; and yet these two treatises were the sole armoury from which the Nominalists had to fight the Realists. Afterwards the Arabian Averroes (1120–1198 A.D.) introduced a richer knowledge of Aristotle, through Spain, into Europe; and then, after the Crusades (1270), western Christendom obtained translations of *all* the works of Aristotle,² partly from Arabian copies in Spain, partly from Greek originals which the Crusaders brought with them from Constantinople, or other Greek cities. The first of the works translated at this time into Latin by a western writer seems to have been the *Ethics*—translated by Hermannus Alemannus at Toledo, in Spain. Afterwards the *Ethics* were commented on by St. Thomas Aquinas, and with this commentary Dante appears to have

² In the years 1260–70, Thomas Aquinas prepared, through the instrumentality of the monk Wilhelm of Moerbeke, his *new* Latin translation of the works of Aristotle after Greek originals. This goes by the name of the *Vetus Translatio*, and its verbal accuracy is considered to place it on a level with the best MSS. (Stahr, in Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Biog.*). The *Vetus Translatio* is full

of a strange Latinity, which arises out of a transliteration, often incorrectly made, of Greek words into the Roman character. Thus we find 'chaymus' as the translation of *χαῦμος*, 'epychia' of *ἐπιχία*, 'michrochindinus' of *μικροχίνδινος*, &c. And mediævalisms occur occasionally, such as the word 'costa' for a side, instead of 'latus.'

been acquainted. If one turns it over, one is struck by the straightforward manner in which it is composed; its only object seems to be to convey exactly what Aristotle said, especially by the enucleation of his arguments. Occasionally, however, it introduces a word or two for the sake of reconciling Aristotle with the doctrine of the Church. For instance, when Aristotle says (*Eth.* i. x. 2) that 'it is absurd to speak of a man being happy after he is dead,' Aquinas observes, 'Est notandum, quod Philosophus non loquitur hic de felicitate futuræ vitæ, sed de felicitate præsentis vitæ, utrum attribui possit homini dum vivit vel solum in morte.' And when Aristotle denies (*Eth.* x. viii. 7) that moral virtue can be attributed to the gods, Aquinas explains 'Diis, id est substantiis separatis—substantiis superioribus,' thus softening Greek polytheism into the doctrine of Angels. But there can be no doubt that to some extent Aristotle exercised a secularising and pagan influence upon the churchmen who studied him so laboriously. He was now recognised as the great Encyclopædist, as the 'Master of those that know,' as the strongest of the ancients, to whom Socrates and Plato and the rest must look up.³ For such a position Aristotle had unconsciously laid himself out by setting himself 'to philosophise upon every department of knowledge, and not to regard mere practical utility, but as far as possible to leave nothing unexplored.'⁴ And yet 'could he have reappeared among later generations, he would have been the first to repudiate the servility of his followers, the first to point out the inanity of Scholasticism.'⁵ He would have justly complained

³ Dante, *Inferno*, Canto iv. 131.

'Vidi il Maestro di color che sanno,
Seder tra filosofica famiglia.
Tutti lo miran, tutti onor gli fanno;

Quivi vid' io e Socrate e Platone,
Che innanzi agli altri più presso gli
stanno.'

⁴ See above, page 183, note.

⁵ Lewes, *Aristotle*, p. 382.

of the prolonged monopoly of study and the undue predominance given to his Logical treatises, which he had intended to be mere *prolegomena* to the great body of knowledge. He would have complained that so much which he had left unfinished and arrested by his death, should be regarded as complete and final, to the repression of all further inquiry. When the revival of learning came, he 'would have been the first to welcome and extend the new discoveries, and to have sided with Galileo and Bacon against the Aristotelians.'⁶

The *Ethics* of Aristotle do not appear at any period of the Middle Ages to have held a foremost place in the consideration of men; with this treatise Aristotle was not primarily identified, either for praise or blame. And thus the reaction made by Ramus and others against the garbled philosophy of the Aristotelians was an attack against their method in physics, and not against their ethical doctrines. Patricius, writing in 1580 A.D., gives a list of the works of Aristotle lectured on in the Italian schools.⁷ In this list neither the *Ethics* nor *Politics* are included. The works enumerated as constituting a four years' curriculum of study are the *Predicables* (by Porphyry), the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, a few chapters of the *Prior and Posterior Analytics*, 4 books of the *Physical Discourse*, 2 books of the treatise *On the Heaven*, 2 of that *On Generation and Corruption*, the whole of the work *On the Soul*, and the 4 most important books of *Metaphysics*. Patricius speaks of this as if it had been a curriculum intended for medical students, to qualify them for their profession as soon as possible. If so, it is curious that the treatise *On the Parts of Animals* and that *On the Generation of Animals* should

⁶ Lewes, *Aristotle*, p. 382.

⁷ *Discussiones Peripateticæ*, Tom. I. lib. xiii. p. 173.

not have been studied. Rather, this looks like a scheme for general liberal education, and what we have to notice is, that the *Ethics* should not have been admitted into it.

The Renaissance and the Reformation gave rise to a fresh start in philosophy, which commenced anew in Descartes and Bacon, with two divergent but highly fruitful and important tendencies. Ethics also were opened afresh, quite independently of ancient systems, but still bearing traces of the ten centuries of Theology which had brooded over Europe. Two great conceptions, both of them Semitic in character, Theology had bequeathed to Ethics—the conceptions, namely, of the will of God and of the will of Man. And the first speculative ethical systems of modern times, as conceived by Spinoza and Leibnitz, essayed to fix the relation to each other of these two conceptions by the attainment of a higher point of view from which they might be reconciled. The question of Free-will and Necessity was now the natural ἀρχή for Ethical science. And this consideration alone would be enough to show how much Aristotle's system had been left behind, how little it would suffice to meet the exigencies of modern thought. Neither to the Theological question, How is the freedom of the will compatible with the omnipotence of God? nor to the Metaphysical question, How is the independence of the will reconcilable with the unalterable sequence of cause and effect in nature? do Aristotle's *Ethics* attempt any answer. It is not merely that the treatise takes a 'political' point of view, and defers all metaphysical and theological questions. Aristotle argues against the Platonic view that vice, being ignorance, is involuntary. But he does so (*Eth.* III. v. 22–6) on the assumption that virtue is voluntary, and with the practical postulate that man is the originator of his own actions. The real

thing is, that the question of Free-will and Necessity, as it came up in modern times, had not forced itself upon Aristotle.

A second question, which differentiates modern systems from the *Ethics* of Aristotle, is the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' question of the ground of action, Why am I obliged to do this rather than that? To which in England there came various answers from Hobbes, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Mandeville, Adam Smith, Hume, and Paley; some of whom placed the ground of action in enlightened selfishness, or utility, with or without religious sanctions added, and others in an authoritative internal principle, the dictates of conscience, or an intuitive moral sense; while Kant, afterwards taking up the question, rejected, as unworthy, all external motives and inducements to right action, and endeavoured to reduce all to the idea of duty, as an *a priori* law of the will. On this point the utterances of Aristotle were simpler than those of the modern writers above mentioned. He took a broad view of man, as a creature in the Universe, and asked what is the chief good for man, and how is it attainable? And he answered that the chief good consists in the sense of vital action in accordance with the law of man's being (*ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπερίην*); that this is only permanently attainable by the formation of habits; and that habits, or formed states, arise out of acts. On the inducements to particular acts he speaks only incidentally. He says (*Eth.* III. i. 11) that the beauty of an act may put us under a sort of compulsion to do it; that we have an intuitive sense of moral beauty (*αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης*, see above, p. 257); that we have a general wish for the good (*Eth.* III. iv. 4) which furnishes the idea of the end to be aimed at in action, and that it is only a very foolish person (*κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου*, *Eth.* III. v. 12) who does not take

the right means to this, or who forgets that a single bad act tends to the formation of a bad habit. All this absorbs the Right in the Beautiful and the Good, and refers everything in life to the law of man's being; it is a great and simple theory. Yet still the conception of the Right is deeper than that of the Beautiful and the Good. It springs perhaps from a Semitic source, and with its cognate conceptions of Duty and Obligation, it predominates over the ethical systems of modern times, which are thus strongly distinguished in character from a Greek system of the fourth century B.C.

The Ethics of modern Europe are far more psychological than those of Aristotle. They start with the possession of a mass of long-inherited distinctions, the foundations of some of which had been laid by Aristotle. He it was who, following out the suggestions of Plato, gave the first impulse to psychology by his division of the soul into rational, irrational, or semi-rational (*μετέχον λόγου*) elements; by another division of mental phenomena into *δυνάμεις*, *πάθη*, and *ἔξεις*; by the distinction of different forms of the voluntary into *βούλησις*, *βούλευσις*, and *προαίρεσις*; and by separating the two spheres of the practical and the speculative reason. But these various analyses of the mind were thrown out in a somewhat cursory manner; they were not laid down as the basis of ethical science, whereas a modern writer, like Dugald Stewart—whose *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man* might be taken as the representative of a large class of modern systems—considers the analysis of the 'active propensities' in men to be the 'only way in which the light of nature enables us to form any reasonable conclusions concerning the ends and destination of our being, and the purposes for which we were sent into the world.' Dugald Stewart thus makes it the object of ethics to learn the designs of God in placing man in the world—which is

considerably different from Aristotle's inquiry into the *τέλος* for man (see above, page 223)—and he makes the means to this to consist in a psychological classification of man's powers and propensities. Aristotle only goes so far in the same direction as to say that the chief good for man must be found in the employment of that faculty which is highest in man, but it is hardly by psychology that he arrives at the conclusion that Reason is the highest faculty in us. This is rather a metaphysical *datum*—Reason being, according to Aristotle's general philosophy, 'the only divine thing in the world.' For the rest, Aristotle does not obtain his lists of the Virtues from a classification of man's 'appetites,' 'desires,' 'affections,' and the like; he accepts ready-made the cardinal and subordinate virtues recognised by Greek society. And in the same way he accepts the idea of Friendship, as current in his times, without basing it on any special need or tendency to be found by a partition of the mind.

The most striking ethical term of modern days is the term 'Conscience.' This term, which owed its first origin and currency to the thoughts and expressions of the Stoics and St. Paul, naturally assumed a great prominence and importance in the history of the Church, especially owing to the practice of the Confessional. Then arose the conflict of different obligations with regard to the same act, and hence 'cases of Conscience,' and 'Casuistry,' the science of dealing with such cases. The Jesuits especially applied themselves to this science; they compiled great systems of Casuistry to meet every conceivable question as to moral, or rather religious, obligation, and these systems for the time being usurped the place of ethical science. Aristotle had no one word to express what we mean by 'Conscience;' his moral psychology had not advanced so far as this; the idea of the 'relief of conscience' by confession, or otherwise, being un-

Greek, would have been alien from his modes of thought. He describes, indeed, in graphic terms the self-reproach and unhappiness of a man who has yielded to temptation, and who 'could have wished that those pleasures had not happened to him' (*Eth.* ix. iv. 10), but this description is given in simple and concrete form, and Aristotle does not make an abstraction of the Conscience. His ἀπορίαι or difficult questions on different points of morals have sometimes the appearance of questions in Casuistry (cf. *Eth.* ix. i.-iii.), but in reality they stand on the same footing with ἀπορίαι in all other sciences; they are a mode of testing some general definition by bringing forward apparent exceptions to it; they are merely an intellectual instrument for obtaining clearness of conception.

Ethics in the modern world have tended, ever and anon, more and more to free themselves from Theology. Of late, not content with the analysis of man's nature as it is, they have entered upon the speculative question, How has man's moral nature come to be what it is? This is the inquiry of certain Schools which commence by denying the reality of any *à priori* ideas in Morals or in any other subject. This being assumed, a genesis for each moral idea must be sought in experience; it must be shown how mankind out of mere animal instincts of self-preservation and desire for pleasure slowly built up the ideas of Justice, Purity, Truth, Benevolence, Modesty, the Right, and all kindred notions. Many of these ideas are, it is true, as old as the history of mankind, and some philosophers go so far as to assert generally that moral ideas admit of no advance. The late Mr. Buckle, who took this view, gladly quotes^{*} Sir James Mackintosh as saying 'Morality admits of no discoveries. . . . More than

^{*} *History of Civilisation in England*, vol. i. 180, note (ed. of 1868).

three thousand years have elapsed since the composition of the Pentateuch; and let any man, if he is able, tell me in what important respect the rule of life has varied since that distant period. Let the Institutes of Menu be explored with the same view; we shall arrive at the same conclusion. The fact is evident that no improvements have been made in practical morality. The facts which lead to the formation of moral rules are as accessible, and must be as obvious, to the simplest barbarian as to the most enlightened philosopher.' But these remarks involve a great exaggeration; instead of its being true that 'no improvements have been made in practical morality,' it is far rather 'evident' that morality improves and must improve with the growth of knowledge and other civilisation. To trace, as far as possible, the formation and growth of moral ideas, is a most legitimate inquiry. And contemporary writers, with the view of throwing light on this subject, have brought together many curious facts from the traditions of early society and from the customs observed to exist among savage peoples who are still in an infantile condition. Such investigations are an endeavour to account for the actual 'content' of man's moral nature, to explain how the otherwise blank formulæ of morality have come to be filled up in a particular way. It is another, and still more speculative, endeavour to go on and ask, What is the genesis of the moral faculties themselves? In answer to this we have the famous 'Evolution theory' of the present day, which points to hereditary habits and tendencies in the nervous and cerebral organisations of animals, and argues that the moral nature of modern civilised man is but the complex result of a long series of these hereditary transmissions—the habit or tendency, so transmitted, having been in each case the result of some experience of life. And thus, by going back from the complex present to the simple past, we

arrive at the early ancestry of man's moral nature in the 'Ascidians' of Mr. Darwin, or in some portion of matter possessing the power of contractility. In this speculation *ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*. Man's moral nature has its basis in Reason, and if it can be conceived that Reason has grown out of Matter, without having originally existed in Matter or in relation to Matter, then Mr. Darwin's theory of the genesis of man's moral nature may be received;—it is, in fact, nearly identical with that of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius in old times, though, up to a certain point, better supported than theirs by observations and analogies.

Aristotle's *Ethics*, and indeed his philosophy in general, are left far in the background by these recent systems. In comparison with all modern scientific accounts of the development of this Earth and of Man, Aristotle's views are of no value. He repudiated the theory of Democritus, and believed in the eternity of the world, the same as a whole, and pretty much the same in its parts, during an infinite past. He admitted a certain progress and development in human societies, and even accepted a strange theory thrown out by Plato (*Laws*, 677 A.) that the human race had periodically been destroyed by floods, all but a few individuals, who had in each case the task of beginning civilisation anew (see above, page 289). But he considered that the possession of Reason by the individuals who were left, would always insure the fresh perfecting of art and science, for in Reason everything is included. To say that Reason could be developed out of Matter, would have seemed to Aristotle a contradiction in terms. Reason was with him the absolute antithesis to Matter. He thought that in man the Reason was in no way connected with his physical organisation—that it was 'something of the nature of God, which came into him from

without.’⁹ While admitting that Reason in the individual is of the nature of a potentiality ever and anon evoked into actuality, and then again subsiding (see above, page 251), Reason in the Universe was figured by him as *ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*, as that which never is, nor ever could have been, in abeyance. When all has been said and done by the great physical investigators of the present day, they will still have to settle with Aristotle this metaphysical question: Can Reason be conceived as a mere result growing out of the blind and accidental changes of Matter, or must Reason be regarded as a pre-existing and absolutely necessary condition to the historical development of the material and intellectual world?

There is one other phase of Modern Ethics which may be mentioned in comparison, or rather contrast, with the system of Aristotle—namely, the modes of thinking, now pretty widely spread, which have arisen out of, or have an affinity to, Comte’s *Religion of Humanity*. These modes of thought have a negative side, being founded on atheism, and they have also a constructive side, in so far as they endeavour to supply other considerations which may fill up the vacuum caused by the negation of God and of a future life. The following sentences may serve to give a specimen of the results arrived at: ‘All moral action arises from the individual’s acting in consonance with the idea of his kind. To realise this, in the first place, and to bring himself as an individual, into abiding concord with the idea and destiny of mankind, is the essence of the duties which man owes to himself. But in the second place, to practically recognise and promote in all other individuals also this permanently enduring kind, is the essence of our duties to others.’ Obliga-

⁹ *De Gen. An* 11. iii. 10, quoted above, p. 297. note.

tions of gratitude are specified to the Family, and then to the State: 'From the nation we have received our language and the entire culture connected with language and literature; national habits are also the basis of family life; to the nation we must be ready to consecrate our best energies—if need be, our lives. But we must recognise our own nation to be but one member of the body of humanity, of which we must not wish any other member, any other nation, to be mutilated, or stunted; as Humanity can only flourish as a whole in the harmonious development of all her members; as again, her stamp is to be recognised and respected in every single individual, to whatever nation he may belong.' 'Ever remember that thou art human, not merely a natural production; ever remember that all others are human also, and, with all individual differences, the same as thou, having the same needs and claims as thyself: this is the sum and substance of morality.' Then follow duties of man to Nature: 'Man is labouring in his own special vocation, if not one of Nature's creatures appears to him too insignificant for the investigation of its structure and habits, but neither any star too remote to be drawn within the sphere of his observation for the calculation of its motions and its course.' Finally man's duties to the brute creation are indicated. 'He knows that the animal is as much a sentient being as himself.' He will spare the sufferings of animals, in their necessary deaths, as much as possible and render their service as tolerable as possible. 'The manner in which a nation in the aggregate treats animals is one chief measure of its real civilisation.'¹⁰ All this, and much more of the same kind, if we can forget its negative and atheistical origin, and treat it merely as a system of Ethics entirely divorced from Theology,

¹⁰ STRAUSS. *The Old Faith and the New* (English translation, London, 1873), pp. 274 seq.

is in itself sufficiently noble. It, inculcates the principles of self-sacrifice, love of one's neighbour, persistent effort for the good of society, striving after knowledge of all kinds, tenderness to all, even to the dumb animals. The Comtist morality, to a somewhat striking extent, resembles Buddhism, which also seems to have consisted in the union of positivist views regarding God, with a tender sympathy for mankind and the animals. But the resemblance is accidental, as there is no trace of Comte having copied the doctrines of Buddha. On the other hand, the best features of the Comtist morality cannot claim to be original. What is there in the doctrine of our duties to 'humanity,' which cannot be found first in Stoicism, and afterwards, in a simpler and sweeter form, in Christianity itself? Aristotle's *Ethics* therefore exhibit the same contrast to the morality of Comte as they do to that of Stoicism or of the Gospel. *First*, in the Grecian narrowness of their view, since the idea of the brotherhood of mankind had not dawned on Aristotle; to him Greek and Barbarian, Bond and Free, were in perpetual antithesis. *Secondly*, in their upholding the institution of Slavery as a matter of theory. Practically, indeed, Stoicism only served to mitigate, without abolishing, Slavery. And Christianity had existed for more than eighteen centuries in the world before any serious effort was made to abolish the Slavery of inferior races. But this was only a failure of carrying out the spirit and principles of Stoicism and Christianity. On the other hand, Aristotle supported the institution of Slavery in deliberate theory. Some thinkers of his age had considered slavery to be a mere institution of custom (*νόμος*), and unjust and unnatural, because based on no difference of nature between the master and the slave.¹¹ But Aristotle maintained on the contrary

¹¹ *Politics*, i. iii. 4.

that part of mankind are by nature slaves, being only fitted to be under control, not having a law of reason (*λόγον*) in themselves, and only sharing in it, so far as to be able to understand it when enunciated.¹² And hence he deduced the detestable doctrine that it is justifiable to make war for the purpose of reducing to slavery those who, having been by nature intended to be subject, refuse to be so.¹³ Domestic slavery in Athens was probably mild, and the lot of an Athenian slave may have been far better than that of many a free labourer in modern times. But the question is one of theory: Aristotle plainly denied the rights of humanity to a slave. He said, 'you cannot conceive a slave sharing in Happiness, any more than in a career in the State' (*Eth.* x. vi. 8).

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate the differences of point of view, which separate Aristotle from all modern systems. One difference is *that* between the Hellenic and the Semitic spirit; between a simple, joyous, and artistic theory of life, which points out how the Beautiful is attainable in action, and a Happiness 'more than mortal' in philosophic contemplation—and a mode of thought which removes Happiness to a region beyond the grave, makes this life a mere means to the attainment of a better life hereafter, and, so far as this world goes, raises Self-abnegation and Pain into objects to be chosen for their own sakes. Again, all the differences have to be taken into account which divide a system only contemplating a small Greek republic, and reflecting many of its peculiarities, from the wider views and changed circumstances of the modern world. The progress of Psychology and its abstractions, deepened by religion and religious morality, is another

¹² *Pol.* i. v. 9.

¹³ *Pol.* i. viii. 12.

matter in which Aristotle is left behind. The conception of the development of the Earth and of Man to which Palæontology and other sciences have given rise, is of purely modern origin, and influences to some extent even the theory of Morals. Lastly, the bold materialism of the last few years offers conclusions utterly irreconcilable with the philosophy of Aristotle.

Many of Aristotle's peculiar terms and phrases still live in ethical phraseology, having been perpetuated in modern language by the schoolmen. But they have for the most part lost their original philosophic import, and are used to express ideas quite out of the Aristotelian context. 'Habits' is no doubt only the Latinised form of *ἔξεις*, but the meaning which attached to *ἔξεις* does not remain pure in 'habit,' which, as it is generally used, rather implies *ἔθος*, i.e. that process by which a *ἔξεις* is formed. The 'passions' with us, though a translation of *πάθη*, do not quite correspond with them, they more nearly answer to the *ἐπιθυμίας* of Aristotle. 'Motive' is properly the 'efficient cause' (*ὁθεν ἡ κίνησις*), but applying it to action we use it invariably for the 'final cause' (*οὐ ἕνεκα*) which was Aristotle's term for the motive of an action. 'Principle,' as above mentioned (page 270), corresponds with the *ἀρχή* of the practical syllogism, but according to the Peripatetic system this major premiss contained an idea of the good, while our 'principle' is meant to imply an idea of the right. 'Energy,' though identical in form with *ἐνέργεια*, has quite lost all notion of a contrast and correlation with *δύναμις* or potentiality, and implies merely the existence of physical or moral force. In saying 'extremes meet,' we forget the philosophical antithesis between the extremes and the mean, and all which that 'mean' originally implied. In translating Aristotle's *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* by the terms 'moral virtue' we omit to notice how

much all these associations connected with the individual will, which go to make up our conception of 'moral,' were wanting in Aristotle's *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*, while this, strictly speaking, might perhaps be better represented by the words 'excellence of the character;' and, as has been already made apparent, in speaking of 'the end of man,' we substitute a religious for a philosophical association. The above-mentioned terms, however, have all a direct affinity to, and a lineal descent from, the system of Aristotle. They have only suffered that degree of change to which all language is liable, and which so many ancient words have undergone in their transition to modern use. Modern terms of this derivative character present, for the most part, two characteristics, as contrasted with their antique originals. In the first place, they are more definite. In the second place, they are less philosophic. The philosophy, however, that once surrounded them and formed their proper context, in ebbing away from them has really sunk into the general thought of the world and become absorbed in it. If 'energy' no longer represents *ἐνέργεια*, 'actuality' and many other forms of thought contain and reproduce all that was philosophical in the original word. If 'habit' is not exactly *ἔξῃς*, the 'law of habits' is a received doctrine in all practical Ethics. And so in a variety of ways Aristotle has influenced modern forms of expression.

But in the *matter* of morals the world has clearly outgrown the *Ethics* of Aristotle. And so, in a utilitarian age, the question may be raised, Why, then, should this treatise be any longer studied? To this, perhaps, dozens of answers might be offered, but we may content ourselves with a few. It might suffice to say in the words of a recent writer, 'nothing which has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality—no language they have spoken,

no oracle by which they have hushed their voices, no dream which has once been entertained by actual human minds, nothing about which they have ever been passionate, or expended time and zeal.'¹⁴ But if this answer be deemed inadequate by the utilitarian, then let him believe that the study of Aristotle is an essential part of high cultivation. If cultivation consists primarily in an acquaintance with the thoughts and words of the greatest writers of the world, Aristotle undoubtedly is one of those greatest writers. Again, cultivation consists in a knowledge of the past, for without this knowledge we cannot understand the present. And in tracing the progress of the thought of Europe a knowledge of Aristotle is an essential ingredient. As a training for youthful minds the *Ethics*, *Politics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Art of Poetry* of Aristotle are found by experience to have a peculiar value. The rich knowledge of life and human nature (the same in all ages) which they contain, their method of exhaustive classification, and their manly handling of all questions which arise, render these works a suitable propædæutic for many careers in life. And the late Dr. Arnold of Rugby¹⁵ used to set especial store on these studies as a main part of the curriculum of the University of Oxford. But again, if, apart from general education, a man would wish to form himself to be a philosopher, he can hardly dispense with a knowledge of the ancient systems, of which Aristotle is the culmination—the want of this knowledge is a deficiency and the source of a certain weakness in some of the most eminent English philosophers of the present day. Finally, it may certainly be good for us all, as a supplement to, and sometimes as a corrective of, our ordinary modes of thought, to imbibe a

¹⁴ *Studies in the History of the Renaissance*, by W. H. Pater, &c. (London, 1873), p. 38.

¹⁵ *The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D.*, by Dean Stanley, vol. ii. letter 274.

portion of the Hellenic spirit and to endeavour to infuse it into our daily life. And there are three great ideas, all too much neglected by the modern world, which we may learn from the *Ethics* of Aristotle to restore to their proper importance; and these are—the Beauty attainable in action, the high pleasure attainable in Philosophy, and the value and grandeur of a noble Friendship.

APPENDIX A.

On the Ethical Method of Aristotle.

SOME notice of Aristotle's Ethical method seems necessary for completeness; it is a subject too long for a note and too short for an Essay, and may be briefly despatched here. Incidentally we have already alluded to several characteristics of his point of view. And in the last resort a philosopher's method, whatever be the subject or science, depends on the whole bearing of his mind and thought. With regard to Ethics, we may first observe, that while Aristotle seems to occupy himself much with the logic of the sentence, and the question, What is its appropriate method? he is quite tentative and uncertain, and to some extent confused, in all he directly answers to this question. In the second place, we may notice that this method unconsciously declares itself, not in the abstract but in the concrete, throughout the pages of his treatise.

At the very outset of his work, in the first seven chapters, he has no less than three digressions on the logic of Ethics. In the first (*Eth.* I. iii. 1-4), he cautions his readers against expecting too much ἀκρίβεια in the present science. This term ἀκρίβεια (see the notes on *Eth.* I. vii. 18) seems to imply both mathematical exactness, and also metaphysical subtlety. The Ethical treatise of Spinoza might be said to

exhibit ἀκρίβεια in both senses of the word, on account of its demonstrative statement, combined with its metaphysical character of thought. Kant's system, without aiming at a mathematical method, might be called ἀκριβής, on account of its speculative depth of view. The question then is, of how much ἀκρίβεια is this 'branch of Politics' (πολιτική τις) capable? Aristotle tells us, that 'the matters of which it treats—virtue and justice—have so much about them that is fluctuating and uncertain, as even to have given rise to the opinion that they are only conventional distinctions. Hence, with such conceptions on which to reason, we cannot expect demonstrative and exact conclusions, we must be content with rough and general theories.' It is to be observed here, that Aristotle departs from the point of view with which he had started. He started with an *a priori* conception of the End-in-itself, which 'must be identical with the chief good for man.' Here he goes off into another point of view—that which looks at action from the outside, recognises the variations in the details of action, and allows the empirical casuistry of the Sophists to have an influence in determining the character of his science.

In his second digression upon this topic (*Eth.* i. iv. 5) he shows even more plainly a tentative and uncertain attitude. He says, 'We must not forget the distinction drawn by Plato between the two methods of science—the method which proceeds *from* principles, and that which proceeds *to* principles. The question is, Which must we adopt at present? We must begin, at all events, with things known. But again, things are *known* in two ways, absolutely and relatively. Perhaps *we*—i.e. as ethical philosophers—may be content to begin with what *we* know (i.e. relative and not absolute truths). Hence the necessity of a good moral training previous to the study of this science. For one who has been so trained is in

possession of facts which either already do, or soon can, stand in the light of principles.' In this passage there appears to be more than one play upon words: (1) In saying, 'perhaps then *we* must begin with what *we* know,' there is a sort of implication that the method of Ethics must be inductive, starting from relative and individual facts. But there is a fallacy in such an insinuation, because, though the individual must begin with what 'he knows,' there is nothing to prevent an absolute truth (τὸ ἀπλῶς γινώριμον) forming part of the intuitions and experience of the individual. (2) There appears to be a play on the word ἀρχή; for while Aristotle implies that the procedure must be to principles, and not starting from them, he says, on the other hand, that 'the fact is a principle.' Now, this may mean two things. It may mean that 'a moral fact or perception really amounts to a law.' But, in this case, the science of Ethics, beginning with moral facts, really begins ἀπ' ἀρχῶν. Or it may mean that 'the fact is a beginning or starting-point for discussion.' In this latter case the word ἀρχή should not have been used, as it introduces confusion into the present passage—the upshot of which, on the whole, seems to be, to assert in a very wavering way that Ethics must be inductive rather than deductive, and must commence with experience of particulars rather than with the intuitions of the universal.

The third digression on the same subject occurs *Eth.* i. vii. 17–21, where Aristotle points out his definition of the chief good as 'a sketch to be filled up;' and also, it would appear, as an ἀρχή or leading principle, which in importance amounts to 'more than half the whole' science. In filling up the sketch, he again cautions us that too much ἀκρίβεια is not to be expected. But it is plain that he has deserted his former view of the science as inductive; he now makes it depend on

a general conception of the chief good, which is to be applied and developed.

Elsewhere in the *Ethics* Aristotle appears puzzled how to deal with the casuistry of his subject. He says (*Eth.* II. ii. 3, 4) that 'the actions and the interests of men exhibit no fixed rule, any more than the conditions of health do; and if this is the case with the universal theory, still more is the theory of particular acts incapable of being exactly fixed, for it falls under the domain of no art or regimen, but the actors themselves must always watch what suits the occasion, as is the way with the physician's and the pilot's art. And yet, though the theory is of such a kind, we must do what we can to help it out.' He reverts to the same point of view, *Eth.* IX. ii. 6, mentioning some casuistical difficulties, and saying it is impossible to give a fixed rule on such points.

Much as Aristotle speaks of the logic of science, we find, when we come to examine his real procedure, how little he is influenced by his own abstract rules of method. It has been sometimes said that his *Ethics* exhibit a perfect specimen of the analytic method. But this is not the entire case. The discussions are very frequently of an analytic character, different parts and elements of human life are treated separately, and indeed are not sufficiently considered in their mutual relationship. And in subordinate questions the strength of his analytic investigation is manifest. Take, for instance, his treatment of Friendship—by analysing τὸ φιλητὸν into the good, the pleasant, and the useful, he at once obtains an insight into the whole subject. But the leading principles of his ethical science are not obtained by this sort of analysis, there is not by any means a procedure ἐν ἀρχαῖς. Aristotle's bias of mind was only on one side analytical, he was on the other side speculative and synthetical, and viewed all the world as reduced to unity under certain

forms of thought, and, as we have said before, every philosopher's modes and forms of thought, his genius, his breadth of view, and his power of penetration, will constitute in reality his logic of science and his method of discovery.

Aristotle's Ethical system, as we saw more in detail in Essay IV., depends on certain *a priori* conceptions, End, Form, and Actuality. We are enabled to some extent to trace how these conceptions grew up out of Platonism, but in their ultimate depth and force they must be regarded as lightning-flashes from the genius of Aristotle. These ideas, by which human life is explained, are no mere results of an induction, no last development of experience, rather they come in from above, and for the first time give some meaning to experience. Aristotle shows how his definition of the chief good includes all the previous notices of the requisitions for happiness. But his definition is not derived from combining these, nor yet from any analysis of happiness in the concrete, but from an inner intuition of a law of good as manifested in life. The same procedure manifests itself throughout. Whatever use Aristotle may make of his *ἀπορίαι*, of appeals to language and experience, of the authority of the many and the few, these are only means of testing, correcting, illustrating, and amplifying his conceptions, and not the source from whence they spring. However, the maintenance of this constant reconciliation with experience and with popular points of view is characteristic of Aristotle's method. That it gives rise at times to an empirical and unphilosophical mode of writing, we have had more than once an opportunity of observing. But it is Aristotle's strength as well as his weakness. His width of mind, which is as distinguished as its profundity, enabled him to sum up all the knowledge of ancient times, as well as all its philosophy. Bacon accuses him of being 'a dogmatic,' and of

resembling the Ottoman princes who killed all their brethren before they could reign themselves. This accusation is an exaggerated and somewhat invidious way of stating the real case. Aristotle is 'a dogmatic,' inasmuch as his philosophy is *γνωριστική οὐ πειραστική*, conclusive, and not merely starting the questions; and in the same sense almost every philosopher, who writes, is 'dogmatic,' for he would not write at all unless he thought that he had got a better system than any before him. Aristotle shows the relationship of all previous philosophies and contemporary opinions to his own system, by which he does not so much 'kill his brethren' as demonstrate that they are evidently 'younger brethren,' leaving his own right to the throne indefeasible. His relations, indeed, to Plato, in this respect are not entirely satisfactory; he never seems conscious of the enormity of his debt to Plato, and how much all the matter of his philosophy, as distinguished from a more precise and scientific mode of statement, had been suggested to him by the works of Plato. But if in the term 'dogmatist' arrogance or assumption is implied, this would not be true either of Aristotle's style of writing, or tone of thought. And he is by no means dogmatic on all points; on some, as we have already seen (in Essay V.), he declines to decide.

APPENDIX B.

On the 'ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟὶ ΛΟΓΟΙ.

IN six places of the undoubted writings of Aristotle, and in three passages of the *Ethics of Eudemus*, reference is made to 'Exoteric discourses,' or 'arguments' (*ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*). Ever since the revival of letters this phrase has attracted a wonderful amount of notice, and a whole literature of works has been composed in support of the different meanings which have been attributed to it. This literature begins perhaps with Octavianus Ferrarius (1573),¹ and, after receiving contributions from all the great modern authorities on Greek philosophy, it ends with the names of Bernays,² Spengel,³ and Grote.⁴ We must endeavour now to give some results of this controversy, in which, however, no important question has ever been involved; except so far as everything connected with Aristotle, and his mode of writing, is interesting and important.

Before the period when the Aristotelian MSS. were brought to Rome and edited by Andronicus, we know that

¹ *Octaviani Ferrarii Hieronymi F. Mediolanensis De Sermonibus Exotericis Liber, ad Bartholomæum Capram Joannis F. Jurisconsultum. Venetiis MDLXXV. apud Aldum.*

² *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in*

ihrem Verhältniss zu seinen übrigen Werken (Berlin, 1863).

³ *Aristotelische Studien*, i. p. 13 (Münich, 1864).

⁴ *Aristotle*, vol. i. pp. 63 sqq. (London, 1872).

many Dialogues, ascribed to Aristotle as their author, had been spread over the world and much read and admired, even to the exclusion⁵ sometimes of any knowledge of the more important treatises which we look upon as the works of Aristotle. When these latter works had been collectively edited, they were contrasted by the ancients with the lighter works in dialogic form which had before been known. And thus Cicero tells us, probably on information received by him from the learned Tyrannion (*De Finibus*, v. 5, 12), that 'On the *summum bonum* (Aristotle and Theophrastus) had two classes of books, one in popular style, which they called "exoteric," the other written in a more exact manner, which they left behind in their commentaries (or note-books),' and that this difference in the style of treatment gave rise to an appearance of inconsistency of view, which, however, was not real.⁶ This, then, was the state of things in the time of Cicero—that the Dialogues attributed to Aristotle were considered genuine, and spoken of as 'exoteric' writings. The Greek Commentators treated them in the same way, but there is no evidence that these dialogues were identified by the ancients with those particular references, in which Aristotle appeals to the 'exoteric discourses.'

The writers of the later empire, who were accustomed to the idea of mystical and hierophantic teachings, as professed by the neo-Platonic and neo-Pythagorean sects, got hold of this word 'exoteric,' and out of it created the fable that Aristotle had a double doctrine, the one form of it 'esoteric,' secret, and confined to an intimate circle of initiated scholars,

⁵ See above, page 8.

⁶ 'De summo autem bono quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod *ἐξωτερικόν* appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in

commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio.'

the other 'exoteric,' containing only superficial truth with which the profane vulgar might be put off and satisfied. In accordance with this notion, Aulus Gellius (xx. 4) gives the apocryphal story that Alexander the Great, having heard that the Acroatic (i.e. abstruse and intimate) discourses had been published, wrote from the East to complain of what had been done, 'since he should now have no superiority over the common herd,' and that Aristotle replied that 'the treatises, though published, were not published, for nobody would understand them.' Such a statement does not require refutation. After the Renaissance, when the works of Aristotle in their original form were widely studied, all the nonsense about his double doctrine was at once dissipated; and the simple, plain-sailing character of his philosophy was admitted on all hands. The only question then which remained was, whether on the few occasions when Aristotle mentions 'exoteric discourses,' he means to refer to his own more popular writings, or to something else. About the meaning of the term 'exoteric' itself, as used by Aristotle, there is no divergence of opinion. 'Exoteric' is not to be taken as opposed to 'esoteric' or secret, but the *ἑξωτερικὸς λόγος* is the external, non-philosophical, non-scientific treatment of a subject, opposed to the *οἰκεῖος λόγος*, or internal, appropriate, and scientific treatment of it. Such being the case, whenever Aristotle says, 'Enough is said on such or such a point, even in the exoteric discourses,' the only doubt is whether he means to refer to those works of his own in which he had treated of philosophical questions after a not strictly scientific method, or to the ordinary debates and discussions on such subjects, rife enough in Athenian society, but of course unscientifically conducted. The latter is the view of Madvig, Zeller, and Spengel, and Grote's opinion

would seem to be in the same direction.⁷ Bernays, on the other hand, argues that the points which Aristotle refers to as having been debated and settled in exoteric discourses were too abstruse and subtle to have been handled 'in the salons and coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) of Athens.' In an elaborate monograph he essays to prove that whenever Aristotle mentions 'the exoteric discourses' he is alluding to some passage in his own, now lost, *Dialogues*. The attempt, however, is infelicitous, and the result unconvincing.⁸ Three passages in which the *ἐξωτερικοί λόγοι* are mentioned, but which make against Bernays, he ignores, or but slightly mentions. The first of these occurs in the *Physical Discourse*, IV. x. 1; the other two in the *Eudemian Ethics*. Spengel very properly observes that any discussion on the nature of the *ἐξωτερικοί λόγοι* should start from an examination of the passage in the

⁷ Grote identifies 'exoteric' with the 'dialectical' treatment of a subject, and says: 'Properly speaking, the "exoteric" does not designate, or even imply, any positive doctrine at all. It denotes a many-sided controversial debate, in which numerous points are canvassed and few settled; the express purpose being to bring into full daylight the perplexing aspects of each. There are a few exceptional cases in which "exoteric discourse" will of itself have thrown up a tolerably trustworthy result; these few Aristotle occasionally singles out and appeals to.' This judgment, however, is unsatisfactory, and does not settle the question. 'Exoteric discourses' were doubtless 'dialectical' and not demonstrative, but this might apply equally to Aristotle's

Dialogues, or to the discussions of cultivated circles.

⁸ Bernays shakes the confidence one might otherwise feel in him as a scholar, by an unfortunate slip in page 135 of his work, here he says, 'Nach Diogenes Laertius 5, 19, soll Aristoteles an Platon einen "Vorsprung des Naturells (προτέρημα φύσεως)" anerkannt haben.' Whereas what Laertius really said was, that 'Plato defined Beauty as "a natural superiority."' The sentence occurs in a list of *Aristoteliana*: Τὸ κάλλος παντὸς ἔλεγεν ἐπιστολίου συστατικότερον. Οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν Διογένη φασὶν ὀρίσασθαι· αὐτὸν δὲ, δῶρον εἶπεν εὐμορφίας· Σωκράτης δὲ, ὀλιγοχρόνιον τυραννίδα· Πλάτωνα, προτέρημα φύσεως· κ.τ.λ.

Physical Discourse of Aristotle, which actually gives specimens of them. The question is as to the nature of Time, on which Aristotle says *καλῶς ἔχει διαπορῆσαι περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων πότερον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, εἴτα τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ*, and then follows a string of these 'exoteric arguments,' which are dialectical reasons for doubting whether Time can be said to exist, and dialectical difficulties as to its attributes. There seems no reason for holding, with Bernays, that such arguments were too abstruse for discussion in educated society, outside the philosophic schools, in Athens. The whole of the *Topics* of Aristotle, not to mention the Dialogues of Plato (which are obviously meant to have a dramatic truth), are against Bernays upon this point. And, at all events, it is impossible that Aristotle by the term *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, in the passage now quoted, can have been referring to his own Dialogues.

Again, in the *Ethics of Eudemus* (I. viii. 4) we find it said of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, that the subject belongs to another department, and is too subtle for discussion in an ethical treatise; that the writer (if he must briefly indicate his opinion) considers the Ideas to be vain abstractions; and that 'the question has already received manifold consideration both in exoteric and in philosophical discussions.'⁹ Here there is evidently no reference to the Dialogues of Aristotle. Eudemus is only mentioning, as Aristotle so often did,¹⁰ two classes of opinions and arguments on any subject—

⁹ Εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, λέγομεν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ἰδέαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὅπου λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

¹⁰ Cf. *Pol.* III. xii. 1. *ἔοικε δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μέχρι γέ*

τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν, 'people in general (= οἱ ἐξωτ. λόγ.) agree with the philosophical theories of ethics.' *Eth.* I. viii. 1. *Σκεπτόμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος (= ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν) ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς, &c.*

the popular and the philosophical. A few pages later in the same work (*Eth. Eud.* II. i. 1), we find the old and common division of goods, into 'external goods and goods in a soul,' mentioned in the following terms, Πάντα δὴ τὰγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἰρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοις· φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὧν ἕνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. Eudemus says that we make this distinction 'even when speaking popularly,' 'for all men consider either thought, virtue, or pleasure, to be an end-in-itself.' Thus the opinions¹¹ of 'all men' are identified with the ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.

In the fifth book of his treatise (*Eth. Nic.* VI. iv. 2) Eudemus makes a similar appeal to the distinctions established, apart from philosophy, in popular opinion and language, ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πράξις· πιστεύομεν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. Bernays, however, considers that the distinction of ποίησις from πράξις was too fundamental a doctrine in the Aristotelian system to be merely taken for granted, or accepted as having been established by the discussions of cultivated society. He therefore conjecturally infers that Aristotle must here be citing the conclusions arrived at in his own dialogue *Περὶ Ποιητῶν*, though none of the fragments of that dialogue, now existing, in the least bear out this supposition. On the other hand, it must be remembered (1) that in all probability Eudemus, and not Aristotle, wrote this passage, (2) that Plato (in *Charmides*, p. 163) describes an 'exoteric argument' between

¹¹ Aristotle himself (*Eth.* I. viii. 2) mentions the distinction here referred to, as one of the λεγόμενα on the subject of Happiness. He says that it is an old opinion, which has received the approval of philosophers

(κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων). It is therefore out of the question to suppose that Eudemus should seek to derive it from the Dialogues of Aristotle.

Critias and Socrates on the difference between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις*. The distinction there given is imperfect, and is meant as a caricature of the manner of Prodicus (see above, p. 125), but still it shows that the question itself had been mooted at a comparatively early period in Athenian talk. And there is no reason for doubting that in the century (or thereabouts) which intervened between Prodicus and Eudemus, the cleverness of the Sophists, and of the society in which they moved, should have sufficed to settle so simple a matter as the difference between 'making' and 'acting.'

Returning now to the undoubted works of Aristotle, we find in *Metaphys.* XII. i. 4, the sentence *Σκεπτέον πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν — ἔπειτα μετὰ ταῦτα χωρὶς περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ ὅσον νόμου χάριν · τεθρύλληται γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων*—'We have first to consider mathematical substances (their nature, &c.), and afterwards we must enter into a separate consideration of the Ideas, looking at them by themselves, and only so far as courtesy demands (*ὅσον νόμου χάριν*), for most points regarding them have been made common property even by the exoteric discussions upon them.' The first thing that strikes us in this passage is the parallel which it presents to the *Eudemian* saying (*Eth. Eud.* i. viii. 4), that 'the doctrine of Ideas had already received manifold consideration both in popular and in philosophical reasonings.' It is possible, indeed, that Aristotle may in this place of the *Metaphysics* be referring to those dialogues of his own in which, according to ancient authority (see above, page 213, *note*), he was 'always declaring his inability to sympathise with the doctrine of Ideas.' But if he does so, he does it by implication, not mentioning his own dialogues, but merely referring to the general class of 'exoteric discussions,' in which his own dialogues would be included. On the other hand, it is easy

to believe that Aristotle's early dissent from Plato's doctrine of Ideas gave rise to much talk in the intellectual circles of Athens, and it is more consonant with the expressions used that Aristotle is merely alluding to the results of that talk.

The next passage to be examined is *Politics*, III. vi. 5, Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥᾶδιον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις—'It is easy to classify the so-called forms of government, for even in unscientific discussion we often draw distinctions about them.' Here we have the same formula as in the *Eudemian* remark about the common division of goods (καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις). The very term *λεγομένους* points to matter of widely spread, ordinary, cognisance. Bernays, however, rejecting this simple explanation, conjectures a reference to the four dialogues, mentioned in the catalogue of Aristotle's writings, Πολιτικός, Περὶ Βασιλείας, Περὶ Ἀποικιῶν, Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης, which all *may have* discoursed on the forms of government. And this, he says, would justify the adverb *πολλάκις*. It would not, however, justify the present tense *διοριζόμεθα*, which, if taken as Bernays suggests, would imply that Aristotle, when he wrote his *Politics*, was still going on with dialogues and exoteric discourses. And this it is impossible to believe. If Aristotle ever wrote dialogues, he wrote them in his youth, and had left them far behind him, both in thought and manner, when he came to compose his systematic philosophy.

In *Politics*, VII. i. 2, it is said, Διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰρετώτατος βίος· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος. Νομισάντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς—'Considering, then, that many of the statements made on the subject of the Best Life even

in not strictly philosophical discourses are adequate, we must even now make use of them.' The expressions used in this passage are different from those in any of the passages previously reviewed. The phrase, 'we must even now make use of them,' is very striking. It looks as if Aristotle, for once in a way, was condescending to avail himself of a portion of one of his earlier writings. And this supposition is borne out by the strange appearance of what follows. Bernays is quite right in remarking that 'one who has been long accustomed to the severe atmosphere of Aristotle's ordinary style, finds himself greeted by a breath of unwonted mildness' in the paragraphs which immediately succeed that now quoted.¹² A fulness and even redundancy of expression, very unlike the usual crabbed brevity of Aristotle, now shows itself. The sentences are harmoniously rounded. A hortatory and somewhat fervent tone is observable. The whole passage, down to the end of the chapter, looks like the peroration of a dialogue, on a level—say with the *Menexenus*. The concluding words, which would have been suitable to such a peroration, look out of place in their present position in the *Politics*. We are willing, then, to concede to Bernays, that in the first chapter of the seventh book of the *Politics* we have not only a reference to, but an actual excerpt from, one of the

¹² The following quotations may illustrate the style of this passage:—
Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μὴθὲν
μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρίας μὴδὲ σωφροσύνης
μὴδὲ δικαιοσύνης μὴδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ
δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας μυίας,
ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μνησθένος, ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ
τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχαίων,
ἐνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθάροντα
τοὺς φιλάτους φίλους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ
διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινό-

μενον.—"Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστω τῆς εὐδαι-
μονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ
ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν
κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον
ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὅς
εὐδαιμων μὲν ἐστί καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν
δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ δι'
αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν
φύσιν.—Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας
ἑάσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, διασκευ-
τίον ὅσπερ, εἰ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις
τυγχάνει μὴ πεισθόμενος.

‘exoteric discourses’ of Aristotle. Bernays does not pronounce with certainty to which of the dialogues this passage originally belonged; he thinks it may have come either from a moral dialogue, called in the catalogue *Νήρινθος*, but which may perhaps be identified with that mentioned elsewhere¹³ under the name *Κορίνθιος*—or from the *Προτρεπτικός*, or ‘Exhortation to Philosophy.’

The last passage to be noticed is *Eth.* i. xiii. 9, where, in speaking of the soul, Aristotle says, *λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἓνια καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς · οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον—* ‘But some points about the soul seem to be sufficiently stated even in the unscientific discussions of the subject, and we must avail ourselves of them;—as, for instance, that part of it is irrational and part rational.’ The terms used here are nearly the same as those in the last-quoted passage, only with the important omission of *καὶ νῦν* before *χρηστέον*. Bernays finds here a reference to the dialogue of Aristotle called *Eudemus* (on which see above, page 301). But there is no appearance of any writing here likely to have come from such a work. And after the publication of Plato’s *Republic*, there seems no reason to think it impossible that a society which gave rise to the *Topics* of Aristotle (see above, page 132), should have arrived at the dichotomy of the soul into rational and irrational, as one of the results of its discussions. And of this rough basis of psychology Aristotle here seems to avail himself.

The conclusions, then, to which we venture to come with regard to the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, are as follows :

(1.) That Aristotle always uses the phrase generically, in a sense capable of including both his own not strictly

¹³ *Themistius, Or.* xxiii. p. 356.

scientific writings, and also the informal and dialectical discussions of other men.

(2.) That in different places he makes a different specific application of this generic term.

(3.) That in *Phys.* iv. x. 1, he uses it in reference to dialectical difficulties and questions, as to the nature of time, in vogue at Athens.

(4.) That in *Metaphys.* xii. i. 4; *Pol.* iii. vi. 5; and *Eth.* i. xiii. 9, he indicates by it the results arrived at by the extra-scholastic discussions and theories of the day.

(5.) That in *Pol.* vii. i. 2, he uses it in especial reference to one of his own earlier works, and actually proceeds to incorporate an extract from that work with his Political treatise.

(6.) That Eudemus, in the three places where he employs the phrase, means by it 'popular,' as opposed to 'philosophical' discussion.

The available fragments of the lost Dialogues of Aristotle have been collected by Valentine Rose, and are now prefixed to the splendid Index to Aristotle which forms the conclusion to the great Berlin Edition. The question of the genuineness of these fragments cannot here be thoroughly attempted. We cannot go with Valentine Rose the entire length of believing that Aristotle never wrote anything of the kind. Indeed, the passage in *Pol.* vii. i. 2 would be sufficient to prevent our holding such an opinion. There often occur fanciful and ornamental phrases in the works of Aristotle, which he may have 'availed himself of' from his earlier writings. Such, for instance, are: *μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ* (*Eth.* i. vii. 16), *διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπύλῳ* (*Ib.* i. v. 3), and *οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός* (adopted by Eudemus, *Eth.* v. i. 15). These and

many more such 'purple patches' may have originally appeared in the more youthful works of Aristotle. But that a considerable element of forgery contributed to the making up of the long catalogue of Aristotle's writings, we can hardly doubt.

APPENDIX C.

On the Political Ideas in the Ethics of Aristotle.

IT may seem a strange omission that, while we have so often alluded to Aristotle's identification or confusion of Ethics with Politics, we have never specified any very important consequences of this view; except, indeed, that we have noticed sometimes a restricted mode of dealing with certain questions, more appropriate to Politics than to philosophy. It remains then to ask, were there any such consequences? Does Aristotle write on Ethics differently because he considered that his science was a kind of Politics? Is the individual in his eyes always regarded as a citizen? Do his views of law, the State, and different questions of the constitution influence his views upon moral action? Every one will be ready to answer that such effects are hardly traceable. We read the *Ethics* as containing discussions on happiness, virtue, friendship, pleasure, and philosophy; we find it replete with anthropology, dealing with the heights and the depths of the human consciousness, and quite away from any consideration of the welfare of masses of mankind. Happiness, as here described, does not depend on any particular constitution or form of government. Aristotle, indeed, specifies the various forms of government, and declares which is the best among them (*Eth.* VIII. x.), but this is only for the purpose of illustration, for the sake of comparing the dif-

ferent degrees of equality in various kinds of friendship with the different degrees of liberty in various forms of the constitution. Aristotle's entering into detail here with regard to the governments is not so much a mark of consistency in preserving a political point of view, but rather it is a want of art and an entrenchment upon the subject of Politics proper. It would be called too long a digression, supposing there were a settled co-ordination of subject between the different parts of Aristotle's system. A still greater entrenchment on the province of Politics occurs in the theory of justice given in Book V. It is remarkable that this book, in all probability by Eudemus, sets forth a closer dependence of moral on political principles than any other book in the *Ethics*. Eudemus, as we saw before (p. 26), does not, at the outset like Aristotle, commence under the name of Politics. But in Book V. he probably merely reproduced, in perhaps imperfect form, the theory of Aristotle. Justice is here defined according to principles of Jurisprudence and Political Economy. To make these a part of morals would be a confusion we should never now fall into; though we might confess that it would be hard to give the ethical idea of justice its full content without appealing to these extraneous sciences.

Other allusions to Politics occur (*Eth.* I. xiii. 21), where Aristotle says that 'the true politician must study the nature of virtue;' (III. i. 1) where he says that 'a theory of the voluntary and involuntary will be useful to legislators;' (VIII. i. 4) 'friendship holds States together; legislators seem more anxious for this than for justice.' Lastly, we have the most remarkable place of all, when at the conclusion of his ethical treatise (x. ix. 8), he makes the transition to Politics proper, by saying that 'for virtue, not only nature, but habits and teaching are requisite, and these last must be provided

by the State. Hence,' he says, 'the nurture and the discipline should be fixed by law, and use will make them easy. Not only, perhaps, ought men while youths to receive good discipline, but also we want laws about their conduct when they are grown up; and, in short, about the whole of life. For the many will rather obey necessity than reason, punishment than the inducements of the beautiful.'

With these evidences before us, let us now sum up the bearing of Aristotle's political thought upon what we now call the *Ethics*. There seems to be an analogy between Aristotle's views of man in relation to the State, and his views of man in relation to nature. We have seen before (Essay V.) that in his *Physics* he considers man as part of nature, and, because he is a part, inferior to and less divine than the heaven and the universe; so, too, in his political system, he considers the State prior to and greater than the individual (*Politics*, I. ii. 13), just as the whole is prior to and greater than the part. The individual without the State has no meaning; the State must be presupposed; man is not a whole in himself (*αὐτάρκης*), he is born to live in relationship to others (*πολιτικός*), if he lived alone he must be either more or less than man (*ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός*). Just as Aristotle said 'the universe is diviner than man,' so he says 'the End for the State is diviner than that for the individual.' *Politics*, then, are the greatest science, the legislator is an *ἀρχιτέκτων*, a master builder laying the plan of that greatest practical thing, a fitly framed human society. This idea, if it were carried out, would tend to overwhelm all individuality. It actually does so in Plato's *Republic*, and the last-quoted passage (*Eth.* x. ix. 8) is a reproduction of the same feeling as Plato's. The laws are to regulate the whole of life, and to force a good discipline on those who would not choose virtue for its own sake. This

idea, then, forms one side of Aristotle's view, it is a sort of background to his ethical system. The End for the State, as he depicts it (see above, p. 228), is something almost mystical, it is like the identification of State and Church. But the other side of his view is that which seemed forced on him by the truth, as soon as he commences a course of ethical inquiries. It consists in an acknowledgment, to the full, of the absolute worth of the individual consciousness. Not only is a reaction thus made against the system of Plato, but also, by the whole treatment which Aristotle gives his subject, Ethics are virtually and for ever separated from Politics.

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS



BOOKS I.-II.

PLAN OF BOOK I.

THIS Book may be roughly divided into the following four parts:—

(1.) The statement of the leading question of political science ; namely, What is the Practical Good? Ch. I.—VI.

(2.) The answer to this question as given by Aristotle himself. Ch. VII.

(3.) A comparison of Aristotle's definition of the Good with existing opinions on the subject. Ch. VIII.—XII.

(4.) A commencement of the analysis of the different elements which constitute his definition. Ch. XIII.

With respect to these divisions, we may remark that they are not with entire precision separated from one another. For the first part professes to examine the most important opinions on the subject of Happiness or the Good (Ch. IV. § 4), and accordingly reviews men's conceptions of it as exhibited in their lives (Ch. V.), and refutes Plato's theory that the Good is a transcendental Idea, on the ground of its being both metaphysically untenable and practically inapplicable.

After developing his own conception, Aristotle returns (in Ch. VIII. *sqq.*) to compare it with τὰ λυγέμενα—'that goods of the mind are highest ;' 'that happiness consists in virtue,' &c. Now we may ask, Why did not a statement of these theories open the Book? Both in Part 1st and Part 3rd we have to do with the existing opinions. Had Aristotle pursued his usual method, he would have precluded his *Ethics* with a brief critical history of the previous progress of the science, in which the leading systems would have been refuted or shown to be inadequate. But it seems as if he did not set out with so clear a conception of ethics

as he does of physics and metaphysics. Before Aristotle, Ethics cannot be said to have existed as a separate science. Even in the present work there is no name for it as yet. Though *ἠθικοὶ λόγοι* and *τὰ ἠθικά* are spoken of in the *Politics* (III. xii. 1, VII. xiii. 5), and in the *Metaphysics* (I. i. 17), yet the word *ἠθική* does not occur. The science is still *πολιτική τις* (*Eth.* I. ii. 9); as in the *Rhetoric* it had been specified as *ἡ περὶ τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγμάτων ἡ δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν* (I. ii. 7).

Hence we may recognise something tentative and uncertain in Aristotle's treatment of the subject. He seems not clear as to how far he is entering on a merely practical and political science, and how far on something speculative. He professes to lay the foundations for his science inductively (Ch. IV. §§ 5-7) in experience, but really obtains his own theory from *a priori* grounds, arguing what the Good *must* be. That Aristotle's principle, thus obtained, is truly profound, we need not fail to acknowledge. Only, with regard to the science as a whole, we see that he was feeling his way; and we must not expect to find, even in the First Book of his *Ethics*, a finished work of art.

With this proviso we may rapidly trace the sequence of ideas contained by the Book, as follows:—The distinction between means and ends characterises every part of life and action. Given the subordination of means to ends, there must be some end which is never a means. This End-in-itself of all action is obviously identical with the Practical Chief Good (*δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον*). What, then, is this chief Good—which must be the determinator of life—and which is the object of Politics, the supreme practical science?

To this question no answer is to be obtained from the common opinions of men; nor from their lives, for the most part; nor from the metaphysical system of Plato.

The Good and the End are always identical; hence, as already said, the Chief Good is identical with the End-in-itself. In this conception the idea of absoluteness and all-sufficiency would seem to be implied (*τό γὰρ εἶλετο ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ*). It must be realised in the proper sphere of man, which a consideration of the scale of life leads us to see must be a rational and moral existence. To give meaning to the conception of this existence

we must assume that it falls under the category of the actual ; in other words, that it is 'vital action' or 'the realisation of man's nature ;' and this must be in accordance with its own proper law of excellence, and not frustrated by external adversity or shortness of duration. Hence we get a definition of the Chief Good for man—that it consists in 'a rightly harmonised consciousness in adequate external conditions.'

Comparing this fundamental principle ($\alpha\epsilon\chi\eta$) with the opinions and theories of others, we find that it includes or supersedes them. From it we get an answer to the common question, 'Is happiness to be acquired by human efforts?' and by means of it we are able to see the shallowness of Solon's view implied in the saying that 'No man can be called happy while he lives.' It at once renders nugatory the question, Is happiness praiseworthy or above praise ?

Assuming, then, the definition as above, let us examine its component parts. And, first, what is that law of excellence (peculiar to man) which is to regulate his mind? A popular psychology serves as a basis for discussing this. Man is a compound of a rational and an irrational nature. Part of his irrational nature (the passions) rises into communion with reason. This part, then, and the reason itself, are two elements in which human excellence may be exhibited. According to this division, we distinguish, on the one hand, intellectual excellence ; on the other hand, moral excellence or virtue : and these two may henceforth be separately discussed.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ Ι.

ΠΑΣΑ τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις τε
καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ διὸ

I. The opening of Aristotle's *Ethica* might be paralleled with that of his *Metaphysics*—*πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἶδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει*. As there it is first said that 'all by a natural instinct desire knowledge,' and then Aristotle proceeds to distinguish among the various kinds of knowledge a supreme kind, which is Philosophy or Metaphysics; so here he says that every human impulse is prompted by the desire of some good, or is, in other words, a means to some end, and among ends there is one supreme end, which is never a means, the object of politics—the chief good, or human happiness. The beginning of the *Politics* is also very similar. All actions are done for the sake of what is thought to be good. Therefore all societies aim at some good, and that society which includes all others aims at the highest good. See Essay I. p. 22.

ἡ πᾶσα τέχνη—δοκεῖ] 'Every art and every science, and so, too, each act and purpose, seems to aim at some good,' i.e. 'every exercise of the human powers.' The enumeration here given answers to the division of the mind (*Eth.* vi. ii.) into speculative, productive, and practical. *Μέθοδος* is literally 'way' or 'road' to know-

ledge, i.e. a research or inquiry. The metaphor still appears in such places as Plato's *Republic*, vii. p. 533 C, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται. *Phædrus*, 269 D, οὐχ ἡ Τίσις—πορεύεται δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος. It is farther used in the sense of a regular or scientific method, and it stands here, as elsewhere (*Eth.* i. ii. 9, *Poet.* xix. 2, *Phys.* i. i. 1), for science itself. The word is well defined by Simplicius (in *Arist. Phys.* fol. 4), ἡ μετὰ ὁδοῦ τινὸς εὐτάκτου πρόοδος ἐπὶ τὸ γνωστόν. *Πρᾶξις* and *προαίρεσις*, action and purpose, go to make up one conception, that of 'moral action.' They are related as language to thought, the outer to the inner. *Δοκεῖ* does not imply any doubt in the assertion. Sometimes it denotes the opinion of others, not of Aristotle himself (*Eth.* i. iii. 2, x. viii. 13, where see note), but sometimes it is a part of style, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism. With this use of *δοκεῖ* may be compared that of similar words, such as *ἴσως*, 'no doubt,' (iv. viii. 9) *εἴδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτει* (κωλύει); *σχεδόν*, 'nearly,' 'something like,' (i. viii. 4) *σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐχόμενος εἰρηται καὶ εὐπραγία*; *μάλιστα*, 'upon the whole,' (i. v. 2) *τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ*

2 καλῶς ἀπεφάναντο τὰγαθόν, οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ
 δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν. τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι,
 τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ
 τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν
 3 τὰ ἔργα. πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ
 ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἱατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ
 ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονο-
 4 μικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν

προβχοντες (βλοι). Such phrases arise partly from Attic usage, partly from the genius of Aristotle's philosophy. A similar hesitation or moderation of statement is observable in his use of interrogations; e.g. (i. vi. 12 ἀλλ' ἀρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι. In such questions πότερον is very frequent, (i. vii. 11) Πότερον οὖν τέκτονες μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστὶν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις; and ἡ, which generally introduces the opinion to be preferred, i.e. ἡ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ—οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θεῖη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; also ἡ frequently stands by itself, (i. vii. 1) τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἡ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται;

διὸ καλῶς—ἐφίεται] 'Hence people have well defined the good to be, that at which all things aim.' This same definition is mentioned in the *Rhetoric*, i. vi. 2, i. vii. 3. It is of uncertain authorship. At first sight its introduction here appears parenthetical; but rather it constitutes a sententious way of opening the subject. 'All we do aims at good, the very idea of good is that which is aimed at. But among ends (or aims) there is a subordination of one to the other.'

2 τὰ μὲν γὰρ—ἔργα τινὰ] 'For sometimes the end consists in the exercise of a faculty for its own sake, at other times in certain external results beyond this.' Strictly, according to the Aristotelian system, to speak of

an 'Ἐνέργεια not containing its end in itself is a contradiction in terms. But in a subordinate and relative sense, just as some τέλη are also means to ulterior ends, so some functions may be called ἐνέργειαι, which are also mere γερύσεις of external results: cf. *Metaphysics*, x. ix. 11, and see Essay IV. p. 236.

4 ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ—διώκεται] 'Now all such operations as fall under some one faculty, as under riding, bridle-making, and all other manufactures of the instruments of riding; while this again, and every warlike operation, falls under strategy; and so (δὴ) in the same way, other operations under some different faculty—in all, I say (δε), the ends of the master faculties are more excellent than all those that are subordinate, for, for the sake of the former, the latter are sought after.' This sentence exhibits many of the peculiarities of Aristotle—(1) the indefiniteness of ὅσαι. Cf. a similar indefiniteness as to the substantive referred to in *περὶ αὐτῆς* (*Elh.* i. viii. 1). It would be most natural to supply to the first ὅσαι the word πράξεις, to the second the word τέχναι. But τέχνη and πράξις are not here sharply distinguished, as appears by the words πολεμικῇ πράξις. (2) Δύναμις is here used in a sense from which the modern application of the word 'faculty' to law and medicine, &c., has been de-

τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἰππικὴν ἢ χαλινοποικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἰππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν· αὕτη δὲ καὶ πῦσα πολεμικὴ πράξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας. ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κάκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν 5 τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, 2 τᾶλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἑτερον αἰρούμεθα

rived, through the term *facultas*, which was used by the Schoolmen. This belongs to the associations connected with *δύναμις* in Aristotle's metaphysical system. The use of this word for 'an art' appears, though less distinctly, in Plato. Aristotle, opposing *δύναμις* to *ἐνέργεια*, treats the arts as a class of *δυνάμεις*, i.e. certain capabilities of action; though they differed from other *δυνάμεις* in being themselves not only developed into *ἐνέργεια*, but also formed out of them; cf. *Etā.* II. i. 4, *Metaph.* VIII. v. 1, and see Essay IV. p. 239. (3) *δέ* in *ἐν ἀπάσαις δέ* is used to mark the apodosis. This is common in the *Ethics*, cf. *Etā.* VII. iv. 5, X. ix. 11. Looking to the protasis *ὅσαι*, we must also say that the sentence is an anacoluthon. The whole style might be called a *σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαίνον*. (4) The adjective *ἀρχιτεκτονικός*, as applied to the 'hierarchy' of the sciences, is not found in writers before Aristotle. The metaphor implied by it may have been suggested by Plato; cf. *Politicus*, p. 259 E: καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικός, ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἀρχων. The architect conceives the design, the labourers carry out the details: the former is concerned with the end, the latter with the means. In like manner the higher

arts and sciences subject to themselves the lower; cf. *Etā.* I. ii. 7, VI. viii. 2.

5 διαφέρει δ'—ἐπιστημῶν] 'But it makes no difference (to our argument) whether the development of faculties be in itself the end of the different actions, or something beyond this again, as in the case of the arts above mentioned,' i.e. the principle of subordination in the scale of means and ends will not be affected by the fact that *ἐνέργεια* are ends as well as *ἔργα*. In taking a walk, the end is walking for its own sake, i.e. an *ἐνέργεια*. In house-building, the end is the house, an external result, or *ἔργον*. But walking may again be viewed as subordinate to some other end, e.g. health or life, just as the house is.

ἐπιστημῶν] When speaking strictly (*Etā.* III. iii. 9), and in his later terminology, as represented by Eudemus (*Etā.* VI. iii. 1), Aristotle distinguishes between *ἐπιστήμη* and *τέχνη*. But he frequently uses the former indiscriminately with the latter (cf. *Etā.* I. vi. 15), as also Plato has done, cf. *Philebus*, p. 57 E, and as 'science' is now in common language often used for 'art.'

II. 1 Εἰ δὴ—ἀριστον] 'If then there is some end in the sphere of action which we wish for its own sake,

(πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), ὁ δὲ ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἀρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ 2 μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες, 3 μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον

while we wish all other things for the sake of this—and if we do not choose all things merely as means to something beyond (since in that case the process will be infinite, so that our desire will be empty and useless), it is plain that this end in the sphere of action must be the chief good and the best.' This is the argument upon which the whole system of the *Ethics* is based. But from the undogmatic way in which it is expressed it is rendered at first sight obscure. It might be put thus: We have desires, these cannot be in vain: hence we cannot always be desiring means. There must be some end which is never a means, and which constitutes the true object of desire.

τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν] Aristotle is not inquiring after a metaphysical and transcendental good, like the Platonic Idea, but after a good attainable in action. τὰ πρακτά implies the whole class and sphere of means and ends which fall under the control of human will. A sort of scholium upon this term is to be found in the *Eudemian Ethics*, i. vii. 4.

πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον] The opposite and correlative terms *εἶναι εἰς ἀπειρον* and *ἵστασθαι* are used with various nominatives in Aristotle, and sometimes, as here, impersonally. Cf. *Eth.* i. vii. 7, *εἰς ἀπειρον πρόεισιν*. vi. viii. 9, *στίσεται γὰρ κάκει*.

ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle applies here to the human mind and to the human desires his principle of universal import, οὐδὲν ἀτελεὲς ποιεῖ

φύσις. As everything in nature has its proper end, so too has human desire. There must therefore be some absolute good, desirable for its own sake, towards which our life ought to be directed.

2 ἀρ' οὖν—δέοντος] 'Must it not be, then, that for the conduct of life the knowledge of the good is of weighty influence, and that, like archers who have a mark to aim at, we shall be more likely to attain the requisite?' Cf. *Rhet.* i. v. 1: Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκδοτῶ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπὸς τις ἔστιν, οὗ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἰροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν.

μᾶλλον] i.e. 'more than if we lived at haphazard without knowledge of the true end to be aimed at.' The metaphor of the archers comes from Plato: cf. *Repub.* p. 519. B; ἀνάγκη μὴτε τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους ἰκανῶς ἂν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεύσαι, μὴτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν οὖν σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἔνα, οὗ στοχαζόμενοι δεῖ πάντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ, κ.τ.λ.

τοῦ δέοντος] Not 'our duty' in the modern sense, this conception not having been as yet developed, but more generally 'what we ought to do' from any motive. The word *δέον* was a received term with reference to moral subjects. Cf. Plato's *Repub.* p. 336 D, where Thrasymachus, calling upon Socrates to define justice, says, 'Mind you don't tell me that it is the *δέον*, or the *ὠφέλιμον*, or the *λυσιστελοῦν*, or the *κερδαλέον*, or the *εὐμεφές*.' Cf. also Charmides, p. 164 B. Xen.

τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ 4 μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς· τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. 5

Memorab. i. ii. 22. But the exact import of the term was not fixed. Aristotle in the *Topics*, ii. iii. 4, mentions among the πολλὰχῶς λεγόμενα, Ὅταν εἰ τὸ θεὸν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἢ τὸ καλόν.

3 εἰ δ' οὕτω—δυνάμεων] 'But if this be the case, we must endeavour to comprehend, in outline at all events, what it is, and which of the sciences or faculties it belongs to.' Aristotle, proceeding tentatively to work, does not ask, 'What science treats of the supreme end?'—but 'To what science or art does its production belong?' He seems at first encumbered with Platonic associations—that virtue is a science—that there is an art of life, &c. Just as in a Platonic dialogue we might have found this train of questions—'What is the science of healing called?'—Medicine. 'What is the science of counting called?'—Arithmetic. 'What then is the science of the welfare of states and individuals called?'—Politics. So here Aristotle says, 'Every art has an end. There is some supreme end: of what art then is it the end?' Accordingly he starts with the impression that the present treatise is an art rather than a science (cf. *Eth.* i. iii. 6, ii. ii. 1). He speaks of his present method aiming at the chief good. (i. iii. 1) Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα. Cf. i. iv. 1, τί ἐστὶν οὐ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι. Afterwards (*Eth.* x. ix. 1) he makes an imperfect separation between the scientific theory of virtue and the practical attainment of it.

4 δόξειε δ' ἂν — ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς] 'Now it would seem to be the end of
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that which is the most absolute, and most of a master science.' The word *κυριωτάτης* seems used somewhat indefinitely. Two trains of association are mixed up in it. *κύριος* means (1) what is authoritative, what determines; cf. *Eth.* i. x. 9, *κύρια εὐδαιμονίας*. (2) What has validity, especially the validity of custom, what is established. Cf. *Poet.* xxi. 5, 6, and *Rhetor.* iii. ii. 2, where *κύριον δόγμα* stands for 'a word in its proper sense,' opposed to all uncommon turns and applications. In *Eth.* vi. xiii. 1, *κυρία ἀρετή* is 'virtue in the full sense of the term,' opposed to *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*, 'a virtuous disposition.' *Eth.* vii. iii. 14, *τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης*, 'that which might properly be called science.' Hence, τὸ κύριον comes to mean that which is striking, characteristic, and essential in a conception. Cf. *Eth.* i. vii. 13, *κυριώτερον γὰρ αὐτῇ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι*. ix. ix. 7, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. In the passage above, *κυριωτάτης* seems partly to mean 'most authoritative' or 'absolute,' partly 'that which is most absolutely a science.'

5 τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται.] Plato generally represents virtue as a science, and politics as inseparable from dialectic or metaphysics. In the *Euthydemus*, however (p. 291 B), he describes politics as the supreme art, in terms from which the present passage is obviously borrowed. See Essay III. p. 191. Aristotle says that all the other arts and faculties, however dignified, are subordinate to this (ὑπὸ ταύτῃ) and are its instruments (*χρωμένης ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς*). Their very existence depends on the *flat* of

F F

- 6 τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ
 ποίας ἐκάστους μαρτάνειν καὶ μέχρη τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει.
 ὀρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην
 7 οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικήν, οἰκονομικήν, ῥητορικὴν. χρωμένης
 δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ
 νομοθετοῦσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ
 ταύτης τέλος περιέχει ἀν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἀν
 8 εἶη τὸνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ
 πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται
 καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν· ἀγαπητόν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ,
 9 κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεϊότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
 μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα.

politics (τίνας εἶναι χρεῶν διατάσσει). Hence, as all others are means to it, the end of politics must embrace the ends of all the other arts. Politics will be the art whose end is the chief human good.

8 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν—πόλεσιν] 'For even supposing the chief good to be identical for an individual and a state, that of the state appears at all events something greater and more absolute (τελεώτερον) both to attain and to preserve. Even for an individual by himself it is indeed something one might well embrace with gladness, but for a nation and for states it is something more beautiful and divine.' In Aristotle's *Politics* (VII. iii. 8) the chief good, or end-in-itself, for a state is portrayed as consisting in the development and play of speculative thought, all fit conditions and means thereto being implied and presupposed. To this high, but indefinite, ideal, the term *θεῖον* would be naturally applied. Like the word 'divine' with us, *θεῖος* is used by Aristotle to express the highest kind of admiration, tinged with a feeling of enthusiastic joy, but also with some degree of vagueness. It is specially appropriated by him to the various

manifestations of Reason (*νοῦς*) in the universe: thus (1) to the substance of the Heavens, *De Caelo*, I. ii. 9, οὐσία σώματος θεϊότερα καὶ προτέρα τούτων ἀπάντων (see Essay V. p. 273), (2) to the Heavenly Bodies, *Ib.* II. xii. 13, τῶν σωμάτων τῶν θείων, (3) to the intellect of man, *De Part. An.* IV. x. 8, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι θείαν· ἔργον δὲ τοῦ θεωτάτου τὸ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν, (4) to the life of contemplation, *Eth.* x. vii. 8, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπάρχει, (5) to happiness in general, *Eth.* I. ix. 3, φαίνεται τῶν θεωτάτων εἶναι, (6) to superhuman virtue, consisting in unalloyed reason. *Eth.* VII. i. 1, ἡρώικην τινα (ἀρετὴν) καὶ θείαν, (7) to the instinct of bees, *De Gen. An.* III. x. 27, θεῖον τι (ἔχει) τὸ γένος τὸ τῶν μελιττῶν.

9 πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα] Aristotle has not yet arrived at the conception of Ethics as a separate science. He still, following Plato, identifies it with politics, or makes it 'a kind of politics.' By his treatment, however, of the questions of Ethics he prepared the way for its separation from politics, which indeed was partly made by Eudemus, and afterwards entirely by the Stoics.

Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἰκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην δια- 3
 σαφθεῖη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβές οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις
 ἐπιζητέον ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις· τὰ δὲ καλὰ 2
 καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει
 διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμον μόνον εἶναι, φύσει

III. In connection with every science, Aristotle never fails to pay attention to the logic of science,—to ask what the proper method of the science ought to be. In Ethics, where he is entirely feeling his way, without predecessors to guide him, it was especially natural that he should make a pause to inquire what is the proper form and logical character of the science on which he is entering. Accordingly we find three digressions relative to the logic of Ethics in this first book. (1) In the present chapter he decides that it cannot be an exact science. (2) Chapter 4th, §§ 5-7, he declares, though not dogmatically, that it must be rather inductive than based on *a priori* principles. (3) In chapter 7th, §§ 17-21, not quite consistently with the last assertion, he dwells upon the importance, for the future development of the science, of the principle (*ἀρχή*) which he has evolved in his definition of the chief good; which principle is henceforth to be applied to the elucidation of all difficulties in detail.

1 λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἰκανῶς—δημιουργου-
 μένοις] 'Now we must be satisfied with the statement of our science, if its distinctness be in proportion to the nature of the subject-matter. For exactness is not to be expected equally in all reasonings, any more than in all the productions of art.' Matter as opposed to form was called by Aristotle ὕλη, or τὸ ὑποκείμενον, that which underlies the form. Cf. *Pol.* i. viii. 2: λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὗ τι

ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, ὅλον ὑφάνθη μὲν
 ἔρια, ἀνδριαντοποιῶ δὲ χαλκόν. The matter of a science, i.e. the facts or conceptions with which it deals, must determine its method or form, according as they admit of being stated with more or less ἀκρίβεια. It is one of the first questions about a science, how much ἀκρίβεια it admits: cf. *De Anima*, i. i. 1; *Metaphys.* d. εἰκάρων, iii. 2, &c. On the different shades of meaning implied in the word ἀκρίβεια, see below, i. vii. 18, note. It combines the notions of mathematical exactness, metaphysical subtlety, minuteness of detail, and definiteness of assertion. Also as applied to the arts (*ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις*) it denotes finish or delicacy.

2 τὰ δὲ καλὰ—μή] 'But things beautiful and just, about which the political science treats, exhibit so great a diversity and fluctuation that they are thought to exist by convention only, and not by nature.' Nothing can be more characteristic of Greek morality than these words, 'the beautiful' and 'the just,' applied to sum up all that we should call 'the right.' The former is the more enthusiastic term, and is connected with all the artistic feelings of the Greeks. In the present passage we may notice two indications of the immaturity of Aristotle's ethical system. (1) He speaks of *Politics* as the science treating of right action. (2) He seems to accept for the moment, as at all events worth considering, the scepticism of the Sophists, and to start accordingly with an empirical

- 3 δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες
 4 ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν· ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τὰληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεισθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβές

point of view about moral distinctions, which in reality his subsequent procedure entirely sets aside.—*νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φέσει δὲ μή.* On the position of this opinion in the history of philosophy, see Essay II. pp. 150-151.

3 τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ] 'And things good also exhibit a similar sort of fluctuation.' The two leading questions of morals may be said to be, What is right? and What is good? The ancient Ethics rather tend to absorb the former into the latter; the modern systems *vice versa*. Aristotle here, from his present empirical ground, says there is an equal uncertainty about things good as about things right. Cf. *Eth.* v. i. 9; *Xen. Mem.* iv. ii. 33.

4, 5 ἀγαπητὸν οὖν—πεπαιδευμένος] 'We must be content then, while speaking on such subjects, and with such premises, that the truth should be set forth roughly and in outline, and, as we are reasoning about and from things which only amount to generalities, that our conclusions should be of the same kind also. In the same way must each particular statement be received. The man of cultivation will in each kind of subject demand exactness so far as the nature of the thing permits: for it appears equally absurd to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and

to demand demonstration from an orator. Every one judges well of things which he knows, and of these he is a good critic. In particular subjects then the man of particular cultivation will judge, and in general the man of general cultivation.'

περὶ τοιούτ. καὶ ἐκ τοιούτ.] A common formula in Aristotle. Cf. *Rhetor.* ii. i. 1.

γένος is with Aristotle the object of a single science: *μία ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπὶ γένους* (*Anal. Post.* i. xxviii.) Cf. the whole of *Met.* ii. iii.

πεπαιδευμένου] In his preliminary inquiries as to the right method of different sciences, Aristotle elsewhere adds that it will be the office of *παιδεία*, or the *πεπαιδευμένος*, to arbitrate on the question. *Παιδεία* has of course in these places a restricted sense. It does not imply the cultivation of the whole man, but a certain special cultivation in relation to science, in short much the same state of acquirement as in modern times is expressed by the name *connoisseur*. The chief passage on this subject occurs *De Partibus Animal.* i. i. 1: *περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινότεραν τε καὶ τιμωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἐξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἶον παιδείαν τινά.* Then follow the characteristics of the *πεπαιδευμένος*, which are said to be *κρίναι*

ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικῷ τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδέχσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ 5 τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκείος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος. ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὧν ματαίως 6

εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδω-
σιν ὁ λέγων. Thus the chief function
of this 'cultivation' is acute criticism.
It is critical as opposed to science,
which is constructive. It will have
certain standards (*δρῶν*) by reference
to which it will form a judgment on
the shape and manner of the proposi-
tions presented, quite independently
of their truth and falsehood (*ἀποδέχεται*
τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεκνυμένων χωρὶς τοῦ
πῶς ἔχει τὰληθές, εἴτε ὁπως εἴτε ἄλλως).
This, which was a current popular
conception of παιδεία, Aristotle not
only accepts as related to all matters
of science (*τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον—*
περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικὸν τινα
νομίζομεν), but also he adds a refine-
ment on his own part by constituting
a special παιδεία in relation to each
separate science (*περὶ τινος φύσεως*
ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τις ἕτερος περὶ
ἐν μέρει). The idea of the πεπαιδευ-
μένος as a judge of method is to be
found in Plato. Cf. *Timæus*, p. 53 C:
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπεὶ μετέχετε τῶν κατὰ παι-
δευσιν ὁδῶν, δι' ὧν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὰ
λεγόμενα ἀνάγκη, ξυτέψετε. In the
Erastus, p. 135, a popular description
of the philosopher is given, exactly
answering to Aristotle's πεπαιδευμένος.
Among the qualifications is mentioned
ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαι-
δευμένον, ἐπακολουθήσαι τε τοῖς λεγο-
μένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ὅλον τε εἶναι
διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων. Socrates

on this remarks, that it makes the
philosopher like a Pentathlos, —*θα-
κρός τις*, or second-best in all special-
ties.—We see in the present passage
Aristotle's distinction of *περὶ πᾶν*
πεπαιδ. from *καθ' ἕκαστον πεπαιδ.* The
latter term shows that not only is a
general knowledge of logic (*ἀναλυτική*)
requisite to constitute παιδεία (cf. *Me-
taph.* I. *min.* iii. I, III. iii. 5, III. iv. 2);
but also that some acquaintance with
the special subject is requisite for the
connoisseur of that subject. Cf. *Pol.*
III. xi. 11: 'Ἰατρός δ' ὁ δὲ δημιουργὸς
καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαι-
δευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γὰρ
τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν
τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν
οὐδὲν ἦσαν τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς
εἰδόσιν. Cf. *Eth. End.* I. vi. 6.

μαθηματικοῦ, κ.τ.λ.] Taken from
Plato, cf. *Theætetus*, p. 162 E: εἰ ἐθέλοι
Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν
(τῷ εἰκότι) χρώμενος γεωμετεῖν, ἄξιός
οὐδ' ἐνός μόνον ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ
τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανο-
λογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τούτων λεγο-
μένους λόγους.

5 διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς, κ.τ.λ.] From
a want of sufficient knowledge of the
special subjects to be treated, the
youth is not fit to be a hearer, i.e. (1)
critic, (2) student of political science.

6 ἐτι δὲ—πράξις] 'Nay, moreover,
as he is given to follow his passions,
he will hear uselessly and without

- ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις
 7 ἀλλὰ πράξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐθέν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ
 ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ
 διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ
 τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρα-
 τέσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ
 8 πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ
 περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτόν, καὶ τί προτιθέ-
 μεθα, πεφροimiώσθω τσαῦτα.
- 4 Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ
 προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὁρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὐ λέγομεν
 τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον
 2 τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν

profit, since the end (of our science) is not knowledge but action.' Aristotle goes off into a digression here, and adds that the youth will not only be an incompetent, but also an unprofitable student, on account of a moral disqualification in the weakness of his will. In saying of *Politics* that 'its end is action,' we must not suppose that Aristotle meant to imply that it was 'practical' in the modern sense, i.e. hortatory, as opposed to philosophical. As before, he is viewing *Politics* as a sort of supreme art. Cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 1. Afterwards, *Pol.* III. viii. 1, he takes quite a different attitude; he excuses himself for prolixity by saying τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν.

ματαιῶς ἀκούσεται.] Shakespeare had seen the present passage quoted somewhere, and by a remarkable anachronism he puts it into the mouth of Hector. Cf. *Troilus and Cressida* act II. sc. 2.

'Paris and Troilus, you have both said well:

And on the cause and question now in hand

Have glozed—but superficially; not much

Unlike young men, whom Aristotle thought

Unfit to hear moral philosophy.'

7 οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις.] 'For the deficiency is not caused by time.' Cf. *Thucyd.* I. 141, οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἀμείλιαν οἰεται βλάψειν. Arnold compares *παρὰ* in this sense with the English vulgarity 'all along of.' Cf. *Eth.* III. v. 19, τι καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν.

IV. 1 Returning from a parenthetical discussion of method, Aristotle takes up (λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαμβάνοντες) the original question, 'What is it that politics aim at, what is the highest practical good?' The original four terms τέχνη, μέθοδος, πρᾶξις, προαίρεσις, are here reduced to two, γνῶσις and προαίρεσις. In the latter πρᾶξις is implied. And τέχνη is omitted as falling under the practical powers in man (cf. *Eth.* VI. ii. 5). Thus human nature, which was before classified as productive, scientific, and moral, is here summed up as moral and intellectual.

πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται. τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτόν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν 3 ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλαῖς δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας

2 There is a verbal agreement, but under this an essential difference, between men as to their opinion of the chief good. All use the same word, 'happiness.' They go a step beyond this together, and say it consists in 'living-well and doing-well.' Any further attempt at definition shows the discrepancy of their notions. On theories of the chief good, see Essay II. pp. 102-103.

οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες] 'The many and the refined.' This classifies the whole body of thinkers. The many are opposed to the philosophers (οἱ σοφοί) and to the educated, the refined, the few. This opposition has always existed. It appears most strongly in the philosophic isolation of Heraclitus the ὀχλοδόκος. It is a natural distinction, since philosophical views are not inborn, but acquired, and imply education, leisure, development. That both classes, however, are in a different way possessed of the truth (wholly or partially), Aristotle would always acknowledge. Cf. *Eth.* i. viii. 7.

εὖ πράττειν is an ambiguous phrase. In its usual acceptation it would rather mean 'faring-well' than 'acting-well.' It occurs in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 507 c, in a way which seems to contain the transition between these two ideas — πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλικλείη, τὸν

σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διήθομεν, δίκαιον δοῦναι καὶ ἀνδρείον καὶ δεινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρῶν εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἂν πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα δολίον. Aristotle was at no pains to solve the ambiguity. Cf. *Eth.* vi. ii. 5.

3 οἱ μὲν γὰρ—ἀγαθὰ] 'For the one class (i.e. the many) specify something palpable and tangible, as, for instance, pleasure, or wealth, or honour; in short, different of them give different accounts, and often the same individual gives an answer at variance with himself, for when he has fallen sick he calls it health, but being poor wealth; and when people are conscious of ignorance they look up with admiration to those who say something fine and beyond their own powers. On the other hand certain (philosophers) have thought that beyond all these manifold goods there is some one absolute good, which is the cause to these of their being good.' Ἐνιοὶ δὲ corresponds to οἱ μὲν γὰρ. 'Palpable and tangible' are analogous though not identical metaphors with ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν.

συνειδότες, κ.τ.λ.] Consciousness of ignorance makes people fancy wisdom to be the chief good.—So the Paraphrast explains the passage.

θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ' ᾤοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὸν ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ 4 τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθόν. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαίωτον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολα- 5 ζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμῶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· εὐ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ

ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι] This of course relates to Plato's theory of the Ideas.

4 ἱκανὸν δὲ—λόγον] 'But it is sufficient to examine the opinions most widely spread, or that seem to have some reason in them.' A similar canon of authority is given, *Eth.* i. viii. 7.

ἐπιπολαζούσας] 'Lying on the top,' 'obvious.' The original sense is found in *Hist. Anim.* viii. ii. 17: Ποιοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀπόλλυνται πολλάκις (αἱ χελῶναι), ὅταν ἐπιπολάζουσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου· καταφέρεσθαι γὰρ πάλιν οὐ δύνασται βεβίως. Hence ἐπιπολάζω and ἐπιπολαῖος come to mean 'what lies on the surface,' 'is easily to be found.' *Eth.* iv. viii. 4, ἐπιπολάζου-τος τοῦ γελοίου, 'constantly turning up:' and in the *Asiotechus* which bears Plato's name, p. 369 D, ἐκ τῆς ἐπιπολαζούσης τὰ νῦν λεσχνηεῖας. *Rhet.* iii. x. 4, ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα καὶ ἀ μὲν δὲ ζήτησαι. *Eth.* *Eud.* iii. ii. 4, ἐστὶ δ' οὐ πάντῃ γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον. From this meaning to that of 'superficial' is but a slight transition. i. v. 4, φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου.

5 From hence to the end of the chapter follows the second digression on the method of ethics. The question now is, whether the Science is to be inductive or deductive, whether the reasoning is to be 'to principles,' or

'from principles.' Aristotle gives a qualified decision in favour of the former of these alternatives.

εὐ γὰρ—ἀπλῶς] 'For Plato rightly used to doubt and question whether the way was from principles or to principles, as, in the stadium, whether from the judges to the goal, or reverse-ly. We must begin, at all events, with things known, and these are of two kinds; for some things are known relatively, and some things absolutely.' There is no particular passage in the works of Plato which we can say is here referred to. That at the end of Book vi. of the *Republic* has a widely different scope. It does not compare the Inductive with the Deductive Method, but describes dialectic as a progress up the ladder of hypotheses to the idea of good, and a descent again without any help from the senses, by successive steps, which are ideas, and are connected with the idea of good. The use of the word Πλάτων here without the article shows that a personal reference to the philosopher is intended (see note on *Eth.* vi. xiii. 3). The use of the imperfect ἠπόρει shows that the reference is general; when Aristotle quotes from a particular passage in the *Laws* of Plato (*Eth.* ii. iii. 2), he says ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησιν.

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν ἡμῶν, τὰ δὲ ἀπλῶς] This is Aristotle's favourite

διτῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ὁ ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἰκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαί-
νοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦ-
τος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. ᾧ δὲ μῆδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὅς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσει,
ἰσθλὸς δ' αὖ ἀκίχης ὅς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.

division of knowledge, into things 'relatively' and things 'absolutely' known. The former implies the knowledge of experience, so far as it depends on the individual perception; it is therefore concrete (*ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως*, *Post. Analyt.* I. ii. 5), while the latter is abstract (*τὰ παρρώτερον*), but being independent of individual experience, it is absolute (*τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα*, *Phys. Ausc.* I. i. 1). We must observe that the distinction is not between things relatively and absolutely 'knowable,' but 'known.' The highest truths are actually in themselves better known than the phenomena of the senses. This is said independently of individual minds, and implies a reference to the impersonal and absolute reason; when Aristotle speaks of the universal being in itself more known than the particular, this is as much as to say it has a more real existence, just as Plato said that the Ideas were most true, while phenomena only partake of truth (*μετέχει τῆς ἀληθείας*).

6 *ἴσως οὖν*—*γνωρίμων* 'Perhaps then we at all events must commence with what we know.' Aristotle was probably unconscious of the sort of pun in this sentence. He merely asserts that we (i.e.) ethical philosophers must start from a basis of personal experience.

6-7 *διὸ δεῖ*—*ῥαδίως* 'Therefore he should have been well trained in his

habits who is to study aright things beautiful and just, and in short the whole class of political subjects. For the fact is a principle, and if the fact be sufficiently apparent we need not ask the reason. Now he who has been well trained either has principles already, or can easily obtain them.' He returns to the qualifications of the *ἀκροατής*. But here previous knowledge seems required in a different way from that mentioned above (I. iv. 5). The object is here not *κρίνειν* τὰ λεγόμενα, but *ἐπίστασθαι*.

ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι The same is repeated below (I. vii. 10). The term *ἀρχή* appears to be used here ambiguously. It may either mean a starting-point or a universal principle. It seems to hover between those meanings, and to express that a moral fact has something at all events potentially of the nature of a universal. *Ἀρχάς* (in § 7) is used definitely for universal principles.

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος i.e. ὁ καλῶς ἡγμέτος. Such a one is in possession of moral facts, which either stand already in the light of principles or can be at once recognised as such on the suggestion of the philosopher. In the former case he will resemble Hesiod's *πανάριστος*, in the second case the *ἰσθλὸς* δε εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται. If he can neither discover nor recognise principles he is *ἀρχήσιος ἀνὴρ*.

οὗτος μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] Hesiod, *Works*
G G

ὅς δέ κε μῆτ' αὐτὸς νοήσῃ μὴτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
 ἐν θυμῷ βάλλεται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀρχήος ἀνής.

- 5 Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν, τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκάσιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπο-
 2 λαμβάνειν· οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν, διό
 καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι
μάλιστα οἱ προὔχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός

and *Days*, 291-295. After νοήσῃ in the editions of Hesiod, in some MSS. of the *Ethics*, and in the *Paraphrase*, comes this verse, φρασσόμενοι τὰ κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ἦσαν ἀμείνω. The whole passage succeeds one quoted by Plato, *Repub.* II. 364 C; *Legg.* IV. 718 E; and by Xenophon, *Memorab.* II. i. 20, on the difficulty of virtue. The sentiment is borrowed by Livy, XXII. XXIX. Cf. Cicero *pro Cluentio*, c. XXXI; *Soph. Antig.* 720; Herod. VII. xvi.

V. 1 Ἡμεῖς δὲ—ὑπολαμβάνειν] 'But to return from our digression,—since people seem with reason to form their conceptions of the chief good and of happiness from men's lives' (sc. 'let us examine these'). The γὰρ shows that the above clause explains the object of this chapter, which is, to examine men's opinions of the chief good, in the concrete, by a criticism of their lives. Men's lives exhibit practically their ideas of what is desirable.

ἐκ τῶν βίων] βίος is the external form, opposed to ζωή, the internal principle of life. Thus βίος is 'line of life,' 'profession,' 'career.' Cf. *Eth.* IX. ix. 9, X. vi. 8; Plato, *Repub.* X. 618 A, τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα.

2 οἱ μὲν—θεωρητικός] 'Now the many and the vulgar (conceive) pleasure (the chief good), whence also they follow the life of sensuality. For the most prominent lives are on the whole (μάλιστα) three in number, that just mentioned, and the political life,

and thirdly the life of contemplation.' With τὴν ἡδονήν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰγαθόν must be supplied, though it was used in a different way in the sentence before. The punctuation of Zell has been adopted. Bekker places no stop after ὑπολαμβάνειν, but ends the sentence after ἡδονήν.

ἀπολαυστικός] a word not occurring in Plato, nor perhaps in any writer before Aristotle.

τρεῖς γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] In the celebrated metaphor attributed to Pythagoras (cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 3), the world is compared to an Olympic festival, in which some are come to contend; for honour; others to buy and sell, for profit; the best of all, as spectators, for contemplation. In Plato a similar division occurs. *Repub.* IX. 581 C: Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγωμεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνηκον, φιλοκερδέε; κομιδῇ γε. This passage appears to be alluded to in the words at the opening of the chapter, οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκάσιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. The Paraphrast explains Aristotle's omission of the life of gain by saying that 'the seekers both of pleasure and honour are wont to amass money also.' Plato, on the contrary, says that pleasure and gain are merely two forms of concupiscence. The life of pleasure then was included under Plato's γένος φιλοκερδέε. Aristotle's classification, which separates these, is much more true to nature. But the reason given by the Paraphrast

καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς 3
 ἀνδραποδῶδεις φαινόνται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι,
 τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις
 ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλῃ. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτι- 4
 κοὶ τιμὴν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος.
 φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ
 γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τὰγα-
 θὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ἔτι 5

is untenable. Aristotle omitted the βίος χρηματιστή, as he tells us presently, because, as not being purely voluntary (βλαῖος τις), it does not exhibit a conception of happiness. Though it may have many adherents, these do not seek it spontaneously, as containing happiness in itself.

3 οἱ μὲν οὖν—Σαρδαναπάλῃ] The life of sensuality is that which the vulgar propose to themselves as their ideal of happiness. This they would pursue if they could obtain the ring of Gyges (Plato, *Repub.* II. p. 359 c). And though Aristotle repudiates it immediately as vile and abject, yet he places it on the scale (τυγχάνουσι λόγου) because great potentates (πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις) show themselves of the same mind as Sardanapalus, thinking nought but sensuality 'worth a fillip,' while they have everything at their disposal, and are of all men most free to choose.

τυγχάνουσι λόγου] 'They obtain consideration,' i.e. both in the eyes of men in general, and also in the present treatise. Cf. *Eth.* x. vi. 3.

Σαρδαναπάλῃ] Cicero, in *Tusc. Disp.* v. xxxv. (cf. *De Finibus*, II. xiii.), mentions the epitaph of Sardanapalus as quoted by Aristotle, 'Ex quo Sardanapali, opulentissimi Syriæ regis, error agnoscitur, qui incidi jussit in busto:

Hæc habeo, quæ edî, quæque exaltata libido

Hæsit; at illa jacent multa et præclara relicta.

Quid aliud, ait Aristoteles, in bovis, non in regis sepulchro inscriberes! No such passage is to be found in any of the extant works of Aristotle.

4 οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες—τέλος] 'But the refined and active conceive honour to be the chief good; for this may be said to be (σχεδόν) the end of the political life.' οἱ δὲ answers to οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι. The desire for honour is of course a higher instinct than the desire for pleasure. It is 'the last infirmity of noble minds.' Honour is the price paid for political service, the garland of the magistrate and the statesman. Cf. *Eth.* v. vi. 7: μισθὸς ἀρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας.

φαίνεται δ'—μαντευόμεθα] 'But it appears too superficial for that which we are in search of, for it seems to rest more with the honourer than the honoured; whereas we have a presentiment that the chief good must be one's own, and not in the power of others to take away.' Honour is evidently a precarious advantage depending on others. No labours or merits could prevent its being withheld by an ungrateful or unappreciating age.

μαντευόμεθα] A phrase worthy of attention. It occurs *Eth.* vi. xiii. 4: τοῖσιν δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἀπάρτες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξι ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ἡ κατὰ

δ' εοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγα-
θοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ
παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ
6 γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. τάχα δε καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις
τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι· φαίνεται δὲ
ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχσθαι καὶ καθεῦδειν
ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις
κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα
οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ
περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλις· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις

τὴν φρόνησιν. Cf. also *Rhet.* i. xiii. 2: ἔστι γὰρ δ μαρτυροῦνται τι πάντες φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἀδικον. It is probably suggested by Plato, in whom both μαρτυροῦσθαι and ἀπομαρτυροῦσθαι frequently occur; e.g. *Crat.* 411 B: δοκῶ γέ μοι οὐ κακῶς μαρτυροῦσθαι δ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐνεκρήσα, κ.τ.λ.

5-6 Moreover, honour is not only an insecure possession, but it seems not even desired for its own sake. It is desired by men as an evidence of their merits. Cf. *Eth.* viii. viii. 2, where he says more at length that most men appear to seek honour κατὰ συμβεβηκός; the many seek it at the hands of those in power, as an earnest of future advantage; the good seek it from the excellent and from competent judges, as a confirmation of their own opinion about themselves. Thus the consciousness of virtue is the end, to which honour is the means. If virtue then be regarded as the end of the political life, will this answer to the chief good? No, it falls short of being a supreme end (ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη). For it might subsist in a life of absolute inaction, or of the heaviest misfortunes. And to call this happiness would be paradoxical.

ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν] It is the ἔξις τῆς ἀρετῆς, virtue regarded as a mere quality, which Aristotle repudiates.

Past merits, or the passive possession of qualities whose existence depends on the attestation of fame, cannot be thought to constitute the chief good. Very different from this is ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν, an actual life of virtue in the present.

εἰ μὴ θέσω διαφυλάττων] 'Unless defending a paradox.' Θέσεις in demonstration are those unproved principles necessary to the existence of each separate science, just as ἀξιώματα are to the existence of reasoning in general (*Post. Analytics*, i. ii. 7), but θέσεις in dialectic (the kind here meant) are paradoxical positions resting on the authority of some great name; *Topics*, i. xi. 4: θέσις δὲ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινός κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οἷον, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀριστοτέλης, κ.τ.λ. The above paradox (ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) was one the Stoics afterwards ventured to maintain. Cicero (*Paradoxa*, II.) defends it with rhetorical arguments—arguing the greatness of Regulus in his misfortunes, as though that were identical with his happiness!

καὶ περὶ μὲν—αὐτῶν] 'But enough on this subject, for it has been sufficiently discussed even in popular philosophies.' Cf. *De Caelo*, i. ix. 16; καὶ γὰρ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις

εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, περὶ 7
οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ 8
χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλούτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ

φιλοσοφίᾳσι περὶ τὰ θεῖα πολλάκις προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀμετάβλητον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀπρότατον, on which Simplicius notes with regard to ἐγκυκλίους—*ἅτινα καὶ ἐξωτερικὰ καλεῖν ἐλθε*. We may translate the passage, 'As in the popular philosophical doctrines about things divine, it is often set forth in argument that the divine must necessarily be unchangeable, being the First and the Highest.' (There seems to be something wrong in the Greek text. Perhaps we should read *ὅν* for *πάν*.) This evidently refers to no work of Aristotle's, but to the common unscientific discourses of men upon scientific subjects. So above, it is intimated that the insufficiency of virtue for happiness had been the subject of commonplace discussion. 'Ἐγκύκλιος' is used three times in the *Politics* of Aristotle to express 'that which belongs to the daily round of life.' *Pol.* i. vii. 2, τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα, 'daily duties of servants;' cf. ii. v. 4, τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους; ii. ix. 9, χρησίμου δ' οὐσης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, 'Boldness is of no use for every-day life.' Hence the word comes to mean 'commonplace,' 'popular,' 'unscientific.' Two other explanations need only be mentioned to be rejected: (1) Eustratius thinks that a poem of Aristotle's is meant, ending with the same line with which it began—hence called Encyclic; (2) Julius Scaliger refers us to two books, 'Ἐγκυκλίων, α', β', mentioned in the list of Diogenes Laertius, v. 26.

7 τρίτος δ'—ποιησόμεθα] 'Third is the life of contemplation, about

which our investigation shall be made hereafter.' This promise is fulfilled in *Book x*. We have here undoubted proof of an idea of method, of a constructive whole; see Essay I. p. 46.

8 ὁ δὲ χρηματιστής—*χάρις*] 'But the life of gain is in a way compulsory, and it is plain that wealth is not that good we are in search of, for it is an instrument and means to something else.' With *χρηματιστής* understand *βίος*. Lambinus finds in two MSS. *χρηματιστὴς βίος βίαιός τις ἐστίν*. This is evidently a gloss. *βίαιος* is to be explained by comparing the parallel passage in *Eth. Eudem.* i. ix. 2: *Διηρημένον δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν [οὐδ'] ἀμφισβητούτων τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, ὧν τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμῶν καὶ τὰς βαρύνουσιν—τῶν δὲ εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων τριῶν ὄντων*. 'Now the lives of men being divided, and the one class laying no claim at all to this kind of good fortune, but being devoted to the obtaining the necessities of life, as for instance those engaged with mean arts and lucre and sordid crafts; while the others, which are ranked severally as in the enjoyment of Happiness, are three in number.' Here *οὐδ'* is restored by the absolutely certain conjecture of Bonitz. *βίαιός τις* exactly corresponds with *οὐδ' ἀμφισβητούτων—σπουδαζομένων*, and so it is understood by the Paraphrast: *καὶ ἐστὶ βίαιος. Ὅτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διώκει, ὅτε πᾶν δοκεῖ διώκειν. Ὅθεν οὐ πολλοῖς ἐστὶν ἐραστός· ὁλίγοι γὰρ εἰλοντο πάσης τῆς ἐν βίῳ σπουδῆς τέλος τὰ χρήματα ἔχειν*. It is to be taken in a passive, not an

τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μάλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται.

6 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως

active sense. It is the opposite of ἐκούσιος, meaning 'forced,' as in *Eth.* III. i. 3. It implies that no one would devote himself, at the outset, to money-making, except of necessity, 'parce qu'il faut vivre.' It assigns the reason for not discussing the life of gain. An additional and final reason is subjoined—that wealth is a mere means. Other and mistaken explanations of this place are (1) that of Eustratius. 'The usurer is violent,' *ὅτι βίαν ἐνδείκνυται πρὸς τὸ κτήσασθαι*. The same has been adopted in the Latin translations, where 'violentus' is used. In Dante's *Inferno*, Canto XI., there is a complete commentary on this. Dante, who only knew Aristotle in the Latin, but studied him much, places usurers among 'the violent' in hell, and gives learned reasons for this classification. (2) That of Giphanius, who, rightly taking *βίος* to be the omitted word, interprets 'vita nature contraria.' It is true that in several places *βίαιος* is opposed to *κατὰ φύσιν*, and in such contexts means 'unnatural'; *Phys. Ausc.* iv. viii. 4, v. vi. 6; *Politica*, i. iii. 4. But without such a context, it cannot simply stand for *παρὰ φύσιν*. The life of gain is truly not a life which one would naturally choose, but this does not amount to its being 'unnatural.'

καίτοι—καταβέβληνται] The general meaning is: 'Although much has been said to show that each of these is the chief good, it has been unavailing.' But a doubt remains as to the precise force of *καταβέβληνται*. Does it mean, 'have been wasted' or

simply, 'have been laid down, promulgated.' This latter rendering is confirmed by *De Mundo*, vi. 3: *διὸ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰπεῖν τινὲς προήχθησαν, ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα ἐστὶ θεῶν πλεῖα . . . τῇ μὲν θεῷ δομάμει πρόποντα καταβαλλόμενοι λόγον, οὐ μὴν τῇ γε οὐσίᾳ*. By a slight extension of meaning we have in the *Politica*, *καταβεβλημένα μαθήσεις* (VIII. ii. 6), *καταβεβλημένα παιδεύματα* (VIII. iii. 11), 'ordinary, usual branches of learning.'

VI. Aristotle now proceeds to examine, or rather to attack, the Platonic doctrine of the Idea of Good. To test the worth of this criticism belongs to a consideration of the entire relation of Aristotle to the views of Plato. See Essay III. The arguments used are as follows: (1) The Platonists allow that where there is an essential succession between two conceptions, these cannot be brought under a common idea—but there is such between different manifestations of good, e.g. the useful is an essentially later conception. (2) If all good be one, it ought to fall under only one category, whereas it can be predicated under all. (3) If it were one, it would be treated of by only one science. (4) The Idea is, after all, only a repetition of the phenomena, for with these it is really identical. (5) Even the most essential and absolute goods seem incapable of being reduced to one idea. (6) It is more natural to consider good an analogous word, and to assign to it a nominalistic, rather than a realistic, unity.

ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάν-
τους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας
εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ
δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν,
ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων
φίλοιον ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες 2

(7) But however this may be, it is plain that the idea can have no relation to practical life, and therefore it does not belong to ethics.

1 τὸ δὲ καθόλου—ἀλήθειαν] 'But perhaps it were as well to consider the nature of the universal term (good) and to discuss in what sense it is predicated, although an inquiry of this kind is rendered disagreeable owing to those who are our friends having introduced their doctrine of Ideas. Still it is the best course, and even incumbent on us, where the safety of truth is concerned, to sacrifice even what is nearest to us, especially as we are philosophers. For where both are dear, friends and the truth, it is our duty to prefer the truth.'

τὸ καθόλου] As part of the logic of Ethics, Aristotle is proceeding to inquire into the nature of the universal term—Good—when he is stopped by the necessity of considering Plato's doctrine of the Idea of Good. His answer to the question is given in §§ 11–12. Aristotle also held the necessary existence of universals, only more as a conceptualist, saying that they were κατὰ πολλῶν (predicable of particulars), not παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ (existing independent of particulars). Cf. *Pont. Anal.* i. xi. 1: Εἶδη μὲν οὐκ εἶναι ἢ ἐν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται, εἶναι μέντοι ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ καθόλου ἂν μὴ τοῦτο ᾗ.

καίπερ προσάπτους] The personal feeling expressed by Aristotle towards

Plato, here as elsewhere, is in the highest degree cordial. But in the argument used there is something captious.

καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν] Cf. *Thuc.* i. 41: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ οἰκεία χεῖρον τίθενται φιλονεικίας ἔνεκα τῇ αὐτίκα.

ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν] This is Plato's own sentiment about Homer; *Repub.* x. p. 595 c, ἀλλ' οὐ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ. He also applies the word ὅσιον in a similar context, *Repub.* ii. p. 368 b: δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ 'οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακῆς ἡγουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν, κ.τ.λ.

2 οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες—κατεσκεύαζον] 'Now they who introduced this opinion used not to make ideas of things of which they predicated priority and posteriority, and hence they constructed no idea of numbers.'

κομίσαντες] Cf. *Top.* viii. v. 6, κομίζοντες ἀλλοτρίας δόξας. The words δόξαν ταύτην and ἐποιοῦν ἰδέας seem used, as if purposely, to express an arbitrary and fictitious system. With the above cf. *Metaph.* ii. iii. 10: ἐτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερόν ἐστιν οὐκ ὁλόν τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα· οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δυάς, οὐκ ἐστι τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν. *Eth. Eudem.* i. viii. 8: ἐτι ἐν δούσι ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον, οὐκ ἐστι κοινόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον. Πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινόν καὶ χωριστόν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον. Οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλα-

οὐσα
 25
 τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τί δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι· παραφυσίαι γὰρ τούτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις 3 ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδέα. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ

σίῳ, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλάσιον πρότερον, εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν. Aristotle often remarks about Plato, that he distinguished with regard to number, making two species of it, mathematical number, and transcendental or ideal number. We may ask of which kind of number it is here asserted that it contains priority and posteriority, and therefore admits of being brought under no one idea? The answer is to be found, Arist. *Metaph.* XII. vi. 7: Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρω φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ἰδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ἰδέας. It is the ideal numbers of which Aristotle says that they stand in essential and immutable succession to and dependence on each other, and therefore can be brought under no common idea. Hence the mention of the *δυάς* and the *διπλάσιον* in the above-quoted passages, which refer to the Platonic doctrine of the *δυάς δόριστος*, which by union with the one becomes ἡ πρώτη *δυάς*, the first actual number. This *δυάς* is itself the first idea of all number, there can be no idea of it. (Cf. *Met.* XII. vii. 18 sqq.) In some cases the ideas are identical with the manifestations of those ideas. Cf. *Metaph.* VI. xi. 6: καὶ τῶν τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων οἱ μὲν αὐτογραμμὴν τὴν *δυάδα*, οἱ δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς γραμμῆς· ἐνια μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτὰ τὸ εἶδος καὶ

οὐ τὸ εἶδος, οἷον *δυάδα* καὶ τὸ εἶδος *δυάδος*.

παραφυσίαι—*δυσταί*] 'For this may be compared to an offshoot and accident of substance.' Cf. *Rhet.* I. ii. 7, *συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφύει τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι*. Aristotle argues that the relative good (ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι) must be a sort of deduction from the substantively good (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι), therefore posterior to it in thought, and therefore incapable of being brought under a common idea.

3 ἐτι ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν—τῷ ὄντι—*δῆλον*—*μόνη*] 'Again, since the good is predicated in just as many ways as existence is, it plainly cannot be a common universal, or a unity, else it would not have been predicated in all the categories, but in one alone.' Good cannot be one, because it is predicated in all the categories. This is a logical, not a metaphysical test of Plato's doctrine. That Aristotle made ten categories—that these were metaphysical *summa genera*, or an ultimate classification of all existence, is rather a deduction from his philosophy than what he had actually arrived at. The Categories with Aristotle were a classification of the modes of predication, and the number ten seems by no means fixed. The so-called book of the 'Categories' is in all probability not from the hand of Aristotle himself, but it shows a tendency in the Peripatetic school to merge the logical into a metaphy-

ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποῦ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ διαίτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἑν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγερ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν 4 32, μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσι πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλων- 5 4', ται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἑν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἦ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἦ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, 6 5, εἴπερ μὴδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. πι- 7 θανώτερον δ' εἰκόσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ,

sical classification. Cf. *Topics* i. iv. 12.

4 There are many sciences of the good, therefore it cannot be reduced to unity.—This argument is certainly unsatisfactory if applied to Plato's point of view. Plato would say dialectic is the science of the Idea of good, and in this all other sciences find their meeting-point. Even of the *πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν* it might be said that according to Aristotle's own account it falls (in all its manifestations, whether as means or ends) under the one supreme science—Politics.

5-6 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις—ἐφημέρου] 'Now one might be puzzled to say what they mean by an "absolute" thing—if, for instance, in man and absolute-man there is one and the same conception of man. For *what* man they will not differ. If so, the same will apply to good. Nor is it any use to say that the absolute good will be more good by being eternal,

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since what is ever so old is not whiter than that which lasts but a day.' Aristotle brings against the idea an accusation which he has also used in the *Metaphysics* (i. ix. 1), that it only multiplies phenomena, as it exhibits the same law or conception as they. He adds to it a captious objection, that it is no use to say the absolute differs from the conditional in being eternal, since length of duration does not constitute a distinction between identical qualities;—as if length of duration were the same as eternity. Cf. *Eth.* vi. iii. 2; and see *Essay III.* p. 210.

7 πιθανώτερον δ'—δοκεῖ] 'But the Pythagoreans seem to give a more probable account of it, placing unity in the row of goods; whom Speusippus too, it must be observed (δῆ), appears to follow.' We have to deal here with the subtle differences between the Greek schools of metaphysical philosophy. There came in

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τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἐν· οἷς δὴ καὶ
 8 Σπείσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων

succession,—first, the Eleatic principle, that ‘the One’ is the only really existent. Second, the Megarian development of this, ‘the One is identical with the good.’ Third, Plato’s adoption of this with modifications,—the One is the idea, opposed to plurality, or phenomena; the highest idea, and most essential, is that of the Good; this is transcendental, self-existent, the cause of existence to phenomena, and also of our knowing them; phenomena, however, have still a conditional existence, dependent on the idea (*μετέχει τῆς οὐσίας*). Fourth, opposed to Plato, and here contrasted with him, we find the Pythagorean doctrine which places ‘the One’ among the various exhibitions of good, whether as causes of good, or manifestations of it. The Pythagorean system was said to be devoid of dialectic (*διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετέχον*, Ar. *Metaph.* i. vi. 7). We do not find in them anything like ‘critical’ philosophy, nor any *rationale* of cognition. They seem content to have seized on a few principles, the conception of harmony, order, and proportion in the world, &c. Their system, however, had a definite bearing, and part of this seems to have been the ignoring any transcendental principle, any principle otherwise than as exhibited in phenomena. In *Metaph.* xi. vii. 10, we find Aristotle repudiating a doctrine which Speusippus shared with the Pythagoreans, namely, that good is rather a result of things than their cause. Speusippus, nephew of Plato, and successor to him as head of the Academy, seems, after the death of his master, to have manifested in several points a Pythagorean leaning (see Essay III. p. 217). It is

mentioned, *Metaph.* XIII. iv. 10, that of those who held the doctrine of ideas, some considered ‘the One’ as identical with ‘the good,’ others not as identical, but as an essential element. If the one be identified with the good, it follows that multitude, or, in other words, matter, will be the principle of evil. To avoid making ‘the many’ identical with evil, some Platonists denied the identity of the one with the good. Of this section Speusippus was leader. He accordingly adopted a Pythagorean formula, saying that ‘the one’ must be ranked among things good. In the present place Aristotle must be regarded as not really entering on the question. His own metaphysical system stood quite beside all these mentioned. But he does not enter here upon a metaphysical consideration of the Good, as not belonging to ethics. He merely states objections to Plato’s doctrine, and in a cursory way alleges a *prima facie* preference (*πιθανώτερον εὐλογεῖν λέγειν*) for the Pythagorean theory, according to which the good was not transcendental, or separate from phenomena.

8 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἐστὼ λόγος] ‘But let us put off to another occasion the discussion of these questions,’ i.e. the whole subject of the good and its relation to unity—to existence—to the world. This is, in short, the scope of Aristotle’s entire *Metaphysics*. We need not confine the reference of *περὶ τούτων* to the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, or refer it, with some commentators, to the books mentioned in the list of Diogenes (v. 25), *περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων*, d. *περὶ Σπενσίππου καὶ Ζενοκράτους*, d.

ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰγαθὰ, καὶ τὰ 9 μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ 10 μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὀρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδεν πλὴν τῆς ιδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ 11 καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἀπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χίονι καὶ ψιμμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθὰ.

τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἄλλον] 'But against my arguments an objection suggests itself, namely, that the Platonic theory was not meant to apply to every good (διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι), but that under one head are classified those goods that are sought and loved in and for themselves (καθ' αὐτά), while things productive of these, or in any way preservative of them, or preventive of their opposites, are spoken of as "secondary goods" (διὰ ταῦτα), and in another fashion.' It seems best to refer τοῖς λόγους to the Platonic theory. The words καθ' ἓν εἶδος are used, not in the peculiarly Platonic sense, 'under one idea,' but in the more common and also Aristotelian sense, 'under one species.'

10 ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο—εἶδος] 'Or is none of these, nor anything except the idea, to be called an absolute good? in which case the class good will be devoid of content and indivi-

duals.' The Platonic idea was meant to be not only an *ιδέα*, or absolute existence, transcending the world of space and time, but also an *εἶδος*, or universal nature, manifesting itself in different individuals. This latter property, Aristotle argues, will be lost if we keep denying of different attainable goods, even those that seem most plainly so, that they are goods in themselves.

11 φρονήσεως] 'Thought.' The word is used in a general sense as the substantive of *φρονεῖν* (cf. *Eth.* vii. xii. 5), and not in its technical sense as defined in (the Eudemean) Book vi.

τιμῆς δὲ—ἀγαθὰ] 'Now honour, thought, pleasure, exhibit distinct and differing laws when viewed as goods.' The same instances are given below, i. vii. 5, of goods sought for their own sake. Obviously here Aristotle is not doing full justice by the question he has started. What are the 'different laws' of good in these objects, calls for

- 12 οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι, ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὥς γὰρ ἐν σώματι
- 13 ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἓν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, δηλὸν ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται.
- 14 τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ,
- 15 καὶ εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευζόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦ-

a subtle investigation; whereas there is here a summary assertion. We might urge, on the other hand, that honour is not an instance of an absolute good (cf. I. v. 5), that pleasure and thought really exhibit the same law of good—as being both *ἐνέργειαι*. But Aristotle here partly trifles and partly dogmatizes. He would, of course, refer us to metaphysics for the question in point.

11-12 οὐκ ἔστιν—*ἀναλογίαν*] 'Good, therefore, is not something generic under one idea. But how then is the term used? For it does not seem like an accidental coincidence of name. Shall we say then that it is so used because all goods spring from one source, or because they all tend to one end, or rather that it is on account of an analogy between them?' 'Ὁμωνυμία answers to 'equivocal' words in logic. The so-called 'Categories' of Aristotle begin 'Ὁμωνυμία λέγεται ὡν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν. A nominalistic

explanation of the general conception of good is here substituted *provisionally* for the realism of Plato.

13 ἀλλ' ἴσως—*ζητεῖται*] 'But perhaps we should dismiss these questions for the present, for to refine about them belongs more properly to another kind of philosophy. So too about the idea. Even if there is any one good universal and generic, or transcendental (*χωριστόν*) and absolute, it obviously can neither be realised nor possessed by man, whereas something of this latter kind is what we are inquiring after.' Cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 4. The whole force of the present chapter is contained in this sentence. The Idea is not *πρακτόν τι*, and therefore does not belong to ethics. The concluding paragraphs of the chapter are occupied with proving that the Idea is not available even as a model (*παράδειγμα*) for practical life.

15 ἐνδεές] Cf. *Pol.* vii. xvii. 15: πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσ-

σαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτον ἅπαντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδῶς αὐτὸ τὰγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἱατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ιδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἱατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἱατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τούτου εἰρήσθω.

Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί γ' ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ

λεῖπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.

15-16 καίτοι — τεθεαμένος] 'And yet it is not likely that all artists should be ignorant of, and never so much as inquire after, so great an aid, if really existing. But it is hard to see in what a weaver or carpenter will be benefited with regard to their respective arts by knowing the absolute good; or how one is to become a better doctor or general by having contemplated the absolute Idea.' It has been objected that Aristotle fixes on too mean specimens of the arts, that he might have spoken differently if he had adduced the fine arts. But the question is, whether for practical life the Idea (that is, a knowledge of the absolute) could be made available? This forms a great point of divergence between Plato and Aristotle. The latter seems to regard the Idea as an object of the speculative reason alone, something metaphysical and standing apart; and between the speculative and practical powers of man he sets a gulf. Plato, on the other hand, speaking without this analytical clearness, seems to think of the Idea as an object for the imagination, as well as the reason, as being an ideal as well as an

idea. In this its many-sided character he would make it affect life, as well as knowledge; for by contemplation of it the mind would become conformed to it. Cf. *Repub.* VII., and see Essay III. p. 205.

VII. 1 πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν—εἴη] 'But let us return to the good we are in search of, and ask what is its nature.' τὸ ζητούμενον is emphatic; it distinguishes the *πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν* of ethics, here 'sought for,' from the transcendental supreme good of metaphysics. Failing to obtain a satisfactory answer to his question, either from the common opinions of men, or from the philosophers, Aristotle starts anew, by asserting that though the conception of good may vary 'in each art and action,' yet it has this unvarying characteristic, that it is the 'end.' From this starting-point the argument easily comes round to the position already anticipated (*μεταβαλὼν δὲ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτον ἀφίκεται*), that the *πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν* is identical with the *τέλος τέλειον*, or end-in-itself of action, and with this basis, by a series of *a priori* principles, some already enunciated by Plato and others peculiar to his own system, Aristotle de-

τέχνη· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἡ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγεία, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῃ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τοῦτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττονσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ
 2 πλείω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφί-
 3 κται. τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοῖς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δηλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη
 4 τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μά-

velops his conception of happiness or the chief good. (1) It is *τέλειον*; (2) Also, it must be *αὐταρκες*; (3) It must be found in the *ἔργον* of man. (4) This *ἔργον* is a rational and moral life; (5) We must conceive of it 'in actuality,' in other words, as 'conscious life;' (6) We must add the condition of conformity to its own proper law; (7) And also the external condition of sufficient duration and prosperity.

3 οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοῖς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα] 'As, for instance, wealth, flutes, and instruments in general.' Wealth is a mere means (cf. i. v. 8). Aristotle seems a stock example with Aristotle of the instruments to an art. Cf. *De Animā*, i. iii. 26, where he argues against the doctrine of the migration of souls, saying, you might as well speak of the carpenter's art migrating into flutes: *παραπλῆσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὥστερ εἰ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοῦς ἐνδύεσθαι—δεῖ*

γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὄργανοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. Cf. Xenophon, *Œcon.* i. 10, where Socrates says: ὥστερ γε αὐλοὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπισταμέμῳ ἀξίως λόγον αὐλεῖν χρήματά εἰσι, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμέμῳ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀχρηστοὶ λίθοι, εἰ μὴ ἀποδιδότῳ γε αὐτούς.

4 καὶ ἀπλῶς—ἄλλο] 'And therefore we call that absolutely of the nature of an end which is desirable in and for itself always, and never in order to anything else.' The conception of ends was not fully developed in Plato; at the beginning of the second book of the *Republic*, those are said to be the highest goods which are desired both for themselves and for their results (cf. *Εἰλ.* i. vi. 10). Aristotle's conception of the practical chief good is that while it is solely an end, it yet sums up the results of all means. Hence he adds that it is not only *τέλειον*, but *αὐταρκες*. These two

λιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ 5
οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν
ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίν-
οντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς
εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονή-
σειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν,
οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ 6
αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκὲς εἶναι
δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐταρκὲς λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι
βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ
καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτι-
κὸς ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνονται 7
γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων
τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυ-
θις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκὲς τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἰρε-
τὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηθενὸς ἐνδεῶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαι-
μονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συν- 8
αριθμουμένην, συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν
μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν
γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μείζον αἰρετώτε-
ρον αἰεὶ. τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκὲς ἢ εὐδαιμονία,

qualities are attributed to the chief good in the *Philebus* of Plato, p. 20 c: τὴν ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλειον ἢ μὴ τέλειον εἶναι; πάντων δὴ που τελεώτατον, ὧς Σώκρατες. τί δέ; ἱκανὸν ἀγαθόν; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; κ.τ.λ.

6 τὸ δ' αὐταρκὲς—ἄνθρωπος] 'We do not apply the term "self-sufficiency" only to the individual who leads a solitary life, but in reference to parents and children, and wife, and in general friends and fellow-citizens, since man is by nature social.' The Greek οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ—ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι is defective in the grammar; the meaning apparently is, that αὐτάρκεια does not imply isolation.

7 τούτων δὲ—ἐπισκεπτέον] 'But of these we must take some limit; for if one extends the circle to ancestors

and descendants and the friends of a man's friends, it will go on to infinity. But this point we must consider hereafter.' γονεῖς seems to be used in a different sense in § 7 from γονεῦσι in § 6. Aristotle promises here to return to the question how far a man's αὐτάρκεια is liable to be affected by his relationship to others. To some extent this is done in chapter xi. of this book, which discusses τὰς τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπαρτίαν as to their influence upon a man's happiness, whether he be alive or dead.

8 ἔτι δὲ πάντων—δεῖ] 'Moreover we think it (οἰόμεθα) the most desirable of all goods, provided it be not (μὴ) reckoned as one among them; but if it were so reckoned, it is plain that it would become more desirable

9 τῶν πρακτῶν οὐσσ τέλος. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται,
 10 ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστὶν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα
 δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
 που. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀνλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ
 τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν
 τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν

with the addition of the slightest good, for the addition constitutes a preponderance of goods, and the greater good is always the more desirable.' This remark points out the difference between the *τέλειον καὶ ἀταρκες ἀγαθόν* and any other thing to which the word 'best' can ever be applied. The all-comprehensive and supreme good, happiness, is indeed the best, but not as being really placed on a level with other goods, or ranked among them; not as being 'best of the lot,' but as including all the lot in itself, so that beside it there is no good left that could possibly be added to it. The Paraphrast gives exactly this meaning to the passage, rendering the word *συναριθμουμένην* by *σύστοιχον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς*. καὶ εἰ σύστοιχον αὐτὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήσομεν ἀγαθοῖς, φανερόν ἐστι, εἰ προσθήσομέν τι τῶν ἄλλων αὐτῇ, αἰρετωτέραν ποιήσομεν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτὴ τὸ ἀκρον τῶν αἰρετῶν. And that the above was the meaning of Aristotle is shown by the author of the *Magna Moralia* (i. ii. 7), who starts the question: Πῶς τὸ ἄριστον δεῖ σκοπεῖν; πότερον οὕτως ὡς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναριθμουμένην; to which he answers: Ἀλλ' ἄριστον. τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ τέλος τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλειον τέλος ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἂν ἄλλο δόξειεν εἶναι ἢ εὐδαιμονία, — ἐὰν δὴ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ συναριθμῇ, αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ βέλτιον· αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἐστὶ. In other words, the end is the sum of the means, and

therefore cannot be compared with the means, for that would only be comparing it with itself. The whole consists of parts, and cannot be called the best of the parts. Nor can it be made better by the addition of one of the parts than it was in itself. The present passage is quoted by Alexander Aphrodisia. *ad Ar. Topica*, iii. 2 (Brandis's *Schol.*, 274b, l. 17), to illustrate the point that knowledge *πρὶς* the process of learning cannot be called better than knowledge by itself, *ὅτι τὸ μαθεῖν διὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἰρούμεθα*. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εὐδαιμονία μετὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν αἰρετωτέρα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας μόνης, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ περιέχονται καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί—οὐ γὰρ συναριθμεῖται τοῖς περιέχουσιν τὰ περιέχόμενα ἐπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν ἐβλήθη. The word *συναριθμεῖσθαι* in the sense of 'to be reckoned as one of a class, "to be placed in the same scale," occurs *Rhet.* i. vii. 3: ἀνάγκη τὰ τε πλείω, τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μείζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. 'The more numerous must be a greater good than the fewer, if they be placed in the same scale of comparison with it.' Eustratius takes the passage to mean that 'happiness would be the most desirable of all things, even if not joined with other good, though with any addition it would be *a fortiori* better.' This contradicts the very principle that Aristotle wished to establish, that 'best' and 'most desirable' are to be applied

ἀν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότε- 11
 ρον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστὶν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ
 πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἡ
 καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου
 τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ
 πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἀν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη
 ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυ- 12
 τοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν
 καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν. ἐπομένῃ δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἀν εἴη, φαί- 13
 νεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῳ.
 λείπεται δὲ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. τούτου δὲ
 τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθεὶς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.

to the supreme good not meaning that which merely as a fact is better than other things, but, ideally, that than which nothing can be better. Aristotle accepts from the Platonists the doctrine that the chief good is incapable of addition. Cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 3.

11 πότερον οὖν τέκτονος κ.τ.λ.] This argument—by which, from the analogy of the different trades, of the different animals, and of the separate parts of the body, the existence of a proper function for man is proved—comes almost *verbatim* from Plato's *Republic*, I. 352-3. The *ἔργον* of anything Plato there defines as that which can alone or best be accomplished by the thing in question. Ἀρα οὖν τοῦτο ἀν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁποῦν ἔργον δ' ἀν ἡ μόνῃ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἡ ἀρίστα; Of course *ἔργον* in this sense is to be distinguished from such uses as in *Eth.* i. i. 2, where it means an 'external result'; iv. ii. 10, 'a work of art'; ii. ix. 2, 'a labour' or 'achievement'.

12 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν—ἐχόντος] 'Now mere life is shared even by the plants, whereas we are seeking something peculiar. We may set aside therefore the life of nutrition and growth.

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Succeeding this will be a principle of life that may be called the perceptive: but this too appears shared by horse and ox and every animal. There remains then what may be called a moral life of the rational part.' The argument here as to the proper function of man, and the division on which it is based, belongs entirely to the physiological and psychological system of Aristotle. See Essay V. p. 295. The meanings of the word *πρακτικός* are (1) with a genitive 'able to do,' or 'disposed to do,' as iv. iii. 27, *ὁλίγων πρακτικόν*, i. ix. 8, *πρακτικοῦ τῶν καλῶν*. (2) 'Active,' 'practical,' opposed to quiescent or speculative, i. v. 4. *Οἱ δὲ χαλεπότες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμῇ*. vi. viii. 2. (3) 'Moral,' as here, opposed to the life of animal instinct. Cf. vi. ii. 2, *τῷ τὰ θηρία ἀσθῆσιν μὲν ἔχουσιν, πρᾶξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν*. Or, as vi. iv. 2, vi. xii. 10, opposed to the artistic and the scientific.

13 τούτου δὲ—διανοούμενον] With regard to the present passage, Bekker exhibits no variation in the MSS., and the Paraphrast evidently had it in his text. All that can be said, therefore, is that the present sentence interrupts the sense and grammar of the

11

διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον·
 14 κυριωτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι· εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον
 ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ
 δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπου-
 δαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ
 ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρε-
 τὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
 κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ
 τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ
 πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ

context, and that it is conspicuously awkward in a book which for the most part reads smoothly.

διττῶς δὲ—λέγεσθαι] 'But further, since this life may be spoken of in two ways' (either as an existing state or developed into actuality), 'we must assume it to be in actuality; for this seems the more distinctive form of the conception.' κατ' ἐξιν is the opposition to κατ' ἐνέργειαν. Cf. I. viii. 9.

14 We have here a fourfold protasis: εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον—τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον—ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν—ἐκαστον δ' εἰδ. The apodosis to all of these is εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, where γίνεται is used as denoting a deduction from premises, just as the future tense is often employed. Similar long-drawn arguments occur II. vi. 9, III. v. 17, &c.

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν—λόγου] 'Now if the proper function of man be vital action according to a law, or implying a law.' ψυχῆ, substituted for the previous term ζωή, denotes the entire principle of life, thought, and action, in man. The additional term κατὰ λόγον gives an equivalent to πρακτικῆ, since the reason necessarily introduces a moral point of view into every part of life (cf. *De Animâ*, II. x. 7). It is difficult to translate κατὰ λόγον, because the word λόγος is ambiguous. Partly it

means reason, partly a law or standard (cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 2). As compared with μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, κατὰ λόγον would express a marked, direct, and prominent control. In the εὐφυνῆς and the σώφρων, where the desires flow naturally to what is good, reason would seem rather to be presupposed (οὐδ' οὐκ ἄνευ) than directly to assert itself. The more significant expression, however, is that which follows, πράξεις μετὰ λόγου. A machine might be said to move κατὰ λόγον, 'in accordance with a law,' but not μετὰ λόγου, 'with a consciousness of a law.' It is this consciousness of the law which, according to Hegel, distinguishes morality (Moralität) from mere propriety (Sittlichkeit). On the transition of meaning from κατ' ἐνέργειαν to ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, and on the translation of these terms, see Essay IV. pp. 237, 247.

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ—κιθαριστοῦ] 'And we say that the function is generically the same of such a one, and such a one good of his kind, as, for instance, of a harper, and of a good harper.' φαμέν is an appeal to language and general consent. τοῦδε is used indefinitely as above, I. xi. 19, τὴν τοῦδε, 'the health of such and such an individual'; VI. xi. 6, ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία, &c. The present passage vindicates the introduction of κατ' ἀρετὴν into the definition by

καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖ- 15
ται· εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια
γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν
ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ 16
χελιδὼν ἕαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ
μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.
περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀγαθὸν ταύτη. δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως 17
ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἴθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ'
ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς
ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετῆς
ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν
αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλείπον. μεμνή- 18

showing there is nothing illogical in doing so, that by taking a genus in its best form we do not go off into another genus.

15 ἕκαστον δ' εὖ—ἀποτελεῖται] 'And everything is well completed in accordance with its own proper excellence.' Cf. *Eth.* II. vi. 2. This principle of the connection between the proper function of a thing and the peculiar law of excellence of that thing is taken from Plato; cf. *Rep.* I. p. 353. It is introduced here to justify the term κατ' ἀρετὴν in the definition of happiness. This term is not at once to be interpreted 'according to virtue,' which would destroy the logical sequence of the argument. It comes in at first in a general sense, 'according to the proper law of excellence in man,' whatever that may be.

εἰ δ' οὕτω—τελειοτάτην] 'If so, I say, it results that the good for man is vital action according to the law of excellence; and if the excellences be more than one, according to that which is best and most absolutely in itself desirable.' Whatever awkwardness and strangeness there may appear in this attempt to render the definition of Aristotle, it will be found on consideration to approach, at all

events, nearer to his meaning than the usual rendering: 'an energy of the soul, according to virtue,' &c.

16 ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ—χρόνος] 'But we must add also "in a complete period and sphere of circumstances." For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so neither one day nor a brief time constitutes a man blest and happy.' βίος the external form and condition of life, implies both fortunes and duration. By adding this last consideration, Aristotle gives a practical aspect to his definition. Ideally, a moment of consciousness might be called the highest good, independent of space and time. τελείος, as we have seen above (§ 4), means 'that which is of the nature of an end,' 'that which is desirable for its own sake.' But no doubt the popular sense of the word comes in to some degree in the present passage; partly Aristotle had before his mind the conception of a 'complete' or 'perfect' duration of life, partly of an external history and career that could be designated as 'desirable for its own sake.'

17 περιγεγράφθω—ἐλλείπον] 'Thus far, then, for a sketch of the chief good; for we ought surely to draw the

- σθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ
 ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν
 ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκείον τῇ
 19 μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπι-
 ζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ
 ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς γὰρ τὰ ληθούς.
 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ
 20 τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίγνηται. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον
 δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ
 ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι

outline first, and afterwards to fill it up. And it would seem that any one could bring forward and complete what fits in with the sketch, and that time is a good discoverer of such things, or at least a good co-operator. Hence it is, too, that the development of the arts has taken place, for every man can supply that which is defective.' From this point to the end of the chapter, Aristotle dwells on the importance of a principle (like his definition of the chief good) as an outline or comprehensive idea, afterwards to be developed and filled up (cf. a similar phrase in *De Gen. Anim.* II. vi. 29: καὶ γὰρ οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι ταῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῶον. He adds, however, the caution that mathematical exactness must not be required in filling up the sketch. He seems here to dwell with some pride on the foundation he has laid for ethics: a similar feeling betrays itself with regard to his logical discoveries, *Sophist. Elench.* xxxiii. 13, where is a parallel passage to the present on the importance of ἀρχαί: τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐρισκόμενα μᾶλλον τὸ πρῶτον ἐπιθεῖν λαμβάνειν αἰῶθε, χρησιμώτερον μέντοι πολλῶ τῆς ὑστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεω. μέγιστον γὰρ ὡς ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται.

18 τὴν ἀκρίβειαν—ἐπιζητεῖν] Cf. I. iii. 1. The word 'ἀκρίβεια, with its

cognate ἀκριβής, has different shades of meaning which may be here specified. (1) 'Minuteness of details.' Cf. Plato, *Repub.* III. 414 A, ὡς ἐν τέλει, μὴ δὲ ἀκριβείας. *Eth.* II. vii. 5. (2) 'Mathematical exactness,' which implies every link of argument being stated, and the whole resting on demonstrative grounds. Cf. *Metaph.* 4 *Ελαττον*, iii. 2. *Eth.* VII. iii. 3. (3) 'Definiteness,' or 'fixedness.' Cf. VIII. vii. 5, ἀκριβὴς οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁρισμός. II. ii. 4, ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τάκερβεί, answering to *ἐστικτός*, IX. ii. 2, III. iii. 8. (4) Applied to the arts it denotes 'finish.' Cf. I. iii. 1, II. vi. 9, VI. vii. 1. (5) By a slight transition from the last, when applied to sciences, it means also 'metaphysical subtlety.' This transition is made VI. vii. 2; cf. x. iv. 3; *De Anima*, I. i. 1. In the passage before us ἀκρίβεια seems to combine several of the above-mentioned meanings. It seems to say that *mathematical exactness* is not suited to ethics—that too much *subtlety* is not to be expected (καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης κ.τ.λ.)—that too much *detail* is to be avoided (ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα, κ.τ.λ.)

20 οὐκ—ἀρχῇ] 'Nor must we demand the cause in all things equally,—in some things it is sufficient that the fact be well established, as is the case with first principles. Now the

πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή· τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεω- 21
 ροῦνται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ'
 ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἢ πεφύκασιν, καὶ
 σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι
 ῥοπήν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἡμῖς παντὸς
 εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῇ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν
 ζητούμενων.

fact constitutes a first point and principle.' The bearing of this somewhat obscure sentence seems to be to repeat the remark made, I. iv. 6-7, that in morals a fact appealing to the individual consciousness has a paramount validity. Just as in the other sciences we do not ask the why and wherefore of the axioms, so in morals we accept the facts because we feel them without their being demonstrated. Cf. *Etā.* VI. viii. 9.

21 τῶν ἀρχῶν δ'—ἐπόμενα] 'But of principles some are apprehended by induction, others by intuition, others by a sort of habituation of the mind, and, in short, different principles in different ways. But we must endeavour to attain each in the natural way, and we must take all pains to have them rightly defined, for they are of great importance for the consequences drawn from them.' This digression seems partly suggested by the immediately preceding paragraph on the relation of facts in morals to principles of science, partly it belongs in general to this part of the subject. Aristotle, having laid down his ground principle of ethics, makes a pause, in which some remarks are introduced on principles, their importance, and the method of attaining them. The words καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως show that the list of methods is not meant to be exhaustive. The commentators, misunderstanding the Greek, have inquired by what 'other methods other principles' could be

sought. But, of course, these words only generalise the whole proposition (cf. *Etā.* I. iv. 3, ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλο).

θεωροῦνται] 'are perceived'; cf. VI. iii. 2, VII. iii. 5. Answering to μετιέναι we have the term θεωρεῖν ἀρχάς, *Prior Analytics*, I. xxx. 2. With ἢ πεφύκασιν we must understand a passive infinitive, 'in the way in which they are meant by nature to be reached. As to the method of obtaining principles, cf. *Prior Analytics*, I. xxx. 1, where the study of nature and of facts is pointed out as the only source of ἀρχαὶ or universal premises. 'Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ περὶ τέχην ὅποιον οὖν καὶ μᾶθημα· δεῖ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει περὶ ἑαστον δῆρυν.—Διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρχάς τὰς περὶ ἑαστον ἐμπειρίας ἐστὶ παραδοῖναι. Connecting then the recognition of ἀρχαὶ with the knowledge of facts, we see that (1) ἐπαγωγὴ is the evolution of a general law out of particular facts, (2) αἰσθήσις is the recognition of the law in the fact. Αἰσθήσις is not to be restricted to the perception of the senses, or confined (as the Paraphrast would have it) to the physical sciences. Rather it is opposed to ἐπαγωγῇ, as intuition to inference. Cf. *Etā.* VI. xi. 5, τοῦτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθήσιν, αὐτῇ δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. (3) ἐπαγωγὴ is a sort of unconscious induction, a process by which general truths may be said to grow up in the mind. Nor is this process peculiar to moral truths

Induction
Intuition

Unconscious induction

- 8 Σκεπτέον δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνίδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, 2 τῷ δὲ ψευδεὶ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές. νενεμημένον δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῶ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ. τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς

alone: it is a question whether even the truths of number do not derive part of their validity as necessary axioms from their frequent repetition. See Mill's *Logic*, book II. ch. v.

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outline of philosophy

VIII. We now enter upon a fresh division of the Book. From hence to the end of Chapter 12th Aristotle tests his great ethical principle, his definition of the chief good, by comparing it with various popular or philosophic opinions, and by applying to it certain commonly mooted questions and distinctions of the day.

1 σκεπτέον δὴ—τὰ ληθές] 'We must consider it (*i.e.* the first principle) therefore not only from the point of view of our own conclusion and premises, but also from that of sayings on the subject. For with what is true all experience coincides, with what is false the truth quickly shows a discrepancy.'

περὶ αὐτῆς] especially with δὴ, can only be referred to ἡ ἀρχὴ in the preceding line. This is a general doctrine of science, though Aristotle immediately exemplifies it with regard to his definition of happiness.

ἐξ ὧν] is compressed for ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν. The clause τῷ μὲν—τὰ ληθές contains an indistinctness and a difficulty overlooked by the commentators. For they content themselves with explaining that 'truth in the thought is identical with existence in

the thing.' "Ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἀληθές, τοῦτο ἢ ὑπαρξῆς ἐν τῷ πράγματι. ὅταν οὖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ πράγματι συνίδει τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις, δῆλον ἂν εἴη, ὅτι ἀληθὲς ὁ λόγος (Eustratus). The difficulty is, that Aristotle is not talking of comparing theory with facts, but his own theory with the theory of others. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, however, cannot exactly mean 'opinions' or 'theories.' It is plain that there is some confusion in the expressions used, which is increased by the word τὰ ληθές in the second part of the sentence answering to τὰ ὑπάρχοντα in the first. There is here a mixing up of the objective and the subjective sides of knowledge. Our word 'experience' may perhaps serve to represent τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, meaning neither 'facts' nor 'opinions,' but facts as represented in opinions. In the same way τὰ ληθές is not simply the true fact, nor the true theory, but 'the truth'—that is, fact embodied in theory. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα would usually mean the natural attributes of a thing, the facts of its nature. Cf. *Prior. Anal.* I. xxx. 1 (quoted above). *Et.* I. x. 7.

2 νενεμημένον—ἀγαθὰ] 'To apply our principle (δὴ), goods have been divided into three kinds, the one kind being called external goods, and the others goods of the soul and goods of the body; and we call those that have to do with the soul most distinctively and most especially goods.' This

ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογούμενην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὁρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις³ τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός. συνάδει δὲ⁴ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ⁵ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλ-

classification is attributed by Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Ethicos* xi. 51, to the Platonists and Peripatetics; but in the *Eudemian Ethics* ii. i. 1, it is spoken of as a popular division, καθὰ περ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. Accordingly here Aristotle calls it 'an ancient division that is admitted by the philosophers.'

τὰς δὲ πράξεις—τίθεμεν] 'But vital actions and realisations have of course to do with the soul.' By these words Aristotle claims that his definition of the chief good for man (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια, κ.τ.λ.) is in accordance with the received idea that 'goods of the soul' are the highest class of goods.

3 ὁρθῶς δὲ—ἐκτός] 'And our definition is right in that certain actions and modes of consciousness are specified as the End. For thus it comes to be one of the goods of the soul, and not one of those that are external.' πράξεις stand for the development of the moral nature of man, ἐνέργειαι more generally for the development of any part of his nature into consciousness. In either case the man departs not out of himself; the good is one existing in and for his mind.

4 συνάδει—εὐπραξία] 'And with our definition the saying' (cf. *Eth.* i. iv. 2) 'agrees that "the happy man lives well and does well." For we have described happiness pretty much

as a kind of well-living and well-doing.'

5 φαίνεται δὲ—λεχθέντι] 'Moreover the various theories of what is requisite with regard to happiness seem all included in the definition.' There is a sort of mixed construction here, ἐπιζητούμενα being used in a doubtful sense. The meanings of the word ἐπιζητεῖν are: (1) to 'require' or 'demand,' viii. xiv. 3, τὸ δυνατόν ἢ φίλα ἐπιζητεῖ; (2) to 'search after,' i. vi. 15, ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν; (3) to 'examine' or 'investigate,' i. vii. 19, ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὁρθήν, viii. i. 6; (4) to 'question,' like ἀπορεῖν, ix. vii. 1. In the passage before us, τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα partly means 'the things demanded, or thought requisite'; partly, as going with περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, 'the discussions or investigations on the subject of happiness.' The words δὲ καὶ mark a transition from considering the merely popular opinions, to the more philosophic 'investigations' of the subject.

6 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ—συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν] As we learn from the next section, Aristotle is rather running over the chief heads of opinion than giving any accurate classification of the different schools of philosophy. The opinion that identified happiness with virtue may perhaps be attributed to the Cynics; with practical thought (φρόνησις) to Socrates; with philosophy (σοφία) to Anaxagoras (cf. *Eth.*

λοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐ-
 7 τηρίαν συμπααραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ολίγοι καὶ ἐνδοξοὶ ἄνδρες· οὐδε-
 8 γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι

x. viii. 11), Heraclitus, Democritus, &c. 'That it consisted in these things or one of these, with pleasure added or implied,' is the doctrine asserted by Plato in the *Philebus*. That 'favourable external conditions' must be included, seems to have been the opinion of Xenocrates, who attributed to such external things a *δύναμις ὑψηρετικῆ*. See Essay III. p. 219.

7 τούτων δὲ—κατορθοῦν] One MS. omits ἢ καὶ, leaving the sentence οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν, for which Dr. Cardwell suggests the emendation *κακορθοῦντας*. 'It is not likely that either class should be altogether at fault, but only in some particular point, their general conclusions being correct.' This is confirmed by the interpretation of the Paraphrast: *ἢ οὐδετέρους εὐλογον τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν πάσι διαμαρτάνειν· ἀλλὰ καθ' ἐν τι μόνον ἴσως, ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις δὲ ἀληθεύειν*. But the text, as it stands above, gives a sense most in accordance with what Aristotle would be likely to say. 'Now some of these are opinions held by many, and from ancient times; others by a few illustrious men; but it is not probable that either class should be utterly wrong, rather that, in some point at least, if not in most of their conclusions, they should be right.'

8 sqq. Aristotle now proceeds to show his own coincidence with these pre-existent theories. It is to be ob-

served that he says nothing here in reference to those who made happiness to consist in 'thought,' or 'a sort of philosophy.' This is one of the marks of systematic method in the *Ethics*. He will not anticipate the relation of *φρόνησις* and *σοφία* to *εὐδαιμονία*. The rest of the argument is very simple. (1) The definition of 'happiness,' 'vital action under the law of virtue,' agrees with, includes, and improves upon the definition that says 'virtue is happiness.' For it substitutes the evocation, employment, and conscious development of virtue, for the same as a mere possession or latent quality. (2) Such a life implies pleasure necessarily and essentially (*καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδόν*); for pleasure, being part of our consciousness (*τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν*, cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 6), necessarily attaches to all that we are fond of, or devoted to, or that we follow as a pursuit (*ἐκδότην δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὴ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοποιεῖσθαι*, cf. *Eth.* ii. iii. 1-3, and thus will arise out of a life of virtue to him that pursues such a life. He will experience a harmony of pleasures unknown to others (*τοῖς φιλοκλέοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα*). Hence we may supersede the addition proposed by some philosophers of *μεθ' ἡδονῆς* to the conception of happiness. Our conception, says Aristotle, needs no such adjunct 'to be tied on like an amulet.' (3) He accepts the requirements of Xenocrates. External prosperity is a condition without which happiness

τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα συνφδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσιν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηρηγκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίᾳσιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κάγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίγνονται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδῆσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκύστω δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. τοι-

cannot practically exist, though it is not to be confounded with happiness.

τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα] 'Virtue or excellence of some sort.' The ambiguity of the word ἀρετή renders it impossible to be translated uniformly. It comes into the *Ethics* with the general meaning of excellence, but constantly tends to restrict itself to human virtue, and indeed to moral virtue, as distinguished from other human excellence.

9 τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐξηρηγκότι] 'To one asleep, or otherwise totally inactive.' Cf. I. v. 6.

πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ εὖ πράξει] Both the terms 'action' and 'well' are implied in ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν. Εὖ πράξει, however, goes off into a different train of associations.

οὕτω — γίγνεται] 'In the same way it is they who act rightly that attain to the beautiful and good things in life.' ἐπήβολος repeats the metaphor of the archer, *Eth.* I. ii. 2; cf.

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Æsch. Prom. 444, *Eth.* I. x. 14. With καλῶν κάγαθῶν (applied to things) cf. Plato, *Apol.* 21 D, οὐδὲν καλὸν κάγαθόν εἶδέναι, and below § 13.

11 τοῖς μὲν οὖν — ἡδέα] 'Now to most men there is a sense of discord in their pleasures, because they are not naturally pleasant; but the lovers of what is beautiful find pleasure in those things which are naturally pleasant.' With μάχεται may be compared the 'Surgit amari aliquid' of Lucretius. Φιλόκαλος occurs in the *Phædrus* of Plato, where it is said that the soul which in its antenatal state saw most clearly the Ideas, in life enters εἰς γόνιν ἀνθρώπου γεννηομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ. Plato uses it, in accordance with his context, to denote one with a poetic feeling and love for the beautiful, like the verb φιλοκαλεῖν in Thucydides, II. c. 40. In Aristotle the meaning is more restricted to a love of the noble in action. *Eth.* IV.

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αὐτα δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν
 12 ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὐτάς. οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ
 βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν
 ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ
 χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδεὶς ἂν
 εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον
 τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 13 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτάς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ'
 ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ
 καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει
 14 περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν. ἄριστον
 ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώ-
 ρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῦστον δ' ὑγιαιίνει·
 ἡδιστον δὲ σίφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρεῖ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύ-
 τας δέ, ἡ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαι-

iv. 4, it means one with a noble spirit :
 τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη
 καὶ φιλόκαλον. φύσει ἡδέα denotes
 partly things that are, ought to be,
 and must be pleasures, according to
 the eternal fitness of things, in
 accordance with the whole frame of
 the world ; cf. φύσει βουλευτόν, *Eth.*
 III. iv. 3 ; partly, pleasures which are
 in accordance with the nature of
 the individual—his natural state—
 his highest condition ; cf. VII. xiv. 7,
 φύσει ἡδέα ἃ ποιεῖ πράξιν τῆς τοιαύτης
 φύσεως, 'Things are naturally pleasant
 which produce an operation of a
 given nature' (viewed as a whole) :
 VII. xi. 4 ; γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή,
 'a perceptible transition into one's
 natural state.' On the various mean-
 ings of φύσις, see below, *Eth.* II. i. 3,
 note.

12 ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός] 'Like
 an amulet to be tied on.' Cf. Plutarch,
Vit. Pericl. § 38 : ὁ θεόφραστος ἐν

τοῖς ἠθικοῖς διαπορήσας εἰ πρὸς τὰς
 τύχας τρέπεται τὰ ἥθη,—ιστοῖηκεν, ὅτι
 νοσῶν ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοπούμενῳ τυτῷ
 τῶν φίλων δείξαι περιάπτου ὑπὸ τῶν
 γυναικῶν τῷ τραχέλει περιηρημένον.
 Cf. also Plato, *Repub.* IV. 426 B, οὐδ'
 αὖ ἐπωδαὶ οὐδὲ περιάπτα, κ.τ.λ.

οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων] This
 anticipates *Eth.* II. iii. 1, where it is
 said that pleasure is the test of a ζῆς
 being formed.

14 κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα]
 The *Eudemian Ethics* commences by
 quoting this inscription, rather more
 circumlocution being used than here.
 'Ὁ μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ
 γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ
 τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Ἀγῶνι, κ.τ.λ. The
 last line, as there given, stands πάντων
 δ' ἡδιστον, οὐ τις ἐρεῖ τὸ τυχεῖν. The
 verses also occur among the remains
 of Theognis, and the same sentiment
 in iambics is found in a fragment of
 the *Creusa* of Sophocles, Stobæus *Serm.*

μονίαν. φαίνεται δ' ὁμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδε- 15
ομένη, καθάπερ εἵπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ
καλὰ πράττει ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττε-
ται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ
πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ 16
μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας, κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ
εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχους ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης
καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἦττον, εἴ τῃ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν
ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνῶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἵπομεν, 17
ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐμερίας· ὅθεν εἰς
ταυτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι
δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

“Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν 9
ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατὰ τινὰ θεῖαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ
διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ 2

CHIL. I 5. This classification of goods—that ‘justice is most beautiful, health best, and success sweetest,’ belongs to the era of proverbial philosophy in Greece; see Essay II. p. 102.

15 ἀχορήγητον ὄντα] We should say, by analogous metaphors, ‘Unless sufficiently furnished’ or ‘equipped.’ Cf. IV. II. 20.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ—τεθνῶσιν] Cf. *Rhetoric*, I. V. 4, εἰ δὴ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγενείαν, πολυφίλιαν, χρηστοφίλιαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς, οἷον ὑγίειαν, κάλλος, ἰσχυρὸν μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικὴν, δόξαν, τιμὴν, εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετήν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκτέτατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τὰ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. The expression in the *Rhetoric*—‘parts of happiness,’ is equivalent to ‘instruments of happiness,’ the more accurate designation in the present passage.

17 καθάπερ οὖν—ἀρετῇ] ‘As we have said then, it seems to require the

addition of such external prosperity. Hence some identify good fortune with happiness, as another class of philosophers do virtue.’ The Cyrenaics and Cynics appear to be alluded to here. Aristotle’s doctrine contains and gives a deeper expression to all that is true in both of the two views.

IX. I ὅθεν—παραγίνεται] ‘Whence also the question is raised whether it (happiness) is to be attained by teaching, or habit, or any other kind of training; or whether it comes by some divine dispensation, or lastly by chance.’ The word ὅθεν expresses the thread of connection, by which this new subject of discussion is introduced. Since happiness seems to be a balance of two principles, an internal one, virtue, and an external one, circumstances, the question arises whether it is attainable by the individual through any prescribed means, or whether it is beyond his control. It seems chiefly, however, to be upon the word ἀρετῇ that Aristotle goes.

- θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὐλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεός
δοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον.
13 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον,
φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν
καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων
εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι
4 φαίνεται καὶ θεῖον τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύ-
κοινον· δυνατόν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις
5 πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δ'
ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιστον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν

off. The question of the day, *πότερον μαθητὸν ἢ ἀρετὴν*, comes before him on mentioning that some identify happiness with virtue. Thus he says, not quite distinctly, 'It is questioned whether happiness can be learnt.' The question forms an important point at issue in the ethical systems of Aristotle and of Plato. The conclusion of Aristotle is directly opposed to that which is somewhat tentatively stated at the end of the *Meno* (99 E): *ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτὸν, ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα παραγιννομένη ἀνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται*.

2-3 *εἰ μὲν οὖν—εἶναι* 'Now it must be confessed that if anything else at all is a gift of gods to men, it seems reasonable that happiness too should be the gift of God, especially as it is the best of human things. But this exact point perhaps would more properly belong to another inquiry; at all events, if happiness is not sent by God, but comes by means of virtue, through some sort of learning or training, it appears to be one of the divinest things.' We have here a characteristic exhibition of Aristotle's way of dealing with questions of the kind. We may observe: (1) His acknowledgment and admission of the religious point of view, and the *prima facie* ground for the inter-

ference of Providence in this case *if in any others*. (2) His strict maintenance of the separate spheres of the sciences. A theological question cannot belong to ethics. (3) His manner of dismissing the subject. 'Happiness, if not given by God, is at all events divine' (cf. *Εἰλ.* x. viii. 13)—by which expression he alters the view, giving it a pantheistic instead of a theistic tendency. (4) His immediate return to the natural and practical mode of thought.

4 *εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ—ἐπιμελείας* This is an addition to the preceding epithets of happiness. Not only is it 'something divine and blessed,' as being 'the crown and end of virtue,' but also 'it must be widely common property, for it may be possessed—through a certain course of learning and care—by all who are not incapacitated for excellence.' As it stands, this last clause is a *petitio principii*. Afterwards, however, the assumption is justified by arguments in its support both from reason and experience. Aristotle insisted much less than Plato on the innate difference between man and man, and approaches much more nearly to the mechanical and sophistical view, *ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπου οὐ πολὺ διαφέρει*.

5-6 *εἰ δ' ἐστὶν—ἂν εἴη* The argu-

οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν 6 αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρη- 7 ται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ

ment, which is stated in rather a complex way, seems as follows:—'If it were better that happiness should be attainable by certain definite means, we may conclude that it is so (because in nature, art, and every kind of causation, especially in what is higher, things are regulated in the best possible way). But it is better, because the contrary supposition (namely, that the chief good should depend on chance) is simply absurd and inconceivable.' It is an *a priori* argument, based on a sort of natural optimism, on a belief in the fitness of things. We find a similar classification of causes into nature, chance, and human skill, *Eth.* III. iii. 7, where however necessity is added. Cf. VI. iv. 4. The ἀρστη αἰρία here meant seems to be virtue. Cf. *Eth.* II. vi. 9, and *De Juv. et Sen.* iv. 1: κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον, οἷον τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον.

7-11 The succeeding arguments may be briefly summed up. (2) He appeals to his definition of the chief good, that it is a certain 'development and awaking of the consciousness under the law of virtue, and with certain necessary or favourable external conditions.' This definition obviously implies the contradictory of any theory making happiness merely and entirely a contingency or chance. (3) Since the chief good is the end of politics, whose main business it is to educate and improve the citizens—

this shows that education is the recognised means of happiness. (4) Animals are not called happy, because they are incapable of the above-mentioned action of the moral consciousness. (5) The same applies to boys, whose age renders them incapable of that which has real moral worth. At this point Aristotle adds that happiness requires absolute virtue, and a completed round of life (ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου), and he goes off into a new train of thoughts on the uncertainty of human affairs, by which he is brought into contact with the paradox of Solon.

7 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν—ὀργανικῶς] The Paraphrast explains τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ here to mean τὰ σωματικά, which he divides into τὰ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, such as health, which are necessary to the existence of happiness (ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον), and τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, as wealth, friends, &c., which are helps and instruments to happiness. Aristotle probably had not this exact division before his mind. He places happiness essentially in the consciousness; and then speaks of other and secondary conditions, partly necessary and partly favourable. He in fact hovers between the ideal and the practical. Sometimes he speaks of happiness as that chief good which includes everything (*Eth.* I. vii. 8); at other times he analyses its more essential and less essential parts, and leaves in it a ground open

- 8 καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιοῦς τινὰς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικούς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βούν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν
- 10 οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας
- 11 καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοδαυὰ τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνούντα μεγάλας συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡρωϊκοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλῖως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.
- 10 Πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμο-

to chance and circumstances, which admits of being improved or impaired.

8 ὁμολογούμενα—τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ] 'In agreement with what we said at starting.' Cf. x. vii. 2: 'Ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ.

10 διὰ ταύτην—μακαρίζονται] In *Politics*, I. chap. xiii, it is discussed, from a more external point of view, whether boys are capable of the same virtue in a household as men. To which the conclusion is 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν τελειὸν καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον (§ 11). The boy's good qualities have not an independent existence; they only give the promise of such. The sentiment διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται is neatly expressed by Cicero *De Rep.* (quoted by Servius on *Æn.* vi. 877): 'O Fanni, difficilis causa laudare puerum: non enim res laudanda, sed spes est.'

11 εὐθηνούντα] aliter εὐθεκούντα. Cf. *Rhet.* I. v. 3, εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων, where also there is the variation εὐθεσένεια.

ἐν τοῖς ἡρωϊκοῖς] aliter *Τρωϊκοῖς*. Dr. Cardwell quotes Bentley, who, upon Callimachus, *Fragm.* 208, pronounces that *ἥρωες* is a false reading for *Τρῶες*. Τὰ ἡρωϊκά means 'the heroic legends.'

X. The mention of βίος τέλειος and of the Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι brings Aristotle now to consider the famous paradox of Solon, that 'no one can be called happy as long as he lives.' The discussion of this question is valuable not only for its own sake as a criticism upon the old saying, but as introducing a practical consideration of happiness, and tending to settle the relation to it of outward circumstances. Other points of interest are mooted rather than set at rest.

1 Πότερον οὖν—ἀποδόσθῃ] 'Must we extend this farther, and call no man

νιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὀρᾶν ;
 εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἄρ' αὖ γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαιμόνων 2
 τότε ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄστοπον,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν ; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαιμόνα, μὴδὲ 3
 Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς
 μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ
 τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα·
 δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ
 καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι
 καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπαραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι.
 ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιω- 4
 κότε μέχρι γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται
 πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐγγόνους, καὶ

whatever happy as long as he lives, but, according to Solon's saying, look to the end ! And if we must allow this opinion, can we say that a man is happy after he is dead ?' τέλος is here used, not in the technical Aristotelian sense, but after the common usage, as in the Solonian proverb itself. There were two ways in which this proverb might be understood. It might express: (1) That a man is positively happy after death. (2) That negatively he now attains happiness, that is, safety from change ; and thus may be retrospectively congratulated.

2 ἢ τοῦτό γε—εὐδαιμονίαν] 'Nay, surely this (the first position) is altogether absurd, especially to us who define happiness to be a kind of actuality.'

3 ἔχει μὲν—τινα] 'Still even this (second way of putting it) is open to some difficulty.' It seems not so sure that the dead is safe and clear from the changes and chances of the world,—for may he not be affected by the fortunes of his posterity ?

δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι

μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ] This is the reading of all Bekker's MSS. ; but the rendering of the Paraphrast is at variance with it, and seems to imply a reading of καὶ instead of—μή. His words are : πάλιν δὲ οὐκ ἀρκεῖται ἡ λύσις δοκεῖ. 'Ἀπορία γὰρ ἔστιν εἶναι, εἰ λέγομεν εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι. 'For it is thought that the dead has, ay and feels too, both good and evil, just as much as the living.' If the common reading be retained, we must suppose Aristotle first to have stated in the mildest form the popular belief that the happiness of the dead is connected with the fortunes of his family, and afterwards (ἀστοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴδὲν) to have expressed this more strongly. In that case, he here seems to say that ordinary opinion ascribes happiness and misery to the dead in a figure—that is, with reference to our idea of their happiness and misery ; just as good and evil may be ascribed to the living who are unconscious of them.

4 τῷ γὰρ—κατὰ λόγον] 'For to him who has lived in felicity till old

τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας. δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. 5 ἄτοπον δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐγγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν, τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ 7 ἐκείνου. εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ

age, and died accordingly,' κατὰ λόγον, 'in the same ratio'; cf. below, § 15.

δῆλον δ'—ἐνδέχεται: 'And it is plain that in their respective degrees of removal (τοῖς ἀποστήμασι) the descendants may stand in an infinite variety of relationships to their ancestors.' Ἐγὼ οὖν apparently answers to the *ὅλων ἀπόγονοι* in the preceding section. The Paraphrast omits the sentence. The Scholiast gives *πρὸς τοῖς γονεῦσι τῶν ἀπογόνων ἀπόστασις πολυειδὴς εἶναι καὶ τοικαῖον ἀναγκαῖον ἐστίν*.

5 ἄτοπον δὲ—γονεῦσιν] 'It would be absurd, therefore, if the dead should change in sympathy with them, and become at one time happy, and then again wretched. But it would be absurd also that the fortunes of the descendants should affect the ancestors in nothing, and not for some time at least,' i.e. after death. The second part of this sentence, pronounced so strongly as it is, seems to contradict what one would have supposed to be Aristotle's philosophical creed. But he is here speaking from the popular point of view, and states strongly the two sides of the difficulty that presents itself. For the nonce he accepts the

common belief on the subject (cf. i. xi. 1, i. xi. 6), but modifies it so as to leave it unimportant. On the apparently indeterminate views on the question of a future life, held by Aristotle, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 299 sqq.

6 'But let us return to the former difficulty, for perhaps the clue to our present question also may be discovered from it.' τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν is not a very accurate expression. Aristotle, when he stated the question now reverted to, εἰ δεῖ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν, gave it two meanings, and showed the impossibility of holding the first, and the difficulty that attached even to the second. He now says, 'let us go back to the former difficulty.' What he means, however, is clear enough. He means to say, 'may we not after all set aside the caution of Solon in whatever way it is stated? May we not predicate happiness in the present as well as retrospectively? By settling the question as far as the present life goes, we may perhaps get some light as to the security or insecurity of the dead.'

7 τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλίσθαι περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] 'And be-

τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλίσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς; ὅλον 8
 γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίμεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαι-
 μονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐρούμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά
 τινα τὸν εὐδαιμόνα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυνμένον. ἢ 9
 τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ
 ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀν-
 θρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἶπαμεν, κύρια δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ'
 ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναν-
 τίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. περὶ 10
 οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης
 ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ
 καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἷται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. τούτων δ' αὐτῶν
 αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώταται διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέ-
 στατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ

cause fortune makes many revolutions around the same individuals.' Various expressions of this sentiment are quoted from the Classics. The most beautiful is that which occurs in Soph. *Trachiniæ*, 127, ἄλλ' ἐπὶ πῆμα καὶ χαρὰ Πᾶσι κυκλοῦσιν, οἷον ἀρκτου στροφάδες κελυθοῖ.

8 χαμαιλέοντα — καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυν-
 μένον] It has been remarked that these words form an iambic line, probably quoted from some play.

9 ἢ τὸ μὲν—ἐναντίου] 'Rather, to follow chances is altogether a mistake, for good or evil resides not in these, but human life, as we have said, requires them as an external condition; while what determines happiness is the rightly regulated mental consciousness, and *vice versa*.'

10 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν] 'And even the present difficulty witnesses to our theory,' i.e. the difficulty felt in predicating happiness, except retrospectively, betrays a latent sense that happiness must be regarded as something more stable than the fluctuations of fortune. Aristotle finds out that this more stable

essence is to be found in his own conception of happiness, since he has placed it in the individual consciousness, in that which is the life and soul of the man himself.

περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ—λήθην] 'For about nothing human is there so much stability, as about the most excellent moods of the consciousness, for these are thought to be more abiding even than the sciences. And the highest among them are most abiding of all, because the happy dwell in them most entirely and continually, which appears to give the reason for their never being forgotten.' Aristotle's doctrine of the stability and permanence of mental states was inherited by him from the Cynic Antisthenes. Cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* i. ii. 19: Οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὁ δίκαιος ἀδικος γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ὁ σώφρων ὑβριστής, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδέν, ὃν μάθης ἐστιν, ὁ μολὼν ἀπεπωτήμενος ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. To speak indeed of human ἐνεργεῖαι as *μόνιμοι* or *συνεχεῖς* is a sort of contradiction of Aristotle's own philosophy, cf. *Eth.* x. iv. 9; *Metaph.* viii. viii. 18. The more accurate expression of his principle would be to say that while the

- 11 ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ λήθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· αἶε γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἶσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντη πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὃ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνθρωπος.
- 12 ψόγου. πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ὅλην ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γιγνόμενα μὲν εὖ μακρύτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίγνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακά-

'*Ἐνέργεια* is perpetually blooming out, and then disappearing, the *Ἔξις* abides, and is ever tending to reproduce the *ἐνέργεια*. Life then may be regarded as a series of vivid moments, with alight intervals or depressions between; or again, ideally, as a vivid moment of consciousness, the intervals being left out of sight. Cf. Essay IV. p. 251. The *ἐνέργεια* then is our life and being, and it would be absurd to speak of forgetting this. It is 'more abiding than the sciences,' i.e. than the separate parts of knowledge, which do not constitute the mind itself. The opposition here is not between the moral and intellectual *ἐνέργεια*, as we may see from § 11, where it is said that 'the required stability will belong to the happy man, for always, or mostly, he will act and contemplate in accordance with the law of his being.' *Σοφία*, viewed as a mood of the mind, is as abiding as the moral qualities, and indeed admits of more continuous exercise. Cf. *Eth.* x. vii. 2.

περὶ αὐτὰ] (sc. *ἐνέργειας*). Cf. *Eth.* iii. xii. 2, *Pol.* vii. xiii. 3, where there occur similar transitions to a neuter pronoun.

11 ὃ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετρά-

γωνος ἄνθρωπος ψόγου] 'He that is truly good, and foursquare without a flaw.' These terms are borrowed from *Simonides*. They are quoted also, and discussed, in the *Protagoras* of Plato, p. 339: ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθῶς γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, χερσὶ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνθρωπος ψόγου τετυγμένον. Cf. *Rhetoric*, iii. xi. 2: τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον, μεταφορὰ, ἀμφὺ γὰρ τέλεια. *Hor. Sermon.* ii. vii. 86: *in seipso totus teres atque rotundus*.

12 ὅλην ὡς—ποιήσει, κ.τ.λ.] The distinction between *ζωή* and *βίος* is hardly preserved. 'Good fortunes if small, obviously do not alter the balance of the life and feelings, but if considerable, and coming in numbers, they will make one's condition more blessed.' Cf. *Eth.* ix. ix. 9.

καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκε] 'For they naturally add a lustre.' This is said from the practical point of view, which analyses happiness into the internal mood and the external circumstances. From the ideal point of view, which takes happiness as a whole (*Eth.* i. vii. 8), nothing can be added to it, or make it better.

ἀνάπαλιν δὲ—μεγαλόψυχος] 'While contrary circumstances mar and deface

ριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλὰς ἐνεργείας. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλύμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δὲ ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὧν καὶ μεγάλῳ ψυχῳ. εἰ δ' ¹³ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰετὰ τὰ κάλλιστα πρῦττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέ- ¹⁴ ποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὲν μακρύος γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥαδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ,

felicity, by introducing pains, and often hindering the play of the mind. But nevertheless, even in these, what is beautiful shines out, when one bears easily many and great misfortunes, not from insensibility, but from being of a noble and magnanimous nature.' In this place, and in *Eth.* iii. ix. 4 (where he describes the brave man voluntarily consenting to death), Aristotle exhibits a high moral tone, quite on a level with the Stoics, and which places him above the accusation of being a mere Eudæmonist.

13 εἰ δ' εἰσι—φαῦλα] 'Now if life is determined by its moments of consciousness, as we have said, no one of the blessed will ever become miserable, for he will never do what is hateful and mean.' μακρύος, which is used repeatedly here and elsewhere, is a more enthusiastic term than

εὐδαίμων. Though it is applied to *βίος* in the previous section, it would seem generally more applicable to the internal feelings. By a false etymology, *Eth.* vii. xi. 2, it is connected with *χαίρειν*. In the next section it is predicated negatively of the *εὐδαίμων*. 'The happy man can never become miserable—not, however, that he will retain his joyful state, if he falls into the lot of Priam.' But no very marked distinction is kept up between *εὐδαίμων* and *μακρύος*.

14 ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων—ἐπήβολος] 'And after such he cannot again become happy in a short time, but if at all, in a long and complete period, having attained great and noble things in it.' This shows that happiness, being deep-seated, and depending on the entire state of mind (*ἔξω*), is neither lost nor won easily.

- 15 *μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπὶ βολος. τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργούντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένον, μὴ τὸν τυγχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον; ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον*
- 16 *τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως. εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζῶντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους.*
- 11 *Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω, τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς*

15 *τί οὖν—πάντως*] 'What hinders then to call him happy who is in the fruition of absolute harmony of mind and is furnished sufficiently with external goods—not for a casual period, but an absolute lifetime? or must one add—"and who shall live on so and die accordingly"—since the future is uncertain to us, and we assume happiness to be an End-in-itself and something absolute in every possible way?' *τέλειος*, as before said, has two associations; one popular, with the common sense of *τέλος*, and thus means 'complete' or 'perfect'; the other philosophic, with the End-in-itself, and thus means that which is in and for itself desirable, that in which the mind finds satisfaction, the absolute. The word here seems to hover between its two meanings. Aristotle probably was not conscious of the collision between the frequent use of *τέλειος* here and the question to which this chapter is an answer—*εἰ χρὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν*.

16 *εἰ δ' οὕτω—ἀνθρώπων*] 'If so, we shall call those happy during their lifetime who have and still have the qualities mentioned, but still happy as

men only.' Solon's view, which had rested on a too great regard to external fortune, is accordingly superseded. Happiness viewed from the inside—from its most essential part—may be predicated of the living, though still with a reserve, since they are still subject to the conditions of humanity.

XI. 1 He returns to the question before incidentally mooted (I. x. 4), where the happiness of the dead can be affected by the vicissitudes of the world they have left. He will not altogether deny that some consciousness of events may reach the dead, but without determining this he argues that in any case the impression produced by them must be too slight and unimportant to affect our notion of the dead.

ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον] In the so-called *Menæxenus* of Plato (p. 248 B) we find this opinion stated in a wavering form.—(The dead are supposed to address their surviving parents) *δεόμεθα δὴ καὶ πατέρων καὶ μητέρων τῇ αὐτῇ ταύτῃ διαβολῇ χρωμένους τὸν ἐπιτακτὸν βίον διάγειν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐ θρηνησάντες οὐδὲ ὀλοφυνόμενοι ἡμᾶς ἡμῖν μάλιστα*

τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων τῶν
 δ' ἦττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραν-
 τον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν ἱκανῶς
 ἔχοι. εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ 3
 μὲν ἔχει τι βριθὸς καὶ ῥοπήν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δ' ἐλαφρο-
 τέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἀπαν-
 τας. διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευ- 4
 τήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ
 προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδαίαις ἢ πρᾶττεσθαι, συλλογι-
 στέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ 5
 διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινω-
 νοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ

χαριούνται, ἀλλ' εἰ τις ἐστι τοῖς τετε-
 λευηκόσιν αἰσθησις τῶν ζῶντων, οὕτως
 ἀχάριστοι εἶεν ἂν μέλιστα, κ.τ.λ.

3-4 εἰ δὴ—διαφορά] There is a
 complex protasis, (1) εἰ δὴ, (2) διαφέρει
 δέ. The apodosis to both is συλλο-
 γιστέον δὴ. The argument is, that we
 must bear in mind the difference: (1)
 between misfortunes in themselves,
 light and heavy; (2) between those,
 of whatever kind, happening in our
 lifetime and after our death. 'If, then,
 it is the same case with regard to the
 misfortunes attaching to the circle of
 one's friends as it is with those attach-
 ing to oneself—namely, that some have
 a certain weight and influence upon
 life, while others seem lighter; and
 if, again, there is a difference between
 the impression made by events on the
 living and on the dead far greater
 than that between crimes and horrors
 enacted upon the stage or only alluded
 to in tragedies; we must, I say, take
 account of this difference.'

προϋπάρχειν—ἢ πρᾶττεσθαι] The
 contrast is that between the actual
 representation of horrors, or the
 mention of them as 'presupposed,'
 and done off the stage. It is merely
 the principle of Horace. A. P. 181.

συλλογιστέον] This cannot mean

'We must conclude'; else the same
 proposition would form both the pre-
 mises and the conclusion; but 'we
 must take account of,' i.e. we must
 make 'this difference' part of the
 premises we have to go upon in all
 reasonings about the dead. The word
 is used, not in its technical Aristo-
 telian, but rather in its earlier and
 natural sense, according to which it
 meant 'to put together the grounds of
 an argument.' Cf. Plato, *Charmides*,
 p. 160 D: πάντα ταῦτα συλλογισάμενος
 εἰπέ εὐ καὶ ἀνδρῶσι. The Paraphrast
 here writes σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς δια-
 φορᾶς.

5 μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως—ἀντικειμένων] 'Or
 rather, perhaps' (we must take into
 account, συλλογιστέον understood),
 'the fact that a question is raised about
 the dead, as to whether they share at
 all in good or evil.' A difficulty has been
 made about τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι. 'Lambinus
 ex Vet. Int. et Argyrop. emendat τὸδε
 δεῖ, eamque lectionem Zwinger in tex-
 tum recepit, quæ hactenus commenda-
 tur, quia sequenti διὰ absorberi facile
 poterat δέ et δεῖ.'—Zell. The conjec-
 ture is supported by the rendering of
 the Paraphrast, who separates this
 clause from the preceding one. σκε-
 πτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς. βέλτιον

- δικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὖν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τούναντίον, ἀφαιρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς
- 6 μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μίτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.
- 12 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων·
- 2 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. φαίνεται δὴ

δέ ἐστι σκέψασθαι εἰ κοινούσιν, κ.τ.λ. But against it these appear to be conclusive reasons: (1) The authority of MSS. (2) We should expect διαπορεῖν, and that the sentence should stand μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸδε δεῖ διαπορεῖν. (3) The alteration would really alter and spoil the context. Aristotle does not say, 'Perhaps after all we had better start the question anew whether the dead are conscious of events.' This would contradict § 6. He only says, 'While granting the hypothesis that they do feel, we must take into account the element of doubt which still continues to attach to the subject.'

6 This section was pronounced suspect by Victorius on account of its being a mere repetition and summing up of former conclusions. He says it is wanting in some MSS., and that it may be a scholium, though a very old one. In favour of its genuineness we may urge that it is quite in Aristotle's manner. Cf. *Éth.* III. v. 22. It is found in all Bekker's MSS., with the exception of the words τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι; which are omitted in two, the omission being obviously due to the similarity of εὐπραξίαι and δυσπραξίαι. It is also recognised by the Paraphrast and Eustratius.

συμβάλλεσθαι τι] 'to contribute,' or 'communicate something.' Cf. *Éth.* III. i. 12: μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος. x. x. 19.

XII. The question which occupies this chapter—namely, in which class of goods happiness is to be placed, the admirable or the praiseworthy? is one that appears of little ethical interest, to have no important scientific bearing; in short, to degenerate into a sort of trifling. Aristotle, however, who aims at verbal precision and distinctness, and again who wishes to reconcile his theory with all questions, doctrines, and forms of language of the day, appears to have thought it worth a passing consideration. We may regard the present question as the last of that series of collateral questions growing out of his definition of happiness. It is answered by being stated; for the Chief Good and the Absolutely Desirable must necessarily be above praise, which is only given to the relatively, not to the absolutely good.

1 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν] 'For it is plain that it is not a merely potential good.' This implies a classification of goods into (1) potential, (2) actual, which latter are sub-

πάν τὸ ἐπαινέτὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν ἐπαινέσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρείον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ 3 τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίους δι' ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἶπαμεν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ 4 ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μείζον τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ 5 δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξὸς καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινέσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐσαν μὴνείν ᾧετο ὅτι κρείττον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιούτων δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ 6

divided into praiseworthy and admirable. There is a complete commentary on the present passage to be found in the *Magna Moralia*, i. ii. 1: 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπὲρ τούτων διώριστα, πειραθώμεν λέγειν, τὰγαθὸν ποσῶς λέγεται. Ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μετρίμια, τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις. τὰ δὲ τῶν λέγω τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτιον, ὡς ψυχὴ νοῦς, τὸ ἀρχαιότερον, ἡ ἀρχὴ, τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . τὰ δὲ ἐπαινετὰ ὡς ἀρετὰ . . . τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις, ὡς ἀρχή (rule), πλοῦτος, ἰσχύς, κάλλος· τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εὖ ἂν δύνηται χρῆσασθαι καὶ ὁ φαῦλος κακῶς, διὸ δυνάμει τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦνται ἀγαθὰ . . . λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ τέταρτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰ σωστικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ ἀγαθὰ, ὡς γυμνάσια ὑγιείας καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. 3 γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται] sc. οἱ θεοί,

Eth. x. viii. 7. Hence in the '*Te Deum laudamus*,' *laudare* is used in a different sense from *ἐπαινέειν*.

διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίους δι' ἀναφορᾶς] 'Because praise is made by a reference to some higher standard.'

5 δοκεῖ δὲ — ἀναφέρεσθαι] 'Now Eudoxus also seems to have well pleaded the claims of pleasure to the first prize, for he argued that its not being praised, although it is a good, shows that it is above the class of things praiseworthy, as God and the chief good are, to whom all other things are referred.' On Eudoxus see *Eth.* x. ii. 1-2, Essay III. p. 218. The metaphor of the *Aristeia* here seems borrowed from the *Philebus* of Plato, p. 22 K: 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμογε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονὴ σοι πεπτω-

- 7 γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων
ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια
πεπονημένοις, ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ
8 εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμῶν καὶ τελείων. ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν
καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα
πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν
τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.
- 13 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ'

κέναι καθαπερὲς πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν
δὴ λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων περὶ
μαχομένη κείται. κ.τ.λ.

6 Praise is of qualities: 'encomia are for achievements, whether bodily or mental.' Cf. *Rhetoric*, I. ix. 33, where the same distinction is given: ἐστὶ δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς . . . τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστὶν . . . διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμάζομεν πρόξαντας. τὰ δὲ ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἐξέως ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπραγότα εἰ πιστεῦομεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. 1. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ κατ' ἕκαστον ἔργου . . . ὃ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.

7 ἀλλὰ—πεπονημένοις] 'But perhaps to go into the details of the subject belongs more properly to the writers on encomia.' πεπονημένοις, a deponent form, as in *Eth.* I. xiii. 2. Encomia in the hands of the Sophists seem to have become a complete branch of literature, so as to have been treated as a separate art with its own proper rules.

8 ἔοικε δ'—τίθεμεν] 'And this seems also the case from its being a principle; for we all do all things else for the sake of this. Now the principle and the cause of goods we assume to be something admirable and divine.' The two senses of ἀρχή—ἀρχὴ οὐσίας and ἀρχὴ γνώσεως (cf. *Metaph.* IV. xvii. 2), the origin of being and the origin of

knowing—the cause and the reason—seem here to flow together. Happiness, or the practical chief good, is the ἀρχή of life, as being the final cause or τέλος. In this sense ἀρχή and τέλος, the first and the last, become identical. But the idea of happiness when apprehended becomes an ἀρχή in another way—namely, a major premise or principle for action (cf. *Eth.* VI. xii. 10). When Aristotle speaks of 'something admirable and divine, the principle and the cause of all goods,' he uses terms that approach those of Plato with regard to the Idea of Good, though his point of view is different. Cf. *Essay* III. p. 204.

XIII. With this chapter commences a new division of the treatise. Aristotle now opens the analysis of the terms of his definition. If happiness be 'vital action in conformity with the law of absolute excellence,' the question arises, what this law of excellence is?—a question essentially belonging to Politics. The answer to this Aristotle gives by the aid of a popular and empirical Psychology. Without attempting to sound the depths of the subject, he assumes, as sufficient for his present purpose, a threefold development of the internal principle (ψυχῆ) into (1) the purely physical or vegetative, (2) the semi-

ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον. τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα 2 πεπονῆσθαι. βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν 3 τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ 4 σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γένοιτ' ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπί- 5 νης δῆλον ὅτι. καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρω- 6 πίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως 7

rational or appetitive, (3) the purely rational. The first being excluded from all share in virtue, or human excellence properly so called; the second is considered the sphere of moral, and the third that of intellectual virtue. This division regulates the methodical arrangement of the *Ethica*. Also it may be said to have regulated almost all subsequent human thought on moral subjects. On Aristotle's general philosophy of the ψυχή see Essay V. p. 295.

2 δοκεῖ δὲ—ὑπηκόους] 'This, too, seems to have been the main concern of the true politician, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.' As we find in Plato ἀλήθεια is the quality most characteristic of the Ideas, so κατ' ἀλήθειαν here implies a thing being absolutely, deeply, essentially what it is to the exclusion of all mere seeming. The contrast here would be to those πρακτικοὶ πολιτικοὶ mentioned *Eth.* vi. viii. 2. Also to those historical and eminent statesmen whom Plato attacks in the *Gorgias*, p. 515 c sq., as having been entirely devoid of this object—making the citizens better.

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3 παράδειγμα δὲ—γεγέννηται] 'As an instance of this we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, and if there have been any others such like.' Aristotle seems to have inherited the preference felt by Plato and by Socrates for the Spartan constitution; not so much as a historical fact, but rather as a philosophical idea. It presented the scheme of an entire education for the citizens, though Aristotle confesses that this became degraded into a school for gymnastic.

5 περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι] 'Now it is obviously about human excellence that we have to inquire.' This passage would prove, if it were necessary, the indeterminate sense with which the term ἀρετή is introduced into Aristotle's *Ethics*. At first it appears merely as the law of excellence, quite in a general signification. Afterwards this is gradually restricted to human excellence, and then physical or bodily excellence is finally excluded.

7 εἰ δὲ ταῦθ'—ἐνέργειαν] 'But if this be so, it is plain that the politician must know in a way the nature of the

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- ἔχει, ὁ ἄλλος ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πῶς τὰ περὶ
ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοῦς θεραπεύοντα καὶ πᾶν
 σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ
 τῆς ἰατρικῆς. τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγμα-
 8 τεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὲ καὶ
 τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ
 ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ
 πλείον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων.
 9 λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις
 ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον
 10 αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρι-
 σται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν,
 ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ
 περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς

internal principle, just as he who is to cure the eyes must also know the whole body. And this holds good the more in proportion as Politics is higher and better than medicine.' A different interpretation is given by some commentators; thus Argyropolus, following the scholium of Eustratius, translates: 'Quemadmodum et eum, qui curaturus est oculos totumque corpus, de ipsis scire oportet;' as if the analogy between the *ἰατρός* and the *πολιτικός* were this, that they both are concerned to know the nature of that which they propose to benefit. The Paraphrast, however, takes it as above, referring *καὶ τῶν σώμα* not to *θεραπεύοντα* but to *δεῖ εἰδέναι*. That this is the true interpretation is rendered almost certain by a passage in Plato (*Charmides*, p. 156 B), from which the present comparison was in all probability taken: ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἴσως ἤδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοῖς προσέειπεν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσί που, ὅτι οὐχ οἷον τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλουσι καὶ αὐ-

τῶν ὀμμάτων εἶναι ἔχειν· καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἰᾶσθαι ἂν ποτε θεραπεύσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' αὐτῇ ἀνευ δλου τοῦ σώματος πολλὴν ἀνομιαν εἶναι. The general sense here evidently is that as the oculist must know to a certain extent the rest of the body, so the politician, who has not by any means to deal with the whole of the *ψυχή*, must yet, in some measure, know its entire nature. This knowledge, however, is to be limited (§ 8) by a practical scope. With *χαρίεντες* cf. *De Sensu*, i. 4: καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφώτεροι τὴν τέχνην μετρίστες.

9 λέγεται—*ἔχον*] 'Now even in popular accounts certain points are sufficiently stated with regard to the internal principle, and we will avail ourselves of them; as, for instance, that part of it is irrational and part rational.' For an account of the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, and for arguments showing that they do not designate a separate class of Aristotle's own works, see Appendix B to Essays.

10 ταῦτα δὲ—*παρόν*] 'But whether these are divided like the limbs of the body, and all other divisible matter,

τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ,¹¹
 λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύ-
 την γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τρεφομένοις θεῖη
 τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης μὲν
 οὖν κοινὴ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ
 γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ¹²
 δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ'
 ὕπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἡμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς
 εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀρ-¹³
 γία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ λέγεται σπονδαία καὶ
 φαῦλη, πλὴν εἴ πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν δικνούνται τινες τῶν κινή-
 σεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιει-

or whether they are only distinguishable in conception, while in nature they are inseparable, like the concave and convex in the circumference of a circle, makes no difference for our present purpose.' The above-mentioned division of the ψυχή, which is attributed to Plato, *Magna Moralia*, i. i. 7, is attacked by Aristotle, *De Anímá*, i. v. 26, and again, more definitely, *De Anímá*, iii. ix. 3. He here avails himself of it as popularly true, though he indicates also that from a higher point of view it will not hold good—that at all events it is a distinction and not a division.

11 τοῦ ἀλόγου—τινὰ] 'Now of the irrational division part appears common and vegetative—I mean that which is the cause of nourishment and growth; for this sort of power of the internal principle one must assume as existing in all things that are nourished, and even in embryos, and this same also in full-grown creatures, for it is more reasonable to suppose this than any other to be the cause of nutriment and growth.' Το τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ correspond the words (§ 15), "ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλῃ τις φύσει, κ.τ.λ. Aristotle first

makes the irrational side double. Afterwards (§ 19) he says that, viewing it differently, you may call the rational twofold. κοινῷ, i.e. 'not distinctive of man.' τελείους is used in the non-philosophical sense. Aristotle's psychology is of course constructed upon a physical basis. The principle of life develops itself into perception and reason, but the lower modes of it are necessary conditions to the higher, and exist in them. So Dryden says (*Palamon and Arcite*, iii. sub fin.) that man is

'First vegetive, then feels, and reasons last;

Rich of three souls, and lives all three to waste.'

12-13 'Now excellence in this respect seems common, and not peculiarly human; for this part or faculty seems to operate especially in sleep, and the good and bad are least distinguishable in sleep. Hence they say that for the half of life the happy are no better off than the wretched. Now this result is as might have been expected, for sleep is an inaction of the internal principle, viewed

- 14 κῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις, καὶ τὸ
 θρεπτικὸν ἑατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἅμοιρον
 15 πέφυκεν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος
 εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς
 καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον
 ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὁρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ·
 φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυ-
 κός, ὃ μάχεται τε καὶ ἀντιταίνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ
 καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ
 προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τὸναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παρα-
 φέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τάναντία γὰρ αἱ
 16 ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ

as something morally good or bad, except so far as certain impulses may to a trifling extent reach it, and in this way the visions of the good will be better than those of the common sort.' The physical principles here enunciated are stated at length in the interesting treatises *De Somno et Vigilis*, *De Insomniis*, & *De Divinatione per Somnum*, which occur among Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*. It may be sufficient now to allude to his definition of sleep and its cause (*De Somno*, iii. 30)—that it is a sort of catalepsy of the consciousness, caused by the rising of the vital warmth so as to clog the perceptive organ, and resulting necessarily from the functions of animal life, which its object is to preserve, by providing a rest for them. He speaks also (*De Somno*, i. 15) of the nutritive particle performing its office more during sleep than waking, 'since creatures grow most during sleep.' In his discussions about dreams we find a frequent recurrence of the words here used, *κινήσεις*—*ἀκινούνται*—*φαντάσματα*. He defines a dream to be 'that image resulting from the impulsion of the sensations which arises in sleep, and is dependent on the peculiar conditions of sleep.'

(*De Insom.* iii. 19) τὸ φάντασμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδῃ ᾖ, ἢ καθεύδῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐνύπνιον. In his excellently wise treatise on prophetic dreams he seems especially to dwell upon the fact that in dreaming the moral distinctions between men are lost, hence dreams cannot be sent by God. (i. 3) τὸ τε γὰρ θεὸς εἶναι τὸν πέμποντα, πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀλογίᾳ, καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς βελτίστοις καὶ φρονιμωτάτοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τυχοῦσι πέμπειν ὁπότεν. (This is well illustrated by Plato, *Republic*, ix. p. 571 c sqq.) In another place, however, he connects the illusions of dreaming with the personal character, just as the coward, he says, and the lover would form different mistakes about a distant object. (*De Insom.* ii. 15). This last coincides with what is said above about the *φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν*. Cf. on dreams generally Aristotle's *Problema*, xxx. xiv.

15-16 *ἔοικε δὲ ἀντιβαῖον* 'But there seems also to be another nature in the internal principle which is irrational, and yet in a way partakes of reason. For in the continent and the incontinent man we praise the reason, and that within them which

παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναι τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, 17 οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῇ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐκολώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῇ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὲ 18 καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς

possesses reason, for this exhorts them rightly, and to what is best; but there appears also to be something else in them besides the reason, which fights and strives against the reason. For just as paralysed limbs of the body, when we mean to move them to the right, go in the opposite direction to the left, so it is with the mind. For the tendencies of the incontinent are in the opposite direction to reason. In the body we see the false movement, but with regard to the mind we do not see it. But perhaps not the less ought we to believe that there is in the mind something besides the reason which is opposed to it, and goes against it.' Zell mentions a conjecture, τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ εὐκρατοῦς. But a slight consideration of the context shows that no change is required. It has been said that this passage exhibits the doctrine of 'human corruption.' To say this introduces a set of associations foreign to Aristotle. Aristotle's remark (1) does not go so deep as to the contrast between sin and holiness, purity and corruption: (2) it does not point out a radical and incurable defect in the whole race of man; on the contrary, he says presently that in the σώφρων 'all things are in harmony with reason.' However, we may well esteem the present observation, especially when first made, as one of the most penetrating

pieces of moral psychology. Aristotle's purpose is to establish the existence of a principle, μετέχον λόγου, which is to be the sphere of the practical virtues. This he exhibits in the case of the continent and incontinent (i.e. man in a state of moral conflict) as opposing and fighting against the reason. This is given as a fact of nature. This same fact viewed from the side of personal repentance might be well expressed in the language of St. Paul. Before attributing anything like the above-mentioned doctrine to Aristotle, we should require to examine the whole bearing of his moral theories, instead of deciding from an isolated passage.

17 πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει.] This shows that Aristotle does not propose here to seek deeply for the rationale of these phenomena in our moral nature.

ἔτι δ' ἴσως—λόγῳ] 'And perhaps it is still more obedient in him who is temperate and brave. For in him all things are in harmony with reason.' We have here a character supposed which unites the two first virtues of the Aristotelian table—Courage and Temperance—the virtues *par excellence* of the ἀλογα μέρη (cf. *Eth.* III. x. 1). In a person possessing both these virtues the unreasoning instincts would *ex hypothesi* have been harmonised with the reason. Book VII.

κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ἢ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φάμεν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μὴνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα
 19 ἐπιτίμησις τε καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως
 20 καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἡθους οὐ

viii. 5 distinguishes the *σώφρων*, in whom reason has complete supremacy, from the *ἐγκρατής*, who maintains his virtue by a conflict.

18 τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν — μαθηματικῶν] 'But the appetitive part, and generally speaking that which desires, in a way partakes of reason, inasmuch as it is subject and obedient to it. In like manner we speak of "paying attention to" one's father or one's friends, not in the same sense as we speak of "paying attention to" mathematics.' Ἐχειν λόγον or μετέχειν λόγου must be said of the passions in a different way from that in which it is said of the rational part of our nature. Aristotle illustrates this by adducing the use of ἔχειν λόγον with a genitive, which exhibits also a shade of variety in the meaning. With ἔχειν λόγον πατρός, cf. Eurip. *Alcestis*, 51, *ἔχω λόγον δὴ καὶ προθυμίαν σέθεν*. The passions are like the slave, as defined in *Politics*, I. v. 9: "Ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσούτων ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν."

τῶν μαθηματικῶν] here apparently means, not 'the mathematicians,' as *Etā.* i. iii. 4, but 'mathematics,' as vi. viii. 9. So it is taken by the Para-

phrast: Διττῶς δὲ λέγεται τὸ λόγον μετέχειν καθάπερ καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν. Λέγομεν γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων λόγον ἔχειν, τὸ ἐπιστρέφειν πρὸς αὐτούς, καὶ οἱ κελεύουσιν ἐξακολουθεῖν. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγον ἔχειν, τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ καὶ γινώσκειν τινα καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἔχειν. Partly there is a play on the words λόγον ἔχειν, which it is impossible to translate; and partly there is an analogy between the obedience of the passions to the reason and the submission one pays to the advice of others; and, on the other hand, between the purely intellectual process of mathematical study and the independent action of the reason itself.

20 διορίζεται—λέγομεν] 'According to this division also is human excellence divided. For we speak of intellectual excellences, and moral excellences; philosophy, intelligence, and thought being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For when speaking of the moral character we do not say that a man is philosophic or intelligent, but that he is gentle or temperate: yet we praise the philosophic man also, with regard to his state of mind, and praiseworthy states

λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρῶος ἢ σώφρων, ἐπαινούμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

of mind we call excellences.' The old difficulty of translating less definite ancient words into more definite modern ones occurs here. Aristotle is founding the distinction between the Intellectual and the Moral which has lasted ever since. But he uses the word ἀρετὴ as applicable to both spheres, whereas the instinct of men, whether rightly or wrongly, inclines to confine the name of virtue and the award of praise to the moral side,—to acts or states in which the will is prominently exerted. On this point

we can trace a progress, even in the Peripatetic school, for while the sentence ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφόν is repeated in the *Eudemian Ethics* (II. I. 18), it is corrected in the *Magna Moralia* (I. v. 3), κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς τοῦ τὸν λόγῳ ἔχοντος οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται· οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὶ σοφός, οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται, οὔτε ἐστὶ φρόνιμος, οὐδ' ὅλως κατὰ τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν. The last line in the first Book contains an anticipation of much that is demonstrated in Books II. and III.

PLAN OF BOOK II.

THE Second Book of the *Ethics* goes far to determine the course of the entire succeeding work, by laying down a programme of the separate moral virtues, which is afterwards followed in Books III. and IV.; and by suggesting for future consideration the conceptions of 'Οὐθὺς Λόγος and of Προαίρεσις. But it cannot be said that this book itself exhibits traces of pre-conceived arrangement or artistic design. On the contrary, it bears the same tentative character as Book I. Its parts are at first confused with each other, and design seems only to grow up as the book proceeds. Its contents may be arranged under the following heads:—

(1) A preliminary discussion on the formation of moral states. Ch. I.—IV.

(2) The formal definition of virtue according to its genus and differentia. Ch. V.—VI.

(3) The exhibition of this theory in a list of the separate virtues. Ch. VII.

(4) The relation of extremes, or vices, to each other, and to the mean or virtue. Ch. VIII.

(5) Rules for action, with a view to attaining the mean. Ch. IX.

Of these heads the first can with difficulty be divided from the second. The first four chapters implicitly contain the whole of the definition of virtue which is afterwards formally drawn out in Chapters V. and VI. And though the reservation of 'Οὐθὺς Λόγος (II. ii. 2) for future analysis really afterwards gives rise to Book VI, and the account of intellectual ἀρετή; yet here 'Οὐθὺς Λόγος is only cursorily, and by implication, identified with intellectual ἀρετή (cf. *ιστεν ὁ δευτὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχου πρὸς τὰς*

ἀλλὰ ἀπειράς), and the whole conception of Book VI. seems to belong to a later development of the Psychology of Aristotle, whether due to himself or to his school. Other marks of crudeness in detail will be adverted to in the notes. At the same time it would be unjust not to recognise the analytic penetration exhibited by Aristotle in the different parts of his theory of Virtue. The merit of this theory can only be appreciated by a comparison with the results which had been previously arrived at, as they exhibit themselves in Plato.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ II.

ΔΙΤΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ 2 τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρέκκλινον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. ἐξ οὗ καὶ ὄλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ

I. 1 The discussion is taken up from the point last arrived at in the analysis of happiness, namely, the distinction of intellectual from moral ἀρετή. We are not immediately told that the consideration of the former is to be deferred. That indeed only comes out incidentally, when (II. ii. 2) the discussion of ὁρθὸς λόγος is deferred, which ὁρθὸς λόγος is afterwards (VI. xiii. 3) identified with φρόνησις, the perfection of the practical reason. Here the mention made of the two forms of ἀρετή only goes to imply that neither of them is innate—that they are both acquired. After this first paragraph, the book confines itself to moral virtue, discussing how it is acquired and what is its nature.

ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ—[ἐθους] 'Now intellectual excellence, for the most part, takes both its origin and its growth from teaching, and therefore it requires experience and time, but moral virtue results from habit;

whence also it has, with a slight deflection, derived its name' (ἠθική from ἔθος); a derivation which is doubtless suggested by Plato, *Laws*, VII. p. 792 E: κυριώτατον γὰρ οὖν ἐμφύεται πᾶσι τότε (scil. in youth) πᾶν ἦθος διὰ ἔθους. A mechanical theory is here given both of the intellect and the moral character, as if the one could be 'acquired' by teaching, the other by a course of habits. That Aristotle inclined to this mechanical view has been already noticed (*Eth.* I. ix. 4). It is qualified, however, by admissions with regard to εὐφύια, φυσικὴ ἀρετή &c. (Cf. III. v. 17.)

2 ἐξ οὗ—[ἐγγίνεται] 'Whence also it is plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature.' Additional proofs of this position are subjoined. (1) The laws of nature are unalterable, and independent of habit. (2) According to the doctrine of δυνάμεις and ἐνέργεια (see Essay IV.), moral faculties are distinguished

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λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθεῖν ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ρίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθεῖν. οὗτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται 3 αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελει-

from physical faculties in that the former are developed out of acts, and do not merely find a development in acts. (3) The whole idea of legislation is based on the supposition that virtue may be cultivated. (4) The analogy of the arts shows that out of practice grows perfection. We need only compare the theory of virtue in this book with the discussions in the *Meno* of Plato, to see how immensely moral philosophy had gained in definiteness in the meantime. While becoming definite and systematic, however, it had also to some extent become scholastic and mechanical.

3 οὐτ' ἄρα—ἐθους] 'Therefore the virtues arise in us neither by nature, nor against nature, but on the one hand we have a natural capacity of receiving them, and on the other hand we are only made perfect by habit.' (Cf. *Etik.* vi. xiii. 1-2, on the relation of φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ τὸ κυρία ἀρετῆ.) It may be well, for the sake of clearness, to collect here some of the chief applications of the word φύσις to moral subjects in Aristotle, without going into the deeper philosophy of his conception of φύσις in relation to God, &c. φύσις is defined (*Metaph.* iv. iv. 8) as ἡ οὐσία ἢ τῶν ἐχόντων ἀρχὴν κινήσειεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ αὐτά. 'The essence of things having their efficient cause in themselves, by reason of what they are.' Here, then, we have two notions blended together: (1) the essence of things, their matter and form; (2) the productive principle of that essence,

which is nothing external, but in the things themselves. From this general conception, we see the term applied in various ways.

I. φύσις denotes the self-produced, or self-producing, principle, opposed especially to that which is produced by the intelligence or will of man: thus to art (*Etik.* vi. iv. 4) or to the moral will, care, or cultivation (x. ix. 6). It is that for which we are irresponsible (*ibid.*), τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὑπάρχει. That which comes of itself (vi. xi. 6), ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας ὁσonti. That which is innate, and out of the sphere of the will, (vi. xiii. 1), πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἔκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως. (iii. v. 18), τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὅπως δῆποτε φαίνεται. It is opposed to habit, as the original tendency to that which is superinduced, (vii. x. 4) ῥᾶν ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως. Also, to the result of circumstances, (iii. v. 15) τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πλῆγησι.

II. From the idea of the self-caused (καθ' αὐτό), it comes to mean that which is under a fixed law opposed to the variable, (v. vii. 2) τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον. Or, to the arbitrary and conventional, (i. iii. 2) νόμος μόνον, φύσει δὲ μή. The absolute opposed to the relative, (iii. iv. 3) τὸ φύσει βουλευτόν.

III. It means not only a law, but also a tendency, as v. vii. 4, φύσει ἢ δεξιὰ κρείττω.

IV. The character and attributes of a thing, whether good or bad,

οὐ μέντοι δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθνους. ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παρα-
 γίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὑπέρτερον
 δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων
 δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησά-
 μεθα, οὐ χρῆσάμενοι ἔσχομεν. τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν
 ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν·
 ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνομεν,
 οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κι-
 θαρισταί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι
 γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία ἀνδρεῖοι.
 5 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ
 νομοθετοῦντες τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ

the powers possessed by a thing, (I. iii. 4) ἢ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις. (III. i. 7) ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερ-
 τείνει.

V. The whole constitution of a thing, viewed as realising its proper τέλος, or the idea of good in itself, the perfect or normal state of any-thing. (VII. xi. 4) γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή. (III. xii. 2) ἢ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχον-
 τος φύσιν. Cf. *Politics*, I. ii. 8: οἷον γὰρ ἑκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελε-
 σθείσης, ταύτην φάμεν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας.

VI. The word is sometimes almost periphrastic; *Topica*, I. i. 3, ἢ τοῦ ψεύδους φύσις. Similar to this is the usage in *Eth. Nic.* I. xiii. 15: ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος.

4 ἔτι ὅσα—ἀνδρεία· 'Again, in the case of every faculty that comes to us by nature, we first of all possess the capacity, and only afterwards exhibit it in actual operation. This is clear with regard to the senses, for we did not get our senses by hearing often or seeing often, but on the contrary we used them because we had them, and did not have them because we used

them. But the virtues we acquire only after having first acted, which is also the case with the arts: for these things which we must learn before we can do, we learn by doing; as, for example, men become builders by building, and harpers by playing on the harp. In the same manner we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, and brave by doing brave actions.' On the philosophy of this doctrine, see Ar. *Metaph.* VIII. viii. and *Essay* IV. above, from which it will be seen that 'acts' or 'operations' is an inadequate translation for ἐνέργειαι. On Aristotle's position with regard to the question whether sight is an inherent or an acquired faculty, see below, VI. viii. 9, note.

τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· 'The arts be-
 side,' not as if virtue were reckoned among the arts. On the idiom, cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 473 c: εὐδαιμονισ-
 μενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ξένων. οἱ ἄλλοι seems to imply a
 separate class in juxtaposition, as in
 the French idiom, 'vous autres.' Cf.
Eth. II. ii. 8: ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
 φανερωτέρων.

μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τούτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιῶσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν ⁶ αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθίρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ⁷ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάζοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐπιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σῶφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποίᾳ ἀπο- 8

6 *ἔτι ἐκ—κιθαρισταί*] 'Again, every virtue, as well as every art, is produced out of and by the same things that destroy it; for it is by playing on the harp that both good and bad players are formed.'

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν] i.e. the circumstances and acts are generically the same, only differing as to well and ill. The doctrine here stated is no doubt true, with an addition. For it must not be supposed that all men start equal, either as artists or in morals. What is it that determines the well or ill of the first essays in art or in action? In the one case we say genius, talent, aptitude, or the reverse; in the other case, *εὐφυΐα* or the natural bent of the character as modified by circumstances. Such a difference between man and man is

quite admitted in the New Test., see Matt. xxv. 14-30.

7 *καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ—γίνονται*] 'And, in one word, states of mind are formed out of corresponding acts.' This is Aristotle's famous doctrine of habits, to appreciate the importance of which, we must think of it not as a philosophic or even as a practical doctrine for modern times, but rather as a new discovery and in contrast with the state of moral science in Aristotle's own time. We can see that it arose in his mind from a combination of his penetrating observation and experience of life with the peculiar forms of his philosophy. By means of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, he finds it possible to explain the formation of virtue, just as he does the existence of the world. In each act and mo-

διδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

- 2 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παρούσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἴν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἴν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ᾖ ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι σκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὐταὶ γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ 2 τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείμεθω,

ment at the outset of life, something which was potential in us and quite indeterminate for good or evil (*δύναμις*) is brought into actuality (*ἐνέργεια*), and now is determinately either good or bad. This determination, by the law of habits, reproduces itself, and thus there is no longer left an ambiguous *δύναμις*, but a *ἔξις*, or definite tendency for good or evil, is superinduced (see Essay IV. p. 239, sqq.) It will be observed that why an act tends to reproduce itself Aristotle does not inquire. He contents himself with stating the fact as a universal law, and expressing it in his own formula:—(τὸ δ' ἐν πρώτῳ καὶ ἀρχῇ, I. vii. 20).

II. 1 Ἐπεὶ οὖν—*εἰρήκαμεν*] 'Since then this present science does not aim at speculation, like the others (for we do not inquire in order to know what virtue is, but in order that we may become virtuous, else there would be no profit in the inquiry), it is necessary to consider with regard to actions how they should be done; for these are what determine the quality of the states of mind which are produced in us, as before stated.' *πραγματεία* is used by Aristotle and his commentators to denote the whole body of a separate science,

ἡ φυσικὴ πραγματεία, ἡ πολιτικὴ πραγματεία, &c. In Plato the word only occurs in a general sense, denoting 'business,' 'undertaking,' 'employment,' &c. ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι. According to this classification, sciences will be divided into speculative and practical; elsewhere a third class is added, the productive. On Aristotle's conception of the nature of Politics, see above, I. ii. 8, 9, notes.

αὐτῆς] Sc. τῆς σκέψεως or τῆς πραγματείας.

αὐταὶ γάρ] i.e. αἱ πράξεις, which are thus identified with the *ἐνέργειαι* of the last chapter.

2 τὸ μὲν οὖν—ἀρετὰς] 'That we must act according to the right law—this indeed is a general principle, and may be assumed as a basis of our conception—but we shall discuss hereafter, both what the right law is, and how it is related to the other virtues.' The meaning of *κοινόν* is made plainer by VI. i. 2 *infra*. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν (scil. κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον) *ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐδὲν δὲ σαφέις*. The Paraphrast has in the present passage, *ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἱκανὸν τὰς πράξεις σημεῖναι*. Cf. *Εὐθ.* I. vii. 9.

ὑποκείμεθω] The MSS. are at issue upon this word, the number of them giving *ὑπερκείμεθω*, which reading is followed by the Paraphrast. *ὑπερκείμεθω*

ρήθῆσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἐκείνο δὲ προ- 3
 διομολογείσθω, ὅτι πῶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν λόγος τύπῃ
 καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς
 εἴπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ' ἐν
 ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐσθηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ

would mean, 'must stand over,' and it would be taken in close connection with *ρήθῆσεται δ' ὕστερον*. But the authority of Bekker and the usage of Aristotle seem sufficient to establish *ὑποκείσθω*. Cf. *Eth.* II. iii. 6, v. i. 3, *Rhet.* I. xi. 1: *ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κινήσιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς*. *Pol.* VII. i. 13: *νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, κ.τ.λ.*

κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον] We find the phrase *ὀρθὸς λόγος* occasionally occurring in Plato, thus *Phaedo*, p. 73 A, it is coupled with *ἐπιστήμη—εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος*, where it means 'a sound understanding.' In the same dialogue, p. 94 A, it occurs with the signification 'sound reasoning.' *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμὴ ψυχὴ μεθέξει, ἔπερ ἀρμονία ἐστίν*. Elsewhere *λόγος* is found joined with *φρόνησις*. Cf. *Repud.* ix. p. 582 A, *ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ*. It is easy to see that *ὀρθὸς λόγος* was in Plato a floating idea; in Aristotle it is passing into a fixed idea, as is the case with many other terms of psychology and morals. But even in Aristotle something indefinite must still attach to a word used in such a variety of kindred senses as *λόγος*. It means 'argument' (*Eth.* x. ii. 1, *ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι*, i. v. 8, *πολλοὶ λόγοι*), 'inference,' opposed to intuition (vi. viii. 9, *ὡς οὐκ ἐστι λόγος*), 'ratio' (v. iv. 2, *κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτόν*), 'reckoning' (v. iii. 15, *ἐν ἀγαθοῦ λόγῳ*), 'conception' (i. vi. 5, *ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*), 'definition' or 'formula' (II. iii. 5,

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται. II. vi. 7, *τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα*), 'theory' as opposed to 'fact' (x. viii. 12, *λόγους ὑποληπτέων*), &c. In *Eth.* i. xiii. 9, *τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον*, it means 'reason,' but still in the present passage it seems best to avoid translating *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*, 'according to right reason,' as is usually done, (1) because of the article, which seems to show that *λόγος* is used in a general sense here, and not to denote a particular faculty of the mind; (2) in reference to the train of associations which must have been in Aristotle's mind, of 'standard,' 'proportion,' 'law,' &c. (see Essay IV. p. 257).

πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς] These words cursorily imply that ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος is an *ἀρετή*, if indeed τὰς ἄλλας is not to be explained as above, i. 4, note.

3-4 τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι κυβερνητικῆς] 'Now the actions and the interests of men exhibit no fixed rule, any more than the conditions of health do. And if this is the case with the universal theory, still more is the theory of particular acts incapable of being exactly fixed, for it falls under the domain of no art or regimen, but the actors themselves must always watch what suits the occasion, as is the case with the physician's and the pilot's art.' τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα refers to the two classes specified, *Eth.* i. iii. 2, 3, τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια—τοιαῦτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ κ.τ.λ. On the meaning of τὸ συμφέρον in morals, cf. *Eth.* III. i. 15, note.

4 οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς αἰετὸς τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς
5 κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος
6 λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθειρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὀρώμεν· τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ

τὰ ὑγιεινά] Aristotle is fond of the analogy between health and morals. He speaks of health as a relative, not an absolute, balance of the bodily constitution, cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 3.

τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου] It seems an over-statement of the uncertainty and relative character of morals, to say that 'the universal theory' is devoid of all fixedness. Rather it seems true to say (1) That in some things there is an absolute, immutable law of right and wrong. This Aristotle would himself acknowledge. (Cf. *Eth.* ii. vi. 19, 20.) (2) That in a large class of cases there is a law universal for the conduct of all men, but admitting also of modification in relation to the individual. (3) That there is a sphere of actions yet remaining, indeterminate beforehand, entirely depending on relative and temporary circumstances for their determination. Aristotle however may say with truth that, on the one hand, the theory of action cannot be reduced to universal axioms, like those of mathematics; on the other hand, that it is impossible to do what the casuists would attempt, namely, to settle scientifically the minutiae of particular actions.

5 πειρατέον βοηθεῖν] This is said in the spirit of the Platonic Socrates, only the uncertainty which Aristotle attributes to morals, *he*, from a different point of view, attributed to all knowledge.

6 δεῖ γὰρ—χρῆσθαι] 'For in illustration of immaterial things we must use material analogies.' This sentence is repeated in the *Magna Moralia* (i. v. 4) with a context that seems at first sight startling, *ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἐνδεῖα καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν. Δεῖ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι.* One might almost fancy that the writer was quoting the *Ethics* of Aristotle. Spengel, however (*Transactions of Philos.-Philol. Class. of Bavarian Academy*, III. 513), remarks that the true reading must be not *ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν*, but *ἐκ τῶν αἰσθησεων*, confirming this conjecture by the words of Stobaeus, who with regard to the Peripatetic ethics says, *πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐνδεῖαν τοῦτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθησεων μαρτυρίοις χρῶνται.* The writer therefore is only borrowing, not quoting, from Aristotle.

ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος—ισχύν] Taken perhaps from Plato, cf. *Erastæ*, p. 134, where, to prove that philosophy is not

σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σώζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ 7 ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν· ὃ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὃ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθίρεται γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται. ἀλλ' οὐ 8 μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ αὔξεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω 9 δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γινόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρείοι, καὶ γινόμενοι μάλιστα δυνήσομεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

πολυμαθία, Socrates argues that φιλο-
γυμνασσία is not πολυτροπία, but exercise
in moderation. To which his opponent
agrees (c), 'Ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ
ἀλλὰ τὰ μέτρια γυμνάσια τὴν εὐερίαν
ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Τί δὲ τὰ σιτία;
τὰ μέτρια ἢ τὰ πολλὰ; κ.τ.λ. There
are three points which this chapter
and the next contribute tentatively to
the theory of virtuous actions: (1)
From the analogy of life, health, and
strength, they must exhibit the law
of the balance between extremes; (2)
Virtue reproduces the actions out of
which it was formed; (3) It is essen-
tially concerned with pleasure, and is
indeed entirely based on a regulation
of pleasures and pains.

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8 ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον—ἰσχυρός] 'But
not only do the formation, the in-
crease, the destruction of these quali-
ties arise out of the same given cir-
cumstances, and by the same means,—
the exercise also of the qualities, when
formed, will be in the same sphere.
We see this to be the case with things
more palpable, as for instance strength.
For it arises out of taking much food
and enduring much toil, and these
things the strong man is especially
able to do.' Virtue is developed out
of, and finds its development in, the
same class of ἐνέργειαι. But only
those which succeed the formation of
virtue are to be called virtuous; see
below, Chapter IV.

O O

- 3 Σημείον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξω τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρείος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ· διὰ μὲν

III. 1 Σημείον δὲ—δειλός] 'Now we must consider the test of a formed state of mind to be the pleasure or pain that results on doing the particular acts. For he who abstains from bodily indulgence, and feels pleasure in doing so, is temperate, but he who does it reluctantly is intemperate; and he who endures danger gladly, or at all events without pain, is brave, while he that does it with pain is a coward.' The doctrine expressed here has been already anticipated, *Eth.* i. viii. 12. It is an ideal perfection of virtue, in which all struggle has ceased, and nothing but pleasure is felt in the virtuous acts. Temperance and courage are pictured in this ideal way, *Eth.* i. xiii. 17. The terms ἀκόλαστος and δειλός above seem used merely as the contradictories of σώφρων and ἀνδρείος, so that ἀκόλαστος has not the more technical sense which it receives farther on in the treatise. According to Aristotle's expanded doctrine, to abstain with difficulty, or to meet danger with reluctance, shows not intemperance or cowardice, but only imperfect self-control.

περὶ ἡδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή] 'For moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains.' On this sentence the chapter goes off, giving proofs of what is here affirmed. These proofs, to some extent, run into each other, and the whole chapter may be accused of want of method, both in itself and in relation to the

entire Ethics. But we must remember that there is still something tentative about Aristotle's theory of virtue; that psychology was still in its infancy; that Aristotle was only gradually winning his way to establish moral virtue as a state of the will in contradistinction to former systems, which had confounded it with a state of the intellect. From this point of view we may see the importance of urging the close connection of morality with the feelings, instincts, desires, in short with pleasures and pains. The arguments are: (1) Pleasures and pains induce and deter; whence Plato said that true education consists in learning to like and dislike the right things. (2) Virtue is an affair of actions and feelings, hence of pleasure and pain, which are inseparable from these. (3) Punishment consists in pain, and therefore vice, which it corrects, must consist in pleasure. (4) So much have pleasures and pains to do with the corrupting of the mind, that some have defined virtue to consist in insensibility to these. (5) There are three principles which form the motives for action: the good, the profitable, the pleasant. Of these, the last is in itself the most widely extended, and it enters into both the others. (6) Pleasure is a natural instinct from infancy upwards, which it is impossible to get rid of. (7) We all, in a greater or less degree, adopt pleasure and pain as the measure of actions. (8) The very difficulty of contending with

γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, 2 ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' εἰ ἀρεταί 3 εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τούτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. μνηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι 4 διὰ τούτων· ἱατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἱατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον 5

these motives proves their claim to be the matter of virtue, and the objects of the highest science, namely, Politics. A glance at these arguments is sufficient to show that they might have been more scientifically stated. It is obvious that they are written previously to Aristotle's analysis of pleasure, as it appears in Book X. The deeper method would have been to state the connection of pleasure with *ἐνέργεια*, and of *ἐνέργεια* with moral virtue on the one hand, and happiness on the other.

2 ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν] The reference is to Plato, *de Legibus*, II. p. 653 A: Δέγω τοίνυν τῶν παιδῶν παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην ἀσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρώτην, ταῦτ' εἶναι—παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετὴν, ἡδονὴν δὲ καὶ φιλίαν καὶ λύπην καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὁρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μὴ πῶς δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ, ὁρθῶς εἰσθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν προσήκόντων ἐθῶν· αὐτῆς δ' ἡ ξυμφωνία ξύμπασα μὲν ἀρετὴ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ὁρθῶς, ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμῶν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ προσαγορεύων κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὁρθῶς ἀνπροσαγορεύου.

4 αἱ δὲ ἱατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι] 'But it is the

nature of remedies to be the contrary of that which they cure.' This principle is stated by Hippocrates, *Aphorism* XXII. § 2, and repeated *Éth.* X. ix. 10.

5 ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον—προστίθεται] 'Again, as we have already said, every mental state is essentially related to, and concerned with, those things by which it is naturally made worse or better; now our mental states are corrupted by pleasures and pains from pursuing and avoiding them, either those which one ought not, or at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner, or whatever other points of the kind are specified in the definition. Hence it is that people define the virtues to be certain apathies and quietudes,—not rightly, however, because they state this absolutely without adding, "as is right," and "as is wrong," and "at the proper time," and all the other qualifications.'

ὡς καὶ πρότερον] The Laurentian MS. (K^b) reads ὡς καὶ πρόην, which is adopted by Dr. Cardwell. But there does not seem to be any instance of a similar usage in Aristotle, by which *πρόην* might be justified. The reference is to the preceding chapter, §§ 8, 9, where it is stated that virtue finds its development in those same acts and feelings out of which it sprung.

εἶπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ' οὗων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλαι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἂς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, 6 καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων 7 πρακτικῇ, ἡ δὲ κακία τούναντίον. γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ πάντα μὲν ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικὸς ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικὸς, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμ-

ἂς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ] The οὐ must be taken immediately with δεῖ, so as to form a positive conception, 'when it is wrong;' else of course μὴ would be required.

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Not 'by reason,' but 'by the formula of definition.' Cf. *Physics*, II. ix. 5: καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου. The notion of a regular formula for defining virtue occurs *Eth.* vi. xiii. 4: Σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὀρίζονται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασιν τὴν ἔξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἐστὶ, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον.

διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται] Especially the Cynics, but other philosophers also, as, for instance, Democritus, who seems to have placed the highest good in ἀταραξία. Cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II. 76: τὴν δ' εὐθυμίαν καὶ εὐεστώ καὶ ἀμωσίαν συμμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀταραξίαν καλεῖ. Aristotle appeals to this definition, as being an evidence, though an over-statement, of the truth that

vice is often caused by the pursuit of pleasure. He appeals to a similar over-statement of the truth that prosperity is necessary for happiness, *Eth.* I. viii. 17.

οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς] Amongst other oppositions, ἀπλῶς is frequently opposed to κατὰ πρόθεσιν, or προσθήκη, 'absolutely' opposed to 'with a qualification.' Cf. *Eth.* vii. iv. 3: οὐ κατὰ πρόθεσιν . . . ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον. This shows the force of προστίθεται above.

6 ὑπόκειται—τούναντίον] 'We may begin by assuming then, as a ground for future inquiries, that this kind of excellence (i.e. moral) is concerned with pleasures and pains, and tends with regard to them to the performance of what is best, while vice is the opposite.' The chapter might have ended here, but Aristotle reopens the discussion with fresh arguments and again sums it up in § 11.

φέρον ἢ δὴ φαίνεται. ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέ- 8
 θραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος
 ἐγκεχωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις,
 οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἥττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τούτ' 9
 οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τὰ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν·
 οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυ-
 πείσθαι. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, 10
 καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ
 καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετὴ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν
 τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα
 ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός. ὅτι 11
 μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν
 γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθίρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως
 γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ τὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ,
 εἰρήσθω.

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια 4

8 *ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου—λύπη*] 'Again, it has grown up along with us all from our infancy, and this makes it hard to rub off a feeling that is ingrained into our life. And all of us, in a greater or less degree, make pleasure and pain our standard of actions.'

χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι—ἐγκεχωσμένον] The metaphor, though not its precise application, seems taken from Plato, *Repub.* iv. p. 429 D, where the effects of right education are compared to a dye, with which the mind is to be imbued, so as to resist the detersive effects of pleasure and pain.

10 *ἔτι δὲ—Ἡράκλειτος*] 'Again, it is harder to contend with pleasure than with anger, which, as Heraclitus says, is a hard antagonist.' The saying of Heraclitus is given in full, *Politics*, v. xi. 31: ἀφειδῶς γὰρ ταυτῶν ἐχουσιν οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ἐπιχειροῦντες, καθάπερ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος εἶπε,

χαλεπὸν φάσκων εἶναι θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖσθαι (i.e. that men are ready to gratify their anger at the cost of their life). It is repeated also *Eth. Eudem.* ii. vii. 9. We see that Heraclitus only spoke of anger; the comparison of anger with pleasure is not due to him.

IV. 1 *Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις*] The theory thus far given of the *γένεσις* of virtue is now supplemented by the starting and answering of a difficulty. The theory, as stated, is a paradox. How can it be said that we become just by doing just things? If we do just things we must be just already, as he that performs music is already a musician. The answer to this difficulty is (1) in the arts, to whose analogy appeal is made, mere performance is no proof of art. The first essays of the learner may by chance, or by the guidance of his master (ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου), αὐ-

πράττοντας δίκαιους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σόφρονα σόφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σόφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σόφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ 2 μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, εἴαν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν. 3 ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ εἴαν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴαν ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν εἴαν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' εἴαν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ εἴαν βεβαίως καὶ

tain a sort of success and an artistic appearance, but the learner is no artist as yet. (2) *A fortiori*, if mere performance is no proof of art, much less is it any proof of morals. For the outward result in art is something sufficient in itself. But the outward act in morals is not enough. Hence those 'just acts' by which we acquire justice, are, on nearer inspection, not really just; they want the moral qualification of that settled internal character in the heart and mind of the agent, without which no external act is virtuous in the highest sense of the term. (3) As Aristotle rarely meets a difficulty arising out of his theories, without adding something in depth or completeness to those theories, so here he deepens the conception of virtue previously given, by urging that knowledge is the least important element in it; and that philosophy without action is impotent to attain it.

3 Knowledge; purpose; purity of purpose (προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά), formed and settled stability of cha-

acter, are the internal requisites for constituting a good act. Knowledge is necessary to, and presupposed in, purpose. We are told presently that knowledge is of slight or no avail for virtue, while the other elements are all in all (πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἶδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται). This is a reaction against the Socratic-Platonic doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge; but Aristotle only means to say—that knowledge, if taken by itself, if separate from the will, if merely existing in the intellect, is of no avail. We find afterwards a strong statement of the opposite view,—that he who has φρόνησις has all the virtues. *Εἰλ.* VI. xiii. 6, VII. ii. 5.

προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά] Here would have been the place for introducing an allusion to the doctrine of moral obligation, had such formed part of Aristotle's system. But he says not that 'good acts must be done with a feeling of duty,' but that 'they must be chosen for their own sake.' A

ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττη. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετῶν τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν 4 ἢ τοιαῦτα οἶα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται 5 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν 6 λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιῶντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἱατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιούσι δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφούτες.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν 5 τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις,

good act must be chosen, loved, and done because it is beautiful (δρι καλόν). Aristotle does not analyse further than this.

ἀμετακινήτως] No point is more insisted on in these *Ethics* than the stability of the moral ἔξεις when once formed. Cf. I. x. 10, I. x. 14, v. ix. 14.

6 ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοί—φιλοσοφούντες] 'But most people, instead of doing these things, take refuge in talk about them, and flatter themselves that they are studying philosophy, and are in a fair way to become good men; which conduct may be likened to that of those sick people who listen attentively to what their physician says, but do not follow a tittle of his prescriptions. Such a regimen will never give health of body, nor such a philo-

sophy health of mind.' We often hear of 'the modernisms in Plato.' The above passage might be called a modernism in Aristotle.

V. With this chapter commences a new division of the Book, in which a formal definition of virtue according to substance or genus, and quality or differentia, is given. We find the conception of this kind of definition already existing in Plato. Cf. *Meno*, p. 71 B: ἐμυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδῶς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστὶ, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖός γέ τι εἰδείην; Like other parts of logic, it was elaborated and made systematic by Aristotle. See Essay III. In the present chapter the τί ἐστὶν; of virtue is established, that it is a ἔξις, or formed state of mind. This is arrived at

2 τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θράσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον (ἥλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη, δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ὧς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ὧς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι, ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ὧς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὐ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὐ.

by assuming that every mode of the mind must be one of three things, either a feeling, a faculty, or a state, and by proving that virtue is neither a feeling, nor a faculty; whence by the exhaustive process it remains that it must be a state of mind. The form of the argument here is the same as that of *Eth.* I. vii. 9-14, where it is demonstrated what is the proper function of man, and that of the argument in *Republic* IV. p. 428-433, where the nature and province of justice are determined. Aristotle does not here explain why he assumes that the modes of mind are only three; but the assumption no doubt rests upon his doctrine of Quality. Virtue is a quality (I. vi. 3: καὶ ἐν τῷ ποίῳ αἱ ἀρεταί), and the category of Quality is subdivided into four divisions (*Cat.* viii.), (1) ἔξεις and *διαθέσεις*. (2) *δυνάμεις φυσικῆς ἢ ἀδυναμίας λέγεται*. (3) *παθητικαὶ ποιότητες*. (4) *σχῆμα καὶ μορφή*. Of these, the last is in the present case excluded by its own nature, and it is only necessary to eliminate two of the remaining three. Apart from the subdivision of the category, the threefold partition of the mind might be defended upon its own merits; for *πάθος* may be in a sense identified with *ἐνέργεια*, and *ἔξεις* is a sort of determinate *δύναμις*,—a *δύναμις*, so to speak, on the other side of *ἐνέργεια*. Granting to the human mind the power of development, and of self-determination by the law of habits, it

follows that every mode in which such a mind exists must either be its innate, undeveloped, and potential faculties, its moments of consciousness, or its acquired and formed tendencies and states.

The arguments to prove that virtue is not a *πάθος*, are: (1) An appeal to language. We are called 'good' or 'bad' on account of virtue or vice; not *ὄν* account of isolated feelings. (2) A passion is by its nature involuntary; but virtue implies deliberate choice (*προαίρεσις*). (3) An appeal to language; we speak of being 'moved' in regard to the feelings; of being 'disposed' in regard to virtue or vice. Again, for the same reason, virtue is not a *δύναμις*. (1) Because we are not 'called good' for our faculties. (2) Because a faculty is something natural and innate (*δυνατοὶ μὲν ἔσμεν φύσει*), and virtue is not.

2 λέγω δὲ—εἶδ' 'I mean by emotions, desire, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, pity; in short, everything that is accompanied by pain or pleasure. I call those *faculties*, by reason of which we are said to be capable of feeling emotions, as, for instance, capable of being angry, of suffering pain, of feeling pity; and I call those *states* by which we stand in a certain relation, good or bad, to the emotions; as, for instance, with regard to anger, we are in a bad condition if our anger is too violent, or too slack, in a

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τᾶλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' 3
αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη
σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας
λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα
οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινείται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ
ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ
πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ
ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέ- 4
τως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα,
κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ δια-
κεῖσθαι πῶς. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ 5
ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πᾶσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί,
οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν
ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴπο-
μεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ 6
ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετὴ, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ 6

good one if we hit the happy medium.' Aristotle contents himself with indicating what he means by these different terms, instead of giving anything like a scientific definition of them. Thus he gives specimens of the feelings in which there is no attempt at classification, 'desire' being a wider term than most of the others mentioned, 'envy' and 'emulation' being perhaps different modes of the same feeling, &c. The words used are throughout informal, τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα—οἷς περὶ αὐτῶν—καθ' ἃς δυνατοί—καθ' ἃς παθητικοί. It is easy to see that a deeper psychology might have stated all that is here said in a different and better way. In his account of ἕξεις there is a play on words which it is impossible to render, ἕξεις—καθ' ἃς ἔχουμεν. Cf. the use of πῶς ἔχων in § 3 of the preceding chapter.

4 αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς]

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This is an extreme statement, in opposition to the Socratic doctrine that virtues were φρονήσεις, cf. *Etih.* vi. xiii. 3. Aristotle immediately qualifies it. There has been no proof of this position as yet.

διακεῖσθαι πῶς] This word is very common in Plato (as in other Greek). Cf. *Repub.* iv. 431 B: ἀκόλαστον τὸν οὕτω διακεῖμενον, &c. In the treatise on the Categories, which bears Aristotle's name, it is made to imply a διάθεσις in contradistinction to ἔχειν, which implies a ἕξις. *Cat.* viii. 5: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διακεῖνται γέ πῶς καθ' αὐτάς, οἱ δὲ διακεῖμενοί οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν.

VI. Having stated the generic conception of virtue (τί ἐστι)—that it is a developed state of mind, Aristotle now proceeds to determine it more exactly (ποία τις). He lays the ground

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- 2 μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μείναι τοὺς
- 3 πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εὔη ἂν ἔξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνε-

for this more accurate determination by giving a summary (borrowed from Plato) of the characteristics of 'Αρετή. Every excellence is the perfection of an object, and of the functions of that object. Thus human excellence (or virtue) will be the perfection of man, and of the functions of man. This leads us to inquire more narrowly what are the characteristics of a perfect *ἔργον* (the word is ambiguous, denoting 'work of art' or 'product of nature,' as well as 'function' or 'province'). From the conception of quantity, whether continuous (*συνεχές*) or discrete (*διαίρετον*), we get the conception of more, less, and equal, or excess, defect, and the mean, which in the case of human action must not be arithmetical but proportional (§§ 4-7.) Now a glance at the arts shows us that the skill of an artist and the perfection of a work consist in the attainment and exhibition of the relative mean, so that nothing can be added or taken away without spoiling the effect (§§ 8-9). According to this analogy, virtue, which, like nature, is finer than the finest art, aims at the mean, avoiding excess and deficiency in feeling and action (§§ 10-13). To this account of the essence of virtue witness is borne by the Pythagorean doctrine that right is one and wrong manifold (§ 14). We need only qualify our theory and

our definition of virtue by adding that it is from an abstract point of view alone we can call virtue 'a mean state.' From a moral point of view it is an extreme that is utterly removed from its opposite, vice (§§ 15-17), and we must not apply the notion of the mean and the extremes to every act. Some acts are in themselves extremes, as, for instance, acts of crime, and it will be impossible to find a mean in such as these (§§ 18-20).

2 ῥητέον οὖν — πολεμίους] 'We must commence then by asserting that every excellence both exhibits that thing of which it is an excellence in a good state, and also causes the perfect performance of that thing's proper function, as, for instance, the excellence of an eye makes the eye good, and also the performance of its function, for we see well from the excellence of the eye. So, too, the excellence of a horse makes him both a good horse, and good in his paces, in bearing his rider, and in standing a charge.' This is taken almost verbatim from Plato, *Repub.* I. p. 353 B: 'Ἀρ' ἂν ποτε ὁμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσωντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, κ.τ.λ. An illustration had been drawn from the horse and its excellence before in the same book, p. 335 B.

3 εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει,

ται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εἶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ 4
 τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανε-
 ρόν, εἰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστίν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν
 παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον
 τὸ δ' ἑλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἡ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ
 πρᾶγμα ἡ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
 ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον 5
 ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν
 πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει.
 τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἔν, οὐδὲ ταυτὸν πᾶσιν, οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ 6
 τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἐξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα·
 ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ 7
 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ
 οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τῷ δέκα μναὶ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο
 δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἐξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως

καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle treats of human virtue as part of a general law by which all natural objects fulfil their several functions, and each in accordance with its own proper excellence. He next passes to the analogy of the arts, though he regards virtue as higher than them, and more akin to nature. (ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις.) In the present passage we have again to do with the conception of the *ἔργον* of man; see above *Εἰλ.* I. vii. 14.

4 πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν] If any special passage is referred to, it must be *II.* iv. 3.

ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ] 'Now in all quantity whether continuous or discrete.' The terms here are not meant to go together, as if it were, 'In all that is continuous, and at the same time capable of division;' but the two forms of quantity are referred to, about which we read, *Categories* VI. 1: τοῦ δὲ πᾶσιν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές.—'Ἐστὶ δὲ διωρισ-

μένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος (a word), συνεχές δὲ οἷον γραμμὴ, ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἐτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος. Cf. *Politics* I. v. 3: ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλείονων συνέστηκε, —εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτ' ἐκ διηρημένων. *De Caelo*, I. i. 2.

5 λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος—ἐλλείπει] 'By an objective mean, I understand that which is equidistant from the two given extremes, and which is one and the same to all, and by a mean relatively to the person (πρὸς ἡμᾶς), I understand that which is neither too much nor too little.' The principle of Relativity forms of course an essential part of the Moral Law. The recognition of this principle under the Christian 'Law of Liberty' was a prominent feature in the teaching of St. Paul. Cf. *Romans*, chapter xiv.

7 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν] / i.e. 'arithmetical progression,' opposed to 'geometrical proportion,' which consists of four terms, cf. *Εἰλ.* v. iv. 3.

καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληφόμενῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως
 8 ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. οὕτω δὲ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ
 9 πρὸς ἡμᾶς. εἰ δὲ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἑλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης), οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστεῖρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἔστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν
 10 εἴη στοχαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἶον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὄλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς
 12 ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ

Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον] This illustration may remind us of the humorous turn in Plato's *Republic*, p. 338 c, where, on Thrasymachus defining justice to be τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, Socrates answers, ὦ Θρασύμαχε τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τό γε τοῦνδε φῆς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστής καὶ αὐτῷ συμφέρει τὰ βόεια κρέα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον. Cf. *Εἰσαίεσθαι*, p. 134, quoted above on II. II. 6.

9 εἰ δὲ—[ἐργα] 'If, then, every art thus completes its work, namely, by looking to the mean and conducting its results to this.' With the theory of art here stated cf. *Politics* III. xiii. 21, Δήλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν, ὅτε γὰρ γραφεὺς

ἐάσειεν ἂν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῶον, οὐδ' εἰ διαφέρει τὸ κάλλος. And on the general doctrine of μεσότης, its history, and its applications, see Essay IV.

10 λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν] The intellectual ἀρεταὶ are not μεσότητες, for this simple reason—that they are, λόγοι; the 'laws' or 'standards' of the balance which is to be introduced into the passions.

11 τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ—[ἀρετῆς] 'But to have these feelings at the right time, and on occasion of the right things, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right manner, this is the golden mean and the highest excellence, names which are proper to virtue.' From the mention of all these qualifications it is

καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινείται καὶ κατορθοῦται ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστίν ἡ ¹³ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστική γε οὕσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρ- ¹⁴ τάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

ἰσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς παιδοπατῶς δι' ἀκακίαν.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι ¹⁵ οὕσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν· μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς ¹⁶ δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν ¹⁷ εἶναι λέγοντά μεσότης ἐστίν ἡ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀριστον

easy to see that Aristotle means by his μέσον to establish something more than a merely quantitative difference between vice and virtue.

¹⁴ ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν—μοναχῶς] 'Again it is possible to err in many ways (for evil belongs to the infinite, as the Pythagoreans figured, and good to the finite), but to do right is possible only in one way.' See Essays II. and IV. The authorship of the verse ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. is unknown.

¹⁵ ἐστίν ἄρα—ὀρίσειεν] 'Virtue, therefore, is a developed state of the moral purpose in relative balance, which is determined by a standard, according as the thoughtful man would determine.' Spengel regards ὠρισμένη as a mere misprint in Bekker's editions for ὠρισμένη, which all former editions had. It is the

μεσότης, and not the ἕξις which is determined by λόγος. In two places already, *Eth.* II. iv. 3, and II. v. 4, we have met with the tacit assumption that virtue implies προαίρεσις. This is justified by the account of προαίρεσις, and its relation to action, in the next book. The other terms of the definition have been sufficiently established in the progress of this book. The reference to the φρόνιμος as an impersonation of the 'law' or 'standard' of reason is a necessary modification of what would else be an entirely relative, individual, and arbitrary theory of virtue. The 'thoughtful man' stands as the representative of the absolute reason of man manifested in the individual consciousness.

¹⁷ διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν—ἀκρότης]

18 καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἓνα γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται

'Virtue, therefore, if viewed in the light of its essence and its constitutive conception, is a mean state, but with respect to supreme excellence and rightness, it is an extreme.' This passage implies that the term *Μεσότης* is an abstract and metaphysical expression for the law of virtue, estimated by the understanding (though doubtless the deepest view attainable); but that viewed in relation to the good, or (as we should say) from a moral point of view,—virtue is no mean state lying between vices (as if virtue were a little less vice, and vice a little more virtue), but an extreme, that is, utterly removed from, and opposed to, vice. It is a profound remark, showing the balance in Aristotle between an abstract and a concrete view of morals. With regard to the terminology here employed, the word *οὐσία* is, as Aristotle himself tells us, to a certain extent ambiguous (cf. *Metaphys.* vi. iii. 1: *Λέγεται δ' ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν τέτταρσι γε μάλιστα*: καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐκάστου καὶ τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκειμενόν). It is made definite, however, in the present place by the addition of the phrase καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα, which may be regarded here as an explanation of οὐσία. On λόγον—λέγοντα, cf. *De Motu Animalium*, x. 1: κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸν λόγον τὸν λέγοντα τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς κινήσεως. The formula τί ἦν εἶναι, like other leading parts of Aristotle's philosophy, appears in his works as already established. Though no trace of it is to be found in Plato, familiarity with its use is presupposed by Aristotle, and no account of its genesis is given. Its metaphysical import is

discussed in *Metaphys.* vi. iv.—xi., from which we gather (1) that τί ἦν εἶναι implies the essential nature of a thing (*ἐκαστὸν δ' ἔχεται καθ' αὐτό*) to the exclusion of all that is accidental; (2) that it is the definition of a thing, but not of all things, for it excludes all material associations, hence that to a conception like *σιμότης* you cannot assign a τί ἦν εἶναι; (3) that it is no mere abstraction, but closely connected with individual existence, and implying what the Germans call *Dasein*; hence it is separable from the καθόλου or universal element in a thing,—it implies this, but also something more. From the concreteness of its nature, it also differs from the Platonic idea, with which it has much in common, being the immaterial, primal, and archetypal law of the being of things; (4) 'The knowledge of a thing,' says Aristotle, 'consists in knowing its τί ἦν εἶναι' (*Metaphys.* vi. vi. 6). With this important conception in his theory of knowledge and of existence we may compare to some extent the 'Forms' of Bacon, which were no doubt borrowed from it. But fully to comprehend the τί ἦν εἶναι implies mastering the metaphysical system of Aristotle. With regard to the grammar of the formula we are left to conjecture, and accordingly at least two erroneous explanations have been given. (1) That of Alexander Aphrod. *ad Top.* i. (Brandis, *Scholia*, p. 256 a 43), that ἦν is simply used for ἐστὶ, whereas we find a frequent contrast between the formula τί ἦν and τί ἐστὶ. (2) The whole phrase has been translated 'substantia quæ est, etsi præterita,' as though τί ἦν could be used for ὅπερ ἦν. Τί ἦν is of course a question, and has been

συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φανλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπή ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ψέγεται τῷ αὐτῷ φαῖλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. ὅμοιον 19 οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἑλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ δὲ 20 σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πράττηται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστίν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις.

Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ 7

represented by the term *Quidditas* in the Scholastic Latin. The preterite *ἦν* appears used to express the prior, i.e. the deeper and more essential nature of a thing. 'What was the essence of the thing?' (i.e. before its present individual manifestation). Cf. *Μεταρῆγ.* vi. vii. 6: 'Ὅτε συμβαίνει τρόπον τινὰ ἐξ ὑγιείας τὴν ὑγιείαν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐξ οἰκίας, τῆς ἀνευ ὅλης τὴν ἔχουσας ὅλην.—Ἀέγω δὲ οὐσίαν ἀνευ ὅλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. It is difficult to say what was the original phrase of which the three words are a disjointed remnant. Probably it may have been as follows: *τί ἦν ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀνθρώπου*; 'What was that property in man which constitutes the conception of his being a man?' *Εἶναι* is used in Aristotle especially to denote the conception or inner essence of a thing, cf. *Eth.* v. i. 20. We may observe that *εἶναι* is never affixed to the ques-

tion *τί ἐστι*, which implies a more superficial and accidental account.

VII. Aristotle now passes on to the exemplification of his general law of virtue in the various separate virtues. He gives accordingly a list of virtues, and shows that they are severally mean states between various extremes. This list forms a table of contents for Books III. and IV., which treat of the virtues here mentioned, and in the order here given. The question arises—upon what principle is this list formed? We find at once that Aristotle has resorted to experience. He has not contented himself with applying his law to the previously recognised divisions of virtue. He has abandoned the old enumeration of four cardinal virtues, given in Plato's *Republic*, p. 428 (and on which most of the reasoning in

τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς· περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώτεροι εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ

that book depends), namely, courage, temperance, justice, wisdom; but these all reappear in his list, only not on the same level with each other. Wisdom is divided into *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*, of which the first is made the standard of moral virtue, and the other stands apart as a perfection of the pure intellect. Justice is separated from other practical virtues, as being something externally determined (cf. *Eth.* v. v. 17). Plato gives, in the *Protagoras*, p. 349 B, another list of five virtues, *holiness* (*δσιότης*) being added to the other four; this answers to *εὐσέβεια*, which is frequently mentioned as a virtue by the Socrates of Xenophon. Aristotle omits it altogether, probably on account of the separation he made between ethics and religion. With this exception, Aristotle's list of virtues implies the same view of life as Plato's, only it goes more into detail and aims at more completeness. In the present chapter ten virtues are enumerated, to which are added modesty and indignation, two mean states in the feelings; and justice is mentioned as something to be treated of separately. In departing from the unity of a law to enumerate its exemplifications, there must always be something arbitrary. Why so many and no more? It would seem as if Aristotle applied his principle to the virtues ready at hand, and then afterwards believed in his own list as complete. (Cf. *Eth.* II. vii. 9, *νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν*; II. vii. 11, *ῥητέον οὖν κ.τ.λ.*; III. v. 23, *ἀμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσιν.*) In the *Rhetoric* I. ix. 5-13, we find a list of virtues (or, as they are called, *Μέρη ἀρετῆς*) given, which is identical with the present (not containing, how-

ever, *φιλοτιμία*, *εὐτραπέλεια*, *ἀλήθεια*, *φιλία*), *μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, εὐευθερίτης, πραότης, φρόνησις, σοφία*. Of those omitted, the first may be said to be included in *μεγαλοψυχία*, while the other three possess only a minor degree of moral importance. Even here Aristotle seems to set them on a somewhat lower footing than the rest.

1 † *κενώτεροι*] The MSS. vary here between *κενώτεροι* and *κουνότεροι*. A similar variation is found *Eth.* III. viii. 6, where the readings are *πολλὰ κενά* and *πολλὰ κουνά*. Bekker has decided against the majority of MSS. in favour of *κενώτεροι*. The Paraphrast, however, supports the other reading. He renders the passage, *τῶν γὰρ περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγων οἱ μὲν καθολικοὶ κουνότεροι καὶ πλείους ἐφαρμόζουσιν· οἱ δὲ μερικοὶ ἀληθινώτεροι*. Dr. Cardwell accordingly reads *κουνότεροι*, which seems most natural, and is supported by the best MSS. K² and L² of Bekker. Whichever reading we take, the general meaning is not affected. *κενώτεροι*, which would be a term of disparagement, is well illustrated by *Eth. Eud.* I. vi. 4: *πολλὰκις λαμβάνουσι λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς*. *Κουνότεροι* means 'more general,' 'of wider application.' Cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 2: *τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὁρὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκεισθῶν*. Accordingly with this reading we may translate the passage *Δεῖ δὲ—διαγραφῆς* as follows: 'This principle however must not only be stated universally, but also we must apply it to particular cases; for in theories about moral actions universal statements are it is true of wider application, but particular ones are more real. For actions

μέρους ἀληθινότεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα 2 ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας, οὐ 3 πάσας, ἦττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ 4 δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἑλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίας δ' ἑαυταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ

are concerned with particulars, and it is necessary that our theories should be borne out when applied to these. Let us take our instances then from the table of the virtues.'

ἀληθινότεροι] 'more real,' as being more concrete and more definite. Plato would have said the universal is more real; here, and in *Categories* v. 8, it is said that the particular is more real than the universal. In the *Politics*, i. xiii. 10, Gorgias is praised for enumerating the separate virtues, while others contented themselves with general definitions. Καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς, ὅτι τὸ εἶδ' ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ τὸ δοῦν πράγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολλὸ γὰρ ἀμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀριζομένων. This is directed against the *Meno* of Plato, where Socrates urges that it is absolutely necessary to know the law of virtue as a unity, instead of regarding it in its multifarious exhibitions. Aristotle, wishing to establish a practical

theory of virtue, returns to the concrete.

ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς] 'Τρογραφῆς' is the word in the corresponding passage of the *Eudemian Ethics*, II. iii., where a formal table is given, containing fourteen virtues with their respective pairs of extremes. In this place in all probability an already existing 'table' or 'scheme' of the virtues, familiar to the Peripatetic School, is referred to. We have seen above (note on § 1) that this table was nearly complete when Aristotle wrote his *Rhetoric*.

2 ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ κ.τ.λ.] It is a sign that Aristotle is here only working his way to his theory of the mean, that he at first speaks as if there were excess and defect of both the two opposite principles, by the balance of which virtue is constituted. This would make four vices round each virtue. But it is obviously more simple to speak of each virtue as a balance of a positive and a negative tendency: which view he afterwards adopts, though he retains the present

Q Q

- δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει
 5 ἑλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῃ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν,
 ἀρκοῦμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ
 6 αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι δια-
 θέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλο-
 πρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ
 δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία,
 ἑλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται τῶν περὶ
 τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.
 7 περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία,
 ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἑλλειψις δὲ μικροψυ-
 8 χία· ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν
 ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ
 πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ
 περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἐστὶ γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἡττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς
 ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος
 ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλο-
 τίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης
 χώρας. καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον
 καλοῦμεν ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἐστὶν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαι-
 9 νοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ
 τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιούμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν
 δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑψηγμένον τρόπον.
 10 ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις καὶ μεσότης,

refinement with regard to courage in the fuller account of this virtue in Book III.

5 ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον] All details with regard to the several virtues may be accordingly reserved for consideration under Books III. and IV.

6 ἄλλαι διαθέσεις] 'other dispositions.' The word is used here as a synonym for ἕξαι, though in *Categories* viii. 1. ἕξαι is distinguished from διάθεσις. "Ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξαι καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν· διαφέρει δὲ ἕξαι διαθέσεως τῷ πολὺ χρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον. In the same

way, διακείσθαι is there opposed to ἔχειν, whereas, *Etā.* II. v. 4, it is used as equivalent to it.

9 κατὰ τὸν ὑψηγμένον τρόπον] 'According to the method which has hitherto guided us,' τότῳ κ.τ.λ. (cf. § 5). The same phrase occurs *Politics* I. i. 3: Δῆλον δ' ἐστὶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑψηγμένην μέθε-
δον. The word frequently occurs in Plato, Cf. *Protagoras*, p. 326 D: κατὰ τὴν ὑψηγῆσιν τῶν γραμμῶν. *Republic* III. p. 403 E: εἰ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους ὑψηγῆσάμεθα. *Rhetoric*, p. 82 D: ἡ φιλοσοφία ὑψηγείται.

σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνώνυμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγον-
 τεσ τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσομεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ
 μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ'
 ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. εἰσὶ δὲ ¹¹
 καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν τινα ὁμοιότητα
 πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ
 εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι
 ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τάληθες τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ-
 τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν
 βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν
 ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ὀρθὰ
 οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ
 πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
 αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακο-
 λουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις ¹²
 καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν
 ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ
 τὸ ἑλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν ¹³
 παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπεία,
 ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ
 δ' ἐλλείπων ἀγροϊκός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροϊκία· περὶ δὲ τὸ
 λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ
 μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρε-
 σκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ

¹¹ ῥητέον οὖν—εὐπαρακολουθήτου]
 'These also must accordingly be dis-
 cussed, in order to show still more
 clearly that in everything the mean is
 praiseworthy, while the extremes are
 neither right nor praiseworthy, but
 blameable. Now most of these qua-
 lities are without names; but we
 must endeavour, as in other cases,
 to make names ourselves for the sake
 of clearness and of being easily fol-
 lowed.' After discussing ἀλήθεια, the
 author of the *Magna Moralia* says,
 Εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἢ μὴ
 ἀρεταί, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος· ὅτι δὲ
 μεσότητες εἰσι τῶν εἰρημένων, δῆλον, οἱ

γὰρ κατ' αὐτὰς ζῶντες ἐπαινοῦνται (I.
 xxxiii. 2).

πειρατέον κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle's method
 consists partly in accepting experience
 as shown in common language, &c.;
 partly in rectifying it, or re-stating it
 from his own point of view; partly
 in finding new expressions for it, so
 as to discover men's thought to them-
 selves. He usually rather fixes the
 meaning of words than creates new
 ones. For instance, he here assigns
 a peculiar and limited meaning to
 ἀλήθεια and φιλία. His influence
 upon the forms of language of civi-
 lised Europe can hardly be overrated.

- 14 ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδώς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ ὁ
- 15 μηδὲ ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος· ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας. εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικός λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρεκάκος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι

It is far greater than has ever been exercised by any one man beside.

14-15 Aristotle winds up his list by adding *Αἰδώς* and *Νέμεσις*, which he does not consider virtues, because they are not developed states of mind, but he mentions them, because he discovers the law of the balance (*μεσότης*) existing even in these natural instincts. There is something peculiarly Greek in the conjunction of these two names. In Greek mythology they are personified and seem to represent the natural and almost indestructible ideas of justice in the human mind. Hesiod speaks of these two goddesses as being the last to clothe themselves in white raiment and to leave the earth (*Works and Days*, 198). In the fable which Plato puts into the mouth of Protagoras these qualities are said to have been sent down to man as an amelioration of his previously wretched condition, without society or the political art (Plato, *Protagoras*, p. 322 c, where, however, the names are *αἰδώς* and *δίκη*). They seem related to one another as the instinct of honour to the instinct of right—i.e. to be two slightly differing phases of the same principle, the first being rather a sensitiveness about right in oneself, the second about right external to oneself. *Αἰδώς* is further

discussed in Book IV., but *Νέμεσις* is not again alluded to. This is probably owing to the unfinished condition of the *Ethics*, which indeed first begins to show itself at the close of Book IV. See Essay I. pp. 43, 50.

15 *νέμεσις* δὲ—*χαίρειν*] 'But indignation is a balance between envy and malice. Now these are concerned with pain and pleasure resulting on what happens to others. For the indignant man is pained at those who prosper unworthily, but the envious man, exceeding him, is pained at all (who prosper), while the malicious man is so far defective in feeling pain as even to rejoice.' This paragraph is a striking instance of crudeness, which the least after-reflection would have remedied. It is obvious that *φθόνος* (envy) and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* (malice) are only different forms of the same state of mind. Indeed, Aristotle, when he wrote his *Rhetoric*, had been clear on the point; cf. *Rhet.* II. ix. 5: 'Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἐπιχαιρεκάκος καὶ φθονερός. Hence they cannot be opposed as two extremes. Again, the *ἐπιχαιρεκάκος* cannot be said *τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπειν ὥστε κ.τ.λ.*, for he does not rejoice at the success of the good, which the envious man grieves at. He rejoices at the misfortunes of the good. This mistake is set right

ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι 16
καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγε-
ται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐρούμεν πῶς
μεσότητές εἰσιν· †ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.

Τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν 8
καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλείψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς
μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινται πῶς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντία εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση
ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἕλαττον 2

by Eudemus (II. iii. 4), who in his list writes *φθόνος, ἀνύμωμον, νέμεσις*. Of course the opposite to *φθόνος* must be *ἀνασθησία τις*. Socrates in Xen. *Memor.* III. ix. 8 defines *φθόνος* as it is here defined. *Μόνους ἔφη φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνωμένους*. Plato does not separate envy and malice; cf. *Philebus*, p. 48 B: 'Ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται. Socrates is there arguing that *φθόνος* being granted to be a painful feeling, it yet constitutes the chief element in comedy, so that in comedy there is a mixture of pain with pleasure.

16 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων—εἰσὼ] 'But about these points in the first place we shall have another opportunity of speaking; in the second place about justice, since the term is used in more senses than one, we will separately (μετὰ ταῦτα) define it and show how the two species of it are severally mean states.' This passage gives accurately enough beforehand the order of subjects for Books III. and IV.; the word *ἄλλοθι* seems to show that he has in view the interruption of the argument by the discussion upon will at the beginning of the Third Book. The separate treatment of justice is also announced. But it can hardly be said that the promise *περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐρούμεν κ.τ.λ.* is exactly fulfilled in Book V. The two

kinds of justice here referred to are: (1) Justice, in the Platonic sense, = all virtue. (2) Justice, in a narrower sense, = fair dealing with regard to property. Cf. *Etik.* v. i.

† *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν*] This passage is obelised, because of the term *λογικαί*, which never occurs elsewhere in Aristotle or Eudemus, as applied to the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί*—secondly, because of the sense, since Aristotle could not possibly say that he meant to show how the intellectual excellences were *μεσότητες*—thirdly, because of the extreme likelihood of an interpolation here.

VIII. A new conception is now developed of the relation between a virtue and the extremes lying on each side of it, and that is, the conception of 'contrariety,' of mutual repulsion and exclusiveness between the several terms. The extremes are opposed each to the other, and both to the mean. This addition tends yet further to raise the moral distinctions from being mere distinctions of quantity into being distinctions of kind. With logical inconsistency, though with thorough truth, Aristotle proceeds to point out that one extreme is generally 'more contrary' to the mean than the other, either because of a greater dissimilarity to virtue in

μείζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἔξει
 πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερ-
 βολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ
 γὰρ ἀνδρείος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν
 ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος,
 ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ
 3 τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον
 οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρείον
 ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 4 ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείων
 ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον·
 πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου,
 ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ
 5 ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοι-
 ότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ
 τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς
 ἀλλήλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης. τὰ δὲ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα
 ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ
 6 πλείον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον
 ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἐλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία

the tendency itself, or from our fol-
 lowing a natural bent and pushing
 out the tendency to extravagance.

2 ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρείος—δειλός] 'For the
 brave man appears rash in comparison
 with the coward, but a coward in
 comparison with the rash man.' Of
 course oppositions of this kind are
 relative and depend upon the point
 of view. If the cowards had to settle
 the question, all bravery would be
 deemed rashness. Hence we see that
 Aristotle's system depends on faith in
 a certain standard inherent in the
 general reason of mankind. The
 μεσότης is ὠρισμένη λόγῳ. And this
 law or standard of the absolute reason
 finds its exponent in the thoughtful
 man, ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν.

5 ἔτι πρὸς μὲν—ἀπέχοντα] 'Again,

while some extremes appear to have
 a sort of similarity to the mean, as,
 for instance, rashness to bravery, and
 prodigality to liberality;—the ex-
 tremes have the greatest dissimilarity
 to each other. But things most re-
 moved from each other people define
 to be "contraries," therefore things
 more removed are more contrary to
 each other.' In the present passage
 it is easy to see a logical inconsistency.
 If contraries be τὰ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα,
 how can we speak of them as πλείον
 ἀπέχοντα? Aristotle commences with
 an idea of absolute contrariety, and
 afterwards takes up one of relative
 contrariety, admitting of degrees. But
 repugnance admits of degrees, if con-
 trariety does not, so the inaccuracy is
 merely verbal.

μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὐσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὐσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὐσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὐσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας 7 τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸνναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγ- 8 ματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὐσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

7 διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας—μᾶλλον] 'Now this takes place from two causes, one (external to us) depending on the nature of the thing itself; for that extreme which is nearer to and more like the mean, we do not oppose so much to the mean, as its contrary.' The first thing, says Aristotle, which makes one extreme more repugnant to the mean than the other extreme, is a difference of kind. Some faults are errors 'on virtue's side,' and while rashness, for instance, is the same tendency as courage, only carried too far, cowardice differs from it in kind. This difference then is one with which the agent has nothing to do.

8 ἑτέρα δὲ—σωφροσύνη] 'A second cause depends on ourselves; for those things to which we are in a way more disposed by nature appear more repugnant to the mean. As, for instance, we are in ourselves more disposed towards pleasures, hence we are more carried away in the direction of

intemperance, than in that of (excessive) orderliness. Therefore we call those things more contrary to the mean in which we run to greater lengths; and thus intemperance, which is the excess, seems more contrary to temperance (than the other extreme).' Passing over the false explanation of this passage, which pretends to find in it the doctrine of human corruption—as if Aristotle said that we are by nature prone to what is worst, whereas he says that 'what we are most prone to appears to be the worst,' there are two modes of explanation left; one is that of the Paraphrast, who renders it, ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος τῷ σπουδαίῳ πρὸς τὰ ἄκρα γίνεται, τὴν μεσότητα ζητοῦντι, πρὸς δὲ τῶν ἀκρων μείζων ἡ μάχη, ἐκεῖνο ἐναντιώτερον τῷ μέσῳ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ., namely, that there is the greatest struggle in avoiding that extreme to which we are prone, and therefore it appears most opposed to the mean. This interpretation is

- 9 "Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ² ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστω γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ὧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ

slightly favoured by § 4 of the next chapter, σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.; but on the other hand, not a word is here said of *avoiding* either extreme; the question is rather of following one's bent. (2) The other explanation is that which the author of the *Magna Moralia* espouses, *Mag. Mor.* I. ix. 5: ἡ οὖν ἐπίδοσις γίνεται μᾶλλον πρὸς ἂ πεφόκαμεν· πρὸς ἂ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιδίδομεν, ταῦτα καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία. ἐπιδίδομεν δὲ πρὸς ἀκολασίαν μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. This is surely what Aristotle means, and his general sense may be given as follows: 'One difference is in the act itself, a difference of kind; the other difference proceeds from ourselves, a difference of degree, for wherever we have an inclination towards one side, we run into extravagance on that side, and so aggravate that form of error, and make it seem worse than its opposite.' In order to make the words suit a preconceived meaning, people have translated ἐπίδοσις 'inclination,' whereas it can only mean 'advance,' 'progression,' 'development,' &c. As the *Magna Moralia* give it, πρὸς ἂ πεφόκαμεν is the 'inclination,' and ἐπίδοσις is the result of this. The addition of γίνεται might have been sufficient to prevent the above misinterpretation. It is observable that

σωφροσύνη is here first contrasted with κοσμιότης, as if that meant 'asceticism,' and afterwards the corresponding term is omitted. Aristotle seems unwilling to employ the term ἀναισθησία, being too strong a word; cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 7: ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων—ἀναισθητός τις. II. vii. 3: ἔλλειποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πᾶν γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασαν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναισθητοί.

IX. The book is concluded with certain practical rules for attaining the mean. (1) Avoid the worst extreme; (2) Find out your bent and go even farther than is necessary in the direction opposite to it; (3) Beware of the delusions of pleasure; (4) After all, the appeal must be in the last resort to the intuitive judgment.

² διδ—εἰδότης.] 'On this account it is a hard task to be good: for it is always hard to ascertain the mean; as, for instance, not every man, but only the mathematician, can find the centre of a circle.' The words of Simonides (quoted by Plato, *Protag.* p. 339, and referred to above, *Eth.* I. x. 11), ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθείᾳ γινέσθαι χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ., may have been in the mind of Aristotle, who here gives a *rationale* of them, and indeed shows that it is hard not only

ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. διὸ δὲ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου 3
πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ
ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

τούτου μὲν καπιῶ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργα
νῆα.

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ' ἦττον·
ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεῦτε- 4 ^{ὡς νηυσὶ τακτικῇ}
ρόν φασὶ πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν. ^{αὐτὴν ἐπαινεῖται} τοῦτο
δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τούτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. σκο-
πεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι
γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν. τούτῳ δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ
τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς 5
τοῦναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ. πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόν-
τες τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ
διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ 6
μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέ-

to become, but to be, good, σπουδαῖον
εἶναι, not only γενέσθαι. See Essay
II. p. 96.

3 καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ]
There is a mistake here in which
Aristotle is followed by the Para-
phrast. It was Circe (not Calypso)
who advised Ulysses (*Od.* XII. 108-
109), when sailing between Scylla and
Charybdis, to keep nearest to the
former, as being less dangerous. Two
of the MSS., with a view of setting
Aristotle right, substitute Κίρκη for
the authentic reading. The verse
here given Homer puts not into the
mouth of Circe, but of Ulysses ordering
his pilot, according to the directions
he had received (*Od.* XII. 219, 220).

4 κατὰ τὸν δευτέρου φασὶ πλοῦν]
A common Greek proverb, which is
variously explained. It is sometimes
said to mean 'on the voyage home, if
not on the voyage out'; but it seems
very much better to take the words
as meaning 'with oars, if not with
sails,' an explanation which is twice
given by Eustathius; p. 661, ὁ τῶν

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κωηλατούντων πλοῦς δεύτερος λέγεται
πλοῦς, ὡς πρώτου ὄντος τοῦ πλέειν πρὸς
ἀνεμῶν. Also in page 1453. Other in-
stances of the proverb are *Politics*,
III. xiii. 23; Plato, *Philebus*, p. 19 c;
Phaedo, 99 d.

5 εἰς τοῦναντίον—ποιοῦσιν] 'But
we must drag ourselves away in the
opposite direction; for by bending
ourselves a long way back from the
erroneous extreme, like those who
are straightening a crooked stick, we
shall at length arrive at the mean.'
The metaphor is borrowed from Plato,
Protag. p. 325 d, where it is applied to
education, not, however, in precisely
the same sense as here. Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν
ἐκὼν πείθῃται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὥσπερ ξύλον
διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύ-
ρουναι ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς.

6 ἐν παντὶ δὲ—ἀμαρτησόμεθα] 'But
in everything we must especially be
on our guard against the pleasant and
pleasure. For we are not impartial
judges in her cause. Therefore, just
as the old counsellors felt towards
Helen, so ought we to feel towards

R R

καστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον
 πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν
 ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω
 γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἦττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ'
 οὖν ποιούντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνήσόμεθα
 τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ'
 ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾷδιον διορίσαι πῶς καὶ
 τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ
 ἡμεῖς ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινούμεν καὶ πράους
 φαμέν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλούμεν.
 8 ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὗτ'
 ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὗτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἦττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ
 οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ
 ῥᾷδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ
 9 αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μέση
 ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετὴ, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν
 ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψίν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα
 τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

pleasure, and in everything apply
 their saying; for by sending her out
 of our sight we shall err the less.
 The reference is to Homer, *Iliad* III.
 156-160:

Οὐ νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ εὐκνημίδας
 Ἀχαιοὺς
 τοιῇδ' ἀμφὶ γυναίκε' πολλὸν χρόνον
 ἀλγεα πάσχειν.
 Αἰνῶς ἀθανάτοισι θεῇς εἰς ὧπα
 ἔοικεν.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς τοιῇ περ εἰούσ' ἐν νηυσὶ
 νεέσθω
 μὴδ' ἡμῖν τεκέεσσι τ' ὀπίσσω πῆμα
 λίποιστο.

ἀδέκαστοι] 'Unbribed,' 'uncor-
 rupted.' δεκάδω, the origin of which
 is obscure, finds a parallel in the
 Latin 'decuriare,' which meant to

bribe the tribes at elections. See
 Cicero, *pro Plancio*, c. xviii. 44.

8 ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον
 ψεκτός] a condensed phrase meaning
 'to what point and how far a man
 (may go before he) is blameable.'

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις] 'The de-
 cision of them is a matter of percep-
 tion.' Aristotle meant that general
 rules are often inapplicable to particu-
 lar cases, which must then be decided
 by a kind of 'intuition' or 'tact,' not
 derived from philosophy, but natural.
 Compare III. iii. 13: ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία
 πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν
 πραξέων.—διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μὴδ' ἐπι-
 στημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθό-
 λου τὸν ἐσχατὸν ὅρον.

END OF VOL. I.







James G. Thompson



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ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

VOL. II.

THE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

ILLUSTRATED WITH
ESSAYS AND NOTES

BY
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THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.



BOOKS III.—X.

VOL. II.

A

PLAN OF BOOK III.

IT has been already assumed without proof, that virtue implies purpose (*Eth.* II. iv. 3, II. v. 4, II. iv. 15), and therefore of course will and freedom. Before proceeding to the analysis of particular virtues, Aristotle begins by examining the generic conception of the Voluntary, with a view chiefly to the comprehension of its species, Purpose.

The first five Chapters of Book III. are accordingly devoted to this subject, and stand so much apart from what goes before and after, that some have been led to the conclusion that they were written as a separate treatise (see Vol. I. Essay I. p. 45). That several parts of these chapters are unnecessarily repeated in Book V. c. xiii., and that certain points in them do not agree with the psychology of Books VI. and VII., is no argument against the present chapters having formed part of Aristotle's original draft and conception of his *Ethics*, but only tends to show that Books V. VI. VII. were written later. It is more to the purpose to notice that in Chapter v. § 10, there is an apparent ignoring of the whole discussion upon the formation of moral states which occupies the commencement of Book II., and that no allusion occurs to 'the mean' or to 'happiness.' But this is only a specimen of the way in which Aristotle concentrated his mind on each new subject as it arose, and in writing upon it frequently neglected to refer to other cognate passages. The same thing is observable in the treatise on Friendship (VIII. i. 1). The treatise on the Voluntary is neatly fitted on to the general ethical treatise by §§ 21, 22, of the fifth chapter of this book. There is no reason to suspect these sections of being other than the work of Aristotle.

It must not be supposed that the present disquisition on the Voluntary is a disquisition on Free Will. The latter question

Aristotle would certainly have assigned to *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, or metaphysics, and would have thought out of place in a system of ethics. Some remarks upon his views of Free Will, so far as they can be gathered, will be found in Vol. I. Essay V. The ensuing chapters assume that man is the *ἀρχή* of his own actions, and with this assumption treat of the Voluntary under its various aspects in relation to virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment. From this practical point of view these chapters furnish to some extent a psychology, though not a metaphysic, of the Will. Their contents are as follows :—

(1.) The general definition of the Voluntary. Ch. i.

(2.) The special account of Purpose, that it is distinct from desire, wish, opinion ; its relation to the process of deliberation. Ch. ii.—iii.

(3.) Some consideration of the question whether Wish is for the absolute or the apparent good. Ch. iv.

(4.) An attack upon the position that while virtue is free, vice is involuntary. Ch. v.

The remainder of the book is occupied with a discussion of the two first virtues upon Aristotle's list—Courage and Temperance. With regard to Courage the following heads are treated of :—
 (1.) Its proper objects ; Ch. vi. (2.) That it is a mean ; Ch. vii.
 (3.) That true courage is to be distinguished from five spurious kinds of courage ; Ch. viii. (4.) That it is particularly related to pain, and implies making great sacrifices for the sake of what is noble ; Ch. ix. The objects and the nature of Temperance are treated of in Chapters x. and xi. And the book ends with two remarks on Intemperance : (1.) that it is more voluntary than cowardice ; and, (2.) that its character is shown in its etymology ; Ch. xii.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ III.

ΤΗΣ ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ
μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ
δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκού-
σιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε 2

I. 1-2 Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ—κολάσεις]
'Virtue then being concerned with feelings and actions; and praise and blame being bestowed on acts which are voluntary, while pardon and sometimes even pity are conceded to involuntary ones,—it will surely be necessary for the philosopher who treats of virtue to define the voluntary and involuntary; and moreover this will be useful for the legislator with a view to the rewards and punishments with which he has to deal.' In the *Eudæmian Ethics*, which contain generally speaking a reproduction of these *Ethics*, for the most part compressed, but also occasionally expanded and supplemented, we find (*Eth. Eud.*, II. vi.) a more definite and reasoned statement of the voluntariness of virtue and vice. The reasoning of Eudemus is briefly as follows:—All *ὄντα* are *ἀρχαί*, and tend to reproduce themselves; and only those *ἀρχαί* are properly so called (*κύρια*) which are primary causes of motion, as is especially the case with regard to invariable motions, whose cause is

doubtless God. Mathematical *ἀρχαί* are called so only by analogy, not being causes of motion. We have hitherto only mentioned necessary consequences: but there are many things which may happen or may not, and whose causes therefore must be, like themselves, contingent. All human actions being contingent, it is obvious that man is a contingent cause, and that the reason of the contingency in his actions is his ability to will one way or the other, as is farther manifest from our praise or blame of actions.—A deeper ground than that which Aristotle has taken might surely have been found for the position that morality implies freedom. But though philosophy even before Aristotle had dealt to some extent with the ideas of necessity and freedom, it remained for the Stoics to open the question more decisively. It is plain that the discussions on the Will in this place are never metaphysical. An appeal to language and common opinions sums up nearly the whole. The scope of the argument is

3 τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα. βίαιον δὲ οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μὴδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι
4 ὄντες. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σώζονται, μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον

limited to a political, as distinguished from a theological point of view (ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι).

3 δοκεῖ δὲ—γινόμενα] 'Now those acts seem to be involuntary which are done under compulsion or through ignorance.' In asking what is the Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue a speculative method of inquiry. Such a method might have commenced with the deep-lying ideas of personality and consciousness, of the individuality of the subject, &c. But he is content with defining the voluntary by a contrast to the common notions (δοκεῖ) of what constitutes an involuntary act. It might be said that this is giving a merely negative conception of freedom. But in fact the conception given is positive, only the analysis of it is not pushed very far. The voluntariness of an act Aristotle represents to be constituted in this—that the actor is in every case the ἀρχή, or cause, of his actions, except in cases of compulsion, where there really is a superior ἀρχή (Kant's 'heteronomy'), or of ignorance, where he does not know what his action is, and can only be held to be the cause of what he meant to do. In what sense and how the individual is an ἀρχή, is the point where Aristotle stops short in the inquiry.

βίαιον δὲ—ὄντες] 'That is compulsory, whose cause is external to the agent, and is of such a nature

that the agent (or patient) contributes nothing towards it; as, for instance, if a wind were to carry you to any place, or men in whose power you are.' 'Αρχή seems here equivalent to ἀρχή κινήσεως, the efficient cause. Aristotle attributes spontaneity so decisively to the individual act, that he confines the term compulsion as only applicable to cases of absolute physical force, where a man's limbs are moved or his body transported, as if he were inanimate, by some external power. The compulsion of threats, fear, and such like, he will not call compulsion without qualification, because still the individual acts under it. He has already spoken of the life of money-making as being βίαιός τις, 'in a sort compulsory' (Eth. I. v. 8). With ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων cf. v. viii. 3: πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττοντες καὶ πάσχοντες—ὅλον τὸ γῆρας ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.

4-9 The cause of the act must be entirely from without, for in some cases men are forced, not to an act, but to an alternative. They may do what is grievous for the fear of what is worse. Such acts, then, are of a mixed character, partaking of the nature both of voluntariness and involuntariness. Relatively to the moment, they come from the choice and will of the individual. Abstractedly and in themselves they are contrary to the will. But as

ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἡ ἐκούσια. τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ 5
περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς
ἀποβάλλεται ἐκὼν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται 6
πράξεις, εἰκάσι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκουσίοις· αἰρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι
τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν

every act aims at something in reference to the particular moment, and is thus entirely dependent on it, so these must be judged as acts done and chosen voluntarily, and according to circumstances must obtain blame or praise. There seem to be four cases which Aristotle conceives as possible: (1) Praise is deserved where pain or degradation is endured for the sake of some great and noble end; (2) but blame, where what is degrading is endured without a sufficiently great and noble end. (3) Pardon is conceded where human nature succumbs, under great extremities, to do what is not right; (4) except the action be such as no extremities ought to bring a man to consent to, in which case pardon is withheld. In these distinctions we may recognise a practical and political wisdom such as might be found in the speeches of Thucydides, but the discussion does not rise to the level of philosophy.

6 μικταί—οὐδέν] 'Now it may be said that such actions are of a mixed character, but they are more like things voluntary, for at the particular moment when they are done they are such as one would choose, and the moral character of an action depends on the circumstance of the moment; hence also the terms "voluntary" and "involuntary" must be predicated in reference to the moment when a person is acting. Now, in the supposed case (*ἐν τοιαύταις πράξεσι*), the individual acts voluntarily; for the efficient cause of the movement of the

accessory limbs is in himself, and where the cause is in a person, it rests with him to act or not. Therefore such things are voluntary, though abstractedly perhaps, involuntary, for in themselves no one would choose any of such things as these.'

τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως] The phrase is general, not referring only to the cases under dispute, but to action universally. In this sense we may translate τῆς πράξεως 'of an action.' Τέλος is used here in a peculiar sense to denote the 'moral character of an action.' This sense arises out of a combination of associations, 'final cause,' and 'motive,' being combined with 'end-in-itself,' 'perfection,' 'completeness.' A precisely similar use of the word occurs, *Εἰλ.* III. vii. 6: Τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας—ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει (on which see note). The Paraphrast, in accordance with the above explanation, states the argument thus:—'Because the character of an action as good or bad is judged in reference to the mind of the actor at the moment of action, so also must the voluntariness of an action be judged.' 'Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκάστης πράξεως τέλος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν αὐτῆς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ ἡ ἀγαθὸν ἢ πονηρὸν γίνεται' ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον, ἢ τὸ ἀκούσιον, κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ὅτε πράττεται, ζητητέον. Of course the interpretation of Muretus is wrong which attributes a merely popular and un-Aristotelian sense to τέλος—'actio terminatur eo ipso tempore quo agimus.'

καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πρᾶττει, λεκτέον. πρᾶττει δὲ ἐκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὦν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πρᾶττειν καὶ μί. ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. 7 ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχροῦν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχυρὰ ὑπομείναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαῦλου. ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἢ μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ 8 μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι. ἐνία δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανατέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἢ δ' ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχροῖα, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς

ὅτε πρᾶττει] The omission of *τις*, especially after conjunctions like *εἰ*, *ὅτε*, &c., is common in Aristotle, though not peculiar to him. Cf. *Εἰκ.* III. ix. 5: *πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσων τοῦ τελους ἐφάπτεται*. *Pol.* VII. xiii. 8: *ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτῶντο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης*.

τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη] The 'subservient,' or 'instrumental' limbs. The modern word 'organised,' which has grown out of the Aristotelian conception of *ὀργανικὸν σῶμα*, does not exactly represent it. 'Organisation' implies multiplicity in unity, the co-existence and interjunction of physical parts under a law of life. But in *ὀργανικός* originally nothing more was implied than 'that which is fitly framed as an instrument,'—according to Aristotle's principle, that the body is the

means to the life, mind, or soul, which is the end. Cf. *De An.* II. i. 6: *ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζῶντι ἔχοντος*. τοιοῦτο δέ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν. *De Part. An.* I. i. 41: *οὕτως καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον (ἐνεκά τινος γὰρ ἑκάστων τῶν μερῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον), ἀνάγκη δρα τοιοῦδι εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοιοῦδι εἰ ἐκείνο ἐσται*.

8 καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου—μητροκτονῆσαι] 'For the things which compelled the Alcmeon of Euripides to kill his mother appear absurd,' i.e. the curses threatened by Amphiaræus, who, when departing for Thebes, enjoined his son to put Eriphyle to death. Aspasius preserves the lines:—

Μάλιστα μὲν μ' ἐπ' ἡρ' ἐπισκῆψας πατήρ,
δδ' ἄρματ' εἰσέβαυεν εἰς Θήβας ἰών.

ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς 10
 μὲν, ὅπου ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ᾗ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν
 συμβάλλῃται; ἢ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ
 ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ
 μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. μᾶλλον
 δ' ἔοικεν ἐκούσιους· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα,
 ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ῥάδιον
 ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα.
 εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίῃ βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζει 11
 γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια· τούτων γὰρ
 χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν βία καὶ
 ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς.
 γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιάσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθιράτον
 ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ'
 αἰσχυρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὲ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὐ ἔξωθεν ἢ 12
 ἀρχῇ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

10 ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ
 ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι] These words repeat
 what has been already said in the pre-
 ceding section. 'Ἐστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐντορε
 κ.τ.λ., but they add the reason 'be-
 cause each particular case has its own
 special diversity:' cf. διαφορὰν καὶ
 πλάσιν, I. iii. 2.

11-12 In these sections Aristotle
 guards his definition against a possible
 misconception. Having defined the
 compulsory to be that whose cause is
 external, he disallows the supposition
 that the two great inducements to all
 action, the pleasant and the noble,
 because external to us, make the
 actions they induce compulsory. His
 arguments against this supposition
 are: (1) It would make all action com-
 pulsory, and thus imply more than
 any one would wish to support. (2)
 Compulsory actions are painful; those
 done for the pleasant or the noble are
 pleasurable. (3) It leaves out of ac-
 count the internal susceptibility of the
 agent (αὐτὸν εὐθιράτον ὄντα). His

own definition, then, is sufficiently
 qualified by the addition of the words,
 'the person under compulsion in no-
 wise consenting' (μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου
 τοῦ βιασθέντος).

τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ] Aspasius
 reads τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ λυπηρά. The
 commentators, Victorius, Muretus,
 Giphanius, and Zell, get over the
 difficulty by taking τὰ καλὰ to mean
 'non honesta, sed formosa, pulchra.'
 It is plain, however, that the same
 classification of inducements is here
 referred to as that given *Eth.* II. iii.
 7, the συμφέρον being a means either
 to the ἡδὺ or the καλόν. The καλόν is
 in short 'the noble,' or 'the good,
 viewed as morally beautiful.' A con-
 cise definition of it is given in *Rhet.*
 I. ix. 3: καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὃ ἂν δι'
 αὐτὸ αἰρετόν ᾖ ἐπαινετόν ᾗ, ἢ δ' ἂν
 ἀγαθόν ᾖ ἡδὺ ᾗ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. It is
 used in the present passage not at all
 emphatically, but simply to denote
 that form of inducement which con-
 sists in our wishing to do a thing

- 13 Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδὲν δὲ δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ
14 γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ μεθύνων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ

because it is right. A little examination shows that the writing here is vague, for presently it is said to be absurd to assign the cause of the good things to oneself, and of the bad things to pleasure (*αἰτιάσθαι—τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐαυτὸν, τῶν δ' αἰσχροῦν τὰ ἡδέα*); whereas consistently the 'good things' would have been assigned to 'the good' as an external cause by those who maintained the position, *εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα κ.τ.λ.* Also would Aristotle say that what is done *διὰ τὸ καλόν*, is always done *μεθ' ἡδονῆς*? This goes strangely against *Eth. III. ix. 4-5*, where the higher satisfaction of the *καλόν* is represented as purchased by great pain. There is a vagueness also in the use of *βία*, which first stands for that which compels, and secondly for that which is compelled. The principle, however, is well brought out, that the objective inducement to an action cannot be separated from the subjective apprehension of this in the will.

13 τὸ δὲ δι' ἀγνοίαν—*ἔχειν ἴδιον*] 'Now that which is done through ignorance is always non-voluntary, but it is involuntary only when followed by pain, and when it is a matter of regret. For he who has done something through ignorance, but without feeling any dislike at the

action, has not, it is true, acted voluntarily, inasmuch as he did not know he was doing it, but, on the other hand, not involuntarily, since he is not sorry. With regard, therefore, to actions done through ignorance we may say that he who repents has been an involuntary agent, while him who does not repent we may distinguish as having been a non-voluntary one; for where there is a real difference, it is proper to have a distinctive name.' Aristotle begins the discussion of ignorance as modifying volition by this refined distinction, that an action may be done through ignorance, and yet not against the will. It may in short be neither with the will nor against it. He then goes on to consider the precise meaning of *δι' ἀγνοίαν*.

14-16 *ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε—ἀκονσίως πράττει*] 'There seems to be a farther difference between acting through ignorance and doing a thing in ignorance. Common opinion pronounces that the drunken or the angry man acts not through ignorance, but in consequence of drunkenness or anger, and yet that he does not act wittingly, but in ignorance. Without doubt every depraved man is in ignorance of what he ought to do, and of that from which he ought to refrain, and it is

διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ

in consequence of this error that men become unjust, or bad generally. But the term involuntary is not meant to cover ignorance of man's true interest. Ignorance which affects moral choice, and ignorance of the universal, are the causes, not of involuntary action, but of wickedness, and it is precisely for this ignorance that wicked men are blamed. The ignorance which causes involuntary action is ignorance of particulars, which are the circumstances and the objects of actions. With regard to these particulars, pity and pardon may be proper, for the man who acts in ignorance of some particular is an involuntary agent.' The connection of this somewhat compressed passage is as follows. An act is involuntary when caused by ignorance. But ignorance cannot be said to be the cause of an act if the individual be himself the cause of the ignorance. In that case ignorance rather accompanies the act (ἀγνοῶν πράττει) than causes it (δι' ἀγνοίαν πράττει). We see this (1) in instances of temporary oblivion, as from anger or wine; (2) in those of a standing moral ignorance or oblivion (εἰ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον—ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοία—ἢ καθόλου ἀγνοία). The only ignorance, then, which is purely external to the agent, so as to take away from him the responsibility of the act, is some chance mistake with regard to the particular facts of the case. A great deal of trouble has been expended upon the endeavour to distinguish and explain the various terms, ἀγνοοῦντα πράττει—ἀγνοεῖν τὸ συμφέρον—ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοία—ἢ καθόλου ἀγνοία. But a closer examination shows that these different terms are not opposed to each other,

but rather are all different ways for expressing the same thing, being opposed to the ἢ καθ' ἑκαστα, ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις. This is the way in which the Paraphrast understands the passage, for he renders it: Αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται πράξεις οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκούσιοι· ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοία, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰτία τῶν κακιῶν, οὐκ ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῦ ἀκούσιου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθόλου περὶ τῆς μέθης ἀγνοεῖν διὰ πονηρόν, αἴτιον γίνεταί τοῦ ἀκούσιου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγνοῆσαι μερικῶς τῆςδε τὴν μέθοδον· ὅσον, φέρε εἰπεῖν, οὐκ εἰδὼτα μέχρι πόσον πῶντας ἐνι μεθύειν. Aristotle strictly confines ignorance, as a cause of involuntary action, to mistakes about particulars. Before proceeding to this particular ignorance, he separates from it that kind of ignorance which is faulty, because caused by the agent himself. Of this there are two kinds, the temporary, as for instance that caused by intoxication, and the permanent, such as that caused by any vicious habit. 'Ignorance of the universal' is not different from 'ignorance of our real interest,' but serves to point the antithesis of 'ignorance of the particular:' nor is it opposed to ignorance as shown in wrong moral choice, but to ignorance of external facts. It goes to constitute ignorance in the purpose, for in every moral act there is a universal conception, as well as a particular application of this. But Aristotle does not here enter upon the psychology of the subject, as is afterwards done, *Eth.* vii. iii. The word *συμφέρον* is used, *Politics*, i. ii. 11, to include and denote all kinds of good, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον.

14 διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων] Some refer

- διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται.
- 15 τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμ-
 φέρον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου
 ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε
 ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς ἡ πρᾶξις·
- 16 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων
 τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι
 αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἡ ἐν
 τίνι πράττει, εἵποτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα
 τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.
- 17 ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσκει μὴ μαινόμενος,
 δηλὸν δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ
 δὲ πράττει, ἀγνοήσκειν ἂν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν
 αὐτούς, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος
 τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφείναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν κατα-
 πέλτην. οἰηθεῖν δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ
 ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν
 λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ παίσας ἀποκτείνειν
 ἂν· καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι,

this to § 11, τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ κακά, but it appears simply to mean 'not from ignorance, but from one of the things now specified' (i.e. drunkenness or anger). Cf. III. iii. 11, τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, which refers to the passage immediately preceding.

16-17 The particulars connected with an action are as follows:—(1) The person doing it, about which ignorance is impossible to the doer. (2) The thing done, which may not be known, e.g. Æschylus did not know he was revealing the mysteries. (3) The thing or person made the object of the action (περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι), e.g. Merope did not know it was her son. (4) The instrument, e.g. one might fancy one's spear had a button on it. (5) The purpose or tendency of the act (ἐνεκα τίνος), e.g. one wishing to preserve might kill.

(6) The manner (πῶς), e.g. one might strike harder than one wished.

ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά] Referring to the well-known story that Æschylus was summoned before the Areopagus on the charge of having revealed the mysteries, against which charge he pleaded that he had never himself been initiated. Ælian, Var. Hist. v. 19.

ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη] This same incident is alluded to by Aristotle in the *Poetics*, c. xiv. 19: Κράτιστον δὲ τὸ τελευταῖον, (i.e. τὸν μέλλοντα ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ἀγνοίαν, ἀναγνώρισαι πρὶν ποιῆσαι), λέγου δὲ οἷον ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισεν.

καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξουσιν αὐτὸν] 'And wishing to show the way, as those do who box with the open hand, a man

πατάξειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὐσης ἐν 18
οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι,
καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι
δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα, τοῦ δὴ κατὰ 19
τὴν τοιαύτην ἀγνοίαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν
πράξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ. ὄντος δ' 20
ἀκουσίου τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν
ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότει τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν
οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι 21
τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι 22
τῶν ἄλλων ζῶν ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἴτα 23
πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ
θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ἀκουσίως; ἢ
γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια 24
φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι
καὶ ἐπιθυμῆναι τινῶν, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως. δοκεῖ δὲ 25
τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα.
ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ 26

might give another a blow.' Aspasius explains ἀπορχειρίζεσθαι thus: ἐστι τὸ πυκτεῖν ἢ παγκρατίζειν πρὸς ἑτερον ἀνεν συμπλοκῆς ἢ ὅλως ἀκραίς ταῖς χερσὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων γυμνάζεσθαι, i.e. it is what we call 'sparring.' This same phrase δεῖξαι βουλόμενος was applied before to 'the man who was showing the catapult,' and was given as an instance of one being ignorant of the nature of his act. Here it is an instance of ignorance of the tendency of an act. The different kinds of ignorance are not very distinct from one another.

18 *περὶ πάντα δὴ—ἔνεκα* 'Ignorance then being concerned with all these circumstances of the action, he that was ignorant of some one of these is held (δοκεῖ) to have acted involuntarily, and especially (if ignorant) with regard to the most important; and the most important seem to be the objects of the action and the

tendency of it.' The words ἐν οἷς are used at the beginning of the section in a general sense, as before (§ 15); afterwards they correspond with *περὶ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι* (§ 16). There is an awkwardness about οὐ ἔνεκα. A person knows with what end or view he is acting (and this is what οὐ ἔνεκα legitimately expresses). But he is mistaken about the means which he uses. Hence wishing to produce one result he produces another. But what he mistakes, is not the end (οὐ ἔνεκα) but the means (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος). The phrase here would imply that an action had an end, or aim of its own (οὐ ἔνεκα) independent of the doer,—in other words a tendency, of which therefore the doer might be ignorant.

20-27 Having separated off the involuntary in its two forms of compulsion and mistake, there remains to us the conception of the voluntary, as that whose cause is in an agent know-

27 θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἡττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη. αἱ δὲ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθενα ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

2 Δωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκούσιου καὶ τοῦ ἀκούσιου, περὶ

ing the circumstances of the action. This definition requires justification, owing to a false notion (οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι) that acts done from anger or desire (which are 'in the agent') are involuntary. This notion is refuted by the following arguments: (1) It would prove too much, and would make all the actions of brutes and of children involuntary. (2) Some acts prompted by desire or anger are right and good. We must either call these involuntary, or say that while these are voluntary, bad acts similarly prompted are involuntary. Either supposition is absurd. (3) There is a feeling of obligation (δεῖ), attaching sometimes to these emotions; we *ought* to desire some things and be angry at some. This feeling of 'ought' implies freedom. (4) Acts prompted by desire are pleasant; involuntary acts, painful. (5) We have as strong a feeling about errors of passion, as about errors of reason, that they are to be eschewed (φευκτά). The passions are as much part of the man as the reason, therefore acts prompted by them are acts of the man.

The polemic in these arguments does not seem to be directed against any philosophical school, but rather against a popular error. Aristotle does not deal with the maintainers of the doctrine of necessity as a whole, but only with those who, allowing that half our actions are free, would argue that the other half are not free. Such reasoners are comparatively easy to answer. The most important argument adduced by Aristotle is the third,

where he implies that the idea of freedom is contained in that of duty. He does not draw out this principle, nor could he have done so without anticipating the philosophy of later times. The last argument seems to come to this, that you cannot separate a man from his passions, or say the reason is the man's self and the passions not. Elsewhere Aristotle says ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἕκαστος. And in truth the relation of a man's desires to his individuality might be more deeply investigated than is here done.

φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω] This seems a counterpart to the former argument, ἄτοπον ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάσαι ὅν δεῖ ὀρέεσθαι. The passions are proved to be voluntary on account of the feeling of reprehension we have for errors of passion. On the emphatic opposition between *φευκτὸν* and *ἀπερὸν*, cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 5.

II. Having given a generic account of the voluntary, Aristotle proceeds to examine the special form of it which he calls *προαίρεσις*. This does not mean the will as a whole (for which, indeed, Aristotle has no one name), but a particular exhibition of it, namely, a conscious, determinate act of the will. 'Purpose' or 'determination' is perhaps the nearest word in our language, but in fact no word exactly corresponds. The contrasts and distinctions made in this chapter might at first seem unnecessary, until we observe that Aristotle is himself founding a new psychology. The

προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἡ ² προαίρεσις δὲ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτόν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλεόν τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκούσιου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνοῦν, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. οἱ δὲ λέγον- ³ τες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εἰκόασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ⁴

word *προαίρεσις* only once occurs in Plato, and then not in its present psychological sense, but merely denoting 'selection' or 'choice.' *Parmenides*, p. 143 B: τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἐν εἴτε τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀρ' οὐκ ἐν ἐκάστη τῇ προαίρεσει προαιρούμεθά τινα ὧ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω; It is true that the verb *προαίρεσθαι* is of frequent occurrence in Plato, but generally in the sense of 'selecting' or 'preferring,' and not 'purposing' or 'determining.' As in other cases, then, Aristotle takes up a floating term from common language, and gives it scientific definiteness, so that it becomes henceforth a psychological formula. His account of *προαίρεσις* in the present chapter is, that it is a species of the voluntary (*ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται*, οὐ ταῦτόν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλεόν τὸ ἐκούσιον), and that it differs from anger, desire, wish, and any form of opinion. (1) It differs from desire or anger as not being shared by irrational creatures, as being often opposed to desire, &c. (2) It is still less like anger than like desire, anger excluding the notion of purpose or deliberate choice (*ἡκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ*). (3) It is not wish, because we often wish for what is impossible, or beyond our control, and because, speaking gene-

rally, wish is of the end, whereas purpose is of the means, and restricts itself to what is in our power. (4) Nor is it opinion, which may be about anything, the eternal or the impossible, and which is characterised as true or false, not, like purpose, as good or bad. Nor is it opinion on matters of action. For opinion on good and evil does not constitute the moral character in the way that purpose does; again, the use of these terms in common language points out a difference between purpose and opinion.

Purpose then, being a species of the voluntary, implies also intellect (*μετὰ λόγον καὶ διανοίας*) and deliberation. It is a deliberate desire of what is within our own power (*βουλευτική βρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, *Eth.* III. iii. 19).

1 *οἰκειότατον γὰρ—πράξεων*] 'For it seems most closely bound up with virtue, and to be a better criterion of moral character than even actions.' Cf. *Eth.* X. viii. 5: *ἀμφοσβητέριαι δὲ πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὁσῆς*. The importance of this position as a ground-work for the whole doctrine of morality must be estimated by the advance which is made in it beyond what Plato had arrived at.

3 *οἱ δὲ λέγοντες*] There is a tendency in Plato to merge the distinctions of will and reason: whether some of his school are here alluded

ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πρᾶττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς
 5 δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ
 προαίρεσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία
 οὐ. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις
 6 δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἦττον· ἥκιστα
 7 γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν
 οὐδὲ βούλησις γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις
 μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι,
 δοκοίη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων,
 8 οἷον ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι καὶ περὶ τὰ
 μυδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν
 ἢ ἀθλητὴν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα
 9 οἶεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ
 τέλους ἔστι μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,
 οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν,
 καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ
 λέγειν οὐχ ἄρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ
 10 τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα
 δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ
 τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀληθεὶ
 διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις
 11 μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξη ταυτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς.

to, or whether it is a merely popular confusion of terms that Aristotle attacks, is not clear.

5 καὶ προαίρεσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ] It might be said that desires are really contrary to each other, and contradict each other as much as purpose contradicts any desire, e.g. the desire for money is thwarted by that for pleasure. But the psychology is not very explicit here, and Aristotle seems to imply without definitely expressing it, that in the moral will there is an element contradicting the desires in a manner different from that in which one desire interferes with another.

7 βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων,

οἷον ἀθανασίας] 'But wish is for impossibilities, as, for instance, immortality.' This is not a passage that can be cited as an indication of Aristotle's opinion with regard to a future life. 'Αθανασία here means 'exemption from death,' and does not touch the question as to the imperishability of the soul. It seems to have been a stock instance of an impossible wish. Dr. Cardwell quotes Xenophon's *Symposium* (i. § 15): οὐτε γὰρ ἐγώ γε σπουδάζειν ἂν δύναμην μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι.

11-13 ὅλως μὲν οὖν—[οὐ μὲν] 'Now that purpose is identical with opinion as a whole, perhaps no one maintains at all. But neither is it identical with any special kind of opinion.

ἀλλ' οὐδέ τινι τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ
 ποιοὶ τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα 12
 μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί
 ἐστὶν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνν
 δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινέεται τῷ εἶναι οὐ 13
 δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ
 προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν
 δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνν ἴσμεν. δοκούσιν τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι 14
 τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον,
 διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα 15
 τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο
 γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστι δόξη τινί. τί οὖν ἡ 16
 ποίον τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν
 δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἡρὰ 17
 γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου
 καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὄν
 πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν 3

For in purposing what is good or bad our moral character consists,—not in opining it. And we purpose to take or avoid, or something of the kind, but we opine what a thing is, or for whom it is good, or how; but we do not exactly opine to take or avoid. And while purpose is praised rather by the epithets, “of the right object,” or “rightly,” opinion is praised by the epithet “truly.” And we purpose things that, as far as may be (*μάλιστα*), we *know* for certain to be good, but we opine what we do not exactly *know*.

οὐδέ τινι] i.e. purpose is not identical with an opinion as to moral matters. The first argument to prove this is characteristic of Aristotle as opposed to Plato. He says, ‘our moral character does not consist in our opinions on good and evil, but in the deliberate acts of our will.’ This is guarded afterwards by the limitation (§ 15) that ‘opinion may go to form purpose, and may

again be reacted on by it;’ but the question is, are they identical?

12–13. The arguments in these sections consist in an appeal to language—we cannot speak of ‘opining to take,’ &c.

μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς] ‘H is of course not connected with μᾶλλον. It simply means ‘or.’ ‘Ὀρθῶς, which should properly go with a verb, seems used because the verb *προαιρεῖσθαι* was much commoner before Aristotle than the abstract form *προαίρεσις*. ‘Ὀρθή is applied to *δρεξις* (the element of desire in *προαίρεσις*), *Eth.* VI. ii. 2.

III. Since Purpose implies deliberation, this latter is now analysed, and an account is given, first of its object, secondly of its mode of operation. The object of deliberation is determined by an exhaustive process. All things are either eternal or mutable; we do *not* deliberate about things

c

- 2 ἐστίν, ἡ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως βου-
 λευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος,
 3 ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς
 βουλευέται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς
 4 πλευράς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει,
 αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει
 5 ἢ διὰ τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ
 περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. οὐδὲ
 6 περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ

eternal. Of things mutable, we do not deliberate about those things which are regulated by necessity, by nature, or by chance. Hence it remains that we deliberate about mutable things within the power of man, and not about all such, but about those within our own power, and not about ends, but about means, and where there is room for question. The mode of operation in deliberating is a kind of analysis. Assuming as desirable some end, we first ask what means will immediately produce this end, what again will produce those means, and so on till we have brought the last link of the chain of causation to ourselves, when we commence acting at once, the last step in the analysis being the first in the productive process. If any step occurs which is on the one hand necessary for the given end, and on the other hand unattainable by us, the chain cannot be completed; the deliberation is relinquished. But if all the steps are feasible, that which was indefinite before at once becomes definite, and purpose succeeds deliberation. A discussion of the nature of *εὐβουλία* as related to *φρόνησις* occurs *Eth.* vi. ix., but is evidently written quite independently of the present chapter, on which it improves by employing the formula of the moral syllogism, and by inquiring after the faculty which

perceives ends. We might have expected Aristotle to say that in the deliberation which precedes an action some account should always be taken of the right or wrong of the action. But here the only question is represented to be, how a given end is to be obtained? What action will serve as a means to it? Hence while the present discussion must be considered a subtle piece of elementary psychology, and of great merit in the infancy of the science, on the other hand it seems incomplete as regards the theory of morals.

3-5 *περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων—εὐρέσεως*] 'No man deliberates about eternal things, such as the universe, or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side in a square; nor indeed about things in motion, if the motion takes place invariably in the same way, whether of necessity, or by nature, or from any other cause, as in the instance of the solstices and the risings of the sun: nor about things entirely variable, like droughts and rains: nor about matter of chance, like the finding of a treasure.' The opposition to *τὰ αἰδία* is *τὰ ἐν κινήσει*. The more exhaustive division of objects would have been that which is given *Eth.* vi. i. 6, into *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν* and *τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα*. But there is an absence of logical formulæ in the present book which is observable. The instances here given

περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκῦθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλευέται. οὐ γὰρ γένοιτο ἂν τούτων οὐθέν δι' ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ 7 τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἷτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλευόμενοι περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν 8 τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' αἰεὶ, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα οἷον περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματι-

of the eternal are (1) the universe, (2) a particular mathematical truth—that the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its side. That the universe is eternal, being uncreated, indestructible, and, as a whole, immutable, was part of Aristotle's physical philosophy. Cf. *de Caelo* i. x. 10: 'ὅστ' εἰ τὸ δλον σῶμα συνεχές ἐν ὅτῃ μὲν οὕτως ὅτῃ δ' ἐκείνως διατίθεται καὶ διακεκόσμηται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ δλου σύστασις ἔστι κόσμος καὶ οὐρανός, οὐκ ἂν ὁ κόσμος γίγνοιτο καὶ φθείροιτο, ἀλλ' αἱ διαθέσεις αὐτοῦ.—The above mathematical truth is called 'eternal,' *De Gen. An.* ii. vi. 15: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχειν δυσὶν ὁρθαῖς ἴσας αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν πλευρὰν αἰδίων. It is mentioned as one of those things which philosophy begins by wondering at, and ends by feeling their universal necessity. *Metaphys.* i. ii. 15: καθάπερ τῶν θανμάτων ταῦτόματα τοῖς μήψω θεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτία, ἢ περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς ἢ τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσύμμετρίαν· θανμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν, εἰ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται. δεῖ δὲ εἰς τούναντίον ἀποτελεῖσθαι.—οὐθέν γὰρ ἂν οὕτω θανμάσειεν ἀνὴρ γεωμετρικός ὡς εἰ γένοιτο ἢ διάμετρος μετρητή. Two kinds of eternity seem here placed in juxtaposition—one physical, the other ma-

thematical. But eternity or necessity can only exist in relation to the laws of the mind that perceives it. Therefore we might say that these two kinds of eternity find their meeting-point in a metaphysic above the division of the sciences. Aristotle however is writing οὐ κατ' ἀκριβειαν.

7 αἷτια γὰρ—ἀνθρώπου] 'For the causes of things seem to be as follows, nature, and necessity, and chance, and again reason and all that depends on man.' A similar classification of causes is implied *Eth.* i. ix. 5, vi. iv. 4. The relation of necessity and chance, as causes, to nature, forms the subject of Aristotle's *Physics*, Book ii. Chapters iv.—ix. See Vol. I. p. 250.

8 καὶ περὶ—γραπτέον] 'And on the one hand there is no deliberation about sciences that are fixed and complete in themselves, as for instance about writing—for we do not doubt how we ought to write.' The ἀκριβεῖς ἐπιστήμαι here meant are not the 'exact sciences,' as we may judge from the instance given. 'Ἀκριβής seems equivalent to 'fixed' (cf. the note on *Eth.* i. vii. 18), and ἐπιστήμη is used in a sense equivalent to τέχνη, though the words are immediately afterwards distinguished.

- στικὴν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσῳ
 9 ἵπτον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον
 δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ
 10 περὶ αὐτὰς διατάζομεν. τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ
 τὸ πολὺ, ἀδύλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον.
 συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπι-
 11 στοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοὶς διαγνῶναι. βουλευ-
 ὀμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
 οὔτε γὰρ ἱατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ
 πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν
 οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ
 διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου
 γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι'
 ἐνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκείνο διὰ
 τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει
 ἔσχατόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζῆτει καὶ
 12 ἀναλύνει τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. φαίνεται
 δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πάντα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθημα-
 τικαί, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πάντα ζήτησις, καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ
 13 ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ

11 οὔτε γὰρ — διάγραμμα] 'The physician does not deliberate whether he is to cure, nor the orator whether he is to persuade, nor the statesman whether he is to produce law and order. The end is not the subject of deliberation in any science. An end being assumed, we consider how and by what means it can be brought about; if it appear that there are more ways than one, we inquire which is the easiest and best; if it can be accomplished by one mean alone, we inquire how this produces the end, and by what it is itself produced, until we come to that which as a cause is first, but is the last thing to be discovered; for such deliberation as we describe is like seeking the solution of a geometrical problem by analysis of the diagram.' The process

of deliberation is analytical, proceeding backwards ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. It ends with the πρῶτον αἷτιον, i.e. the individual will. 'Will,' says Kant, 'is that kind of causality attributed to living agents, in so far as they are possessed of reason, and freedom is such a property of that causality as enables them to originate events independently of foreign determining causes.' That each man is, as regards his own acts, an originating cause not determined by other causes, is Aristotle's view throughout. Kant's definition throws light upon this.

κἀκείνο] Refers to ἐνός and διὰ τούτου.

ὥσπερ διάγραμμα.] Aristotle compares deliberation with the analysis of mathematical problems. Given a

ἐντύχουσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατόν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἂ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζητεῖται δ' ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα, ὅτε δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν. 14 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὐ, ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δὲ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ 15 τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα. οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος 16 ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὥς δεῖ· αἰσθησεως γὰρ ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ αἰεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξει. βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ 17 προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθὲν προαιρετόν ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τό

problem of geometry, e.g. to find the method of constructing some figure. Assume it as constructed, and draw it accordingly. See what condition is immediately necessary, and what again will produce this, &c.

14 *ζητεῖται δ'—διὰ τίνος*] 'The question is sometimes what instruments are necessary, sometimes how they are to be used; and, speaking generally, we have to find sometimes the means by which, sometimes the manner or the person by whom.' Michelet makes a difficulty about *ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς*, explaining it 'in reliquis categoriis;' but the Paraphrast renders it simply *καὶ ἀπλῶς*.

15 *ἔοικε δὲ—ἔνεκα*] 'It seems, therefore, that man is, as we have said, the cause of his actions: that deliberation is about the things to be done by ourselves, and that actions are means to something else.' In one sense, and so far as deliberation is concerned, actions must be regarded as means. Cf. *Rhetoric*, I. vi. 1:

πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλευόντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον, βουλεύονται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις. But in another sense, and from a moral point of view, each action is an end-in-itself. Cf. *Eth.* vi. ii. 5: *Οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς—τὸ ποιητόν. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραγία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὀρεξις τοῦτο.*

16 *εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξει*] 'It will go on to infinity'—impersonal. Cf. I. ii. 1, I. vii. 7.

17 *παύεται γὰρ—προαιρούμενον*] 'For every one stops inquiring how he shall act, when he has brought home the first link in the chain to himself and to the guiding principle in himself; that is to say, to that which purposes.' Throughout these discussions we find a striking clearness of expression for some of the ordinary phenomena of consciousness; on the other hand, evident tokens that the psychology is new and tentative; and again, a want of deeper inquiry into

- 18 προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐμμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἂ προ-
 19 ἔλουντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὅντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι γὰρ
 20 κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῃ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιά ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
 4 Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν, εἴρηται,

the nature of personality and of the will.

18 δῆλον δὲ—δήμῳ] 'Now this is exemplified from the old politics which Homer depicted; for the kings used to announce to the people the course they had selected.' Cf. the conduct of Agamemnon, *Iliad* II. 53, sqq. A modern illustration is furnished by the French Parliaments, which used to register the edicts presented to them by the king as a matter of course. The Paraphrast explains the comparison by making the people represent the προαίρεσις—Εἰσάγει γὰρ τοὺς βασιλεῖς μετὰ τὴν βούλην τὸ προκρίθην ἀπαγγέλλοντας τῷ δήμῳ ὥσπερ τῇ προαίρεσει, ὥστε πραχθῆναι. The people were required to acquiesce in and carry out the decisions of the kings, which else would have remained unratified. So the reason announces its decisions to the will or purpose, i.e. the active powers in the mind. Metaphors of this sort never accurately represent mental distinctions. The present comparison has many flaws. For the προαίρεσις is here called τὸ ἡγούμενον, which does not answer to the people, distinguished from the king. Again, it is the individual (ἐκαστος), not the reason, that announces his deliberations to the leading part in himself. What constitutes the individual as separate from the will or purpose? And, is not

reason part of purpose, how then can it be distinguished from it?

19 ὅντος δὲ—βούλευσιν] 'If the object of purpose is that, which, being in our power, we desire after deliberation, purpose will be a deliberate desire of things in our power. After deliberating we decide, and form a desire in accordance with our deliberation.' The Paraphrast here reads κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν at the end of this passage. There might seem to be something plausible in the change, because βούλευσις is represented as confining itself to means; hence how can we be said to desire κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν? Consistently, our desires must depend on something else, namely, βούλησις—deliberation is the faculty for attaining them. On the other hand, the phrases βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ, and βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις, run the consideration of means and ends together.

IV. Hitherto every act has been regarded as a means, and has been accounted voluntary because originating in the individual. Deliberation and purpose have been restricted in their function to the mere choice and taking of means. A great question therefore remains to be mooted, whence do we get our conception of ends? What is the nature of the faculty called βούλησις, which has

δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινο-
μένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλευτὸν τὰ γα- 2

been assumed to be the faculty of ends? Are we as free in the choice of these, as we are in that of the means? Aristotle contents himself with mentioning in the present chapter that there are two extreme opinions, the one (that of Plato) that wish is always for the good; the other (that of some of the sophists) that it is for the apparent good. He rejects both of these, the first as contradicting facts, the second as ignoring any true object of wish. He takes a position between them, that, abstractedly and ideally, as appealing to the universal reason (*ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν*) the good is the object of wish, while to the individual mind only what appears good can seem desirable; hence, although the good man, who has the *mens sana*, and is thus in accordance with the universal reason, and is its exponent in particular cases (*τὰ ληθὲς ἐν ἐκδότοις ὁρᾷ ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν*), wishes for the good alone, others are deceived by false appearances and by pleasure, and choose what is not truly good. In the statement that the morally good man (*σπουδαῖος*) wishes aright, there is implied the doctrine, afterwards developed by the Peripatetics, that it is Virtue that gives a right conception of ends. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. xi. 1, and *Eth. Nic.* VI. xii. 8, and see Vol. I. Essay I. p. 59.

1 *δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι*] This doctrine is found stated at length in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 466, sqq. Polus having argued that the position of a tyrant or orator is enviable, because 'he can do what he wishes,' Socrates answers that 'the tyrant or orator does nothing that he wishes: ' *φημι γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς*

ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σμικρότατον—οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. Then follows an account of βούλησις, that it is of ends not means. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἐκδόστω, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὃ ἕνεκα πράττουσι τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; By which it can be demonstrated that βούλησις is of the absolute good. The difference between Plato's account and the one above is, that Plato distinguishes βούλησις from ἐπιθυμία, while Aristotle does not. The βούλησις of Plato is the higher will, or desire of the Universal. In this higher sense of the word wish, no one wishes except for what is good, that is, in his best moments, in the deepest recesses of his nature, if the true bearings of his wish be pointed out to him. In this sense the wish of the individual is in accordance with universal reason, and is an expression of it. In a lower sense, we wish with different parts of our nature, and thus wish for all sorts of things, bad as well as good. But to this latter kind of wish the name 'desire' is appropriate. The tenet *ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ βούλησις ἐστίν* is of great importance for morals. It implies much that modern systems would convey in other terms, such as the 'supremacy of conscience,' the 'autonomy of the will,' &c. Elsewhere Aristotle distinctly maintains it. Cf. *Metaphys.* XI. vii. 2: *τὸ ὁρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κυεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά* (transcendentally the objects of reason and of longing are identical). *Ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλευτὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ δὴ καλόν.* In

θὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ βούλεται ὃ μὴ ὀρθῶς
 αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλευτὸν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ
 3 οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ
 βουλευτὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλευτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστω
 τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε,
 4 τάναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον ἀπλῶς
 μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, ἐκάστω δὲ
 τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν
 εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαίῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων
 τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινὰ ἔστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν
 τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν
 5 ἐκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἔξιν
 ἰδιά ἔστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ
 σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληθες ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ
 μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη δια τὴν ἡδονὴν
 εἶκοι γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὐσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται· αἰροῦνται
 οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

De Anima, III. x. 4, he makes the wish (or will) side with reason, in opposition to desire. 'Ἡ γὰρ βούλησις δρεξίς' ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται. ἡ δ' δρεξίς κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία δρεξίς τίς ἐστιν. In other parts of the *Ethics* also (which may hence be concluded to have been composed at a different period from this chapter) this distinction between βούλησις, the general wish, and any particular desire or determination, is observed. Cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 6: οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει. οὕτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐθεὶς ὃ μὴ οἶται εἶναι σπουδαῖον. VIII. xiii. 8: τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλὰ, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα.

τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ] This is a corollary of the doctrine of Protagoras. If the individual could only

know what 'seemed' to him, he could only wish for what seemed good. Thus the objective distinction between good and evil is done away with (συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλευτὸν). Cf. *Metaphys.* x. vi. 1: 'Εκεῖνος (ὁ Πρωταγόρας) ἔφη πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι μέτρον ἀνθρώπων, οὐθὲν ἕτερον λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστω τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι παλιν. τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.

4 ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς] The good man is made here again, as above (II. vi. 15), that standard of right and wrong, that exponent of the universal reason, by which Aristotle escapes being forced into an utterly relative system of morals.

5 οὐ γὰρ οὐσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται] The 'pleasant' is characterised as 'the seeming good' in the *Peripa-*

*Οντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ 5
προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ
προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι
περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ 2

tetic book *De Motu Animal.* vi. 5: δεῖ
δὲ τινέσθαι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν
ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινό-
μενον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν.

V. Aristotle winds up his account of the voluntary, by arguing that virtue and vice are free (ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία). As before remarked, this must not be taken as a metaphysical discussion of the question of free-will. Partly, the question had never yet been fully started; partly, Aristotle would have thought it foreign to an ethical treatise; partly, we find in the present chapter that same elementary and tentative character which marks the previous discussions in this book. In dealing with one of the real difficulties of the question at the end of the chapter, Aristotle contents himself with a very qualified and moderate assertion of freedom, which contrasts with the dogmatic statements on the same subject in the *Ethics* of Eudemus. The discussion here is evidently suggested by, and directed against, the doctrine of the Platonists, that 'vice is involuntary,' since it consists in ignorance. The arguments are as follows: (1) All action implies the possibility of its contrary, hence if to act rightly be in our power, to act wrongly must be in our power also. (2) That an individual is the originating cause of his actions, is a conception which it is difficult to get rid of. This implies freedom. (3) We all act as if vice were free as well as virtue. It is punished by the state. Even for

ignorance and carelessness producing vice, men are held to be responsible. (4) Men must not charge their acts upon their natural character—rather their character is produced by their acts. (5) The analogy of bodily infirmities shows us that if some vices are congenital, some, at all events, are self-produced. (6) The great difficulty of the question is as follows: if, as was said above (Chapter IV.), we each of us desire what seems good; if our conception of the end, that is, our idea of good, depends not on our own will, but on nature, or our character and tendency from birth; and if all our acts are determined by this conception of the end, how can they be called free? Aristotle answers by putting various alternatives: (α) You may either accept this position in its full extent. It will then apply to virtue as well as vice. Both will be equally under a law of nature. Neither will be voluntary. But this the mind seems to revolt against. (β) Or, you may say that while the end is absolutely determined, the means to it are all free as springing from the will of the individual. Thus, virtue and vice are free, because all their parts are free. (γ) Or, you may modify the doctrine by admitting that there is something self-produced and self-determined in the character as a whole, and therefore in the idea of good, which is to determine our actions.

1-2 *δενος δὴ—ἡ κακία* 'The end then being the object of wish, while the means are the objects of

κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὄν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὄν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὄν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαῦλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὥς

οὐδαίς ἐκὼν ποιεῖς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ,

ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδαίς

deliberation and purpose, the actions that are concerned with the means must depend on purpose and must be voluntary. But every calling out of the virtues into play is concerned with the means; virtue accordingly is in our power, and in like manner so is vice.'

αὶ περὶ ταῦτα πρῶξαι] The words περὶ ταῦτα are ambiguous. The Paraphrast confines them to 'the means,' which rendering is supported by κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν. Actions were above said to be means (III. iii. 15).

αὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι] This is an unusual expression. We find it again, *Eth.* x. iii. 1: οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν. Aristotle's usual formula is ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετῇ, i.e. the evocation of the internal nature into consciousness or action, under the regulation of the moral law. He seems averse to considering ἀρετῇ as a δύναμις, or latent quality that might be so evoked. The psychology of this passage is different from that of *Eth.* vi. xii. 8-10. Here it is said that βούλησις gives us the idea of the end, and that virtue consists in προαίρεσις and βούλευσις taking the means; there that virtue gives the end, and an intellectual faculty

(φρόνησις) the means. But see above, note on iv. 1.

2 ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν] Elsewhere (*Metaphys.* viii. ii. 2) Aristotle states in more philosophical form this first step in the doctrine of free-will, namely, that every psychical δύναμις is a capacity of contraries, see Vol. I. p. 238.

3 τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι] 'And this is, according to our hypothesis,—being good and bad.' ἦν = 'is as we have said,' referring to the preceding section. Trendelenburg in his paper on τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (*Rheinisches Museum*, 1828) tells us that ἀγαθοῖς in the present passage is by attraction to ἡμῖν. It is therefore to be distinguished from the logical expression τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, 'the essential idea of goodness.'

4 τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὥς—ἀληθεῖ] 'But to say that "No man prefers a crime or spurns a bliss" seems half false and half true.' The line here quoted, on which the discussion in this chapter turns, is of uncertain authorship. It is quoted in the ninth book of the *Laws of Plato*, p. 374, A, which passage is referred to here. Πότερον δὲ ἐκόντας οἷε ἔχειν τοῦτο τὸ ἀδικον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἀκόντας; ὥδε δὲ λέγω,

ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον. ἡ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις 5
ἀμφισβητήτεον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι
οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα 6
φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ
τὰς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
καὶ ἐκούσια. τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' 7
ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γάρ
καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι'
ἄγνοιαν ἥς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας
τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες, τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες.
καίτοι ὅσα μὴτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μὴθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προ-

ἐκόντας οἷε ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδίκους εἶναι ἢ
ἀκόντας; 'Εκόντας ἐγώ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες'
πονηροὶ γὰρ εἰσιν. 'Εκόντας ἄρα σὺ
οἷε πονηροὺς εἶναι καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώ-
πους; 'Ἐγώ γε' σὺ δ' οὐ; Οὐκ, εἰ γέ τι
δεῖ τῷ ποιητῇ πείθεσθαι. Ποῶν ποιητῇ;
'Ὅστις εἴπῃ

οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ.

'Ἀλλὰ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἡ παλαιὰ
παροιμία ἔχει, ὅτι πολλὰ ψεύδονται
δαίδοι. The answer to this is, an ar-
gument to show that injustice is δι'
ἀμαθίαν, and therefore involuntary.
Οὐκ ἄρα ἐψεύσατο τοῦτό γε δαίδοι.
The original saying was probably a
mere truism, πονηρὸς meaning not
'wicked' but 'wretched.' This play
on the word rendered the line pec-
uliarly suitable for Plato's argument.
The same quotation occurs in the spu-
rious Platonic dialogue *περὶ Δικαίου*.

5 γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ
τέκνων) The analogy here given, when
looked at closely, does not imply any
very strong assertion of free-will
(though Aristotle meant it to be so).
For the father inherits, or receives by
nature, qualities that he transmits to
his children. Analogously the will
might be regarded as an effect, as
well as a cause, of circumstances.

7 τούτοις δ' ἔοικε—νομοθετῶν] 'This
seems to be supported by the testimony
both of individuals and of the great
legislators themselves.' The argument
drawn from the constitution of society,
from the fact of rewards and punish-
ments, goes so far as this. It proves
that the mind is of a nature to be
acted on by inducements. It, of
course, does not touch the metaphy-
sical difficulty as to the whole world
being bound by a law of necessity.
But it proves an instinctive belief
existing in society, exactly coincident
with the position of Aristotle, that the
individual is the cause of particular
acts. There is no natural tendency
in criminals to disclaim responsibility
for their crimes. If they do so, it is
not from an instinctive feeling, but
rather from a sophisticated mind. As
before said, this fact is not sufficient
to disprove a metaphysical system
which would represent legislature,
judge, criminal, and the whole world,
as forced to do what they do by an
irresistible succession of cause and
effect. But ethically and politically
it is sufficient to justify a practical
assumption of freedom. And in any
system it must at all events be taken
account of.

τρέπεται πρᾶττειν, ὥς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὄν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ
 θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων.
 8 οὐθὲν γὰρ ἦπτον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ
 ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἶον
 τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλῶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ·
 κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας.
 καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστα-
 9 σθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὥς ἐπ' αὐ-
 10 τοῖς ὄν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ'
 ἴσως τοιούτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ
 τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀναιμένως, καὶ τοῦ
 ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν
 πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα
 11 ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
 μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντιοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι
 12 γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν
 13 περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀνασθήτου. ἔτι
 δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν
 14 ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πρᾶττει

8 διπλῶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια] Cf. *Politeia*, II. xii. 13: 'Ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς ἄλλ' οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἂν τυπτήσῃσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νηφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. Drunkenness is self-caused ignorance of right and wrong. (Cf. *Eth.* III. i. 14.) The law of Pittacus is given in the *Rhetoric* to illustrate an *ἐνστασις* depending on an appeal to authority. (II. xxv. 7) *Ἐἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἐνστασις ὅτι οὐκ οὖν δ Πιττακὸς αἰρετός.* οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐὰν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ.

10-12 αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα — ἀναι-

σθήτου] 'For the particular developments of the mind in each case give people their character. This may be illustrated by the case of those who are practising for some contest or action,—for they keep on exercising their powers. Now not to know that the several states of mind arise from particular developments of the powers is absolute idiocy.' This passage contains exactly the same theory of the formation of moral states as that given at the beginning of Book II. But it is written independently of the former passage—in that separate way, which must be called a marked peculiarity of Aristotle's writings.

13 ἔτι δ' ἄλογον — ἀκόλαστον]

'Again it is absurd to say that he who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust, or he who acts intemperately

ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν εἰάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγίης. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατόν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ρίψαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι. οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοί 15 εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν ἀσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρωσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσκειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἐλείσσει· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμῆσαι. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ 16 σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔ. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμῶμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ 17

to be intemperate.' Aristotle would not say himself that any one 'wished to be intemperate,' that is, wished it in the general, in the abstract, for its own sake. But here he points out that those who do not wish to be intemperate yet take the steps that lead inevitably to this. He argues that the means make the end free; the outset, the conclusion; the parts, the whole. Afterwards (§ 22) he allows that the general state is not so entirely in our power as the particular act. With regard to the former it is rather true to say that we are responsible for it, than that we choose it. A paradox then still remains, that men produce by voluntary acts that which they do not wish. The resolution of this is to be found in *Eth.* VII. iii., where it is shown that right moral acting consists in allowing the act of the moment to be sufficiently in-

fluenced by universal considerations. Error and vice, on the contrary, consist in suffering the universal idea, the general conception of what is good and desirable, to stand in abeyance.

14 προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι] 'But after he has thrown his health away, he has no longer a choice.' To 'give away' is the only sense in which *προεσθαι* is used in the *Ethics*. Cf. IV. i. 9, IX. i. 7, &c.

17-20 This complex argument will be perhaps made most clear, if divided into the following separate members. (1) *Εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι*—αὐτῷ is the general protasis. Suppose it to be said that all aim at what appears to them good, but that their ideas and impressions are beyond their control, being dependent in each case on the character of the individual. (2) On this an alternative follows: *either (el*

φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ·

μὲν οὖν—αἰσῖος) the individual is the cause of his own character, and so accordingly of his ideas, or (3) let us see what the consequences will be if we allow that the individual is not the cause of his own character (εἰ δὲ μή—εὐφύτα). In this case no one will be responsible for doing wrong: wrong will reduce itself to mere ignorance, the knowledge of the good to a happy gift of nature. (4) But these extreme deductions are overthrown (εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστίν—ὀπωσθήποτε) by its being shown that they will equally disprove the voluntariness of virtue, as well as that of vice. (5) The argument is concluded by summing up the results of the previous discussions (εἰτε δὴ—ὁμοίως γάρ). In whatever sense virtue is said to be free, whether as implying that the idea of the end is in our power, or only that there is something free and individual in the taking of means,—in exactly the same sense will vice be free, for these two opposite terms stand on exactly the same footing.

17 τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι] 'But are not masters of their impression.' Φαντασία is a special word, denoting something between sense and intellect (φαντασία γάρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας· αὐτὴ τε οὐ γίγνεται ἀνεὺ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἀνεὺ ταύτης οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις. *De An.* III. iii. 5). It denotes, in short, the sensuous impression of an object. Aristotle says that we may have a false φαντασία even where we have true opinions, as, for instance, our φαντασία of the sun makes it a foot in diameter, while our belief is that the sun surpasses in magnitude the habitable world (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ

ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πεπίστευται δ' εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης. *De An.* III. iii. 15). Φαντασία is closely allied with μνήμη, it belongs to the same part of the mind (*De Memor.* I. 9). Memory and φαντασία are something short of intellect—Aristotle attributed them to the lower animals. Cf. *Metaphys.* I. I. 3: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπεφίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν. Cf. also *Eth.* VII. iii. 11. Brutes and the incontinent are said to follow their φαντασίαι, *De An.* III. iii. 21: καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῶα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πᾶσι ἢ νόσοις ἢ θνῦν, οἷον οἱ ἀνθρώποι. Cf. *Eth.* VII. vii. 8. We find the word φαντασία not as yet settled into a psychological formula in Plato's *Theaetetus*, p. 152 B, where the doctrine of Protagoras is shown to imply that everything is as it appears, and that this appearing is identical with sensation. Σ. τὸ δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐστίν; Θ. Ἔστι γάρ. Σ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἰσθήσις ταῦτόν ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, ὅλα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστω καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. Aristotle, giving a scientific account of it in the *De Anima*, separates it, as we have seen, from sensation on the one hand, and reason on the other. The term does not correspond with any of our regular psychological terms. In relation to the fancy and the imagination, it represents the material for these, the brain-images out of which the creations of fancy (as well as the phantasmagoria of dreams) are con-

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἐαυτῷ τῆς ἑξέως ἐστί πως αἷτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἷτιος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ αἷτιος τοῦ κακῷ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσσεσθαι. ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δέi ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἥ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται. καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὲς ὃ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἐτέρου μὴ οἶόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφυ, τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς ταῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυῖα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς 18 κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ φαί- 19 νεται οἰονδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐστίν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκούσιως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἦττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὖν, 20 ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἑξέων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος

structed. Aristotle, not entering at all into the philosophy of the imaginative faculties, merely speaks of *φαντασία* as furnishing a necessary element to thought (*νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνευ φαντάσματος*, *De Mem.* i. 5). From what has been said it is easy to see the special appropriateness of the word in the above passage to denote an impression or idea of the good received passively, and in itself erroneous.

19 εἴτε δὴ—τέλει] 'Whether, then, the conception of the end, of whatever kind, comes not to each individual by nature, but something also is contributed by himself (τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐστίν), or whether the end

indeed is fixed by nature, but it is through the good man's voluntarily taking the means that virtue is voluntary; in either case, I say, vice will be not a whit less voluntary (than virtue), for the bad man, exactly as the good, has individuality (τὸ δι' αὐτὸν) in the particular actions, if not in the conception of the end.'

20 καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἑξέων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν] 'For we are ourselves joint causes, in a way, of our own states of mind.' The word *συναίτιος*, meaning not the primary, but a concomitant cause, is of not unfrequent occurrence in Plato. Cf. *Timæus*, p. 46 D, where it is said of fire, &c., *δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ*

- τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως
 21 γάρ. κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
 γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἔξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε
 γίνονται, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὕρθος λόγος προστάξῃ.
 22 οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἔξεις· τῶν
 μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν,
 ἐδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ'
 ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρω-
 στιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρῆσασθαι,
 23 διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι. ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης, εἵπωμεν
 τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ
 πόσαι εἰσὶν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.

ξιναιτία, ἀλλ' αἷτια εἶναι τῶν πάν-
 των.

21-22 These sections form the junction between the somewhat isolated treatise on the Voluntary and Aristotle's discussion of the separate virtues. They bear marks of having been added for the express purpose of forming a junction. For after a general statement of the theory of virtue in section 21 there is a *résumé* of some points with regard to the voluntariness of actions and habits, which is just what a man might have been likely to add after reading over his own treatise, and thinking that it required a word or two of elucidation.

22 οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ — ἀρρωστικῶν] 'But actions and habits are not equally voluntary, for we are masters of our actions from the beginning to the end because we know all the particulars, but we can only control the beginning of our habits, while the gradual addition made by each particular step is unperceived, as is the case also with illnesses.'

23 ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης — εἰσὶν] 'Let us therefore resume our discussion of the separate virtues,

stating what they are, with what actions they are concerned, and in what manner. It will at the same time appear how many there are.' On the assumed completeness of Aristotle's list of the virtues, see note on *Eth.* II. vii. 1, and the plan of Book IV.; cf. also *Eth.* III. x. 1, note.

καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας] Aristotle's admirable account of courage is to some extent indebted to the observations of Plato, while in some points again it is a protest against the Platonic theory. In the *Protagoras* (pp. 349-351, 359-361) courage is identified with the science of the truly safe and the truly dangerous. In the *Laches* (pp. 198-201), however, written previously, it is argued that, if danger be 'future evil,' courage cannot be the science of this, for a science excludes all consideration of time, so, if courage be a science at all, it must be the science of good and evil universally. Thus Plato merges courage in that universal wise consciousness, which he considered the true ground of morality. In the *Republic* (p. 430 B), courage is said to be the maintenance of

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἥδη 6
καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, φοβούμεθα δὲ ἄλλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, 2
ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον
ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα 3
τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πέναν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ'
οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ
φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ
μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπικεικὴς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φο-

right principles in spite of the distractions of danger. By Aristotle, courage is more definitely fixed as a condition of the moral side of man's nature, and as implying not only a consciousness, but a conscious choice of the highest moral good. Its sphere is limited to war, and thus a rather special and restricted character is given to the virtue. At the same time a reverence is shown for the nobleness of courage beyond what we find in Plato. And deep human observations are made which are in the best style of Aristotle's moral writing.

VI. 1-2 περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη—
ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά·
διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν
κακοῦ] These points are accepted from
Plato, cf. *Protag.* p. 358 D: προσδο-
κίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον
εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. *Laches*, p. 198 B:
ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεῖν μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ
δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος
παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγενητά
οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ
προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδο-
κίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ. . . . τούτων δέ γε
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν προσαγορεύεις;
κομῶδῃ γε. The subject of the present
chapter is the proper sphere of courage.
ἥδη καὶ πρότερον, *Eth.* II. vii. 2.

3-8 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν—κινδύνῳ]
These sections contain a protest
against the doctrine represented in
the *Laches*, p. 191, D, K, where

courage is extended to all those
objects which are here expressly
excluded from it—dangers by sea,
illness, political conflicts, even the
encountering of temptation. Βουλόμε-
νος γὰρ σου πύθισθαι μὴ μόνον τοῦς
ἐν τῷ ὁπλητικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ καὶ ἐν ἑξυμπαντί τῷ
πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ
πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν
θάλατταν κινδύνους ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ
οἱ γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ οἱ πρὸς
πέναν ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικά
ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσι, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον οἱ
πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν ἢ φόβου,
ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ
μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες
. . . εἰσι γὰρ πού τινες, ὧ Λάχης καὶ ἐν
τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀνδρεῖοι. Aristotle treats
all such applications of the word
ἀνδρεῖος as merely metaphorical
(λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ
μεταφορὰν), to these he opposes the
proper use of the word (κυρίως δὲ
λέγεται δὲ, § 10) as belonging peculiarly
to war.

ἔνια γὰρ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν]
Cf. *Eth.* III. i. 24: δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι
ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆναι τινῶν, οἷον
ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως. It admits of
discussion how much, independently
of a merely permissive attitude in
the will and reason, the instincts of
fear, anger, and desire may be posi-
tively called out and even created
by considerations and suggestions of
the reason, or how far their place

E

βούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δ' ὑπό τινων ἀνδρείος κατὰ
 μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος
 4 γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος. πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι
 οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν.
 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρείος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ
 τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς
 κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοι εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων
 5 ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ
 παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων,
 δειλὸς ἐστίν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρείος.
 6 περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρείος; ἢ περὶ τὰ
 μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. φο-
 βερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ
 7 τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. δόξειε δ'
 ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος εἶναι, οἷον εἰ
 8 ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ ἐν νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς
 καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν μελέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ
 9 καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τοῦτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ
 τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις.
 10 κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρείος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον
 ἀδεῆς, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγνια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα
 11 δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν
 θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεῆς ὁ ἀνδρείος, οὐχ οὔτω δὲ ὥς οἱ
 θαλάττιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν
 θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδες εἰσι
 12 παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν
 ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς
 οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει.

may be supplied by the reason itself. It is a similar question which is discussed by Kant, How far is it possible to obey in a positive sense the injunction, 'love your enemies' ?

6 φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ] See Vol. I. Essay V. p. 302.

10-12 κυρίως—ὑπάρχει] 'He then can be properly called brave who is fearless about the noble kind of

death, and about things which suddenly (*ὑπόγνια ὄντα*) bring on death,—and such are especially the affairs of war. No doubt the brave man, when he is upon the sea, or upon a sickbed, will be brave: but his bravery will not be that of a sailor. Landsmen in danger of drowning give up all hope of safety, and feel repugnance at the thought of such a death;

Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι καὶ 7
 ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν
 ἔχοντι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον
 καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος 2
 ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβίσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ
 ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς· ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον 3
 καὶ ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερά ὡς
 τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν 4
 ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν
 τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν 5
 ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ
 ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ
 ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πᾶσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος. τέλος 6

while sailors are made confident by their experience. Besides, men put forth their courage on occasions where prowess may be shown or where to die is glorious; but in death at sea or from sickness neither of these qualities is to be found.' In this passage Aristotle was evidently not alluding to death in a sea-fight, but to being drowned in a shipwreck. At Salamis 'the deck' was a 'field of fame' (*ἐν οἷς ἀλκή ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν*).

VII. This chapter discusses courage as being a mean state with regard to daring and fearing. Setting aside terrors which are too great for human nature to bear, the brave man is calm (*ἀνέκπληκτος*), and endures or fears all things in their due measure according to the true standard, his aim being to attain the noble. Thus he is distinguished from the extremes by whom these proportions are violated. The extremes, by a refinement which Aristotle does not extend to the other virtues (cf. note on *Eth.* II. vii. 2), are fourfold. (1) Deficiency of fear, producing a character which has no

name. (2) Excess of fear=cowardice. (3) Deficiency of daring=cowardice. (4) Excess of daring=rashness. Two of these terms are identical, and one is nameless, so that the extremes really reduce themselves to cowardice and rashness (§ 12). Some excellent remarks are introduced on the characters of the boastful man and the rash man.

τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν—*θαρραλέα*] Having said where fear and courage are to be looked for, we next observe that fear admits of degrees, so that courage is proportionate. 'Now the Fearful is different to different persons, independently of our calling some things fearful beyond human endurance. These latter are fearful to every man in his senses, but dangers that are not beyond human endurance differ both in magnitude and in degree, a difference found also in the things that give courage.'

6 τέλος δὲ—*ἀνδραγαθία*] This difficult section must be taken in connection with what has gone before. Aristotle is determining the characteristics of a brave act. He here says

δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ
 δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται
 γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὲ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει
 7 καὶ πρῶττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλ-
 λόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβία ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς
 πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἂν τις μαινό-
 μενος ἢ ἀνάληγτος, εἰ μὴτὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε
 τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς. ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν
 8 ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
 ἀλαζῶν εἶναι ὁ θρασύς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας. ὥς οὖν
 ἐκείνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται φαίνε-
 9 σθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ
 πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασυδείλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι
 10 τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι
 ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ

that 'the End-in-itself, or perfection, of a particular moral act will be identical with that which belongs to the formed moral character. The End-in-itself for courage, as a whole, is the idea of the beautiful. The idea of the beautiful, therefore, must be that End-in-itself which a man proposes to himself in each separate act of bravery in order to constitute it brave.' In short, the meaning comes to this, 'what makes an act truly brave, is that, like the perfect state of bravery, it aims at the beautiful.' The term *τέλος* is used in a sense between that of 'perfection' and 'motive,' or rather as implying both (see Vol. I. p. 226, and cf. *Eth.* III. i. 6, note). *Ἐνέργεια*, in *πάσης ἐνεργείας*, is opposed to *ἔξις* as 'act' to 'state.' The phrase *τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν τέλος* occurs again III. ix. 3: *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ.* The whole notion that a moral act can only be considered good when it exhibits the qualities of the formed moral character has

been already brought forward, II. iv. 3.

καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ—ἀνδρείαν] 'Now to the brave man courage is something morally beautiful. Of this nature, then, must be the end of courage, for it is the end of a thing which in each case determines its character. Therefore the beautiful is the end for the sake of which the brave man endures and does whatever is brave.' The argument is as follows: Moral beauty is what characterises bravery, therefore it is the end of bravery (because final and formal causes coincide), therefore it should be the end of each brave act. The above explanation agrees with that given by the Paraphrast, except that he does not appear to supply *τέλος* with *τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν*. His words are, *τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης ἐνεργείας τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξω γίνεσθαι· ὅσον αἱ κατὰ δικαιοσύνην πράξεις τέλος ἔχουσι τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξω τῆς δικαιοσύνης πράττεσθαι· καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν*

πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ
 θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλον μᾶλλον κατα-
 φανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δὲ τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα γὰρ φο- 11
 βεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος.
 περὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ 12
 ὁ ἀνδρείος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
 ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς
 δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν
 κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς
 ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι. καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, 13
 ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερὰ, ἐν οἷς
 εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς
 τὸ μὴ. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι
 λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ
 τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίκουα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ
 φεύγων κακόν.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ 8
 ἕτεροι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ·

κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἕξεως τῆς ἀνδρίας.
 κ.τ.λ.

13 Aristotle denounces suicide committed on account of poverty, or love, or anything grievous, as the act rather of a coward than of a brave man. Taking a broad human view of life, he does not sympathise with or discuss the sentimental deaths of the Cynic philosophers (see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 174). Suicide was afterwards dignified by the Stoics with the name of *ἐξαγωγή*, 'ushering oneself out of the world.'

VIII. This chapter discusses the spurious kinds of courage, classified under five heads. Of this classification we find the germ in Plato's *Protagoras*, p. 351 A : θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται. The

five shades (*τρόποι*) mentioned by Aristotle are : apparent courage produced (1) from a regard to the opinions of society, (2) from experience of the particular danger, (3) from anger, (4) from a sanguine mind, (5) from ignorance.

1 πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ] This phrase is to be found in Plato's *Republic*, p. 430 c, where it probably originates, but it is there used in a different sense from the present. Plato meant by the term 'civil courage' to distinguish the true courage of a civilised man from all merely brutal instincts. Δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὕτε πάνυ νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. Ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρεῖαν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέχει.

μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρείοτατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι 2 παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἔκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·

καὶ Διομήδης,

Ἔκτορ γάρ ποτι φήσιν ἐν Τρώϊσσ' ἀγορεύων,
Τυδίδης ὑπ' ἰμίοις.

3 ὁμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένην, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὀρεξιν (τιμῆς

Aristotle meant by 'civil courage' that daring which is prompted, not by an independent desire for the beautiful, but by a regard to reputation, and to the fame or disgrace, and even punishment, awarded by society to brave or cowardly actions respectively.

διὰ τὰ ἐκ νόμων ἐπιτίμια] The laws relating to cowardice are alluded to, *Eth.* v. i. 14.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο—ἔντιμοι] 'And for this cause men appear to be more brave in communities where cowards are held in dishonour, and the brave in honour.' Aristotle does not actually assert that real courage is capable of cultivation by the influence of society. But if we do not put too fine a meaning on the word courage, there is no doubt that it flourishes most in warlike ages and communities. And, in short, with all but the very few, individual virtue generally springs out of the feelings of society; what is first outward, afterwards takes root in the mind.

2 τοιούτους δὲ—ἰμίοις] 'Now just such men does Homer depict, as, for instance, Diomed and Hector, (when the latter says,) "Polydamas will be the first to cast a reproach at me;"

and so Diomed, "Hector will some day, haranguing among the Trojans, declare,—Tydides, by me terrified, fled to the ships." Cf. *Iliad* xxii. 100, viii. 148, sq., where the line ends φοβούμενος ἵκετο νῆας.

3 ὁμοίωται δ'—ἔντος] 'But this courage is most like the kind which we described above, for it originates in virtue, namely, in a sense of honour (*αἰδῶ*), in a desire for the beautiful (since it aims at reputation), and in a fear of dishonour as of something base.' On the nature of *αἰδῶς*, see *Eth.* iv. ix. and the note on ii. vii. 14. Most admirably does Aristotle touch off here in a few words the spirit of honour which is the nearest approach to, and, at all events in many of the relations of life, the best substitute for a genuine morality. In reading his words, we can hardly fail to be reminded of Burke's magnificent lament over the loss of the age of chivalry. 'The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, is gone! It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which

γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδούς, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἂν τις 4
καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκάζομένους εἰς ταυτό·
χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ
φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι
γάρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ

ὅν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νήσω,
οὗ οἱ ἄρκυι ἰσσεῖται φυγίῃ κίνα·.

καὶ οἱ †προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες τὸ αὐτὸ 5
δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρα-
τάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι'
ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ 6

inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness' (*Reflections on the Revolution in France*, p. 149). Just as Plato placed the philosopher above the man of honour (*Θυμοειδής*, cf. *Repub.* p. 547-9), so Aristotle conceives of a courage higher and purer than that which emanates from the spirit of honour.

4 'Civil courage' is of two kinds: (1) that which depends on honour, (2) that which depends on fear. The latter may remind us of the description given by Plato (*Phædo*, p. 68 D), where he speaks of most men being courageous from a sort of cowardice. There is a vast falling off between the first class and the second. To the second belongs the spirit of Asiatic slavery, which Burke contrasted with the spirit of chivalry (*l.c.*). The instances here given are the compulsory measures used by the princes in the Trojan war to make the people fight, and similar devices used by the Persians, &c.

ὁ Ἑκτωρ] This is a misquotation; the words are those of Agamemnon (*Iliad* II. 391).

5 †προστάττοντες] As Rassow observes, the emendation of Lambinus —οἱ προτάττοντες, 'those who set the soldiers in front of them and beat them if they fall back,'—seems certain.

τύπτοντες] As done by the Persians at Thermopylae, Herod. VII. 223.

6 δοκεῖ δὲ—ἔστιν] 'Experience of particular dangers is also accounted a kind of courage; which gave Socrates occasion to think that courage was a science. Different men have experience in different dangers, and regular soldiers in the dangers of war. Now there are many unreal shows of danger in warfare, and professional soldiers, being perfectly accustomed to these, appear brave, because other men are deceived by appearances.' The second cause (after that of a regard for opinions) which gives rise to a semblance of courage, is experience, the quality of the practised veteran. The effects of this may be analysed and subdivided into (1) a familiarity with, and contempt for, much that is seemingly, but not really, terrible; (2) a skill of weapons, &c., giving both an offensive and a defensive superiority (ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας).

ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ψήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιώται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνειρμάσιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὲ ἀνδρείοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι 7 οἷά ἐστιν. εἴτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὅποια ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ

ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης] Cf. *Memorab.* III. ix. 2, and Plato, *Protag.* p. 350, where it is agreed that those who dive most boldly are the professional divers, those who fight most boldly the professional soldiers, &c. This empirical view of courage forms one side, it is true, of the Socratic doctrine, but by no means the whole (see Vol. I. p. 107), and the statement about Socrates in the text is accordingly unfair. The statement is corrected by Eudemus in his *Ethics* (III. i. 13), where he well sums up the present part of the subject: "Ἔστι δ' εἶδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. Μία μὲν πολιτική· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δι' αἰδῶ οὔσα. Δευτέρα δ' ἡ στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη, τὰ δεινὰ, ἀλλ' ὅτι (ἴσασι) τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν.

πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου] This is the reading of Bekker, supported by a majority of the MSS., the Scholiast, the Paraphrast, Casaubon, &c. It is illustrated by Cicero, *Epist. ad Att.* v. 20: 'Scis enim dici quædam πανικά, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου,' where the *editio princeps* (Romana) has *κοινά*, another instance of similar confusion. Another reading, supported by six MSS., is 'τὰ καυὰ τοῦ πολέμου,' which would mean 'the surprises of war.' The phrase occurs in Diodorus Siculus, xx. 30: ἀληθές ἐστίν, ὅτι πολλὰ

τὰ καυὰ τοῦ πολέμου. Cf. Thucyd. III. 30: καὶ μὴ ἀποκνήσωμεν τὸν κίνδυνον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ καυὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ εἰ τις στρατηγὸς ἐν τε αὐτῷ φυλάσσοιτο καὶ τοῖς πολεμοῖς ἐνορῶν ἐπιχειροῖη, πλείστ' ἂν ὀρθοῖτο: where also the MSS. vary between *καυὸν* and *κενόν*. It would seem, then, that τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and τὰ καυὰ τοῦ πολέμου, were both received formulæ, only with different senses. In the text above, either phrase might have been substituted for the other, according as it was more familiar to the transcriber. But τὰ κενὰ alone makes good sense, for while the soldiers would get accustomed to the empty show, the noise and pageantry of war, it is not true to say that they would get accustomed to the surprises of war, these being exactly what not even the experienced could calculate upon. Perhaps there is no better setting forth of the *κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου* than in the speech of Brasidas, Thucyd. iv. 126, 4: οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλουσιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβερὰν· καὶ γὰρ πλήθει ὕψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοηθῆς μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι, ἡ τε διὰ κενῆς ἐπανάσεως τῶν ὅπλων ἔχει τινὰ δῆλωσιν ἀπειλῆς· προσμῖξαι δὲ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οὐχ ὁμοῖοι.

συνειρμάσιν] The *συν* here seems to mean not 'together,' or 'at a glance,' but as in *συγγινώσκω*, *σύνουδα*, &c., 'intimately,' 'privily,' 'familiarily.'

μὴ παθεῖν κρίτιστα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὀπλισμένοι 8
 μάχονται καὶ ἀθλήται ἰδιώται· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις
 ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρείοτατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ
 μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ 9
 στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος
 καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι
 γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθήσκει, ὅπερ
 κατὰ τῷ Ἑρμαῖῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχροὺς τὸ φεύ-
 γειν καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος·
 οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες
 δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμε-
 νοι· ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν 10
 ἀνδρείαν ἐπιφέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ
 διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενοι,
 ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδείς· ἱητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
 πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὀμηρος 'σθένος ἔμβαλε
 θυμῷ' καὶ 'μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε' καὶ 'δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ
 ῥίνας μένος' καὶ 'ἔξεσεν αἶμα·' πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 εἵκει σημαίνει τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὀρμήν. οἱ 11

9 οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ—συνέβη] 'But regular troops lose heart when the danger is overpowering, and when they are inferior in numbers and equipment. In such cases they are the first to run away, while citizen troops remain and die, as actually happened at the Hermæum.'

ἐπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαῖῳ] Of this affair the Scholiast gives the following account. Coronea had been betrayed to one Onomarchus of Phocis; an engagement took place in an open spot called the Hermæum; the Coronean citizens were killed to a man, while their Boeotian auxiliaries fled in a panic. Τὰ πολιτικά, by a common usage, is nearly equivalent to οἱ πολῖται. Cf. *Æsch. Persæ*, i. τὰδε μὲν Περσῶν—πιστὰ καλεῖται, &c. Στρατιῶται, or mercenaries, in the time of Aristotle had not a high name. As common fighting men, the machines of

war, they are opposed to the independent heroism of the brave man; see below, III. ix. 6. The present passage contrasts the courage of the man of honour with the hardiness of the veteran, which under any extraordinary pressure gives way. 'Citizen courage' in the instance mentioned cannot externally be distinguished from the very highest kind of courage.

10 καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ'—ὀρμήν] 'The spirit of anger, too, men reckon as courage, and they who act through anger (like brutes turning on those who have wounded them) get the character of being brave, because the converse is true, and brave men are spirited. The spirit of anger is most keen for the encountering dangers, and hence Homer wrote:

"(Apollo) put strength into his wrath."

μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς
 συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ
 πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἑάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἔλει ᾗ, οὐ
 προσέρχονται. οὐ δὴ ἔστιν ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνας
 καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν, οὐθέν τῶν
 δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρείοι εἴεν
 πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς·
 καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν.
 12 οὐ δὴ ἔστιν ἀνδρεία τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνας ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
 πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. φυσικωτάτῃ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν
 εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀν-
 δρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγούσι,

"He roused up his strength and
 wrath."

"Fierce strength in his nostrils."

"His blood boiled."

For all such things appear to signify
 the awakening and outbreak of anger.
 These quotations are obviously made
 from memory, and none of them are
 quite accurate. The first seems to be
 compounded of *Il.* XIV. 151, μέγα
 σθένος ἐμβαλ' ἐκάστω καρδίῃ, and XVI.
 529, μένος δὲ οἱ ἐμβαλε θυμῷ. The
 second appears to be meant for *Il.* V.
 470, ὥτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστω.
 The third is *Od.* XXIV. 318, ἀνὰ ῥίνας
 δὲ οἱ ἦδη Δριμὸν μένος προθυψέ. The
 last is not in Homer at all. This
 passage illustrates the progress of
 psychology towards distinctness, for
 it is impossible to translate it simply
 into English; θυμός means more than
 anger, or than any one modern word,
 for even with Aristotle it includes what
 we should call 'spirit.' But with
 Homer it meant (1) life, (2) spirit, (3)
 wrath, (4) heart, (5) mind. Aristotle
 in quoting Homer fails to remember
 this great indefiniteness, though there
 is no doubt that in Homer a simple
 and physical account is given of the
 manifestations of courage.

12 φυσικωτάτῃ δ' ἔοικεν — εἶναι]
 'Yet the sort that springs from anger
 appears most natural, and with pur-
 pose and motive added, it becomes
 genuine courage.' Taking this sen-
 tence in its context, it must be an
 apology for the ἀνδρεία διὰ θυμόν.
 Aristotle had said that anger makes
 a man brave only in the sense that a
 hungry ass is brave, obeying the goads
 of a blind instinct. He adds that the
 instinct of anger is part of our nature
 (cf. *Eth.* II. iii. 10, note, and VII. vi.
 2), and that, rightly directed and
 brought under the control of the will
 and reason, it can be elevated into a
 moral state. It is remarkable on what
 a high level Aristotle places courage.
 It must be entirely, he says, prompted
 by a desire for what is morally beau-
 tiful (οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν
 πράττουσιν); mere physical courage
 is only an assistance in realising this
 (ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς), and the
 prompting of anger, &c., will make
 men pugnacious, but not brave (οἱ δὲ
 διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ
 ἀνδρείοι δέ). Perhaps Aristotle makes
 almost too great a separation between
 true courage and this 'spirited ele-
 ment,' which must be its physical
 basis. This is to be attributed (1) to

τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδονται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι
μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρείοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ
λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσί τι.
οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρείοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολ- 13
λάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνους.
παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι
διὰ τὰ προειρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶσθαι κρείτ-
τους εἶναι καὶ μὴθὲν ἀντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιούσι 14
καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ
ἀπτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ
φοβερά ἀνθρώπων ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν
καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ 15
ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν
τοῖς προδηλοῖς· ὑπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι ἡττον
ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ
λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.
ἀνδρείοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ 16
πύρρῳ τῶν εὐελπίδων, χεῖρους δ' ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχου-
σιν, ἐκείνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ'

his high moral tone, (2) to his analytical mode of treatment. In Shakespeare, as in Homer, courage is attributed to physical causes. It is made sometimes to depend on the action of the spleen, or it is connected with the gall. Cf. *King John*, Act. II. Sc. 1:

'Rash, inconsiderate, fiery volunteers,
With ladies' faces and fierce dragons' spleens.'

And *Hamlet*, Act II. Sc. 2, quoted below on *Eth.* IV. v. 6.

13-15 The fourth kind of spurious courage is that which arises from a sanguine mind. This may be due to previous success, and gives a confidence like courage, but also like intoxication. Such confidence is liable to a collapse.

15 διὸ καὶ—ἕξιν] 'For this reason it seems braver to be fearless and untroubled in sudden perils than in such as may be anticipated. In the former case a man is brave more by habit, or in other words less by premeditation; for in foreseen dangers a man may calculate and reason out the course to be chosen, in sudden ones he must depend upon his habitual character.' This acute observation puts real courage in opposition to the case of a man puffed out with a sort of extraneous confidence. Take a man on a sudden, and you will find how brave he is. While Aristotle makes courage a quality of the moral will, he requires that it should be a settled habit, and a second nature of the mind, not prepared consciously to meet a particular emergency.

16 ἀνδρείοι δέ—Σικωνίους] 'In the

ἡπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φέγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς
 17 Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυνίοις. οἳ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰρηνται ποιοῖ τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

9 Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὔσα οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρείος
 2 μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ λυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ
 3 λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κὰν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνε-
 ται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὐ ἔνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινος, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ τῶντ' εἶναι, μικρόν ὃν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδύ φαίνεται ἔχειν.

last place, men appear brave from not knowing their danger. Such persons are not far removed from the sanguine, but are inferior to them, because they have no self-confidence, as the sanguine have. This confidence enables the sanguine to stand their ground for a time; while those who have blundered into bravery, as soon as it appears that the danger is other than they had supposed, take to their heels, as was the case with the Argives, when they fell in with some Lacedæmonians whom they took for men of Sicyon.' The last and poorest semblance of courage is when something daring is done unknowingly, and from a mistake. The instance given is mentioned by Xenophon (*Hellenics*, iv. 10). Some Spartans assumed the shields of some vanquished Sicyonians, and were at first contemptuously encountered by the Argives, who, when they discovered their formidable enemies, took to flight.

IX. This interesting chapter is on the connection of courage with pain and loss. The nobleness of courage chiefly depends on the sacrifice which it implies (*ἐπὶ λυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται*). The brave man by encountering death consciously makes a sacrifice of the greatest magnitude, since he runs the risk of relinquishing a life which is eminently valuable, and, by reason of his virtue, full of happiness. Courage, then, is not to be called pleasurable, except as attaining to a satisfaction above all pleasure, attaining, in short, to the end of one's being (*οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πρὶν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται*). The conscious heroism of the brave man distinguishes him from the recklessness of the mercenary; it disqualifies him, indeed, from becoming mere rank and file, a mere machine of discipline.

3 οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ—*ἐχέω*] 'Without

εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὃ μὲν 4
 θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι
 ἔσται, ὑπομένει δὲ αὐτά, ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ.
 καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πῶσιν καὶ εὐδαιμονέ-
 στερος ἢ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπηθήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ
 γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀπο-
 στερεῖται εἰδώς· λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον
 ἀνδρείος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν

doubt the end that belongs to courage is pleasant in itself, but this pleasantness is neutralised by the attendant circumstances, as happens likewise in the contests of the arena. The end at which the boxers aim, the garland and the honours, is pleasant; but the blows, and indeed the whole exertion, are painful and grievous to flesh and blood; so that by the multitude of intervening pains the incentive, which is small in itself, loses all appearance of being pleasant.

4 καὶ ὅσῳ—ἀλπεῖραι.] 'And in proportion as a man possesses all excellence, and the happier he is, so much the more will he be pained at death, for to such a one life is especially valuable, and he will consciously be deprived of the greatest blessings. And this is painful. But he is not the less brave, nay, perhaps even more, because he chooses the noble in war in preference to those other goods.' These last words may remind us of the characteristic attributed by Wordsworth to his *Happy Warrior*, who is 'more brave for this, that he hath much to love.' The whole of Wordsworth's description may well be compared with that of Aristotle:

'Who, if he be called upon to face
 Some awful moment to which Heaven
 has joined

Great issues, good or bad for human kind,

Is happy as a lover, and attired
 With sudden brightness, like a man inspired;

And, through the heat of conflict, keeps the law

In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw;

Or if an unexpected call succeed,
 Come when it will, is equal to the need:

He who, though thus endued as with a sense

And faculty for storm and turbulence,
 Is yet a soul whose master-bias leans
 To homefelt pleasures and to gentle scenes;

Sweet images! which wheresoe'er he be

Are at his heart, and such fidelity
 It is his darling passion to approve;
 More brave for this, that he hath much to love.'

The consciousness of the sacrifice to be made appears rather more prominent in Aristotle's brave man than in Wordsworth's. In saying this we must not forget that the word 'sacrifice,' in the moral sense of the term, expresses an idea that has grown up in the human mind subsequently to Aristotle. How nearly Aristotle, by the force of his penetration, realised it, the present chapter shows most remarkably.

- 5 ἀντ' ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ
 ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφά-
 6 πτεται. στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιοῦτους
 κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἦπτον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ'
 ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κιν-
 δύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.
 7 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν,
 οὐ χαλεπὸν τύφῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
 10 Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι

5 οὐ δὴ—ἐφάπτεται] 'Therefore it is not the case that in all the virtues virtuous action is accompanied by pleasure, except in so far as one attains to the End-in-itself.' On the import of this passage, see Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 226. With ἐφάπτεται, *τις* is to be understood; see above, III. i. 6, note.

6 στρατιώτας δ'—καταλλάττονται] 'After all, perhaps it is true that it is not brave men such as I have described who will make the best mercenaries, but fellows who, while they are less brave, have nothing to lose; for these are ready for dangers, and will sell their life for a trifling sum.' See above, ch. viii. 9, note. On the readiness of miserable wretches for danger and death, cf. Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, Act III. Sc. 1:

Second Murderer.—I am one, my liege,
 Whom the vile blows and buffets of
 the world
 Have so incens'd, that I am reckless
 what
 I do, to spite the world.

First Murderer.—And I another,
 So weary with disasters, tugg'd with
 fortune,
 That I would set my life on any
 chance,
 To mend it, or be rid on't.

X. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην—ἀρεταί] 'Next

let us speak of temperance, for these (namely, courage and temperance) seem to be the excellencies of the irrational parts of our nature.' This is almost the only indication which Aristotle gives of the system upon which he has arranged the several virtues in order; he places together, and first treats of, the development of the lower and more instinctive qualities. On the arrangement of the remaining virtues see the plan of Book IV. With regard to the first two, there is a want of any distinct principle in their arrangement. If it be said that they are based on *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*, and that Aristotle begins at the bottom of the scale, why does he not begin with *σωφροσύνη*, since *θυμός* is higher than *ἐπιθυμία* (*Eth.* VII. VI.)? Again, as we have seen (ch. viii. § 12) *θυμός* is here considered rather as having an occasional connection with courage than as being the basis of it. But in fact Aristotle's *Ethics* are very little psychological in their character. In them psychology and morals are both in process of formation; we cannot therefore expect to find systematic arrangement. Aristotle probably began his list of the virtues with courage and temperance because they were two of the Greek cardinal virtues, and when he came to temperance, he said 'this comes

γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διηρήσθωσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ 2 αἱ σωματικά, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ

next, since it also belongs to the irrational part of our nature.'

τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν] The instincts, such as those of self-preservation, fear, desire, &c., can only be capable of excellence by being brought under a law (μεσότης, λόγος) of the intellect, having no law in themselves. This law of the intellect becomes the most important part of the conception of virtues, as form is more striking than matter. In Plato the law is put for virtue altogether, and thus, as we saw, he calls courage a science. Similarly in the *Charmides*, where temperance is discussed, the nearest definition that is given is 'self-knowledge,' though it is shown that mere 'self-knowledge' has no content, and would be a useless blank; therefore it is implied that knowledge of the good must be added to make the conception complete.

It is the extreme opposite of Plato's view to speak of temperance as 'a virtue of the instincts' (τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν); the word μεσότης however in the next line implies what was omitted, namely, 'under a law of the intellect.' The formula of Aristotle attributes a worth to the bodily instincts which would be opposed to asceticism.

μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς] Σωφροσύνη, which, in spite of the false etymology given in Plato's *Cratylus*, 411 κ, and *Eth.* vi. v. 5, meant originally 'sound-mindedness' (in German *Besonnenheit*), soon came to mean temperance with regard to pleasures. In this sense it is often popularly defined by

Plato, cf. *Repub.* p. 430 E: κόσμος ποῦ τις—ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια. *Sympos.* p. 196 C: εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, &c. Aristotle's procedure in discussing it is first to ascertain definitely its object. Pleasures are either bodily or mental. With mental pleasures temperance and intemperance are not concerned. Nor again with all bodily pleasures—not those of hearing, nor of smell; but only the merely animal pleasures (ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ) of touch and taste. Even taste, as an object of intemperance, reduces itself to touch; and with regard to touch we must exclude the manly and human satisfaction felt in exercise, &c. (chapter xi.) Desires of the kind in question are either common, or special and acquired (ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπιθετοί); in the former, excess is the only kind of error possible; in the latter all kinds of errors are committed. The only pains with which temperance and intemperance can be concerned are pains arising from the want of certain pleasures; these pains the intemperate man feels to excess. While intemperance thus consists in excess, there is no such thing as deficiency in the sense for the above-named pleasures; thus there is no name for the opposite extreme to intemperance. With due regard to his health, and the means at his disposal, and acting under the law of the beautiful (xi. 8), the temperate man preserves a balance.

2 διηρήσθωσαν—διανοίας] 'We must

τούτων χαίρει, οὐ φιλητικός ἐστίν, οὐθὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικά εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομήτους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμενούς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις.
 3 περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἶον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν.
 4 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβηβλημένους χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολά-
 5 στους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μῆλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων καὶ ὀψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις
 6 γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινώσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς. τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου· τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ
 7 ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις κατὰ ταύτας

take a distinction between the bodily pleasures and such as are mental, like ambition and the desire of knowledge. The man who has either of these feelings takes pleasure in the object of his desire without the body being at all affected, but only the mind.' The writing is loose here, constituting a σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον. Transitions as from φιλοτιμία to φιλότιμος are common. Cf. below, ch. xi. § 3: διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, where there is nothing preceding which answers to οὗτοι, only a general description of a course of action.

4-5 While Aristotle justly says that the words temperance and in-

temperance do not apply to the pleasure felt in colours, forms, painting, music, and acting, it is strange that he should have spoken of these at all as bodily pleasures. Such a way of speaking shows an early and immature psychology.

6 Pleasures of smell are not the objects of intemperance, except accidentally, as by association, reminding people of eating, &c. Eudemus quotes a witty remark on the subject. *Eth. Eud.* III. ii. 10: ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὰς ὀζειν, τὰς δὲ ἡδύ.

7 Brutes, says Aristotle, have no pleasures of hearing, or smell, or sight, except accidental ones, namely,

τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαις τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει· τὴν δ' αἰσθῆσιν ἡ ὁσμή ἐποίησεν. οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἥσθητο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἡ εὐρὼν ἔλαφον ἡ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὴ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκόλασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὔται δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὴ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθέν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως ἐστὶν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες. οὐ πᾶν δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἡ οὐχ οἱ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἡ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ἡῤατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὧν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ 10

when sounds or scents indicate to them their prey or their food. It may be questioned whether this is absolutely true, whether, for instance, brutes are not capable of some pleasure from musical sounds. This appears to be the case with lizards and snakes; and horses are fond of bells. It is said that the cat likes the smell of mint. Dogs like the smell of carrion, apparently for its own sake, this being their taste. With brutes the senses are the intellect, and thus by the well-known law that as an organ increases in fineness of perception, it decreases in sensitiveness to pleasure and pain,—we may conceive how it is that the fine perceptive organs of brutes are to them in a less degree the instruments of pleasure. See Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, pp. 880 and 886.

εὐρὼν ἔλαφον] This alludes to Homer, *Il.* iii. 23:

ὥστε λέων ἐχάρη μεγάλῃ ἐπὶ σώματι κύρσας,
εὐρὼν ἡ ἔλαφον κεραὸν ἡ ἄγριον αἶγα.

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10 διὸ καὶ ἡῤατό τις ὀψοφάγος] The name of this glutton is recorded by Eudemus (*III.* ii. 10), who paraphrases the present passage as follows: διὸ οἱ ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὐχονται τὴν γλώτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος δ' Ἐρύξειδος. Athenæus mentions the same story (*VIII.* 26), quoting the verses—

Φιλόξενος ποθ', ὡς λέγουσ', ὁ Κυθήριος
εὗξατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πῆχυν.

Aristotle uses the word φάρυγγα here in its loose sense for the 'throat,' as λάρυγξ (which properly meant the top of the windpipe) was also loosely employed by the ancients to mean the whole throat. Speaking scientifically Aristotle confined the term φάρυγξ to mean the *trachea* or windpipe, distinguishing it from the *oesophagus* or gullet, cf. *De Part. An.* iii. iii. 1: ὁ μὲν οὖν φάρυγξ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐνεκεν πέφυκεν—ὁ δ' ὀσφάγος ἐστὶ δι' οὗ ἡ τροφή πορεύεται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν. The latter was the term properly required above. Aristotle seems to

G

- μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ ἀνθρωποὶ ἐσμεν
- 11 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἡ ζῶα. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾷν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῆρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινα μέρος.
- 11 Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι. οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικὴ· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὁμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων· τὸ δὲ τοιαύσδε
- 2 ἡ τοιαύσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν. ἕτερα γὰρ ἐτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν
- 3 τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἓν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον. τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ
- 4 λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ

have considered that the pleasure of gluttony was not in *taste*, of which the tongue was the organ, but in the contact of food with the passage of the œsophagus.

XI. 1 καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὁμηρος] *Iliad* xxiv. 129: μεμνημένος οὐτε τι σίτου, ὅθρ' εὐνῆς, the remonstrance of Thetis to Achilles. It is plain what εὐνῆς means.

2 διὸ—τυχόντων] 'Hence (this choice of particular foods, &c.) appears merely capricious. In reality, however, it has something natural in it, for different things are pleasant to different people, and all men have their preferences.' Aristotle attributes

the very diversity of tastes to a law of nature, which no doubt exists,—and to a wise purpose, else what a fearful rivalry there would be in the world. Some MSS. for πᾶσιν read τισιν. It seems common for transcribers, when they do not understand a sentence, to play fast and loose with πᾶς and τις: see below, *Ét.* v. vii. 4.

3 γαστρίμαργοι] 'Greedy-bellies' from μάργος, cf. Homer, *Od.* xviii. 2, μετὰ δ' ἔπρεπε γαστέρι μάργῃ—and Euripides, *Cyclops* 310, πάρες τὸ μάργον σῆς γνάθου.

πληροῦντες αὐτήν] sc. τὴν γαστέρα, which is to be supplied from γαστρίμαργοι, according to the Aristotelian mode of writing.

καὶ πολλὰ ὥς ἀμαρτάνουσιν· τῶν γὰρ φιλοτιοιούτων
 λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ τῶς οἱ
 πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὥς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερ-
 βάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνόις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ
 γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ,
 καὶ ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς 5
 ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς
 λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται
 σῶφρων ἀκόλαστος δὲ τῷ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ
 λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ
 τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σῶφρων τῷ μὴ
 λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος. ὁ μὲν 6
 οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν μάλιστα,
 καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ'
 αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν.
 μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν
 λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἦττον ἢ 7
 δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστίν
 ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ
 βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δὲ τῷ μὴθέν
 ἐστὶν ἡδὺ μὴδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ
 ἄνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ

4 ἡ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ τῶς οἱ πολλοί] It seems almost certain that ὥς here is an interpolation. It could not have been said that 'with regard to the special pleasures men are called "lovers of particular things" because they like them as people in general do.' What Aristotle wrote was, no doubt, ἡ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, 'or because they like them more than people in general'; cf. *Eth.* IV. iv. 4, *ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ*. The copyist must have taken ἡ οἱ πολλοί for a separate sentence, and so have thought it necessary to insert ὥς.

5 καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή] 'And thus it is pleasure that

produces him his pain.' This is stated as if it were a sort of disgraceful paradox, which takes place in intemperance.

7 οὐ πάνυ γίνονται] Aristotle, from his experience as a Greek, might have been justified in asserting that a deficiency in the sense for pleasures 'could hardly be said to exist.' It is not so certain that the same would be true in all periods of the world. It is not so certain that the monkish turn of mind does not occasionally diminish to an unhappy extent the natural and human feelings, so as to impair the kindness, the geniality, and the good sense of mankind.

8 μὴ πᾶν γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταύτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὔθ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεί, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐστὶν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέζεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιούτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

- 12 Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον εἰσικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος

8 We see how indefinite after all Aristotle has left the standard of temperance; he refers it merely to the blank formula of ὡς δεῖ and τὸ καλόν. In so leaving it, however, he appeals to a sense in each man's own mind. There is a relative element to be considered, the health or fortune of the individual (πρὸς ὑγίειαν, μὴ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν), and there is also something that appears absolute amidst all that is relative (τὸ καλόν).

ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων] This is an awkward piece of writing. Οὕτως refers to those phrases which have been negatived—παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

XII. Which is most voluntary, cowardice or intemperance? a suitable question to conclude a Book which opened with a theory of the voluntary and proceeded to discuss courage and temperance. Thus far there is method. Courage and temperance are considered very much throughout in relation to each other, and here they are considered in relation to the voluntary. On the other hand, the subject of this

chapter is closely connected with the theory of the formation of habits (*Eth.* II. i.-ii.), and also with the questions mooted above (*Eth.* III. v.) as to the voluntariness of vicious habits. Standing then as it does isolated, it forms an instance of the immaturity of Aristotle's moral investigations.

Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice, inasmuch as it consists in *choosing* pleasure, while cowardice is under a sort of compulsion, flying from pain. (2) Again it is easier by practice to learn to resist temptation, than it is to learn to withstand danger, for the opportunities are frequent and free from risk. Hence intemperance is the more disgraceful of the two. (3) These vices are in a peculiar way different from each other, for cowardice as a whole is more voluntary than its parts. Intemperance as a whole is less voluntary than its parts.

The chapter ends with some remarks on the nature of ἀκολασία as connected with its etymology.

2 καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη—ποιεῖ] 'And while pain distracts and overturns

φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκούσιον· διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνίπαλιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως 3 ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ῥίπτειν καὶ τᾶλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνίπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐκούσια, 4 ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ, τὸ δ' ὅλον ἡττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας 5 καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γὰρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετεννήχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ 6 δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσchrῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἢ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις

the mental balance of him who experiences it, pleasure does nothing of the kind.' *Φύσις* here denotes the perfect or normal state: see above, *Eth.* II. i. 3, note.

3 δόξειε δ' ἂν—ἐξίστησιν] 'But cowardice is not equally voluntary with (i.e. is more voluntary than) its particular acts, for in itself it is painless, while its particulars distract the mind with pain.' It seems curious to speak of cowardice in this abstract way as distinct from all particular acts of cowardice. It is, however, true that cowardice is not, like intemperance, a growing chain upon the mind. Each cowardly act, while it leaves the mind irresolute and so prone to fresh cowardice, on the other hand brings experience and renders the mind more familiar with danger. Thus cowardice, which at first was involuntary, tends to become more and more voluntary and deliberate, the more it is continued in; but in-

temperance, which at first was voluntary, becomes, the longer it lasts, more and more involuntary and a mere bondage.

5-6 τὸ δ' ὄνομα—δρεξις] 'Now the name intemperance (or unrestrainedness) we apply also to the faults of children, for these have some resemblance to it. Which is called from which, matters not for our present purpose; obviously that which is later in conception is called from that which is earlier. And it seems no bad metaphor, for that which hankers after what is base, and which has a mighty capacity for development, requires to be chastened, and this is just the character of desire and of the child. Children live entirely by desire, and have the longing for what is pleasant most strongly.' Eudemus (*Eth. Eud.* III. ii. 1) commences his account of intemperance with this etymology. He points out that ἀκόλαστος is capable of two meanings,

7 ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις· εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ
 ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἤξει· ἅπλοστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις
 καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῃ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια
 αὖξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρὰ ᾧσι, καὶ τὸν
 λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ
 8 ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μῆθ' ἐναντιοῦσθαι. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον
 εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν παῖδα
 δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ
 9 ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ
 ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφῶν
 τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ
 10 ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω
 περὶ σωφροσύνης.

'he that has not been chastened,' and 'he that cannot be chastened.' His account of the metaphor implied in the word appears to be lost. He says (§ 3), *διεγράψαμεν πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν*, but in *Eth. Eud.* II. iii., to which he alludes, there is apparently a lacuna. Aristotle declines to decide which is the primary and which the metaphorical use of the word; but there can be no doubt that the punishment and unrestrainedness of children is the more concrete and the primary idea.

7 *εἰ οὖν—ἐναντιοῦσθαι*] 'If then this thing be not obedient and subjected to the governing element, it will develop vastly; for the longing for what is pleasant is insatiable in him that is foolish, and it seeks satisfaction from all quarters; and the

exercise of desire increases its native powers, and if the desires grow great and vehement, they expel all reasoning in the end. Wherefore the desires should be moderate and few, and no-wise opposed to the law of reason.' *Εὐπειθές* is indefinite; it might refer either to ἡ ἐπιθυμία or ὁ παῖς. Aristotle speaking indistinctly had the idea of ἐπιθυμία most present to his mind. Out of this etymology of 'intemperance' he develops anew the relationship which ought to exist between the passions and the reason. The passions should be to the reason as a child to his tutor. This analogy was already suggested in *Eth.* I. xiii. 19: *διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχων, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.*

PLAN OF BOOK IV.

WITH only two exceptions, this Book follows faithfully the programme drawn out in the seventh chapter of Book II. These exceptions are, that it inverts the order of the social virtues—Truth, Wit, and Friendship; and that, being at its close fragmentary or mutilated, it omits to discuss Indignation, and breaks off in the middle of a discussion upon Modesty.

The only question, then, that arises is—Can we find any logical sequence in Aristotle's list of the virtues as given in Book II. and followed out here? There are various principles on which a classification of the virtues might have been made; as, for instance, on a principle of psychological division, it might have been shown how the virtues are the proper development of man's nature in its various parts. Or, again, with a view to education, the virtues might have been arranged according to the most natural order of inculcation. Or, again, in point of excellence, the greater virtues might have taken precedence of the lesser ones. But no one broad principle of this kind is to be found in the arrangement made by Aristotle. It must always be remembered that his *Ethics*, while tending to advance psychology very greatly, are not composed upon a psychological system. Hence, though he said (*Eth.* III. x. 1) that Temperance must succeed Courage, because these both consisted in the regulation of the brute instincts, we do not find elsewhere any reference to a classification of the parts of man's nature. Aristotle, having clearly divided moral from intellectual excellence, does not carry out the same sort of division in discussing moral excellence. He seems to have taken up first the most prominent and striking qualities, according to the common notions in Greece—Courage, Temperance, and Liberality. Liberality suggested to him Magnificence—Magnificence, Great-souledness; and from this

he proceeded to distinguish the more ordinary quality of Ambition. He then added, what had hitherto been omitted, the virtue of regulation of the temper ; and pointed out that in social intercourse three excellent qualities are produced by bringing the demeanour under the control of the law of balance. Lastly, he was proceeding to show that even in the instinctive and untrained feelings of Modesty and Indignation, this same law exhibits itself, when, either from interruption, or from mutilation, the book came abruptly to a close.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ IV.



ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος, δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν² πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ³ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν αἰ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλούμεν. διὸ καὶ φανλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα⁴ κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλε-⁵ται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἐν τι κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ δ'

I. 1 Aristotle's excellent account of liberality represents it as the balance between illiberality and prodigality. On the characters produced by these different qualities the most discriminating and happy remarks are made in the present chapter.

I οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν] 'Nor again in decisions.' The Paraphrast adds ὥστερ ὁ δίκαιος. Κρίσις here is used in a general sense; it may or may not be a legal decision. Cf. *Eth.* v. vi. 4: ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου.

² χρήματα δὲ—μετρεῖται] 'Now VOL. II.

we call "property" all things whose value is measured by money.' In other words 'all things with an exchangeable value.'

³ τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν—καλούμεν] 'But the term "prodigality" we sometimes apply in a complicated sense, for we call those who are incontinent and who lavish money on intemperance—prodigals.' Exactly the same usage has been confirmed in modern language by the associations of the parable of 'the Prodigal Son.'

⁵ οὐ δὲ οἰκείως—ἐκδεχόμεθα] 'This application of the name is improper;

H

ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ
 ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα.
 6 ὦν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς·
 ὁ πλούτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἐκάστω δ' ἄριστα
 χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετὴν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὲ
 χρῆσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετὴν.
 7 οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημά-
 των δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λήψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτήσις
 μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς
 δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ.
 τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ
 τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχροὰ μὴ πράττειν·
 8 οὐκ ἄδελον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν δότει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ
 καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ
 αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμ-
 9 βάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ τὸ μὴ

for "prodigal" ought to denote a man who has *one* fault, the habit of wasting his substance. The word literally means "he who destroys himself," and the wasting of one's substance may well be thought a kind of self-destruction, for life depends upon substance. This accordingly is the sense in which we take the word "prodigality." Aristotle attributes some weight here to the etymology of *δωτος*, arguing that the man who destroys his property, destroys himself, and he who destroys himself is beyond salvation (*δωτος*). *Βούλεται εἶναι* is exactly analogous to the English word 'means.' Cf. *Eth.* III. i. 15, *Τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι κ.τ.λ.* In *Eth.* v. v. 14, *βούλεται* is used in a slightly different sense to denote not the 'meaning' of a word, but a 'tendency' in things, *δμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον*.

7 Liberality or 'the virtue connected with property' consists more in right giving and spending than in

right receiving. The former is the positive and active side, the latter is the negative and passive side. Giving is the 'use' of money, receiving and keeping is mere 'possession.' And 'use,' as Aristotle tells us in the *Rhetoric* (I. v. 7), constitutes wealth proper, as being a sort of life and reality (*ἐνέργεια*), which mere possession is not. *Ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτηῖσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλούτος*.

8 οὐκ ἄδελον δ'—*αἰσχροπραγεῖν* 'It is not hard to see that giving is an avenue to the doing of good and to noble action, while in taking we only receive a benefit or at most keep clear of doing a base action.' *Αἰσχροπραγεῖν* here corresponds with *αἰσχροκέρδεια* in § 41; an act of *λήψις* may have the negative praise of having avoided this.

9 καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ—*ἀλλότρισον* 'And it is easier too to abstain from taking than it is to give; for men are less willing to give away (*ἤττον προδενται*

λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι. τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἦττον προΐενται
 μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ 10
 λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευ-
 θεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἦττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην·
 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνν. φιλοῦνται δὲ 11
 σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς. ὠφέλιμοι
 γάρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις 12
 καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει
 τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε,
 καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως 13
 ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ
 λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα 14
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις
 ῥηθίσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ
 χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου.
 οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶν- 15
 τος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' 16
 αἰτητικός. οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ εὐ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργε-

μᾶλλον) what is their own, than they are to abstain from taking what belongs to others.' Μᾶλλον is redundant; it goes to strengthen the comparative force of ἦττον.—Οὐ λαμβάνουσι corresponds to μὴ λαβεῖν just before, and makes up a positive notion to 'abstain from taking.' Aristotle attributes to men in general a character the reverse of that attributed by Sallust to Catiline, 'alieni appetens, sui profusus.'

11 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνν] 'But they who receive are not praised at all.' Πάνν means 'quite': οὐ πάνν in the sense of 'hardly' is frequent in Aristotle; cf. *Eth.* III. ii. 12-13: λαβεῖν ἢ φονεῖν οὐ πάνν δοξάζομεν—δοξάζομεν ἃ οὐ πάνν ἴσμεν: and οὐδὲ πάνν appears to mean 'not at all,' the οὐδὲ being joined with the verb.

16 οὐκ ἂν εἴη—εὐεργετῆσαι] 'Nor would he be ready to ask favours, for

it does not belong to the benefactor to be easily a receiver of benefits.' This is a manifestation of the spirit which runs through the virtuous characters of Aristotle—the spirit of manliness and nobility (*ἀνδρώδης καὶ φιλόκαλος*, cf. *Eth.* IV. iv. 3). It appears most strongly in the character of the great-souled man; see below, ch. III. § 24. The principle of individuality, a sense of life and free action (*ἐνέργεια*), are with Aristotle the basis of morality, and the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect. Now, a slight difference in the way in which this truth is stated will make it appear a pure or a selfish principle. Christianity says, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive,' implying that to gratify a feeling of love and kindness is better than any pleasure that the sense of gain could afford. But the Christian sentiment of love and charity, though unselfish, is not selfless.

- 17 τείσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχη διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχη διδόναι οἷς δεῖ
- 18 καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δώσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω·
- 19 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. οὐθὲν δὲ καλῶς ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων
- 20 διδῶ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς

For as all knowledge implies a subject as well as an object, so does every moral act or feeling imply the will and individuality of the actor. In the Christian sentiment there is so great a harmony between the object and subject, that the subjective side appears to be lost; but in reality it is only lost to be found again, it is diminished to be enhanced. Aristotle's statement would be, 'It is better to give than to receive, because it is more noble.' This has a slight tendency to give too much weight to the subjective side. In Aristotle's whole account we do not find a word about benevolence or love to others as prompting acts of liberality. We find no other motive but the 'splendour' (*καλόν*) of the acts themselves. What is said in the present section verges towards the selfish theory, which would ascribe such acts to the love of power inherent in man. In Hobbes (*Leviathan*, Book I. Chap. xi.) we find a bitter statement of the feelings with which benefits may be received. 'To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth

to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thralldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thralldom, which is to one's equal, hateful.' Cf. *Eth.* ix. vii.

17-19 Points in the character of the liberal man: he will take care of his own property in order that he may have means for his liberality. Hence, too, he will be discriminating in the objects of his favours; yet his tendency is to forget himself, to give largely, to leave hardly anything for himself; yet again, liberality does not depend on the largeness of the gift, it is in proportion to the means of the giver—a less gift may be more liberal than a large one.

20 *ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ—πονηταί* ['We see that those are the most liberal who have not themselves acquired their property, but have inherited it; for they have never known what want is, nor are they restrained by that love of what we have ourselves produced, which belongs to all men, and is well exemplified in parents and poets.' On the philosophy of this remark, cf. *Eth.* ix. vii. 2-7. The remark itself

ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα 21 ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχη, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε 22 οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ 23 εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων 24 δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλαις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἅμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὥς δεῖ· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεί δώσει ἢ τοιαύτη λήψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίγνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὥς οὐ. εἰν δὲ παρὰ 25 τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνει αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπῆσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὥς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ

comes almost verbatim from Plato's *Republic*, p. 330 B-C. Socrates asks Cephalus whether he made his money or inherited it, and gives as a reason for the question, οὐ τοι ἔνεκα ἡρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶσιν ὥς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταύτῃ τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματιστάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν, ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν

χρεῖαν, ἥπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. From another cause, however, merchants, with their large fluctuating gains, seem often more liberal than the landowners, with their fixed incomes.

21 With perfect good sense Aristotle says that a very natural explanation may be given of the common railings you hear against fortune for not making 'the right people' (i.e. the liberal) rich. People can't expect to be rich who have hardly any care for money, and this is the characteristic of the liberal.

- 26 ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώ-
 27 νητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα· δύναται γὰρ ἀδι-
 κείσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἰχθόμενος
 εἶ τι δέον μὴ ἀνίλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε,
 28 καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν
 τούτοις διαμαρτάνει. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὥς
 29 δεῖ οὔτε λυπείται· ἔσται δὲ προϊούσι φανερώτερον. εἴρηται
 δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἄσωτία καὶ ἡ
 ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην
 γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτία τῷ δίδοναι
 καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει,
 ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ δίδοναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν
 30 δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἄσωτίας
 οὐ πᾶν συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα
 πᾶσι δίδοναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ιδιώτας
 31 δίδοντας, ὅσπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος
 δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῶ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐιάτος

26-27 καὶ εὐκοινώνητος — ἀρεσκόμενος] 'Further, the liberal man is easy to deal with in business transactions; for there is no difficulty in cheating him, owing to his disregard of money, and he is more annoyed at having omitted any proper expense than vexed at spending what is needless, nor does he approve the precepts of Simonides.' These remarks show a penetrating knowledge of mankind, but they do not exhibit liberality in the highest light. The gratification of a personal feeling is made rather too prominent, hence we miss the beauty of 'charity seeketh not her own.' With the present passage we may compare the description of equity in the *Rhetoric* (I. xiii. 15-19), part of which is τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον. Various sentiments are attributed to Simonides, all testifying to the solid advantage of riches. Cf. *Ar. Rhetoric*, II. xvi. 2: ὁθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ

πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἰέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρείττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· πλούσιον εἰπείν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας. Again, there is quoted by Plutarch a saying that 'the money-chest is always full, and the chest of the graces always empty;' and another, that 'avarice is the proper pleasure of old age.' On the philosophy of Simonides, see Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 95-96.

29 τῷ λαμβάνειν—μικροῖς] 'Illiberality exceeds in taking, only it must be in petty matters.' Grasping on a large scale gets another name than illiberality; cf. §§ 41-42.

30 τὰ μὲν οὖν—ἀνελευθέρου] 'The two sides of prodigality can hardly exist together; as it is not easy to give to everybody and receive from nobody; private persons, whom alone we reckon prodigals, soon find their substance failing them. For, in fact, the

τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ' εἶ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθεῖη ἢ πως ἄλλως μεταβίλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φανῶλος τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβύλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺν δοκεῖ 32 βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμ- 33 βάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰςὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, 34

prodigal man may well be thought in no small degree superior to the illiberal.' The commentators, from not seeing the train of thought in this passage, have made a difficulty about ἐπεὶ, which refers to the beginning of the sentence, the intermediate clauses οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον—εἶναι being parenthetical. With ὥστε καὶ δοκοῦσιν, cf. § 23.

31-32 Reasons are given why the prodigal is better than the illiberal man; namely, he may be cured by time, or by the failure of his means. His tendency to give is a principle which requires only to be harmonised to become a virtue. Lastly, he does more good than the illiberal man. Aristotle here is speaking of a better sort of prodigality (τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀσώτος), which is only a slight overstepping of the bounds of liberality; but even with this restriction, it is much to be doubted whether prodigality does more good than illiberality. From wise acts of liberality much good may arise, but the common sort of prodigality, as Aristotle himself says, § 35, being prompted by folly and vanity, almost invariably goes to enrich the wrong people. If the case

be even not so bad as this, the solid benefit which accrues from any tendency to capitalise money may surely be set against the chance good done by money given away indiscriminately or spent unproductively.

33 ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ—ἀνελεύθεροι] 'But most prodigals, as we have implied already, take whence they ought not, and in this way are illiberal.' This is an instance of a phenomenon often to be observed in Aristotle's virtues and vices, that the 'extremes meet' (cf. IV. vii. 15, II. vii. 15). The rationale of this phenomenon appears to be that the extremes are both the result of the same principle, they are both different forms of selfishness. Selfishness can equally produce prodigal giving and meanness in receiving. Hence, if a man be selfish, though his tendency is to be prodigal, yet on occasion selfishness, which is his governing principle, will lead him to become illiberal. The fact is noticed by Eudemus, *Eth. Eud.* III. vii. 12: 'Ἔστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἀκροῖς τὸ μέσον ἢ ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' οὐδέτερου γίνεταί αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις

εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει
 αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν.
 ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηθὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως
 καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ
 35 δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ'
 ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ
 τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐνίστε οὓς δεῖ
 πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις
 τὰ ἥθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην
 ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσιν
 οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκο-
 λασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν
 36 ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσματος
 ἀπαιδαγωγήτος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν
 37 δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἂν. ἡ δ'
 ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτος ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πῦσα
 ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. καὶ συμφνέστερον τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι
 38 μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυεῖδές
 ἐστίν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι.
 ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερ-

μετ' ἀλλήλων καὶ εἰσιν ἐνίστε οἱ αὐτοὶ
 θρασύθειλοι, καὶ τὰ μὲν δῶται τὰ δὲ
 ἀνελεύθεροι καὶ δῶται ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς.

37 καὶ συμφνέστερον—δοτικοί] 'This
 vice runs more in our blood than
 prodigality: the mass of men love to
 keep money, rather than to give it.'
 It may be doubted whether this as-
 sertion is universally true. Would
 it, for instance, be true of the Irish?
 Again, Aristotle hardly acknowledges
 enough the kindness that exists among
 men, and which made Kant wonder
 that there was 'so much kindness
 and so little justice' in the world.
 Aristotle, from his dislike to all that
 is sordid, and his admiration for the
 brilliant and noble qualities, takes
 perhaps too favourable a view of the

vice of prodigality. Its connection
 with vanity, selfishness, and often
 utter heartlessness, he does not suffi-
 ciently notice, nor does he observe
 that lavish giving often proceeds from
 the want of a faculty—from an inca-
 pacity for estimating the worth of
 objects. Thus if illiberality be in-
 compatible with a magnanimous spirit,
 prodigality is incompatible with ab-
 solute truth and justice.

38 Illiberality is widely spread,
 and has many forms; it contains two
 elements—excess of taking and defect
 of giving; but it does not always
 manifest itself in its entirety (οὐ
 πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται), some-
 times one element exists separately
 from the other.

βολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις 39 προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἄλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχροῶν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξι. τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθεὶ ἂν δοῦναι. οἱ δ' ᾧ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἄλλοτρίων ὥς 40 οὐ ῥᾶδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἐτέρους μὴ· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μῆτε λαμβάνειν μῆτε δίδουαι. οἱ δ' ᾧ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅποσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχρο- 41 κέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ ἔνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδῇ ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν 42 δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μὴδὲ ᾧ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθεύοντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας,

39-40 οἱ μὲν γὰρ—οὐ δεῖ] 'Men of one class, those who go by such names as "stingy," "closefisted," "curmudgeons," all fall short in what they give away, but they neither covet their neighbours' goods, nor wish to take them. With some of them this arises from a certain sense of equity and shrinking from what is base; for their motive, either supposed or professed, in being careful of their means, is to prevent the possibility of their being compelled by want to do base actions. To this set belong the "skinfint," and all his like, a name derived from superlative unwillingness to give to anybody. But others again abstain from their neighbours' goods through fear, since it is

not easy to take what belongs to others, and not have others take what belongs to oneself—they are content, therefore, neither to take nor give. A second class are excessive in taking everything and from all quarters, as, for instance, those who ply illiberal trades, brothel-keepers, and all such like, and lenders of small sums at high interest. For all these take whence they ought not, and more than they ought.' This passage falls into two parts, οἱ δ' ᾧ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν corresponding to οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις. There are two subordinate divisions of the first part, namely, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινα ἐπιείκειαν, and οἱ δ' ᾧ διὰ φόβον.

- 43 ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἄδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ ληστής τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν. αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνειδῆ ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δὲ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται
- 44 λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μείζον τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
- 45 λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.
- 2 Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας

44 μείζον τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας] Before (§ 32) Aristotle made the doubtful statement that prodigality does more good than illiberality. He now makes the positively untrue statement that illiberality does more harm than prodigality. His view is fallacious from an ignorance of the principles of political economy, and from not looking at the question with sufficient breadth. He regards prodigality as a short-lived evil which will be cured by time, and illiberality as inveterate. But in their consequences it is rather prodigality that is incurable, and illiberality transitory. Illiberality can always be remedied, and indeed it brings its own remedy, for saving produces wealth and capital, and these lift a man naturally and necessarily into a more expensive style of living, however much he may haggle over details. But prodigality causes personally, to the family, and to the nation, a loss of resources which is absolutely incurable.

II. Magnificence, the virtue next discussed, is a higher kind of liber-

ality. It consists in spending money on a great scale with propriety (ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν). Thus there are two elements, greatness and propriety. The greatness is relative, being limited by the propriety, and the propriety is relative to the person, the circumstances, and the object. Magnificence will of course be prompted by a desire for what is noble. There will be something imaginative and striking about the effect it produces (τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν). Great and solemn occasions will be its proper sphere, the services of religion, the entertaining of foreigners, public works, gifts, and return-gifts. The well-born and illustrious will be the proper persons to exercise it. The house of the magnificent man will be of suitable splendour, everything he does will show taste and propriety: even in a gift to a child he will exhibit the idea of magnificence. The vulgar man, missing this happy nicety, will jar on our taste with his excessive splendour (λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος), his object being evidently mere ostentation. The petty man, on the other hand,

διελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρημάτων τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι. οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὺς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τι οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ² δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ αἱ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις ³ κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἶον τὸ 'πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη·' ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξως ἡ μὲν ⁴ ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ αὐτοῦ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμ-

from timidity and constant fear of expense, will be always below the mark, and even after considerable expense will mar the whole effect by meanness in some point of detail.

2 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος—ἀρχιθεωρῷ] 'Now the greatness is relative, for there is not the same expense for a trierarch as for the head of a sacred legation.' This latter office would of course demand peculiar splendour. The *leitourgoi* at Athens were exactly fitted to exercise the magnificence of the citizens.

τὸ πρέπον δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ αἱ] 'The propriety accordingly must be relative to the person, the circumstances, and the object.' We have here nearly the same categories as were given, *Éth.* III. i. 16, where the points connected with an action are enumerated, *τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει*. On the suitableness of the person see below §§ 12-14. The circumstances are touched upon §§ 11, 15. The object

(which cannot be definitely separated from the circumstances), §§ 16-18.

3 πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη] *Homer Odyss.* xvii. 420.

4 ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται] 'The corresponding excess is called "vulgarity," and "bad taste," and the like.' *Βάναυσος* is said to be derived from *βαῖνος* 'a forge' and *αἶω*. Thus it means a metal-worker, or artisan. From the contempt felt by the Athenians for this kind of craft, *βάναισος* came to imply 'mean,' 'vulgar,' analogously to *φορτικός*. In Aristotle's *Politics*, there is a definition of what kind of work is strictly to be considered *βάναισος* (VIII. ii. 4). *Βάναισος* δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. The word *βαναυσία* is applied here to denote vulgarity in expenditure.

5 πρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ μεγα-
 λοπρεπῆς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεω-
 6 ρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
 ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν.
 αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαί καὶ πρέπουσαι.
 τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ
 πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον
 δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἡ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.
 7 δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα·
 8 κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετι-
 9 κῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κύλλιστον
 καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς
 10 ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ
 εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.
 ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
 περὶ τῶν τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
 δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ
 αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου· κτήμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλεί-
 στου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα

5 ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπῆς — ἐμμελῶς]
 'The magnificent man is a kind of
 artist, because he has an eye for the
 becoming, and can spend great sums
 tastefully.' The word ἐπιστήμων here
 conveys the association of those quali-
 ties which were said to belong to a
 perfect work of art, *Eth.* II. vi. 9: *Εἰ*
δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ
ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα,
κ.τ.λ.

6 ὥσπερ γὰρ—τῷ ἔργῳ] 'For as
 we said at the outset, a moral state is
 determined by its acts and its objects.
 Therefore the outlays of the magnifi-
 cent man will be great and suitable.
 And the works on which he employs
 them will be of the same character,
 for only thus it will be possible to
 have a great outlay suitable to the
 work.'

ἐν ἀρχῇ] The allusion seems to be

generally to the beginning of Book II.;
 perhaps *Eth.* II. ii. 8 is the nearest
 reference that can be given. But in
 the present place Aristotle is not
 speaking of the formation of habits
 out of acts, but rather of moral habits
 or states having a definite existence
 and reality only in acts and in the
 objective circumstances (ὧν ἐστίν) to
 which they (the moral states) refer.
 This view regards a moral state as a
 mere potentiality, which only attains
 definite and conscious reality by
 emerging into an act. The remark
 is apparently made to account for a
concrete treatment of the virtue of
 magnificence. Elsewhere we have
 noticed (*Eth.* III. xii. 3 note) a com-
 plete separation made between the
 habit and the act.

10 ἀναγκαῖον δὴ—ἐν μεγέθει] 'It
 follows therefore that the magnificent

καὶ καλόν. τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα 11 λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ᾗπασιν δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς 12 τὸν πρᾶττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων.

man must also be liberal, for the liberal man spends what he ought and in the way he ought. But it is in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence and liberality, that the element of greatness which there is in the magnificent man appears, as for example in vastness of proportions, and with the same expense he will make the result more splendid. For a work is not to be esteemed for the same qualities as a possession. That possession is most prized which is worth most, as for instance gold, but that work which is great and noble. When we contemplate such a work, we admire; but the magnificent is always admirable; and in short magnificence is—excellence of some work, which is on a scale of grandeur.' The words *οἷον μέγεθος* have vexed the commentators. One device that has been adopted is to omit the stop after *μέγεθος* and to translate the passage, 'Sed in his magnum est magnifici, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa hæc (reading ταῦτα) versantis' (Michelet). Or, without altering the punctuation, we might construe, taking *οἷον μέγεθος* as epexegetic of τὸ μέγα,

But the greatness of the magnificent man, as it were a certain grandeur of scale, appears in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence and liberality.' But the point Aris-

totle insists on is that magnificence differs from liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result. He gives as an instance of the means employed, 'vastness of size.' Τὸ μέγα is the moral greatness of the magnificent man, this takes as its exponent *μέγεθος* or physical bulk. Cf. Aristotle's definition of Tragedy (*Poetic.* vi. 2). 'Ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μῆσιν πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος ἐχούσης, κ.τ.λ., where *μέγεθος* implies bulk, or length of the story. Its limits are assigned *Ib.* vii. 12. *δεῖ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ μεγέθους.*

11 *εὐφιλοτίμητα*] 'favourite objects of rivalry.' Dr. Cardwell (upon § 2 above) quotes Lysurgus, *Orat. contra Leocr.* p. 167: Οὐ γὰρ εἰ τις *ἱπποτετρόφην* ἢ *κεχορήγηκε* λαμπρῶς —*ἀξίως ἐστι παρ' ἡμῶν τοιαύτης χάριτος* —*ἀλλ' εἰ τις τετρηράρχηκε* λαμπρῶς ἢ *τείχῃ τῇ πατρίδι περιέβαλεν, ἢ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων συνευπόρησε.*

5 πρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεω-
 6 ρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ δὲ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαί καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἡ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.
 7 δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα·
 8 κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετι-
 9 κῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς
 10 ἐλαχίστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου· κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλεί-
 στου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα

5 ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς — ἐμμελῶς] 'The magnificent man is a kind of artist, because he has an eye for the becoming, and can spend great sums tastefully.' The word ἐπιστήμονι here conveys the association of those qualities which were said to belong to a perfect work of art, *Eth.* II. vi. 9: *Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα, κ.τ.λ.*

6 ὥσπερ γὰρ—τῷ ἔργῳ] 'For as we said at the outset, a moral state is determined by its acts and its objects. Therefore the outlays of the magnificent man will be great and suitable. And the works on which he employs them will be of the same character, for only thus it will be possible to have a great outlay suitable to the work.'

ἐν ἀρχῇ] The allusion seems to be

generally to the beginning of Book II; perhaps *Eth.* II. ii. 8 is the nearest reference that can be given. But in the present place Aristotle is not speaking of the formation of habits out of acts, but rather of moral habits or states having a definite existence and reality only in acts and in the objective circumstances (ὧν ἐστίν) to which they (the moral states) refer. This view regards a moral state as a mere potentiality, which only attains definite and conscious reality by emerging into an act. The remark is apparently made to account for a concrete treatment of the virtue of magnificence. Elsewhere we have noticed (*Eth.* III. xii. 3 note) a complete separation made between the habit and the act.

10 ἀναγκαῖον δὲ—ἐν μεγέθει] 'It follows therefore that the magnificent

καὶ καλόν. τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα 11 λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητᾶ ἔστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἶονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ᾗπασι δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς 12 τὸν πρίττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων.

man must also be liberal, for the liberal man spends what he ought and in the way he ought. But it is in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence and liberality, that the element of greatness which there is in the magnificent man appears, as for example in vastness of proportions, and with the same expense he will make the result more splendid. For a work is not to be esteemed for the same qualities as a possession. That possession is most prized which is worth most, as for instance gold, but that work which is great and noble. When we contemplate such a work, we admire; but the magnificent is always admirable; and in short magnificence is—excellence of some work, which is on a scale of grandeur.' The words *οἷον μέγεθος* have vexed the commentators. One device that has been adopted is to omit the stop after *μέγεθος* and to translate the passage, 'Sed in his magnum est magnifici, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa hæc (reading *ταῦτα*) versantis' (Michelet). Or, without altering the punctuation, we might construe, taking *οἷον μέγεθος* as epexegetic of *τὸ μέγα*. But the greatness of the magnificent man, as it were a certain grandeur of scale, appears in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence and liberality.' But the point Aris-

totle insists on is that magnificence differs from liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result. He gives as an instance of the means employed, 'vastness of size.' *Τὸ μέγα* is the moral greatness of the magnificent man, this takes as its exponent *μέγεθος* or physical bulk. Cf. Aristotle's definition of Tragedy (*Poetic.* vi. 2). 'Ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μύησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος ἐχούσης, κ.τ.λ., where *μέγεθος* implies bulk, or length of the story. Its limits are assigned *Ib.* vii. 12. *δεῖ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος*, ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς ὁρὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ μεγέθους.

11 *εὐφιλοτίμητα*] 'favourite objects of rivalry.' Dr. Cardwell (upon § 2 above) quotes Lysurgus, *Orat. contra Leocr.* p. 167: Οὐ γὰρ εἰ τις ἱπποτετρόφῃσιν ἢ κεχορήγηκε λαμπρῶς —ἀξίως ἐστὶ παρ' ἡμῶν τοιαύτης χάριτος —ἀλλ' εἰ τις τετραηράρχῃσιν λαμπρῶς ἢ τεύχεσιν τῇ πατρὶδι περιέβαλεν, ἢ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων συνευπόρησε.

- ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ
 13 τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλο-
 πρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως·
 ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον,
 14 κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα
 προὔπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς
 μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα
 τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα.
 15 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται·
 μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότερα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ
 γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περὶ τι πᾶσα ἡ
 πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑπο-
 δοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ
 εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ
 16 δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. μεγαλοπρεποὺς δὲ
 καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ· κόσ-
 μος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος. καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν
 ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων· κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν
 17 ἐκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀν-
 θρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων
 ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ
 18 ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα. καὶ
 διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι·
 σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ λίκυθος ἢ καλλίστη ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν
 παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον.
 19 διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει,

14 πρέπει δὲ—ἀξίωμα] 'The under-
 taking of such expenses is proper for
 persons already distinguished by mag-
 nificence, either in themselves, or their
 ancestors, or their connections, and
 for the noble, the illustrious, and such
 like persons: for in all those cases
 greatness and dignity are present.'
 The use of προὔπάρχειν here to denote
 that which exists already as an achieve-
 ment in one's family is not unlike its
 use, *Eth.* I. xi. 4, to denote those

events which in a play are supposed
 to have been done before the com-
 mencement of the action.

18-19 καὶ διαφέρει—δαπανήματος]
 'And the "greatness," which is ex-
 hibited in the work, differs from the
 "greatness" of the expense; for the
 most beautiful of balls or of bottles is
 magnificent as a present to a child,
 though its price be small and paltry.
 Hence the magnificent man, whatever
 kind of thing he be producing, will

μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ 20
μεγαλοπρεπής, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάνυστος τῷ παρὰ τὸ
δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύν-
ται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὺς γαμικῶς ἐστῶν, καὶ κωμω-
δοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ
Μεγαρεῖς. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ
ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα
οἴομενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι,
ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπής 21
περὶ πάντα ἐλλείπει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ
τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεί, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν
πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ

produce it magnificently; for the character of such work is that it cannot be easily outdone, its magnificence being always in proportion to the outlay; i.e. the feeling about such works will never be merely 'how costly they are!' but 'how great they are!' from an imaginative point of view; cf. § 10. The 'ball' and the 'bottle' seem to have been common toys. Dr. Fitzgerald compares the description of Cupid's toy in Apollonius Rhodius, *Arg.* III. 135, and Plato, *Phædo*, p. 110 B, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασι διειλημμένη. Also Theophrastus' *Characters*, Περὶ ἀρεσκείας, where the ἀρεσκός is said to purchase Θυριακὰς τῶν στοργύλων ληκύθους—καὶ σφαιριστήριον.

20 τοιοῦτος—πολλά] 'Such now is the magnificent man, but he who exceeds and is vulgar—exceeds, as was said before, in that he spends more than is right. He spends much upon trifles, and preserves no harmony in his splendour; he entertains his club-fellows with a wedding-feast, and when he has charge of a comic chorus, he makes them appear in purple, as

the Megarians do. In all this extravagance he never aims at the beautiful, but only seeks to parade his riches, in the hope of being stared at; where he should spend much, he draws his purse-strings, where he should spend little, he squanders.' The last sentence shows that in vulgarity extremes meet, selfishness prompting both too much expense and too little; see above, chap. i. § 33, note. With παρὰ μέλος we may compare Shakspeare, *Merry Wives*, Act i. sc. 3. 'His filching was like an unskilful singer: he kept not time.'

οἷον ἐρανιστὰς] *ἐρανός* being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ] The parody was the first song of the chorus sung at its entry. Naturally the comic chorus would not require rich purple dresses. The expense of a comic chorus at Athens appears to have been sixteen minæ (64*l.*), that of a tragic chorus thirty minæ (120*l.*); see Bentley on *Phalaris*,

- 22 πάντ' οἴομενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἔξεις αὐταὶ κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μῆτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μῆτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.
- 3 Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος

p. 360. The Megarians were noted among the Greeks for stupidity.

22 εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν—ἀσχήμονες] 'Now these (i.e. vulgarity and pettiness) are vices, but they do not entail disgrace, because they are neither hurtful to one's neighbour, nor are they very unseemly.'

III. Aristotle's famous description of the virtue of great-souledness (which he places as a mean between vanity and want of spirit) throws light upon the whole bearing of his moral system.

We must notice in it rather an admiring picture of what is than an investigation into what ought to be. Great-souledness is nothing else than a certain loftiness of spirit possessed by great men. It can only (in its fullest sense) belong to great men, for unless accompanied by qualities superior to those of the rest of the world, it would be simply ridiculous.

Aristotle takes this loftiness of spirit, and, considering it fine and admirable, points out the various traits in which it exhibits itself. And nothing can be more subtle or felicitous than many of his observations on this head. But it is plain that great-souledness, as here represented, is not something which is prompted by duty; rather it stands quite beside the idea of duty. Greatness and the sense of moral obligation are essentially distinct, however much they may accidentally coincide.

The great-souled man has all virtues, says Aristotle (§§ 14-15).

But we find on nearer inspection that this means that he is above all those minor interests which might induce to vice; he does not care about money, so he will never cheat; he does not value even life very high, so he will not be a coward. Here then there is no self-subjection to a law. The great-souled man does not avoid vice because it is 'wrong' (in the modern sense), but simply because it is unworthy of him. Thus he is most essentially a law to himself and above all other law. Aristotle spoke of great-souledness as being a sort of culmination of the virtues (§ 16), and justly so, for it is the culmination of his moral system. As we before remarked (ch. i. § 16, note), his system is based on the idea of self-respect. Loftiness of spirit is the highest form of self-respect (μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν δέξω, δέξιοι ὦν). This principle goes a long way in elevating the character and purifying the conduct, but its natural development is also a dislike (§§ 24-26) of all limitations of the individuality; in short, its natural development is a sort of noble pride.

Great-souledness, however fine may be the qualities that go to make it up, is essentially not a human attitude. As we have observed already, it is something exceptional, and in Aristotle's account of it we have a psychological portrait of a great man. Yet still this account shows Aristotle not to have been familiar with that conception of 'moral goodness' which has arisen out of later associations.

ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. διαφέρει 2
 δ' οὐθὲν τὴν ἔξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὲ 3
 μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων ἄξιος ὢν. ὁ
 γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος αὐτὸν ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ
 εἰρημένος. ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξίων ἑαυτὸν 4
 σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλο- 5
 ψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ
 δ' ὑστεροὶ καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων 6
 ἑαυτὸν ἀξίων ἀνίξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος
 οὐ πῶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, εἰν 7
 τε μεγάλων εἰάν τε μετρίων, εἰάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι
 ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων
 ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσοῦτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι 8
 δὲ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ
 μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλ-
 λουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος 9
 ὢν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη.
 ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. μέγιστον δὲ τούτ' 10
 ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται
 οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον.

2 διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν—σκοπεῖν] 'Now it does not make the least difference whether we consider the state of mind, or the character that is produced by the state of mind.' The procedure adopted by Aristotle throughout is that of describing virtues in the concrete, though in no other case does he give so complete a personality as in describing the great-souled man. This procedure, while it gives graphic liveliness to his discussions, tends to make us forget that these virtues are not so much different *kinds* of character as different *elements* in the same character. A later development of Aristotle's ethical system calls attention to this point (cf. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 6). It

has been said that the picture of a great-souled man here given to us must have been taken from life. Probably Aristotle traced different manifestations of the great-souled element in different people, and has here combined them.

5 ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ—οὐ] 'For great-souledness implies greatness, just as beauty implies a large body; little people may be pretty and elegant, but not beautiful.' This was the Greek idea, cf. *Politics*, vii. iv. 8: τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλῆθει καὶ μεγέθει εἰσθε γίνεται. *Poetic*, vii. 8: τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστὶ. Cf. also the story of Phyo in Herodotus, i. c. 60. Against such critics of beauty as the Greeks, nothing is to be said.

- τοιούτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. περὶ τιμᾶς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν
 11 ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλισθ' οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν
 12 ἑαυτούς, κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ
 13 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῖνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλό-
 14 ψυχον. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἕϊ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν
 15 ἐκάστη ἄρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα πράξει αἰσχροῦ, ᾧ οὐθὲν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνεται ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.
 16 ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον

10-11 τοιούτον δ'—κατ' ἀξίαν δεῖ] 'Such a prize is honour, which is the greatest of all outward goods. Therefore the great-souled man bears himself as he ought with regard to honour and dishonour. But why should we prove what is obvious, that the study of magnanimous minds is honour? And great men lay especial claim to honour, yet according to their desert.' Aristotle here fixes external honour as the object with which great-souledness deals. Afterwards he sets it above all external honour (§ 17), ἀρετῆς γὰρ παρτελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή. Honour is not good enough, but the world has nothing better to give.

15 οὐδαμῶς — παρασεῖσαντι] 'It would never suit the great-souled man to fly in ungraceful haste.'

Παρασεῖν (i.e. τὰς χεῖρας) meant 'to work the hands in running.' Cf. *De Incess. Animal.* iii. 4, where the principle of the lever is shown to be involved in this motion. Διὸ καὶ οἱ πένταθλοι ἄλλοιται πλείων ἔχοντες τοὺς ἀλτήρας ἢ μὴ ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ θέοντες θάπτον θέονσι παρασεῖοντες τὰς χεῖρας· γίνεται γὰρ τις ἀπέριεσις ἐν τῇ διατάσει πρὸς τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τοὺς καρπούς.

16 ἔοικε μὲν οὖν — καλοκάγαθίας] 'Now great-souledness appears to be, as it were, a sort of crown of the virtues; it enhances them, and it cannot come into existence without them. Hence it is hard to be great-souled in the true sense of the term, for this is impossible without nobleness and virtue.' The word 'magnanimity' is the conventional

εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἄνευ καλοκάγαθίας. μάλιστα μὲν 17
 οὐδὲν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγάλόψυχος ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐπὶ
 μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθή-
 σεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς
 γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄξία τιμῇ· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀπο-
 δέξεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μεῖζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. τῆς
 δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγοωρήσει·
 οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας. οὐ γὰρ
 ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ 18
 εἶρηται, ὁ μεγάλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ
 πλούτου καὶ δυναστείας καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν
 μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὐτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς
 ἔσται οὐτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως
 ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλούτος
 διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶ-
 σθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι,
 τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα. διὸ ὑπερόπτει δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ 19
 δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν.
 οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ
 πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον πᾶν
 ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχότερους ποιεῖ.
 τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν. κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος 20
 τιμητέος· ᾧ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς.
 οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως

representative of *μεγαλοψυχία*, but it does not really answer to it. 'Magnanimity' often implies rather generosity, and what Aristotle calls *ἐπείκεια*, than that loftiness of spirit which he attributes to the *μεγαλόψυχος*.

καλοκάγαθίας] This abstract noun does not occur in Plato, who frequently uses the words *καλός τε κάγαθος* (written separately) in the common Athenian sense, denoting very much what we mean by 'a gentleman.' Aristotle uses the words *τῶν ἐν βίῳ καλῶν κάγαθων* (*Eth.* i. viii. 9) to denote generally 'what is noble and excellent in life.' He also in-

troduces the present form, *Eth.* x. ix. 3, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς *καλοκαγαθίαν* προτρέψασθαι. In *Pol.* i. xiii. 4, he asks if both ruler and ruled must equally partake of *καλοκαγαθία*. In these passages there is no special import given to the word. It seems to imply a sort of elevated virtue. Stahr translates the present place, "Es ist unmöglich ein Grossgesinnter zu sein, ohne die Totalität aller Tugenden." And St. Hilaire—"On ne peut l'être sans une vertu complète." This is, however, taking *καλοκαγ* in the Eudemean sense, on which see Vol. I. Essay I. p. 25-27.

21 *ταί.* ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπε-
 όπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ
 γίγονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ
 εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἴομενοι τῶν
 ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι
 ἂν τύχῃσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον
 οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν
 οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν
 22 ἄλλων. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει
 23 γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
 μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμῶν, μεγα-
 λοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ
 24 ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος
 δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχο-
 μένου. καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ προσ-
 25 οφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ
 καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν
 οὐ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται
 δ' ὑπερέχειν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ
 καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διὶ· οὐδ' οἱ
 Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ.

22 ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος—*τυχόντως*]
 'But the great-souled man despises
 justly (for his estimate is true), but
 most people do so at haphazard.'
 Throughout, the great man is justified
 in the high position he assumes by
 reason of the correctness of his esti-
 mate. Modern ideas of delicacy, to
 say the least, would proscribe this
 accuracy of self-appreciation, and the
 claims founded upon it.

24-26 He is glad to do a benefit
 and ashamed to receive one; he will
 wipe out a favour by doing a greater
 one in return; he will remember
 those whom he has benefited, but
 not those by whom he has been
 benefited; he will be in want of no

one; he will serve any readily; he
 will be proud to the great, and easy
 with the lowly, &c. On the principle
 of independence, which appears here
 in an extreme form, see above, note
 on ch. i. § 16.

διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν] Homer, *Iliad* i.
 503-4. She only says—

*ἔπειτα δὴ σε μετ' ἀθανάτοιων δῖος
 ἦ ἔπει ἦ ἔργω.*

οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες] This is said to have
 been on the occasion of a Theban in-
 vasion into Laconia. Aspasius quotes
 from Callisthenes a mention of the
 circumstance. Xenophon is thought
 to allude to the same event (*Hell.* vi.
 v. 33), where, however, he makes the
 Spartans enumerate their services.

μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγισ, ὑπηρετεῖν 26
 δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις
 μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ
 ὑπέρειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις
 μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν,
 ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐντιμα 27
 μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ
 μελλητὴν ἄλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων
 μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ 28
 καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν
 φοβούμενου. καὶ μέλει τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης,
 καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς· παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ
 τὸ καταφρονεῖν. διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ
 δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἰρωνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ πρὸς 29
 ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἄλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουρικὸν γάρ,
 διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες.
 οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐθὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ 30
 μνηστικός. οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρω- 31
 πολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου·
 οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῇται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι
 ψέγωνται, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακο-
 λόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ 32
 ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός καὶ δεητικός·

27-34 A list of characteristics follows, completing the picture of the great-souled man. He will not compete for the common objects of ambition (τὰ ἐντιμα); he will only attempt great and important matters, he will seem otherwise inactive; he will be open in friendship and hatred; really straightforward and deeply truthful, but reserved and ironical in manner to common people. Will live for his friend alone, will wonder at nothing, will bear no malice, will be no gossip (οὐκ ἀνθρωπολόγος), will not be anxious about trifles, and will care

more to possess that which is fine than that which is productive. His movements are slow, his voice is deep, and his diction stately.

28 εἰρωνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς] Bekker has introduced this reading on the authority of one MS. alone; all the rest read εἰρωνεία. Εἰρωνα is not strictly grammatical, but it is in accordance with the Aristotelian mode of writing; it comes in despite the nominative ἀληθευτικός, as a carrying on of the accusatives before used, καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι—καὶ ὀλίγων πρακτικόν, &c.

- 33 σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. καὶ οἷος
κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ
34 ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεία
τοῦ μεγαλοφύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεία, καὶ λέξις
στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων,
οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μὴθὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἢ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ
35 ἢ ταχυτής διὰ τούτων. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόφυχος, ὁ
δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόφυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον χαῖνος. οὐ κακοὶ
μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὔτοι· οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν·
ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόφυχος ἄξιός ὢν ἀγαθῶν
ἐαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὢν ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ
τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἐαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἐαυτόν·
ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὢν ἄξιός ᾤν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν
ἡλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί.

35 οὐ κακοὶ—ἡμαρτημένοι δέ] 'Now it is true that these again are not bad, for they do no harm, but are only in error.' Οὐδέ refers to ch. ii. § 22. Vanity and want of spirit are, like pettiness and vulgarity, not very serious vices. Of the latter pair, speaking of the qualities and not the persons possessing them, he said they *are κακίαι*, but not disgraceful.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ—ἀγαθῶν] 'For the small-souled man, though worthy of good things, deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to be harmed by not appreciating his own claims, and by ignorance of himself; else he would have aimed at the good things he had a claim to. Such characters, however, are not to be called foolish, but it is rather their energy that is deficient. Still this way of thinking seems to have a bad effect upon the character: for men's aims are regulated by their opinions of their merits,—but these draw back from noble actions and pursuits, thinking themselves unworthy; and in the same way they cut themselves off from external advantages.' From

these considerations, and from the whole tendency of his system, Aristotle decides that small-souledness is worse than vanity (§ 37), and he also asserts that it is more common. Want of elevated aims, want of effort, of will, of individuality, these are indeed fatal deficiencies as regards the attainment of what is fine and noble in character. The conception of 'humility' is of course quite beside the system of Aristotle, but we may observe that it does not come into necessary collision with a condemnation of *μικροψυχία*. For this latter implies a want of moral aspiration. Now it is desirable to combine with humility the greatest amount of moral aspiration.

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί] Another reading, supported by several MSS., is *νοεροί*, which the Scholiast explains by *δριμύεις καὶ ἐπινοητικοί*. The Paraphrast, however, gives *νοητοί*, which supports the present reading. *Νοεροί* makes good sense, since it is true that want of spirit often accompanies an intellectual turn of mind, men's 'native hue of resolution' being

ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς 36 ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταύτ' ἐπιφανῶς· ὡς γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα ἐξελέγχονται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ 37 μεγαλοψυχία ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίγνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χείρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγα- 38 λοψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς 4 πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἡ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ. ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήφει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ 2 ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῇ ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἡττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τὸν τε 3 γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφίεμενον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον 4

'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' Yet, on the other hand, it is possible that *νοερός* has come to supplant *δκηρός* from a mistake arising from a fancied antithesis to *ἡλίθιοι*.

IV. Descending now from what is extraordinary to the common level, Aristotle discusses another virtue which bears the same relation to great-souledness as liberality does to magnificence, namely, the virtue of a laudable ambition. This is concerned with the desire for honour as it exists in ordinary men. There is no name for this virtue, but language testifies to the existence of extremes, hence

we may infer a mean. There are two words, ambitious and unambitious; both these are made terms of reproach, thus implying that there must be a middle quality, in relation to which they are each extremes. Again, both are used as terms of praise, which shows that each in turn lays claim to the mean place, as setting itself off against its opposite.

I καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις] Cf. *Eth.* II. vii. 8. This expression might seem to suggest that the present passage was written after an interval; it is repeated in § 4.

4 ἔστι δ' ὅτε—μέσον] 'But sometimes we praise the ambitious man as

ἐπαινούμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δὲ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἵπομεν. δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτιοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ φέρομεν τὸν φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωνόμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρίμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα· ἐν οἷς δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
 5 ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον. ὀρέγονται δὲ τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἡττον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται γοῦν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὐσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω δὲ ἀμφοτέρω πῶς.
 6 ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικείμεθα δ' ἐνταῦθ' οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

5 Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς, ἀνωνόμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον

manly and noble-spirited, and sometimes we praise the unambitious man as moderate and sober-minded, as mentioned in our first remarks. Now it is plain that as the term "lover of anything" is used in more senses than one, we do not always apply the term "lover of honour" to express the same thing, but when we praise, we praise that ambition which is more than most men's, and when we blame, we blame that which is greater than it should be. The mean state having no name, the extremes contend, as it were, for this unoccupied ground; but still it exists: for where there is excess and defect there must also be a mean.'

6 ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς] Cf. *Etik.* II. viii. 1-2.

V. The regulation of the temper (μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς) is the next subject for discussion. Aristotle con-

fesses that there is no name for this, but he provisionally calls it mildness, though this term is also used to express a deficiency in the feeling of anger. Excess in this feeling has various forms, and accordingly various names; the passionate (ὀργίλοι), the hasty (ἀκρόχολοι), the sulky (πικροί), the morose (χαλεποί), all come under the same category as showing excessive or ill-directed anger. Aristotle does not here enter upon the philosophy of anger, inquire its final cause, and in accordance with this determine its right manifestation. He says it is human to avenge oneself (§ 12), and not to resent certain things is slavish (§ 6) and a moral defect, hence we must have a certain amount of anger. This amount must be duly regulated, but where the true mean is cannot be laid down in the abstract (οὐ ῥῆδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι); it depends on the particular circum-

τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἑλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσιν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγεται ἄν. 2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, 3 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινείται· πρῶτος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινείται. βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. ἀμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ 4 μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν. οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρῶτος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. ἡ δ' ἑλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία 5 τίς ἐστὶν εἴθ' ὅ τι δὴ ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μὴδ' ὅτε μὴδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ 6 λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός. τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν

stances, and must be left to the intuitive judgment of the mind (*ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις*).

3-6 βούλεται γὰρ — ἀνδραποδῶδες] 'For the term "mild man" means one that should be dispassionate and not carried away by his feeling, but should be angry in the way, at the things, and for so long a time, as the mental standard may have appointed. Yet this character seems rather to incline to error on the side of deficiency, for the mild man is more apt to pardon than to resent. But the deficiency is a moral fault (*ψέγεται*), whether it be called perhaps (*τις*) want of anger, or whatever else. For men seem fools who do not feel anger at things at which they ought to feel it, or in the manner they ought, or at the time they ought, or with the persons they ought. Such a man seems to be devoid of feeling and of the sense of pain, and since nothing provokes him, he seems not to know how to defend himself: but to suffer

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insult or to stand by and see one's friends insulted is servile.'

βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος] βούλεται appears to be used here in a doubtful sense, something between 'the word mild means,' &c., and 'the mild man has a tendency to,' &c.; cf. ch. I. § 5, note.

τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον] Had the *Ethics* been composed on a psychological plan, what is said here might have been arranged under the head of *θυμός*, and would have been connected with the relation of *θυμός* to courage, which is discussed above, *Eth.* III. viii. 10-12. The present passage is admirably illustrated by Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Act II. Scene 2:

'Am I a coward?

Who calls me villain? breaks my pate across?

Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face?

Tweaks me by the nose? gives me the lie i' the throat

L

- 7 ἀνδραποδῶδες. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται· καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θάπτον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον· οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται.
- 8 οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὁ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἢ φανεροί
- 9 εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἴτ' ἀποπαύονται. ὑπερβολὴ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ
- 10 παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ

As deep as to the lungs? Who does me this?

Ha! why I should take it: for it cannot be

But I am pigeon-liver'd, and lack gall

To make oppression bitter.'

7 ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ—γίνεται] 'Now the excess is possible under all heads, the wrong people, the wrong things, more, quicker, longer, than is right. However, these excesses cannot all coexist in the same man. This would be impossible. For evil destroys even itself, and if it exist in its entirety, it becomes unbearable.' Psychological reasons might be assigned why the same person cannot be passionate, peevish, and sulky. But Aristotle here gives an abstract generalisation—that the different forms of evil are mutually destructive, and that it is only by tempering evil with a certain admixture of good that its existence can be borne.

8 συμβαίνει δ'—ἀποπαύονται] 'This happens because they do not keep in their anger, but through their keenness make reprisals in an open way, and then they are done.' The words

ἢ φανεροί εἰσι can have nothing to do with the principle given in the *Rhetoric*, II. ii. 1, that anger desires to make itself manifestly felt, else we must have had ἢ φανεροὶ ἂν εἴησαν. The Paraphrast simply renders οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν, οὐδὲ κρύπτουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐξάγονται καὶ ἀμύνονται εὐθὺς.

9 οἱ ἀκρόχολοι] 'The hasty.' The older form of this word is ἀκράχολοι. The etymology appears to be ἀκρος and χολή, as if 'on the point' or 'extreme verge of anger.' On the same analogy we find the word ἀκροσφαλής, 'on the verge of being overturned,' 'rickety,' cf. Plato, *Repub.* p. 404 B. Plato speaks of passionate and peevish people as having become so through the enervating of an originally noble and spirited temperament. Cf. *Repub.* p. 411 B-413: ἐὰν δὲ θυμοειδῇ (ἐξ ἀρχῆς λάβῃ), ἀσθενῇ ποιήσας τὸν θυμὸν δέξερρον ἀπειργάσας, ἀπὸ συμκρῶν ταχὺ ἐρεθιζόμενον τε καὶ κατασβεσνύμενον. ἀκρόχολοι οὖν καὶ ὀργίλοι ἀπὶ θυμοειδοῦς γεγέννηται, δυσκολίας ἐμπλεοὶ κ.τ.λ.

10 οἱ δὲ πικροὶ—φίλοι] 'But the sulky are hard to bring round, and are angry a long time, for they keep

πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα· τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπεῖθει αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ ¹¹ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. τῇ ¹² πραύτητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιῶν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν ¹³ τοῖς πρότερον εἶρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δηλόν· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἀμαρτάνει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον. ἐνίστε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδράδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δηλόν, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ¹⁴ ἔξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δηλόν οὖν ὅτι

in their wrath. Now there is a natural termination, when one has wreaked one's resentment, since revenge stops anger by substituting a feeling of pleasure for that of pain. But if this does not take place, these people continue to feel their burden. Their feeling is not manifest, and so no one reasons them out of it, while to digest it internally requires time. Therefore such persons are exceedingly vexatious both to themselves and to

their best friends.' An admirable account of sulkiness, on which nothing more need be said.

13 ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἶρηται] This refers to *Eth.* II. ix. 7-9, which passage is with some amplification almost exactly repeated here. This part of the *Ethics* is written with a constant reference to Book II., and yet as if the subject had been taken up again to be worked out after an interval.

- 15 τῆς μέσης ἕξως ἀνθεκτέον· αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.
- 6 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' 2 οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέται ἕξεις ψεκταὶ εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέξεται 4 ἡ δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ. ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλία· τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσσην ἕξιν οἶον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν 5 ἐπικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώστας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς ἀρμόζει. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει

VI. The next subject is the regulation of one's deportment in society, with regard especially to complacency or the reverse. This also is a balance between extremes, avoiding on the one side surliness (τὸ δύσκολον), and on the other side the conduct both of the weak assentor (ἀρεσκος), and of the interested flatterer (κόλαξ). The balance has no name, it is most like friendship, but differs from it in being devoid of affection, and being extended to all in proper degrees. There is a slight departure here from Book II. vii. 11-13, and it may be said that the present treatment is an improvement. Before (*l.c.*) it was said, there are three virtues connected with speech and action in society: the first is about what is true, the others about what is pleasant. But here the quality which concerns the deport-

ment and whole spirit of a man in society is rightly treated as most generic, and placed first. In Book II. the name *φιλία* is unreservedly given to the quality in question, but here no name is assigned, and only a resemblance to friendship is pointed out.

5 οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως—λυπεῖν] 'For it is not fitting that we should pay the same regard to strangers as to familiars, nor again have we an equal title to put them to pain.' This latter clause is explained in §§ 7-9, where it is laid down that though the general object will be to give pleasure, yet that a man must bring himself to give pain on occasion, with a view to important moral consequences in the future. He would, of course, feel himself more bound to exercise this duty with regard to friends. *φροντίζειν* is a

συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου 6
 μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ
 καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάζεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ
 συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας εἶναι 7
 τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας, τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ
 ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ
 προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν. κὰν τῷ ποιούντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην
 φέρῃ, καὶ τούτῃ μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἢ δ' ἐναντίωσις
 μικράν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέχεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφε- 8
 ρόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχούσι, καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἢ ἡττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας
 διαφοράς, ἐκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν
 αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ'
 ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ἢ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ
 καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαυθις
 μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, 9
 οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ, τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι
 στοχαζόμενος μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά
 τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων,
 κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ

general expression, implying equally care to please, and care for the welfare of the persons in question.

6-7 καθόλου—δυσχερανεῖ] 'We have said generally that (the good man) will associate with people as he ought, but we may add (δέ) that, with a constant reference to what is beautiful and what is expedient, he will aim at not giving pain, or at contributing pleasure. The province of his virtue lies among the pleasures and pains that arise out of social intercourse, and wherever in giving pleasure he would dishonour or injure himself, he will make a difficulty, and rather choose to give pain than such gratification. And if there be something which will bring, to any considerable degree, disgrace or harm on the doer, while opposition will give him slight pain, (the good man) will not approve it, but will

show his repugnance.' (1) It may be derogatory to oneself to show complacency. (2) It may be hurtful to some member of the company. These cautions show the moral and thoughtful spirit by which Aristotle would have conduct in society regulated. The following section prescribes the bearing of a finished gentleman, giving to all their due. It must not be forgotten that Aristotle himself had played the part, not only of a philosopher, but also of a courtier.

9 δύσκολος] Eudemus uses the word αὐθάδης to denote this character (*Eth. Eud.* III. vii. 4), in which he is followed by Theophrastus (*Characters*, c. 15) and the author of the *Magna Moralia* (I. xxix.). Eudemus makes the mean state σεμνότης, which is a departure from the present treatment.

δύσερις. ἀντικείμεθα δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

- 7 Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύομεν ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιή-
 2 ματι. δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζῶν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων
 3 εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν,
 4 ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀθέκαστός τις ὧν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ

VII. There follows another nameless excellence closely connected with the former, having still to do with demeanour in society; this, by a curious formula, is termed the regulation of boastfulness (ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης). The boastful man lays claim to honourable qualities which he does not possess, or to a greater degree than he possesses them (δοκεῖ προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι κ.τ.λ.), while the ironical man denies or understates his own merits. The balance between these two is found in the straightforward character (ἀθέκαστός τις), who in word and deed neither diminishes nor exaggerates his own good qualities. In *Eth.* II. vii. 12, the provisional name ἀλήθεια was given to this virtue, but here Aristotle points out that it is to be distinguished from 'truth,' in the more serious sense of the word,—that 'truth' which makes the difference between justice and injustice. What he is at present concerned with is merely a truthfulness of manner, though he confesses (§ 8) that this has a moral worth (ἐπικέρως), and

that the man who is truthful in little things will also be truthful in more important affairs.

3 εἴρων] This is an excessively difficult word to express in English. 'Ironical' has acquired an association of bitterness and taunting,—'Dissembler' of craft. If we render it by 'over-modest' we trench upon the qualities of the μικρόψυχος, and imply too much that is connected with the whole character. *Εἰρωνεία* as here spoken of is simply an affair of the manner; there appear to be two forms of it, one that refined species exhibited by Socrates, the other an affectation of humility which is really contemptible. There is perhaps no one English word to express these two forms, the only resource appears to be to use the word 'Ironical' in a restricted sense. *Εἴρων* in Theophrastus (*Char.* I.) is used in a worse sense than in Aristotle, to denote one who dissembles for selfish motives, and whose whole life is artificial and deceitful.

4 ἀθέκαστος] probably from αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, 'everything exactly as it is,'

τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μεῖζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά 5 τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηθενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μή τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' 6 ἀληθές καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικός μέσος ὢν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφοτέρω μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἵπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν 7 ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταύτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηθενός τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιούτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ' 8 ἂν ὁ τοιούτος ἐπεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον. ὥς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἠυλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιούτος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλάττω δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει· 9

and hence a 'matter-of-fact' or 'straightforward' man.

5-6 ἔστι δὲ—ἀλαζών] 'Now it is possible to practise both irony and boastfulness either with or without a particular motive. But in general a man speaks, acts, and lives, in accordance with his character, unless he have a particular motive. Falsehood is in itself base and reprehensible, and truth is noble and praiseworthy. And thus the truthful man, who occupies the mean, is praiseworthy, while those who strive to give a false impression of themselves are both reprehensible, and especially the boaster.' Aristotle first appears to assert that both irony and boastfulness are prompted generally by a particular motive, for, if it were not so, men would be simple and natural. Afterwards we are told that boastfulness is a condition of the will (ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει), that it aims at either gain or reputation,—that irony may

spring from a motive of refinement, or again from vanity itself. These things however may aim at reputation and yet be instinctive, the desire for reputation forming part of men's natural impulses.

8 δόξειε δ' ἂν—ἐπαινετός] 'But this character appears to possess a moral excellence. For the lover of truth, who adheres to what is true even in things where it does not matter, will be still more truthful in affairs of importance, for he will surely avoid a lie when it appears as something base, when he avoided it before merely for its own sake.' The writing here is a little careless, since above, all lies were declared to be essentially base, but here a contrast seems to be drawn between the 'white lie' in society, and the base lie in affairs of importance. Aristotle probably intended in his account of Justice (§ 7) to treat more profoundly

- ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερ-
 10 βολὰς εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος
 μηθενὸς ἔνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ
 11 ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός. εἰ δ' ἔνεκά
 τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, ὥς ὁ ἀλαζών,
 12 ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος. οὐκ
 ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει·
 κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ
 13 δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν
 ἀλαζονεύοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιούνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος
 ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς
 πέλας καὶ ἂ διαλαθεῖν ἐστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ
 14 καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ
 δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἥθη
 φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ

of Truth in its relation to the moral character. This intention, however, was never fulfilled.

10-12 ὁ δὲ μείζω—κέρδους] 'But the man who pretends to better qualities than he really possesses, if he has no motive, shows like a mean man, for else he would not have delighted in the falsehood, though he seems foolish rather than bad. Supposing there is a motive, if it be reputation or honour, the boaster is not to be severely blamed, but if it be money, directly or indirectly, his conduct is more discreditable. The boaster is not constituted by a given faculty, but by a particular condition of the will; for it is in accordance with his moral state, and by reason of his character, that he is a boaster, just as either from taking pleasure in falsehood itself, or from aiming at reputation or gain (in short, from the state of his will and moral character)—a man is called a liar.

†ὥς ὁ ἀλαζών] This makes no sense. The Paraphrast omits ὥς altogether, rendering the passage, εἰ δὲ τινος ἔνεκα προσποιείται, εἰ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός ὁ ἀλαζών. To follow his example seems the simplest remedy. One of the MSS. omits δ, which would give the sense 'he is not very blameable considering that he is a boaster.'

12 οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει—ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει] Cf. the well-known passage *Rhet.* I. i. 14, where the Sophist is said to be distinguished from the Dialectician not intellectually but morally, ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει.

13 This is a very happy observation, that desire for reputation makes men pretend to virtue, power, and the like; but desire for gain makes them pretend to useful arts the possession of which cannot be tested; thus a man will give himself out to be a clever sooth-sayer or doctor.

14-15 οἱ δ' εἴρωνες — ἀλαζονικοί]

φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνούνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει, οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰ 15 μικρὰ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ προσποιούμενοι βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ ἐγκαταφρόνητοί εἰσιν. καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἑλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι 16 τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνεύμενοι χαριέντες φαίνονται. ἀντικείμεθα δ' ὁ ἀλαζών 17 φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.

Οὕσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ 8

'Ironical persons, in depreciating themselves, exhibit, it is true a certain refinement of character, for they do not appear to speak in that way for the sake of gain, but to avoid pomposity; but it must be confessed that these too especially disclaim qualities held in repute, as Socrates used to do. But they who make a pretence about things petty and obvious are called "humbugs," and are despised by every one. Sometimes this kind of conduct appears to be really pretension, as in the case of the Laconian dress; for both the excess and the extreme of deficiency are of the nature of boasting.'

There appears to be a slight antithesis between *χαριέστεροι μὲν*—and *μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι*, as if the disclaiming of honourable qualities were not so much to the credit of the Ironical. *καὶ οὗτοι* seems to imply a reference to the great-souled man, who was described as having tendencies of the same kind, I. ii. § 27-28.

οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης] On the Irony of Socrates, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 157.

15 *προσποιούμενοι*] It is impossible to understand this in the sense of 'disclaiming' which the context requires. The Paraphrast supplies *μὴ δύνασθαι*, and explains it very clearly, as follows, δὲ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ μεγάλα καὶ

ἐνδοξα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἀπαρνείται, καὶ ἂ δῆλός ἐστι δυνάμενος ταῦτα προσποιεῖται μὴ δύνασθαι. But προσποιούμενος can never have been consciously meant to stand for this. There must have been some slip about the writing. Two of the MSS. read μὴ προσποιούμενοι. This sort of variation in MSS. does not show what was the original reading, but only that the transcribers felt a difficulty.

VIII. 1 *Οὕσης δὲ—τοιούτων ἀκούειν*] 'Rest also being a part of human life, and an element of this being playful diversion, we find here likewise the sphere for a certain harmonious manner of intercourse, and the possibility of both speaking and hearing the right sort of things in the right way; though there will be a difference as to whether one is the speaker in such matters or listens to what is said.'

Aristotle considers the virtue of wit or tact (*εἰς τὴν ἐπιδέξιον εἰς τὴν εὐπράγελον λέγεται*) to be concerned with the amusing and sportive element in society, and to be a balance between buffoonishness that sacrifices all propriety to the ludicrous, and dulness that is incapable of either making or appreciating a joke. Aristotle does not here enter into the philosophy of the ludicrous, or inquire what is a

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διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν.
 2 δῆλον δ' ὥς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις
 3 τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μὴθὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγριοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποὶ· τοῦ γὰρ ἥθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ
 4 τὰ ἥθη. ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαριέντες. ὅτι
 5 δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἔξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπι-

joke and why it pleases. Nor does he lay down any canons for the regulation of wit, except such general ones as that 'nothing should be said which is unworthy of a gentleman' (*πότερον οὖν τὸν εὐ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον τῷ λέγειν ἢ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ*); that the hearer must not be shocked, &c. On the whole he leaves it indefinite, saying that tastes differ, and the educated man will be a law to himself. His account of wit then is negative, and abstract, though perfectly just as far as it goes.

1 διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς] διαγωγή is the passing of time, hence 'diversion.' Cf. *Metaphys.* I. i. 15: *πλείονων δ' εὐρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν.* *Eth.* X. vi. 3: *καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί.*

3 βωμολόχοι] This name seems originally to have belonged to the

vile creatures who lay in wait at the altars to purloin the offerings, and hence to have been applied to those who thought nothing too low for them, buffoons who would descend to anything.

οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς—τὰ ἥθη] 'But they whose jocularity is in good taste are called witty, by a name that implies their happy turns; for such motions of wit seem to belong to the moral character, and characters, like bodies, are judged by their movements.' Aristotle here calls attention to the etymology of *εὐτράπελος*, as he did before to that of *ἄσματος*. Ch. i. § 5.

4 ἐπιπολάζοντος—χαριέντες] 'But as the ludicrous meets us at every turn (*ἐπιπολάζοντος*, cf. *Eth.* I. iv. 4), and most people take pleasure in sport and jesting more than they ought, even buffoons get the name of witty, just as though they were fine wits.'

δεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾷ μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ αὖ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδευτοῦ. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν 6 κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσημοσύνην. πότερον 7 οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὀριστέον τῷ λέγειν ἢ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα, ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἢ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, 8 ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ 9 σκῶμμα λαιδωρήμα τί ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λαιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὧν ἐαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν 10 οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται· ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἡπτων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἐαυτοῦ

6 ἴδοι δ' ἂν—εὐσημοσύνην] 'This we may see from a comparison of the old and the new comedy. In the former it is coarse language that provokes laughter, in the latter it is rather inuendo; which makes no small difference with respect to decorum.' This interesting remark is in accordance with what we know from other sources of the comparative tameness of the new comedy in relation to the license of the old. Cf. Horace, *A. P.* 281 sqq.

9 οὐ δὴ πᾶν—σκώπτειν] 'Therefore he will not give utterance to every jest, for the jest is a sort of reviling, and the lawgivers forbid certain kinds of reviling—they ought perhaps to have forbidden (certain) jests.' ἔνια must be understood as carried on from λαιδορεῖν to σκώπτειν. Aristotle could never have wished that jesting altogether should be forbidden by the law.

ὁ δὴ χαρίεις—ἐαυτῷ] 'This then will be the attitude of the refined and liberal man, he being as it were a law to himself.' Aristotle usually escapes from pure indefiniteness and relativity by asserting that the standard in each case is to be found in the good, the wise, the refined man. This standard is evidently the expression of the universal reason of man. It is not to be supposed that wit, beauty, or goodness are mere matters of taste, as Aristotle would seem for a moment to imply (ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ). When he adds afterwards that the educated man must be the standard of appeal, he means that the laws of reason must decide. And these might, had Aristotle thought it worth his while, have been more drawn out in reference to the question under discussion.

10-12 These sections are an almost

οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα
 λέγων ὧν οὐθέν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι.
 ὁ δ' ἄγριος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὀμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὐθέν γὰρ
 11 συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπασις
 12 καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς οὖν αἱ
 εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰςὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων
 τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν
 περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν
 ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον
 βίον ὀμιλίας.

9 Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τιнос ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν·

verbal repetition of what was said, *Eth.* II. vii. 11-13. They appear like an after-thought as compared with *Eth.* IV. vi. 1.

We perhaps ought hardly to quit the present subject without alluding to the remarks which Aristotle has elsewhere thrown out on the nature of wit and of the ludicrous. The most striking are *Rhet.* II. xii. 16, where he defines wit as 'chastened insolence,' ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπέλεια πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν, and his account of the ludicrous, that it consists in a thing being out of place, anomalous, ugly and faulty, though not in such a way as to cause any sense of apprehension or pain. *Poet.* v. 2: Τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνος καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, ὅλον εὐθύς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχροῦν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἀνευ ὀδύνης. This definition, which is to the highest degree penetrating, has been made by Coleridge the text for his admirable dissertations on wit and humour. See *Literary Remains*, Vol. I.

IX. 1-2 Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς—εἶναι] 'Modesty we can scarcely with propriety describe as a virtue; for it seems to be rather a feeling than a moral state; at least it is defined to

be a kind of fear of evil report; and in its effects it is analogous to the fear of danger, for persons who are ashamed blush, and those who are in terror of death grow pale. Both affections then appear to be in a manner corporeal, which is the mark rather of feelings than of states.' Aristotle, following out the programme given, *Eth.* II. vii. 14-15, arrives now at the place for discussing two instances of the law of the balance existing in the instinctive feelings of the mind (ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι μεσότητες), namely modesty and indignation. But from some cause his work is interrupted here; indignation (*Νέμεσις*) is not treated of at all, and the discussion on modesty is left unfinished. There is no mention of the extremes, shamelessness (*ἀναισχυρία*) and shamefacedness (*κατάπληξις*), which are specified in Book II. (l. c.) and in *Eth. Eud.* III. vii. 2. After stating that only to certain ages is 'modesty' suitable, and that only in a certain provisional sense (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) can it be called a virtue, the chapter abruptly ends, a couple of sentences having been added by some later hand which give an appearance of finish to the book and awkwardly connect it with the opening of Book V.

πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. ὀρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παρα- 2 πλῆσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχρίωσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεται πως εἶναι ἀμφοτέρα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι. οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ· 3 οἴομεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζώντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδῶς δὲ κωλύεσθαι. καὶ ἐπαινούμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαιnéσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἴομεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνῃ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπικεοὺς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνῃ, εἴπερ γίγνε- 4 ται ἐπὶ τοῖς φανλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰ 5 δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐθὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον. φανλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἶον πράττειν τι 6 τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξειέ τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδῶς, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ ἐπικῆς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φανῶ. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδῶς ἐξ 7 ὑποθέσεως ἐπικῆς· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνειτ' ἂν. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φανῶν καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπικῆς. † οὐκ 8

3-5 αἰδῶς is the apprehension of shame, joined of course with a capacity for strongly feeling it; neither modesty nor any other English word seems adequately to convey the force of αἰδῶς. Aristotle speaks of it as a desirable quality in tender age, before the character is formed. But in maturer life the necessity for it, and therefore its merit, ceases to exist. It might be said that sensibility to shame ought to be preserved with regard to acts that are conventionally (κατὰ δόξαν) and not really (κατ' ἀλήθειαν) disgraceful; but Aristotle says that any possibility of feeling

shame must be avoided altogether, so that the former acts must not be done.

7 'Modesty can only be good hypothetically: if a person were to do so and so, he would be ashamed. But this is not the way with the virtues. Though shamelessness and the having no sensibility about base acts is bad, it does not follow that to do such things and feel shame is good.' 'Ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 'conditionally' is opposed to ἀπλῶς 'absolutely.' While the virtues are absolutely good, modesty is only conditionally so.

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς] The same formula occurs before, *Εἴη*.

ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἰπόμεν.

L vii. 20 : ἰκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, ὡς καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

† οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. Νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἰπόμεν] Aristotle's MS. of the fourth book having ended

abruptly at the word ἐπιεικής, Nicomachus or the editor, whoever he was, in all probability added these clauses in order to give the book a seeming union with the three Eudemian books which were now to be grafted on.

PLAN OF BOOK V.

HITHERTO all has been perfectly coherent and regular in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. Down to the ninth Chapter of Book IV., though all the parts may not have been composed at the same time, yet all belong to the same plan, and bear every mark of being the work of the same author. But the MS. of Book IV. seems suddenly to have broken off in the middle of a subject. Whether this was owing to mutilation, or to original incompleteness, there are now no means of saying. What is clear to us from internal evidence is, that the editor has at this point commenced supplying a *lacuna*; and accordingly three whole books are now introduced, which, though bearing a close resemblance to the style of Aristotle, and probably conveying, with only slight modifications, his actual system, yet belong to the *Ethics* of Eudemus, Aristotle's disciple, and thus have only an imperfect coherence with the present work. The chief arguments by which it is demonstrated that Books V., VI., VII., are only 'copies' from Aristotle by one of his school have been given, Essay I. pp. 50-71, and need not here be recapitulated.

The present Eudemian book on Justice may bear the same relation to Aristotle's theory of Justice, now lost, as the Eudemian theory of Pleasure in Book VII. bears to Aristotle's theory of Pleasure given in Book X. Or, on the other hand, Aristotle's account of Justice may never have been actually written, and may only have existed as orally imparted to the School; in which case the present book would claim a slightly more original character, being built up by Eudemus out of Aristotelian materials, but not on the lines of any one treatise. The extent to which parts of this book appear to have been suggested by passages in the *Politics* of Aristotle (see ii. 11, iii. 1-14, v. 6, vi. 4-5, and notes) would rather

favour the latter supposition. But we trace the same endeavour to slightly improve on the conclusions of the *Politics*, which Eudemus elsewhere so often exhibits to improve upon the *Ethics* of Aristotle. We observe here also indications that the Peripatetic School had been busy in working out the beginnings of political economy as made by Plato and Aristotle. The theory of money, value, and price, given in chap. v., is in its way excellent. The Eudemian books, however, have all a peculiar indistinctness which taxes the reader's thought to divine their exact bearing. But on consideration, the outlines of a method appear to show themselves through the mist. And accordingly the following parts may perhaps be discerned in Book V.

(1.) Justice having been defined to be 'a state of mind that wills to do what is just,' the first part of the book is concerned with determining what is the just? (*τὸ δίκαιον* as distinguished from *δικαιοσύνη*). The abstract principle of 'the just' may either be identified with all law, and therefore with all morality; or it may be restricted to its proper sense, fair dealing with regard to possessions, &c. (*τὸ ἴσον*). In this restricted sense 'the just' finds its sphere either in distributions of the state, or in correcting the wrongs done in dealings between man and man. Though justice is not retaliation pure and simple, yet in all commerce, &c., there is a sort of retaliation. Ch. i.—v. § 16.

(2.) Having settled the nature of 'the just,' it follows to discuss 'justice,' or this same principle manifested in the mind of the individual. This part of the subject is very imperfectly carried out. We miss the graphic impersonations of the virtues with which the fourth book of Aristotle's *Ethics* is filled. We find nothing but a few barren remarks on voluntariness as necessary to make an act unjust, and deliberate purpose to constitute an unjust character. There is a large digression here on the proper sense of the word 'justice.' Justice, it is said, can only properly exist between citizens; it is a mere metaphor to talk of justice in families, &c. Ch. v. § 17—Ch. viii.

(3.) Certain questions are added, the answers to which go to supply deficiencies in the definition hitherto given of justice. The leading question is, Can one be injured voluntarily? and the answer to this shows that justice implies a relation between two distinct

wills and interests. It is again repeated that justice must be a settled state of the character; thus the just man could not at will be unjust. The subject is concluded by an assertion that justice is essentially a human quality. Ch. ix.

(4.) An appendix follows on the nature of Equity, which is a higher and finer justice, dealing with exceptional cases and acting in the spirit, not in the letter of the law. Ch. x.

(5.) Ch. xi. might be called superfluous and out of place. It touches on the already settled question, Can a man injure himself? But the want of a *lucidus ordo* is universally characteristic of the *Eudemian Ethics*; and this chapter adds some after-thoughts on suicide as an act of injustice, and on the metaphor of justice between the higher and the lower faculties.

Owing, probably, to the want of distinctness in it, this book has not made so much impression on the world as some of the *Nicomachean* books with which it has been incorporated. The distinction between 'distributive' and 'corrective' justice is, however, sometimes referred to, as, for instance, by Lord Bacon in the 'Advancement of Learning.' This and the other distinctions which the book brings out belong rather to politics or political economy than to morals. The remaining contributions to the subject here made—such as the showing that injustice implies a conflict of wills—may have been useful as a clearing up of language at the time when the book was written.

Hildenbrand, in his *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie*, complains of the meagre account of Contracts given in this book, especially as contrasted with the full disquisition in the *Laws* of Plato.

What is still more to be complained of and regretted is, the insufficient account of Justice—from an ethical point of view, as a state of the soul—with which we have here to content ourselves.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] V.

[[ΕΠΙ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας
τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης
² ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ
σκέψις ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημέ-
³ νοις. ὁρῶμεν δὲ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους

I. This chapter proposes and opens the discussion upon the nature of justice and injustice. The chief points it contains are as follows. (1.) Justice and injustice must stand opposed to each other, as being two contrary states of mind. From the nature of one, we may infer its contrary the nature of the other, and if the one term be used in a variety of senses, the other term will be used in a corresponding variety of senses. (2) The term 'unjust man' is used in two senses, to denote one who is lawless, and one who is unfair. Therefore the term 'just' must denote both lawful and fair. (3) The lawful (τὸ νόμιμον) is simply all that the state has enacted for the welfare of its citizens. Therefore, in one sense, 'justice' means fulfilling all the requirements of law. Thus it is nothing else than perfect and consummate virtue. In this general sense justice is different from virtue only in the point of view which one would take in defining it.

I ποία μεσότης] Aristotle proposed the question about the two kinds of

justice, 'in what sense are they mean states?' πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν (*Eth.* II. vii. 16), which is slightly different from the above. Cf. ch. v. § 17 of this book.

2 ἡ δὲ σκέψις—προειρημένους] 'And let our inquiry be according to the same method as what has preceded.' This probably refers to the way in which the moral virtues have been treated in the preceding Book of the *Eudemian Ethics*. There is nothing distinctive about this method, or different from the procedure of Aristotle. What is most specially alluded to at present must be the fixing of the meaning of terms, which is now resorted to with regard to justice, and which was more or less employed before. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* III. v. 1-3, where the general method and the style of the writing has great affinity to the present opening. Περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις ἀποδιδόμενων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον (c conj. Bonitz. *Ceteri aliorum*). Ὡς περὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν γειννίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι τοῦ λανθάνειν πόρρω προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ

λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκεισθῶ ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπι- 4 στημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγείας οὐ πρίττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἢ ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναν- 5 τίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· εἴν τε γὰρ ἢ εὐεξία ἢ φανερά, καὶ ἢ καχεξία φανερά γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἢ εὐεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ εὐεξία πυκνότης σαρκὸς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, εἴν 6 θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγε-

τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταῦτ' συμβέβηκεν. —Λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν μεγέθει τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως. κ.τ.λ.

4 οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν — μόνον] '(And I have specified them thus), for it is not the same with developed states as it is with sciences and faculties. A faculty or a science appears to be the same of contraries, but a contrary state does not include its contraries, as, for instance, from health only healthful things and not the contraries of health are produced.' Γὰρ refers to the mention of both justice and injustice separately, and as opposed to each other. The writer accounts for this by saying that a δύναμις admits of contraries, but a ἔξις not (see Vol. I. p. 241). The style above is somewhat careless, for we first have ἐπιστήμη

τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτῇ, and then, to answer to it, ἔξις ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ.

5-6 Though a state does not include its contrary, yet its contrary may be inferred from it; and the state itself may be known by its particular manifestations (ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων), just as a bodily condition is known from the symptoms. If the name of a state be used in more senses than one (πλεοναχῶς), it follows usually that the name of its contrary will be used in more senses than one.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων] As we might say, 'from its facts,' the ὑποκειμένα being the singular instances in which a general notion is manifested. The meaning is, that τὰ δίκαια are to δικαιοσύνη as good symptoms are to good health. Τῶν ὑποκειμένων is an instance of the logical formulæ with which the writing of Eudemus abounds.

7 σθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ πλεονα-
χῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ
σύνηγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσ-
περ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δῆλη μᾶλλον· ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλή
ἢ κατὰ τὴν ιδέαν, οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται κλείς ὁμωνύμως ἢ
τε ὑπὸ τὸν ἀνέχονα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἢ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν.
8 εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ τε
παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ὁ ἄνιστος,
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὁ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ
ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ'

Cf. *Ar. Met.* i. ii. 4 (ὁ ἔχων τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην) οἶδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκειμένα.

7 ἔοικε δὲ—κλείουσιν] 'Now the term "justice" appears to be used in more senses than one, and so does the term injustice, but, because there is a close resemblance between the ambiguous senses, the ambiguity escapes notice, and the case is not the same as with things widely differing, where the ambiguity is comparatively plain (δῆλη μᾶλλον). A physical difference appealing to the eye (κατὰ τὴν ιδέαν) is widest, as, for instance, the word "key" is used ambiguously to denote the clavicular bone of animals, and that with which men lock doors.' While the general upshot of this passage is clear enough, the writing is in itself very indistinct. Hence in translation it has been necessary to use expansion. To say that 'their equivocation escapes notice because it is close' goes beyond the legitimate bounds of compression. Cf. the obscure and probably corrupt passage above cited from *Eth. Eud.* III. v. 1: ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν γειννάσκειν καὶ ὁμοιώματα μέχρι τοῦ λανθάνειν πόρρω προΐοντα.

κατὰ τὴν ιδέαν] This seems to mean 'in external form.' Cf. *Eth.* i. viii. 16: ὁ τὴν ιδέαν παραλογής.

κλείς] There is a pun attributed to Philip of Macedon—cf. Plutarch, *Reg. et Imp. Aporrh.*, *Philippi* ix.—which, it has been thought, may be here alluded to: τῆς κλειδὸς αὐτῷ κατε-
αγέλης ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῦ θεραπεύοντος
λατροῦ πάντως τι καὶ ἡμέραν αἰτούσσης,
λάμβανε, ἔφη, ὅσα βούλει, τὴν γὰρ
κλεῖν ἔχεις.

8-11 The word 'unjust' is used in three different senses to denote the lawless man, the greedy man, and the unfair man. The word 'just' may mean either the lawful man or the fair man. In this statement there is something illogical, for we notice at once that there are only two senses of the word 'just' to match the three senses of 'unjust.' We find in § 10, that unfairness (τὸ ἀνιστον) is a generic term, including both greediness (πλεονεξία) and also the collateral notion of selfishly avoiding evil. In short, to divide 'unjust' into lawless, greedy, and unfair, is a cross division. Evidently there are on each side two terms: (1) justice is divided into lawfulness or universal justice, and (2) fairness about property, or particular justice. Injustice is divided into (1) lawlessness or universal injustice, and (2) unfairness about property, or particular injustice.

ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πλεονέ- 9
κτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ
ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ,
τινὶ δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εἰχονταὶ καὶ διώ-
κουσιν· δεῖ δ' οὕτως, ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ
αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ' 10
ἄδικος οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸ πλεόν αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ
τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν
ἀγαθὸν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ
τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ 11
περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ 12
νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστὶ πως
δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά
ἐστὶ, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν. οἱ δὲ 13
νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ
κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις,

9 ἐπεὶ δὲ — ἀγαθὰ] 'Now, since the unjust man is greedy, he will be concerned with things good, not all, but the "goods of fortune," which abstractedly are always goods, but which are not so always to the individual. (Men pray for these and follow after them, but they ought not to do so; they ought to pray that what are abstractedly goods may be so to *them*, and they ought to choose the things which are good for *them*).' The goods of fortune are those which all men desire, though it is not certain that they will prove goods to *them*. The phrase τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ is an Eudemian formula. See Vol. I. Essay I. p. 63. The difficulties connected with prayer, arising out of human ignorance, form the subject of Plato's *Second Alcibiades*. They are also alluded to, *Lysis*, III. p. 687. At the end of *Phaedrus* is given the prayer of Socrates (279 B): "ὦ φίλε Πῶν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δόλητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τὰνδοθεν· ἔξωθεν

δ' ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλια. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζομαι τὸν σοφόν. τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλήθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναται· ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων.

12-15 In one sense all that is lawful is just; the law aiming at the good of all, or of a part, of the citizens, speaks on *all* subjects, and more or less rightly enjoins the practice of all the virtues. Justice, then, in this sense, may be said to be the practice of entire virtue towards one's neighbour.

13 στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *Ar. Pol.* III. vii. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἐνπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων. The term νομοθετικὴ (§ 12) occurs again in the Eudemian book, *Eth.* vi. viii. 2. The view given here of law, which is expressed still more strongly below, ch. xi. § 1, is quite different from modern views. Law is here represented as a positive system

- κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.
- 14 προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ρίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πρᾶου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὁρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὁρθῶς,
- 15 χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδισμένος. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ

(though the instances quoted of its formulæ are all negative, *μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν*, &c.), aiming at the regulation of the whole of life, sometimes, however, with a bias of class-interests, and sometimes only roughly executed (*ἀπεσχεδισμένος*). This educational and dogmatic character of the law was really exemplified to the greatest extent in the Spartan institutions. Athens rather prided herself (according to the wise remarks which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles) on leaving greater liberty to the individual. But Plato and Aristotle both made the mistake of wishing for an entire state-control over individual life.

14 τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου] Cf. *Eth.* III. viii. 1-2. Enactments of the kind here mentioned form part of the system given in Plato's *Laws*, pp. 943-4. Modern statutes of military discipline against desertion, &c., furnish an exact parallel to these ancient laws, if we only consider that in the Greek cities the whole state was more or less regarded as an army.

15 αὕτη μὲν οὖν — ἕτερον] 'Now this justice is complete virtue, not absolutely, however, but in relation

to one's neighbour.' There is a careless transition here from τὰ νόμιμα and τὰ δίκαια to ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Correct writing would have required ἡ κατὰ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνη or a similar phrase. Generally speaking, this first part of the Book is about τὰ δίκαια as distinguished from ἡ δικαιοσύνη (see Plan of Book V.)

15-20 Hence justice is often thought the best of the virtues, brighter than the evening or the morning star, the sum of all other excellence. It is the use of virtue, and not in relation to oneself alone, but also towards others. Hence it has been defined 'others' profit.' As he is the worst man who is bad both to himself and others, so he is the best who is good to himself and to others. This kind of justice is not a part of virtue, but the whole; it can only be distinguished from virtue when you come to define it, and discover that you must take a different point of view for each.

15 οὐθ' ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ.] This may have allusion to something in literature now lost. At all events, it is a fine saying.

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ] Given among the

δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἐφ' ὧς οὕτω θαυμαστός·
καὶ παροιμαζόμενοι φάμεν

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ ἵι.

καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστίν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 16 εὐδοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἀνδρὶ δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἡδὴ ὁ ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ 17 αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλω γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πρίττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῶ. κύκιστος μὲν 18 οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτόν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν 19 ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέ- 20 ρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

verses of Theognis (147 sq.) in the following couplet:

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ
'στιν,
πᾶς δὲ τ' ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, Κύρνε δίκαιος
εἷω.

It is, however, also attributed to Phocylides, and may have been the common property of many early moralists.

πρὸς ἕτερον] Fritzsche quotes Eurip. *Herod.* 2:

ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τοῖς πέλαις πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ.
ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ κέρδος λήμ' ἔχων ἀνείμενον,
πόλει τ' ἀχρηστος καὶ συναλλάσσειν
βαρὺς,
αὐτῷ δ' ἄριστος.

And Ar. *Pol.* III. xiii. 3: κοινωνικὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν εἶναι φάμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην

ἢ πᾶσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας.

16 ἀρχὴ ἀνδρα] The same sentiment is expressed by Sophocles, *Antig.* 175 sq.

17 ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν] Repeated below, ch. vi. § 6. Cf. Plato's *Repub.* I. p. 343 C: ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἀρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετούντος βλάβη (see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 150). The sophistical and sneering definition of justice is here repeated without comment, being accepted as a testimony to the unselfish character of justice.

20 τί δὲ διαφέρει—ἀρετῇ] 'But what the difference is between virtue and this kind of justice is clear from what we have said already. They are the same, only conceived diffe-

- ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἢ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἀπλῶς, ἀρετή.
- ² Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι γὰρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ ² μέρους. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας

rently : viewed as a relation to others, the state is justice ; viewed as a state of the mind simply, it is virtue.'

τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό] This logical formula occurs again *Eth.* vi. viii. 1, where it is said that wisdom and politics are the same state of mind, only their essence is differently conceived (τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν αὐταῖς). On the force of εἶναι, see *Eth.* ii. vi. 17, note. In both of these Eudemian passages, where it is said of two things that 'they are the same, only their εἶναι is different,' we must understand that the results are the same, but the essential nature, the causes, and what the Germans would call the *Grund-begriff*, or fundamental conception, are different. Thus the first idea about justice (in the widest sense) is, that it is a relation to others. The first idea about virtue is, that it is a regulation of the mind. There is a slightly different application of the formula, *Arist. De Anima*, iii. ii. 4 : ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία, τὸ δὲ εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν αὐταῖς. 'Now the present existence of an object is identical with and inseparable from the present existence of the sensation of it, but yet in conception these differ from each other fundamentally.' Here we have two distinct sides or 'moments' represented as, though logically distinct, yet inseparable.

Plato in discussing justice had first to clear the subject of sophistical notions, and to prove that justice did not depend alone upon human insti-

tutions, but far more on the nature of the human soul. Thus he concluded by defining it to be a just balance in the mind itself. The Peripatetic starting-point is different. It is assumed that justice proceeds from the development of man's nature as a 'political creature.' Also it is assumed that in political institutions there is something which is absolute and not merely conventional (*Eth.* v. vii. 1-5). Then the only question is, what are the exact limits of justice itself? To which the answer is, that we may either regard it in the broadest sense as including the whole of right dealing with others, or, more restrictedly, as right dealing in respect of property and advantages of all kinds.

II. This chapter consists of three parts. (1) It brings arguments to prove the existence of a particular kind of injustice, relating chiefly to property, from which the existence of a particular kind of justice might also be inferred, §§ 1-6. (2) It sets aside universal justice as not being the object of discussion to the present book, §§ 7-11. (3) It divides particular justice into two kinds, distributive and corrective, §§ 12-13.

1-6 The arguments brought to prove the existence of a particular kind of injustice reduce themselves apparently to an appeal to language.

(1) We speak of the coward as 'doing wrongly' (ἀδικεῖν); also we speak of the man who takes more than his share as 'doing wrongly;'

μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ
 ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπό-
 τητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ
 πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ
 μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν
 γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία 3
 ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου
 τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα 4
 μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβίνει, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμε-
 νος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι
 μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ·
 ὁ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα 5
 πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινι μοχθη-
 ρίαν αἰεὶ, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε
 τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργὴν· εἰ δ'
 ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν.

the latter use of the terms is evidently different from the former.

(2) A crime committed for the sake of gain is called a 'wrong' distinctively, rather than by the name it would have had, were this motive of gain not present.

(3) While all other wrongs (ἀδικήματα) are referred each to some evil principle, such as cowardice, intemperance, and the like; acts of unjust gain are referred to no other principle except 'injustice,' which accordingly must be used in a special sense and denote a special vice in the mind.

The statement of the first of these arguments in the text is extremely confused. It is put in such a way that it would as well prove any other vice as πλεονεξία to be particular injustice. Suppose we substituted 'idleness' in the text for 'grasping'; it would then be true to say, 'When a man is idle, he often errs in none of the other vices, certainly not in all, but yet he acts with a certain faultiness (for we blame him) and wrongly

(κατ' ἀδικίαν). Hence there is a kind of wrong separate from universal injustice,' &c. However, this is only a matter of statement; there is no doubt that ἀδικία with regard to property means something special, and different from ἀδικία in the sense of wrong-doing in general. In English 'injustice' is not used to mean vice generally; though its opposite 'just' is occasionally used in the translation of the Bible as equivalent to 'righteous,' and in a sense answering pretty nearly to that of νόμιμος.

4 ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν—κερδαίνειν] 'Again if one man commits an adultery for the sake of gain, making a profit by it, and another man does the same for lust, lavishing money (προσθίς) and incurring loss; the latter would rather be deemed intemperate than covetous, the former would be called unjust, but not intemperate; evidently because of his gaining by it.' Fritzsche (upon i. 14) quotes Aeschines Socraticus, II. 14: δοκεῖ δ' ἂν σοι ἄνθρωπος εἰ μοιχεύει τὰς τῶν πέλας

- 6 ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλην ἐν
μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω
γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν
περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τιτι ἔχοιμεν ἐνὶ
ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ
τοῦ κέρδους, ἡ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.
- 7 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις
καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ὁποία
- 8 τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον
καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον.
κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία
- 9 ἔστιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλεόν οὐ ταυτὸν ἀλλ'
ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἅπαν
ἄνισον, τὸ δ' ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλεόν), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ
ἀδικία οὐ ταυτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ'
ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν
μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον,
- 10 καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ

γυναικας ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ, ἀδικεῖν δὲ ἡ οὐ,
καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ
τῶν νόμων κωλυόντων;

6 ὥστε—σπουδαῖος] 'So that it is
plain that there is a particular kind
of injustice distinct from the uni-
versal kind, having the same name by
reason of a kindred nature (*συνώνυ-
μος*), because its definition falls under
the same genus. For both have
their whole force consisting in a rela-
tion to others, but the one is con-
cerned with honour, property, or
safety (or by whatever one name one
might sum up all such things), and
is prompted by the pleasure of gain,
but the other has to do with the
whole sphere of virtue.'

συνώνυμος] What logic calls 'ana-
logous.' We before had the word
ὁμωνύμια to denote 'equivocation'
(c. i. § 7), see *Etā.* i. vi. 12, and note;
and cf. *Ar. Categor.* i. 3: *Συνώνυμα δὲ*

λέγεται ὡς τὸ τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ
κατὰ τοῦτομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός.

9 ἐπεὶ δὲ—δικαιοσύνης] 'But as
(ἐπεὶ) 'unequal' and 'more' are not
the same, but stand related to each
other as part to whole (for 'more' is
a species of 'unequal'), so (*καὶ*) the
unjust principle and habit belonging
respectively to the two kinds we have
mentioned are not the same but dif-
ferent, this from that, the one being as
part, the other as whole. For this injus-
tice (about property) is a part of uni-
versal injustice, and the correspondent
justice is a part of universal justice.'
The only way to give any meaning to
this indistinct passage is to consider
what is said about 'more' and
'unequal' to have nothing to do with
πλεονεξία, but simply to be an illustra-
tion of a part included by a whole.
Particular justice includes all the
generic qualities of universal justice,

τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὐσα χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον, ἡ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερόν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πρᾶττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος. τὰ δὲ ποιητικά τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἑκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταυτὸν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί. τῆς δὲ κατὰ 12 μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν

no less than as a particular virtue it includes all the generic qualities of universal virtue. Some MSS. read *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀνίσω καὶ τὸ παράνομον*, from not understanding the force of the illustration applied in *ἐπεὶ*. It is no wonder that confusion should have been caused when the writer was at so little pains to avoid it.

10-11 We may set aside justice in the wider sense as being identical with the exercise of virtue, and also the principle on which it depends (*καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ*), this being simply the inculcation of virtue by the state. (The question as to whether private education is the same as public, whether the good man is the same as the good citizen, may be discussed hereafter.)—This seems to be the train of thought, the whole of § 11 being parenthetical. *σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ κ.τ.λ.* is a mere repetition of ch. i. § 14.

τὰ δὲ ποιητικά—παντί] 'Now the enactments productive of entire virtue are those which have been made with regard to education for public life. With regard to individual education, according to which one is not a good citizen, but simply a good man, we

must afterwards determine whether it belongs to politics or some other province. For perhaps the idea of the good man is not the same as that of the citizen in every case.'

ὕστερον διοριστέον] This is an unfulfilled promise in the *Eudemian Ethics* as they stand. The question here started seems to have arisen out of the discussions in *Politics* III. iv. and III. xviii., as to whether the virtue of the man and the citizen is the same, which, on the whole, Aristotle would answer in the affirmative; and he also lays it down decisively that all education should be public, i.e. under the control of government and reduced to a common standard. Aristotle's treatise on education was however unfinished, the eighth book of the *Politics* being a fragment. Eudemus would seem to have wished to take up the question where Aristotle left it, and—with the view of giving a separate existence to *Morals* as a science—to ask whether there is not a kind of education, not falling within the province of *Politics*, which aims at producing the virtues of the individual man, as distinct from those of the citizen. But the *Eudemian Ethics*

- εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἐν δὲ τὸ
 13 ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ' ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρῶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμός ἐγγυή χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις· ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμός θάνατος ἀρπαγὴ πῆρωςι κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.
- 3 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον,
 2 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον,

were also unfinished, or else mutilated. See Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 67-68.

ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι] 'The essential idea of a good man.' On this formula, see *Eth.* II. vi. 17, note.

12-13 Particular justice is now divided into distributive and corrective justice. For all details connected with these two forms, see the following chapters. It is here said that 'voluntary transactions' (τὰ ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα), 'such as buying, selling, lending, pledging, using, depositing, and hiring,' come under the head of corrective justice, as well as 'involuntary transactions.' By this must be meant that the rectification of acts of injustice committed under these various heads falls to be made by corrective justice. Buying and selling, as we learn from ch. v., are, or ought to be, arranged on the principle of geometric proportions, and thus resemble cases of distributive justice. It is only where cheating or mistake has occurred, that buying and selling would be brought under corrective justice.

III. This chapter, without formally announcing its subject, treats of distributive justice. The main points with regard to it are as follows. Justice implies equality, and not only that two things are equal, but also two persons between whom there may be justice. Thus it is a geometrical proportion in four terms; if A and B be persons, C and D lots to be divided, then as A is to B, so must C be to D. And a just distribution will produce the result that A + C will be to B + D in the same ratio as A was to B originally. In other words, distributive justice consists in the distribution of property, honours, &c., in the state, according to the merits of each citizen.

With regard to this principle, though the text is not explicit, yet it appears to be (1) really applicable in all cases of awards made by the state, (2) ideally to be capable of a wider application as a regulative principle for the distribution of property and all the distinctions of society. As to the history of the

ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον 4

doctrine, we find it shadowed out by Plato in the great idea of a harmony and proportion ruling in the world; cf. *Gorgias*, p. 507 E: φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλειε, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμίωτητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἄκοσμον, οὐδὲ ἀκοσμίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λεληθῆσθαι σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύνатаι· σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶε δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. There is a still nearer approach to the present doctrine in *Lysis*, p. 757 B, where it is said that there are two kinds of equality; one is a mere equality of number and measure, the other is the 'award of Zeus,' the equality of proportion. Τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι βῆδιδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστὶ· καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰεὶ σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεί· πᾶν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώταις, πάντ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται. τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δὲ ἐλάττωι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρω· καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζονι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν αἰεὶ μείζον· τοῖς δὲ τούναντιον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρῶτον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον.

It is remarkable that the terms 'distributive and corrective justice' are not found in the *Politics* of Aristotle, though this distinction and the various points connected with it in reality belong much more to political than to ethical science. However, though the name of distributive justice does not occur, yet the idea of

it is fully developed in *Politics*, III. c. ix.—a passage from which it is not improbable that the present chapter may be partly taken, though an interpolated reference (καθάπερ εἰρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς) gives the passage in the *Politics* a fallacious appearance of having been written later, and of having accepted conclusions from the present book. Far rather it is likely that the conception of 'distributive justice,' having been received as a conception from Plato, and farther worked out by Aristotle in his *Politics*, only became stereotyped into a phrase in the after-growth of his system, at the end of his own life, or in the exposition of his views made by Eudemus. It is in speaking of the 'oligarchical and democratical principles of justice' that Aristotle says: (§ 1) πάντες γὰρ ἀπτονται δικαίου τινὸς ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. Οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις. καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίστοις. οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. Ὅστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, † καθάπερ εἰρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι. The conclusion is (*Pol.* III. ix. 15) that they who contribute most to the joint-stock of virtue and good deeds in the state are entitled to a larger share in the control of affairs than those who base their claims upon any other kind of superiority.

1-4 These sections are full of

μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι [καὶ πρὸς τι] καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἡ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλείον καὶ ἑλάττω), ἡ δ' ἴσον ἐστὶ, δυοῖν, 5 ἡ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστὶ, 6 καὶ ἐν οἷς τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ 7 ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμονται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δηλόν· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' 8 εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετὴν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ

confused writing. It is said 'since the unjust is unequal, there must be a mean, which is equal; justice must be equal; the equal is a mean, therefore justice must be a mean. As being equal justice implies two terms, as being a mean two extremes, as being just two persons, therefore it must be in four terms, &c.' The general meaning is clear, but the statement, especially in § 4, is very faulty. A confusion is made by the introduction of the idea of μέσον with regard to justice, which at the present part of the argument was not required.

6 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Ar. Pol. III. ix. 1 sq. l. c.

7 ἐτι ἐκ τοῦ—ἀρετῆς] 'Again this is clear from the principle of equality according to standard; for all agree that justice in distributions must be according to standard, but men are not unanimous in declaring the same standard. While the democrats declare freedom, those who are for an oligarchy declare wealth or birth, and

those who are for an aristocracy (in the highest sense) declare virtue.' This is apparently taken from the saying in Aristotle's Pol. III. ix. 4: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τι ἀνισοὶ ὦσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, δλωσὶ δόματα ἀνισοὶ εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, δλωσὶ ἴσοι. Cf. Ib. III. ix. 15. 'Freedom' here of course means being above the condition of a slave. To make this the ground for political claims would be analogous, from A.'s point of view, to instituting manhood suffrage. For a slave is less than man; cf. Ib. § 6, where it is said that slaves and the lower animals could not constitute a state διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν.

8-14 ἐστιν ἄρα—ἀγαθοῦ] 'The just then is something proportionate. The proportionate is not restricted to pure number alone, but applies to everything that admits the idea of number. Proportion is an equality of ratios, and implies four terms at the least. Now it is plain that "discrete proportion"

μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ 9 συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὡς δυτὶ χρῆται καὶ δις λέγει, οἷοι ὡς ἡ τοῦ α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ. δις οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐν ἡ τοῦ β τεθῇ δὶς, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον 10 ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός· διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ᾧ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος πρὸς τὸν 11 β, οὕτως ὁ γ πρὸς τὸν δ, καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς τὸν δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει· κἂν οὕτως συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν 12 διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον

is in four terms; but so also is "continuous proportion," for it uses the one of its terms as two, and names it twice over, thus,—as *a* is to *b*, so is *b* to *c*. *b* then is twice named, and if it be set down twice over, the proportionate terms will be four. But justice also implies four terms at least, and an equality of ratios: for the two persons and the two things are divided in similar proportion. (The formula) then will be, "as the term *a* is to *b*, so is *c* to *d*;" and *alternando*, "as *a* is to *c*, so is *b* to *d*," and so too the whole to the whole, which the distribution couples, and if the terms be thus united, it couples them justly. The joining therefore of *a* to *c* and of *b* to *d* in distribution is just, and this justice is a mean between violations of proportion. For proportion is a mean, and the just is proportionate. Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical, for in geometrical proportion the whole is to the whole as each separate term is to each. This proportion is not "continuous" for it has no one term

standing in a double relationship. Well, then, the just is that which is thus proportionate, and the unjust is a violation of proportion, which takes place either on the side of more or less. And this is actually the case, for he that does an injury has more than his share, while he that is injured has less than his share of what is good.' This passage gives a formula for distributive justice in mathematical language, which comes in short to this, that in all awards of the state, the result should be proportionate to the separate worth of the citizens.

8 μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ] 'Number expressed in ciphers,' 'abstract number,' in German, *unbenannte Zahl*. Fritzsche refers to Euclid *El.* vii. *def.* 1. The terms introduced in this chapter seem to be neither lines, nor numbers, but algebraic quantities.

9 ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β] ἡ is indefinite, and probably meant to be so. It may stand for *στιγμή*, *γραμμὴ*, or the like.

13 γεωμετρικῆ] Cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 508, quoted above, p. 109.

- 13 ἀνάλογον· καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον.
- 14 ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἰς ἀριθμῷ ὄρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλογον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος
- 15 ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον
- 16 κακόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ
- 17 μείζονος, τὸ δ' αἰρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.
- 4 Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλ-

15-16 A repetition of ch. i. § 10.

IV. This chapter is on corrective justice, which is said to apply to the transactions between men whether voluntary or involuntary. Corrective justice goes on a principle, not of geometrical, but of arithmetical proportion; in other words, it takes no account of persons, but treats the cases with which it is concerned as cases of unjust loss and gain, which have to be reduced to the middle point of equality between the parties. Justice is a mean, and the judge a sort of impersonation of justice, a mediator, or equal divider. The operation of justice, bringing plaintiff and defendant to an equality, may be illustrated by the equalising of two unequal lines. The names, 'loss' and 'gain,' are, however, often a mere metaphor borrowed from commerce.

The term 'corrective justice' (τὸ διορθωτικόν, or, as it is afterwards called, § 6, τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον) is itself an unfortunate name, because it appears only to lay down principles for restitution, and therefore implies wrong. Thus it has a tendency to

confine the view to 'involuntary transactions,' instead of stating what must be the principle of the just in all the dealings between man and man. In the present chapter, it is remarkable that although we are told at first that 'voluntary transactions' belong to corrective justice, yet all that is said applies only to the 'involuntary transactions;' and at last we are told that the terms used are 'a metaphor from voluntary transactions'—as if these were something quite distinct. It may be said, however, that bargains, and voluntary dealings in general, have no respect of persons (κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητ. ἀναλ.), and thus have something in common with civil and criminal law. Bacon, in the *Advancement of Learning*, Book II., refers to the two heads of Justice here given, under the names 'commutative and distributive.'

1 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν] This excludes all possibility of the writer having conceived another kind of justice, to be called 'catallactic' or some such name, as it has been sometimes fancied. Τὸ διορθωτικὸν δικ. implies not merely 'regulative,' but strictly 'remedial'

λάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ 2
τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
διαμεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν
ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν
γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ
ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα. καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ
ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν.
τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ 3
τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν. οὐθέν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ
ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῇ, οὐδ' εἰ
ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους
τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις,
εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέ-
βλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὃν ἰσάζειν πειράται 4
ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἡ
καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις
εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειράται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν

justice; διώρθωμα is used to signify a remedy in Arist. *Pol.* III. xiii. 23, where it is said of ostracism, βέλτιον μὲν οὐκ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω συστήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἰατρίας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἀν συμβῇ, πειράσθαι τοιοῦτον τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν.

2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ—εἰσενεχθέντα] 'For distributive justice deals always with the goods of the state according to the proportion we have described; for if the distribution be of common goods, it will be according to the proportion which the different contributions bear to one another.' Τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα is thus explained by the Paraphrast, ἀναλόγως ἐκάστω δίδωσι κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν, ἣν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν συνετέλεσεν· ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντες ὁμοιοί, οὐδὲ πάντες ὁμοίως εἰσφέρουσιν. Possibly the remark in the text was taken from Aristotle, *Pol.* III. ix. 15: διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς

τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τοῦτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλείον.

3 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν] This term occurs *Eth.* II. vi. 7. 'Arithmetical proportion' denotes a middle term or point of equality, equidistant from two extreme terms; thus, 6 is the mean, according to arithmetical proportion, between 4 and 8. In *Eth.* II. (*l.c.*) it is called μέσον τοῦ πράγματος, which implies that it has no respect of persons. So corrective justice is here said to regard each case impersonally as an affair of loss and gain, and between these it strikes the middle point. It is the moral worth of persons that is ignored (εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον κ.τ.λ.), for we find afterwards, ch. v. §§ 3-4, that a consideration of the position and circumstances of persons *does* come in to modify the estimate of the loss sustained from an indignity, &c.

5 τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἶπεν ἐπὶ τοῖς
 τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκείον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος,
 6 οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν
 γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος.
 ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ
 κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δ' ἐλάττον ἐναντίως,
 τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλεόν τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἐλάττον κέρδος, τὸ
 δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὦν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι
 δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον
 7 ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ
 τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι
 ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι
 οἷον δίκαιον ἔμφυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ
 καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίου, ὡς εὖν τοῦ μέσου τύχῳσι, τοῦ
 8 δίκαιου τευξόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ
 δικαστὴς. ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς
 εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ᾧ τὸ μείζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας
 ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ' ἀφείλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέ-
 9 θηκεν. ὅταν δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν
 τὰ αὐτῶν, ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ
 τῆς μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀνα-
 λογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν,
 ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστὴς.

7 ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον] Cf. Thucyd. iv. 83: 'Ἀρριβαῖος ἐπεκηρυ-
 κεύετο, ἐτόμιος ὦν Βρασιδᾷ μέσῳ
 δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν. Ar. Pol. iv. xii.
 5: πανταχοῦ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής,
 διαιτητής δ' ὁ μέσος.


μεσιδίου] Used in rather a dif-
 ferent sense, Pol. v. vi. 13: ἐν δὲ τῇ
 εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀνιστίαν τὴν πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν
 στρατιώταις καὶ ἀρχοῖσι μεσιδίῳ.

9 διὰ τοῦτο—διχαστής] 'Hence, too,
 justice gets its name, because it is a
 dividing in twain (δίχα), as though it
 were written not δίκαιον, but δίχαιον,
 and the judge is one who divides in
 twain.' This etymology, though in-

genious, is false. The earlier notion
 connected with δικη seems not to have
 been one of decision, arbitration, or
 justice, but rather of 'showing,' 'in-
 struction,' 'rule,' 'manner.' The word
 is derived from a root δικ-, which
 appears in δεικνυμι, and the Latin
indico, index, iudex (the law-shower),
 &c. Plato, in the *Cratylus*, p. 412 D,
 gives a sportive etymology of δίκαιον,
 in accordance with the spirit of the
 work. Justice is there said to be
 the 'permeating,' τὸ διὰ ὧν, with a
 κ added for euphony. 'Ἐπεὶ ἐπιτρο-
 πεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαῖν, τοῦτο τὸ
 ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὁρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίας
 ἕνεκα τὴν τοῦ κ δύναμιν προσλαβόν.

ἐπὰν γὰρ δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ 10
προσθεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη
μὲν, μὴ προστεθῇ δέ, ἐνὶ ἄν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου
ἄρα ἐνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνί. τούτῳ ἄρα 11
γνωριούμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ
τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον
ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ'
ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν 12
ΑΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ ἀφηρήσθω τὸ ΑΕ,
καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ὧν ΓΔ, ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ΔΓΓ
τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ. τῆς ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ
ΓΔ. ἴσῃ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τούτου· ἀνη-
ροῦντο γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον,
καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τούτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιούτον.
ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἧ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, 13
ἐκ τῆς ἐκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ

10-12 ἐπὰν γὰρ—ΓΔ] 'For, of two equal lines, if a part be taken from the one and added to the other, that other will exceed the first by twice this part; for if it had been subtracted only from the one and not added to the other, that other would have exceeded the first by only once this part. Therefore the line which is added to exceeds the mean by once the part added, and the mean exceeds the line subtracted from by once the part added. By this we learn what we must take from the term which has more, and what we must add to that which has less. We must add to that which has less the amount by which the mean exceeds it, and we must take from the largest term the amount by which the mean is exceeded. Let AA, BB, and CC be equal to one another; from AA take AE, and add CD to CC; then the whole DCC exceeds EA by CD and CZ; and therefore it exceeds BB by CD.' The figure required is as follows:



ἴσῃ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τούτου] This clause exists in all the MSS. The Paraphrast explains it here to signify that the same principles of corrective justice are applicable to the arts and commerce, &c. But when the clause is repeated with a different context in the next chapter, the Paraphrast, no doubt feeling a difficulty about the repetition, does not again touch it. In its present position the clause has no meaning, in the next chapter it is an important remark. All we can say about its appearance here is that it is an evidence of the same sort of unskilful interpolation which shows itself in chapter xi., and also in sundry other parts of Books v., vi., and vii.

13-14 ἐλήλυθε δὲ—δοσερον] 'Now these names, "loss and gain," have

- ἐαυτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 ζημιοῦσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις
 14 ἄλλοις ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος. ὅταν δὲ μῖτε πλέον μῖτ'
 ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν
 ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν· ὥστε κέρδους
 τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκού-
 σιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.
- 5 Δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον,
 ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὠρίζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ
 2 δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλω. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ

come from voluntary exchange. For having more than one's own is called "gaining," and having less than at the commencement is called "losing," as, for instance, in buying and selling, and all the other things in which the law gives one immunity. But when the things are neither more nor less, but on a level (αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν), then men say they have their own, and neither lose nor gain. Thus justice is a mean between a sort of gain and loss in involuntary things; it is the having the same afterwards as before.

[ἐν ὅσοις ἄδειαν] In commerce of all kinds, the law allows one to gain as much as one can. In involuntary transactions, the law allows no gain to be made, but brings things always back to their level. This non-interference of the law with bargains becomes, if carried out, the principle of free-trade.

ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται] This has puzzled the commentators. Felicianus interprets it 'sed sua cuique per se ipsa evaserint'; Argyropulus, 'sed sua per se ipsa sunt facta'; Lambinus, 'sed paria paribus respondent.' What the phrase *must* mean is plain, whether grammatically it *can* mean this is another question. It *must* mean 'neither more, nor less, but equal to itself.' Perhaps it may

be construed 'but result in being themselves by means of reciprocity,' i.e. by mutual giving and taking, ἐαυτῶν being equivalent to ἀλλήλων.

V. This chapter, commencing with a critical notice of the Pythagorean definition of justice, that 'justice is retaliation,' shows it to be inadequate, and then goes off into an interesting discussion upon the law of retaliation as it exists in the state. Proportionate retaliation, or an interchange of services, is said to be the bond of society. The law of proportion regulates exchange, and settles the value of the most diverse products. Money measures and expresses value, and turns mere barter into commerce. The chapter concludes with some general remarks on the relation of justice as a quality to the just as a principle.

1 δοκεῖ δὲ — ἄλλω] 'Now some think that retaliation without further qualifying (ἀπλῶς) is justice, as the Pythagoreans said, for they defined justice simply as retaliation on one's neighbour.' On the rude and inadequate attempts at definition made by the Pythagoreans, cf. *Ar. Metaph.* I. v. 16: ὠρίζοντο τε γὰρ ἐπιτολαίω, καὶ ὃ πρῶτον ὑπάρξειεν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος, τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος

ἐφαρμόττει οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν· καίτοι βούλονται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ 3
'Ραδαμάνθους δίκαιον·

εἴ κε πάθοι τὰ κ' ἱεῖσι, δίκη κ' ἰδία γίνοιτο.

πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἶον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, 4
οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πλη-
γῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον 5
καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις 6
ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπε-
πονητός, κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα· τῷ ἀντι-
ποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνίλογον συμμένει ἢ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς
ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει·
ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, μετὰδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ

ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ εἰ τις οἴοιτο ταῦτόν εἶναι διπλάσιον καὶ τὴν δυνάδα, διότι πρῶτον ὑπάρχει τοῖς δυοῖ τὸ διπλάσιον. Their inadequate account of justice was doubtless owing not only to an imperfect logical method, but also to the immature political and social ideas of the day. Demosthenes mentions a law of retaliation given by Zaleucus to the Locrians (*Timocr.* p. 744): *ὁστος γὰρ αὐτόθι νόμον, ἔαν τις ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκόψῃ, ἀντεκκόψαι παρασχεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ.* In the Mosaic code the same rude principle appears, *Exod.* xxi. 24, *Levit.* xxiv. 20, *Deuteron.* xix. 21.

2 It is obvious that simple retaliation cannot be the principle of distributive justice; the state does not win battles for its generals, &c. Nor is it that of corrective justice: (1) because the same treatment is different to different individuals; (2) because an involuntary harm must not be requited like a voluntary one.

3 τὸ 'Ραδαμάνθους] Necessarily a primitive idea of justice.

εἰ κε πάθοι] Of uncertain authorship, attributed to Hesiod.

4 οἶον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων] Cf. ch. iv. § 3,

note. Rank is here looked at as a kind of property. It is not a question of individual goodness or badness, but an officer being struck loses more than a common soldier being struck in return, so that retaliation is in that case not justice.

6 ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν—συμμένουσιν] 'But in commercial intercourse, at all events, this kind of justice, namely, retaliation, is the bond of union—on principles, not of equality, but proportion, for by proportionate requital the state is held together. Men seek to requite either evil or good; to omit the one were slavery, to omit the second were to fail in that mutual interchange by which men are held together.' On mutual need as the basis for civil society, cf. Plato, *Repub.* p. 369 B: *γίγνεται τοίνυν πόλις, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκτης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής.* A recognition of this principle might be called the first dawning of political economy; from it several deductions are made in the text above as to the nature of value, price, and money. These, though rudimentary, are able


7 *συμμένουσιν.* διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετήσαι τε γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι
8 *χαριζόμενον.* ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις, οἷον οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ A, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ B, οἰκία ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ οὖν πρῶτον ἢ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἴτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρον

and interesting, but the relation of the law of value (τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς κοιν. ταῖς ἀλλ.) to the other kinds of justice is not stated.

τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς, κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα] This seems to be written as if in correction of *Ar. Pol.* II. ii. 4. Διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον. On which see Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 52, 53.

7 διὸ—χαριζόμενον] 'Hence, too, it is that men build a temple of the (Graces in their streets, that there may be reciprocity. For this is the property of grace, one must serve in return one who has done a favour, and again be in turn the first to confer favours.' Seneca (*Benef.* I. 3) mentions with some disdain the various symbolical meanings which were supposed to be expressed by the figures of the Graces, and on which Chrysippus appears to have written an elaborate treatise. Of course no English word will exactly answer to χάρις.

8 *ποιεῖ δὲ—σύζευξις]* 'Now the joining of the diagonal of a square gives us proportionate return.' The diagram supposed to be drawn is as follows:



The joining of the diagonal gives each producer some of the other's work, and thus an exchange is made, but the respective value of the commodities must be first adjusted, else there can be no fair exchange. What, then, is the law of value? It is enunciated a little later (§ 10). *δεῖ τοίνυν—τροφήν.* 'As an architect (or a farmer it may be) is to a shoemaker, so many shoes must there be to a house or to corn.' That is, the value of the product is determined by the quality of the labour spent upon it. The sort of comparison here made between the quality of farmer and shoemaker seems connected with a Greek notion of personal dignity and a dislike of *βαρυντα*. But in the following section a view more in accordance with Political Economy is taken,—for it is said that all products must be measured against one

ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρον, δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ 9
 τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ
 μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον
 ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο
 ἱατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἱατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ καὶ
 ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.
 διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγὴ 10
 ἐφ' ᾧ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον· πάντα
 γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, πόσα
 ἅττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ
 οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν
 ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοι-
 νωνία. τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα 11
 ἐνὶ τινὶ πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο
 δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἢ χρεΐᾳ, ἢ πάντα συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ
 μὴθὲν δέοντο ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ
 αὐτή. οἶον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρεΐας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε

standard, and that this is in reality 'demand' (χρεΐα). It is demand, then, or in other words the higgling of the market, which determines how many shoes are to be given for a house. But the result ought to be such (§ 12) that the architect + the number of shoes that he will receive (or the equivalent of these in money) will be to the shoemaker + a house, as the architect was to the shoemaker, originally. That is, each producer will have got his deserts.

9 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο—ἰσασθῆναι] Cf. ch. iv. § 12, note. 'Now this is the case with the other arts also (i.e. beside those of the architect and shoemaker), for they would have been destroyed if there had not been the producer producing so much, and of a certain kind, and the consumer (τὸ πάσχον) consuming just the same quantity and quality. For out of two physicians no commerce arises, but out of a physician and a farmer it

does, and, in short, out of persons who are different from one another, and not equal; these, then, require to be brought to an equality.' The division of labour, the mutual dependence of the arts, and the correspondence of supply and demand, are here well stated. The terms ποιοῦν and πάσχον may probably have some reference to the ἀπαιτησθῆναι, which is the subject of the chapter.

11 οἶον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρεΐας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην] 'Now money is a sort of representative of demand conventionally established.' This excellent definition was not altogether new; Plato had already said (*Repub.* p. 371 B): ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου. The present chapter is disfigured by repetitions. Thus cf. § 15: τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται. The saying (§ 10) τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον, is repeated

κατὰ συνθήκην· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν
 12 καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται δὲ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσα-
 σθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ
 σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας
 οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάζονται, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας
 ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ
 αὐτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται
 ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς Α, τροφή Γ, σκυτοτόμος

§ 14: τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον
 σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει. The law of
 value is given twice, § 10 and § 12,
 &c.

12 ἔσται δὲ ἀντιπεπονθός—γίνεσθαι]
 'Retaliation, then, will take place
 when the terms have been equalised,
 and the production of the shoemaker
 has been made to bear the same
 relation to that of the farmer, as a
 farmer himself does to a shoemaker.
 We must not, however, bring the
 parties to a diagram of proportion
 after exchange has taken place, else
 the one extremity of the figure will
 have both superiorities assigned to
 it, but at a moment when the parties
 still retain their own products. They
 are thus equal and capable of trad-
 ing, for proportionate equality can
 be established between them.' This
 vexed passage appears to describe the
 steps in a commercial transaction.
 There being a mutual need between
 producers of a different kind, their
 products require to be equalised.
 This is done by reducing the goods to
 a standard of inverse proportion. As
 a farmer to a shoemaker, so shoes to
 corn; thus, if a farmer's labour be 5
 times better than a shoemaker's, then
 5 pair of shoes = a quarter of corn; or
 if a pair of shoes = 10 shillings, then
 a quarter of corn = 50 shillings. When
 this process of equalisation has been

effected (ὅταν ἰσασθῇ),—which is done
 by 'demand' or the higgling of the
 market,—then simple retaliation, or
 'tit for tat,' begins. After an ex-
 change has been made, or, in short,
 after the price of an article has once
 been expressed in money, it is no
 longer the time to talk of 'the quality
 of labour,' or for either side to claim
 an advantage on this account. If he
 did he would have 'both superiorities'
 reckoned to him, i.e. his own superi-
 ority over the other producer, and
 the superiority of his product over
 that of the other (see § 8, οὐθέν
 κωλύει κρείττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου
 ἔργον). Having enjoyed the superi-
 ority of price already, in which the
 quality of labour was an element,
 he would now proceed to claim the
 superiority of labour by itself, which
 would thus be reckoned to him twice
 over. "Ὅταν ἀλλάζονται can mean
 nothing else than 'when they have
 exchanged,' ὅταν with the aorist im-
 plying a completed act. It seems
 unnecessary to say that the value of
 a thing is not to be settled after it is
 sold. Rather it is after the goods
 have come to market, and had a
 market price put upon them, that
 considerations of their production
 must cease. The expression, there-
 fore, is not clear, but the above inter-
 pretation seems the most natural that

Β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεποιθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία συνέ- 13 χει ὥσπερ ἔν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ὦσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὐ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἶον οἶνον, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγῆς. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελ- 14 λούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἐν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἶον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πᾶσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμ- μετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγῇ ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ 15 τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς· ἐν δὲ τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ

can be given of the passage. The words ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν are opposed to ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται. The punctuation therefore has been altered above, in concurrence with Fritzsche and with the learned paper by Mr. H. Jackson in the *Journal of Philology* (vol. iv. p. 316), the other conclusions of which are not accepted. "Ἀκρον above seems to mean 'one of the extremities of the figure' (ἐφ' ᾧ Α, κ.τ.λ.) 'Both the superiorities' must be those named or implied in § 8-10, the superiority of the one product over the other, and the superiority of the one producer over the other.

13 *ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία—ισασθῆναι* 'And that mutual want like a principle of unity binds men together, this fact demonstrates, namely, that when men are not in want of each other, whether both parties or one be thus independent, they do not exchange; whereas, when some one else wants the commodity that a man has (they effect an exchange), one party wanting, for instance, wine, and the other being will-

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ing to give it for an export of corn: and then an equality has to be brought about.' Some MSS., and the Paraphrast, read ἐξαγωγήν, 'and giving for it an export of corn.' Διδόναι ἐξαγωγήν, 'to grant an exportation,' occurs in Theophrast. *Char.* xx.: διδομένης ἐαυτῷ ἐξαγωγῆς ξύλων ἀτελεοῦς.

14 *ὑπὲρ δὲ—μᾶλλον* 'But with a view to future exchange, supposing one does not want an article at present, money is a security that one will be able to get the article when one wants it, for with money in his hand a man must be entitled to take whatever he wishes. It is true that money is under the same law as other commodities; for its value fluctuates, but still its tendency is to remain more fixed than other things.' On these excellent remarks nothing farther need be said. The term ἐγγυητής is quoted from the sophist Lycophron by Aristotle, *Pol.* III. ix. 8, in application to the law.

15 *τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως* 'Conventionally' opposed to ἀπλῶς, cf. *Eth.*

Q

- ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται. τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία Α, μυαῖ δέκα Β, κλίνη Γ. τὸ δὲ Α τοῦ Β ἡμισυ, εἰ πέντε μυῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἡ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος τὸ Γ τοῦ Β· ὁῦλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκία, ὅτι 16 πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, ὁῦλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσον αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.
- 17 Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ὁῦλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ

iv. ix. 7. The merely conventional character of money is strongly stated by Aristotle, *Pol.* I. ix. 11: "Ὅτε δὲ πᾶσι λήρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασιν, φύσει δ' οὐθέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χωρῶν οὐθένος ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον, κ.τ.λ.

16 ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ] The origin of commerce seems taken from this place by Paulus, cf. *Digest.* I. *De Contr. Empt.*: "Origo emendi vendendique a permutationibus coepit; olim enim non ita erat nummus, neque aliud merx aliud pretium vocabatur, sed unusquisque secundum necessitatem rerum ac temporum utilibus inutilia permutabat, quando plerumque evenit ut quod alteri superest alteri desit; sed quia non semper nec facile concurrebat ut, quum tu haberes quae ego desiderarem, invicem ego haberem quod tu accipere velles, electa materia est cujus publica ac perpetua aestimatio difficultatibus permutationum aequalitate quantitatis subveniret."

17 τί μὲν οὖν—εἴρηται] 'We have now stated what is the nature of the unjust and the just abstractedly.' A fresh division of the book commences here; after discussing the various kinds of justice objectively, that is, as principles which manifest themselves in

society, the writer proceeds to consider justice subjectively, that is, as manifested in the character of individuals.

ἡ δικαιοπραγία—ἀδικεῖσθαι] 'Just treatment is plainly a mean between injuring and being injured. Δικαιοπραγία is formed on the analogy of εὐπραγία, and as εὐπραγία is used ambiguously to denote both 'doing' and 'faring well' (cf. *Eth.* I. iv. 2), so δικαιοπραγία includes both the doing and the receiving justice.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης κ.τ.λ.] Justice is a mean state or balance in a different sense from the other virtues. It is not a balance in the mind, but rather the will to comply with what society and circumstances pronounce to be fair (τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν). Justice, according to this view, is compliance with an external standard. While in courage, temperance, and the like, there is a blooming of the individual character, each man being a law to himself, in justice there is an abnegation of individuality, in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all. It must be remembered that the account of ἐπιείκεια in this book supplements that of justice and takes off from its otherwise over-legal character.

τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσον ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἵρετοῦ πλεόν αὐτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνίπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τούναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν 18 ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλείψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλείψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἑλλείψεως ἐστίν, ἐφ' αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἑλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μείζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν. περὶ μὲν οὖν 19 δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἐκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τούτων τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα 6 ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτῃς ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ ληστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ

18 διὸ ὑπερβολὴ—ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν]
'Hence, too, injustice is an excess and a defect, because it is a principle that aims at excess and defect, in one's own case the excess of what is beneficial absolutely, and the defect of what is hurtful; but in the case of others, while the general result will be similar, it will not matter in which of these two ways proportion is violated.' That is, an unjust award may be made by giving a person too much good as well as too little, and too little evil as well as too much. Injustice is here said to be an extreme *διὸ ὑπερβολῆς ἐστίν*, just in the same way as justice was before said to be a mean state *διὸ μέσον ἐστίν*.

confusedly after the manner of Eudemus, apparently has for its object to restrict the term justice yet more definitely than has hitherto been done. We are now entering on the second division of the book, and the question is, what will constitute an individual unjust? This question tends to elucidate the nature of justice and injustice as individual qualities. But before answering it, there is a digression. It must be remembered, says the writer, that we are treating of justice in the plain sense of the word, that is, civil justice, not that metaphorical justice which might be spoken of as existing in families. On the nature of this justice, proper or civil justice, and on the metaphorical kinds, some remarks are given.

VI. This chapter, which is written

γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ἦ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαι-
 2 ρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἀδικος δ'
 οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐδὲ κλέπτῃς, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός,
 3 ἐμοίχευσε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. πῶς μὲν οὖν
 ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον.
 4 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς
 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ κοι-
 νῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ
 κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μὴ ἐστι τοῦ-
 το, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον,
 ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον,
 οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς· νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ

3 πῶς μὲν οὖν—πρότερον] The allusion is to ch. v. § 4-6, and the meaning appears to be simply, in the variety of cases that may occur, punishment by simple retaliation will not do. The sentence, however, appears irrelevant.

4 δεῖ δὲ μὴ—κατ' ἀριθμόν] 'Now we must not forget that the object of our inquiry is at once justice in the plain sense of the word (ἀπλῶς) and justice as existing in the state. But this exists amongst those who live in common, with a view to the supply of their mutual wants, free and equal, either proportionately or literally.' Τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον is opposed to καθ' ὁμοιότητα. It is not meant here to separate τὸ ἀν. δίκ. from τὸ πολ. δίκ., rather it is implied that they are both the same. The only justice that can be called so without a figure of speech is that between fellow-citizens, who have mutual rights and some sort of equality, cf. *Ar. Pol.* III. vi. 11, where it is said that all constitutions that aim at the common advantage ὁρθὰι τυγχάνουσιν οὕσαι κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον. Proportionate equality belongs to aristocracies and constitutional governments, numerical or exact equality to democracies. Cf. *Ar. Pol.* VI. ii. 2.

4-5 ἐστι γὰρ δίκαιον—τύραννος] 'For what is just exists among those who live under a common law, and law is where there is injustice (for legal judgment is a decision between the just and the unjust). Now wherever there is injustice there is wrong dealing, but it does not follow that where there is wrong dealing there is injustice. Wrong dealing consists in allotting oneself too much absolute good and too little absolute evil; and hence it is that we do not suffer a man to rule, but the impersonal reason, for a man does this for himself (i.e. rules, cf. *ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ* below), and becomes a tyrant.' This passage does not give the origin of justice, but the signs by which you may know it. Justice could not be said to depend on law (especially as law is said to depend on injustice, for we should thus argue in a circle), but where law exists you may know that justice exists. The argument then is that justice exists between citizens who have a law with each other, and not between father and children between whom there is no law. Law implies justice because it springs out of cases where a sense of wrong has been felt.

δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν· διὸ οὐκ ἐῴμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος· οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἰκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταῦτόν τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἄν ᾗ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν δ' οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν. οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον

ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία κ.τ.λ.] This seems to mean that law has not arisen merely from the fact of unequal dealings (ἀδικεῖν), but from a sense of the violation of a principle (ἀδικία). Thus the principle of justice is prior to all law and not created out of it. Τοῦτο δ', i.e. τὸ ἀδικεῖν. Following up this conception of the *a priori* character of justice, the writer says we must be governed not by a man, who may act selfishly, but by an impersonal standard of the right. That selfish rule is tyranny, Aristotle asserts in *Pol.* III. vii. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος. Cf. also *Pol.* III. xvi. 3: τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἀρχειν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἓνα τινα.—ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἀρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἀρχειν τὸν θεόν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον. ἡ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἀρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ

τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἀνευ ἀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.

6 ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν—γέρας] The apodosis to ἐπεὶ is μισθὸς ἄρα. From οὐ γὰρ το πρότερον is parenthetical. 'But since he does not seem to gain at all, if he is a just man (for he does not allot to himself more of the absolutely good than to others, unless it be proportional to his own merits, and hence he acts for others, and justice thus is said to be the good of others), we must give him some reward, and this comes in the shape of honour and reverence.'

καθάπερ ἐλέχθη τὸ πρότερον] The reference is to ch. i. § 17.

8 τὸ δὲ—ὅμοιον. 'Now the justice of masters and parents is not identical with what we have gone through (τούτοις i.e. ἀπ. καὶ πολιτ. δικ.), but is only analogous to it.'

9 διὸ—ἀρχεσθαι] 'Hence a man cannot have a spirit of wrong towards

τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ νόμον γάρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος· οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτῆματα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

- 7 Τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐθὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ

himself; nor civil justice or injustice; for this is, as we have said (*ἦν*), according to law and among those who can naturally have law; namely, those, as we said (*ἦσαν*), who have an equality of ruling and being ruled.'

VII. Continues the discussion as to the nature of civil justice, in which there are two elements, the natural (*φυσικόν*) and the conventional (*νομικόν*). They are distinguished, and arguments are brought against the sophistical position that all justice is merely conventional. The chapter as above is not conveniently divided. We need not have had a fresh commencement with § 1, *τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ*, which is a carrying on of the same digression before made; and we might well have had the end of a chapter at § 5, *κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη*, after which there is a return to the main question as to justice and injustice in the acts and the characters of individuals. In his later edition Bekker makes one undivided chapter including Chaps. VI., VII., VIII., of the present edition.

1 *τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ—διαφέρει*] 'Now in civil justice there is a natural element and a conventional element; that is natural which has the same force everywhere, and does not depend on being adopted or not adopted (*τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ*); while that is conventional which at the outset does not matter

whether it be so or differently, but when men have instituted it, then matters.' The distinction here drawn is like that between *ιδίος* and *κοινός νόμος* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, I. xiii., and also that between moral and positive laws in modern treatises. Natural justice is law because it is right, conventional justice is right because it is law. *Τὸ νομικόν* is not to be confused with *τὸ νόμιμον* (cf. ch. i. § 8), which is justice expressed in the law, and which is nearly equivalent to *πολιτικὸν δίκαιον*, containing therefore both the natural and conventional elements. In the early stages of society all law is regarded with equal reverence. Afterwards, in the sceptical period, the merely conventional character of many institutions is felt, and doubt is thrown on the validity of the whole fabric. Afterwards the proper distinction is made, and the existence of something above all mere convention is recognised. The idea of 'nature' as forming the basis of law, which was started in the school of Aristotle, was afterwards developed by the Stoics, and still further drawn out by Cicero and the Roman jurists. It became a leading formula in the Roman law, and hence has influenced the modern school of continental jurists, until a reaction was made against it by Bentham.

μῶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασιίδα, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνόις εἶναι 2 πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσais καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' 3

τὸ μῶς λυτροῦσθαι] Herod. (vi. 79) speaks of two minæ as the ransom, ἀποῦδ' ἐστὶ Πελοποννησίοισι δύο μνᾶι τεταγμένα κατ' ἄνδρα αἰχμάλωτον ἱκτίνειν.

τὸ αἶγα θύειν] Cf. Herod. ii. 42 : ὅσοι μὲν δὴ Διὸς Θηβαίους ἰδρυνται ἱρὸν ἢ νομοῦ Θηβαίων εἰσι, οὗτοι μὲν νῦν πάντες ὁῶν ἀπεχόμενοι αἶγας θύουσι.

τὸ θύειν Βρασιίδα] i.e. in Amphipolis, cf. Thucyd. v. xi. : καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολίται περιέρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον, ὡς ἡρώ τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδωκάσιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας νομίσαντες τὸν Βρασιίδα σωτήρα σφῶν γεγενῆσθαι.

2 δοκεῖ δὲ—ὁρῶσιν] 'Now some think that all institutions are of this character, because, while the natural is fixed and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns equally here and in Persia), they see the rules of justice altered.' Καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τοῖς Πέρσais. This appears to have been a common formula, cf. Plato, *Minos*, p. 315 E : ἐγὼ μὲν (νομίζω) τὰ τε δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκαια ἀδίκαια. οὐκοῦν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται ; —ναί.—οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσais ; —καὶ ἐν Πέρσais. In the same dialogue, p. 513, are given specimens of the different laws and customs in different times and places (D) : Μυρία δ' ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν. πολλὴ γὰρ εὐρυχωρία τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ὥς οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα νομίζομεν οὔτε ἄλλῃσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. The variety of customs and ideas is brought for-

ward by Locke and Paley to disprove the existence of an innate 'moral sense.' This variety is generally overstated, and the list of aberrations is mainly obtained from the usages of barbarous tribes. On the origin of the opposition between 'nature' and 'convention,' and on the use made of this by the Sophists, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 149.

3 τοῦτο δ'—οὐ φύσει] 'But this is not the case (i.e. that justice is mutable), though it is so to a certain extent. May be among the gods justice is immutable ; but with us, although there is somewhat that exists by nature, yet all is mutable. Though this does not do away with the distinction between what is by nature and what is not by nature.' The writing here is very compressed, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὥς, i.e. τὰ δίκαια κινούνται, to which also οὐδαμῶς afterwards must be referred. The answer given to the sophistical argument against justice consists in denying the premiss that 'what is by nature is immutable.' This might be the case, it is answered, in an ideal world (παρὰ γε τοῖς θεοῖς), but in our world laws are interrupted, and the manifestation of them is less perfect (κινήτων μέντοι πάν). Again, 'nature' must be taken to mean not only a law but a tendency (see note on *Eth.* ii. i. 3), as, for instance, the right hand is 'naturally,' but not always, stronger than the left, while merely conventional institutions exhibit no natural law (οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ

οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς. καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς· παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινήτῳ μέντοι πᾶν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει 4 τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχει, καὶ ποῖον οὐ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινήτᾳ ὁμοίως, δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, 5 καίτοι ἐνδέχεται τινὰς ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὁμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὐ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταυτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ 6 μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὥς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ' ἕκαστον 7 ἓν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον

συνθήκη), and are like weights and measures, which entirely depend on the convenience of men.

παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς] Of course there is nothing theological in this allusion. In *Eth.* x. viii. 7, the notion of attributing justice to the gods is ridiculed. The present mention of the gods is not meant to convey anything about their nature, it merely contrasts a divine or ideal state with the human and actual. An exactly similar mention of the gods is made below, ch. ix. § 17.

4 ἐνδέχεται τινὰς] Bekker reads τινὰς, Zell and Cardwell πάντας, all without mentioning any variation in their MSS. The latter of the two readings is supported by the Paraphrast and also by the author of the *Magna Moralia* (I. xxxiv. 21): λέγω δ' οὐκ εἰ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ μελετῶμεν πάντες δεῖ βάλ्लειν, γινώμεθ' ἂν ἀμφιδέξιοι. In either case, the sense is nearly the same, πάντας implying 'any one

out of all,' as above, κινήτῳ μέντοι πᾶν.

5 ὁμοία τοῖς μέτροις] The meaning appears to be, that measures differ in size in the producing (οὐ μὲν ὠνοῦνται) and the consuming (οὐ δὲ πωλοῦσιν) countries.

ὁμοίως δὲ — ἀρίστη] 'So, too, those institutions which are not based on nature, but on human will, are not the same in all places, for not even are forms of government the same, though there is one alone which for all places is naturally the best.' From the primary difference in governments will follow manifold other differences in conventional usages. For the Aristotelian idea of the one best government, see *Politics* III. vii., III. xv., &c.

6 τῶν δὲ δικαίων — καθόλου γάρ] 'Now every just and lawful rule stands like the universal in relation to the particulars, for while actions are manifold, the rule is one, being universal.'

καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἄδικον μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει. τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὐπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποία τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποία τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

Ὅντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ 8 μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ, ὅταν ἐκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδικοῖς, πράττονσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ 2 ἐκούσιφ καὶ ἀκούσιφ· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότε' ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὐπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῇ. λέγω δ' 3 ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἂν τις τῶν

We have a transition of subject now, a return from the digression on civil justice to inquire into individual responsibility, &c. The transition is made by saying that the principles of justice and injustice (τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ἀδικον) are universals and differ from just and unjust acts. At first the writer makes δικαίωμα stand to δίκαιον, as ἀδίκημα to ἀδικον. Afterwards he substitutes δικαιοπράγημα as a more correct word, inasmuch as δικαίωμα had another special meaning to denote the setting right of injustice—legal satisfaction. It is not improbable that Eudemus here is correcting phraseology of Aristotle, who at all events in his *Rhetoric*, i. xiii. 1, uses δικαίωμα as the opposite of ἀδίκημα, merely to denote a just action. Τὰ δ' ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαίωμα διαίλωμεν, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. The general principles of justice having now been defined, the question is what constitutes justice and injustice in the individual? In

one word the will. This chapter adds some needless remarks on the nature of the voluntary, and distinguishes between the different stages of a wrong done, according to the amount of purpose which accompanied it. The same act externally might be a misfortune, if happening beyond calculation; a mistake, if through carelessness; a wrong, if through temptation; the act of an unjust man, if through deliberate villany (§§ 6–8). This distinction is illustrated by the legal view with regard to acts done in anger (§§ 9–10). All voluntary just acts are just. Some involuntary acts are still unpardonable.

3 λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.] The reference is to the *Eudemian Ethics* II. ix. 2: "Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἐαυτῷ ὅν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι' αὐτόν, ἐκούσια ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅσα δ' ἀγνοῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀκων.

ἐψ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττει μήτε ὄν
 μήτε ᾗ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ τίνος
 ἔνεκα, κακείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βία,
 ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον, οὐχ
 ἐκῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον
 πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις
 γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον
 διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην.
 τὸ δὲ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ'
 ὄν, ἢ βία, ἀκούσιον· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόν-
 των εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθέν οὐθ'
 ἤκούσιον οὐτ' ἠκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρῶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.
 4 ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀπο-
 δοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε
 δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην
 μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ
 5 ἄδικοι πράττειν. τῶν δὲ ἐκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι
 πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προ-
 6 βουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσα ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν
 δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ'

ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα κ.τ.λ.] The same illustration is given in the *Eudemian Ethics* II. viii. 10, where the discussion has a great affinity to the present chapter

ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα] See the note on *Eth.* III. i. 18.

πολλὰ γὰρ—ἀποθνήσκειν] 'Since we knowingly both do and suffer many of those things that happen to us by nature, none of which are either in our power or voluntary, as, for instance, growing old or dying.' Obviously old age and death are ἀκούσια (cf. III. i. 3). So there must be something wrong in the text. Rassow conjectures οὐτ' ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐτ' ἐκούσιον, which has been adopted above. Cf. III. v. 7, ὅσα μὴτ' ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐστὶ μὴτ' ἐκούσια.

It is characteristic of Eudemus to turn to the consideration of physiological facts; see the notes below on *Eth.* VII. ch. xiv.

6 τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις] 'Therefore there being three kinds of harm that may be done in the intercourse of men,' &c. Really four kinds are specified, but the last (διὰ μοχθηρίαν) seems to be an addition to the old list, consisting of the misfortune, the error, and the wrong, which division is to be found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, I. ch. xiii. The present discussion is promised in *Eth. Eud.* II. x. 19: ἅμα δ' ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς διωρίζονται οἱ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκ προνοίας

ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτημάτων ἐστίν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ
 μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξει· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βαλεῖν ἢ οὐ
 τοῦτω ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα φήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη
 οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα φήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα κεντήσῃ,
 ἢ οὐχ ὄν, ἢ οὐχ ὥς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβῃ 7
 γένηται, ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας,
 ἀμάρτημα· ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ
 τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν. ὅταν δὲ εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ 8
 προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ
 ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκυῖα ἢ φυσικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀν-
 θρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδι-
 κούσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι πῶ ἀδικοὶ διὰ
 ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβῃ· ὅταν 9
 δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ
 ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ
 ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ 10
 μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένη
 γὰρ ἀδικία ἡ ὀργή ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλ-
 λάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὦν ἀνάγκη
 τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν·
 ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρως
 δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ,
 ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ. ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως
 βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ. καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ 11

νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακρι-
 βοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπονται γέ πῃ τῆς
 ἀληθείας· ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων
 ἐρούμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπι-
 σκέψει.

9-10 διὸ καλῶς—ἀδικεῖ] 'Hence
 too acts done from anger are well
 judged not to proceed from purpose,
 for not he who acts in anger, but he
 who provoked the anger is the beginner.
 Again, the question is not about the
 act having taken place or not, but
 about the justice of it; for anger
 arises on the appearance of injustice.
 It is not as in contracts, where men
 dispute about the thing having been

done, and where (if the thing has
 been done) one of the parties must be
 a villain, unless they have done it in
 forgetfulness. But (in the present
 case) agreeing about the fact, they
 dispute on which side justice is.
 Now he that has laid a plot against
 another cannot plead ignorance (in
 mitigation of the charge of injustice
 against him), so that B (the party
 who commits an act of wrathful re-
 taliation on A, whom he alleges to
 have plotted against him) maintains
 that he has been injured, while the
 other party, A, denies it. But if A
 has purposely hurt B, he is certainly

ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ.
 12 δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν πράττη. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίῳ
 τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγγνωμονικά τὰ δ' οὐ συγγνωμονικά· ὅσα
 μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμαρ-

guilty of injustice towards him.' Owing to the obscurity of expression, this passage has given great trouble to the commentators. The context is a carrying on of the distinction between ἀμάρτημα, δίκημα, and δίκον. What distinguishes these is the amount of purpose they contain. This, says the writer, is illustrated by the way in which acts of anger are treated legally. In violations of civil contract the question is merely as to fact,—did the contract exist, and has it been consciously violated? But in cases of assault, &c., committed in anger, the fact is admitted, but justification is pleaded in respect of some act of injustice, which provoked the acts complained of. Thus the question is moved off from the acts themselves, and is entirely concerned with their antecedents. Was it a real injustice that gave rise to them? That this is what the writer means, is shown by the words of the text (§ 10) ἀμφοσβητεῖται—περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἐπὶ φαινόμενη γὰρ ἀδικία ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. According to the text, when an act of wrathful retaliation has been committed, the question is, was the act that provoked this retaliation an act of injustice or not? And this turns very much on the question whether it was a harm done knowingly and on purpose? (ὁ ἐπιβουλευσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ—ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ.) We thus return to the general proposition (§ 11) that injustice of act requires only voluntariness, but injustice of character deliberate purpose. The reference here is to the point of

view of the law-courts, and may have been suggested, like so much else in this book, by the discussions in the *Politics* of Aristotle. Cf. *Pol.* iv. xvi. 1-5, where the different kinds of law-courts are specified, and it is mentioned as one of the cases that fall to be treated of in a criminal court,—where homicide is admitted, but its justification is pleaded: Φονικοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶδη, ἂν τ' ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικασταῖς ἂν τ' ἐν ἄλλοις, περὶ τε τῶν ἐκ προνοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκουσίῳ, καὶ ὅσα ὁμολογεῖται μὲν, ἀμφοσβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, κ.τ.λ.

ἐπὶ φαινόμενη γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ] This is a reasonable deduction from Aristotle's definition of anger, *Rhet.* II. ii. 1, δρεξίς μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινόμενης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν, κ.τ.λ. If anger arises from a sense of wounded *amour propre*, the idea of injustice and wrong must certainly be counted among the most common causes of its being excited.

12 ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον] This would seem to imply a state in which moral insensibility and temporary mental obscuration have been caused by an access of brutality (*θηριότης*) as described in *Elh.* VII. v. 3. αἰτὰι μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ τε νόσους γίνονται καὶ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μήτερα καθιερεύσας καὶ παγίων, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἦπαρ. The police courts afford frequent instances of the fiction of brutal injuries, which are 'not forgivable,' though the perpetrators seem hardly responsible beings.

τάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοϊαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώριστα περὶ τοῦ ὀδικοῦσθαι καὶ ὀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

μητέρα κατέκτα τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος,
ἐκὼν ἐκοῦσαν, ἢ θύλουσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν,

IX. This chapter, by means of mooted and answering certain difficulties and objections with regard to the nature of justice and injustice, completes and deepens the conception of them that has hitherto been given. These questions are as follows: (1) Can one be injured voluntarily? §§ 1-2. (2) Is the recipient of an injury always injured? §§ 3-8. The latter question is first generally answered, and then, §§ 9-13, it is re-stated in the form of two other questions, namely, Is the distributor of an unjust distribution, or he that gains by it, unjust? and, Can a man injure himself? By mooted these points it is at once shown that justice implies a relationship of two wills, and that an act of injustice implies a collision of two wills: a loss on one side and a gain on the other. The chapter ends with some remarks correcting popular errors, and deepening the conception of justice. (1) Justice is no easy thing consisting in an external act. It consists in an internal spirit, § 14. (2) To know it is not like knowing a set of facts. It implies a knowledge of principles, § 15. (3) The just man could not at will act unjustly. The character of the act depends on the state of mind, § 16. (4) Justice is limited to a human sphere, § 17.

ἢ ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν—ἐκόντες] 'Now one might doubt whether we have

adequately defined being injured and injuring; in the first place, whether it be as Euripides says, in his strange language, A. "I killed my mother, and there's an end of it." B. "Was it with the will of both, or was she willing while you were unwilling?" In short, is it as a matter of fact possible that one should be voluntarily injured, or, on the contrary, is that always involuntary, just as all injuring is voluntary? And is all injustice, like all injuring, to be summed up under the one category or the other, or is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary? The same may be said about being justly treated, for all just doing is voluntary, so that it might be supposed that being injured and being justly treated would be opposed to each other as to being voluntary or involuntary correspondingly to the two active terms (ἀντικ. ὁμολως καθ' ἐκάτερον). But it would be absurd to say of being justly treated that it is always voluntary, for some are treated justly against their will.

εἰ ἱκανῶς διώριστα] This shows the purpose of the chapter, to complete the definition of justice and injustice by looking at them on the passive side.

ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης] Wagner (*Eur. Fragm.* p. 40) says the lines come from the *Alcæon* of Euripides. The Scholiast refers them to the

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον. καὶ ἄρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ὥστ' εὐλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ 3 δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἐκόντες. ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν τὸ τὰδिका πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικούντος ἢ 4 δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγούντος. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ

Bellerophon. Wagner writes them as a dialogue, supposing the persons to be Alcmaeon and Phegeus. He conjectures *κατέκταν*, which appears more probable than the usual reading *κατέκτα*, and which accordingly has been adopted in the above translation.

2 The passive terms are not opposed to each other in respect of voluntariness in the way that might be expected from the opposition between the active terms under which they stand.

ἀδικεῖν—δικαιοπραγεῖν
ἀδικεῖσθαι—δικαιοῦσθαι.

For ἀδικεῖσθαι is always involuntary, but δικαιοῦσθαι is not always voluntary. A man may be 'treated justly' by being hanged.

3 Not every one who suffers what is unjust is injured, for injury implies intention on the part of the injurer. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* I. xiii. 5 : *ἐστι δὲ*

τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος τὰ δίκαια πάσχειν.

4-6 *εἰ δ' ἐστίν—πράττει*] 'Now, if to injure is simply defined "to hurt any one willingly," and "willingly" means "knowing the person, and the instrument, and the manner," and the incontinent man hurts himself willingly, then it follows that one can be willingly injured, and it will be possible to injure oneself. But this was one of the points in question, whether it is possible to injure oneself. Again, one might from incontinence be hurt willingly by another who was acting willingly, so that in that way it would be possible to be injured willingly. But shall we not rather say that the definition is not correct, but that we must add to the formula "hurt any one willingly, knowing person, instrument, and manner," the terms "against that person's wish?" It is true one is hurt and one suffers injustice willingly, but no

ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα τινά, τὸ δ' ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ϕ καὶ ὥς, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν, ἐκὼν τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο καὶ ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν τι τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἐκὼν ἂν τις δι' ἀκрасίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἐκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἐκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετόν τῳ βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ϕ καὶ ὥς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν καὶ τὰδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἐκὼν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐθεὶς ὃ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὃ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἶεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ "Ομηρός γ φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῳ Διομήδει

χεύσσεια χαλκίῳ, ἐκατόμβοι' ἱνιαβοίων,

one is injured willingly. For no one wishes (harm), nor does the incontinent man, but he acts against his wish. For no one wishes for what he does not think to be good, and the incontinent man does not do what he thinks to be good.'

ἀπλῶς is opposed to κατὰ πρόσθεσιν as implied in προσθετόν. Cf. VII. iv. 2-3.

τὸ βλάπτειν] Harm does not constitute injustice without a violation of the will. Cf. Ar. *Rhet.* I. xiii. 6: ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι, καὶ ἀκούσιως βλάπτεσθαι.

ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς] The incontinent man may harm himself, or be led into ruin by others. The phenomena of incontinence appear to have constantly occupied the attention of Eudemus. They not only form the main subject of *Eth.* Book VII. (*Eth. Eud.* VI.), but they are also mixed up with the discussion on the voluntary, *Eth. Eud.* II. viii.

ὁ οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται κ. τ. λ.] In his inmost self every one wishes for what he thinks good. Thus the

incontinent man, following his desire, acts against his own real wish. This is the same point of view as is taken in the *Gorgias* of Plato (p. 466 sqq.) It is rather different from that in *Eth.* III. ch. iv. (on which see notes), though the word *αἰεταί* prevents an absolute collision. The terms *παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν* are rather awkwardly introduced in the text, for it is said they are necessary to turn mere harm into injustice, but with regard to the incontinent man, while acting voluntarily he receives 'harm—against his wish.' Yet he is not injured voluntarily, because the terms 'against his wish' constitute him an involuntary agent. In short, in this case *παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν* is made to qualify, not the harm, but the voluntariness of the recipient. There is a slight confusion in the expression, but on the whole the tendency here is to attribute a less degree of voluntariness to weak and foolish acts than was done by Aristotle in his discussions on the voluntary; *Eth.* III. i. 14, &c.

οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ δίδοναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.
8 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον, δῆλον.

Ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δὴ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ' ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεῖον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ
9 ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανεμὼν ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλεόν, εἴ τις πλεόν ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἐκόν, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ. ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλῶν; ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἐπλεονέκτει, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐθέν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον.
10 φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ διανεμὼν ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλεόν ἔχων αἰεὶ· οὐ γὰρ ὅτ' ὁ ἀδικὸν ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅτ' ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἢ
11 ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ διανεμόντι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ
12 μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ

8-13 *ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δὴ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν*] 'But of the questions which we determined on there remain two to discuss,' namely, (1) whether the distributor of an unjust distribution does the wrong, or he who gains by it? (2) Can a man injure himself, as for instance by taking less than his share? These questions are as good as answered already; it is already clear that no one can injure himself. Again the *act* belongs to the distributor and not to the receiver. If the distributor acts from corrupt motives he is unjust, if unconsciously and by accident he is not unjust, though jus-

tice may have been violated by his decision.

11-12 *ἔτι ἐπεὶ—πρῶτον*] 'Again, as the word *doing* is used in more senses than one, and there is a sense in which inanimate things kill—or one's hand—or the slave who does his master's bidding—so the distributor may be the instrument of doing injustice, without himself injuring. Again, if he decided in ignorance, in the eye of the law he is not guilty of injuring, nor is his decision unjust, though from another point of view it is unjust, for justice according to law is distinct from abstract justice.' The

αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερί- 13
 σαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως
 πλεόν ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ
 ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς 14
 οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥάδιον.
 τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ
 πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον
 ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν
 οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γινῶναι τὰ 15
 δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν
 οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ'
 ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ πῶς πρατ-
 τόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ πλεόν ἔργον ἢ
 τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι, ἐπεὶ κύκει μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον
 καὶ κᾶσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νείμει
 πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσούτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν
 εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐθὲν 16
 ἦττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἦττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον
 δύναται ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι

first case supposes the distributor to act as the instrument of others, the second that he makes a mistake through ignorance. In the latter case abstract justice (τὸ πρῶτον δίκαιον) is violated, and yet legally (κατὰ τὸ νομικόν) no injustice can be complained of. *πρῶτον* here appears used analogously to *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, *πρώτη ὄλη*, &c., to denote that which is most real and necessary, and also most abstract as being most removed from individual modifications. The Paraphrast and many of the commentators understand § 11 to refer to the receiver, not to the distributor. It might also be taken in a quite general sense, as applying to all such subse-
 quent acts. But it seems simplest to refer it to the distributor.

14-17 These sections contain remarks concluding the subject of

justice. As they correct popular errors regarding its nature, they may be considered a continuation of the *ἀπορία*, with which the chapter commenced. The views which are here combated are, (1) a shallow and external notion about justice and injustice, as if they merely consisted in outward acts; (2) a sophistical opinion that to know justice merely consists in knowing the details of the laws, cf. *Eth. x. ix. 20*; (3) an opinion that justice implies its contrary, as if it were an art (*δύναμις*); see above ch. i. § 4. This opinion would be a consequence of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to and drew out the paradoxical conclusion, *Repub. p. 334 A, Hipp. Min. pp. 375-6*. The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (*ἔξις*) set the difficulty at rest.

- γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφείναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὅποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῦειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ
- 17 φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐθὲν μῶριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.
- 10 Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν ἐπιεικεία πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,

17 ἔστι δὲ—ἐστιν] 'Now the relations of justice exist between those who share in what are commonly called goods, but with regard to them can have both too much and too little. For some cannot have too much, as perhaps the gods; and to others again no portion is advantageous, but all is hurtful—I mean the utterly bad; while there is a class who can receive goods up to a certain point. Hence justice is human.' Two ideal states, one of the absolutely good, the other of the absolutely bad, are here depicted in contrast to the condition of human society. The idea of property cannot of course be connected with God (cf. *Eth.* x. viii. 7), who has and is all good (cf. *Eth.* i. vi. 3, ix. iv. 4); nor again with those who are so degraded that they could not receive any benefit at all from what are called goods (cf. ch. i. § 9). The passage is a curious one, and may remind us of the position assigned by Aristotle (cf. *Pol.* i. ii. 14) to man in his social condition, as something between the beast and the god.

X. Some account of equity

(*ἐπιεικεία*) forms a suitable complement to the theory of justice, and we find the subject so treated in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, i. xiii., from which it is not improbable that the present chapter may be partly borrowed. Professor Spengel is mistaken in saying that this chapter is out of place, being introduced into the midst of the *ἀπολογία* on justice. Evidently it is chapter xi., and not chapter x., that is out of place. Spengel thinks that the words *περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας*, would come in well after the words *πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἰρηται πρότερον* (which occur ch. vi. § 3), as if first retaliation and then equity should be discussed in relation to justice. But it is evident that they stand on a different footing, as treated in this book. Retaliation is a principle existing in justice and with certain modifications constituting it; equity is something outside justice and correcting it.

Ἐπιεικεία has a close connection with what is called *γνώμη* (consideration), *Eth.* vi. xi. 1, cf. *Rhet.* i. xiii. And thus it is treated of by the author of the *Magna Moralia* amongst

ἐχόμενον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταῦτον ἀπλῶς οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπούμενοις, καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὅτε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὃν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἅμφω σπουδαῖα, τῶτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπικὲς, ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐθὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπικὲς

the intellectual qualities, and is coupled with what he calls *εὐγνωμοσύνη*, *Μαγνα Moralía*, II. I, sqq.

To us the contents of this chapter appear natural and easy to apprehend. The idea of equity as the complement of law and justice is to us perfectly familiar, but the writer saw a difficulty in saying how logically (τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι) equity could be praised if it contradicted justice. The answer is well given above, that equity is a higher and finer kind of justice coming in where the law was too coarse and general. The best illustration of this conception is to be found in the beautiful description given in *Rhet.* I. xiii. 'It is equity to pardon human failings, and to look to the lawgiver and not to the law; to the spirit and not to the letter; to the intention and not to the action; to the whole and not to the part; to the character of the actor in the long run and not in the present moment; to remember good rather than evil, and good that one has received, rather than good that one has done; to bear being injured (τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον); to wish to settle a matter by words rather than by deeds; lastly, to prefer arbitration to judgment, for the arbitrator sees what is

equitable, but the judge only the law, and for this an arbitrator was first appointed, in order that equity might flourish.'

I ὅτε μὲν—ἀγαθοῦ] 'Sometimes we praise what is equitable and the equitable character in such a way, that we transfer the term and use it instead of the term good in praising people for all other qualities besides.' The word *ἐπικὲς* is constantly used merely in the sense of 'good'; cf. *Eth.* IV. ix. 7, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπικέες, and above, ch. iv. § 3, &c.; but it is a mistake to consider this the *later* sense of the word, as if 'equitable' were the primary sense. *Ἐπικὲς* (from *εἰκός*) first means 'customary,' as in Homer; then 'seemly,' then 'good' in general; afterwards it is probable that an association of *εἰκω*, 'to yield,' became connected with the word, and hence the notion of moderation and of waiving one's rights arose, and τὸ *ἐπικέες* was constantly contrasted with τὸ *δίκαιον*. Thus in Herod. III. 53: πολλοὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἐπικέστερα προτιθέασιν. Cf. Plato, *Laus*, p. 757 D: τὸ γὰρ ἐπικέες καὶ ἐὺγυμνον τοῦ τελείου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς παρὰ δίκην τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐστὶ παρατεθραυσμένον, &c. Out of this contrast the idea of equity was developed.

δικαίου τινὸς ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὥς ἄλλο τι γένος ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. ταῦτ' οὖν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαῖον ὄντοιν κρείττον τὸ ἐπιεικές.
 3 ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικές δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου.
 4 αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον· καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἡττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός
 5 ἐστίν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς οὕτως ἂν εἴποι ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ἥδει, 6 ἐνομοθέτησεν αὖν. διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος. καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων
 7 ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ ὁ κανὼν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς ὁ μολίβδινος κανὼν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν, καὶ τὸ ψή-
 8 φισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές,

4 περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε κ.τ.λ.] That law is necessarily imperfect and unable to cope with details, Aristotle constantly admits, cf. *Pol.* III. xi. 19: περὶ ὧν ἐξαδυνατούς οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾶδιον εἶναι καθόλου περὶ πάντων. *Pol.* II. viii. 23: ἐπεὶ ἐνίας ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν. *Pol.* III. xv. 9: μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπει ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν.

6 ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ] 'There are some cases for which it is impossible

to legislate; you require a special decree to meet them.' The ψήφισμα, like the exercise of equity, was a remedy to make up the insufficiency of laws. On its special character cf. ch. vii. § 1, and *Eth.* VI. viii. 2, see also Arnold on Thucyd. III. 36.

7 τοῦ γὰρ—πράγματα] 'For the rule for what is indefinite must be itself indefinite, like the leaden rule in the Lesbian architecture—the rule is not fixed, but shifts itself according to the shape of the stone, and so does

καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον, καὶ τίνος βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπικῆς τίς ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπικῆς ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὔσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ, φανερόν ἐκ II
τῶν εἰρημένων· τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει· ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη μὴ ἀντιβλάβη, ἐκὼν 2
ἀδικεῖ, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ. ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων ἐκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἔῃ ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὐ; 3
ἐκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἐκὼν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιοί, καὶ τις ἀτιμία πρόσσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἀδικος, ὁ μόνον 4

the decree according to the nature of the case.' 'Lesbian architecture' appears to have been a kind of Cyclopiian masonry, which may have remained in Lesbos from the early Pelasgian occupiers of the island. Polygon stones were used in it, which could not be measured by a straight rule; cf. *Æsch. Fragm.* 70,

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τις Λέσβιον
κῦμα' ἐν τρεγῶναις ἐκπεραίνετω ρυθμοῖς,
where κῦμα means a waved moulding.

XI. This chapter, which is merely an instance of Eudemian mal-arrangement, starts by discussing an already settled question, Can a man injure himself? Amidst the somewhat feeble reasonings and the repetitions which it presents, it is not quite without interest in the view that is taken of suicide, §§ 2, 3, and in the saying that it is a mere metaphor to speak of justice

between the higher and lower parts of a man.

I ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] i.e. ch. i. §§ 12-20. The question is complicated by introducing a mention of universal justice (τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν), and the extraordinary assertion is made that 'whatever the law does not command it forbids.' We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, &c.?

2-3 The suicide sins against the state, not against himself. This is proved by the fact that the state affixes infamy to the deed. In *Æschines, Ctesiph.* p. 636, § 64, it is mentioned that the hand of a suicide was buried apart from himself. And in Plato's *Laws*, ix. p. 873 c, sqq., regulations are laid down for the burial of suicides. In the words ἀδικεῖ ἄρα, ἀλλὰ τίνα; there is a change of meaning from the intransitive ἀδικεῖν, to 'do wrong,' to the transitive verb to 'injure.'

ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου. ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη ἀφηρῆσθαι καὶ προσκείσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.

5 ἔτι δὲ ἐκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον. ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' ἑαυτόν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐθεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοίχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ λύεται τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν

7 περὶ τοῦ ἐκούσιως ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ πλεόν ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ· ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας

4 ἅμα γὰρ—ἀδικον] 'For it would be thus possible for the same thing to be gained and lost by the same person; but this is not possible, justice and injustice must always take place between more persons than one.' Cf. ch. iii. § 4.

6 ὅλως δὲ λύεται κ.τ.λ.] A verbal repetition of what was said above, ch. ix. § 9.

7-9 The chapter ends by touching upon two points which have an apparent reference to Plato: (1) the assertion that to injure is worse than to be injured, which the writer here qualifies with a consideration; (2) the conception of justice existing between the different parts in the mind of an individual, which is here pronounced to be a metaphor.

7 καὶ ὥσπερ—γυμναστικῇ] This sentence is parenthetical and elliptic. The train of thought appears to be: 'Injuring and being injured are both

bad, they are both departures from the mean, and it is (with justice) as with health in medicine and good condition in training,' namely, it is a state of balance between excess and defect. Cf. *Eth.* II. II. 6.

ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] This is exactly the point which is urged by Socrates in the *Gorgias* of Plato (p. 473 A, 509 O), and seems to his hearers a paradox. It is qualified above by the admission that being injured might be in its consequences (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) a worse evil than injuring; just as a stumble might cause a man's death, and so be accidentally worse than a pleurisy. Is it then worse to be ruined by the cheating of others, or to cheat some one of a sixpence? The writer above acknowledges that moral science will maintain the severity of its verdict, and say cheating is the worse (ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ κ.τ.λ.). Of

καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας. καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι 8 ἦπτον φαῦλον, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐθὲν κωλύει μείζον εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρίτιν λέγει μείζω νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίῃ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητά ἐστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς 9 αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον. εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἐαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχονται καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἀλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ 10 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

course being depraved in mind is the worst of all evils. It is not this (*ἄδικος εἶναι*), but a single act of wrong (*τὸ ἀδικεῖν*), that will bear comparison with the evil of being injured.

9 κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ—τούτοις] 'Now metaphorically and by analogy one is capable of justice, not towards one's own self, but towards certain parts of oneself, not every kind of justice, but despotic or household justice. For in the theories alluded to there is a separation made between the reasonable and unreasonable part of man's nature. Regarding this, people consider that one can have injustice towards oneself, because these separate parts may be made to suffer

a contradiction of their respective inclinations; so then, like ruler and ruled, they have a sort of justice among each other.'

ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις] It can hardly be doubted that there is a reference here to Plato, *Repub.* p. 441 A, 443 D, 432 A, &c. To deny the appropriateness of the term 'justice' to express a harmony between the different parts of man's nature is unlike the point of view taken *Eth.* ix. c. iv., where the friendship which the good man has with himself is described at length. Eudemus, however, was much busied with problems as to the unity of the will, and probably advanced to some extent the Peripatetic psychology.

PLAN OF BOOK VI.

TURNING to the contents of this Sixth Book, we see at once that it includes two subjects, and that the intermixture of these two has given rise to some little confusion. The questions are: (1) What is the moral standard? (2) What are the intellectual *ἀφαιρέσεις*?

Commencing with the former question, the writer goes off into the latter. And thus Thought (*φρόνησις*) is treated of at some length as a perfection of the moral intellect, but is hardly touched upon with regard to its operation as the moral standard.

After the two above-mentioned questions have been proposed, without any statement of their connection, the discussion of the intellectual *ἀφαιρέσεις* commences by a division of the reason into scientific and calculative. Ch. I.

Truth is the object of both, but truth is divided into practical and speculative. The former enters into and becomes an element in the decisions of the will. Ch. II.

Truth of whatever kind is attained by only five organs of the mind—Science, Art, Thought, Reason, and Philosophy. These then are severally discussed; and Philosophy, after being treated independently, has Thought brought in again in contrast to itself. Ch. III.—VII.

The relation of Thought to Economy and Politics is then discussed. Ch. VIII.

Prudence (*εὐβουλία*), Apprehension (*σύνσις*), and Considerateness (*γνώμη*), as being component elements of Thought, are severally treated of, and some remarks are added on the natural and intuitive character of these practical qualities. Ch. IX.—XI.

The book ends by the statement and solution of difficulties with

regard to Thought and Philosophy, their respective *use*, and their relation to each other in point of superiority.

With regard to the *use* of Thought some important though not very clear remarks are made on its inseparable connection with Virtue. Though inseparable, it is not, however, identical with Virtue, as Socrates wrongly asserted. In relation to Philosophy, Thought is concerned with the means, while Philosophy is concerned with the end. Ch. XII.—XIII.

The upshot of the book, then, is, that it treats of the intellectual *desiral*. These are two—not *five*, as some would say, reckoning as such the five organs of truth, nor again an indefinite number, as Aristotle would seem to say, admitting ‘Apprehension,’ &c. (*Eth.* i. xiii. 20); but two essentially, Philosophy and Thought. These are contrasted with each other, but in such a way that Thought, though the least excellent, is brought into prominence, and is the real theme of the book. With all the discrepancies of statement which are apparent between different passages in this book, ‘Thought’ comes out in its general outlines as the perfection of the practical reason combined with the will; as inseparable, if distinguishable, from Virtue itself. The picture of this quality and of its growth in the mind is made the occasion of many interesting remarks; but the question how the mind acts in determining the mean, and what is the nature of the moral standard, is left still unanswered.

For the term *φρόνησις*, as used in this book, it is not possible to find an exact equivalent in English. ‘Prudence,’ which is generally employed for this purpose, is not suitable; for *φρόνησις*, according to Platonic views, included the contemplation of absolute existence (see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 194). ‘Thought’ is the equivalent for *φρόνησις* in its general Greek sense, and it has been thought better, in the following notes, to take ‘Thought’ in a peculiar and technical sense to represent the peculiar and technical application of *φρόνησις*, which here occurs.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VI.

ἘΠΕΙ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξει, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐστὶ τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καὶ τις

I. This chapter states, though somewhat indefinitely, the question which is to be answered in the ensuing book. Referring back to a previous mention of 'the mean,' it proposes now to discuss 'the right law' by which the mean is determined. For only to know that action must be 'in the mean, and according to the right law,' is a mere blank formula which requires filling up (ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές). What then is the right law, and what is the standard of it (τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὁρος)? In answering this question, the procedure must be to discuss the most perfect developments of the intellectual faculties, for by so doing we shall learn the proper function of each (ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἐξίς· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκίον). As the inner nature of man was before divided into two parts, the rational and irrational, so we may now subdivide the rational part into two elements, the scientific and the cal-

culative, in accordance with the two classes of objects which are presented to the mind, and which we may conclude are dealt with by separate faculties, namely, the permanent, which is dealt with by the scientific element in us, and the contingent, which is the object of calculation, or deliberation.

Ἰ ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες] The reference is to *Eth. Eud.* II. v. 1: ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἐξίς ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἣν ἀριστα διακένται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἀριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς κ.τ.λ.

ἐν πάσαις γὰρ—λόγον] 'For in all the states of mind which we have described, as also in all others, there is a certain mark to which he who is in possession of "the law" (ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων) looks, and tightens or relaxes (the strings) accordingly, and there is a certain standard of those mean states which we say are between

ἐστὶν ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὕσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ² σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὧν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὥς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἂν τις οὐθὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλεόν, αἶον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεισθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα,

excess and deficiency, being in accordance with the right law.' 'Ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίσιν' is a metaphor from tuning the strings of a lyre. Cf. Plato, *Lysis*, p. 209 B: καὶ ἐπειδὴν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, τὴν λύραν λάβης, οὐ διακωλύουσί σε οὐθ' ὁ πατήρ οὐθ' ἡ μήτηρ ἐπιτείνειν τε καὶ ἀνείναι ἦν ἂν βούλη τῶν χορδῶν. *Phædo*, p. 98 C: καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅσα ἐστὶ στερεά, καὶ διαφυνὸς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνείσθαι. This metaphor is not quite in accordance with that other metaphor of 'looking to the mark,' but in fact the term σκοπός seems to have become so regular a formula with Eudemus as to have lost its metaphorical association. By Aristotle σκοπός was used as a pure metaphor, the application of which was borrowed from Plato (cf. *Eth. I. ii. 2*, note). But in the writing of Eudemus it seems used as a scientific term equivalent to τέλος; cf. *Eth. Eud. II. x. 20*: ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλευεται δὲ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἐκείνους, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπός τις δεῖ τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλευεται. *Ib. II. xi. 2*: λέγομεν δὲ προσηγόρησαντες. 'Ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνει· ἐστὶ δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτάνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαινόμενα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μὴ δέτερον. The similar use of ὅρος by Eudemus is not found in *Eth. Nic.*, but appears

borrowed from the mode of writing in the *Politics* of Aristotle (see Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 61-62). Cf. *Eth. Eud. II. v. 8* (which is especially referred to in the present passage), *tis δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ δρᾶν ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον*, ὅτεροι ἐπισκεπτέον. *Ib. VIII. iii. 12*: δεῖ τινα εἶναι δρᾶν καὶ τῆς ἐξέως καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ περὶ φυγῆς χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. *Ib. VIII. iii. 15*.

² ἔστι δὲ—σαφές] 'Now to say this is to say what is true enough, but not explicit.' This same expression, with the same illustration of the medical art, is repeated *Eth. Eud. VIII. iii. 13*: ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφήν εἴποιεν ὡς ἡ λατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης. τοῦτο δ' ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐ σαφές δέ. Cf. *Ib. I. vi. 2*: ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφὺς δὲ προϊούσιν ἐσται καὶ τὸ σαφές. In the present place there is an apparent protest against the indefiniteness and relativity of Aristotle's moral theory of 'the mean' and 'the law.' Eudemus does not seem (according to the statement here) content to give greater explicitness to the idea of the 'law' by the development of the idea of the wise man who is its impersonation. But he asks (separating σκοπός and δρᾶς from the λόγος), 'What is the mark to which one possessing the law must

εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὥς ὁ ταύτην
3 ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον
ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς τ'
ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὁρος.

4 Τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ
ἥθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς
5 πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη
δύ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον.
νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον.
καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωρούμεν
τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως

look?' What is the standard of the law? In reality these questions get no answer. They only cloud the subject by introducing a confusion of formulæ.

4 τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἥθους ἔφαμεν] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. i. 18: ἀρετῆς δ' εἶδη δύο, ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ διανοητικὴ· ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον τοὺς δικαίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς.

5 πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύ' εἶναι] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. iv. 1: Εἰλημμένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διήρηται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος διανοητικαὶ, ὡς ἔργον ἀλήθεια, ἡ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἡ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος δ' ὁρεῖται.

καὶ ὑποκείσθω—αὐτοῖς] 'And let us suppose that the parts possessing reason are two, one by which we apprehend such existences as depend on necessary principles, and one by which we apprehend contingent matter, for to objects differing in genus there must be different members of the mind severally adapted, if it be true that these members

obtain their knowledge by reason of a certain resemblance to and affinity with the object of knowledge.' We have here a division of the mind in accordance with a division of the objects of which the mind is cognisant. And as a justification of this we have the assumption that knowledge implies a resemblance and affinity between object and subject. With regard to this, Aristotle (*De Animâ*, I. ii. 10) says that 'those philosophers who wished to account for knowledge and perception identified the ψυχὴ with the principles of things, because like is known by like.' 'Ὅσοι δ' ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων (ἀποβλέπουσιν), οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, οἱ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτω

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὁδοὶ δ' ὁδῶν,
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διὰ, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ
ἀττηλον,
στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δὲ τε νεῖκεῖ
λυγρῷ.

ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειό-
τητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ 6
μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι
καὶ λογιζέσθαι ταῦτόν, οὐθεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ
Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων
ποιεῖ· γινώσκεισθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ
ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν
εἶναι. Sir W. Hamilton says (*Dis-*
cussions on Philosophy, p. 60): 'Some
philosophers (as Anaxagoras, Hera-
clitus, Alcmaeon) maintained that
knowledge implied even a *contrariety*
of subject and object. But since the
time of Empedocles, no opinion has
been more universally admitted than
that the *relation of knowledge* inferred
the *analogy of existence*. This analogy
may be supposed in two potences.
What knows and what is known are
either, first, *similar*, or second, the
same; and if the general principle
be true, the latter is the more philo-
sophical.' The fact is, that every act
of knowledge is a unity of contra-
dictions. It would be absurd to deny
that the subject is contrary to the
object, and it would be equally
absurd to deny that the subject is the
same as the object. As Empedocles
says, the mind only knows fire by
being fire, but, on the other hand, if,
in knowing fire, the mind only *were*
fire, and were not contrary to fire,
then to know fire would only be to
add fire to fire. But it is *qua* 'know-
ing' that the mind is contrary to its
object, not *qua* knowing any par-
ticular object. Thus from the diver-
sity of objects we are justified in con-
cluding a diversity in the mind. But
we must be sure that objects are

really different from one another in
genus (τῷ γένει ἕτερα), before we con-
clude the existence of different parts,
faculties, or elements corresponding to
them, else we may attribute to diffe-
rent principles in the mind phenomena
that were only modifications of each
other, and not by any means implying
a diversity of principle.

6 λεγέσθω δὲ—ἐχοντος] 'Of these,
let one be called the "scientific," the
other the "calculative" part, for deli-
berating and calculating are the same,
and no one deliberates about neces-
sary matter. The calculative part,
then, is one division of the rational.'
The psychology here is an advance in
dogmatic clearness of statement be-
yond what we find in the writings of
Aristotle. The terms τὸ ἐπιστημονι-
κόν and τὸ λογιστικόν are not opposed
to each other in the *De Animā*. Λογι-
στικόν has not there taken the definite
meaning which it wears in the present
book. Rather it is used in a general
sense to denote 'rational.' Thus in
asking how the ψυχὴ is to be divided,
Aristotle says (*De An.* III. ix. 2): ἔχει
δ' ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μέρη λέγειν
τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. Τρόπον γάρ τινα
ἄπειρα φαίνεται καὶ οὐ μόνον ἃ τιμὲς
λέγουσι διαρίζοντες, λογιστικόν καὶ θυ-
μικόν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν (i.e. Plato, *Re-*
pub. pp. 436-441), οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον
καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. Cf. *Ib.* III. ix. 5: ἐν
τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται.
Ib. III. x. 10: φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἡ
λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ. Cf. *Topica*,

ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐστὶν ἐν τι
7 μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρ' ἐκατέρου τούτων
τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἔξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ἡ δ'
ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.

2 Τρία δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ

v. v. 4, where in stating the various ways in which the logical property may be predicated of a substance, it is said, ἡ ἀπλῶς καθάπερ ζῶον τὸ ζῆν, ἡ κατ' ἄλλο, καθάπερ ψυχῆς τὸ φρόνιμον, ἡ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον, καθάπερ λογιστικοῦ τὸ φρόνιμον (φρόνιμον and λογιστικὸν being here both used most probably in a general sense for 'thought' and 'reason'). Again, τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν is used, not as here opposed to τὸ λογιστ., but generally. *De Anim.* III. xi. 3: τὸ δ' ἐπιστημονικὸν οὐ κωεῖται ἀλλὰ μένει. However, the distinction here given is already prepared in the *De Anima*, and is even stated (though less dogmatically) in a place which was probably borrowed by the present writer. *Ib.* III. x. 2: νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἐνεκὰ τοῦ λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει.

οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλευεται, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. x. 9: περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδ' ἐγχειρήσειε βουλευέσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν. Περὶ ὧν δ' ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. We before observed (cf. *Eth.* III. iii. 3 note) that Aristotle, in the parallel passage, did not use the terms τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα and τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα. To combine logical with psychological formula is the characteristic of Eudemus.

II. The last chapter having divided the reason into scientific and calculative, the present chapter proceeds to bridge over the interval between the intellect and moral

action. This is done by assuming three principles in man—sensation, reason, and desire. Sensation merges into the other two, and then it is shown that in purpose, the cause of action, there is the meeting point of desire and reason, not of the pure or speculative reason (answering to the 'scientific part' of the last chapter), but the practical reason aiming at an end (which answers to the 'calculative part' in the former division). Thus there are two kinds of truth, one pure, the other having a relation to the will, and 'agreeing with right desire.' This distinction is a great step towards answering the question with which the present book is concerned. Truth having been divided into pure and practical, it only remains to see the forms under which the mind deals with these two kinds, and the highest developments of the mind will be disclosed, arranged under a twofold head.

1 τρία δ' ἐστὶν] Cf. *Ar. De Anima*, III. x. 1: φαίνεται δὲ γε δύο ταῦτα κινῶντα, ἡ ὁρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἰ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθεὶς ὡς νόησιν τινα. . . . ἀμφω δὲ ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὁρεξις. Νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἐνεκὰ τοῦ λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. . . . Καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινήσῃ οὐ κινεῖ ἀνευ ὁρέξεως. It is highly probable that Eudemus had this passage before his eyes. The only alteration he has made is to substitute αἰσθησις for φαντασία, and to speak of the deter-

ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις 2
οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· ὁῦλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν
ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ
κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει διώξις καὶ φυγῇ·
ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρετικὴ, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις
ὄρεξις βουλευτικὴ, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι
καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ
αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ
διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτικὴ. τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς 3
διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς
τάληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητι-
κοῦ ἔργον, τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἡ ἀλήθεια
ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. πράξεως μὲν οὖν 4
ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα, προαι-

minators of truth and action as three, with one merged in the other two, instead of calling them two with a third implied. Τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις κ.τ.λ. answers to καὶ ἡ φαντασία κ.τ.λ.

2 δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία—πράξεως μὴ κοινωνεῖν] The definite meaning of πράττειν and πράξις to denote 'moral action' appears perhaps rather more strongly in Eudemus than in Aristotle. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. vi. 2: πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις δ' ἄνθρωποι καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζώων· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἰποιμεν ἂν πράττειν. *Ib.* II. viii. 6: οὐ γὰρ φαμέν τὸ παιδίον πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἦδη διὰ λογισμὸν πράττοντα.

ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κ.τ.λ.] All this is a compressed result of Aristotle's discussions, *De Anima*, III. x.-xi.

ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. x. 28: ἀνάγκη τοίνυν—τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἔξω προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς.

ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II.

x. 14: δῆλον ὅτι ἡ προαίρεσις μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ βουλευτικῇ.

τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν] 'The decision of the reason must be true, and the desire must be right.' The terminology here used is rather more accurate than that of Aristotle, *De An.* III. x. 4: νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός· ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. Cf. *Eth.* III. ii. 13, where it is said that ὀρθός is the proper epithet for purpose (i.e. as a function of the will), ἀληθής for the functions of the intellect.

4-5 πράξεως μὲν οὖν—ἀνθρωπος] 'Now of moral action purpose is the cause (I mean the efficient cause, not the final), and the efficient cause of purpose is desire, and reasoning on the end to be aimed at. Hence purpose can neither be separated from reason and intellect, nor from a particular state of the moral nature. Well-doing and its contrary imply intellect and moral character. Now intellect by itself moves nothing, only intellect aiming at an end, that

ρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος· διὸ οὐτ' ἄνευ
 νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἢ προαίρεσις·
 εὐπραξία γάρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ
 5 ἡθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διάνοια δ' αὐτῇ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά
 του καὶ πρακτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχη·
 ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς τι καὶ τινὸς τὸ ποιητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἢ γὰρ
 εὐπραξία τέλος, ἢ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου· διὸ ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς
 ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητικῇ, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ
 6 ἀνθρώπος. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐθὲν γεγονός, οἷον

is, practical intellect. This controls the productive intellect as well, since he that produces, produces for the sake of some end, and the thing produced is not an end in and for itself, but is only an end relatively and for a particular individual. But the thing done is an End-in-itself, since well-doing is an end, and this is what we desire. Hence purpose may be defined as desiring reason, or as rational desire, and such a principle as this is man.' We have here a *resumé* of Aristotle's views in *De Anima*, l. c. Another division of the intellect, however, is introduced, that into practical, productive, and speculative, which is to be found implied in *Eth.* I. i. 1, and is stated *Metaphys.* v. i. 5: *ὥστε ἐι πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητικὴ κ.τ.λ.* It is here shown that the productive faculties of man are subordinate to the practical thought, since no artist produces anything purely and solely for its own sake; however much he may seem to do so, still his art as a part of his life falls under the control of his will and reason.

διάνοια δ' αὐτῇ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του There is a slight confusion here. Aristotle had said (*De An.* III. ix. 10, III. x. 2, III. x. 4), that the

reason dealing with ends differed from the speculative reason, that reason neither speculative nor practical was the moving cause of action (III. ix. 10: *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κινῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν νοεῖ πρακτόν—οὐδ' ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ.*), and that intellect could not move anything without desire conjoined (III. x. 4: *νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἀνευ ὀρέξεως*), but Eudemus mixes up these points. He says that 'intellect by itself moves nothing,' and then as if in opposition to intellect by itself he puts 'but practical intellect does.' He should have said 'practical intellect plus desire.'

καὶ πρακτικῇ] *Kai* is used here denoting identity. Cf. *Eth.* v. vi. 4: *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.* *Ar. De An.* III. x. 2: *νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογισόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός.* *εὐπραξία*] On the ambiguity of this term, cf. *Eth.* I. iv. 2, note.

6 *οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐθὲν γεγονός*] 'Now nothing that is past is ever the object of purpose.' This assertion with the quotation from Agathon to illustrate it, appears certainly to be a digression. The nature of purpose had been quite sufficiently

οὐθείς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βου-
λένεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ
ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ
ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων

μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στρίσκειται,
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἄσφ' ἂν ἢ πιπραγμένα.

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον.
καθ' ἧς οὖν μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύσει ἐκάτερον, αὐτὰ
ἄρεται ἀμφοῖν.

Ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. 3
ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι,
πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη

explained already, especially in refer-
ence to the present context. How-
ever, to exclude the past, and circum-
stances which though contingent have
become historical, from the sphere
of deliberation, is an addition to
Aristotle's list of exclusions (*Eth.*
III. iii. 1-10), and on this account
probably Eudemus was glad to intro-
duce the above remarks.

III. This chapter proposes to con-
sider the two parts of the reason
(scientific and calculative) from a
fresh point of view (*ἀρξάμενοι—πάλιν*).
It accordingly gives a list of five
modes under which the mind attains
truth; namely, art, science, thought,
philosophy, and reason. It then pro-
ceeds to give some account of science.
This account will be found to be a
mere *cento* of remarks from the logical
writings of Aristotle. The chief
points specified are as follows. Science
deals only with necessary
matter. It is demonstrative, starting
from truths already known, and pro-
ceeding by means of induction or
syllogism. Its premises are obtained

by induction, but they must be more
certain than the conclusion, else the
knowledge of the conclusion will be
not scientific, but merely accidental.

ἰ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν] It seems in
the highest degree probable that this
list was suggested by a passage in
Aristotle's *Post. Analytics* (I. xxxiii. 8),
where, after a discussion on the differ-
ence between science and opinion, it
is said: τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πῶς δεῖ διαρίσσειν
ἐπὶ τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης
καὶ τέχνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας,
τὰ μὲν φυσικῆς τὰ δὲ ἠθικῆς θεωρίας
μᾶλλον ἐστίν. It will be observed
that Aristotle in this passage does not
propose six terms to be distinguished
from each other, but three pairs of
terms which are to be separately dis-
cussed, part of them (*i.e.* probably
the two first pairs) by psychology
(*φυσικῆς θεωρίας*), and part of them
(*i.e.* *σοφία* and *φρόνησις*) by ethics.
Eudemus, taking up the whole list,
has omitted *διάνοια*, which he does
not distinguish from *νοῦς*, and has
given the rest as an exhaustive
division of the modes by which the
mind apprehends truth. By so doing

φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξη ἐνδέχεται
 2 διαψεύδεσθαι. ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν
 φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς
 ὁμοίότησιν. πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα,
 μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως,
 ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ. ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. αἰδίων ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἀπλῶς πάντα αἰδία, τὰ δ' αἰδία, ἀγέννητα
 3 καὶ ἄφθαρτα. ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι,
 καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα

he has made a cross division, for *σοφία* does not stand apart from *νοῦς* and *ἐπιστήμη*, but includes them, and surely so complex an idea as 'philosophy' ought not to be placed on the same level with the intuitions of the reason, the simplest and deepest forms of the mind. In ch. vi. § 2, however, the logical exhaustiveness of the division is made the only ground for proving that the principles of science are apprehended by reason.

ὑπολήψει γὰρ—διαψεύδεσθαι] 'For conception and opinion may be false.' This is suggested probably by *Ar. Post. Anal. II. xix. 7*: 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξω, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν δεῖ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, ὡς δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθὴ δ' αἱ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, κ.τ.λ. In *Ar. De An. III. iii. 7*, ὑπόληψις is used in so general a sense for the apprehensions of the mind as to include *ἐπιστήμη*, *δόξα*, and *φρόνησις*. If opposed (as here) to scientific certainty, it comes to very much the same as *δόξα*.

2 ἐπιστήμη μὲν—ἐπιστητόν] 'Now what science is, will be clear from the following considerations, if we wish to speak exactly and not be misled by resemblances. We all conceive that what we know is necessarily what it is—if it be so only contingently, as

soon as it is out of our ken, we cannot tell whether it be so or not. Therefore the object of science is necessary matter.'

ταῖς ὁμοίότησιν] i.e. the various analogical and inaccurate uses of the word 'knowledge.' 'Ἐπιστήμη is to be defined ἀπλῶς and not καθ' ὁμοίτητα, cf. *Eth. v. vi. 4*. The present passage is taken from *Post. Anal. I. ii. 1*: 'Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς—ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐστίν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστὶ, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν.—ὥστε οὐ ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν] 'Out of the reach of our observation.' *Θεωρ.* here retains more of its original sense of 'seeing' than generally; cf. e.g. ch. i. § 5: *Ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα* κ.τ.λ. *Eth. I. vii. 21*. In the following chapter, § 4, *θεωρεῖν* is used for to 'consider' or 'speculate,' though not in the special sense of philosophical speculation.

τὰ δ' αἰδία κ.τ.λ.] For a specimen of 'things eternal' cf. *Eth. III. iii. 3*, and see note.

3 ἐτι διδακτὴ—συλλογισμῶ] 'Again all science appears capable of being imparted by demonstration, and the matter of science appears capable of

διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῶ. ἡ μὲν δὲ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς· ἐπαγωγή ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη⁴ ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδευκτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι

being so apprehended. But all demonstration depends on pre-existent knowledge (as we say in analytics also), for it proceeds either by induction or syllogism.'

ὥσπερ λέγομεν] This is a general mode of expression, not a particular reference; some MSS. however read ἐλέγομεν. Eudemus, as we know, wrote a book on analytics (cf. Vol. I. Essay I. p. 32). In his *Ethics*, II. vi. 5, he speaks, as here, *generally* of analytics, δῆλον δ' ὅτι ἐπιχειροῦμεν διὰ ἀναγκῶν, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν. In the present passage he is borrowing, not quoting, from the opening of Aristotle's *Post. Anal.* Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως. It is the first proof of knowing a thing to be able to impart it, cf. *Metaphys.* I. i. 12: ὅπως τε σημείων τοῦ εἰδέντος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν. Hence, by association with the idea of science, διδασκαλία comes to be almost identical with demonstration, cf. *Sophist. Elench.* II. 1: 'Ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν τῇ διαλέγεσθαι λόγων τέτταρα γένη, διδασκαλικοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειραστικοὶ καὶ ἐριστικοί, διδασκαλικοὶ μὲν οἱ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν ἐκάστου μαθήματος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου δοξῶν συλλογισζόμενοι, δεῖ γὰρ πιστεῦειν τὸν μαθητάνοντα. Cf. *id.* x. II.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς κ.τ.λ.] This is taken from *Post. Anal.* I. i. 2: where Aristotle, having said that all demonstration depends on previous

knowledge, adds that this is true with regard to the mathematics, and also in dialectical arguments, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὅτι διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προϋπαρχουσῶν ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δήλου εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. What Aristotle had said of dialectical arguments, Eudemus applies to science, which he accordingly asserts to be sometimes inductive. His further assertion that the principles of deductive science are obtained by induction is inconsistent with the conclusion of ch. vi., though it agrees with *Ar. Post. Anal.* II. xix. 6. In fact ἐπαγωγή seems to be used by Aristotle in the *Post. Anal.* as equivalent to that amount of experience which is the *condition*, not the *cause*, of necessary truths. Cf. *id.* I. i. 4.

4 ἡ μὲν—ἀναλυτικοῖς] 'Science, then, is a demonstrative state of mind, with all the other qualifications which we add in analytics.' Cf. *Ar. Post. Anal.* I. ii. 2: 'Ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδευκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος. Aristotle, in his account of science, represents it from its objective side as a deduction of ideas rather than as a state of mind.

ὅταν—γὰρ ἐπιστήμην] 'For a man knows when he is convinced, and is

αὐτῷ ὧσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται, εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

- 4 Τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ
2 πρακτόν, ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πράξις· πιστεύομεν δὲ
περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ
λόγου ἔξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιη-
τικῆς ἔξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχονται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ
3 ἡ πράξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πράξις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ
οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τις ἐστὶ καὶ ὅπερ ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου
ποιητικῆ, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἣτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου
ποιητικὴ ἔξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἡ οὐ τέχνη, ταῦτόν ἂν

sure of the premises; since if he is not more sure of them than of the conclusion, the knowledge which he has will be only accidental.' Taken from *Post. Anal.* i. ii. 1: 'Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἴμεθ' ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κ.τ.λ. To know results without the proofs Aristotle called 'accidental' knowledge, and this mode of knowledge he attributed to the Sophists; cf. *Metaphys.* v. ii. &c.

πιστεύει] Cf. *Sophist. Elench.* ii. 1 (*l.c.*): δὲ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μανθάνοντα. *Infra*, ch. viii. § 6: τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι, ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν.

IV. Eudemus altered the list of mental operations given by Aristotle (*Post. Anal. l.c.*) only by the position of νοῦς, which in first stating his list Eudemus places at the end, probably because, having separated it from διάνοια, he was uncertain about its admission; afterwards he discusses it before σοφία, as being prior to it in order of time. The list then appears in Aristotle, διάνοια νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη τέχνη, φρόνησις σοφία; in Eudemus, ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς (afterwards νοῦς, σοφία). This

chapter, in treating of art, gives but a scanty account, apparently borrowed from different passages in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Art, like action, belongs to the sphere of the contingent, but its difference from action is universally recognised (πιστεύομεν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ. λόγ.) As shown by an instance, it consists in 'a productive state of mind in harmony with a true law.' It has to do with producing and contriving the production of things that fall neither under the law of nature nor necessity. Rather art deals with the same objects as chance, by which it is often assisted.

1-2 τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου—λόγους] 'Now contingent matter includes the objects both of production and action, but production and action are different. On this point even popular notions sufficiently bear us out.' With regard to ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, cf. *Eth.* i. xiii. 9, and see Vol. I. *Essays*, Appendix 2.

3 ἐπεὶ δ'—ποιητικῇ] 'But since architecture is an art, and may be defined as (ὅπερ) a certain state of mind rationally (μετὰ λόγου) productive, and there is no art which is not a rationally productive state of

εἷν τέχνην καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. ἔστι δὲ 4
 τέχνην πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν
 ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι,
 καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ·
 οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἢ τέχνην ἐστίν,
 οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν
 ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποιήσις καὶ πράξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν
 τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι, καὶ τρόπον τινὰ 5

mind, nor again any such state which is not an art: art must be the same as "productive state of mind rightly directed." The procedure here is to take a species of art, and, abstracting what is peculiar, to leave the generic conception remaining, which thus is taken as the definition of the genus.

ἑτέρ] A logical formula implying identity, convertibility of terms, cf. *Eth.* VII. xiii. 1: οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη] This is a slight discrepancy from Aristotle, who speaks of three modes of production, art, faculty, and intellect, without, however, specifying the difference between them, *Metaphys.* VI. vii. 3: πᾶσαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ποιήσεις ἢ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἢ ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀπὸ διαβολῆς. *Ib.* X. vii. 3: ποιητικῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιουμένῳ τῆς κινήσεως ἢ ἀρχῆς, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν εἶτε τέχνη τις εἴτ' ἄλλη τις δύναμις.

4 ἐστὶ δὲ — ποιουμένῳ] 'Now all art is about creation, and the contriving and considering how something may be created of those things whose existence is contingent, and whose efficient cause exists in the producer and not in the thing produced.' There is not any distinction intended between τεχνάζειν and θεωρεῖν. The absence of the article before θεωρεῖν shows that these belong to the same idea; they are

both only an expansion of the term γένεσις, and are not to be separated from it, as if the writer was describing different stages in the process of art. We find τεχνάζειν used by Aristotle simply in the sense of 'contriving,' *Pol.* I. xi. 12: ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχρασαν γενέσθαι μουσικῶν *Ib.* VI. v. 8: τεχναστέον ὅν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος.

ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ.] Taken from Aristotle, *Metaphys.* X. vii. 3 (*l.c.*) Cf. V. i. 5: τῶν μὲν ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις. There is the same classification of causes here as in *Eth.* III. iii. 7, into nature, necessity, chance, and the human intellect. On Aristotle's conception of nature, see Vol. I. Essay V.

5 καὶ τρόπον τινὰ—τέχνη] 'And in a way chance and art are concerned with the same objects.' Eudemus, taking this observation from Aristotle, illustrates it, after his own fashion, with a quotation from Agathon. Cf. *Metaphys.* VI. vii. 4: τοῦτων (ποιήσεων) δὲ τινες γίνονται καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης παραπλησίως ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ φύσεως γινομένοις. Cf. *Ib.* VI. ix. 1, where the following question is started: ἀπορήσει δ' ἂν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίνονται καὶ τέχνη καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δ' οὐ, οἷον οἰκία. The answer is, that there is a

περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀ-
γάθων φησὶ

τίχνη τύχην ἰστιγξί καὶ τύχῃ τίχῃ.

6 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου
ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τούναντίον μετὰ
λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως
ἔχειν.

5 Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες

principle of self-movement in the matter to be operated on in the one case, but not in the other. That the devices of art are often suggested, and its results assisted, by chance, need not be confirmed by examples; but while art is thus assisted by chance, on the other hand, it is the main object of art to eliminate chance. Cf. *Metaphys.* I. I. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ὁρθῶς λέγων, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην. The theory of art is but meagre in the writings of Aristotle. His great defect with regard to the subject is, his not having entered into the philosophy of the imagination. Yet still he gives us remarks of far greater interest than what is contained in the brief *resumé* of Eudemus, cf. especially the saying, *Metaphys.* VI. vii. 4, that 'all things are done by art, of which the idea exists in the mind,' ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, and add *Post. Anal.* II. xix. 4: ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, δ' ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐπὶ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτὸ, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμη.

V. Thought (*φρόνησις*) is next discussed. Its nature we learn from the use of the word 'thoughtful' (*φρόνιμοι*) to denote those who take good counsel

with regard to the general ordering of life. This subject admits of no scientific demonstration; again, it is different from art. We see the quality of 'thought' exemplified in such men as Pericles, who know what is good for themselves and others. This knowledge and insight is preserved by temperance, which hence gets its name (*σωφροσύνη*). Art admits of degrees of excellence, but 'thought' does not. Voluntary error in art is better than non-voluntary, but the reverse in 'thought,' which thus is shown to be more than a mere quality of the intellect,—it becomes part of ourselves (*φρονήσεως οὐκ ἐστὶ λήθη*).

I *περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως*] From Socrates to Eudemus we may trace a distinct progress with regard to the doctrine of *φρόνησις*. Socrates said 'virtue is knowledge' (*ἐπιστήμη*). Plato first 'virtue is,' afterwards 'virtue implies thought' (*φρόνησις*). Cf. *Meno*, p. 98 D: διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἢ ἀρετὴ. *Theaet.* p. 176 B: ὁμοίωσις δὲ (τῷ θεῷ) δίκαιον καὶ δόσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. *Phaedo*, p. 69 A: ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὁρθόν, ἀνθ' οὗ δὲ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ἀνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἦ, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ ἧ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγυγνομένων καὶ ἀπογυγνομένων

τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσάσθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ 2 τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ 3

καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονησεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀπὲρ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ βῆτι ἀνδραποδῶδης. This 'thought,' however, he defined as the contemplation of the absolute (*Phædo*, p. 79 D), and thus identified the moral consciousness with philosophy (see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 194). Aristotle, as we have already seen (*Post. Anal.* I. xxxiii. 8, quoted on ch. iii. 1), proposed as a subject for discussion the distinction between φρόνησις and σοφία. With him φρόνησις was gradually coming to assume its distinctive meaning as practical wisdom; but this was not always clearly marked. Cf. *Topics*, v. vi. 10, where it is said to be the essential property of φρόνησις to be the highest condition of the reasoning faculty (τὸ λογιστικόν), just as it is of temperance to be the highest condition of the appetitive part. In another place of the *Topics* (iv. ii. 2) it is incidentally mentioned that some think φρόνησις to be both a virtue and also a science, but that it is not universally conceded to be a science. Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον τῶν γενῶν ὑπ' οὐδετέρου περιέχεσθαι· οὐ μὴν ὑπὸ πάντων γε συγχωρεῖται τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. In the *Politics*, iii. iv. 17, it is said to be the only virtue properly belonging to a ruler. 'Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχontos ἰδίας ἀρετὴ μόνη· τὰς γὰρ

ἄλλας ἔουκεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων. 'Ἀρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής. Thus it is used for practical wisdom, but in a broad general sense, with reference to state affairs rather than to individual life, implying, however, an absolute consciousness as opposed to ἀληθής δόξα. Frequently Aristotle uses φρόνησις simply to denote 'thought' or 'wisdom,' without reference to its sphere. Cf. *Eth.* I. vi. 11, I. viii. 6, &c. Finally, it appears in its distinctive sense, *De An.* I. ii. 9. 'Anaxagoras says that all animals possess νοῦς; they certainly do not all possess equally the reason that gives what we call "thought." οὐ φαίνεται δ' ὅ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν. *Rhet.* I. ix. 13: φρόνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας, καθ' ἣν εὖ βουλευέσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν. *Eth.* x. viii. 3, where there is a contrast between the life of contemplation and of practical virtue, φρόνησις is spoken of as inseparably connected with the latter, while the happiness of contemplation by the pure reason is something apart. In the present book we have the Eudemian exposition and development of Aristotle's theory, which entirely contrasts φρόνησις with σοφία, and limits the former to the regulation of individual life.

3 βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς] A verbal

τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
 πράξαι· ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὣν δ'
 αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἔστιν ἀπό-
 δειξεις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι
 βουλευσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων), οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ
 φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται
 τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος
 4 πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν
 ἀληθῇ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ καὶ
 κακά· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ
 5 πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ
 τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα
 εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται
 θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ
 τοὺς πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσα-
 6 γορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῶζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν. σῶζει
 δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν

repetition of ch. i § 6. Cf. *Eth. Eud.*
 II. x. 9 (*l.c.*)

4 τῆς μὲν γὰρ] A repetition of ch.
 ii. § 5.

5 διὰ τοῦτο—πολιτικούς] 'Hence
 we consider such men as Pericles
 "thoughtful," because they have a
 faculty of perceiving what is good for
 themselves and good for men in general.
 And we attribute the same character
 to those who have a turn for the
 management of households and of state
 affairs.' On φρόνησις as a quality for
 the ruler of a state, cf. *Ar. Pol.* III. iv.
 17 (*l.c.*), and on the connection estab-
 lished by Eudemus between thought for
 the individual, for the family, and for
 the state, see below, ch. viii. § 1, note.

ἐνθεν—ὑπόληψιν] 'Hence it is that
 we call temperance by its present
 name (σωφροσύνη) as preserving one's
 thought (σῶζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν), and
 this is the kind of conception which
 it preserves,' i.e. a moral conception
 (περὶ τὸ πρακτὸν) about the right and

wrong, or, as it is here put, about
 'the end' (τὸ οὐ τέλος) of actions.
 The false etymology here given
 comes from Plato's *Cratylus*, p. 411 D,
 where, after a sportive derivation of
 φρόνησις, that of σωφροσύνη is added:
 'Ἡ φρόνησις· φορᾶς γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ρού-
 νοσις. Εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ θυσιον ὑπολαβεῖν
 φορᾶς· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ φέρεσθαι
 ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ γνώμη παντάπασιν
 δημοῖ γοῆς σκέψιν καὶ νόμῳ· τὸ
 γὰρ νομᾶν καὶ τὸ σκοπεῖν ταῦτόν. εἰ
 δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸ ἡ νόσις τοῦ νέου ἔστιν
 ἔσις· τὸ δὲ νέαν εἶναι τὰ δὲ στα σημαίνει
 γιγνόμενα δεῖ εἶναι· τούτου οὐκ ἐβίεσθαι
 τὴν ψυχὴν μηνύει τὸ δρομα δὲ θέμενος
 τὴν νεέσιον. οὐ γὰρ νόσις τὸ ἀρχαῖον
 ἐκαλεῖτο, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡ εἰ εἴδει λέγειν
 δύο, νεέσιον. σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὐ
 νῦν δὴ ἐσκέμεθα, φρονήσεως. Of course
 σωφροσύνη merely means 'sound-
 mindedness.' But the whole concep-
 tion of the relation of Temperance to
 'Thought' here given agrees with
 Plato, *Repub.* 518, C-E.

διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν, οἶον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἡ ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἔνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς· ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἔξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ, περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν·⁷ καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἦττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δηλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιιν μεροῖν⁸

7 ἀλλὰ μὴν—τέχνη] 'It must be added, that while in art there are degrees of excellence, there are none in thought; and while in art he that errs voluntarily is the better, he that does so in thought is the worse, as is the case with the virtues also. Therefore it is plain that thought is a sort of virtue and not an art.' Ἡττον, as contrasted with αἰρετώτερος, stands for ἦττον αἰρετός. The phrase ἀρετὴ τέχνης occurs again ch. vii. § 1. The present passage probably has reference to *Topica*, iv. ii. 2 (*l.c.*), δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, where ἐπιστήμη answers to τέχνη in the place before us. To say that there are no degrees of excellence in 'thought' gives it an absolute character, just as it is said that there are degrees in the understanding, but not in the reason. Common language would admit of degrees in thoughtfulness. Cf. *Ar. Metaphys.* i. i. 2: διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμέων μνημονεύειν ἐστίν. *De An.* i. ii. 9, *l.c.* But here 'thought' is considered as something ideal, just as afterwards, ch. xiii. § 6, it is said to imply all the virtues.

8 ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων] Eudemus seems often inclined to betake himself to
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a small antagonism against Platonic doctrines; whether in detail this was original, or borrowed from oral remarks or lost writings of Aristotle, we cannot tell. Cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 16, v. xi. 9, vi. xiii. 3, &c. Here there seems to be an allusion to the Socratico-Platonic paradox which forms the subject of the *Hippias Minor*, that to do injustice voluntarily was better than doing it involuntarily (see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 169). Here the contrary is assumed with regard to 'thought,' and the conclusion drawn is, that 'thought' is not an art, in other words (as is said more distinctly afterwards), not merely intellectual. If 'thought' were merely intellectual, then voluntary error in action would not be error at all, because knowledge would remain behind unimpaired; but if 'thought' is a state of the will as well as of the intellect, then voluntary error, as implying a defect of the will, is the worst kind of error. The worst kind of error, morally, is considered to be sinning against knowledge, knowing the right and doing the wrong, which some philosophers deny to be possible. See below, Book VII. ch. iii.

8 δυοῖν δ'—ἔστιν] 'And as there

X

τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγων ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθῃ τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἑξῆώς ἐστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

6 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις

are two parts of man's nature which possess reason, thought will be the highest state of one of these, namely, the opinative part, for opinion and thought both deal with the contingent. We must add that it is not merely an intellectual state (*ἕξις μετὰ λόγου*), the proof of which is that while such states admit forgetfulness, thought does not.' Τὸ δοξαστικὸν answers to τὸ λογιστικόν, ch. I. § 6. That opinion deals with contingent matter we are told, *Ar. Post. Anal. I. xxxiii. 2*: *λείπεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ ἀληθές μὲν ἢ ψεῦδος, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν*. After associating opinion with thought, the writer separates them, just as Aristotle separates *προαίρεσις* from *δόξα*, *Eth. III. ii. 11*. In the present passage there is a great want of clearness. We are told that thought is an excellence, or highest state, of a part of the intellect. Hence we should naturally conclude that it was *λόγος τις* (cf. ch. xiii. § 5), but the formula throughout used is, that thought is *ἕξις μετὰ λόγου*. This formula, in the sense of 'accompanied by inference,' 'able to give an account of itself,' is applied by Aristotle to *ἐπιστήμη* (see notes on the next page); and so too Plato, *Theaetetus*, 201 D: *τὴν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι*. Cf. *Eth. Eud. VIII. ii. 3*; *οὐ γὰρ ἀλογος ἡ φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἔχει λόγον διὰ τὸ οὕτω πράττειν*. Thought then is first defined to be 'a reasoning state of mind'; afterwards we are told that

thought is not simply a *ἕξις μετὰ λόγου*, by which the writer evidently means to say, that thought is not a mere state of the intellect. It may be indeed true that the moral intellect cannot be separated from the will and personality (cf. ch. xii. § 10), but what is to be complained of is, that the formulæ used for expressing all the truths connected with this subject are so very imperfect.

σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθῃ] Cf. *Eth. I. x. 10*, where it is said that 'the moments of virtuous consciousness in the mind are more abiding than the sciences,' and see note. To *φρόνησις* in the Platonic and general sense, of course forgetfulness might attach. Cf. *Laws*, p. 732 B: *ἀνάνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροὴ φρονήσεως ἀπολείπουσας*.

VI. This chapter treats of reason, but goes no further into the subject than as follows,—science implies principles, and we cannot apprehend these principles by science itself nor by three out of the other four modes of mind which give us truth. It therefore remains, on the grounds of exhaustive division, that reason must be the organ by which we apprehend first principles.

On examination it will be found that the contents of the chapter are borrowed almost *verbatim* from Aristotle's *Post. Analyt. II. xix. 7*: *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν αἰεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός,*

καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰς δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τοῦτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀποδείξιν ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαφεν-² δόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηθὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις ⁷

ἀληθῆ δ' αἰ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ οὗτοι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀποδείξιν, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. Aristotle argues that principles must be apprehended either by science or reason; they cannot be apprehended by science, therefore they must be by reason. Eudemus, it will be observed, follows this mode of arguing, only he applies it to all the five organs of truth, which he had before arbitrarily laid down as an exhaustive list. In following implicitly the passage above cited, he has ignored for the time the earlier part of the same chapter, in which Aristotle attributes the origin of universals rather to induction; *id.* § 6: Δῆλον δὲ οὗτις ἡμῶν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον. καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ.

Also he is at variance with his own statement above, ch. iii. § 3.

1 μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη] 'For science implies inference.' This is evidently the meaning of the present sentence, taken as it is from *Post. Anal. I. c.* Λόγος is frequently used to denote 'inference.' Cf. ch. viii. § 9: ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄντων, ὧν οὐκ ἐστὶ λόγος: xi. 4, τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, &c.

οὐδὲ δὴ—ἐστίν] 'Nor of course does philosophy apprehend these principles, for it is the part of the philosopher to possess demonstration about some things.' It need hardly be said that this is a very poor ground for establishing the point in question.

VII. What 'philosophy' is may be learnt from the use of the word σοφός, as applied to the arts. It denotes 'nicety,' 'subtlety,' 'exactness.' Philosophy, then, is the most subtle of the sciences. It embraces not only deductions, but also principles. It is 'a science of the highest objects with the head on.' It is above both practical thought and science. It is one and permanent, while they

τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο 2 σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφοὺς, ὥσπερ Ὁμηρὸς φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ' σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα
οὐτ' ἄλλω; τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ 3 σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοὺς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμωτάτων. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν

are manifold, relative, and changeable. It is higher, as the cosmos is higher than man. Philosophy and not practical thought was the reputed property of men like Thales and Anaxagoras, who were thought to know strange and out-of-the-way, but useless things. On the other hand, 'thought' (*φρόνησις*) is good counsel about human things. It implies knowledge of particulars as well as of universals. Indeed, the knowledge of the particular gained by experience is its most important element, though it includes the universal also, and in its own sphere, namely, that of action, it is supreme and paramount (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*).

1-2 τὴν δὲ σοφίαν—σοφία] 'The term *σοφία* we apply in the arts to those who are the most finished artists, as, for instance, we call Phidias a consummate (*σοφός*) sculptor, and Polykletus a consummate statuary, and in this application we mean nothing else by *σοφία* than the highest excellence in art. But we conceive that some men possess the quality in a general and not a particular way,—“nor in aught else accomplished,” as Homer says in the *Margites*—

“Not skilled to dig or plough the gods have made him,
Nor in aught else accomplished.”

We may argue, then, that *σοφία*, in the sense of philosophy, is the most consummate of the sciences. On the meaning of *ἀκρίβεια* as applied to the arts, and on the transition of meaning when it is applied to philosophy, see *Éth.* I. vii. 13, note, and II. vi. 9, note.

3 ὥστ' εἴη—τιμωτάτων] 'So that philosophy must be the union of reason and science, as it were a science of the highest objects with its head on.' This excellent definition does not appear to have anything in Aristotle exactly answering to it. There are two chief places where Aristotle treats of *σοφία*, namely, *Metaphysics*, Book I. i.-ii., and *id.* Book X. ch. i.-vii. *Metaphys.* Book I. opens by showing an ascending scale in knowledge,—perception, experience, art, and the theoretic sciences, or philosophy. Of philosophy we are told that it is the science of first causes, it is most universal, most exact, and most entirely sought for its own sake, &c.

ἡ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἶεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ὑγιεινὸν 4 μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταῦτόν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταῦτόν πάντες ἀν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον· τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα εὖ

(*Met.* I. ii. 2-6). Philosophy begins in wonder, wonder at first about things near at hand, afterwards about the sun, moon, and stars, and the creation of the universe (*Ib.* § 9). It ends in certainty and a sense of the necessity of certain truths (*Ib.* § 16). We may see that this account is perfectly general—it does not distinguish in philosophy between mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. It even attributes a practical scope to philosophy, saying that philosophy, by taking cognisance of the good, determines the object of the other sciences (*Ib.* § 7), ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνας ἐνεκὲν ἐστὶ πρακτέον ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὰγαθὸν ἐν ἐκάστοις, ὅπως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ. From a certain immaturity thus shown, it would be difficult to believe that the account in *Metaphys.* Book I. was written after that in the present chapter of the *Ethics*. In *Metaphys.* Book X. the subject is taken up anew, and treated much more fully. Physics, practical science, and mathematics, are now separated from philosophy proper. *Ib.* I. 4: οὐδὲ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς εἰρημένας αἰτίας τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην θετέον. Ὅστε γὰρ περὶ τὸ οὐ ἐνεκεν· τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὰγαθὸν, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν κινήσει. *Ib.* I. 7: οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τὰ μαθηματικά—χωριστὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐθέν. These, however, are branches of philosophy, *Ib.* iv. 3: διὸ καὶ ταύτην (τὴν φυσικὴν) καὶ τὴν μαθηματικὴν ἐπιστήμην μέρη τῆς σοφίας εἶναι θετέον.

Cf. *Met.* III. iii. 4: ἐστὶ δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη. Hence we get the famous division of speculative sciences, *Met.* X. vii. 9: δῆλον τοῖσιν ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, φυσικὴ, μαθηματικὴ, θεολογικὴ. Βέλτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν γένος, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα· περὶ τὸ τιμωτάτον γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, βελτίων δὲ καὶ χείρων ἐκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστητόν. Philosophy, then, in the highest sense, may be called theology, or the science of the divine, that is, of pure, transcendental (χωριστὴ), immutable being. It is the science of being *qua* being (τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὅν ἐπιστήμη). Eudemus, following in the wake of this discussion, has adopted as much of its results as suited his purpose. He speaks of philosophy as having the highest objects (τῶν τιμωτάτων, cf. *Met.* X. vii. 9, *l.c.*), but he does not distinguish its different branches. He includes in it both physical and mathematical ideas (§ 4, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταῦτόν δει· ἰδ. ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν), though he uses σοφός once in its special sense to denote a metaphysical, as opposed to mathematical or physical, philosopher. Ch. viii. § 6: μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν, σοφὸς δ' ἡ φυσικὸς οὐ. In short, his object is rather to contrast philosophy with practical thought than exactly to define it. His attributing to it a union of intuition with reasoning seems however a happy result of his present method of discussion. (See Vol. I. Essay I. p. 53, sq.)

θεωροῦν φαίεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν αὐτά. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἕνα φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικὴν. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφαί· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἀπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἱατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θεϊότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε
 5 ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλὴν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέρονθ' ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ

4 εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον—συνέστηκεν] 'And if it be said that man is the best of the animals, this will make no difference, for there are besides other things far diviner in their nature than man, such as, to quote the most obvious instance, the parts out of which the symmetry of the heavens is composed.' On the Aristotelian view of man's position in the scale of dignity in the universe, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 287. On Aristotle's doctrine of the divine nature of the stars, &c., cf. *De Caelo*, I. ii. 9: 'Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων φανερόν ἐστι πέφυκέναι τις οὐσία σώματος ἄλλη παρὰ τὰς ἐν ταύθῃ συντάξεις, θεϊότερα καὶ προτέρα τούτων ἀπάντων (this has given rise to the notion of the 'quintessence'). *Ib.* I. ii. 11, which repeats the same. *Ib.* II. iii. 2: 'Ἐκαστὸν ἐστίν, ὥς ἐστιν ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου. Θεοῦ δ' ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζῷη αἰδίας. Ὅσῳ ἀνάγκη τῷ θείῳ κίνησιν αἰδίου ὑπάρχειν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ οὐρανὸς τοιοῦτος (σῶμα γὰρ τι θεῖον) διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει τὸ ἐγκύκλιον σῶμα, δὲ φύσει κινεῖται

κύκλῳ δει. Cf. *Metaphys.* XI. viii. 5: 'Ἡ τε γὰρ τῶν ἀστρῶν φύσις αἰδίας οὐσία τις. *Ib.* X. vi. 8: 'Ὅλως δ' ἀποπον ἐκ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τὰ δεῦρο μεταβάλλοντα καὶ μηδέποτε διαμένοντα ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἐκ τούτων περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν κρίσιν ποιείσθαι. Δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν δει κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντων καὶ μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν ποιουμένων τάληθές θηρεῖν. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον.

5 διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλὴν] Cf. *Eth.* X. viii. 11; Plato, *Theaetetus*, p. 174 A: 'Ὅσπερ καὶ Θαλὴν ἀστρονομούντα, ὧ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἀνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φέαρ, Θράττα τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, ὥς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναί, τὰ δ' ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λαθάνει αὐτόν. Ταῦτόν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. On the other hand, Aristotle (*Politics*, I. xi. 9) tells a story of Thales turning his philosophy to practical account, foreseeing by astronomical observations that there would be a good crop of olives, buying up the crop in Miletus

θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ 6 φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλευέσθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναι φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι, βουλευέται δ' οὐθεις περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τί ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ 7 καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδόντων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ. ὥστε δεῖ ἅμφω ἔχειν, ἡ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.

*Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν 8

beforehand, and having sold at his own price, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδείξειν ὅτι ῥάδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἢ βούλονται, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ ὁ σπουδάζουσιν.

6 βουλευέται δ' οὐδεὶς] A repetition for the third time of the same remark, cf. ch. i. § 6, ch. v. § 3.

7 Owing to its practical character, 'thought' (φρόνησις) necessarily implies a knowledge of particulars. The particular, indeed, would seem for action the more important element, as appears also in other things, if we compare science with empirical knowledge.

διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες] Cf. *Ar. Met.* i. i. 7-8 (whence this passage may probably be borrowed), πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγων ἐχόντων. Αἴτιον δ' ἐστὶ ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνώσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν

καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν.

VIII. This chapter fulfils a promise made before in the *Eudemian Ethics* (I. viii. 18), by distinguishing 'thought' from other modifications of the same practical quality, namely, economy and the various forms of politics. This distinction would at first sight tend to reduce 'thought' to mere egotism (§ 3, δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἑα. § 4: τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι), and thus to isolate the individual within himself. In order to obviate this, the writer brings forward arguments to show that the welfare of the individual is bound up with that of the family and the state (§ 4). He urges the difficulty of knowing one's own interest, hence concluding that 'thought' is no mere instinct of selfishness. 'Thought' implies a wide experience, on which account boys

ἔξι, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταῦτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἢ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετικὴ, ἢ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτικὴ· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν· μόνοι

cannot attain to it, no more than they can to philosophy, though they are often clever in mathematics (§§ 5-6). 'Thought' is a sort of deduction with a universal and a particular element (§ 7), and yet we must distinguish it from science on this very account, that it deals with particulars (§ 8). It is the opposite to reason, which is of first principles, while thought is rather an intuition of particular facts (analogous to apprehending a mathematical figure). At all events, one form of thought is of this character.

1-3 *ἔστι δὲ — δικαστικὴ*] 'Now politics and "thought" are really the same faculty of mind, though they would be defined differently. Thought dealing with the state is divided into first,—legislation, which is the master-spirit as it were; and secondly, politics in detail, which is practical as being deliberative (for a "measure" is like the practical application of a general principle), and which usurps the common name of politics; hence too they who are concerned with particular measures alone get the name of politicians, for these alone act, like workmen under a master. Just so that appears to be especially "thought" which is concerned with the individual self. And this kind usurps the common name of "thought," while the other kinds I have alluded to may be specified as—first, economy; second, legislation; and third, politics (in the restricted sense), which may be subdivided into the deliberative and the judicial.' This distinction was pro-

posed before, *Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 8: 'Ὅστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτῶν. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. Αἰτη δ' ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ φρόνησις. Διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἔξεις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τῷ τοιαῦτα εἶναι· πρὸς δ' ἀλλήλας εἰ τι διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον λεκτέον. It would appear that Eudemus by a sort of afterthought united the conception of φρόνησις, which was developed later, to that of πολιτικὴ, to which Aristotle had assigned the apprehension of the chief good for man (cf. *Eth.* I. ii. 5). But in so doing he had to bring together two different things; for φρόνησις was a psychological term expressing a faculty of the mind, but πολιτικὴ was merely one of the divisions of the sciences. In order to make them commensurate, Eudemus alters the signification of πολιτικὴ. He treats it as a state of mind (ἔξις), as a mode of φρόνησις, dealing with the state either universally or in details. From the same later point of view he adds also οἰκονομικὴ; cf. *Ar. Pol.* I. iii. 1: 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνέστηκεν, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν πρότερον, &c.


2 *ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον*] The ψήφισμα or particular measure is here compared to the minor term in a syllogism, i.e. it constitutes the application of a general principle. Cf. *Eth.* v. x. 6. On the use of ἔσχατον in this purely technical and logical sense, cf. §§ 8-9: *Ar. Met.* X. I. 9: πᾶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου

γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχνη· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ 3
φρόνησις μάλιστα εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα. καὶ ἔχει
αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομία
ἡ δὲ νομοθεσία ἡ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν βουλευτική
ἡ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως τὸ αὐτῷ 4
εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν· καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ

καὶ οὗ τῶν ἐσχάτων. *Post. Anal.* I. i.
4 : οὐ διὰ τὸ μέσον τὸ ἐσχάτον γνωρίζεται.

3 The classification here intended is as follows, — φρόνησις or thought being

first a general term and including politics with the other faculties mentioned, and secondly a special kind contrasted with the other faculties—



4 εἶδος μὲν οὖν—πολιτείας] 'Now it must be considered a species of knowledge to know one's own interest, but this opens matter for controversy. The man who knows his own concerns and occupies himself with these is commonly considered thoughtful, while politicians are called busybodies, and hence Euripides wrote :—

Small wisdom were it in me to aspire,
When well I might, mixed with the common herd,
Enjoy a lot full equal with the best.
But ah ! how full of vanity is man !
The restless meddling spirits in the state

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Are gaped at still and made the country's gods.

Men with these selfish principles seek their own advantage, and this, they consider, is what they have to do. From this notion the idea has grown that *they* are the thoughtful. And yet, perhaps, the welfare of the individual is inseparable from the regulation of the household and from the existence of a state.'

τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι] Fritzsche reads τὸ τὰ αὐτῷ with the authority of two MSS., adding 'Ceterum in hac quoque præfractâ orationis brevitate qui multum Eudemi Moralia diurnâ nocturnâque manu volutavit Eudemi stilum agnoscat necesse est.'

Y

αὐτὸν εἰδώς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ
πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης

πῶς δ' ἂν φροσίνη, ᾧ παρὴν ἀπραγμώως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἡριθμηταῖσι στρατοῦ
ἴσον μετασχεῖν;
τούς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον. . .

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἶονται τοῦτο δεῖν
πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους
φρονίμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ
οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας· ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ
5 διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρη-
μένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ
γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνε-
σθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ
γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν·
6 πλήθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν
τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν,
σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεως

πολυπράγμονες] This is often op-
posed to τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν. Cf. Plato,
Gorgias, p. 526 c. φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ
πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος
ἐν τῷ βίῳ. *Repub.* p. 433 A : τὸ τὰ
αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν.

Εὐριπίδης] in the *Philoctetes*; the
later lines are thus filled up by
Wagner, *Fragm. Eur.* p. 401 :—

ἴσον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφιστῇ τύχης;
οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω γαῦρον ὡς ἀνὴρ ἔφυ.
τούς μὲν περισσοὺς καὶ τι πράσσοντας
πλέον

τιμῶμεν ἀνδρας τ' ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν.

The Scholiast and Paraphrast both
conjecture Ζεὺς μισεῖ to govern περισ-
σοῖς. This would give no metre, and
only a very inferior sense.

4-5 ἔτι—γίνεσθαι] Moreover the
directing one's own affairs is by no
means simple; it is a subject for much
consideration. In proof whereof we
may allege that while boys learn

geometry and mathematics, and be-
come clever in such things, no boy
seems to attain to "thoughtfulness."
The writer is arguing against the iden-
tification of 'thought' with an instinct
of selfishness. If it were so simple,
why should not boys possess it? διότι
is for ὅτι as in *Eth. Eud.* vii. x. 20 :
ἄτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι, διότι καλλίων
μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκασιτέρα δὲ ἡ
χρησὶμῃ. Cf. *Ar. Meteor.* iii. iii. 5 :
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου διότι ἐντεῦθεν γίγνε-
ται ὁ ἀνεμὸς ὅθεν ἂν ἡ κυρία γίγνηται
διδασκασις. *Ib.* i. xiii. 23 : Τό τε ὑπὸ
τοῖς ὁρεσιν ἔχειν τὰς πηγὰς μαρτυρεῖ
διότι τῷ συρρεῖν ἐπ' ὀλίγον καὶ κατὰ
μικρὸν ἐκ πολλῶν νοτίδων διαδιδῶσιν ὁ
τόπος καὶ γίγνεται οὕτως αἱ πηγαὶ τῶν
ποταμῶν.

6 σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ] 'But not a
metaphysician or physical philoso-
pher.' Σοφός is here used in a dis-
tinctive sense, 'philosopher' *par ex-
cellence*, with a science above physics

ἐστίν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστίν οὐκ ᾄδελον; ἔτι ἡ ἀμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευ- 7 σασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοῦδι βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι 8 δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἶρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντί- 9 κειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι

and mathematics; cf. ch. vii. § 3, note.

ἢ ὅτι—ᾄδελον] 'The reason surely is that the former matters (i.e. mathematics) are abstract, while the principles of the latter (physics and philosophy) are got by experience; thus boys repeat truths of the latter kind, without being really convinced of them; while the nature of the other subjects is easy to comprehend.'

δι' ἀφαιρέσεως] The form in Aristotle is either ἐν ἀφαιρέσει or ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως. He constantly applies these terms to denote the mathematics. The *locus classicus* on this subject is *Metaphys.* x. iii. 7: Καθάπερ δ' ὁ μαθηματικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται, περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, ὅλον βάρος καὶ κορυφότητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ τούναντιον, ἐτι δὲ καὶ θερμότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἐναντιώσεις, μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ πᾶσόν καὶ συνεχές, κ.τ.λ. Cf. *De Caelo*, iii. i. 11: διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λέγεσθαι τὰ μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φυσικά ἐκ προσθέσεως. *De Animā*, iii. vii. 10: οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικά οὐ κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ ἐκεῖνα.

πιστεύουσι] Cf. ch. iii. § 4, note, and *Eth.* vii. iii. 8: οἱ πρῶτον μαβόντες συνείρουν μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὐπω.

7 Another argument to prove the complex and difficult character of

'thought' is that it implies a kind of syllogism, wherein both the major premiss and the minor equally admit of error.

τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα] This was probably a medical notion of the day. Cf. *Problems*, i. xiii., where a similar superstition is maintained: Διὰ τί τὸ τὰ ὕδατα μεταβάλλειν νοσῶδες φασιν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα σθ;—ὕδατος μὲν πολλὰ εἶδη ἐστὶ καὶ διάφορα καθ' αὐτά, ἀέρος δὲ σθ, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο αἴτιον.

8 ὅτι δ'—τοιοῦτον] 'But (though implying a syllogism) it is plain that "thought" is not science, for it deals with the particular, as we have said, the action being of this kind.'

9 ἀντίκειται—εἶδος] 'To reason, indeed, it forms the opposite pole; for while reason deals with those terms which are above all inference, "thought," on the other hand, deals with the particular, which is below demonstration, and is apprehended by perception; not the perception of the separate senses, but analogous to that faculty by which we perceive that the immediate object presented to us in mathematics is a triangle. For on this side also demonstration must cease. However, it is rather this particular mode of thought which is a perception, the other presents a different form.'

ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ] Having

λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὐ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ.

alluded to the syllogistic nature of 'thought,' the writer seems to have been reminded to distinguish it from science; and thus, having before (ch. v. § 8; ch. vii. § 6) contrasted it with art and philosophy, he is led on to finish the round by placing it in contrast with reason.

οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα] This is the same as Aristotle's famous distinction between the 'separate senses' and the 'common sense.' His own words are clear on the point; cf. *De Anima*, II. vi. 2: Λέγω δ' ἰδίων μὲν (αἰσθητῶν) ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἐτέρῃ αἰσθῆσαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν χρώματος καὶ ἀκοῆς φύσος καὶ γεύσεως χυμοῦ.—Τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἐκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κινήσεις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμὸς, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμῶς ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις· καὶ γὰρ ἀφ' ἧς κινήσεως τις ἐστὶν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὅψει. It will be seen that figure (σχῆμα) is one of the objects of the 'common sense;' the text gives as an instance of this the perception of a triangle. In *De An.* III. i. 6, Aristotle adds 'unity' to the list of 'common sensibles,' but he reduces them all to modifications of the perception of motion: ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, ὡς μέγεθος κινήσει. Ὡστε καὶ σχῆμα· μέγεθος γὰρ τι τὸ σχῆμα. Τὸ δ' ἡρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι· ὃ δ' ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, κ.τ.λ. He admits (*De An.* II. vi. 4) that 'common sensibles' can scarcely be said to be apprehended by sense at all, τῶν δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ; cf. *Id.* III. i. 6, where it is said these are apprehended acci-

dentally or concomitantly by the senses. This is surely the true view; we see in the apprehension of number, figure, and the like, not an operation of sense, but the mind putting its own forms and categories, i.e. itself, on the external object. It would follow then that the senses cannot really be separated from the mind; the senses and the mind each contribute an element to every knowledge. Aristotle's doctrine of κοινῇ αἰσθήσει would go far, if carried out, to modify his doctrine of the simple and innate character of the senses, e.g. sight (cf. *Eth.* II. i. 4), and would prevent its absolute collision with Berkeley's *Theory of Vision*. On the general subject of κοιν. αἰσθ. see Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, pp. 828-830.

ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον] This has been frequently understood to mean that 'the ultimate or simplest possible figure is a triangle.' But the Paraphrast does not so explain it: his words are τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γινώσκουσιν τρίγωνον, κ.τ.λ. And referring to *Ar. Post. Analyt.* I. i. 4, we find exactly this instance given of a particular knowledge, the result of observation, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχει δυοῖν ὁρθαῖς ἰσας, προσῆδει· ὅτι δὲ τὸδε τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ τρίγωνόν ἐστιν ἅμα ἐπαγόμενος ἐγνώρισεν. The term ἔσχατον is used in the very next line: ἐνίων γὰρ τοῦτων τὸν τρόπον ἡ μάθησις ἐστι, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἔσχατον γνωρίζεται. It is true that in different places Aristotle uses ἔσχατον in different senses, as denoting with various applications

ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις † ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

Τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βου- 9
λεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας
τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ ἄλλο
τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι²
περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἢ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὃ δὲ βουλευόμενος

the end of a series ; thus cf. *De An.* III. x. 2, where it means 'final cause;' *Eth.* III. iii. 11, 'the last step in analysis;' *Metaph.* VI. iii. 6, 'matter,' &c. But in the place before us τὸ ἔσχατον has been already appropriated to the logical meaning of 'particular,' 'minor term,' 'immediate truth;' cf. § 2 and § 8.

σθῆσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ] 'For on that side too (i.e. in dealing with an object of the sense as well as an intuition of reason) demonstration must stop.' Ἰσασθαι is a common logical form, it is opposed to προῖναι εἰς ἀπειρον, and is frequently impersonal ; cf. *Post. Anal.* I. iii. 1 : ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὰ ἀπειρα διελθεῖν. Εἰ τε ἴσασται καὶ εἰσὶν ἀρχαί, κ.τ.λ. *Met.* II. iv. 22, &c.

ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις † ἢ φρόνησις] Three of Bekker's MSS. read ἡ φρόνησις, and this seems most natural, and to give the best sense (though ἡ is supported by the Paraphrast). What the writer means is apparently to add that only one kind of thought can be called analogous to the apprehension of a triangle ; αὕτη refers to ἡ καθ' ἑκάστα φρόνησις, mentioned above, ch. vii. § 7 : δεῖ ἀμφω ἔχειν ἡ ταύτην μᾶλλον. There is another kind (ἐκείνης), namely, the possession of universal ideas (τῶν καθόλου) (l.c.), which is of a different nature.

examination of a set of faculties cognate to 'Thought,' or forming part of it. The first of these is good counsel (εὐβουλία). This, says the writer, is to be distinguished from science, which does not deliberate ; from guessing (εὐστοχία), which is too quick ; from sagacity (δύχινος), which is a kind of guessing ; and from opinion, which is too definite. It consists, then, in a certain 'rightness;' it chooses the right means to a good end. The conception of this end 'Thought' itself must supply. There is a great assumption here of the manner of Aristotle. The chapter seems formed after *Eth.* III. ii. ; § 6 reminds us of many similar passages in Book IV., and § 7 is after the manner of *Eth.* I. iii. 5. There is an advance upon Aristotle's account of deliberation (*Eth.* III. iii.) in two points: (1) the process is illustrated here by the logical formula of the syllogism ; (2) there is a mention here of the faculty whereby ends are apprehended, which Aristotle had left unnoticed. See *Eth.* III. iii. 1, note.

I It is an abrupt, awkward commencement of the chapter to say, 'inquiring and deliberating are different, for deliberating is a species of inquiring.' But what is meant apparently is, to bring 'good counsel' under the head of inquiring, which separates it at once from both science and opinion.

IX. This chapter commences the

ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία. ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλευόμενοι δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα, 3 βουλευέσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἀμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλευέται, ὁ δὴ ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὗτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία), δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὠρισταί ἤδη πᾶν οὐ δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὕτω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ

2 φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche quotes Isocr. *Demon.* p. 9, c. § 35: βουλευόμεν μὲν βραδέως ἐπιτέλει δὲ ταχέως τὰ δόξαντα. Herod. VII. 49; ἀνὴρ δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη ἄριστος, εἰ βουλευόμενος μὲν ἀρρωδέει, πᾶν ἐπιλεγόμενος πείσασθαι χρήμα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ θρασύς εἴη.

3 ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια] This is announced by Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* I. xxxiv. 1, in the very next line to that passage on the distinction of the organs of truth, which apparently suggested so much of the subjects of the present book, ἡ δ' ἀγχίνοιά ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου. In more general terms ἀγχίνοια is defined by Plato, *Charmides*, p. 160 A, as δξύτης τις τῆς ψυχῆς.

ἐπιστήμης μὲν—λογίζεται] 'Now in science there is no such thing as "rightness," for there is no such thing as wrongness. In opinion, on the other hand, rightness is truth (and not good counsel). And besides, whatever we have an opinion about is already decided. But good counsel is not by any means beyond questioning (*ἀνευ λόγου*). Therefore it must be a kind of operation of the reason (*διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται*), for this does not

amount to decision. Opinion is not an inquiry, but is already a kind of decision. On the other hand, he that deliberates, whether well or ill, is inquiring after something and calculating.'

ἐπιστήμης] This is said here just as it was before said, ch. v. § 7, that there were no degrees of excellence in Thought.

δόξης δ'] Cf. *Eth.* III. ii. 13, and above, ch. ii. § 2, note.

διανοίας ἄρα] Plato, *Repub.* p. 511 D, proposed to confine the term *διάνοια* to the discursive understanding as opposed to *νοῦς*, the intuitive and speculative reason, *διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἔξιν ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οἶσαν*. Aristotle probably had the same distinction in view, *Post. Anal.* I. xxxiii. 9 (*l.c.*), *πῶς δεῖ διαεῖμαι ἐπὶ τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ*. But he did not maintain the distinction in his works, and certainly it is not observed by Eudemus in the present book, where both *νοῦς πρακτικός* and *διάνοια θεωρητική* are spoken of. In the place before us *διάνοια* apparently means the exercise of the reason.

ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, εἴν τε εὖ
 εἴν τε κακῶς βουλευήται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογιζέται. ἀλλ' 4
 ὀρθότης τίς ἐστίν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα
 πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς,
 δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πάσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὁ προτί-
 θεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται
 βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν
 τι εἶναι τὸ εὖ βεβουλευέσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς
 εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου 5
 ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν,
 δι' οὗ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ'
 αὐτῇ πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὐ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι

4 ἐπεὶ δ'—βεβουλευέσθαι] 'But since the term "rightness" is used in more senses than one, it is plain that "good counsel" does not answer to all the senses. For the incontinent or bad man will obtain, by his calculation, what he proposes to himself to obtain, so that he will have deliberated rightly, yet secured a great evil. Whereas, to have deliberated well is generally thought (δοκεῖ) to be a good.'

πλεοναχῶς] i.e. rightness of means, either respective or irrespective of rightness in the end; or, again, rightness of end (§ 5), whatever may have been the means.

ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής] It would seem rather the abandoned man (ἀκόλαστος) who by calculation attains bad ends. The incontinent man would not generally have deliberation attributed to him; cf. *Eth.* vii. ii. 2. But the characters cannot be kept very distinct.

† ἰδεῖν] δεῖν, which some have proposed to read for ἰδεῖν, makes no better sense. Rassow conjectured τυχεῖν, and as Bekker gave this conjecture his sanction, it has been adopted in the above translation.

δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν] Fritzsche quotes Herod. vii. 10: τὸ γὰρ εὖ βουλευέσθαι κέρδος μέγιστον εὐρίσκω ἐόν. Sophocles, *Antig.* 1050: κράτιστον κτημάτων εὐβουλία. Isocr. *Demon.* p. 9, c. § 35: ἡγοῦ κράτιστον εἶναι παρὰ μὲν τῶν θεῶν εὐτυχίαν, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εὐβουλίαν.

5 ἀλλ' ἔστι—εἶναι] 'But, further, it is possible to obtain what is good by a false syllogism, and to hit on doing what one ought, not however by the right means, but with a false middle term.' It is an inaccuracy to speak of a 'false middle term.' Falsehood or truth is the attribute of a proposition, not a term; cf. *De Interpret.* i. 3: περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἐστὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. If the conception of the end be right and yet the syllogism wrong, it follows that the minor premiss must be false, thus:

Preservation of health is good:
 Abstinence from intellectual labour is preservation of health:

the result of which syllogism will be the preservation of health, but by the sacrifice of mental culture.

- 6 δι' οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης
 7 ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἀπλῶς εὐ βεβουλευῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τι τέλος. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἀπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, ἡ δὲ τις ἡ πρὸς τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὐ βεβουλευῆσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τι τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις ἐστίν.
 10 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ ἀσυνεσία, καθ' ἧς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ ἀσυνέτους, οὗθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξη

6-7 The writer first raises good counsel to the rank of one of the virtues, by the mention of all the qualifications necessary; afterwards he seems to modify this by saying that, besides the absolute good counsel which aims at the absolute end, there is also such a thing as relative good counsel aiming at relative ends.

One might have thought that it was unnecessary to give so separate a psychological existence to excellence in deliberation. However, the quality here described answers more nearly than *φρόνησις* to what we call 'prudence.' *Φρόνησις*, we are here told, is the conception of ends, and afterwards (ch. xii. § 9) it is shown to be the faculty of means. In truth, it is both, according to the Aristotelian views (as far as we can discern them); it implies both prudence (*εὐβουλία*), and also a certain moral condition (*ἀρετή*), and it is implied by both of them. As compared with the one it is of ends, and as compared with the other it is of means.

X. This chapter treats of another faculty which forms an element in wisdom, and yet may be distinguished from it, namely, apprehension (*σύνεσις*). Apprehension is not mere

opinion (else all would possess it), nor is it a science, for it deals with no separate class of objects whether necessary or contingent (*οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν δει ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσις ἐστίν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὄντων*). It deals with all that can be matter of human deliberation, in short, with the same objects as Thought. But Thought *commands*; it is concerned with right action; in short, it belongs to the will as well as to reason. But apprehension only *judges*, it is merely intellectual. It is neither the having nor the getting Thought, but rather it is the application of one's knowledge to give a meaning to the *dicta* of wisdom. It is 'understanding,' as its name implies, or 'putting things together' (*συνιέναι*) when another person speaks.

Aristotle had spoken of *σύνεσις* as one of the intellectual excellences, *Εἰκλ.* i. xiii. 20: *σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς*. Eudemus does not apply the term *ἀρετή* to this, or to any of the other intellectual qualities which he treats of, except Thought and Philosophy. He gives here a psychological account of *σύνεσις*, the operation of which he confines to intellectual insight with regard to moral subjects, apprehension of

(πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν ἢ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθους· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν αἰὲ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἢ σύνεσις ἐστίν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁπουοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταῦτόν σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις· ἢ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν· τί 2 γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἢ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον· ταῦτόν γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν 3 οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἢ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μαθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἢ φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς ταυτόν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοῦνομα ἢ 4

the meaning of moral dicta and critical judgment thereon. That there is such a faculty of apprehension, and of sympathetic or critical understanding, quite distinct from moral goodness in people, the experience of life seems to show.

The author of the *Magna Moralia* gives a much inferior account of σύνεσις (I. xxxv. 17), making its characteristic to be that it deals with small matters, περὶ μικρῶν τε καὶ ἐν μικροῖς ἢ κρίσις.

1 διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει] It is used nearly equivalently to φρόνησις by Thucyd. I. 140: Δικαιῶ τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν, ἣν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλώμεθα, βοηθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθοῦντας τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι.

2 ἢ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν—ἢ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον] The opposition of these terms is taken from Plato, *Politicus*, p. 259 x—260 c, where it is argued that the arithmetician (λογιστής) is content with a knowledge and judgment about numbers, whereas the architect (ἀρχιτέκτων) must go on to apply his know-

ledge by directing the workmen—thus that all science may be divided under the two heads of critical and mandatory. (260 Δ) Οὐκοῦν γνωστικαὶ μὲν αἶτε τοιαῦτα ξύμπασαι καὶ ὅποσαι ξυνέπονται τῇ λογιστικῇ, κρίσει δὲ καὶ ἐπιτάξει διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοις· τοῦτω τῷ γένει;—φαίσεσθον. Ἄρ' οὖν συμπάσης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι προσείπομεν, ἐμμελῶς ἂν φαίμεν διηρῆσθαι; κατὰ γε τὴν ἐξῆν δόξαν.

3 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μαθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ] The word μαθάνειν was ambiguous in Greek; it meant either to 'learn' or to 'understand.' The Sophists used to play on this ambiguity, arguing that one could 'learn what one knew already.' Cf. Ar. *Soph. Elench.* IV. 1, 2, which illustrates the present passage: Εἰσι δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιοῦτε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μαθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι· τὰ γὰρ ἀποστοματίζόμενα μαθάνουσιν οἱ γραμματικοί. Τὸ γὰρ μαθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην.

σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μαθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μαθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

- 11 Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν εὐγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαιμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπεικῇ μάλιστα φαιμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἑνία συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς ὀρθή. ὀρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

- 2 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἔξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι· λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς

XI. This chapter (which is not conveniently divided as it stands) opens with a mention of the quality of considerateness (γνώμη), and proceeds to point out how various qualities unite in 'thought,' and what are the natural and intuitive elements which it contains.

1 ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη] By the progress of psychology, this term came to bear the special meaning of 'considerateness.' At first it meant knowledge in general, cf. Theognis, vv. 895 sq.

Γνώμης δ' οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ἀνὴρ ἔχει αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ,

Οὐδ' ἀγνωμοσύνης, Κύρν', ὀδυνηρότερον.

In Thucydides it bore a variety of significations, especially when used in the plural, standing for almost anything mental, 'minds' as opposed to bodies, 'thoughts' as opposed to deeds; 'feelings,' 'principles,' 'maxims,' &c. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, II. xxi. 2-15 γνώμη is used for a moral maxim (such as those of the so-called Gnostic Poets); so also for all popular sayings, *Soph. El.* xvii. 17. It was probably from the association

of συγγνώμη that γνώμη came to have its distinctive meaning. The author of the *Magna Moralia* calls it εὐγνωμοσύνη, and makes it a sort of passive form of ἐπιείκεια (II. ii. 1): ἐστι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιείκειας ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίναι τοῦ εὐγνώμονος, τὸ δὲ δὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς.

In the text above, it is said that 'considerateness is a right judgment of the equitable man. Pardon is a right critical considerateness of the equitable man.'

ὀρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς] 'Now by a right considerateness is meant a true one.' This must be the import of the sentence, but the writer says not ἀληθῆς, but τοῦ ἀληθοῦς—probably 'by attraction' to τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς. But it is an inaccuracy of language to speak of 'a true man' in the sense of 'a man whose judgment is true.' Stahr translates τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς as if it were neuter. But the 'equitable man' here apparently gives the standard for γνώμη, as the φρόνιμος for virtue, *Eth.* II. vi. 15.

2 εἰσὶ δὲ—ἄλλον] 'Now all the (above-mentioned) conditions of mind

εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων πάντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἐσχάτα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων

naturally tend to the same point; we apply (*ἐπιφέρουτες*) the terms considerateness, apprehension, thought, and reason to the same persons, and say (*λέγομεν*) that they have considerateness, that they have attained to (*ἦδη*) reason—that they are thoughtful—that they are apprehensive. For all these faculties deal with ultimate truths (*τῶν ἐσχάτων*) and particulars; and it is by being able to judge of those matters with which the thoughtful man is concerned that a man is apprehensive, considerate, or forgiving. Equity extends itself over all the forms of good which consist in a relation to one's neighbour.'

νοῦν ἦδη] What this means is not quite clear. It may refer to what is said in § 6, *ἦδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει*. Thus it might be nearly equivalent to our saying of a person that he had 'attained to years of discretion.' Or again, it may refer to the moment of action, and *ἦδη* would be thus equivalent to the French *voilà*. 'There is reason exhibited.' 'H δ η' is used similarly to denote the present moment, *Εὐδ. Ευδ.* II. viii. 11: *Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατεύμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἦδη, καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφεληθήσεται, ἢ καὶ ἦδη ὠφελεῖται ὑγιάνων*.

τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ] This is said because *γνώμη* and *συγγνώμη* are acts of equity. Cf. *Εὐδ.* v. x. 1, note.

4-5 *καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων—νοῦς*] 'And reason is of the ultimates at both ends of the series. Both the first and the last terms are apprehended, not by inference, but by reason. On the one hand, the scientific and demonstrative reason (*ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις*) apprehends those terms which are immutable and primary. And on the other hand, the practical reason (*ὁ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς*) apprehends the ultimate (*ἐσχάτων*) and contingent truth, and the minor premiss. For these constitute the sources of our idea of the end, the universal being developed out of the particulars. Of these particulars, then, one must have perception, and this perception is reason.' The writer having before (in § 3) connected the faculties of 'apprehension,' &c., with 'Thought,' on the ground of their all being concerned with ultimate truths, proceeds to include reason (*νοῦς*) under the same category, and says that this apprehends *ἐσχάτα* at both ends of the series. But now comes in a piece of confusion which is thoroughly Eudemian, for he goes on to say that the scientific reason apprehends first truths or principles (cf. ch. vi.), while the practical reason apprehends last terms or particulars. To mix up considerations of the scientific reason with the present discussion is to introduce what is entirely irrelevant. We see

καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ
 5 ἔνεκα αὐται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὸ καθόλου. τούτων
 οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθῆσιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ
 δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδεὶς, γινώμην δ'
 6 ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλι-
 κίαις οἴομεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ
 γινώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ

here a bringing together of two things which were before placed in contrast with each other (ch. viii. § 9), namely, the reason which apprehends first principles, and thought apprehending particular facts (*ἐσχατῶν*). In the present passage, what was before called thought (*φρόνησις*) is called reason (*νοῦς*), and it is said that reason is the faculty which perceives or apprehends the particular in moral subjects (*ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς*). This, then, is the main purport of the present remarks. Setting aside as irrelevant what is said of the scientific reason, we learn that the moral judgment is intuitive, that moral intuitions are to be attributed to the reason, and that out of these particular intuitions the moral universal grows up. When stripped of its ambiguities of statement, the sense of the passage becomes unexceptional. We may compare it with the incidental observations of Aristotle, *Eth.* i. iv. 7: 'Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ἐστὶ· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνεται ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἡ ἔχει ἡ λάβοι ἀν ἀρχὰς βεβῶως. *Ib.* vii. 20: *ἱκανὸν ἐν τισὶ τὸ ἐστὶ δειχθῆναι καλῶς, ὡς καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ἐστὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀρχῆς*. The expression of Eudemus is not so strong as that of Aristotle. Eudemus says *ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ καθόλου*, while Aristotle said *ἀρχὴ τὸ ἐστὶ*. The latter must be true if *reason* be the organ by which

the fact is apprehended, for reason is in itself universal, and whatever it apprehends must be of the nature of the universal.

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα αὐται] This is similar in form of expression to ch. iii. § 3: *ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου*. On *οὗ ἔνεκα* see below, ch. xii. § 10, note.

αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς] To say that 'reason is a perception of particulars' is only the counterpart of Aristotle's saying that we can have 'a perception of universals.' *Eth.* i. vii. 20: *τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν αἰσθῆται θεωροῦνται*. Aristotle expresses the intuitive character of reason by saying that it 'touches' its object. Cf. *Metaphys.* viii. x. 5, *τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθές . . . τὸ δ' ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν*. *Ib.* xi. vii. 8, *αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετέληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτ' οὖν καὶ νοητόν*. That reason, while it is on the one hand intuitive, is on the other hand developed by experience, we learn from the discussions in *Post. Anal.* ii. ch. xix. The same is expressed above in the saying that 'reason is the beginning and the end.'

5-6 *διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ—ὁρθῶς*] 'Hence it is that these faculties are thought to come naturally, and that although no one without conscious effort (*φύσει*) gets to be a philosopher, men do get naturally to have considerationateness, and apprehension, and

τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων. ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἥττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ 7 περὶ τίνα ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται.

Διαφορήσειε δ' ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοι εἰσιν. 12 ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρω-

reason. A proof of this is, that we think they ought successively to appear as age advances, and (we say that) such and such an age possesses reason and considerateness, as if these things came from nature. Hence reason is the beginning and the end, the matter of premises and conclusions is the same. Thus we must pay regard to the unproved assertions and opinions of the elderly and experienced, or of the thoughtful, no less than to demonstrations. For, from having obtained the eye of "old experience," they see aright.' In these excellent remarks the subject is brought round again to the contrast between Philosophy and Thought. The former never comes naturally, but the latter does. The nature of reason, and its growth in the mind, is illustrated by the common fact of the respect paid to age.

ἐκ τούτων—καὶ περὶ τούτων] Cf. *Eth.* I. iii. 4: *περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας*. The 'subject' of the demonstration is the conclusion, cf. *Eth.* I. viii. 1, *Σκεπτόν . . . οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος*.

ὄμμα] Cf. *Eth.* I. vi. 12, *ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς*. Plato, *Repub.* p. 533 D, *ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῇ τιτὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορυγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἀνω*.

XII. In this and the following chapter, by mootng the question, Of what use are Thought and Philosophy? the writer shows the relation of the two qualities to each other, and the inseparable connection existing between thought and virtue. The following difficulties are first stated.

(1) Philosophy is not practical, it does not consider at all the means to happiness, how then can it be useful? (2) Thought, on the other hand, though it treats of happiness, might be said to be mere knowledge. It might be said that a man no more *acts* well from having this knowledge of the good, than he is well from having a knowledge of medicine. (3) Or again, if thought be useful for telling us *how* to be good, why not get this advice from others? Why should it be necessary to *have* thought, any more than it is to learn medicine, when one can go to a doctor? (4) If philosophy be better than thought, how is it that the latter controls the former? The answer to question (1) is, that both philosophy and thought are good in themselves, and desirable as being perfections of our nature, even though they were not useful as means to anything beyond. But they are not without results. Philosophy, if it does not serve as an instrument to happiness, is identical with happi-

πος (οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἐστὶ γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπων, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἔξεις αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν 2 ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος, ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἰκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ

ness itself. Questions (2) and (3) are answered by showing the relation of thought to virtue. Virtue gives the right aim, and thought the right means. They are inseparable from one another. Thought without virtue would be mere cleverness, apt to degenerate into cunning, and virtue without wisdom would be a mere gift of nature, a generous instinct capable of perversion. While thus inseparable from virtue, thought is not to be identified with it. In this respect an advance has been made beyond the crude formula of Socrates. Wisdom accompanies the virtues, and is a sort of centre-point to them all (ἀμα τῇ φρονήσει μᾶ οὐσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν, xiii. 6). Question (4) is easily answered, since wisdom rather ministers to philosophy than thinks of controlling it.

Ἴ οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἐστὶ γενέσεως] Suggested perhaps by *Eth. X. vii. 5*, where it is said of the θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεταί παρά τὸ θεωρῆσαι. *Ib.* § 7: δοκεῖ . . . παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδένας ἐφίεσθαι τέλους.

εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπων] 'If thought be that which is concerned

with things just and beautiful and good for man.' 'It is indefinite, being probably feminine on account of the preceding φρόνησις. This passage is the first that asserts strongly the moral nature of 'thought.' We are told here that it takes cognisance of the just and the beautiful; before it was only said to be concerned with what was good (περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ, ch. v. § 6). These concluding discussions about φρόνησις show the inadequacy of the term 'prudence,' by which it has been so often translated, really to represent it.

οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά] The answer to this objection has virtually been already given, ch. v. § 8: where φρόνησις was said not to be a merely intellectual quality.

2 εἰ δὲ μὴ—πείθεσθαι] 'But suppose we assume that a man is thoughtful not for this object (i.e. mere knowledge of virtue), but with a view to becoming (virtuous), we must then concede that to those who are virtuous thought will not be useful,—nor any more so to those who have not got (virtue), for there will be no difference whether they have (thought) themselves, or follow the advice of

περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ μαίνεται νομεν ἰατρικὴν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δοξίειν, 3 εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἢ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὲ τούτων λεκτέον· ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετὰς 4 αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ' οὐσας ἐκατέραν ἐκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μὴδὲν μὴδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ 5 ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὐσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. ἔτι 6

others possessing it.' The compression used here is quite in the style of Eudemus, and so is the confusion caused by the careless writing in τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν, where ἔχουσιν and ἔχειν appear to refer to two different things.

3 *εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται*] This difficulty may have been partly suggested by the prominent position assigned to Thought in the present book (cf. ch. vii. § 7: εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική), partly by the authoritative character attributed to politics by Aristotle, *Eth. I. ii. 4-6*: δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato on the βασιλικὴ τέχνη, *Euthydem.* p. 291 B, quoted Vol. I. Essay III. p. 191.

4 Thought and Philosophy cannot be otherwise than desirable, as they are the best state of the human mind. And the mind must necessarily (ἀναγκαῖον) desire its own best state.

5 *ἔπειτα — εὐδαίμονα*] Furthermore they do produce happiness—philosophy produces it, not in the way that medicine produces health, but rather it operates like health itself. Being a part of the entire well-being (τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς) of man,

it makes one happy by the consciousness of possessing it.'

τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς] This phrase, which never occurs in the writings of Aristotle, is frequent in those of Eudemus. Cf. *Eth. Eud. II. i. 9*: καὶ ἐστὶ ζωὴ καὶ τελεία καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μέρος). *Ib.* § 14: διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἰ τι μέρος ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἢ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς. *Eth. Eud. IV. (Nic. v.) ii. 7*: οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύνην πλείους, καὶ οἱ ἐστὶ τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, δῆλον. *Ib.* § 10: ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη. This conception Eudemus came to identify with καλοκάγαθια, *Eth. Eud. VIII. iii. 1*: κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἐκάστης ἀρετῆς εἰρηται πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χωρὶς διελομεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς διαθροῦτεον τῆς ἐκ τούτων, ἣν ἐκαλοῦμεν ἥδη καλοκάγαθίαν.

τῷ ἔχσθαι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν] 'Ενεργεῖν added on to ἔχσθαι expresses the fruition, as well as the possession, of philosophy. It implies that philosophy exists not only *in*, but *for*, the mind. See Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 243 sq.

6 *ἔτι — τοῦτον*] 'Again, man's proper function is discharged by an

τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικῆς· οὐθὲν γὰρ 7 ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθέν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὕτω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιούντας ἢ ἄκουστας ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἑτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὰ (καίτοι πράττουσιν γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν 8 καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετὴ, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράτ-

accordance with thought and moral virtue. For virtue makes the aim right, and thought the means to the attainment of this.' The conception of τὸ ἔργον is taken from *Ar. Eth.* I. vii. 10. The rest of the psychology here is different from that of Aristotle (see *Eth.* III. v. 1, note), but is identical with that adopted by Eudemus in his earlier books. Cf. *Eth.* *Eud.* II. xi. 1: *τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων λέγωμεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως ὥστε οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισὶ τὸν λόγον. "Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια." αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον. "Ἔστι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. Λεκτέον δ' ὅστερον περὶ αὐτῶν* (this refers to ch. v. § 6, where, however, σωφροσύνη is substituted for ἐγκράτεια). *Id.* § 3: *πότερον δ' ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπόν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος.* *Id.* § 6, quoted below.

τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου κ.τ.λ.] The parts are: (1) the scientific reason, (2) the

practical reason, (3) the moral nature (*λόγου μετέχον*), (4) the vegetative element,—'Ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, i.e. 'moral virtue.' The vegetative soul has its own ἀρετὴ or 'excellence,' in a general sense.

7 The first step to prove the use and practical necessity of thought, is to show that moral action implies consciousness and a conscious purpose.

8 *τὴν μὲν—διωόμεως*] 'Now virtue makes the purpose right, but the means to this (*ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι*) do not belong to virtue, but to another faculty.' There is some confusion here in speaking of the means to a purpose, *προαίρεσις* itself being in the Aristotelian psychology a faculty of means; but cf. *Eth.* *Eud.* II. xi. 5-6, where *προαίρεσις* is said to imply both end and means, and whence the present passage is repeated almost verbatim. 'Ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινος καὶ ἑκὲς τινος. Οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τὸ (τῷ, Fritzsche, e conj.) προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα. Ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ

τεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ τις δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾗ καλός, ἐπαινετή ἐστίν, ἂν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμέν εἶναι. ἔστι 10 δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δεινότης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἔξις τῷ ὁμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε

τῶν τούτων ἕνεκα. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὁρθεῖν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως, οὗ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία.

8-10 λεκτέον δ'—ἀγαθόν] 'But we must speak on the point with a more exact attention. There is a certain faculty which is called "cleverness," this is of a nature to perform and to hit upon the means that conduce to any given aim. Now if the aim be good, this faculty is praiseworthy, but if bad, it turns to cunning. Hence it even comes to pass (καὶ) that thoughtful men get called "clever" and "rogues." Now thought is not cleverness, but it is not without a faculty of the kind. But this eye of the mind attains its full condition not without virtue, as we have already stated, and as is clear, for the syllogisms of action have as their major premiss—"Since such and such is the end and the best"—(being whatever it is,—something for the sake of argument, it matters not what). But this (major premiss) cannot be apprehended except by the good man; for vice distorts (the mind), and makes it false with regard to the principles of action. Hence it is evident that

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one cannot possess "thought" unless he be good.'

καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμέν εἶναι]. The terms δεινός and πανούργος went often together. Cf. Plato, *Theaet.* p. 177 A: ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος—ταῦτα δὲ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανούργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται. Demosth. *Ol.* I. p. 9: πανούργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἀνθρώπος πράγμασι χρήσασθαι. Rassow refers to Plato, *Hippias Min.* p. 365 E, for the popular identification of φρόνησις with δεινότης.

10 ἡ δ' ἔξις τῷ ὁμματι τούτῳ] The whole conception of reason, 'the eye of the soul,' being capable of being perverted into worldly cunning or of being kept pure by good moral habits, comes, originally, no doubt, from Plato, *Repub.* 518 E: ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονήσαι παρὰ μᾶλλον θεοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν οὕτω, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιγωγῆς χρήσιμον καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀχρηστον αὖ καὶ βλαβερόν γίγνεται, ἢ ὅπως ἐννεόηκας, τῶν λεγομένων ποιηρῶν μὲν, σοφῶν δὲ, ὡς δριμύ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχράριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαῦλην ἔχον τὴν δψιν, κακίᾳ δ' ἡραγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν,

A A

τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὅτιδήποτε ὄν. ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν. τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαφειδесθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν.

- 13 Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα· οὐ ταῦτόν μὲν, ὅμοιον δέ· οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ

ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν δεύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσούτῳ πλείω κατὰ ἐργαζόμενον;

ὡς εἰρηται τε] Ch. ii. § 4: διὸ οὐτ' ἀνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, οὐτ' ἀνευ ἡθικῆς ἐστὶν ἔξωθεν ἡ προαίρεσις. *Εἰλ. Ευδ.* II. xi. 5: διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἶη τὸ τέλος κ.τ.λ.

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν] The form of the practical syllogism is similarly given, *Εἰλ. Ευδ.* II. xi. 4: ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις· 'ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τὸδε ὑμῖν αἰεῖν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο,' ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, 'εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰ, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι.' On the doctrine of the practical syllogism, see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 263, sq.

XIII. 1 Σκεπτέον δὴ—κυρίαν] 'We must consider then, over again, the nature of virtue. For there is a relation in virtue analogous to that borne by 'thought' to cleverness. Cleverness, though not the same as 'thought,' is similar to it, and this is the way in which natural virtue stands related to virtue proper.' The doctrine of the natural element in virtue was clearly given by Aristotle, cf. *Εἰλ. x.* ix. 6-8: Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθὸς ὁνομαζομένη, οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδασχῇ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ

ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θελας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει—Δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἥθος προὑπάρχειν πως οἰκείον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραίνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. In the present passage, the analogy between the development of the reason and of the moral will is well drawn out. At first, there is the intellectual faculty, cleverness, undetermined as yet for good or bad, but requiring a right direction to be given to its aims. This the moral feelings can alone supply. On the other side, there is the generous instinct, the impulse to bravery, justice, and the like, but this is deficient in consciousness and in the idea of a law, which reason can alone supply. The joint development of these two sides gives, on the one hand, 'thought,' on the other hand, virtue, in its complete and proper form. What there is difficult or strange in the doctrine is, that virtue has apparently assigned to it the intellectual function of apprehending the end of action. This appears an inversion. 'Ἀρετὴ' seems now to have changed places with λόγος. But, at all events, the point is clearly established that an intellectual side and a moral side are entirely inseparable.

τᾶλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὁμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν· καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὐσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὀραῖσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῶ ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλῃσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει. ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὐσα τότ' ἔσται 2 κυρίως ἀρετῇ. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινὲς φυσί 3 πᾶσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν

καὶ γὰρ παισὶ—ἀρετῇ] 'For the natural dispositions belong both to children and beasts, but without reason they appear harmful. At least this seems evident, that as a strong body, if moved without sight, comes into violent collisions because it has not sight to guide it, so is it in mental things (*ἐνταῦθα*). If the natural qualifications have reason added to them, they then excel in action, and the state, which (before) was a semblance of virtue, now becomes virtue in the true sense of the term.' Φυσικαὶ ἕξεις is used inaccurately for φυσικαὶ διαθέσεις, cf. *Eth.* II. vii. 6, note. On the moral qualities of brutes Aristotle often speaks; cf. *Hist. An.* I. i.; IX. i. &c. The 'courage' of brutes, being undirected, is no doubt harmful, so the generosity, &c., of boys. That fine natures are capable of the worst perversion, is an opinion to be found stated in Plato's *Republic*, p. 491 E: Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδελμάντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφροσύνας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχοῦσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἶει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἀκρατον

πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνεσθαι, ἀσθενῇ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὕτε ἀγαθῶν οὕτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι;

3-5 διόπερ—μετὰ λόγου] 'Hence it is that some say that all the virtues are manifestations of thought; and thus Socrates was partly right and partly wrong in his investigations. He was wrong in considering the virtues manifestations of thought, but perfectly right in holding that they were inseparable from thought. The same point is testified to by the fact that, at present, persons, when they wish to define virtue, add the terms "state (specifying the particular object), according to the right law." And that law is right which is in accordance with thought. All men therefore seem to have a presentiment that a particular state in accordance with thought is virtue. But a little alteration is necessary. Not merely the state according to the right law, but that which is conscious of (*μετὰ*) the right law constitutes virtue. Now in such matters thought is right law. Socrates then considered that the

ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις
 ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ
 4 φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν
 πάντες, ὅταν ὀρίζονται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασιν τὴν ἔξιν,
 εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὅτι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον·
 ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. εἰκάσι δὲ μαντεύεσθαι
 πῶς ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
 5 φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ
 κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις
 ἀρετὴ ἐστίν. ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις
 ἐστίν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι
 6 (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον
 οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως
 ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύσις· ἂν, ὅς διαλεχθείη τις ἂν
 ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυνέ-

virtues were laws (for he defined them all as sciences), but we consider that they are conscious of a law.'

καὶ Σωκράτης] On the doctrine of Socrates that 'virtue is science,' see Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 165, sq. In *Eth.* III. viii. 6, the phrase is *ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης*, on which Bishop Fitzgerald remarks, that by prefixing the article Aristotle appears to have indicated the Socrates of Plato's dialogues, the dramatic, and not the historical, philosopher. Thus speaking similarly of *characters* in books, Aristotle says, *Eth.* III. viii. 2, *τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα*. *Ib.* II. ix. 3, *ἡ Καλυψώ*. II. ix. 6, *πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην*. And contrariwise of real persons he speaks without the article. *Eth.* I. iv. 5, *Εἰ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει*. *Ib.* I. v. 3, *ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλῳ*. I. vi. 8, *οἷς δὲ καὶ Σπεύσιππος*. I. x. 1, *κατὰ Σόλωνα*. All through the first book of the *Metaphysics*, when writing the history of philosophy, Aristotle speaks of the different philosophers without

the article, and so too elsewhere in contrasting Socrates with Plato, &c. The only exceptions to this rule are the cases of *renewed mention*. Cf. *Met.* XII. iv. 5: *Δύο γὰρ εἰσιν αἱ τις ἀν' ἀποδοῇ Σωκράτει δικαίως*—'ΑΛΛ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. But in discussing Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* (*Pol.* II. i-vi.), Aristotle invariably speaks of ὁ Σωκράτης, οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι, &c., as referring not to a real but to a represented personage. Assuming that Eudemus has followed the same rule, we may conclude that here and in *Eth.* VII. ii. 1, *Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ δὴως ἐμάχετο*, *Ib.* VII. iii. 14, *ὁ ἐξήτει Σωκράτης*,—the actual and historical Socrates is designated.

καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες] i.e. since the establishment of the Peripatetic doctrine. Eudemus (§ 5) refines upon the usual Peripatetic formula, substituting *μετὰ λόγου* for *κατὰ λόγον*. On the meaning of this alteration, see *Eth.* I. vii. 14, note.

6 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος—ὑπάρξουσιν]

στατος πρὸς ἀπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὐπω εἰληφώς ἔσται· τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ὥς δὲ ἀπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· αἶμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ οὕση πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον γ' δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ᾖ, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία 8 γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἰατρικὴ· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὀρᾷ ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἔνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη. ἔτι ὁμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

'Thus the opinion is refuted of him who would argue that the virtues are separated from one another, that the same man is not equally gifted by nature for all the virtues, so that he will acquire one now and another later. This is possible with regard to natural good qualities, but not so with regard to those which constitute a good man absolutely; for together with Thought, which is one, all the virtues will be in his possession.' The same perfect character is attributed to Thought below, *Eth.* vii. ii. 5: *πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς.* The theory is, that he who has thought can do no wrong. It will be seen how nearly this ap-

proaches to the Stoical idea of the 'wise man.'

7 This section is a mere repetition, in Eudemian fashion, of what has gone before, ch. xii. §§ 4, 10; *Eth. Eud.* ii. xi. 6 (*l.c.*) Cf. also ch. ii. § 4: *διὸ οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξως ἡ προαίρεσις.*

8 The relation of thought to Philosophy is clearly stated by the author of the *Magna Moralia*, who paraphrases the present passage (*M. M.* i. xxxv. 32), *ἡ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἐπιτροπὸς τίς ἐστι τῆς σοφίας, καὶ παρασκευάζει ταύτην σχολὴν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον, κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ ταῦτα σωφρονίζουσα.*

PLAN OF BOOK VII.

THIS last of the Nicomacho-Eudemean Books consists of two parts, of which the one is a necessary complement to Aristotle's ethical system ; the other superfluous, being little more than a modification of Aristotle's (far superior) treatise on Pleasure.

Part I. having enumerated the moral states which are above, below, and between virtue and vice, mentions six ordinary opinions on these states (Ch. I.), points out the difficult questions to which those opinions give rise (Ch. II.), and proceeds to elucidate them.

In Ch. III. the question is discussed, How is Incontinence compatible with a knowledge of the right?

In Ch. IV. the question, Whether Incontinence is confined to any definite object-matter?

Chs. V. and VI., pursuing the same inquiry, treat of certain morbid and unnatural kinds of Incontinence, and of Incontinence (analogously so called) in the matter of anger.

Ch. VII. compares generally Incontinence with Intemperance, treats of the subordinate forms of the intermediate moral states (endurance, softness, &c.), and traces Incontinence to two separate sources in the character.

Ch. VIII. continues the comparison between Intemperance and Incontinence, reverts to two questions before mooted, namely :— (1) Is Intemperance more curable than Incontinence? (2) Is Incontinence to be regarded as absolutely bad? and gives a negative answer to both.

Ch. IX. §§ 1-4 discusses the question mooted in Ch. II., Does Continence consist in sticking to an opinion or purpose, right or wrong? In answering this question, a good distinction is drawn between Obstinacy and Continence.

Ch. IX. § 5—Ch. X. winds up the previous discussions, and

formally settles the remaining questions of Ch. II. Is Intemperance the same as Incontinence? Can the thoughtful man be incontinent?

These chapters form, as we have said, a necessary complement to the Aristotelian ethical system, taking a more practical point of view (*ἀλλήν ἀρχήν*) than that which would divide mankind simply into the virtuous and the vicious. Moral systems in general have perhaps too much neglected this field of the intermediate states; and general language has not definitely adopted the distinction between the 'Intemperate' and the 'Incontinent,' as the use of these English words at once testifies, for we are evidently obliged to give a certain special and technical meaning to the word 'Intemperate' in order to make it stand as the representative of *ἀκόλαστοι*.¹ A subtle, but not always clear psychology is employed to explain the phenomena of moral weakness, and it is observable that physical and medical considerations are prominently appealed to throughout this book. The remarks on bestiality, cretinism, or morbid depravity (*θηριότης*) here made have attracted the notice of modern writers on the psychology of insanity (as, for instance, Dr. Thomas Mayo).² And the interesting allusions here made to the

¹ The attributes assigned (c. vii. § 2) to the Intemperate man, who 'of deliberate purpose pursues excessive pleasures, for their own sake, and never repents of doing so, and thus is incurable,' make this a sort of ideally vicious character. A similar conception of ideal vice in its extreme form, with the element of cruelty added, is to be found in Shelley's portrait of Count Cenci: see *The Cenci*, Act I. sc. i.

As to my character for what men call
crime,
Seeing I please my senses as I list,
And vindicate that right with force
or guile,
It is a public matter, and I care not
If I discuss it with you.
All men delight in sensual luxury,
All men enjoy revenge; and most
exult

Over the tortures they can never feel;
But I delight in nothing else. I love
The sight of agony, and the sense of
joy,
When this shall be another's and that
mine.
And I have no remorse, and little fear,
Which are, I think, the checks of
other men, &c.

² 'Now, according to this view of the subject, we have a class of persons, differing from the majority of mankind in their incapacity for moral distinction, differing from the insane, in not labouring under any suspension of the power of will. On the first of these grounds, they have a right to a place in our system of mental pathology. On the last, they must constitute a distinct head from insanity. I am not at present considering this class generally; I exclude indeed that

melancholic or bilious temperament might be illustrated, not only from Aristotle's *Problems*, but also from Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*. The chief thing that we have to complain of in this book is the too vague way in which incontinence is treated. For the sake of forming a more definite notion of the standard of Greek morality, we could have wished a graphic portrait of the continent man, in the style of Aristotle's fourth Book. As it is, we must be content to know that the continent man yields to temptation less, and the incontinent man more, than people in general.

Part II. consists of that superfluous treatise on Pleasure, the authorship of which has been so much disputed. While professing to treat of pleasure as falling under the philosophy of human life, the writer seems to confine himself almost entirely to a refutation of three positions maintained by the Platonic school: 1st. That pleasure is in no sense a good. 2nd. That most pleasures (*i.e.* physical pleasures) are bad. 3rd. That no pleasure can be the chief good.

The first and third of these positions are refuted in Chs. XII. and XIII., and the second in Ch. XIV. The subject is treated in this book under a more physiological and practical aspect than in the tenth book of the Nicomachean work.

section of persons, in whom the absence of principle is obviated by the harmlessness of their tendencies. I am speaking of persons destitute of the moral faculty, and also vicious in their

propensities. For these I have borrowed the designation given to them by Aristotle: and I call them *brutal*.' —Mayo, *Elements of the Pathology of the Human Mind*, p. 127.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VII.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἥθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δηλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλούμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' αὖ ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶς ἀρετὴν, ἡρωϊκὴν τινα καὶ θεϊάν, ὥσπερ "Ομηρος περὶ Ἑκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός.

I. This chapter proposes a new field of inquiry (ἄλλην ἀρχήν) in Ethics, namely, to consider those intermediate states, continence and incontinence, together with their subordinate forms (softness, luxury, and endurance), which are 'neither identical with virtue and vice, nor yet wholly distinct from them.' After an enumeration of the moral states above, below, and between, virtue and vice, the writer announces that his method of inquiry will be, as elsewhere, to collect current opinions on the subject, to raise doubts and objections to them, and by a process of sifting to reject such existing opinions as are untenable, and to leave a residue of 'sufficiently demonstrated' theory. He accordingly mentions six common notions about the states in question.

I τὰ δ' ἐναντία κ.τ.λ.] A scale of the moral states is here drawn out, which stands as follows: 1. Divine

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virtue, or pure reason. 2. Virtue (afterwards called temperance, σωφροσύνη), or the perfect harmony of passion subjugated to reason. 3. Continence, or the mastery of reason over passion after a struggle. 4. Incontinence, or the mastery of passion over reason after a struggle. 5. Vice (afterwards called ἀκολασία, intemperance), or the perfect harmony of reason subjugated to passion. 6. Bestiality, or pure passion. It is remarkable that the terms σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία, which in this book certainly supply the place of ἀρετή and κακία, are actually introduced extremely late. Cf. ch. v. § 8.

ἡρωϊκὴν τινα] Cf. Arist. Pol. VII. xiv. 2, where the gods and heroes are mentioned as excelling men. Dr. Hampden, in his *Bampton Lectures*, mentions that, in the canonisation of a Roman Catholic Saint, it was customary to declare that he had graduated 'in heroico gradu virtutis.'

B B

οὐδὲ ἐψέκει

ἀνδρός· γὰρ θητοῦ πάϊς ἴμμεται ἀλλὰ θείοιο.

- 2 ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἔξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον
3 ἀρετῆς, ἡ δ' ἑτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θείον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του (σεῖος ἀνὴρ φασιν), οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
4 ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας εἰρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκрасίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθη-
5 ρίᾳ ἐκάτεραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ

οὐδὲ ἐψέκει] *Pl. xxiv.* 258.3 οἱ Λάκωνες] Apparently taken from the *Meno* of Plato, p. 99 D.

4 ὕστερον] i.e. in chapter v.

πρότερον εἰρηται] Cf. *Éth. Eud.* II. x. 28, &c.

5 δεῖ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων—*ἰκαρῶς*] 'Our course must be, as elsewhere, to state existing ideas (*τὰ φαινόμενα*), and, having gone through the doubts (which these ideas suggest), to establish thus, if possible all, but if not all, anyhow the greater number and the most important of the ideas which are generally admitted (*ἐνδόξα*) about these conditions of mind. For if the difficulties be resolved and at the same time the generally admitted ideas be suffered to stand, the thing will be established sufficiently.' This passage is obscure, chiefly on account of the ambiguity in the words *ἐὰν γὰρ λήγῃαι τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπῃται τὰ ἐνδόξα*. Two meanings might be

attributed to *λήγῃαι τὰ δυσχερῆ*, which might either refer (1) to the rejection of ideas that involved a difficulty; or (2) to the clearing up of difficulties attaching to any of the popular ideas. The former interpretation would seem best to suit the context, and to be justified by the actual procedure of subsequent chapters, and accordingly the following is the way in which the passage is rendered by the Paraphrast. *Λέγωμεν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸν τρόπον καθ' ὃν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰπομεν· ἐκθυσόμεθα γὰρ τοὺς δοκοῦντας περὶ αὐτῶν λόγους, ὧν τοὺς μὴ συμβαίοντας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐλέγξαντες, τοὺς μάλιστα ἐνδόξους καταλείψαντες βεβαιώσομεν· καὶ οὕτως ἔσται φανερόν ὃ περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος.* But on looking below we find a sentence answering to, and in fact repeating, the present one in such a way that we cannot help taking it as a decisive guide as to what is here meant. After a statement of the

δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλείστα καὶ κυριώτατα· εἰς γὰρ λήπται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπεται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

Δοκεῖ δὴ ἢ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων 6 καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν φαύλων τε καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σῶφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σῶφρονα οἱ

various ideas, and of the difficulties which they suggest, the writer adds αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦται τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τοῦτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ, τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἢ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρεσίς ἐστιν (ii. 12). The words before us, λήπται τὰ δυσχερῆ, correspond with τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν (τῶν ἀπορίων) and with ἢ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας. It is to be observed, however, that καταλιπεῖν is used in the one place to refer to the popular ideas, and in the other to the objections (ἀπορίαι) urged against those ideas. τὰ φαινόμενα, as shown by what follows, is here equivalent to τὰ λεγόμενα in § 7, the common sayings and ideas of men. It is used in the same sense, *Eth. Eud.* i. vi. 1: πειρατέον δὲ περὶ τούτων πάντων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυροῖς καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις.

6-7 The common ideas are now enumerated. They are six in number:

(1) 'That continence and endurance are morally good, while incontinence and softness are morally bad.'

(2) 'That the continent man is he who sticks to his opinion, while the incontinent man is he who departs from his opinion.'

(3) 'That the incontinent man errs

through his peculiar state, knowing all the while that he is doing wrong; while owing to this knowledge the continent man abstains.'

(4) 'That temperance is the same as continence, and in like manner incontinence is sometimes confused with intemperance.'

(5) 'It is occasionally maintained that "thoughtful" and clever men may be incontinent.'

(6) 'That there is such a thing as incontinence of other things beside pleasure, e.g. of anger, of honour, and of gain.'

6 δοκεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. v. 4-5, where it is said that Socrates considered ἐγκράτεια the foundation of the virtues. (Cf. *Id.* iv. v. 1, iv. v. 3-7, 11.)

καὶ τὸν σῶφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν] The distinction between σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, and καρτερία, was not accurately maintained either by Xenophon or Plato; cf. *Memorab.* iv. v. 7, ii. i. 1, &c. Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 491 D: πῶς ἐαυτοῦ ἀρχοντα λέγεις; οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σῶφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἐαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἐαυτῷ. *Rep.* p. 430 E: κόσμος πού

- δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῇ ἀκόλα-
 7 στον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ' ἑτέρους εἰναί φασιν. τὸν δὲ
 φρόνιμον ὅτε μὲν οὐ φασιν ἐνδέχασθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῇ, ὅτε
 δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινούς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι
 ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ
 μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
- 2 Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύε-
 ται τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασί τινες οἶόν τε εἶναι.

τις . . . ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν
 τιῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια.

τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῇ] Fritzsche
 refers to Xen. *Mem.* iv. v. 6 sq., and
 for the opposite comparison to Xen.
Mem. ii. i. 1: ἐδόκει προτρέπειν τοὺς
 συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν βρωτοῦ καὶ
 ποτοῦ καὶ λαχρείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ῥίγους
 καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνου. γνοῦς γάρ τινα
 τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα
 πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, κ.τ.λ.

7 ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ
 τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους] Cf. Plato, *Legg.* ix.
 p. 869 A. Isocr. *Demon.* p. 6: ὑφ' ὧν
 κρατεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσυχρόν, τούτων
 ἐγκράτειαν ἀσκει πάντων, κέρδους,
 ὀργῆς, ἡδονῆς, λύπης.

II. This chapter contains a state-
 ment of the objections and difficulties
 which may be raised against the
 above-mentioned ideas.

1-4 state the difficulties which at-
 tach to the third-mentioned idea—
 that the incontinent man sins against
 knowledge. How is this possible? how
 can one know the best and not do it? Socrates denied the possibility
 of incontinence altogether, making it
 convertible with ignorance; but with
 what kind of ignorance remains to be
 asked. Others confess that it is not
 knowledge which is perverted in the
 mind of the incontinent, but only
 opinion, i.e. a vague and weak con-
 viction.

5 Continuing the same subject,

introduces also an objection to idea
 (5)—that the thoughtful man may
 be incontinent. Some fancy that
 Thought (though not knowledge in
 the scientific sense) may co-exist with
 incontinence. But this shows a mis-
 conception of the nature of 'thought.'
 The thoughtful man can do no wrong.

6 Contains an objection to idea (4).
 How can continence be the same as
 temperance, since the former implies
 evil desires to be controlled, but the
 latter is a harmonious state of the
 moral nature?

7-10 Shows the difficulties and
 absurdities which attach to idea (2),
 that continence consists in sticking to
 your opinion. If so, it must be bad
 sometimes; Neoptolemus was incontin-
 ent; folly and incontinence com-
 bined will produce right actions; the
 abandoned man will be a more hopeful
 character than the incontinent, &c.

11 Urges against the sixth of the
 ideas that the term 'incontinence'
 cannot be indiscriminately relative
 to wealth, honour, &c. There must
 be some absolute conception of in-
 continence, independent of these
 qualifications.

1 Ἀπορήσειε δ'—ἀγνοῖαν] 'Now one
 might raise the question, how it is
 that a person with right conceptions
 comes to act incontinently. That a
 man who had absolute knowledge
 should do so, some say would be
 impossible, for it would be a strange

δαινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας. ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶεται γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι, φανερόν. εἰς δὲ τινες οἱ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ 3

thing, as Socrates thought, if knowledge were in a man, that anything else should master him and twist him about like a slave. Socrates, in short, was totally opposed to the idea, (arguing) as if incontinence did not exist at all, for he said no one with a conception of what was best could act differently from that best, but he could only so act through ignorance.' On this doctrine of Socrates, and on its connection with the rest of his ethical views, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 166. The omission of the article before Σωκράτης seems to show that the real man, and not the personage of Plato's dialogues, is referred to (see above, note on *Eth.* vi. xiii. 3), but yet the words of the passage before us have obvious reference to Plato's *Protagoras*, p. 352 B: δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλὰκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης, οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἀρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμὸν, τοτὲ δὲ ἥδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλὰκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδράποδον, περιελλομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

ὅλως ἐμάχετο] This is repeated in strong terms by the author of the *Μεγὰ Μοράλια*, II. vi. 2: Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἀνὴρ εἰς ὅλως καὶ

οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὅτι οὐθεὶς εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ εἰσιν ἐλοιτ' ἄν. Cf. Plato, *Protag.* p. 357 E: ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανόμενη πρᾶξις ἀνεῖ ἐπιστήμης ἵστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθία πρῶττεται, &c.

2 οὗτος μὲν οὖν—φανερόν] 'Now this reasoning is manifestly at variance with experience, and we require to ask with regard to the state, supposing it to arise from ignorance, what manner of ignorance it is that takes place, for it is plain that the person who acts incontinently does not at all events think (that he must so act) before he gets into the particular state.' Φαινομένοις here refers no doubt to the actual facts of life, and accordingly the rendering of the Paraphrast is οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐναντιος ἐστὶ τοῖς φανοείοις. And yet there is probably some allusion also to the φαινόμενα mentioned above (i. 5); we may represent the double allusion of the word by translating it 'experience,' comparing with it also the use of τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, *Eth.* I. viii. 1.

οὐκ οἶεται γε] There seems to be an ellipsis of δὲ μὲν πρᾶττειν ἂν πράττει. Cf. below, iii. 2: ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν, διώκει δέ. The writer argues that if incontinence be ignorance, it is a peculiar kind of ignorance, an ignorance that comes on (γίνεται), not a consistent ignorance; for the incontinent person does not think ignorantly, i.e. wrongly, before the time of temptation. On

δ' οὐ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μὴθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολο-
 γοῦσι, τὸ δὲ μὴθὲνα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ
 ὁμολογοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην
 4 ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. ἀλλὰ
 μὴν εἶγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μὴδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ἢ
 ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἡρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι,
 συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς·
 τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν
 5 ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης· αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυ-
 ρότατον. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἄμα φρόνιμος
 καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσκει δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πρᾶτ-
 τειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται πρό-
 τερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις
 6 καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας
 ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων
 ἐγκρατής οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατής σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώ-
 φρωνος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε. εἰ μὲν
 γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαῦλη ἢ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκο-
 λουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθε-
 νεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθε-
 7 νεῖς, οὐθὲν μέγα. ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἢ
 ἐγκράτεια, φαῦλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ. καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης

Plato's conception of moral ignorance
 see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 187.

3 ἐπιστήμης μὴθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον] Cf.
Eth. Eud. viii. i. 10: καὶ ὁρθῶς τὸ
 Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον
 φρονήσεως, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἐφη,
 οὐκ ὁρθόν. Plato, *Protag.* p. 352 D:
 αἰσχρόν ἐστι—σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ
 οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν
 ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.

5 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις—ἀρετάς] 'And
 besides, it has been previously de-
 monstrated that the thoughtful man
 is emphatically (γε) one who acts, for
 his province is to deal with particulars,
 and he possesses also all the virtues,'
πρότερον, cf. *Eth.* vi. vii. 7, vi. viii. 8;
τῶν ἐσχάτων is here the genitive of

the object, as, in the place just quoted,
 τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστὶν (ἡ φρόνησις).

καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς] Cf. *Eth.*
 vi. xiii. 6; καὶ τὰς ἄλλας is equivalent
 to καὶ αὐτὰς πᾶσας. See the note on *Eth.*
 ii. i. 4.

7 The rough and hasty conception
 of continence which would confound
 it with obstinacy is here refuted by
 showing that absurdities would follow
 from it. Continence would be some-
 times an evil, and incontinence some-
 times a good. From this point of view,
 the conduct of Neoptolemus (who first
 promised to deceive Philoctetes, and
 afterwards abandoned the design as
 unworthy) must be called incontinent
 and at the same time right. The

ἡ ἀκράσια ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπονδαία ἀκράσια, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπέισθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδόμενος ἀπο- 8 ρία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία

allusion is repeated below, c. ix. § 4. For the sake of observing more accurately the 'noble incontinence' of Neoptolemus, it is worth while to quote at length the passage referred to (Soph. Phil. 895-916).

N. παπαῖ· τί δὴτ' ἂν δρῶμ' ἐγὼ τούν-
θενδε γε;

Φ. τί δ' ἐστιν, ὦ παῖ; ποῖ ποτ' ἐξέβης
λόγῳ;

N. οὐκ οἶδ' ὅποι χρὴ τάπορον τρέπειν
ἔπος.

Φ. ἀπορεῖς δὲ τοῦ σύ; μὴ λέγ' ὦ
τέκνον, τάδε.

N. ἀλλ' ἐνθάδ' ἦδη τοῦδε τοῦ πάθους
κυρῶ.

Φ. οὐ δὴ σε δυσχέρεια τοῦ νοσήματος
ἐπεισεν ὥστε μὴ μ' ἀγειν ναύτην ἔτι;

N. ἅπαντα δυσχέρεια, τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν
ὅταν λιπὼν τις δρᾷ τὰ μὴ προσει-
κότα.

Φ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ φυτεύσαντος σύ γε
δρᾷς οὐδὲ φωνεῖς, ἐσθλὸν ἀνδρ'
ἐπωφελῶν.

N. αἰσχρὸς φανοῦμαι· τοῦτ' ἀνιῶμαι
πάλαι.

Φ. οὐκουν ἐν οἷς γε δρᾷς· ἐν οἷς δ'
αὐθῆς ὀκνῶ.

N. ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δράσω; δεύτερον ληφθῶ
κακός,
κρύπτων θ' ἂ μὴ δεῖ καὶ λέγων
αἰσχιστ' ἐπῶν;

Φ. ἀνὴρ δδ', εἰ μὴ 'γὼ κακὸς γνῶμην
ἔφην,
προδοῦς μ' ἔοικε κάκλιπὼν τὸν
πλοῦν στελεῖν.

N. λιπὼν μὲν οὐκ ἔγωγε· λυπηρῶς δὲ μὴ
πέμπω σε μάλλον, τοῦτ' ἀνιῶμαι
πάλαι.

Φ. τί ποτε λέγεις, ὦ τέκνον, ὡς οὐ
μανθάνω.

N. οὐδὲν σε κρύψω. δεῖ γὰρ ἐς Τροίαν
σε πλεῖν
πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τὸν Ἀτρεΐ-
δῶν στόλον.

8-9 ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς—κακὰ πράξει]
'Again (if we accept the above-men-
tioned definition of continence) the
sophistical argument [though lying]
will cause us perplexity. For from
the Sophists wishing to confute, and
at the same time astonish (παράδοξα
ἐλέγχειν), in order that on succeeding
they may establish a reputation for
ability—they construct a piece of
reasoning which perplexes, since the
intellect is fettered, on the one hand
not wishing to abide by a conclusion
which does not please, and, on the
other hand, being unable to get loose,
from having no means of breaking
the chain of argument. Now from
one of their reasonings it ensues that
folly together with incontinence will
make up virtue; for (he who pos-
sesses these qualities) does the reverse
of what he conceives (he ought) by
reason of his incontinence, but he
conceives good to be bad and that he
ought not to do it, and thus he will
do what is good and not what is bad.'
In the Oxford edition of Bekker
(1837) there is a misprint of μένειν
μὲν δὴ. The Berlin edition of Bekker,
like all other editions, reads μένειν μὲν
μὴ. The MSS. appear to vary with
regard to μὲν (which by some of them
is omitted), but not with regard to μὴ.

γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένιν μὲν μὴ βού-
ληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προΐεναι δὲ μὴ
9 δύνῃται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ
τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκрасίας ἀρετῇ. τὰναντία
γὰρ πρᾶττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκрасίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει
δὲ τὰγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πρᾶττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ

The great difficulty in the passage before us is caused by the word *ψευδό-μενος*. This is explained either to be (1) an additional adjective to *ὁ σοφιστικός λόγος*, in which position it has an awkward appearance, or (2) to refer to the well-known puzzle of Eubulides the Megarian, which was called *ὁ ψευδόμενος*, and in logic books 'Mentiens' or 'the liar.' The puzzle was as follows: 'If a man says that he lies, does he lie or speak the truth?' to which of course no simple answer can be given. He may lie, and yet speak the truth in saying that he lies; for if he lies in saying that he lies, then he speaks the truth. This was a specimen of the 'eristic' of the Megarians, which consisted to a great extent in drawing out the difficulties that beset the common forms of language. Chrysippus wrote six books on the puzzle of 'the Liar'; and Philetas of Cos is said to have died of vexation from failing to solve it. Hegel (*Geschichte der Philos.* II. 117) compares it to the squaring of the circle. But clearly this puzzle has nothing to do with the subject under discussion in the text. Indeed one might almost fancy that the word *ψευδόμενος* was an interpolation which had crept in owing to the occurrence of the words *διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος* in the line before. The acquaintance of the copyist with the fallacy 'Mentiens' might have tended to shroud the mistake. Evidently the words *συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου* are an explanation of *ὁ σοφιστικός λόγος*, and the Paraphrast,

seeing this, ignores the word *ψευδό-μενος* altogether. Supposing, however, that it be allowed to stand, we must interpret it in a logical sense, not as if it had anything to do with the fallacy of Eubulides. The explanation of it is to be found in the *Sophist. Elench.* of Aristotle, iii. 1-2, where it is said that the aims of the Sophists and Eristics are five in number, *ἐλεγχος καὶ ψεύδος καὶ παρ-δοξον καὶ σολοικισμός* (making one talk bad grammar), *καὶ πέμπτον τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχεῖν* (making one repeat the same thing over and over)... *μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ προαιροῦνται φαίνεσθαι ἐλέγ-χοντες, δεύτερον δὲ ψευδομένον τι δεικνύειν, τρίτον εἰς παρδόξον ἄγειν, κ.τ.λ.* In the above passage we see that the writer has brought together two of these separate terms, speaking of *παρδόξα ἐλέγχειν*. It is possible that he may also have qualified the 'sophistical reasoning' with another of these logical formulæ. The above-mentioned fallacy is an instance of the Sophists' way of tampering with moral notions in order to be thought clever.

δέδεται ἡ διάνοια] Cf. *Ar. Metaph.* II. i. 2: *λύειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμὸν· ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ἡ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ ταύτη παραπλήσιον πέποιθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προσελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν.* If we grant the premiss that continence is sticking to an opinion of whatever kind, we cannot 'get loose' from the conclusion forced upon us by the Sophists.

οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεισθαι πράττων καὶ διώ- 10
κων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ
διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ
μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἐνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ἧ
φαιμέν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγη, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ μὲν
γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο ἂ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο·
νῦν δὲ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἤττον ἄλλα πράττει. ἔτι εἰ 11
περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἀπλῶς
ἀκρατὴς; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαιμέν
δ' εἶναι τινὰς ἀπλῶς. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες 12
συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ κατα-
λιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρεσίς ἐστιν.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς 3
εἰδότες, εἴτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῇ θετέον,

10 ἔτι ὁ τῷ—ἀλλὰ πράττει] 'Again he who on conviction and with full purpose acts and pursues pleasure would seem to be in a better state than he who does so not from reasoning, but from incontinence; for (the former) is more curable, since there is a possibility of changing his convictions, whereas the incontinent man is open to the saying, "When water chokes, what must one take to wash it down?" Had he not been convinced before with regard to his actions, there might have been a hope of his mind being enlightened and his ceasing so to act; but as it is, with all the conviction in the world, he still acts contrary to it.' This is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the saying that incontinence means never acting on your conviction, and that continence means sticking to your conviction. If it were so, intemperance (*ἀκολασία*) would seem to be a sort of continence, and, on the other hand, incontinence would seem incurable. The reverse, however, of all this is true. See below ch. viii.

εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο] Some MSS.

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omit μὴ, which is not to be wondered at, as there is a transition of meaning in the use of ἐπέπειστο: (1) the intemperate man is said to act τῷ πεπεισθαι, i.e. with a wrong conviction, thinking bad to be good; (2) the incontinent man acts οὐ τῷ πεπεισθαι, not by reason of a conviction that he ought to do so as he does; (3) the incontinent man πέπεισται & πράττει, has a full conviction with regard to what he does (i.e. that it is wrong), but does not abide by that conviction.

12 αἱ μὲν οὖν—ἐστὶν] 'This then is the kind of difficulties which arise; part of them we must explain away (*ἀνελεῖν*), while we leave part unanswered, for resolving a difficulty is finding something out.' Cf. Ar. *Metaphys.* II. i. 2: ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορήσαι βουλομένοις προῆργον τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστὶ, λύνειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν. See above, ch. i. 5, note.

III. This chapter discusses that which is really the most important and interesting question with regard

C C

λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περὶ
 τινὰς ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν,
 πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῇ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἐστὶ δ'
 2 ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς
 εἰσι τῷ περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ
 πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἢ
 οὐ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ'
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὐ· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ πάντ'
 ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἁπὲρ ὁ ἀκόλαστος,
 οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταῦτόν γὰρ αὖν ἦν τῇ
 ἡκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥδι ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαι-
 ρούμενος, νομίζων αἰεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὁ δ'

to incontinence and the whole nature of the moral will, namely, how is it possible to know the right and yet do the wrong? It treats of the third of the popular opinions mentioned above (ch. i. § 6), and the difficulties arising out of the same (ch. ii. §§ 1-4). The commencement of the chapter is rather confused, as it touches on, without discussing, the nature of the object-matter of continence and incontinence, &c. With § 3 the main question is opened, namely, the relation of knowledge to incontinence, and a preliminary step is taken by the assertion that it makes no difference whether it be right *opinion* or *knowledge* which the incontinent man possesses, since opinion may be held quite as *strongly* as knowledge.

In §§ 5-8 it is shown that the real point to be ascertained is, what is meant by *knowing* or *having knowledge*. A man may have knowledge which is in abeyance, either because he does not apply a minor premiss to his general principle, or because he is under the influence of sleep, wine, madness, or the like.

9-14 A more intimate examination tells us that there may be two syllogisms in the mind, the one leading to continence and the other to incontinence. The former is not drawn out, but remains in want of a minor premiss; the latter through the instincts of sense and desire becomes realised and is acted on. However, the former knowledge cannot be said to have been present in a complete form to the mind, and therefore Socrates was not wrong in denying that knowledge of the right could exist, and yet be overborne.

1-2 There is something awkward in the way in which the questions to be discussed in succeeding chapters are here propounded. The writer might have made it his *ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως* to consider what is the exact point of difference between continence and incontinence, but as a matter of fact he has not done so. There is a want of art in the sudden announcement (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται, κ.τ.λ.) of the distinction between intemperance and incontinence. The same want of art, proceeding from whatever cause, marks

οὐκ οἶται μὲν, διώκει δέ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ 3
 ἁλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐθὲν δια-
 φέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστά-
 ζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα 4
 πιστεύειν οἱ δοξαζόντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν
 ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι
 γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἥττον οἷς δοξαζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπί-
 στανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν 5
 τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ
 ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει
 τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ
 ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ

the whole of these two sections, and the main business of the chapter only commences with section 3.

3-4 *περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ κ.τ.λ.*] Cf. above ch. ii. §§ 3-4. We must dismiss any idea that the phenomena of incontinence can be explained by saying that the incontinent man has only moral opinions, and that opinions are weak. 'Heraclitus shows' that opinions may be as strongly held as scientific certainties. Of course neither Aristotle nor his school would wish to do away with the distinction which Plato had established between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. It is only as connected with the will, and as forming a ground for action, that opinion can be considered as strong as science.

δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος] Heraclitus had a reputation with the ancients for pride and dogmatism; cf. Diog. Laert. ix. i. 5: *ἤκουσε τε οὐδενὸς ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ' ἑαυτοῦ.* *Ib.* ix. i. 1: *μεγαλῶφρων δὲ γέγονε παρ' ὀντισαῦν καὶ ὑπερόπτης, ὡς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συγγράμματος αὐτοῦ δηλὸν ἐν ᾧ φησι· πολυμαθὴν νῦν οὐ διδάσκει.* 'Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἀν' ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, ἀθδῖς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἐκκαταῖον. εἶναι γὰρ ἐν τῷ σοφὸν ἐπίστασθαι γινώ-

μην ἦτε οἱ ἐγκυβερνήσει πάντα διὰ πάντων.

5 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς—θεωρῶν] 'But since we use the term "knowing" in two senses, both to denote the man who possesses without applying, and the man who applies knowledge, there will be a difference between doing what is wrong, when you have the knowledge but do not attend to it, and doing the same when you have the knowledge and pay attention to it. The latter case seems strange, but not so if you act without attending.' This distinction between the possession and the application of knowledge, which is of the utmost importance for explaining moral weakness, was perhaps first started by Plato in the *Theaetetus*, pp. 197-198, where he introduces his famous image of the pigeon-house. Every knowledge once acquired by the mind is like a bird caught and placed in a pigeon-house; it is possessed, but not available, till it be chased within the enclosure and captured anew.

μὴ θεωροῦντα] θεωρεῖν is used to express 'direct observation,' just as in *Eth.* vi. iii. 2: *ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται.*

6 μὴ θεωρῶν. ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρωμένον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι οὗτος ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τότε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι
7 μὴθὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν. ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ρηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾷσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ

6 ἔτι ἐπεὶ—θαυμαστόν] 'Again since the premisses (in a syllogism) are of two modes, nothing hinders a man acting against knowledge, although he possesses both these, if he apply only the universal premiss, but not the particular, for it is particulars which are the objects of action. Moreover there is a distinction which may be made in the universal itself; part of it applies to the subject (ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ), and part to the object (ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος); for instance (you may have the universal) "dry things are good for all men," and (the minor premiss) "this is a man," or "such and such is dry;" but (the farther knowledge) that "this object is such and such," the person either has not or it is not realised. According then to these different modes of the premisses there will be an immense difference (in the way one knows), so that there is nothing paradoxical in (the incontinent man) "knowing" in the way I have

specified, but that he should know otherwise would be marvellous.' This section well points out the number of particular applications which have to be made before a general moral principle can be realised and acted on. Else it remains in abeyance, and the man who possesses it may yet act against it.

7 ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν—οἰνωμένον] 'For in the case of having and not using we see that the having (τὴν ἕξιν) becomes quite a different thing, so that in such cases a man has (knowledge) after a manner, and has it not, as for instance in sleep, in madness, and in drunkenness.' ἕξις is used here simply as the active verbal noun of ἔχω, as it is in a passage of Plato, already alluded to, which the writer possibly had before his mind, *Theaetetus*, p. 197 A: ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; —'ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.—Ἐπιστήμης που ἕξιν φασὶ αὐτὸ εἶναι.

καὶ μανίας ποιούσιν. ὁῦλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ 8 τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὐπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, τούτῳ δὲ χρόνου δεῖ· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατενομένους. ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπι- 9

8 τὸ δὲ λέγειν — ἀκρατενομένους] 'Now repeating the words which belong to knowledge is no sign, for those also who are in the states I have mentioned repeat demonstrations and verses of Empedocles, and those who are beginning to learn string the words together without yet understanding them; for (to be understood) a thing must be assimilated, and for this time is required. So in short we must suppose that men in a state of incontinence speak just like actors.' This is an extremely subtle observation. The writer having said that passion is like sleep or madness, which make one know and yet not know at the same time, proceeds to remark that men acting incontinently will often speak as if they were fully aware of the nature of their acts. They will say at the very moment of yielding to temptation, 'I know I ought not to do this.' But such words are no sign that the knowledge is really felt and realised; they are only like the verses of Empedocles which a man might mutter in his sleep; they are like the repetition of a schoolboy's task; they are hollow like the ranting of an actor.

ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης] 'That are caused by, are the results of, science.' Cf. *Met.* I. iv. 4: ἀλλ' οὐτε ἐκείνοι ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης, 'they do it not because of science;' and see below, IX. ix. 6.

οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες] Cf. *Eth.* vi. viii. 6.

9-11 ἔτι καὶ ὧδε—μῆμην] 'Again in the following manner one might psychologically consider the cause. There is first a general belief, and secondly a particular belief, which is no longer under the domain of reason, but under that of sense. Now when out of these two a third is created, it is a necessity that the mind should on the one hand assert the conclusion, and in the sphere of practice should straightway carry it out. As, for instance, if (there be the general proposition) "one ought to taste all that is sweet," and the particular one "this thing is sweet," it is a necessity that he who is able, and is not hindered, should at once proceed to act upon the knowledge. When therefore there is in the mind one universal which forbids tasting, but another which says, "all that is sweet is pleasant" (having a minor), "this thing is sweet," and thus the second universal is realised,—and supposing that desire happen to be there; (in this case) the first universal says, "avoid this," but desire leads us on (to take it), from the power which it has of setting in motion every one of our organs. Thus the result is that one is incontinent under the sanction as it were of reason and belief, and a belief too which is opposed not directly but only acciden-

βλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα
περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν
δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα
μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς,
οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὥς ἐν
τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλύο-
10 μενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου
ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γλυκὺ ἡδύ,
τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχη δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα,
ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ
ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου

tally (to the true knowledge). For it is desire, and not the intellectual belief, which is opposed to the right law. And this consideration leads us to see why it is that brutes are not incontinent, namely, because they have no conception of universals, but only an image and a memory of particulars.'

This passage gives an admirable explanation of the way in which a man under temptation may ignore his moral principles. Action (as the writer implies) always depends on a syllogism in the mind, and, if a minor premiss were applied to the right moral principle, wrong action could never take place. But it is equally true that the man who acts wrongly does so under some sort of shadow of reason. The story of the temptation of Eve is typical of all similar cases of yielding. There are always arguments and considerations on which the mind, self-deceived and blinded by desire, may form a syllogism. And as the writer observes, the misleading principle thus applied is not directly false or contrary to what is right. The saying 'sweet things are pleasant' is not in itself contrary to the principle 'intemperance is to be avoided.' Accidentally and in their effects the two

propositions are brought into collision, though not originally opposed.

φυσικῶς] Perhaps 'psychologically' is the most representative translation which we can give of this word in the present passage. Psychology, up to a certain extent, was considered as a branch of physics by Aristotle, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 295, and cf. *Eth.* ix. ix. 7.

ἤδη] A circumlocution is necessary to express what was probably here meant by this word. Cf. *Eth.* vi. xi. 2.

ἐνθα μὲν] i.e. in the sphere of the reason, to which ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς is opposed. For the latter phrase we should have expected to find ταῖς πρακτικαῖς, a formula which occurs *Eth.* vi. xi. 4. But in the *Eudemian Ethics*, II. xi. 4, exactly the same usage is found: ὥστε γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. It is not easy to say what substantive is understood. Perhaps αἱ πρακτικαὶ (or ποιητικαὶ) ἐπιστήμαι was the original phrase.

ἀνάγκη—πράττειν εὐθύς] On the doctrine of the practical syllogism, see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 263-270.

τῶν μορίων] i.e. 'the parts of the body.' This is mixing up a physical explanation with the account of mental phenomena. The same thing is done

πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἢ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' 11 οὐχ ἡ δόξα, τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. πῶς δὲ λύνεται ἡ 12 ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ 13 κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ ἐν τῷ πάθει ὢν,

in the Peripatetic treatise *De Motu Animalium*; cf. especially with the present passage *Ib.* viii. 5: διὰ τοῦτο δ' αὖτα ὡς εἰπεῖν νοεῖ ὅτι πορευτέον καὶ πορεύεται, ἀν μὴ τι ἐμποδίσῃ ἕτερον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδεύει τὰ πάθη, ἢ δ' ὁρεξίς τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ' ὁρεξίν ἢ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίνεταί ἢ διὰ νοήσεως ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως.

11 The mere intellectual knowledge that a thing is pleasant is not opposed to the moral law. It is only when this knowledge has become desire, i.e. part of the will, which implies acting, that an opposition is felt. Brutes act on desire, but their intellectual apprehension being entirely of particulars, there is a harmony between desire and the data of perception which prevents our attributing incontinence to brutes.—It might be said that there are dawns of the moral faculty, traces of a sense of right and wrong, in some animals, for instance, dogs; but the writer here does not enter upon the subject. On the meaning given by Aristotle to *φαντασία*, see note on *Eth.* III. v. 17.

12 'Now to explain how the oblivion (*ἀγνοία*) of the incontinent man is stopped, and how he comes again to the use of his knowledge, requires no special account peculiar to this condition, but the same account as is to

be given about (the recovery of) the intoxicated man or the sleeper, for which we must inquire of the physiologists.' The most interesting relic of the speculations of the old physiologists upon the above question which has come down to us, is the account given by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* VII. 129) of the opinion of Heraclitus, who thought that our rationality depended upon our communion through the senses with the universal reason that surrounds us; in sleep we become foolish because cut off from all communication with this, except through the act of breathing alone, but on awaking we are again replenished. Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ' Ἡράκλειτον δι' ἀναπνοῆς σπᾶσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν ὕπνῳ ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἐγερσιν πάλιν ἐμφρονες. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνῳ μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων, χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφύσεως ὁ ἐν ὑμῖν νοῦς, μόνης τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν προσφύσεως σωζομένης, οἷον ἐν τῷ σίξῃ· χωρισθεὶς τε ἀποβάλλει ἢν πρότερον εἶχε μνημονικὴν δύναμιν. ἐν δὲ ἐγρηγορήσει πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων, ὥσπερ διὰ τινων θυρίδων προκύψας καὶ τῷ περιέχοντι συμβάλλων λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν.

13-14 ἐπεὶ δ'—αἰσθητικῆς] 'But the minor premiss being a belief with regard to perception of the senses

ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὥς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μὴδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον. καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ ἐξήτει Σωκράτης συμ-
 14 βαίνειν· οὐ γάρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὐτὴ περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μὴ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεῦσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

and being what determines action,—this is either not possessed by a man in the condition we have been describing, or he possesses it in a way in which, as we said (ὥς οὐκ ἦν), possession is not knowledge, but is only a form of words, like the drunken man spouting Empedocles. And since the minor term is not universal and has not the same scientific character as the universal, the question raised by Socrates seems really (καὶ) to be substantiated. For it is not knowledge properly so called that is present when the condition arises, nor is it this which is twisted about by the condition of mind that comes on,—but only perceptual knowledge.' This section winds up the discussion of the compatibility of knowledge with incontinence. The first sentence is clear enough, but there is some little obscurity in the saying that perceptual knowledge is present in incontinence, and is overborne by passion. What is meant apparently is, that passion prevents that perception which would cause the moral principle existent in the mind to be realised. Hence, in short, there is a moral oblivion, and it is quite true that Socrates was justified in saying that incontinence could not take place if knowledge of the right were really present to the consciousness of the actor.

καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου] Lambinus,

followed by Fritzsche, places a full stop before these words, and connects them with καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ Σωκράτης. This punctuation has been adopted in the above translation as making far better sense. It must be confessed, however, that the Paraphrast favours the punctuation of Bekker. The occurrence of καὶ before ἔοικεν would naturally lead to a full stop being placed after ὅρον, but καὶ is rather to be explained as giving emphasis to ἔοικε συμβαίνειν; cf. ch. x. 2: διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε κ.τ.λ. *Eth.* III. viii. 6: ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. *Ib.* § 10, ὅθεν καὶ Ὁμηρος. ἡ τελευταία πρότασις] This phrase is equivalent to ἡ ἑτέρα πρότασις, *Eth.* VI. xi. 4. The minor premiss is so called as containing the ἔσχατος ὅρος, or minor term, which is mentioned shortly after.

ὥς οὐκ ἦν] With this use of the past tense, cf. *Eth.* v. vi. 9: κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, 'for this is, as we have said, according to law.'

ὁ ἐξήτει] This is sometimes translated 'what Socrates meant,' for which the Greek would have been ὁ ἠθελε or ἐβούλετο λέγειν. ὁ ἐξήτει must mean 'the questionings' or 'doubts' of Socrates, i.e. as to the possibility of acting against knowledge. Cf. *Eth.* I. iv. 5: Εἰ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐξήτει.

τῆς αἰσθητικῆς] The phrase αἰσθητικῆς ἐπιστήμης would to some philosophers

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής ἢ πάντες κατὰ μέ- 4
 ρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποιά ἐστὶ, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
 περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἱ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ
 καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ 2
 μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ'
 αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά.
 λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὴν τῶν
 ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ
 ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην. τὰ δ' ἀναγ-
 καῖα μὲν οὐ, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτά. λέγω δ' οἶον νίκην τι-
 μὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων. τοὺς
 μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας

be a contradiction in terms, as they would hold that sensible things cannot be known. A doctrine was attributed to Speusippus, of which we may be here reminded, viz. that besides science there is 'scientific perception.' Cf. Sextus Empiricus *adv. Math.* VII. 145: Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν, ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπεῖλεψε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας.

IV. This chapter discusses the question noted above (ch. i. § 7, ch. ii. § 11), as to whether incontinence is an absolute term, having a definite object-matter, or is merely relative. The answer is very simple. Pleasure is divided into necessary and desirable (§ 2), or into good, bad, and indifferent (§ 5). Incontinence, in an absolute sense, applies only to the necessary or bodily pleasures. It has then the same range of objects as were before assigned to Temperance and Intemperance, and differs from Intemperance chiefly in that it goes against the

reason and the will, instead of carrying them on its side. Having thus laid down a definite notion of Incontinence as something absolute and positive, it is easy to see that the idea and the term may be applied in a sort of analogous sense to mean an ill-control of the desires for other kinds of pleasures also, beside the bodily pleasures, e.g. wealth or honour. In such applications we must recollect that the use of the word Incontinence is metaphorical.

2 περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* III. ii. 5: 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. Δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνος. Οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περὶ τε τὸ γενεστὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἀπτόν, κ.τ.λ.] This is of course taken from *Eth. Nic.* III. x. 3-8.

τοὺς μὲν οὖν] Here commences the apodosis to ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ, which is a complicated sentence with two parentheses (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα—σωφροσύνην) and (λέγω δ' οἶον—ἡδέων).

τοὺς μὲν—ἕτερος ἦν] 'Those then who with regard to these latter objects

τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρῷ διέφερεν ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἀμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις ἢ ἀπλῶς οὐσα ἢ κατὰ τι 3 μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐθείς. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ αἷς λέγομεν τὸν σῶφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἀφῆν καὶ γεύσιν, ἀλλὰ

(i.e. good pleasures) transgress that right law which they have within themselves, we do not call simply "incontinent," but we add a qualifying term (*προστιθέντες*) and speak of them as incontinent of wealth, gain, honour, rage,—not as absolutely incontinent, because they are different from this and are only called incontinent by analogy, as in the phrase "Man that has been victor at Olympia;" there the general conception (of man) differed but little from the special conception of the individual in question, and yet still it was different.' The meaning of this passage is clear, not so however that of the illustration which closes it. It is plain that the word *ἀκρατής* when spoken of in relation to anger, money, &c., has a somewhat different sense from the unqualified term *ἀκρατής*, which implies a certain moral weakness with regard to bodily indulgence. But what is meant by saying that *ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς* is different from the general conception Man? There appear to be only two explanations possible: (1) that supported by the Scholiast on this place and also the Scholiast on *Eth.* v. i.,—by Alexander Aphrod. *ad*

Topica i. xvi., by Suidas, and by Eustathius on *Iliad*, λ. p. 847: namely, that there was a certain Olympionices whose name was "*ἄνθρωπος*." It might be said that this name "*ἄνθρωπος*" was not more distinct from the general term 'Man,' than the term *ἀκρατής* in the phrase *ἀκρατής θυμῷ* is from the general conception of incontinence. The historical tenses *διέφερον* and *ἕτερος ἦν* are in favour of this interpretation. (2) It might be argued that these very tenses had given rise to a conjectural fiction about a person called "*ἄνθρωπος*." The Paraphrast takes no notice of the tradition, and treats the illustration as a logical one, which would come merely to this, 'the conception of an individual implies a certain diversity from the conception of the genus.' If this be accepted, the past tenses of the verbs must be understood to mean a reference to some previous logical discourse with which the school was familiar. In short, the passage must be considered to bear traces of being a scrap from some oral lecture—a hypothesis not to be entirely set aside with regard to parts of the *Ethics* of Aristotle.

παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ 4 ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταυτὸν τὸν ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῇ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταυτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν, ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ 5 τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων· τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μετὰξὺ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μετὰξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ὑπερβάλλειν.

3 κατὰ πρόσθεσιν] See note on *Éth.* II. iii. 5.

καθάπερ ὀργῆς] Fritzsche quotes Thucyd. III. 84: ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις—ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὕσα κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου.

4 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα] i.e. not one of those mentioned in § 2, who are immoderate in giving way to a fondness for riches, honour, &c.

διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον κ.τ.λ.] It is more intemperate to pursue luxury, &c., in cold blood, than to do so under the influence of passion. It shows that luxury has become more a part of the mind itself.

5-6 The remainder of this chapter is little more than a repetition of what has gone before. Indulgence in the good pleasures is no harm, except it be to excess; even excess in them is rather folly than vice, and is not to be

called by the name of incontinence, except as a sort of metaphor.

ἐπεὶ δὲ—ὑπερβάλλειν] 'Now since some desires and pleasures are in their kind beautiful and good—according to our former division of pleasures into the naturally desirable, the naturally detestable, and the intermediate—as, for instance, wealth, gain, victory, and honour (are good); with regard then to all such, and the intermediate pleasures, men are not blamed for feeling, desiring, and loving them, but for some sort of excess in them.' The present division of pleasures can hardly be said to have been made 'before,' though it can be harmonised with that given above in § 2. The φύσει αἰρετά (of which wealth and honour are specimens) answer to the αἰρετά μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολὴν; while τὰ μετὰξὺ

διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διάκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν. μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἵρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό· φᾶνλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί.

6 ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν. δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἐκάστου λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἱατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτὴν, ὃν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κακεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμὸν καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατὴ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

5 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἓνα μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν

here correspond with the 'necessary or bodily pleasures' of the former passage. The writer has here introduced a mention of pleasures 'naturally detestable,' by which must be meant the bestial pleasures which are discussed in the following chapter. The formula τὰ δ' ἐναντία, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, is used by Eudemus in *Éth. Eud.* II. x. 24: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφή οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ. Later in the present book (ch. xiv. § 2) there is a mention made of pleasures which are not only good in themselves, but do not admit of excess.

Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ] Of this personage nothing is known. The story given by the Scholiast is, as Fritzsche observes, not worth repeating.

μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν] This is an anacoluthon. The sentence ought to form an apodosis and supply a verb to διὸ ὅσοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. We therefore require μοχθηροὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ, &c.

6 δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ] The writer seems here to make a mistake about the history of the word ἀκρατής, just as before (*Éth.* v. x. 1) about the history of the word ἐπικεύς. Ἀκρατής in a limited and special sense, to denote want of control over a particular set of desires, is certainly later than the general use of the word, as in the phrase ἀκρατής ὁργῆς, &c. Hence the latter is not to be regarded (historically) as a metaphorical extension of the former.

V. This chapter discusses those

ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῶων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθη γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίως ἰδεῖν ἔξεις. λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον 2 τὴν ἀνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κνούσας ἀνασχίζουσιν τὰ παιδία κατεσθίειν, ἣ οἷοις χαίρειν φύσιν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὥμοις τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἣ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θη- 3 ριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ τε νόσους γίνονται καὶ μανίαν ἐνίοις,

kinds of incontinence which are something more than incontinence, being morbid or bestial. Certain pleasures are specified which imply a depravity either of nature or habits. A sort of classification of these is suggested, but the whole style of the chapter is careless and inaccurate.

1 ἐπεὶ δ'—ἔξεις] 'Now while some things are natural pleasures, either absolutely so, or relatively to the different races of animals and men, other pleasures are not natural, but depend on physical defects or habits or depravity of the nature; and we may see moral conditions corresponding to each of these latter kinds.' The apodosis to ἐπεὶ is ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων. The things which are 'pleasures absolutely' are for instance life and consciousness; while it depends on the constitution of the race whether it be pleasant to live on land or water, &c. In this passage φύσις is used in two senses, (1) φύσει = in accordance with the entire constitution of things, not only what is, but what ought to be. (This corresponds with head V. in the note on *Εὐθ.* II. i. 3.) (2) φύσεις means individual natures, not as they ought to be, but as they are. (See the same note, head IV.)

2 τὰς θηριώδεις] i.e. ἔξεις.

τὴν ἀνθρωπον] 'The female.' The

word ἀνθρωπος (in the feminine) was applied contemptuously, as, for instance, to female slaves. Here it denotes the monstrous nature of the person in question, who was not to be called 'a woman.' Perhaps for the same reason it was applied by Herodotus to the gigantic Phye. Book I. ch. 60: καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀσπερὶ πειθόμενοι τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν θεὸν προσέχοντο τε τὴν ἀνθρωπον καὶ ἐδέκοντο τὸν Πεισιστρατον. Cf. *Mag. Mor.* I. xv. 2: Οἷόν φασι ποτὲ τινα γυναῖκα φίλτρον τιλὶ δοῦναι πικρὴν εἶτα τὸν ἀνθρωπον ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ φίλτρον, τὴν δ' ἀνθρωπον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ἀποφυγεῖν.

τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν] 'And others (they say) lend their children to each other (in turn) to be served up as a banquet.' Cf. 2 Kings vi. 26–29, where the same horrible arrangement is said to have been made under the compulsion of famine. The shores of the Black Sea seem to have had a character for cannibalism. Cf. *Ar. Pol.* viii. iv. 3: πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοί τε καὶ Ἠνίοχοι.

τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον] Some story now lost, which is apparently referred to again in § 7.

3 αἱ δὲ διὰ τε νόσους—αἱ δὲ νοση-

ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἥπαρ. αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ οὐνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβρι-
 4 ζομένοις ἐκ παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπιύουσιν ἀλλ' ὀπιύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς
 5 νοσηματωδῶς ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸ δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἀπλή ἀκрасία ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμὸν ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ
 6 νοσηματώδεις εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος διεῖναι πάντα, κἂν ψοφήσῃ μῶς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ

ματώδεις] These clauses are a repetition of each other; the style is unfinished.

ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν] It is important to observe here the strong terms in which the unnatural character of these practices is denounced. An equally strong and more explicit passage occurs in the *Lysis* of Plato, p. 636 B, where the advantages and disadvantages of the gymnasia and *syssitia* are discussed: Καὶ δὴ καὶ παλαιὸν νόμιμον δοκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα κατὰ φύσιν τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἡδονὰς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων διεφθαρτέναι. Καὶ τούτων τὰς ὑμετέρας πόλεις (Sparta and Crete) πρώτας ἂν τις αἰτιῶτο καὶ δεῖναι τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα ἀπτονται τῶν γυμνασίων· καὶ εἰτε παίζοντα εἰτε σπουδάζοντα ἐννοεῖν δεῖ τὰ ταῦτα, ἐννοεῖν ὅτι τῇ θηλείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀρρένων φύσει εἰς κοινωνίαν ιούση τῆς γεννήσεως ἢ περὶ ταῦτα ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδεδοῦσθαι δοκεῖ, ἀρρένων δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἢ θηλειῶν

πρὸς θηλείας παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν πρώτων τὸ τόλμημα εἶναι δι' ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῆς.

4-5 δεῖναι μὲν οὖν — λεκτέον] 'Where nature is the cause, one cannot call people incontinent, just as no one would find fault with women for being not male but female; and it is the same with those who by habit have superinduced a morbid condition. To possess, indeed, any of these tendencies is beyond the pale of vice, just as bestiality is; and if a person possesses them, his subduing them or being subdued by them is a matter not of simple incontinence (or continence), but is the "analogous" kind, exactly as a man who is in this condition with regard to his angry passions may be called (incontinent of anger), but not simply incontinent.' What the writer here implies is quite true, that morality requires for its sphere certain natural conditions of body and mind. In states that are entirely morbid, whether originally so or from the

δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἓνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἶον τὰς ἐπιληπτικὰς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. τούτων γ' ὃ ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἶον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρία ἢ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἀπλῶς λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης ἢ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ γ' ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφοράν καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον·

“Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἡττον αἰσχυρὰ ἀκρασία ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ 6 τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἴτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτήτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν

effects of an ill-regulated life, the distinctions of right and wrong are no longer applicable. Cf. ch. vii. 7.

7 *ei Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν*] ‘Had Phalaris refrained.’ With this use of *κατέχω*, cf. Aristoph. *Peace*, 944, where it is applied to a wind lulling :

*ἐπείγετε νῦν ἐν ὄσῳ
σοβαρὰ θεόθεν κατέχει
πολέμου μετὰτροπος αἶψα.*

And Soph. *Ed. Rex*, 782 :

*κἀγὼ βαρυνθεὶς τὴν μὲν οὔσαν ἡμέραν
μόλις κατέσχω.*

incontinence not simply to be called so without a qualification, there now follows a comparison of some of these kinds, from a moral point of view, with incontinence proper. Incontinence of anger is not so bad as incontinence of lust, (1) because there is more semblance of reason in anger ; (2) because anger is more a matter of constitution ; (3) it admits of less deliberate purpose ; (4) because anger is exercised under a sort of pain, and not in wantonness. As to the rest, incontinence which exceeds the pale of human weakness is more horrible, but at the same time is rarer and less mischievous, than vice.

VI. It having been repeatedly laid down that there are some kinds of

τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, εἰ μόνον εἶπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχύων οὖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ² λόγου. ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμῃ ἀκολουθεῖν

1 ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος—οἷ] 'For first (μὲν) reason or fancy tells that there is insult or slight, and then (anger) drawing a sort of conclusion, "I must fight with such and such," forthwith rages accordingly. But desire, if reason or sense merely assert that a thing is pleasant, rushes to the enjoyment of it; so that anger in a way follows reason, but desire does not.' *Φαντασία* here seems nearly to correspond to our word 'fancy,' which has of course grown out of the Greek term, though it has come to imply widely different associations. We are told in *Ar. De An.* III. iii. 15 that *φαντασία* may be mistaken. See the note on *Etih.* III. v. 17.

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 5 δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὥς μὲν τοίνυν
 αἰσχίων ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ
 ὅτι ἐστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ
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 ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν ἀνθρω-
 πικαὶ εἰσι καὶ φυσικαί, καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ
 θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ
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 καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ'
 ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τιτι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο δια-
 φέρει γένος τῶν ζώων ὕβρις καὶ σιναμωρία καὶ τῷ παμ-
 φάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ'
 ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
 7 ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέ-

ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς] 'While he who wantons acts with pleasure.' There seems to be a double meaning in this passage to the word ὑβρίζει, exactly as there might be to our word 'wantonness.' It first means 'to act insolently' or 'wantonly' in a general sense, and secondly, it means to 'act wantonly' in a particular sense, i.e. lasciviously.

6 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον] i.e. the difference between continence and incontinence, which with other things is treated of in the next chapter. There is a want of method about the sequence of different parts in this book. The reference which follows, ὥσπερ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς only goes back to ch. v. 1, and gives colour to a suspicion that the book may have been put together out of separate pieces, and perhaps lectures, one of which may have commenced with the fifth chapter.

διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία—ἀνθρώπων] 'Hence we do not call brutes either temperate

or intemperate, except by a metaphor, and where it happens that one whole race of animals in comparison with another is remarkable for wantonness it may be (τῶν), or lechery, or voracity; for (animals) have no purpose or reasoning, but are beside themselves like madmen.' Different races of animals have good or bad moral characteristics ascribed to them. The goat, the ass, and the monkey have a bad reputation for wantonness, and the shark, &c., for voracity. It is not quite clear what is meant by ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως. Perhaps it may best be taken to imply not that animals transgress their own nature, but simply that they get into a state of ecstasy, like madmen, and have no senses nor any principle which would justify their being called either temperate or intemperate.

7 ἔλαττον δὲ—θηρίου] 'Now brutality is a less evil than vice, though it is more fearful, for in it the good principle is not corrupted, as in a man, but does not exist. Therefore (comparing

φθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἢ φαυλότης αἰεὶ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδύκιαν πρὸς ἀνθρώπον ἄδικον· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἐκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἀνθρώπος κακὸς θηρίου.

Περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ 7 ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγὰς, περὶ ἃς ἡ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε ἡττάσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡττους· τούτων δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρτερικός. μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἔξις, κὰν εἰ ρέπουσι μᾶλλον

brutality with vice) is like comparing what is inanimate with a living thing, and asking which is worse. Evil is always less harmful when it has no guiding principle, and reason is the guiding principle. So it is just like comparing injustice with an unjust man; each is in a different sense worse. A bad man will do ten thousandfold more evil than a beast.'

[χει] sc. τὸ θηρίον. The whole passage is briefly expressed, but perhaps requires no further comment.

VII. This chapter, after a general comparison between intemperance and incontinence (§ 1-3), makes some remarks on endurance, softness, and childishness (§ 4-7); and ends by distinguishing two kinds of incontinence, of which the one proceeds from impetuosity, the other from weakness of character.

1 πρότερον] *Eth. Eud.* III. ii. 6. Cf. above, ch. iv. § 2.

ἔστι μὲν—χείρουν] 'It is possible to be in such a state as to yield to things that most men are superior to, and again it is possible to overcome things

that most men yield to. Of those who possess these opposite dispositions with regard to *pleasures*, the first is an incontinent man, and the second a continent man; with regard to *pains*, the first is soft and the second enduring. But the state of the majority of mankind lies between these opposites, albeit men verge rather to the side of the worse.' Moral designations may be fixed either in relation to the standard of what is, or of what ought to be. Cf. *Eth.* III. xi. 4: τῶν γὰρ φιλοτιμοῦντων λεγομένων ἡ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. *Ib.* IV. iv. 4: ἐκαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. The above passage fixes the terms 'continent' and 'incontinent' relatively to what *is*, as implying more or less continence than people in general have. And yet there is evidently some reference beside to the standard of what ought to be, else it could not be said that people in general verge rather to the worse side. To represent the majority of mankind as possessing a mediocre moral character, neither eminently

2 πρὸς τὰς χεῖρους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἱ δ' οὐ καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς † ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαίνειν, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ' ἀνιάτος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνιάτος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἦτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαί-
3 ρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυ-

good nor bad, but inclining to weakness, was in accordance with the Greek point of view. Widely different from this was what may be called the Semitic point of view, which, regarding man with greater religious earnestness, attributed to him 'desperate wickedness.' The latter feeling was not confined to the Jews and to the pages of the Bible, but in some degree made itself known to the world in the Stoical philosophy. See Essay VI. p. 357, &c.

2 ἐπεὶ δ' ἔναι—ἀνιάτος] 'Now as some pleasures are necessary, but others are not to be called so, as being (καὶ) only necessary in certain degrees, while their excesses or deficiencies are not necessary (and the same division holds with regard to desires and pains), he who pursues excessive pleasures, or who pursues pleasures not in themselves excessive in an excessive way, and does so from deliberate purpose, with no ulterior aim beyond the pleasures themselves, is abandoned (ἀκόλαστος), (and he may well be called so), for it stands to reason (ἀνάγκη) that he is not likely to repent, and so he is incurable; for without repentance there is no cure.'

οὐδ' αὖ ἐλλείψεις] This might seem superfluous. But what is meant is,

that in some pleasures the μέσον is good and necessary. Cf. below, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος.

ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς † ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν] The Paraphrast well expresses the meaning of this passage as follows: ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδονῶν, καὶ ἢ τὰς φύσει μεγάλας αἰετῶν ἡδονὰς, ἢ τὰς φύσει μετρίαις ὑπερβαλόντως ζητῶν, οὐχ ἐλκόμενος βιαίως πρὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ προαιρέσεως ἐπ' αὐτὰς τρέχων, οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι, δόξαν, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἢ κέρδος, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰς δι' ἐαυτὰς, ἀκόλαστος. It is plain that ἢ before διὰ προαίρεσιν in the text must be a mistake. One of Bekker's MSS. reads καὶ, which would be very easily changed into ἢ, especially with the clause ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς preceding. It would answer also to the expansion of the Paraphrast, οὐχ ἐλκόμενος κ.τ.λ.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ] If a man with deliberate purpose pursues pleasure for its own sake, he is not likely to repent of his course, therefore he is ἀκόλαστος. This is the first intimation we have had that an unrepenting character belongs to 'intemperance;' it is an irregular argument, unless we regard it as laying some stress on the etymology of the word ἀκόλαστος. Cf. *Εὐθ.* III. xii. 5-7, IV. i. 5.

μίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα πράττει τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτει ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὦν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ 4 μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡτῶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ 5 ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τίς ἐστίν· ὅς ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵρειν λύπην, καὶ μμούμενος τὸν κάμοντα οὐκ οἶεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὦν. ὁμοίως 6

3 ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων] 'So that they are distinct from one another,' i.e. on the one hand the reprobate (ἀκόλαστος), in his two forms of systematically seeking pleasure, and of systematically avoiding pain; and, on the other hand, the morally weak, whether in the form of yielding to the allurements of pleasure (ἀκρατής), or flying from the pressure of pain (μαλακός). The comparison is not between the two forms of the μὴ προαιρούμενοι, but these are together contrasted with ἀκολασία.

παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε] A repetition of ch. iv. § 4, on which see note.

τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος] The temptation is great to refer τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων to τῶν μὴ προαιρουμένων, and to read ἀκρατής for ἀκόλαστος, taking the sentence in connection with what follows. But when we consider (1) the unanimity of MSS.; (2) that μαλακία has been already distinguished from ἀκρασία, in § 1; (3) the import of μᾶλλον (cf. *Εἰλ.* VI. viii. 9, αὐτῇ μᾶλλον αἰσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ'

ἄλλο εἶδος), we shall be led to see that the sentence comes in, though rather in a disjointed way, to wind up the comparison here made generally between incontinence and intemperance (cf. ch. vi. § 5, and above, § 1). Incontinence may be said to be more like a kind of softness, while determinate vice is something different. Μαλακία, according to this interpretation, is used here in a general sense, in the next section with a special and limited import.

4 Continnence, it is argued, is finer than endurance, just as victory is finer than holding out. This argument is not sound, since continence is in reality nothing more than holding out against temptation. To noble natures continence would doubtless cause a greater struggle than mere endurance of pains, and in this sense it might be called finer.

5 ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων—ὅμοιος ὦν] 'Now he who faints before things against which most men hold out and are strong, he is soft and luxurious (for luxury, it may be added, is a kind

δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκрасίαν· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττάται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικόν, εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτῆτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττάται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεύσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός· ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσις ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης 8 ἐστίν. ἀκрасίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια· οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ

of softness), he, for instance, who trails his cloak rather than have the trouble of lifting it, and who imitates the langour of an invalid, without seeing that it is miserable to be like one who is miserable.' This passage is somewhat in the style of the *Characters* of Theophrastus. To illustrate the affection of weakness described above, Coray quotes from Athenæus a story of the Sybarites, one of whom said that he had been in the fields, and that 'to see the men digging had given him a rupture.' To which his friend replied, that 'the very mention of it gave him a pain in his side.'

6 ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτῆτης] A play by Theodectes the rhetorician, a friend of Aristotle's. Fritzsche quotes Cicero, *Tusc.* II. vii. 19: Adspice Philoctetam, cui concedendum est gementi: ipsum enim Herculem viderat in Ceta magnitudine dolorum ejulantem, &c.

Καρκίνου] Of this tragic poet nothing appears to be known.

Ξενοφάντῳ] Giphanius finds in Seneca, *De Ira*, II. 2, a mention of

Xenophantus as a musician of Alexander the Great.

οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεύσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος] Aspasius for Σκυθῶν reads Περσῶν. But the commentators refer us to Herodotus I. 105: τοῖσι δὲ τῶν Σκυθῶν συλήσασιν τὸ ἴδιον τὸ ἐν Ἀσκάλῳ καὶ τοῖσι τούτων δει ἐκγόνοισι ἐνέσκηψε ἡ θεὸς θῆλειαν νοῦσον· ὥστε ἅμα λέγουσιν τε οἱ Σκύθαι διὰ τοῦτο σφεας νοσέειν. Hippocrates gives a description of this malady, which appears to have been a kind of impotence (*De Acr. Ag. et Loc.* VI. 108): εὐνουχίαι γίνονται καὶ γυναῖκες ἐργάζονται καὶ ὡς αἱ γυναῖκες ἀλέγονται τε ὁμοίως, καλεῖνται τε οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀνανδρεῖς. 'This impotency Hippocrates ascribes to venesection, but he mentions that the natives believed it to be a judgment from the gods. It is said that traces of the disease are still found among the inhabitants of Southern Russia.'—See Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, Vol. I. p. 248.

καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ] Cf. ch. v. § 4.

8 ἀκрасίας δὲ—φαντασίᾳ] 'Now incontinence is sometimes impetuosity

πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλιζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προιδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττώνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὐτ' ἂν ἦδ' ἢ οὐτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

and sometimes weakness. Some men when they have deliberated, do not abide by their deliberations, owing to the state into which they are thrown, (and this is weakness): while others, from never having deliberated, are carried away by their feelings. Some, on the contrary, like the beginners in a tickling match, who cannot be tickled,—having prescience, and foresight, and having roused up themselves and their reason beforehand, are not overcome by their feelings, whether pleasant or painful. It is especially persons of a quick or bilious temperament who are subject to the impetuous kind of incontinence, for the one through the rapidity, and the other through the intensity, of their nature, do not wait to see what is the law of right, because they are apt to follow impressions.'

ὥσπερ οἱ προγαργαλίσαντες] The Paraphrast understands ἑαυτοὺς, rendering the passage ὥσπερ τὰ προτριβέντα καὶ προγαργαλισθέντα μέλη οὐ γαργαλιζονται. And two of Bekker's MSS. read οἱ προγαργαλισθέντες. It might be possible by previous tickling to exhaust the irritability of the cuticle, but this would not be a usual process, and in one of the *Problems* attributed to Aristotle (xxxv. vi.) it is discussed, 'Why cannot a man tickle himself?' To which the answer is, 'For the same reason that he

can hardly be tickled by anybody else if he knows that it is going to happen. For laughter implies a sudden revulsion and a surprise.' Surely this is exactly what is meant in the text.

οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ] An account which seems at first sight the opposite of this is given by the author of the *Magna Moralia* (II. vi. 43): 'Ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν (the impetuous kind of incontinence) οὐδ' ἂν λίαν δόξειεν εἶναι ψεκτὴ· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐγγίσκεται, ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς καὶ εὐφύεσι· ἡ δὲ (the weak kind) ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι ψεκτοί. If however we consult the curious disquisition on μελαγχολικοί and the μέλαινα χολή in *Ar. Problems*, xxx. i., we shall see that both passionate impetuosity and cold sluggishness were considered by the ancient physiologist to be different manifestations of the same strange temperament. *Ib.* xxx. i. 18: "Ὅσοις δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει συνέστηκε κρᾶσις τοιαύτη, εὐθεὶς οὕτω τὰ ἥθη γίνονται παντοδαπὰ, ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλην κρᾶσιν· οἷον ὅσοις μὲν πολλὴ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐνυπάρχει, νωθοὶ καὶ μωροί, ὅσοις δὲ λίαν πολλὴ καὶ θερμὴ, μανικοὶ καὶ εὐφρεῖς καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ καὶ ἐκθύητοι πρὸς τοὺς θυμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ λάλοι μᾶλλον. With the moderns the term 'melancholy' is restricted to the cold and dejected mood; while the ancients much more commonly applied the term μελαγχολικός to denote

- 8 Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελη-
 τικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμε-
 λητικός πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει,
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνιάτος, ὁ δ' ἱατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθη-
 ρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία
 τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς, ἡ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς
 πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας·
 ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.
 2 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον
 ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους

warmth, passion, and eccentricity of genius. Cf. Plato, *Repub.* 573 C: *Τυραννικός δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ δαιμόνιε ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἡ φύσει ἡ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἡ ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικός τε καὶ ἐρωτικός καὶ μελαγχολικός γένηται.* Cf. also Ar. *Probl.* xl. xxxviii: *τὸ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀκολουθεῖν ταχέως τὸ μελαγχολικὸν εἶναι ἐστίν.* In the language of our own day, 'The passionate heart of the poet is whirled into folly and vice.' For more remarks on *μελαυα χολή*, see below.

VIII. This chapter is not separated by any marked logical boundary from the preceding one. Rather it is a continuation of the same subject, as it goes on comparing incontinence with intemperance. Two previously mooted questions are now discussed, namely, is intemperance more curable than incontinence? (which is answered in the negative), and, is incontinence to be regarded as absolutely bad? (See above, ch. i. § 6.) This is also answered in the negative.

1 Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός] Cf. ch. vii. § 2. The continuity of the subject is preserved, if we consider that the writer, having mentioned the various ways in which incontinent people submit to temptation, next reflects that,

after yielding, these are all repentant (*μεταμελητικός πᾶς*), while the intemperate man forms a contrast to them and is unrepentant.

διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν] Cf. ch. ii. § 10. Intemperance, which is a corruption of the will, is like a chronic disorder, while incontinence, which is a temporary derangement of the will, is like an epileptic seizure.

ἡ γὰρ κακία λανθάνει] As being a false sort of harmony in the mind, in which no struggle is felt.

2 αὐτῶν δέ—ἐμμένοντες δέ] 'Now looking at incontinence itself and the two kinds of it which I have mentioned, those people who are carried away are better than the sort who are in possession of "the law" but do not abide by it.' As said before, the thread of reasoning goes on continuously from the end of the preceding chapter (according to Bekker's division), and so there is nothing remarkable in the writer's now reverting to the two kinds of incontinence, as if he had never digressed from discussing them. Οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ here answers to the *δέρξει καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ* (οἱ) *τὴν προσηγῆ ἀκρασίαν εἶναι ἀκρατεῖς*. The words *ἐκστασις*, *ἐκστήναι*, and *ἐκστατικός*, are frequently used in the *Problems* (*l.c.*) in connection with the *μελαγχολικός*. Cf. *Ib.* xxx. i. 3:

ἥττωνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἄτεροι· ὅμοιοι γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἢ 3 ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν. ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐστίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁμοίον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους· 'Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσι δ' οἰά- περ οἱ ἀξύνετοι.' καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, 4 ἀδικοῦσι δέ. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἶος μὴ διὰ τὸ πε- πείσθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, ὁ δ' οὐ· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ μὲν φθεί-

where it is said of Ajax, ἐκστατικός ἐγένετο παντελῶς (i.e. mad). Cf. above, ch. vi. § 6. 'Ἐκστατικός is used presently (§ 5) in a different sense to express 'departing from' a purpose, as also before, ch. i. § 6, and ii. § 7.

αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες] On this phrase see *Eth.* vi. i. 1, and note.

ὅμοιος γὰρ—οἱ πολλοί] 'For the man who is weakly incontinent is like those who are soon intoxicated, and by a small quantity of wine, less than intoxicates people in general.' 'Ὁ ἀκρατής seems used in this sentence as if specially applicable to the weak kind of incontinence. It is in contrast to ἐκστατικός. Weakness is worse than being carried away by passion, for it is acting against warning and with less temptation.

3 Incontinence is not vice, though it resembles vice in what it does (κατὰ τὰς πράξεις), but it goes against the will, while vice goes with the will. It is like the saying of Demodocus against the Milesians: 'The Milesians are not fools, but they are just as if they were fools.' The incontinent are not bad, but they do wrong.

Δημοδόκου] This was an epigrammatist of the island of Leros, not far

from Miletus. Some of his epigrams against different cities are preserved in the *Anthology*. A slight change in the reading shows the above to be in verse:

Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν

Οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσι δ' οἶατερ ἀξύνετοι.

4 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ—ἐναντίας] 'For virtue, on the one hand, preserves, while vice destroys the major premiss. Now the end is in action just what the hypotheses are in mathematics, namely, a major premiss on which everything depends; hence, neither in the one case nor in the other is it the chain of inference (ὁ λόγος) that demonstrates the major premiss, but in the case of action (ἐναυθα) it is virtue, either natural or acquired, to which a right opinion with regard to the major premiss is due. He who possesses this is temperate, while the contrary person is intemperate.' This passage comes in as a final argument against the notion that incontinence is more curable than intemperance. In the latter the fountain-head of action (the ἀρχή) is destroyed. While the temperate man has in himself the source of all good action, the intemperate man is the direct opposite, and the

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ρει ἢ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. Σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων τοῦ

incontinent man is something intermediate.

ἢ δὲ σώζει] Cf. *Eth.* vi. v. 6, where almost all the ideas which occur above are given, even the reference to mathematical axioms. *Id.* ch. xii. § 10, where a still more explicit statement is made of the relation of virtue to the practical syllogism.

αἱ ὑποθέσεις] This term is used precisely in the same way in the *Eudemian Ethics*, II. x. 20: περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλευεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις· εἰρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχείας, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δι' ἀκριβείας (i.e. the *Analytics* of Eudemus). Cf. *Id.* ch. xi. § 4: ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. In *Eth. Eud.* VII. ii. 4, ὑπόθεσις is used as equivalent to ἀρχή.—(§ 3) περὶ τούτων . . . πειρατέον διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε . . . τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν. Plato, *Repub.* p. 510-511, reproaches mathematics with always resting on hypotheses of which they can give no account. P. 510 σ: οἶμαι γὰρ σε εἰδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοῦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἑκάστην μέθοδον,

ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παρτι φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τούτο, ὃ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψῃ ὁρμήσωσιν.

Aristotle, *Post. Analyt.* I. ii. 7, defines thesis or assumption as an immediate syllogistic principle, indemonstrable, but not (as the axioms are) a necessary antecedent to all reasoning. He divides these into hypotheses and definitions, which differ in that the former assert existence or non-existence, while the latter do not. The hypothesis, then, is a peculiar principle (*olkeia archē*), and differs from an axiom, (1) in that it varies in the different sciences; (2) in that it is wanting in recognisable necessity. (Cf. *Post. Anal.* I. x. 6: οὐκ ἔστι δ' ὑπόθεσις . . . δ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι δι' αὐτὸ καὶ δοκεῖν ἀνάγκη). The Aristotelian hypothesis is, however, widely different from the hypothesis of the moderns, which means, in short, little more than a conjecture. For more particulars on this subject see Mr. Poste's *Logic of Science* (Oxford, 1850), p. 139-143.

τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν] By what the grammarians call *zeugma*, this genitive goes with τῶν ἀρχῶν, as governed by διδασκαλικός. One would have expected *aitria*.

ἀκολάστον, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἀπλῶς· σῶζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἢ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διὰ γε τὸ πάθος. φανερόν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία ἔξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατὴς ἐστὶν ὁ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὁποιοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ ὁ ὁποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ ψευδεὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἡγορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιοῦν,

5 ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος κ.τ.λ.] Incontinence having been shown to be an intermediate state not so bad as intemperance, it is here added that the true opposite to the incontinent man is he

'Who, through the heat of conflict, keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw;'

i.e. not the temperate, but the continent. And though incontinence is not absolutely bad, yet relatively, if you compare it with its opposite, you must call one bad and the other good.

IX. The first part of this chapter (§§ 1-4) takes up again the question before started (ch. i. § 6, ch. ii. § 7-10). Does continence consist in sticking to any opinion and purpose, whether wrong or right? After some refinements, which are perhaps unnecessary, as to the continent man 'accidentally' or 'non-essentially' maintaining a wrong opinion, a good distinction is given between obstinacy and continence. Obstinate people (*ισχυρογνώμονες*), if not mere dullards (*οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἀγοικοὶ*), are self-opinionated, which state of mind is rather incontinence than continence, for it is a yielding to the desire for victory and self-assertion. The continent man, on

the other hand, is not at all deaf to the voice of persuasion; it is only the voice of passion when opposed to reason which he resists. Nor is a man to be called incontinent if he deserts a resolution even for the sake of pleasure, since Neoptolemus deserted his resolution to deceive in order to obtain the noble pleasure of preserving his honour.

1 ἢ ὁ τῷ ψευδεὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ] Various solutions have been proposed for the difficulty involved in this sentence. (1) Aspasius, followed by Argyropulus, Fritzsche, &c., think that ἐμμένων is to be understood as carried on from μὴ ἐμμένων in the line before. But this will not do. The ἀκρατὴς cannot be said to 'abide by a false opinion.' (2) Some understand the clause as applying to cases like those of Neoptolemus. 'Is a man incontinent who does not stick to a false opinion?' But all this is implied in ὁ ὁποιοῦν κ.τ.λ. And moreover this interpretation would give a new sense to ἢ, making it a particle of apposition instead of a particle of contrast, which is required for the sake of correspondence with the opening sentence. (3) One of Bekker's MSS. reads τῷ μὴ ψευδεὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ. This is a very natural correction to make, and it seems followed by

καθ' αὐτό δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει
 ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ
 αἰρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὐτό μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἰρεῖται,
 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ
 καθ' αὐτό, ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιοῦν δόξη ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει
 2 ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ τῇ ἀληθεί. εἰσὶ δέ τινες καὶ
 ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἷον
 δῦσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἱ ὅμοιοι μὲν τι ἔχουσι
 τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θραυὺς
 τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλὰ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ
 πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει, ὁ ἐγκρατής, ἐπεὶ
 εὐπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ
 λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ
 3 ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες
 καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδο-
 νήν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες, εἰ μὴ μεταπί-
 θωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται, εἰ μὴ ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ὥσπερ
 ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ εἰκόασιν ἢ τῷ
 4 ἐγκρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ
 δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ

the Paraphrast, who has ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων τῇ ὀρθῇ. But since the correction is so natural, why should such a preponderance of MSS. have failed to adopt it? Though the sense absolutely requires some such reading, it seems better to conclude that there is some original confusion in the text. The author may have carelessly written as above from a mistaken antithesis to ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ in the former sentence.

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον] One chooses the means 'accidentally.' This is a mere illustration of the import of καθ' αὐτό and συμβεβηκός. The whole paragraph seems perfectly irrelevant. It may be compared with *Eth.* v. xi. 8: καθ' αὐτό μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἦτον φαῦλον, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐθὲν κωλύει μείζον εἶναι

κακόν, which is a weak qualification of the moral principle, that to injure is worse than to be injured.

2 ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος κ.τ.λ.] The same illustrations are coupled together in the *Eudemian Ethics*, III. vii. 14: τὸ ὁμοίωτον ἦτον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

ὁ δὲ οὐχ—ἡδονῶν] 'But the obstinate man (is immovable), not from the influence of reason, for such men assuredly admit desires, and many of them are carried away by the allurements of pleasures.' The curious phrase ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι occurs in the *Eudemian Ethics*, III. ii. 13: πάντες γὰρ τοῖς φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι.

4 οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ] See above, ch. ii. § 7, note.

Νεοπτόλεμος. καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλὴν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπέισθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεὺς ψεύδεσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι πράττων οὗτ' ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὗτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἶος ἦττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σω- 5
ματικοῖς χαίρων, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ ἢ τοιούτος, τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατής οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἦττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει. Δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφο-
τέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἔξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαί-
νονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις
εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ
ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ 6

5—ch. x. § 5. In his later edition Bekker makes this portion of the text into a separate chapter, which seems a better arrangement. We have now a winding up of the previous discussions. Continence is not only the contrary of incontinence, but is also a sort of mean. It bears an analogy to temperance, but must not be identified with it. Neither must incontinence and intemperance be confounded (see above, ch. i. § 6). Nor must it be thought possible that the 'thoughtful' man can be incontinent, though the clever man may (see ch. i. § 7). Incontinence is like sleep or drunkenness, not a state of wakeful knowledge (see ch. iii. §§ 6-8). Its acts are voluntary, but yet it is not absolutely wicked, since it implies no deliberate purpose. The incontinent man is like a state which has good laws, but does not act upon them. The bad man like a state with a bad code, which she carries out. Both the terms incontinence and continence are used comparatively, as implying more

firmness than is common, or less. Of the two kinds of incontinence, that which is caused by passion is more curable than that caused by weakness; that which proceeds from habit is more curable than that which is natural.

5 καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει.] This is an Atticism for καὶ δι' οὐδέτερον. The attempt to make continence into 'a mean' can hardly be called successful. It can only be done by assuming the same ἁλλειψις for this quality as for temperance. You will have one set of terms, ἀκολασία, σωφροσύνη, ἀναισθησία, and another set ἀκρασία, ἐγκράτεια, ἀναισθησία. It is plain that ἐγκράτεια is not a mean, in the sense of being a balance or harmony of the mind. It is only imperfect temperance; it is temperance in the act of forming.

6 ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡκολούθηκεν.] 'The "continence" of the temperate man has come to be called so derivatively (ἡκολούθηκεν) and by analogy.'

τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὃ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φάυλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἡδесθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἡδесθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι. 7 ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες, ἀμφοτέρω δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ οἴομενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἴομενος.

- 10 Οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῇ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος 2 δέδεκται ὢν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός. τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῇ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναι τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς 3 εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνώμενος. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν (τρόπον γὰρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὐ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ

X. 1 ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεκται ὢν] Cf. ch. ii. § 5. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 6.

2 τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] Cf. *Eth.* vi. xii. 8-9. The phrase ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις is used by Aristotle, *Eth.* iv. iv. 1, 4, in reference to the Second Book of *Ethics*. It must mean something more than πρότερον, one would think. It seems to point to a sort of interval between the later passage and that referred to. Cf. ch. i. § 1: ἀλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν.

3 καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν] Cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 4-6, where the question is discussed, Does the incontinent man voluntarily do wrong and injury to himself as well as harm?

ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής] Προαίρεσις

here must mean the general state of the will. It is only one form of incontinence, which errs against a definitely formed purpose. Incontinence is always παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν (cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 6): in passionate natures it is ἀνευ προαίρεσεως. The Aristotelian psychology seems however to have admitted the formation of προαίρεσις which are not carried out into action, and the question thus arose, Are purposes or actions most decisive as constituting virtue? See *Eth.* iii. ii. 1, note, and *Eth.* x. viii. 5.

ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος] 'So that he is only half depraved.' This epithet occurs in *Ar. Pol.* v. xi. 34: ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν (the monarch) διακεῖσθαι (ἀναγκαῖον) κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἦτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα, καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἄλλ'

μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικούς οἷς ἂν βουλευσῇται, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός οὐδὲ βουλευτικός ὄλως. καὶ ἔουκε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἢ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωπεν

ἢ πόλις ἰβούλειθ, ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μίλει·

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένη. 4 ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἔξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἦττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. εὐϊατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμού ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾶον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπὸν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔουκεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐνῆος λέγει

φημί πολυχρόνιον μιλίτην ἔμειναι, φίλι, καὶ δὴ ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαι φύσει ἴλαι.

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία 5 καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἔξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.

ἡμυπόνηρον. In Plato, *Repub.* p. 352 c, the term ἡμυπόνηροι is used in proving that there must be honour even among thieves.

οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος] Though lust as compared with anger is called ἐπίβουλος (cf. ch. vi. § 3), yet it is true on the other hand that the incontinent man is not a designing character.

ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός] Cf. above, ch. vii. § 8, ch. viii. § 2.

ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης] A Rhodian comic poet, who is said to have satirised the Athenians. Aristotle mentions one of his plays, the *Γεροντομανία* (*Rhet.* iii. xii. 3). Also a famous saying of his (*Id.* iii. xi. 8), 'Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον—

καλὸν γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν
ἀξιον.

And another witticism (*Id.* iii. x. 7). Cf. Athenæus, *Deipnos.* ix. 16.

4 τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως] Cf. ch. vii. i, note.

ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐνῆος] An elegiac and gnomic poet of Paros, who appears to have been a contemporary and friend of Socrates.

φημί πολυχρόνιον κ.τ.λ.]

'Habit sticketh long and fast,
Second nature 'tis at last.'

μελέτην] 'That which is acquired by culture and habit.' That habit is 'second nature' we are told by Aristotle, *De Mem.* ii. 16: ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, διὸ ἀπολλάκις ἐννοοῦμεν ταχὺ ἀναμνησκόμεθα· ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσει τὸδε μετὰ τὸδε ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· τὸ δὲ πολλὰκις φύσιν ποιεῖ.

- 11 Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφούντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς
2 λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ

XI. We now come to a treatise upon the nature of Pleasure. With regard to the authorship and character of this treatise see the remarks in Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 64-65, and Essay III. p. 250. A notable scholium, discovered by Professor Brandis in the Vatican, and quoted by Spengel and Fritzsche, attributes it to Eudemus, though in a merely conjectural way; see below, ch. xiii. § 2, note. In the outset of the *Eudemian Ethics*, a discussion on Pleasure is promised in terms which correspond both to the contents and the position of the present chapters (*Eth. Eud.* I. v. 11). τούτων δ' (i.e. with regard to the three kinds of life) ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονῆς, καὶ τίς καὶ πόλα τίς γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἀδηλον, ὥστ' οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτάς, ἀλλ' εἰ συντείνουσι τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι, καὶ ὕστερον εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ ζῆν καλὰς ἡδονάς τινας, ταύτας δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλων τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἔτεροι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως οἴονται τὸν εὐδαιμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον, περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν. It is quite in agreement with the terms of this programme that the present treatise is prominently concerned with the discussion of *bodily* pleasure (ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονῆς). At the close of the *Eudemian Ethics* there is also a reference backward to these chapters (*Eth. Eud.* VIII. iii. 11): καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ' εἰρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἷτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ

καλὰ, καὶ τὰ (γε) ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα. οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει· διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαίμων καὶ ἡδιστα ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀξιοῦσιν. (Cf. this book, ch. xii. § 3, and § 7; ch. xiii. § 2.)

1-2 περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς — χαίρειν] 'Pleasure and pain are subjects which come within the scope of him who makes politics a philosophy, for he has to frame the idea of that supreme end, in reference to which we call things absolutely good and bad. Also these are quite necessary for us to consider, since we have laid down the principle that moral virtue and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures, and since people in general hold that pleasure is involved in happiness, whence they have given the happy man his name (μακάριος from χαίρειν).'

There are three reasons given here for discussing pleasure: (1) Because it has claims to be 'the end.' (Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. i. 1, where as a reason for discussing psychology it is said, φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὧν ἓν α ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν.) (2) From the connection before shown to exist between pleasure and morality; cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. iv. 2-4. (3) Because the idea of pleasure is involved in the common idea of happiness, as shown by the etymology (a false one) of μακάριος.

ἀρχιτέκτων τοῦ τέλους] i.e. to conceive in a grand and liberal way, independently of details, that supreme human good at which a state should aim. Cf. *Eth.* I. xiii. 1-3, and I. i. 4, note.

ἀπλῶς λέγομεν] There is some con-

αὐτῶν· τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ
λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλείστοι
μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναι φασιν, διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν
ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι³
ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ
εἶναι ταυτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' εἶναι μὲν εἶναι αἱ
δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι
ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.
ὅλως μὲν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστίν· εἰς⁴
φύσιν αἰσθητῇ, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν,
οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει
τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ.
ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει,
μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι
νοῆσαι τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν
ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς
ἡδονάς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰς⁵ καὶ 5

fusion in this expression, for though things are called good in reference to the supreme end, yet they are not called so *absolutely*. All such goods are merely means, and therefore goods relatively. What is here meant is more definitely expressed in *Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 18, *ὅτι δ' αἴτιον τὸ τέλος τῶν ἐφ' αὐτό, δημοῖ ἡ διδασκαλία*. ὁρισμένοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τᾶλλα δεικνύουσιν, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα. On *ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ* as a Eudemean formula, see Vol. I. Essay I. p. 63.

μεθ' ἡδονῆς] The first sentence of the *Eudemean Ethics* asserts that happiness is not only most good and beautiful, but also most pleasurable; this is taken, of course, from *Eth. Nic.* I. viii. 4.

3-5 The writer now mentions three existing opinions with regard to pleasure, and the arguments by which they are supported.

VOL. II.

1 That pleasure is in no sense a good.

(α) because it is a state of becoming (*γένεσις*):

(β) because the temperate man avoids pleasures;

(γ) because the thoughtful man aims not at pleasure, but at a painless condition;

(δ) because pleasure hinders thought;

(ε) because there is no art of pleasure;

(ς) because children and brutes follow pleasure.

2 That some pleasures may be good, but that most are bad; supported by instances of morbid and hurtful pleasures.

3 That pleasure is at all events not the chief good; because it is not an end-in-itself, but a state of becoming.

τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ] The opinions stated here are negative. The writer

G G

- αἰσχροὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραί· νοσῶδη γὰρ
 ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον ἡ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος
 ἀλλὰ γέनेσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
- 12 "Οτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ
 τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν

in all probability had before him Aristotle's treatise on Pleasure (*Eth.* x. i.-v.). He deviates from it slightly, and exhibits that kind of differences which might be expected under the circumstances. He does not, like Aristotle, state the positive view (held by Eudoxus) that pleasure is the chief good, but commences with the opinions of the objectors to this view (i.e. Speusippus and the Platonists of his school). The principal argument which he attributes to them (that pleasure is a *γένεσις*) is given, though not in such a definite form, *Eth.* x. iii. 4. Argument (f) appears to be implied in the objection against Eudoxus which is mentioned *Eth.* x. ii. 4. Argument (e) may be the same perhaps as that given *Eth.* x. iii. 2 (that pleasure is *ἀόριστον*). The other arguments are not taken from Aristotle; they may perhaps have been derived from the books of Speusippus on this subject (*περὶ ἡδονῆς* δ, *Ἀριστιππος* δ. See Vol. I. Essay III. p. 218).

The second view belongs probably to a more moderate section of the Older Academy. It still, however, requires qualification, and to this effect the writer argues below, in ch. xii.

The third view,—that pleasure, however good, cannot be the chief good,—was held by both Plato and Aristotle (though the argument by which it is supported, *ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γέनेσις*, was Plato's alone; cf. *Philebus*, p. 53 C, 54 A, &c. *Eth.* x. ii. 3, x. iii. 8-13. Eudemus, identifying

pleasure with happiness, denies this, ch. xii. § 1, ch. xiii. § 2.

XII. The arguments used in this chapter are as follows: (1) Before deciding on the goodness or badness of pleasure, a distinction has to be made between absolute and relative goodness or badness, and then various degrees have to be admitted among the relative kinds of goodness, § 1. (2) We must allow that real pleasure consists in life itself (*ἐνέργεια*), not what merely produces life (*γένεσις*). Hence all the arguments founded on defining pleasure to be a *γένεσις* fall to the ground. Those processes which restore nature are only pleasures in a subsidiary and accidental way. And even in them what is pleasant is the life (*ἐνέργεια*) which accompanies them, §§ 2-3. (3) Some pleasures may be morbid or they may hinder thought; but this only proves that *from one point of view* they are not good; but again the pleasures of thought are an assistance to thought, §§ 4-5. (4) There is no art of pleasure, because art is of conditions, not of functions, not of life itself, § 6. (5) The arguments about the thoughtful man, the temperate man, and the child (ch. xi. § 4), all apply merely to the inferior and subsidiary, that is, the bodily, pleasures, § 7.

The course of procedure here is like that in *Eth.* x. ii.-iii., where the objections of the school of Speusippus are answered before Aristotle gives his own theory of the nature of pleasure. The arguments above are rather confused in statement. Those in § 1

διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἔξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἰρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔναι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον, αἰρεταὶ δ' οὐ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἔνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ 2

are apparently meant to answer the assertion that no pleasure is good, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The writer wishes first to urge that pleasure may be relatively good, if not absolutely so; he afterwards goes on to maintain that it is absolutely good.

Other passages of Eudemus bear a similarity to this; cf. *Eth. Eud.* III. 1. 7: ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ φοβερόν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὰγαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τούναντιον φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς πονηροῖς ὠφέλιμα, καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς παιδίοις ἢ παιδία. VII. ii. 4-7, &c.

1 ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει—καμνόντων] 'But that it does not follow from these arguments that (pleasure) is not a good, nor even that it is not the chief good, will be seen from the following considerations. First, the term "good" has a double import; it means either the absolute or the relative good; in accordance with this distinction, different constitutions and states will be either absolutely or relatively good, and so too the processes of change and transition (which produce them). Thus some of these processes which appear bad may be so in the abstract (ἀπλῶς), while they are not so relatively (τινί), but are desirable for the particular individual. Others again cannot be called desirable even for the particular individual, except on occasion and for a short time; others are not pleasures at all, but only seem so, being accom-

panied by pain and being (merely) for the sake of relief; as, for instance, the pleasures of the sick.'

2 ἐτι ἐπεὶ—ἀπὸ τούτων] 'Secondly, "good" may be either the state or the operation of a state, and so the processes which restore any one to his normal state (φυσικὴν ἔξιν) are pleasurable (not in themselves, but) accidentally (and by association). In fact, there is an operation or vital action in desire, namely, that of the powers in us which remain unimpaired (τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἔξεως καὶ φύσεως). (And it may be proved that pleasure depends not on want and desire, but on vital action) because there are pleasures which do not imply want and desire, as, for instance, the pleasures of thought, which take place when the nature is in no respect deficient. A proof (that the processes before-mentioned are only accidentally pleasurable) is to be found in the fact that men do not find delight in the same pleasure while their nature is being recruited (ἀναπληρουμένης) and when it is in a settled condition, but when it is settled they delight in things which are absolutely pleasant, and during the other process in things that are even quite the reverse; as in sharp and bitter things, which are not naturally nor abstractedly pleasant. Nor is the enjoyment of them natural, for as pleasant things, regarded objectively (τὰ ἡδέα), are to one another, so are the subjective feelings which these excite (ἡδοναί).'

μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἔξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν ἡδεΐαι εἰσιν. ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἔξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσιν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ χαίρουσιν ἡδεῖ ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ οὔθ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλλα συναέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. 3 ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ

This passage is expressed so elliptically as to require several links of thought to be supplied. In the above translation this has been attempted. A bare rendering of the sentences into English would leave them utterly unintelligible.

αἱ καθιστᾶσαι] i.e. αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, carried on from the previous section. The argument is that it is only life and the vital action (φυσικὴ ἔξις καὶ ταύτης ἐνέργεια) which is good and pleasant; the restorative processes are only secondarily, non-essentially, and by a sort of inference, pleasant. The words καθιστᾶσαι and καθεστηκυίας correspond with the term κατὰστασις, which is used of pleasure in *Ar. Rhetoric*, I. xi. 1: κατὰστασις δόρυα καὶ ἀσθητὴ εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν.

τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἔξεως] The argument goes on to add that even in these restorative processes there is vital action (ἐνέργεια), namely, of those organs that remain unimpaired. The Paraphrast and others understand ὑπολοίπου to mean 'deficient,' and as being equivalent to ἐνδεοῦς in the next line. But the above translation is not only more suitable to the doctrine of the Peripatetics (see Vol. I. Essay IV.

pp. 247-250), but it is borne out by c. xiv. § 7: Λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ λατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει λατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένουτος ὄντος πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι. Cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 6.

ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς] Mentioned as an instance of things only pleasant during a morbid condition of the body. Cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 8.

3 ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη—ἔστι δ' ἕτερον] 'Moreover it does not follow that there must be something better than pleasure, as some argue, in the same way that the end is better than the process which leads to it. For all pleasures are not transition-states nor the accompaniments of such, but they are rather life itself and the end itself. They do not result from our coming to our powers (γινόμενων), but from our using those powers (χρωμένων); and it is not true that all pleasures have an end separate from them; this is only true of such as are felt by persons in the process of being restored to their normal condition. Hence it is not right to define pleasure as a "sensible transition," but rather we should call it "a vital action of one's natural state," and

τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἑτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν

instead of "sensible," "unimpeded." Now pleasure appears to people to be a transition-process from its being good in the full sense of the term, for people confound the ideas of process and action, whereas they are distinct.'

ὥσπερ τινές φασι] In all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings of Speusippus, are here alluded to. Nowhere in Plato do the exact words of this definition of pleasure occur (*γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή*), but they represent his views, though perhaps carried rather farther. The present section places in opposition to each other the theories of the Platonic and the Aristotelian school, of whom the one considered pleasure to be a relief from pain, a return from depression, an addition to the vital powers; the other considered it to be the play of life itself, the flow of life outward rather than anything received. On these two divergent theories see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 247-250. The same subject may be found worked out at greater length, and with interesting notices of the opinions held by later philosophers, in Sir W. Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. II. lect. xliii. pp. 444-475.

ἀλλὰ μάλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν] Aristotle when writing accurately distinguishes pleasure from the moments of life and consciousness (*ἐνέργειαι*), from which it is inseparable. Cf. *Eth.*

x. v. 6: αἱ δὲ (ἡδοναὶ) συνεγγυαὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστε ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν τοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἰσθησις· ἀποπον γάρ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τῇ χωριζέσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταῦτόν. He however does not more specifically define it than as *ἐπιγεννόμενόν τι τέλος* (τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ), *Eth.* x. iv. 8, &c. Eudemus does not preserve the distinction, but simply says that pleasure should be defined as 'the unimpeded play of life.' Aristotle himself occasionally writes in this way; cf. *Metaphys.* xi. vii. 7: *ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐνέργεια τοῦτου.*

ἀνεμπόδιστον]. This word is borrowed from Aristotle's *Politics*, iv. xi. 3. See Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 55-56.

δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν] At first sight there appears to be a contradiction in saying that pleasure is thought not to be a good, because it is a *γένεσις* (ch. xi. § 4); and that it is thought to be a *γένεσις* because it is a good. The explanation is that the latter clause refers not to the Platonists, but to the Cyrenaics. The Cyrenaics, who considered pleasure the chief good, defined it as an equable process in the soul. Plato accepted this definition, and turned it against them, arguing that by the very terms used the Cyrenaics had proved pleasure not to be the chief good. The Platonists then were originally

γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἶονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν. ταύτῃ οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν 5 ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν, ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἔξει οὐδεμῶ ἢ ἀφ' ἐκάστης ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μαθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι 6 θεωρεῖν καὶ μαθάνειν. τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ 7 ἡδονῆς εἶναι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σῶφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παῖδια καὶ τὰ

indebted for their definition of pleasure (*αἰσθητὴ γένεσις*) to the Cyrenaics. See Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 176-177.

4-5 τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας—μαθάνειν] 'To say that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying (health is bad) because some healthy things are bad for money-making. From that point of view it is true they are both bad, but they are not on account of this incidental badness bad *simpliciter*, since even thinking is sometimes injurious to health; but neither thought nor any other state of mind is impeded by its own pleasure, but only by foreign pleasures; for the pleasures of thinking and learning will make one think and learn more.' The argument here is that a thing good in itself may be relatively bad, *e.g.* health, and thought itself. One good may clash with another, and be from that point of view (*ταύτῃ*) bad. The writing is elliptical; we might have expected ἀπλῶς to be added to φαῦλα. The last clause in section 5, which asserts that a mental function is rather assisted than impaired by its own proper pleasure, is taken from Ar.

Eth. x. v. 2-3. Νοσώδη seems to mean 'producing disease;' cf. ch. xi. § 5: as νοσματούδης before (ch. v. § 3, &c.) means 'produced by disease.' Φρονήσει is evidently used above as the verbal noun of φρονεῖν, in the general sense of 'thought,' and not in the restricted sense which is given to it in Book vi. Cf. *Eth.* i. vi. 11; *Eth. Eud.* ii. i. 1 (quoted above).

6 τὸ δὲ τέχνης κ.τ.λ.] Cf. ch. xi. § 6. An answer is now given to an argument probably occurring in the works of Speusippus. This argument, if fairly represented here, must have had a false major premiss, namely, 'All that is good is the subject of art.' The answer consists of two different pleas: (1) pleasure, like life, is above art, which can only deal with the conditions tending to these things. (2) In another sense there are arts of pleasure, *e.g.* the cook's or the perfumer's art.

7 Most of the arguments against pleasure ignore the distinction between different kinds of pleasures, the one kind being of the nature of life, and the end, and therefore good in themselves (§ 3); the other kind being

θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυσίαν ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς (τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ' ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σόφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σωφρονος.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακὸν ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ 13
φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδι-

connected with inferior conditions of our nature, with pain, want, &c., and being therefore only secondarily and accidentally good (§ 2). This latter kind of pleasures, and excess in them, are made the ground of reproaches against pleasure in general.

XIII. In this chapter, after refuting (§ 1) the objection of Speusippus (that pleasure may be the opposite of pain without being a good), Eudemus urges the claims of pleasure, of the highest kind, to be considered the chief good, because from the terms of its definition it is inseparable from, and indeed identical with, happiness (§ 2). It is a mere paradox to talk of a man being happy in torture, &c. Happiness requires prosperity, that an 'unimpeded function' may be obtained, i.e. pleasure, though there must not be too much prosperity, else happiness is 'impeded' in another way (§§ 3-4). The instinct of all creatures testifies to pleasure being the chief good (§ 5); and it is a mistake to think that bodily pleasure is the only kind that exists (§ 6). In short, that pleasure is necessary for happiness proves that it is a good (§ 7).

Ἱ ἀλλὰ μὴν—ἡδονήν 'But we may go further—it is universally agreed that pain is an evil, and detestable—for it is either absolutely an evil, or

is so relatively as impeding the individual in some way or other. But that which is contrary to the detestable in that very point which makes it detestable and evil is good. Therefore it follows that pleasure must be a good. For the answer of Speusippus to this argument does not hold, that "(pleasure is contrary to pain and to the absence of pain) in the same way that the greater is contrary to the less, and also to the equal." For no one could ever say that pleasure is identical with any form of evil.' That pleasure is a good because it is the contrary of pain, is an argument attributed to Eudoxus, *Eth.* x. ii. 2. Aristotle there (*ib.* § 5) mentions the answer to it, and refutes that answer as above. Eudemus, in accordance with his usual style, adds the name of Speusippus. Aulus Gellius, ix. 5, mentions this doctrine: 'Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese: bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret.' Accordingly, the neutral state between pain and pleasure would have to be regarded as good. Aristotle and Eudemus reply that the point of contrariety between pain and pleasure is that the one is *φευκτόν* and the other *αἰρετόν*, therefore the one must be considered an evil, the other a good.

στική. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τε καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττω καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη 2 ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. ἀριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔναι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινα ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης ἑξέως εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν,

ὅπερ κακόν τι] Cf. *Eth.* vi. iv. 3, note. We are probably to understand *τις*, with the Paraphrast and Scholiast. Speusippus would have said that pleasure is an evil. Cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 5.

2 ἄριστον τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει] This admission is directly contrary to the conclusions of Aristotle (cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 13). It is to be explained as an after development of the system of Aristotle, and an attempt to bring different parts of that system into harmony with each other. Aristotle having used the same formula (*ἐνέργεια*) to express both pleasure and happiness, Eudemus from the force of the terms identifies them. In this he is quite justified, for it is impossible to distinguish the highest kind of pleasure or joy from happiness, especially if we consider peace (*ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀκυσίας*) to be a mode of joy. It is in accordance with the rest of the *Eudemean Ethics* to speak in this way of pleasure as being an essential element in, and as inseparable from, happiness. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* i. i. 6-7, i v. 11-12 (quoted above), viii. iii. 11, &c.

-The Vatican Scholium on this passage speaks of it as being merely dialectical (but this is from an unwillingness to recognise the discrepancy between Books vii. and x.) It proceeds to attribute the present treatise

conjecturally to Eudemus. Διὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων δοκεῖ ταῦτόν ἀποφανέσθαι τὰγαθόν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ μὴν οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας γένεσιν εἶναι ἡ φαύλας τινὰς τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀς καὶ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπιγίγνεται καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἐνδόξως ὡς ἐόν αὐτὴν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν, ἐπεὶ ἐν γὰρ τοῖς Νικομαχείαις ἔθεν διελλεκταὶ καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς Ἀριστοτέλης σαφῶς εἰρηκεν αὐτὴν μὴ ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἀλλὰ παρακολουθεῖν ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀκμαίοις τὴν ὥραν. σημείων δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τοῦτ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἀλλ' Εὐδήμου τὸ ἐν τῷ κ' (Book X.) λέγειν περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς οὐδέπω περὶ αὐτῆς διειλεγμένου. πλὴν εἴτε Εὐδήμου ταῦτά ἐστιν εἴτ' Ἀριστοτέλους, ἐνδόξως εἰρηται. διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονὴν εἶναι σὺν τῷ ἄριστῳ καὶ ἀχώριστον αὐτοῦ. τοῦτ' ὁμολογεῖ καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. This, which is a remarkably favourable specimen of the Scholia, may serve to show the wavering and unprofitable character of the commentaries.

ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην] This must not be taken very strictly, since pleasure and knowledge cannot both be the chief good. Both, however, may be considered as forms of the absolute good. Cf. *Eth.* i. vii. 5. The article is omitted at first with *ἄριστον*, but is added below. Knowledge is good, though some things it is better not to know.

ἀν ᾧ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονή τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἀπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἶονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις με- 3 γάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾧ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ 4 προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταῦτόν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὔσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον·

καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* i. v. 11 (which passage is here referred to): ἔτεροι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως οἰοῦνται τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἔχειν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύτως.

τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης] This is the principle with regard to happiness which is laid down in *Eth. Nic.* i. viii. 15-17. It was afterwards considered characteristic of the Peripatetic School. Cf. Cicero, *De Fin.* ii. vi. 19: 'Aristoteles virtutis usum cum vitæ perfectæ prosperitate conjunxit.'

3 οἱ δὲ—λέγουσιν] 'But they who allege that he who is being racked on the wheel, or he that is plunged in great calamities, is happy provided he be virtuous, talk nonsense, whether intentionally or not.' Cf. *Eth. Nic.* i. v. 6. The words ἐκόντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν answer to εἰ μὴ θέσω διαφυλάττων in that place. The paradox alluded to was maintained by the Cynics, and afterwards by the Stoics (who denied that pain was an evil). Cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* v. ix. 24: 'Theophrastus quum statuisset verbera, tormenta,

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cruciatu, patriæ eversiones, exilia, orbitates, magnam vim habere ad male misereque vivendum, non est ausus elate et ample loqui, quum humiliter demisseque sentiret.—Vexatur autem ab omnibus primum in eo libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quamobrem is, qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit: in eo etiam putatur dicere in rotam beatam vitam non escendere' (quoted by Fritzsche). Cf. also Cicero, *Paradoxa*, ii.

4 ταῦτόν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* i. i. 4: ἢ διὰ τύχην· πολλοὶ γὰρ ταῦτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. This, together with the present passage, is taken from *Eth. Nic.* i. viii. 17.

αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν] A more forcible expression of what is said *Eth.* x. viii. 9: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἴσως—αὐτῇ] 'And perhaps (when it is overweening) we should no longer call it prosperity; for the standard of prosperity consists in its being conducive to happiness. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* viii. iii. 12: τῶν φύσει μὲν

HH

5 πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ διώκειν
δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημείον τι
τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτῇν.

Φήμη δ' οὐ τί γι πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦν τινα λαοὶ
πολλοί . . .

6 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἔξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ'
ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες,
ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἦν
οἶονται οὐδ' ἦν αἰ φαίεν. ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτῇν· πάντα γὰρ
φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. ἀλλ' εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος
κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε

ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινα εἶναι
ὅρον καὶ ἔξεως καὶ τῆς ἀλρέσεως, καὶ
περὶ φυγῆς χρημάτων πλῆθους καὶ ὀλι-
γότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχιμάτων· and
Vol. I. Essay I. p. 61.

5 καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ'—θεῖον] 'In short,
that all things pursue pleasure, both
beasts and men, is a proof that it is
in some sort the chief good,—

"For mankind's universal voice can
not

Be wholly vain and false."

Since however there is no one nature
or state which is, or is thought to be,
the best for all, so neither do they all
pursue the same pleasure, but still
they all pursue pleasure. Nay, per-
haps unconsciously they are pursuing,
not what they think, or would declare,
but (in reality) the same; for all things
have within them by nature a divine
instinct.' This is said, *Eth.* x. ii. 1, to
have been the argument of Eudoxus:
Εὐδοξὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν
ᾤετο εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα
αὐτῆς καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα. *Ib.* § 4,
Aristotle justifies the argument against
objectors in much the same terms as
those adopted in the text.

ἦν τινα λαοὶ πολλοί] sc. φημίζωσι.
Hesiod, *Works and Days*, v. 761. Cf.
Eth. x. ii. 4: δ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ'
εἶναι φάμεν.

6 ἴσως δὲ καὶ] Perhaps by a mys-
terious instinct all creatures, in seek-
ing life and joy, seek under different
manifestations one and the same prin-
ciple of good. Cf. the dream-images
in Goethe's *Faust* :

'Einige glimmen
Ueber die Höhen,
Andere schwimmen
Ueber die Seen,
Andere schweben,
Alle zum Leben;
Alle zur Ferne
Liebender Sterne,
Seliger Huld.'

Aristotle, *Eth.* x. ii. 4 (which is the
source of the above passage), does not
go so far as to make all creatures aim
at the same good, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
φασίλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρείτ-
τον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, δ ἐφίεται τοῦ οὐκ ἐκείνου
ἀγαθοῦ.

ἀλλ' εἰλήφασιν—ἀσονται εἶναι] 'But
bodily pleasures have usurped the
possession of the name of pleasure,
from men's most often resorting to
them, and from all men partaking of
them; hence because these are the
only pleasures they know of, they
think they are the only ones which
exist.' παραβάλλειν appears to mean
'lay themselves alongside,' 'apply
themselves to.'

παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, 7 οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς 14 λέγουσιν ὅτι ἐνὶ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ αἵρεται σφόδρα, οἶον αἱ

7 φανερόν δέ—αὐτοῦ] 'Finally, it is plain that unless pleasure and the action of life are a good, the happy man cannot live pleasurable. For why should he need pleasure if it be not a good, and if it be possible for him to live painfully? (and it will be possible), for pain will be neither evil nor good, unless pleasure is; so why should he avoid it? and hence it will follow that the life of the good man will not be more pleasurable than that of the bad man, if his moments of action are not more pleasurable.' This is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the position that pleasure is not a good. We shall be reduced to think: (1) that the happy man may live devoid of pleasure; for nothing that is not good can form part of happiness—or even he may live a life of pain, which is the contrary of pleasure; (2) that the good man will have no more pleasure than the bad man, unless pleasure attaches to good acts, in which case it will be part of the good.

XIV. Hitherto Eudemus has followed the lead of Aristotle, only in one respect making a slight development of his conclusions. He now discusses a subject untouched by Aristotle, but which he had proposed to himself in his first book; cf. *Eth. Eud.*

I. v. 11: πότερον, εἰ δὲ προσάπτειν τῷ ζῆν καλὰς ἡδονὰς τινὰς, ταύτας (i.e. τὰς σωματικὰς) δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωρεῖν—ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. Assuming that there are higher pleasures, and that pleasure in the highest form is identical with happiness and the chief good, what is to be said of bodily pleasure? is it an evil or a good? and why is it that men indulge in it so much? To this twofold problem the answers are, Bodily pleasure is in itself a good, as being the contrary of pain; but it is only good under certain limits, as it admits of excess, and the excess is bad (§ 2). There are various reasons why bodily pleasure recommends itself to human nature. (1) It expels the sense of pain, and hence as an anodyne is universally desired from a physical law, for life is full of labour, and the ordinary functions of the senses are laborious acts, only mitigated by custom, §§ 4, 5. (2) The period of youth especially craves after physical pleasure. (3) There are special cases where it is in a way necessary, namely, where peculiarities of temperament render men constitutionally depressed and in want of a sort of relief, §§ 4, 6. (4) From the mixture of the material with the

καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
 2 διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντία λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
 ἐναντίον. ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ
 κακὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν; ἢ μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ
 ἔξω καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή,
 οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων δ' ἐστὶ, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστίν.
 τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος
 τῷ διώκει τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας·
 πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσιν πῶς καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἶνοις καὶ ἀφρο-
 δισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ. ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ
 γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶ τῇ
 ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερ-
 βολήν.

3 Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον
 τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν·
 ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὄν

spiritual in us, we are unable to continue perpetually delighting in one pure pleasure, that is, the pleasure of thought. God alone is capable of this; to us, through a fault in our nature (οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῇ οὐδ' ἐπιεικῆς), change appears sweet, because lower and contradictory elements in us require to be allowed their due action, § 8.

1 τοῖς λέγουσιν] i.e. that section of the Platonists referred to above, ch. xi. § 3: τοῖς δ' ἐνταὶ μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι.

2 τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν — ὑπερβολῇ] 'But right bodily pleasures admit of excess, and the bad man (is bad) in that he seeks that excess, instead of seeking such pleasures as are necessary. All men find delight in meat, and wine, and love, though not all according to the proper law. And reversely all men avoid pain (ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης). A man does not avoid the excess of pain, but pain in general. Pain is not contrary to the excess of pleasure, except to him who pursues

the excess of pleasure.' This argument goes to prove that bodily pleasure is in itself good; only when in excess is it evil. On the other hand all pain is evil. Pleasure and pain then are opposite terms, the one being good and the other evil. To make the doctrine of Speusippus (ch. xiii. 1) hold good, it would be necessary to make pain and the excess of pleasure opposite terms. But they are not so, except perhaps in the mind of the in-temperate man, who thinks that the only alternative is between excessive pleasure and a painful sensation.

3 This section is not logically continuous with what immediately precedes. It no longer deals with the opinion of the Platonists that bodily pleasure is an evil, but takes up another question already partly anticipated, ch. xiii. § 6, namely, How is the vulgar error to be accounted for which gives so much prominence to physical pleasure in the scale of pleasures?

ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἰρετώτεραι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ⁴ ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἢ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις, ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων. αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι, ὅτι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελευομένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκός οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ⁵ ἔτι διώ-
κονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμέ-

4 πρῶτον—φαίνεσθαι] 'The first reason is that it drives out pain. When overwhelmed with pain, as a remedy men seek excessive pleasure, and in short bodily pleasure. Now remedies are naturally violent, and they are adopted because they seem to match (παρὰ) their opposites.' On the opinion that remedies are the opposites of the diseases to be cured, cf. *Etik.* II. iii. 4.

καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ—σπουδαῖαι] 'It is on account of these two causes, then, that pleasure is thought not to be a good; first, that some pleasures, as we have said before (ch. v. 1.), are the actions of a depraved nature, whether congenital, like that of a beast, or acquired, like that of depraved men; secondly, that other pleasures are remedies, implying imperfection, since a normal condition (ἔχειν) is better than the process of arriving at that condition, and some pleasures take place while we are arriving at a complete state of being, hence they are only inferentially and not directly (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) good.' This paragraph reverts parenthetically to the opinion of the Platonists.

5-6 ἔτι διώκονται—γίνονται] The argument is now resumed from the sentence ending φαίνεσθαι. 'Another reason why physical pleasure is sought is its comparatively coarse and violent character, which suits those who require strong excitement. And indeed such men even create in themselves certain artificial thirsts for pleasure. If this does not hurt their health, it is no harm. Such men are incapable of enjoying the purer and simpler pleasures, and a neutral state of the sensations is to many painful by a law of nature. For the living creature ever travails, as the physiological books testify, telling us that the acts of seeing and hearing are laborious, only that we are accustomed to them (so they say). So also the young, in the first place, owing to the principle of growth in them, are like those who are intoxicated, and youth is full of pleasure. And again those of bilious nature are ever in need of an anodyne. Their body is continually fretted by reason of their temperament, and they are ever in vehement desire. Now pleasure, be it the opposite of a given pain, or be it what it may, provided it be strong

νων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον· οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυτηρόν διὰ τὴν φύσιν· αἰὲ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσικοὶ λόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυτηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὥς φασίν.

6 ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξῃσιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν αἰὲ δέονται ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ αἰὲ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρῶ εἰσίν. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχεύουσα, ἐὰν ἢ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ

7 φαῦλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερ-

enough, drives out that pain. And hence persons of the bilious temperament become intemperate and vicious.' This passage gives two reasons to explain why a neutral state of the sensations is distasteful, first a general reason: that the laborious action of the human faculties calls for alleviation; second, a special reason: that certain periods of life and certain temperaments produce a craving after physical indulgence.

δίψας τινὰς] Fritzsche, after the Scholiast, understands this literally, that some men make themselves thirsty to enjoy the pleasure of drinking. But the use of the plural seems to indicate that we should rather follow the Paraphrast and the majority of the commentators in understanding it generally of artificial desires for pleasure, ἐπισκευασταὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, as the Paraphrast calls them.

ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ.] The best commentary on this passage will be found in Aristotle's *Problems*, bk. xxx. ch. i., where a frequent comparison is made between the effects of wine,

youth, and the melancholy (or bilious) temperament, in producing desire. Cf. § 5: ὁ γὰρ οἶνος ὁ πολλὸς μάλιστα φαίνεται παρασκευάζειν τοιοῦτους οἶνους λέγομεν τοὺς μελαγχολικοὺς εἶναι. § 10: καὶ ὁ οἶνος δὲ πνευματώδης τὴν δύναμιν. διὸ δὴ ἐστὶ τὴν φύσιν ὁμοία ὁ τε οἶνος καὶ ἡ κρᾶσις, κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Prob.* iv. xxx.: διὰ τί ἀφροδισιαστικοὶ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ; ἢ ὅτι πνευματώδεις, κ.τ.λ. The Scholiast gives a rapid explanation of the words ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι in the passage before us. Evidently, all that is meant is to compare the desires of youth with those of drunkenness and of the melancholy temperament. We may compare the lines of Goethe:

'Trunken müssen wir alle sein;
Jugend ist Trunkenheit ohne Wein.'

The principle of αὔξῃσις in youth is represented as producing the same results as the humours (χυμοὶ δὲ μελαγχολικός—ἡ τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς κρᾶσις) in the bilious temperament.

7-8 αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν—ἐπιεικῆς] 'The pleasures unpreceded by pain do not admit of excess, they are essentially and not accidentally pleasures.

βολήν. αὐται δὲ αἱ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρυνόντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρυνέσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιούς πρᾶττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. οὐκ αἰεὶ δ' οὐθέν ἡδὺ 8 τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλὴν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναι τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτά, ὥστε ἂν τι θάτερον πρᾶττη, τοῦτο τῇ ἐτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον. ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἀπλὴ εἴη, αἰεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιας, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλὴ οὐδ' ἐπικεύς.

† Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ 9

By the accidental pleasures, I mean such as are of the nature of a remedy. Because, when it happens that we are relieved, owing to some operation of that part in us which continues sound, the result is a sensation of pleasure. By the natural pleasures, I mean those which produce the action of any given nature. The same thing is never continuously pleasant to us, because our nature is not simple, but there is in us a second element, by reason of which we are destructible. Thus, when the one element is in action, it thwarts the tendencies of the second element. And when the two elements are balanced, the result appears neither painful nor pleasant. If there is any being whose nature is simple, the same mode of action will be continuously and in the highest degree pleasurable to him. Hence God enjoys everlastingly one pure pleasure. For there is a function not

only of motion, but of rest; and pleasure consists rather in tranquillity than in motion. "Change," as the poet says, "is the sweetest of all things," on account of a certain fault in our nature. The bad man is fond of change, and of the same character is the nature which requires change; it is not simple or good.' In the above passage we see a reproduction, and to some extent a carrying out, of Aristotle's doctrines in the tenth Book of the *Ethics*, cf. especially ch. iv. 9: Πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἡδεται; ἡ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. On the comparison between the compound nature of man and the purely divine nature of God, cf. ch. vii. 8: ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐστὶν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσω δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτω καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν.

ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.

It is to be remarked that the present Book, which commences with a mention of *θελα ἀρετή*, or the operation of reason unalloyed by passion, ends with a mention of *θελα ἡδονή*, which is the consciousness of the same.

† λοιπὸν—ἐροῦμεν] These words, which have caused, by their occurrence here, an obvious literary confusion in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (see Vol. I. Essay I. p. 56), are not even suitable to the *Eudemean* treatise. The clause is evidently an attempt to sum up and give unity to the preceding book, but it can hardly have been written by the author of the book. To say *εἴρηται τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ*

κακά, is an inadequate and incorrect description of the discussions on Continence and Incontinence (cf. x. 5) and on Pleasure and Pain. With regard to the latter, it has been assumed (xiii. 1) that all Pain is an evil, and it has been argued (xiii. 2-7) that Pleasure, as being *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*, is identical with the chief Good. We trace, then, the work of a somewhat shallow and hasty editor. In the last chapter of *Eth. Eud.* it is said *καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ' εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ, καὶ τὰ [τε] ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα*, which seems to refer generally to chapters xii. and xiii. of this book. The editor may have had that passage before him.

PLAN OF BOOKS VIII.—IX.

ARISTOTLE'S treatise on Friendship, here contained, is quite continuous. The division of it into two books is merely artificial. There is really no break between the end of Book VIII. and the beginning of Book IX. The words *πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπέσθω* (VIII. xiv. 4) have been introduced, whether by the Author's or by an Editor's hand, to create a division and to constitute two books conformable in length to the other books of the *Ethics*.

The use of the phrase *ἐν ἀρχῇ* (VIII. ix. 1, VIII. xiii. 1, IX. iii. 1), in reference to the earlier chapters of Book VIII., has led some persons to suppose that this was originally an independent treatise. But nothing is more clear than that it was written to form a part of Aristotle's work on Ethics. Besides general expressions of the author's purpose to confine himself to an ethical point of view (see VIII. i. 7, IX. ii. 2), we find direct quotations of, or references to, the first books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. (Compare IX. ix. 5 with *Eth. Nic.* I. vii. 14; and I. viii. 13, and IX. iv. 2, with *Eth. Nic.* III. iv. 5.)

The present treatise has a close connection with the first three books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But it is remarkable that it has no connection with Books V. VI. VII. Friendship is here treated in relation to Happiness and in relation to Justice. What is said of Happiness forms the complement to *Eth. Nic.* Book I., but what is said of Justice has no reference to *Eth. Nic.* Book V.; rather it appears written tentatively, probably before the *Politics* of Aristotle, from which the theories of *Eth. Nic.* Book V. seem to have been derived. (See VIII. vi. 6, VIII. vii. 2-3, VIII. ix., x., IX. i. 1-2.)

Again, it is equally striking that there is no reference to Book VII. in the parts of this treatise where the phenomena of vice are

discussed (see IX. iv. 8–9, IX. viii. 6). Indeed the views taken here are inconsistent with those of Book VII., which contain a more rigid analysis. (Compare IX. iv. 8 with VII. viii. 1.)

The style of these two Books is certainly unlike that of Books V. VI. VII., while it bears a close similarity with that of *Eth. Nic.* I. and X. Not one of the 'Eudemian' forms of expression is to be found here.

The treatise on Friendship may be roughly divided into three parts :—

I. On the different kinds of Friendship, and on the nature of the highest and truest type. VIII. i.–viii.

II. On the connection of Friendship with Justice, (1) as arising (with certain exceptions, see c. xii.) out of political relationships, or coinciding with them ; (2) as implying obligations to be repaid. VIII. ix.—IX. iii.

III. On other questions connected with the nature of Friendship, and especially on its relation to Happiness. IX. iv.–xii.

Though the treatise is continuous, yet it is easy to see that the writer's views became deeper and more definite as he advanced. (Thus compare IX. vi. with VIII. i. 4 ; IX. x. with VIII. i. 5 ; and VIII. vi. 2–3, VIII. viii. 7 with VIII. i. 6.)

At the same time we see what a powerful instrument was the Aristotelian analysis for producing clearness of view. By an analysis of the objects of liking (*τὸ φιλεῖν*, VIII. ii. 1), Aristotle clears away all the vagueness which the *Lysis* of Plato had left around the nature of Friendship. By an application of his own philosophical form *ἰδέγμενα* (IX. vii. 4–6, IX. ix. 5–6, IX. xii. 1), he obtains a profound theory of the operation of the highest kind of Friendship in relation to human happiness.

In these Books there is no allusion to the sentimental relationship, in vogue among the Dorians from the earliest ages, between a warrior and his squire (the *εἰσπνήλης* and *ἀτρεής*, or 'inbreather' and 'listener'). All here is broadly human. And yet the idea of 'Friendship' is purely Greek. The Romans imitated it. But in modern times it has been much superseded by the idea of sympathetic marriage. Christianity ignores Friendship ; and theoretically it now exists only as a temporary advantage for the young.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ VIII.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἥ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν βίον· ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεῖα· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἥ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἥ πῶς ἂν τηρηθεῖ καὶ σώζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλέστερα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε 2 καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνον οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλείπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθεῖ, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις·

σύν τε δὴ ἐρχομένῳ·

I. The discussion of Friendship is justified here (analogously to the way in which the discussion of the voluntary is justified, *Eth.* III. i. 1-2), *first*, on the ground of its connection with virtue, *secondly*, on the ground that it is a means to happiness (*ἀναγκαιότατον*) in all conditions of life. As a commencement of the discussion, Aristotle mentions the difficulties raised on the subject in the *Lysis* of Plato: Does friendship depend on similarity or on contrast? Can bad men be friends to each other? and he adds another: Is there only one species of friendship, or are there more? Aristotle by his own analysis of the likeable (τὸ φιλητὸν) immediately cuts straight through these difficulties.

I ἀρετὴ τις ἥ μετ' ἀρετῆς] We have here no reference to that harmonious manner in society, the mean between flattery and moroseness, which is included in the list of the virtues (*Eth.* II. vii. 13) under the name of *φιλία*, but is afterwards said to be nameless (*Eth.* IV. vi. 4) and to be devoid of the feeling of affection.

τί γὰρ ὄφελος—φίλους] 'For what is the use of that sort of abundance, if one is deprived of the power of doing good, which is exercised most especially, and in its most praiseworthy form, towards friends?'

2 σύν τε δὴ ἐρχομένῳ] The saying of Diomedes when about to penetrate the Trojan camp, *Il.* x. 224:

- 3 καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει τ' ἐν-
 πάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ
 πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων, καὶ
 τοῖς ὁμοεθνεῖσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
 ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐν
 ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ
 4 φίλῳ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ
 νομοθεταὶ μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην·
 ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοίον τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ
 μάλιστ' ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα
 ἐξελαύνουσιν. καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης,
 δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ
 5 μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν
 ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἡ τε
 πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἓν τι εἶναι, καὶ ἔνοι τοὺς
 αὐτοὺς οἶονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.
- 6 Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν

σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένῳ, καὶ τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ
 ἐνόησεν,
 ὅπως κέρδος ἐπ' αὐτοῦ δ' εἴπερ τε
 νοήσῃ,
 ἀλλὰ τε οἱ βράσσω τε νόος, λεπτὴ δὲ
 τε μήτις.

The words here quoted had become
 proverbial. Cf. Plato, *Alcib.* II. 140 A;
Protag. 348 a.

3 τοῖς ὁμοεθνεῖσι] This word is ap-
 plied here to brutes as well as men.
 In the same sense ὁμογενεῖς is used,
Eth. *Eud.* VII. v. 3, and *συγγενῇ*, *Ar.*
Rhet. I. xi. 25.

ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις—φίλῳ] 'And in tra-
 velling too one may see how near and
 dear every man is to man,' i.e. one
 may see this both as a matter of ge-
 neral observation, and as oneself meet-
 ing with kindness and hospitality.

4 καὶ οἱ νομοθέται] Cf. the speech
 of Lysias in Plato's *Phaedrus*.

καὶ τῶν δικαίων—δοκεῖ] 'And the

height of justice appears to be of the
 nature of friendship.' Under the
 words τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα equity
 (τὸ ἐπιεικές) appears to be meant. Cf.
Eth. v. x. 6-8.

5 ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν] This is repeating
 in other words that friendship is ἀρετή
 τις. The distinction between ἀναγκαῖον
 and καλόν is common in Aristotle, and
 the one term suggests the other. Cf.
Eth. ix. xi. 1.

ἡ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ] 'To have
 many friends is commonly thought to
 be something beautiful.' This popular
 opinion is considerably qualified on
 further examination: cf. *Eth.* ix. x. 6.

καὶ ἔνοι—φίλους] 'And some think
 that the term "good friend" is con-
 vertible with that of "good man."' Cf.
 a similar form of expression, *Eth.*
 v. ii. 11: οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτον ἀνδρὶ τ'
 ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.

6 διαμφισβητεῖται] The questions
 mentioned here are raised in the *Lysis*

γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὁμοίον φασιν ὡς τὸν ὁμοιον, καὶ κολοῖον ποτὶ κολοῖον, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀλλήλοις φασὶν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν εἰς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν 7 φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνίκει εἰς τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷον τε μοχθηροῦς

of Plato, pp. 214-215. (214 A) Λέγουσι δὲ (οἱ ποιηταί) πως ταῦτα, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, ὡδί·

αἰεὶ τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἀγεί θεός ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον

καὶ ποιεῖ γινώριμον . . . οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμμασιν ἐντετύχκας ταῦτ' αὐτὰ λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ φίλον εἶναι; εἰσὶ δὲ πού οἱ τοὶ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες, ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις . . . (215 C) Ἦδὴ ποτὲ τοῦ ἤκουσα λέγοντος, καὶ ἀρτι ἀναμνησέσκειμαι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολεμῶνται οἷον· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἡσιόδον ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα. λέγων ὡς ἄρα

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ αἰοῦς αἰοῦ
δοῖδῶ
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ.

καὶ τὰλλα δὴ πάντα οὕτως ἔφη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι μάλιστα τὰ ὁμοιότατα πρὸς ἀλλήλα φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονεικίας καὶ ἐχθρας ἐμπέλασθαι, τὰ δ' ἀνομοιότατα φιλίας . . . τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἐναντιωτάτῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φίλον. ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' οὐ

τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὕγρου, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν γλυκεῖος, τὸ δὲ ὀξύ ἀμβλύος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως, καὶ τὸ πλήρες δὲ κενώσεως. Which of the two views is true is not decided in the *Lysis*, where, however, it is laid down that friendship cannot consist in pure contrariety.

καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν—φυσικώτερον] 'And about these very questions some inquire more deeply and physically,' i.e. not limiting their view to the phenomena of friendship itself, but bringing in the analogies of the whole of nature. Aristotle sets aside such speculations as not belonging to ethics; he remarks parenthetically below (*Eth.* VIII. viii. 7), that the contrary in nature does not desire its extreme contrary, but the mean.

Εὐριπίδης] The verses occur in a fragment of an uncertain play, which is preserved by Athenæus, XIII. p. 599. τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον] 'The opposing conduces,' a play on words characteristic of the oracular style of Heraclitus.

7 ἢ οὐχ οἷον τε μοχθηροῦς ὄντας]

ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἴόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἰκανῶ πεπιστεύκασι σημείω· δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. τείρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐμπροσθεν.

- 2 Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον. δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' ὃ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε
- 2 φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τὰγαθὸν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλος. πότερον οὖν τὰγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ ἐκάστω. φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὃν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν·
- 3 ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' αὐ

This question is started in the *Lysis*, p. 214 D: τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀνίττονται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὡ ἐταῖρε, οἱ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ὡς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὐτ' ἀγαθῷ οὐτε κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρχεται.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἴόμενοι κ.τ.λ.] 'For they who think that there is only one species of friendship, because it admits of degrees, trust to an insufficient proof. For things also that differ in species admit of degrees. But we have spoken about them before.' Aristotle immediately proceeds to show that there are three distinct species of friendship, in accordance with the three objects of liking. He also says that the friendships for pleasure or profit are *less* friendships than that for the good (*ἥττον εἶσιν*, VIII. vi. 7). All three kinds admit of the idea (*λόγος*) of friendship; thus they agree in genus and are comparable in point of degree. Cf. *Ar. Categ.* viii. 36: ἀπλῶς δέ, εἰ μὴ ἐπιδέχεται ἀμφό-

τερα τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ βληθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. As there is no place in the *Ethics* where Aristotle has discussed this logical question before, a Scholiast says with regard to the last words of the paragraph: εἴκοι δὲ εἰρησθαι ἐν τοῖς ἐκπεπτωκόσι τῶν Νικομαχείων. But most probably the words εἰρησθαι δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν are the interpolation of a copyist, who was perhaps thinking vaguely of *Eth.* II. viii. 5, to which the commentators generally refer. These words spoil the grammar of the sentence, as *περὶ αὐτῶν* is used in the next line with a different reference.

II. 2 πότερον οὖν—αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν] Aristotle here guards himself against the appearance of having admitted the Platonic theory, that the absolute good is always the object of human desire. Cf. *Eth.* III. iv. 1, and note.

ἔσται γὰρ—φαινόμενον] 'For in that case the object of liking will be an apparent and not an absolute object.'

φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται
φιλία· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων
ἀγαθοῦ· γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἶκῳ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ·
ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σῶζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ. τῷ
δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. τοὺς
δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ εὖνους λέγουσιν, εὖν μὴ
τῷτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίγνηται· εὖνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντι-
πεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσιν· 4
πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασι, ὑπολαμβάνουσι
δὲ ἐπικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τῶντων κἂν ἐκείνων
τις πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται
ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὥς
ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὖνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι
τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἓν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα 3
καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρίῳ δὲ τῇ τῆς φιλίας εἶδι, ἰσύριθμα τοῖς
φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθά-
νουσα. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλή-
λοις ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρησίμον φι-
λοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ γίγνεται
τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδο-
νῇ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέ-
λους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. οἱ τε δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον 2
φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονῇ

3 τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων] Suggested by the
Lysis of Plato, p. 212 D, where οἶκος
is mentioned as an object of liking :
οὐδ' ἄρα φίλιπποι εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἂν οἱ ἴπποι
μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδ'
αὖ φιλόκυνες γε καὶ φιλοῖνοι κ.τ.λ.

4 ἢ—τοῦτον] 'Or must we add the
proviso that (this good feeling) must
not be unknown! For many are
kindly disposed to men whom they
have never seen, but whom they sup-
pose to be good or useful, and one of
these latter might reciprocate the same
feeling.' τοῦτον, being substituted for
the plural πολλοί, gives definiteness.

Cf. IX. i. 4: τοῖτοις καὶ προσέχει,
καὶ κείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει.

III. 1 ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν] 'Accord-
ing to the particular mode of their
friendship.' The differences of mode
are specified afterwards.

οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν] 'Do not
love each other for their very selves.'
This phrase καθ' αὐτοὺς is rather a
logical formula than an ordinary
grammatical combination. It seems
to have arisen from καθ' αὐτό, 'the
absolute.' Cf. VIII. lii. 7, and the use
of δι' αὐτούς, VIII. iv. 6, IX. i. 7.

- διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ
χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταὶ
εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτη
φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν.
3 εὐδιάλντοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων·
ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ᾧσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες.
τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίγνεται.
ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία,
4 ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσ-
βύταις ἢ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ
τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν
ἁκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάντ' δ'
οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ'
εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν
μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ᾧσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον
ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν
5 τιθέασιν. ἢ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ
πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς
καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα
γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται·
ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἢ φιλία μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης
ἡδονῆς ταχέια ἢ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ
πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ
φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας
μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλον-
ται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν οὕτως.
6 Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν
ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις
ἢ ἀγαθοί· ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι
τὰγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι'
αὐτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·

2 καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς] The reading surely should be ὁ φιλούμενος ἐστιν, 'not by reason of the existence of the person who is loved, but by reason of his being useful or pleasant.' The personal existence of the friend is, according to

Aristotle, the chief blessing of friendship. Cf. IX. IX. 10: εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετὸν ἐστὶ καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ἐν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν ἀν εἶν.

διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾧσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκείαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἔστιν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' ἡμοιότητά τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτούς· ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἔστιν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά, καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ' εἰκὸς τὰς 8 τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν

6 ἐκάστῳ γὰρ—*ῥμοιαι*] 'For to every man his own actions and those similar to them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are (to the good) identical (with their own actions) or similar.' The friend being *alter ego*, the delight of friendship is that it gives an increased sense of existence.

7 συνάπτει] Neuter, as in VIII. iv. 5: οὐ πάντ' δ' αὐτὰ συνάπτουσιν.

πᾶσα γὰρ—*τινα*] 'For every friendship is for good or for pleasure; either absolute, or else relative to him who feels the friendship, and only bearing a certain resemblance to the absolutely good or pleasurable.' The comma should surely be omitted after τῷ φιλοῦντι. Aristotle is not here saying (as the commentators fancy) that every friendship implies similarity, but that every friendship, whether the genuine type or one of the secondary and reflected species, aims at either good or pleasure. This is made clear by the next chapter, § 4: *πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθῶν, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα.*

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ταύτῃ δὲ—*τὰ λοιπά*] 'But this friendship has all the specified qualities essentially belonging to the persons who feel it (*καθ' αὐτοὺς*)—(I say essentially), for even the other kinds of friendship are resemblances of this (the perfect kind).' This passage has vexed the commentators. Zell thinks that *ῥμοια* may be referred to *καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα* in the previous sentence (which he mistakes), and explains, 'In this kind of friendship there is similarity and all the other requisite qualities.' But we surely then should have expected τὰ *ῥμοια*. Cardwell, following Giphanius, Zwinger, and the Scholiast, reads *ταύτῃ γὰρ ῥμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά*. In this kind of friendship men are similar, *et cætera*. Stahr doubts the genuineness of the entire section. The common reading, as above explained, seems borne out by the opening of the next chapter, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει. Cf. VIII. vi. 7. 'Ὅμοια here is in opposition to ταύτῃ—*καθ' αὐτούς*.

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εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας συναναλῶσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν 9 ἐκάτερος ἐκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιούντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὐ. αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰντὰ γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια ἐκατέρῳ παρ' ἐκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν·

- 4 Ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι διαμένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίγνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὀρῶν ἐκείνῳ, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει· τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέϊα ἡ ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία. πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, εἰς τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἦθη στέρ-
2 ζῶσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἡττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαῦλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαῦλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιοῦν, δι' αὐτοὺς

8 τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας] 'The salt of the proverb;' cf. *Eth. Eud.* vii. ii. 35: διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμος τῶν ἄλων. Cicero, *Laelius*, ch. xix.: 'Verumque illud est quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit.'

οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ—φίλους] 'Nor indeed can they be satisfied that they are friends at all.' Cf. viii. v. 3: οἱ δ' ἀποδέχμενοι ἀλλήλους. ix. iii. 3:

εἰάν δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν. Xen. *Mem.* iv. i. 1: ἀποδέχεσθαι Σωκράτην.

9 εἰ μὴ—ἴσασιν] 'Unless they are likeable (by one another), and are assured of this.'

IV. 2 καὶ εἰς ἡττον—διαμένουσιν] 'Are both friends in a less degree and are (less) abiding.'

καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιοῦν] 'And he who is neither good nor bad may be a friend

δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μὴ τις ὠφέλεια γίγναιτο. καὶ μόνῃ δὲ ἡ τῶν 3 ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιάβλητος ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑπ' αὐτῶν δεδοκιμασμένου. καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλίᾳ ἀξιούται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρή- 4 σιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἶδῃ δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρῶτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ ὅμοιον, ταύτῃ φίλοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὐταὶ συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται 5 οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰς ταῦτα δὲ 6 τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται

either to the good or to the bad, or to him who is neither one nor the other. For the word *μηδέτερος* to express a neutral or intermediate state, cf. *Eth.* VII. xiv. 5 : τὸ *μηδέτερον*, 'that which is neither pleasure nor pain.'

3 καὶ μόνῃ δὲ—*γίνεσθαι*] 'And in short, the friendship of the good is alone incapable of being disturbed by accusations. For it is not easy (for the good) to believe any person about a man whom they have long proved. And the sayings about "having faith," and that (the friend) "never could wrong one," and all the other points which are demanded in ideal friendship, are realised in the friendship of the good. But in the other kinds nothing prevents disturbances from accusations (τὰ τοιαῦτα) arising.' Διαβάλλειν is 'to set two people by the ears.' Cf. Plato, *Repub.* p. 498 c :

μὴ διάβαλλε ἐμέ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἀπὸ φίλους γεγονότας.

4 ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ ὅμοιον, ταύτῃ φίλοι] 'For so far as (these kinds of friendship exhibit) something good and resembling the good, so far (those who exercise them) are friends.' The commentators are again deceived by the word *ὅμοιον*, taking it to mean 'similarity of character.' See above, ch. iii. § 7, note.

5 οὐ πάνυ—*συμβεβηκός*] 'But the above-mentioned kinds of friendship do not always coincide. Nor do the same men become friends for the sake of the useful, as for the sake of the pleasant. For things only accidentally connected are not always found together.' On *συμβεβηκός*, cf. *Ar. Met.* IV. xxx. 1 : *συμβεβηκός λέγεται ὁ ὑπάρχει μὲν τινι καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι οὐτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.* See also below, § 6.

φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκείνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ ὁμοιωσθαι τούτοις.

- 5 Ὡσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ' ἑξίν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τὰγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. εἰάν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται

πολλὰς δὲ φιλίας ἀπροσγηγορία δίδυσι.

- 2 οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὐθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεῖν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ
3 ἡδέος. οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὖνοις ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὥς τὸ συζῆν· ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεῖν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει. συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχειν.
4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φίλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ'

6 ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες] 'In this respect (i.e. as affording and seeking pleasure or utility) being like (the good).'

V. 1 οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες—ἐνέργειαν] 'But those who are asleep, or who are separated by the intervals of space, do not exercise friendship, though they have all the disposition to exercise it. For the intervals of space do not destroy friendship, but only its exercise.' This is of course a most inadequate

translation of ἐνεργεῖν and ἔχουσιν. These words must be understood by a study of Aristotle's forms of thought. See Vol. I. Essay IV. On the ἐνέργεια of friendship, cf. *Éth.* IX. ix.

3 οἱ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους] 'They who are satisfied with one another.' Cf. above, VIII. iii. 3.

ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχειν] 'And this (i.e. pleasure and sympathy) seems the property of companionship.'

4 ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἀμφοῦ ταῦτα] 'Now the good man (is a

ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἅμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε δ' ἡ μὲν φί-
λῃσι πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἔξει· ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἦττον
πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως,
ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἔξεως. καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς
φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἔξιν.
καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ
ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ὥ φίλος. ἐκάτε-
ρος οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἡ ἰσότης.

Μάλιστα δὴ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύθ' ὑπάρχει. ἐν δὲ 6
τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἦττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία,
ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἦττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν.
ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας.
διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ
γίνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυ-

friend) to the good man for the sake of both these things' (i.e. the absolutely good and the absolutely pleasant).

5 *εἔοικε δ'—ἔξει*] 'Loving is like an emotion, but friendship like a settled disposition of the mind. For loving exists just as well towards inanimate objects; but when men reciprocate friendship it implies purpose, and purpose proceeds from a settled disposition of the mind.' In *Eth.* iv. vi. 5 (cf. II. v. 2), Aristotle makes friendship to be an emotion, or characterised by emotion. The present passage does not in the least contradict this, as *ἔξει*, or a settled disposition of mind, is merely the result of regulated emotions, and the tendency to reproduce them.

ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις, κ.τ.λ.] In *Eth.* III. ii. 1, Aristotle speaks of 'purpose' as the test of character; *ib.* § 11, as constituting character; *ib.* § 2, as not acting suddenly; *ib.* § 17, as implying reason and forethought.

ἐκάτερος—ἡδεῖ] 'Each of the two then loves that which is a personal

good to himself, and he makes an equal return both in wishing good and in (actual) pleasure.' Zell, following two MSS., reads *εἰδει*. But Bekker's reading (*ἡδεῖ*) appears preferable: (1) because *ἴσον εἰδει* would not be a natural expression; it confounds *degree* with *kind*; we should expect *ταῦτόν εἰδει*; (2) because *ἡδεῖ* gives very good sense, since it is one thing to reciprocate the motives or feelings of friendship, and another to give your friend the same amount of pleasure as he gives you.

λέγεται—ισότης] 'For equality is said to constitute friendship.' A Pythagorean saying, connecting moral ideas with the ideas of number. Cf. *Diog. Laert.* VIII. i. 8: *εἰπέτε πρώτος (ὡς φησι Τίμαιος) κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι· καὶ φιλίαν ἰσότητα.*

VI. 1. This section is an awkward repetition of what has been said before, ch. v. § 2. This, however, merely shows that we have probably the uncorrected draft of Aristotle's treatise on Friendship.

φνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλον-
ται γὰρ τὰγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ
πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἃ
2 δὴ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικὰ. πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ
τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πολλῶν
ἅμα· ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα πέφυκε
γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ
3 ῥάδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν
λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. διὰ τὸ
χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ
4 γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι. τούτων
δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν ταῦτα ὑπ' ἀμ-
φοῖν γίγνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οἵαι
τῶν νέων εἰσιν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευ-
θέριον. ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. καὶ οἱ μακά-
ριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ. συζῆν μὲν
γὰρ βούλονται τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον φέ-
ρουν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐθεὶς ἀν' ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγα-

2 πολλοῖς—εἶναι] 'It is not possible to be a friend to many men on the footing of the perfect kind of friendship, just as one cannot be in love with many at the same time. For (the perfect friendship) is a sort of excess of feeling, which naturally arises towards one person alone; again, it is not easy for many persons to be intensely pleasing to the same individual, and perhaps not easy that many should be good.' ὑπερβολή here would be nearly represented by the French word *abandon*; it implies the throwing away of limits and restraints, a giving up of one's whole self. Cf. IX. iv. 6: ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. Of course there is an association of Aristotelian ideas (*μεσότης*, *ἡλλειψις*, &c.) in the term. It is repeated *Eth.* ix. x. 5, where the question of the plurality of friendships is carefully gone into.

3 πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται] We should have expected πολλοὺς ἡμῶν ἀρέσκειν, on the analogy of the last sentence, πολλοὺς τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν, but the writing seems careless and the expression is inverted.

οἱ τοιοῦτοι] i.e. the useful and the pleasant. Cf. § 6, where τοιοῦτοι again takes its sense from the context.

4 ἀγοραίων] 'Of mercenary persons.' Cf. *Ar. Pol.* iv. iv. 10: λέγω δ' ἀγοραίων (πλήθος) τὸ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ὠὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρίβον. *Ib.* vi. iv. 12: ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλήθος τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικόν.

χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται] i.e. Happiness by its definition implies a sufficiency of external means, *Eth.* i. viii. 15.

οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν] If Aristotle had been capable of a

θόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἶη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν
 δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιοῦτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς·
 οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. οἱ δ' ἐν 5
 ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διηρημένοις φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις·
 ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἅμφω δ'
 οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πᾶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε
 χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλὰ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ
 ἡδέος ἐφίεμενοι, τοὺς δὲ δεινούς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν· τᾶντα
 δ' οὐ πᾶν γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος 6
 ἅμα εἶρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ
 τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἂν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
 οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πᾶν δ' εἰώθασι
 τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλῖαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ 7
 γίγνεται ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἥ ἕτερον

joke, we must have considered this to be meant as such. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of the Absolute Good as painful. But the argument is given in a merely matter-of-fact way. See Vol. I. Essay III. p. 216.

δεῖ δ' ἴσως—αὐτοῖς] 'And perhaps (in seeking friends) one ought (to require) that even good men should have this qualification (i.e. pleasantness), and moreover not in a merely universal way, but relatively to oneself.'

5 οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς—φίλοις] 'Great potentates' (cf. *Eth.* I. v. 3), 'however, seem to make use of their friends separately;' i.e. they keep two sets of friends, one for profit or business, and another for pleasure.

6 ἡδὺς δὲ—γίνεσθαι] 'Now we have already said that the good man is both pleasant and useful at once. But such a man does not become a friend to his superior (in rank), unless he be surpassed (by that superior) in virtue also. Else he does not find

himself in that position of equality which is produced by superiority in proportion to merit. Such persons however (as potentates who surpass the good in virtue), are not produced every day.' The commentators have strangely interpreted this passage, making ὑπερέχων take for its nominative ὁ ὑπερέχων, as though Aristotle had said that a good man would not be a friend to a potentate, if that potentate had superior moral qualities; and as though 'equality' were produced by one man having all the merit and another all the power. On the contrary, Aristotle would have said that 'proportionate equality' is produced, according to the principles of distributive justice, by each man having in proportion to his merits; cf. *Eth.* v. iii. 6; *Pol.* III. ix. 15. There is no sense of inequality produced by the position of a man socially exalted, if he be also exalted in intellect and character; inequality is felt when a fool or a villain occupies a high social position. Cf. *Pol.* III. ix. 15:

ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἀντικαταλλάττονται, οἶον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας. ὅτι δ' ἦττον εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταύτου εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει ἡ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κακείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.

- 7 Ἐτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, οἶον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτὰ φιλοῦσιν.
- 2 Ἐτεροι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ταῦτά μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίγνεται ἐκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ αὐτοῖς τοῖς γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν αὐτοῖς τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὐσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἶον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίγνηται, τότε γίγνεται πῶς ἰσότης ὁ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

- 3 Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρῶτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρῶτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν δευ-

Διόπερ τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέεσσι πλείον—ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσιν, κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις.

7 εἴρηται] Cf. VIII. iii. 2-3.

VII. 2 ἀνάλογον δ'] The same principle of distributive justice, main-

tained above in § 6 of the last chapter, is again appealed to. Where friends are not equal, their friendship must be regulated by proportion.

3 οὐχ ὁμοίως — δευτέρως] 'But equality seems to stand differently in justice and in friendship. In justice

τέρως. δῆλον δ', εἰν πολὺ διάστημα γίγνηται ἀρετῆς ἢ 4
κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσίν,
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιούσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν·
πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτοις ἀξιούσιν εἶναι
φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφω-
τάτοις οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις 5
οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαι-
ρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ,
οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι 6
τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθὰ· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι
ἀγαθὰ. εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται
τὰ γαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἔστιν ἐκείνος·
ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. ἴσως
δ' οὐ πάντα· αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰ γαθὰ.

proportionate equality is primary, and quantitative equality secondary; in friendship, quantitative equality is the first, and proportionate equality the second consideration.' Distributive justice begins by presupposing inequalities between man and man, and by proportionate assignments it equalises these. Justice, however, cares little about bringing men to quantitative or exact equality. The latter kind of equality, at all events, is aimed at only in democracies, while the proportionate equality belongs to aristocracies and constitutional governments. Cf. *Ar. Pol.* vi. ii. 2. Friendship, on the other hand, begins by presupposing equality between the parties, and though a certain amount of inequality may be made up by proportionate assignment of affection, &c., yet a wide interval of inequality will render friendship altogether impossible.

5 ἀκριβὴς—οὐκέτι.] 'In such cases there is no exact definition up to what point friendship is possible;

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for after many deductions (from equality) have been made, friendship still abides; but when (the one friend) is far removed from the other, as, for instance, God is from man, there is no friendship any longer.' It is indeterminate at what point, if you go on diminishing equality, friendship will cease, just as, in the old puzzle, at what point the heap ceased to be a heap.

6 ὅθεν καὶ—τὰ γαθὰ.] 'From this the question has arisen whether friends wish for their friends the greatest of all goods, as, for instance, to be gods. For having attained this, they would no longer at all be friends to those who formed the wish, and therefore no advantage to them, for friends are an advantage. If, then, it has been rightly stated that the friend wishes all that is good to his friend for that friend's sake, it will be necessary for that friend to remain as he is, and then he will wish for him, being a man, the greatest goods. After all, perhaps, he will not wish

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- 8 Οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν, διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι
 2 δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δι' αὐτὸ δ' εἰκόασιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα· οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἃν του δέωνται· ὥς δὲ σημείω τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ. οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεικῶν καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὲ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία
 3 καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔναι γὰρ διδῶσαι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφοτέρω μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἰκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι, ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας, καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτούς, κἂν

him to have everything. For every one especially wishes for himself what is good.' Under the words ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ is included a question both as to fact and cause. Οὐδὲ γὰρ denies the fact and states the cause, which is that if we wished our friend to become a god, we should wish him to be in a position where he can no longer be our friend. The last sentence (ὥς δ' οὐ πάντα) qualifies the previous statement, and guards against the notion that any human friendship can be utterly disinterested and selfless. The same topic is fully discussed in the eighth chapter of Book IX.

VIII. 1-2 Though the essence of friendship consists rather in loving than in being loved, the mass of men

prefer the latter, as ministering to their vanity. Being loved is akin to being honoured. Parenthetically it may be observed that honour is sought not for itself but on account of things variously associated with it (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). (1) To be honoured by the great affords a hope of promotion. (2) To be honoured by the wise and good is an evidence to men of their own merits. Thus honour is desired as a means to the consciousness of virtue. Cf. *Eth.* I. v. 5: εὐκτασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ.

3 The active spirit of love, as opposed to the passive gratification of being loved, is exemplified by the case of mothers, who give their children

ἐκείνοι μὴδὲν ὦν μητρὶ προσήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων ἀρετῇ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι μάλιστα εἴεν φίλοι· 5 ἰσάζονται γὰρ ἂν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακλύουσι· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ' αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίγνονται φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· 6 ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρησίμον γίγνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὲς εἰδότη· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὦν, τούτου ἐφίμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἂν τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιοτέον, μὴδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθ' 7 αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἡ δ' ὁρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν·

to be brought up by other persons, and go on loving them, though not even recognised by them.

4-5 It is this active spirit of love which constitutes the virtue of friendship, and which causes us to praise those who are of a friendly disposition. This then explains what was above stated merely as a fact, *Eth.* VIII. i. 5. The same spirit serves as the equalising principle in unequal friendships, greater merit being met by greater love.

5-7 Friendship is based on equality and similarity, especially the friendship of the good. Friendships for

the sake of pleasure or profit seem rather based on contrariety, as, for instance, on the contrariety of riches and poverty. But, after all, one would say not that the contrary seeks its contrary, but that the contrary seeks the mean.

5 μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης] Cf. the *Lysis* of Plato, p. 214, quoted above upon ch. i. 6.

τῶν ἀγαθῶν—ἐπιτρέπειν] 'For the good will neither do wrong themselves, nor permit their friends to do it.'

7 ὁρεξις τοῦ μέσου] This phrase is in accordance with the pantheistic side of Aristotle's philosophy, attri-

τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄλλοτριώτερα.

- 9 Ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἐν ἀπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνία δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὥς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ συστρατιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις· καθ' ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία 'κοινὰ τὰ φίλων,'
2 ὀρθῶς. ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἐταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ' ἦττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ' ἐταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
3 φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἐκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὔξῃσιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερηῆσαι ἐταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὀθνεῖω, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὄντινουν ἄλλον. αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὥς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον
4 δῆκοντα. αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις ἐοικασί τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοι τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ

buting to nature a desire for the good. Cf. *De Animā*, II. iv. 3: πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου (τοῦ θεοῦ) ὁργεται, κἀκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν. *Eth.* X. ii. 4: ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φάουλαις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφέταται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ.

IX. 1 ἐν ἀρχῇ] *Eth.* VIII. i. 4.

περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς] 'About the same things, and in the same persons.' Cf. *Eth.* v. iii. 5: οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ἐν, δύο ἐστὶ, καὶ

ἐν οἷς τὰ πράγματα, δύο. *Pol.* III. ix. 3: τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

3 Αὔξεσθαι δὲ—διήκοντα] 'Justice of necessity becomes more binding as friendship becomes closer, for they exist in the same subjects, and are co-extensive in their application.'

4 αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι—βίον] 'All communities are like parts of the political community; for (the members of them) unite with a view to some advantage, and to providing some of the conveniences of life.'

κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχαζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν 5 οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιούτον, συστρατιῶται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται. ἐναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίγνεσθαι, θιασῶν καὶ ἐρασιστῶν· αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας. πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν εὐόκασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον, θυσίας τε ποιούντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχολάζον τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς 6 πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.

Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις, 10 οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασιλεία

5 θιασῶν καὶ ἐρασιστῶν] Cardwell refers for illustration of these terms to Demosthenes, pp. 313, 23; 403, 19; 1355, 3; 1217, 14.

By omitting, with Fritzsche, Bekker's full stop after συνουσίας, and by placing the words οὐ γὰρ—τὸν βίον in a parenthesis, we see that the participles ποιούντες, ἀπονέμοντες, πορίζοντες are to be referred to κοινωνοί, as implied in κοινωνιῶν above. The passage which speaks of men 'awarding honour to the gods, while providing recreation and pleasure for themselves,' is highly characteristic of the Greek religion. This sort of thing can perhaps be best understood in the present day by those who have

seen the religious festivals of the Hindus. Cf. Plato's *Republic*, p. 364 B: θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπφοδαῖς—μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐοργῶν.

X. This chapter, containing a classification of forms of government and of the perversions to which they are exposed, can hardly have been written after the *Politics* of Aristotle. It has rather the appearance of a first essay, the conclusions of which were afterwards worked out into detail, and partly modified. Thus Aristotle in the *Politics* by no means concedes the position that monarchy is the best form of government. He argues, *Pol.* III. xv. 4–16, that it is better for

τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἡ τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκείον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν² εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις δὲ βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλείστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἐαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπέρεχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος

a state to be governed by good laws than by the best individual will; further on, *Pol.* III. xvii., he qualifies this by admitting that for some peoples monarchy is better suited.

ἰ παρεκβάσεις] 'Perversions' or 'abnormal growths'; cf. *Pol.* III. vi. II, where a form of government is pronounced to be normal as long as it aims at the public good, abnormal when its end is private interest: φανερόν τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αἷται μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὁδοὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἡμαρτημέναι πᾶσαι καὶ παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν· δεσποτικαὶ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινῶν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν.

πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν] 'But most people are accustomed to term it "a constitution."' The word *politeia* was used by the Greeks in a restricted sense, just as the word 'constitution' is in English, to denote a balanced form of government. Cf. *Ar. Pol.* III. vii. 3: ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. Aristotle does not use the word in the *Politics* to denote a timocracy. In the ninth chapter of Book IV. he uses it to denote a mixed form between

oligarchy and democracy. He also uses it to express his own ideal of a state, which was far from being a timocracy.

2 ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεὺς] 'For he who had not these qualifications would be a sort of ballot-box king.' It is difficult to express the word *κληρωτός*, which as coupled with *βασιλεὺς* is certainly meant to be contemptuous. Aristotle does not appear to mean any definite form of monarchy, so we learn nothing from *Pol.* III. xiv., to which the commentators refer us. Aristotle here says that the genuine king must be independent in property and position, and above all his subjects in this respect. Externally wanting nothing for himself, he will administer the state for the good of his subjects. If this is not the case, he will be no genuine king, but a *parvenu*, *κληρωτός τις*, like a person who had been raised to the throne by the contingency of lot, and therefore insecure in his position, with perhaps only a temporary tenure of office. The word *ἀμισθός* is coupled with *μὴ κληρωτός* (as an epithet of *πενταρχίας*), *Pol.* II. xi. 7. It is possible that in the present passage a notion of 'paid services' may be implied. If so, 'hiring monarch' would express the terms under notice.

κληρωτὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεὺς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης· τὸ γὰρ ἐαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ 3 βελτίστω. μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γάρ ἐστι μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννὶς· ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμονται τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰετοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ δὴ τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται· πλῆθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστὶν ἡ δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεαὶ· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν 4 καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεὺς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννικὴ. χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσιν· τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότης πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότης συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστο- 5 κρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἀρμόζει, ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ἀμείνων. ἐνίστε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ κληροῖ οὐσαι·

4 τῶν διαφερόντων—διάφοροι] 'For those who differ should be governed differently.' And therefore the Persian system is wrong, which governs children as if they were the same as slaves.

5 γυναῖκες ἐπὶ κληροῖ οὐσαι] The

Greek feeling about 'heiresses' is strongly expressed in a fragment of Menander (LV.):

ὅστις γυναῖκ' ἐπὶ κληρὸν ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν πλουτοῦσαν, ἥτοι μὴν ἐκτὶναι θεῶν, ἢ βούλετ' ἀτυχεῖν, μακάριος καλούμενος.

οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον
6 καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατικῇ
δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γάρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον ταῖς
ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις
διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία
δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα
γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενῆς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ
ἐκάστω ἐξουσία.

- 11 Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ'
ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους
ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους,
εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν,
ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὁμηρὸς τὸν Ἀγα-
2 μέμοννα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρικὴ,
διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ
τοῦ εἶναι δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας·
καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν
πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασι-
3 λευόμενων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὐται, διὸ καὶ
τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτ'
4 ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὶ
δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ. κατ'
ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον
5 ἐκάστω· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ
ἐταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιωται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ'
ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ
καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται
βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ
6 ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν,
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία

XI. 3 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ—γονεῖς] 'All these friendships imply superiority on the one side, and hence it is that parents are honoured, i.e. because superiority demands honour, as well as love.

5 ἴσοι γὰρ—εἶναι] 'For it is the part of the citizens (in a timocracy) to

live equally and equitably with one another.' To understand the full meaning of ἐπιεικεῖς, see the fine passage from *Rhet.* I. xiii., translated in the note on *Eth.* v. X. i., and cf. IX. x. 6. βούλονται expresses a natural tendency, cf. VIII. x. 3: πλῆθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι.

ἐστί, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίσῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οἶον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δούλον· ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βούν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δούλον ἢ δούλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δούλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δούλος. ἢ μὲν 7 οὖν δούλος, οὐκ ἐστὶ φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλίας δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν 8 αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλείστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν.

Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἴρηται· 12 ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπολοῖκαί, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς εἰκόασιν μᾶλλον· οἶον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται πολυ- 2 εἰδὴς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἐαυτῶν τι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γενηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ τού-

6 ὠφελεῖται—δίκαιον] 'For though all these things receive benefit from those who make use of them, yet neither friendship nor justice is possible towards inanimate objects.' The corresponding passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* serves as a commentary on this: *Eth. Eud.* VII. x. 4: συμβάλει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ [e conj. Bonitz] ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἥτις δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐκεῖν ἐστι. The instrument receives just so much care from its master as will keep it in proper condition for the exercise of

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its functions. The slave, who is treated not as a person but as a thing, receives the same kind of attention. Friendship and justice imply the recognition of personality; they imply treating men not as instruments, but as ends in themselves. On the slavery of the body to the soul, cf. *Ar. Pol.* I. v. 6-8.

XII. 1 ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις] In saying that all friendships imply community of interests, an exception is to be made of the friendships of relations

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των, καὶ μᾶλλον συνφκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποίησαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἶον ὁδοὺς ἢ θρίξ ἢ ὅτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐθὲν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἦττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προσελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις τούτοις γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι' αὐτὴν φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες.

3 γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἶον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταῦτοποιεῖ· ὁθεν φασὶ ταῦτόν αἷμα καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

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ἀμείνων χείρονη, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον
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 κατ' ἰσότητά δὲ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς
 2 δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. γίγνε-
 ται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ
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 καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἢ χαρίεις,
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 4 ἐξὸν μὴ συνδιημερεύειν· ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική·
 ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις αἰετὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέον-
 ται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφον-
 ται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄν-
 τες· οἱ δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσῶτα ὅσων οἱ
 5 πᾶσχοι δέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διτ-
 τόν. τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ

2 τὸν γὰρ—εὖ δρῶν] 'No one takes
 it ill that one loves and benefits him,
 but, if he be of gentle mind, pays his
 benefactor back in good deeds.' The
 subject to ἀμύνεται is implied in
 οὐδεὶς. Fritzsche quotes Horace, *Sat.*
 I. i. I.

Nemo quam sibi sortem
Seu ratio dederit, seu fors objecerit, illā
Contentus vivat, laudet diversa se-
quentes.

χαρίεις has nothing to do with 'grati-
 tude.' It means much the same as is
 conveyed in the word 'gentleman.' Cf.
Eth. I. v. 4: οἱ δὲ χαρίεστες καὶ πρακ-
 τικοί. IV. viii. 9: χαρίεις καὶ ἐλεύθεροι.

5 ἔοικε—διαλῶνται] 'Now as jus-
 tice is twofold, the one unwritten, the

other according to law, so also of
 utilitarian friendship there appear to
 be two branches, the one moral and
 the other legal. The complaints then
 (which arise) chiefly take place when
 men do not conclude their connection
 in the same branch in which they
 commenced it.' συναλλάττειν is to
 make a contract, διαλῶνται to wind
 up a contract by the mutual perform-
 ance of the terms. Men who consider
 that they have entered upon a so-
 called friendship with a fixed stipula-
 tion (νομική) of certain advantages to
 be received, will complain if the fixed
 stipulation is denied, and only a gen-
 eral moral obligation (ἠθική) to render
 services is admitted.

χρήσιμον φιλίας ἢ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἢ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίγνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δὴ νομικὴ μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ 6 ῥητοῖς, ἢ μὲν πάνπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἢ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοῦκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας. ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ 7 δωρεῖται ἢ ὅτιδῆποτε ἄλλο. κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεόν, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ 8 συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλὰ, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα. καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετῆσθαι. δυναμένῳ 9

6 ἔστι—συναλλάξαντας] 'That which is on stated conditions then is legal (utilitarian friendship). One sort of it is wholly commercial, implying payment on the spot (ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα); another is more liberal, allowing time (εἰς χρόνον), but still on the understanding of a specified return. In this then the debt is plain and undoubted, but the delay which it admits of is friendly. Hence in some states no suits are allowed in cases of this kind, but men think that those who have contracted on faith should abide (by the issue).' ἀναβολή in commerce answers to 'credit'; cf. Plato's *Laws*, XI. p. 915 D: μὴδ' ἐπὶ ἀναβολῇ πρᾶσιν μὴδὲ ὧν ποιεῖσθαι. Or it may answer to buying or selling for future delivery. φιλικόν ('of the nature of friendship') stands here as a predicate. Cf. *Eth.* VIII. i. 4: τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

7-8 ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ—εὐεργετῆσθαι] 'On the other hand, the moral (branch of utilitarian friendship) is not on stated conditions, but the gift, or whatever else it be, is made as if to a friend.

Yet (the giver) claims to get as much, or more, as though he had not given but lent. And if he does not come off in the connection as well as he commenced, he will complain. Now this (sort of disappointment) takes place because all or most men *wish* that which is noble, but *practically choose* that which is expedient. It is noble to do good not with a view to receive it back, but it is expedient to be benefited.' This passage discriminately exposes a sort of vacillation between disinterestedness and self-interest, which occurs in utilitarian friendships. A man at one moment thinks vaguely (βούλεται) of aiming at the noble, and makes a gift as if he expected no return. But presently the more definite bent of his mind (προαίρεσις) reverts to the profitable, and he claims to get back as good as he gave. On the distinction between βούλεσθαι and προαιρεῖσθαι cf. *Eth.* III. iv. 1, v. ix. 6, and the notes.

9 δυναμένῳ δὴ—ἢ μὴ] 'If one is able, then one ought to pay back the full value of what one has received ;

δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν,† καὶ ἐκόντι· ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον. ὥς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρωντος· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον. καὶ ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ δοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν· ὥστ' εἰ δυνατός, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ 10 ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένη ἢ μή. ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν 11 κινδύνους ἢ τοιαύταις χρεῖαις. ἅρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἢ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσῃν· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέλῃται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπὶ ἡράτο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν

for one must not make a man a friend against his will (i.e. treat him as if he were disinterested, when he did not really mean to be so). (One must act) as if one had made a mistake at the outset, and had received a benefit from one whom one ought not to have received it from, that is to say, not from a friend, or from some one doing a friendly action: one must conclude the business therefore as if one had been benefited on stated conditions. And (in this case) one would stipulate to repay to the best of one's ability;— if one were unable, not even the giver could demand it; so in short, if one is able, one should repay. But one ought to consider at the outset by whom one is benefited, and on what terms, so that one may agree to accept those terms or not.' The words

καὶ ἐκόντι are omitted in the above translation. They are left out by two of the MSS., and while they merely interrupt the sense of the passage, they may easily be conceived to have arisen out of the following words, ἄκοντα γάρ. The passage prescribes the mode of dealing with a person who having conferred a benefit (as described in the last section) expects a return for it. The accusative case διαμαρτόντα is governed by the verbal adjective διαλυτέον which follows; cf. *Εἰλ.* VII. i. 1: λεκτέον ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχὴν. Some editions read ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν, which the commentators explain to be governed by δεῖ as implied in the verbal adjectives ἀνταποδοτέον, διαλυτέον.

11 ἅρ' οὖν—πλέον] 'Surely, as the friendship is for the sake of utility,

ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.

Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις· ἀξιοὶ 14 γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλεόν ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίγνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἶεται γὰρ ὁ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλεόν ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλεόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἰονται γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνία πλείον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλείον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῃ ἢ δυνάστη φίλον εἶναι, μὴθὲν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; ἔοικε 2 δὲ ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιῶν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλεόν νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς, τῷ δ' ἐνδεεὶ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ 3 γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ διδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὴ

the benefit accruing to the recipient is the gauge (of what is to be repaid). For he (the recipient) is the asking party, and (the other) assists him on the understanding that he will receive the same value. The assistance rendered then is exactly so much as the recipient has been benefited; and he ought therefore to repay as much as he has reaped, or even more.'

XIV. 1 *διαφέρονται*] 'Men have differences' in those friendships which are contracted between a superior and an inferior. Aristotle says that these differences ought to be settled by both

parties respectively getting more than each other; the one receiving more money or good, the other receiving more honour.

3 *οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν—ὑπομένει*] 'For it is not allowable that a man should at once gain money and honour out of the public, for no one endures to have the inferior position in all points.' This notion, that the state-officers should have *either* pay or honour, but not both, is expressed before, *Eth.* v. vi. 6-7. It is drawn from the Athenian ideas of liberty and equality, but is hardly in accordance with the practice of the modern world.

περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δω-
 ροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σώζει
 τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις
 ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν
 4 τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀνταποδιδόντα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. τὸ δυ-
 νατὸν γὰρ ἢ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ
 τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίη, εἰς
 δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κἂν δό-
 ξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι νύφ' πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν·
 ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐθὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν
 ὑπηρεγμένων δεδρακεν, ὥστ' αἰεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται,
 ἐξουσία ἀφείναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὴ. ἅμα δ' ἴσως οὐδεὶς
 ποτ' ἂν ἀποστήναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίᾳ· χω-
 ρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ
 διωθέισθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρ-
 κεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὐ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται,
 τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἄλυσιτελέες. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων
 ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

4 ἀπείπασθαι] 'To disown.' Card-
 well quotes Herodotus i. 59: *εἰ τίς οἱ*
τυγχάνει ἐὼν παῖς, τούτον ἀπείπασθαι.
 Demosthenes 1006, 21: (ὁ νόμος) τοὺς
 γονεῖς ποιεῖ κυρίους οὐ μόνον θέσθαι
 τοῦνομα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν
 ἐξαλείψαι ἐὰν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀποκηρύξαι.
 χωρὶς γὰρ—διωθεῖσθαι] 'For inde-
 pendently of natural affection, it is a
 human instinct not to reject the assist-
 ance (which he might derive from

his son).'
 διωθεῖσθαι is used in the
 same sense, *Eth.* ix. xi. 6.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
 εἰρήσθω] These words may have been
 written by Aristotle himself, with the
 view of dividing his treatise on Friend-
 ship into two books, of the same length
 as the books into which all his various
 writings are divided. Or, on the other
 hand, they may have been added, for
 the same purpose, by an editor.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ IX.

ΕΝ ΠΑΣΑΙΣ δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον
 ἰσάζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον
 καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων
 ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς.
 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ ²
 πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν
 δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν
 οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
 πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα
 ἡν οὐθὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὴν ὁ ³
 μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον
 τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει. διὰ ταῦτα
 γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὕσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὴν μὴ γίνηται
 ὡς ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρ-
 χοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦτα καὶ αἱ φιλῖαι. ἡ δὲ
 τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὐσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. διαφέ- ⁴

I. In heterogeneous friendships, equality is to be obtained by the rule of proportion. The same rule holds good in political economy, where the most heterogeneous products are equalised against one another. In political economy there is the convenience of a common standard, money, by which products may be measured. In friendship there is, unfortunately, no such standard.

I ἀνομοιοειδέσι] This is not quite the same as ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις. It implies relationships in which the two parties have respectively different objects in view, as, for instance, in the

case of the employer and the employed, the ἐρώμενος and the ἐραστής, &c.

καθάπερ εἴρηται.] Cf. *Eth.* VIII. xiii. 1.

ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ] By the modern division of sciences, Political Economy has been raised into separate existence, so as in its method to be entirely independent of, and in its results subordinate to, Politics. On the Aristotelian theory of the law of value in exchange, see *Eth.* v. v. 8, and note.

3 ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν] 'Moral friendship,' or 'friendship based on character,' the same as ἡ καθ' ἀρετὴν φιλία. Cf. *Eth.* VIII. xiii. 11: ἐν δὲ ταῖς καθ' ἀρετὴν—τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡθους,

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ρονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίγνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὦν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μὴθὲν γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν οὐ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρωδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἧν δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει ὁ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὦν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κακείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. 5 τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ προϊέμενου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ' ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἀξία ἐπί-

κ.τ.λ. Of course the above terms have nothing to do with the 'moral' branch of utilitarian friendship, mentioned *Eth.* VIII. xiii. 5, 7.

4 *οἶον*—[ἐφη] 'As in the case of him who promises (a reward) to the harper, and "the better he sang, the more he should have," but when the man next morning demands the fulfilment of his promises, said that "he had paid pleasure for pleasure "' (i.e. the pleasure of hope for the pleasure of hearing music). The present tenses *ἐπαγγελλόμενος*, *ἀπαιτοῦντι*, seem to imply an oft-repeated and current story. The story itself is repeated by Plutarch (*De Alexandri Fortuna*, II. 1), where the trick is attributed to Dionysius. Διονύσιος γοῦν ὁ τύραννος, ὡς φασί, κιθαρωδοῦ τινος εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἀκούων ἐπηγγελλάτο δωρεὰν αὐτῷ τάλατον· τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν ὑπόσχασιν ἀπαιτοῦντος· χεῖς, εἶπεν, εὐφραίνόμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ παρ' ὃν ἦδες χρόνον, εὐφράνα κάγώ σε ταῖς ἐλπίσιν· ὥστε τὸν μισθὸν ὦν ἑτερπες ἀπελάμβανες εὐθύς, ἀντιτερόμενος.

ὦν γὰρ δεόμενος—[δώσει] 'For a man sets his mind on the things he happens to want, and for the sake of that he will give what he himself possesses.'

The beginning of the sentence (*ὦν γὰρ δεόμενος*) is a general statement, the words *κακείνου γε* contain an application of the general statement to a particular case.

5 *τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ—τοσούτου*] 'But whose part is it to settle the value (of a benefit),—is it the part of the giver in the first instance, or of the recipient? (One would say it was the part of him who was the recipient in the first instance), for the giver seems to leave it to the other. Which they mention Protagoras as doing, for whenever he taught anything he used to bid the learner estimate "how much worth he thinks he has learnt," and he used to take exactly so much.' ὁ προϊέμενος is used in a peculiar sense here to denote 'qui prior donum dedit,' in opposition to ὁ προλαβών (or ὁ προέχων, § 8), 'qui prior ab altero accepit.' Protagoras was said to be the first philosopher who taught for money. He probably found it not disadvantageous to assume a high and liberal attitude towards his pupils. On the wealth which he amassed by teaching, see Plato's *Meno*, p. 91 D, and above, Vol. I. Essay II. p. 119.

στασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσούτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' 6 ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ 'μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί.' οἱ δὲ προλαβόντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἴτα μηθὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν, διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ' ἴσως 7 ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηθένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθὸν μὴ ποιοῦντες, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσιν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίγνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δὲ αὐτοὺς προέιμενοι εἶρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία. τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν· αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρημαθ' ἢ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο,

6-7 ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις—ἐπίστανται] 'In such matters some like the principle of "a stated wage." Those, however, who take the money beforehand, and then do nothing of what they promised, are naturally blamed in consequence of their excessive promises, for they do not fulfil what they agreed. But this course the Sophists are perhaps obliged to adopt, because no one would be likely to give money for the things which they know.' Protagoras had no fixed price for his teaching; he left it to the pupil. But some people prefer having terms settled beforehand, *μισθὸς εἰρημένος*, as it is called in the line of Hesiod (*Works and Days*, v. 368): *Μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἀρκίος ἔστω*. It is the perversion of this when men take the money beforehand, and then fail in performing that which was paid for. The Sophists (says Aristotle with severe irony) are perhaps *obliged* to insist on payment beforehand, on account of the utter worthlessness of their teaching. Aristotle contrasts the conduct of Protagoras (of whom he speaks honourably) with that of

'the Sophists' after the profession had become regularly settled.

7 ἐν οἷς δὲ—φιλία] 'But supposing there is no agreement with regard to the service rendered—then, in the first place (οἱ μὲν), with regard to those who give purely for personal reasons, we have said that *they* are free from all chance of complaint; for this is the mode of virtuous friendship.' δὲ αὐτοὺς is more of a logical than a grammatical formula, and would be represented by *per se* in Latin. This phrase and καθ' αὐτοὺς are frequently used by Aristotle to characterise the highest kind of friendship, which is an 'absolute' feeling. *Eth.* VIII.iii.1: οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν. In the following section, ἐπὶ τινι, 'for some external object,' is contrasted with δι' αὐτοὺς, 'that which looks to the personal character alone.' Cf. ix. x. 6: δὲ ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς (φιλία) οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλοὺς.

οὕτω δ' ἔοικε—ἐνδεχόμενον] 'And thus it seems that they ought to act who are made partakers in philosophy (i.e. they should measure the benefit

ἀλλ' ἴσως ἰκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς,
 8 τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὐσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ'
 ἐπὶ τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι
 δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαί-
 νοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου
 τὴν ἡδονὴν εἴλετ' ἂν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἔξει τὴν παρὰ
 9 τούτου ἀξίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμε-
 νον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας
 μὴ εἶναι ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθά-
 περ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφη, τοῦτον οἶεται δικαιο-
 τερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ
 τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ
 γὰρ οἰκεία καὶ ἃ διδύασιν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια.
 ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τὰτ-
 τωσιν οἱ λαβόντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτου τιμᾶν ὅσου
 ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

2 Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πότερα δεῖ πάντα
 τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἱατρῷ
 πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν·
 ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπονδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐερ-
 γέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ δοτέον, ἐὰν
 2 ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχῃται. ἄρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκρι-
 βῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥάδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας
 ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ

received by the intention of their teacher), for the worth of philosophy is not measured against money, and no amount of honour can balance it. But, perhaps, as also towards the gods and one's parents, it is enough if one gives what one can.' Aristotle, perhaps mindful of the twenty years which he passed in the school of Plato, places very highly the spiritual dignity of teaching in philosophy. After *τοιαύτην* *εἶναι* is to be understood.

8 *μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὐσης*] 'In the second place, when the gift is not of this kind,' i.e. not *ἀ' αὐτούς*.

τὸν προέχοντα] 'The first recipient,' see above, § 5.

8-9 καὶ γὰρ *ἐν—ἐκοινώνησεν*] 'For this is what is done in the market (i.e. the buyer, who is the recipient, settles the price); and in some places it is the law that there must be no action on voluntary contracts, it being right that one should conclude with a person whom one has trusted on the same terms as those on which one entered on the contract with him.' Cf. *Ἠθλ.* VIII. xiii. 6: *κοινωνεῖν* here is used in the same sense as *συναλλάττειν* there.

καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ 3
 ἄδελον. καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
 πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἐταίροις, καὶ ὥσπερ δάνειον, ᾧ
 ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ 4
 τοῦτ' αἰεὶ, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερον τὸν
 λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὅστισούν ἢ, ἢ καὶ μὴ
 ἐάλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτ-
 ρωτέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα.
 ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν 5
 δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἢ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταύτ'
 ἀποκλιτέον· ἐνίστε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προὔπαρχὴν
 ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ
 δὲ ἢ ἀνταπόδοσις γίγνηται, ὃν οἶεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ
 γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίστε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει
 κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως
 ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἰόνται
 δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις 6
 εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως
 ἔχουσι τὸ ὠρισμένον τοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν εἶσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ
 ταῦτα πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ

II. 5 *ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται—ποιεῖν*] 'As I have said then, as a general rule the debt should be repaid, but if the giving (to some one else) preponderates in moral glory, or in the urgency of the case (over repaying), one must incline to this; for sometimes it is not even an equal thing to requite the former favour, (namely) when the one man knowing the other to be good has benefited him, but on the other hand, the repayment has to be made to one whom one thinks to be a scoundrel. For sometimes a man ought not even to lend money in return to one who has lent money to him. For he lent it to one who is good, thinking to get it back again, but the other does not hope to get it back again from a villain. If this be

the real state of the case, the claim is of course not equal: and even if it be not, but the parties only think so, such conduct does not seem unreasonable.' This and the other casuistical questions here discussed have very little interest.

εἴρηται] vide § 3.

προὔπαρχὴν] 'that which was pre-existing,' here 'primary obligation.' Cf. *Eth.* VIII. xiv. 4: *οὐθέν ποιεῖσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπεργγμένων.* *Eth.* IV. ii. 14: *οἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα προὔπαρχει.*

ὁ μὲν—τῷ δὲ] These words, by carelessness of writing, refer to the same subject.

εἴτε τοίνυν—εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ] This double protasis, instead of having as usual only one, has a double apodosis.

6 *ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται*] Cf. *Eth.* I. iii. 1; II. ii. 3, and above, § 2.

- 7 οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδῃλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἐταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἐκάστοις τὰ οἰκεία καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τοῦτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστα' οἶονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς
- 8 ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταῦτό. δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστα' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὢν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν. καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί· οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητ-
9 ρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις. πρὸς ἐταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφούς παρρησίαν καὶ ἀπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὴ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅσιν αἰεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκειότητα
- 10 καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥάων ἢ κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχῃται, οὕτω διοριστέον.
- 3 Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ

οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται] 'Not even to Zeus are all things indiscriminately sacrificed.' It is given as an illustration of conventional right, *Eth.* v. vii. 1, that goats and not sheep are sacrificed to Zeus.

7 καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη—διὰ ταῦτό] 'And for the same reason men think that relations ought especially to meet at funeral ceremonies.'

8 τροφῆς ἐπαρκεῖν] 'To furnish subsistence.' Fritzsche quotes Xenophon, *Memor.* II. vi. 23: δύναται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον—κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις.

9 ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει] 'Rising up to greet them, and conducting

them to the seat of honour.' Cf. Plato, *Repub.* p. 425 A: σιγάς τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ὡς πρέπει, καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.

10 τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥάων ἢ κρίσις] i.e. it is easy to compare a relation with a relation, a tribesman with a tribesman, &c., but to compare a tribesman with a relation would be more troublesome.

III. 1 πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας] 'who do not continue the same.' Cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 3: ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τῆς.

ἐγκαλέσειε δ'—ἦθος] 'But one might complain if a man who liked one for

χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὦν ἀπολιπόντων εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, πλείστα διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὥσι φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φι- 2 λείσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηθὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἐαυτὸν αἰτιῶντ' ἂν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ κακουργία. εἰ δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ 3 μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἂρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τὰγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρή εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιόσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἂρ' οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένει ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὲς- 4 τερος γένοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἄρα χρηστέον φίλῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα

profit or pleasure pretended to like one for one's character.'

ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ] This observation, that 'differences arise when men are not really friends to each other in the way they think,' has never been exactly made before. The commentators variously refer us to *Eth.* VIII. iii. 3, VIII. iv. 1, and IX. i. 4, none of which passages correspond.

2 ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις] 'Whenever one is mistaken,' i.e. by his own misconception. Cf. *Ar. Metaph.* III. iii. 7: βεβαιωτάτη δ' ἀρχὴ πασῶν περὶ ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον. The word

διαψευσθῇ answers to *διαμαρτάνει* in *Eth.* VIII. xiii. 9.

κιβδηλεύουσιν] To counterfeit friendship, says Aristotle, is worse than counterfeiting the coinage. The commentators quote *Theognis*, vv. 119 sqq., where the same maxim occurs.

3 οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ] The MSS. vary extremely about the reading of this passage, in which there is evidently something wrong. *οὔτε δεῖ* is at all events an interpolation. Fritzsche thinks that the whole is a double gloss upon *φιλοπόνηρον*.

ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι] 'To those who are capable of restoration.'

- δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένει τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἴεν φίλοι μήτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι.
- 5 συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἂρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δὲ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνεῖσι οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγεγεννημένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας ἢ διάλυσιν γένηται.
- 4 Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθῆναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλούμενον καὶ πράττοντα τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλούμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκροκότες. οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δὲ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν 2 ὀρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεκεί

4 ἀνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι] 'But without these things it is not possible, as we said, that they should be friends.' On this use of the past tense ἦν in reference to what has been previously said by the writer, cf. *Metaph.* xi. vi. 1: ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι. *Eth.* iii. v. 3: τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακοὺς εἶναι. v. i. 12: ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παρὰ νόμος ἀδικὸς ἦν, &c. Aristotle is here referring to *Eth.* viii. iii. 9; viii. v. 3.

IV. 1 ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες—προσκεκροκότες] 'Which mothers feel towards their children, and which friends who have had a rupture (feel towards each other),' i.e. they quite disinterestedly, since in the latter case intercourse is

precluded, wish each other to live. On the disinterested feeling of mothers, cf. *Eth.* viii. viii. 3. On the use of προσκρούειν, cf. *Politics*, ii. v. 4: οἱ πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκρούοντες ἀλλήλοις. ἐτι δὲ τῶν θεραπεύοντων τοῖς μάλιστα προσκρούομεν, οἷς πλείστα προσκρούμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους.

2 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν—εἶναι] 'The good man has every one of those feelings towards himself, and other men have them in so far as they set up to be good' (i.e. wherever they fall short in these feelings, they fall short also in their attempt to be good). 'For, as we have said, virtue and the good man are the standard for everything.' Cf. *Eth.* iii. iv. 5; x. v. 10.

ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι. ἔοικε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστω ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν 3 αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. ἕκαστος δ' 4 ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχει ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον, (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τὰγαθόν), ἀλλ' ὧν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ 5 βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνήμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικέι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν (ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς

4 ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται—μάλιστα] 'But every man wishes what is good for himself. No one, on condition of becoming another man, chooses that that new thing, which he should become, should possess everything (for God has now all good); but (every man desires to possess what is good) remaining his present self. And the thinking faculty would appear to be each man's proper self, or more so than anything else.' The usual punctuation of this passage has been altered to obtain the above translation, which has been suggested to the annotator, and which seems to give a more natural explanation of the text than has been arrived at by the commentators, who universally

explain ἀλλ' ὧν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν to refer to the unchangeableness or to the personality of God. If the passage be read as above, it will be seen that the words ὧν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν are in opposition to γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος. Aristotle says that to every man his personality is what is dear to him; he would not relinquish this to gain all the world, for by relinquishing it he would not gain anything. With a changed personality, he would no more possess any good thing, than he now possesses it because God possesses all good. All his wishes are made on the basis of being still what he is. The good man, who fosters his thinking faculty, most of all takes care of his proper self.

6 ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι
 φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν ταύτῃ
 εἶναι φιλία, ἥ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι
 7 ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. φαίνεται
 δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὐσι
 φαύλοις. ἄρ' οὖν ἡ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβά-
 νουσιν ἐπικεικὶς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν
 γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐθενὶ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει,
 8 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· δια-
 φέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα
 δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν

6 πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ—ὁμοιοῦται] 'But whether friendship towards oneself is, or is not, possible, we may leave undecided for the present. It would seem to be possible in so far as two or more of the above-mentioned conditions exist, and because the extreme of friendship resembles one's feelings towards oneself.' Several commentators explain ἥ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω to mean 'in so far as man consists of two or more parts,' and ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων they would translate 'in accordance with what we have before said,' referring to *Eth.* i. xiii. 9. In this sense the passage would be a parallel one to *Eth.* v. xi. 9. But it is clear from the next section that ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων refers to the definitions of friendship, given in § 1 of this chapter. ἀφείσθω is used as in *Eth.* i. 7, viii. viii. 7. We are not here referred to the subsequent discussion in *Eth.* ix. viii., where by no means the same subject is renewed.

8 Σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις—ἑαυτοῖς] 'But one might almost say that these things do not appertain to the bad at all. For they are at variance with themselves, and desire one set of things while they wish another, just like the incontinent; instead of what seems to them to be good, they

choose the pleasant though it is hurtful; and others through cowardice and want of spirit abstain from doing what they think to be best for themselves; and they who through wickedness have committed many crimes hate their life, and fly from it, and put an end to themselves.' The 'desire' of the wicked, as being of the particular and subject to the domination of the senses (*Eth.* vii. iii. 9), is at variance with their 'wish,' which is of the universal and implies a conception of the good. Cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 6, viii. xiii. 8. The description of bad men given here ignores and is at variance with the conclusions of Book vii. In that book the strength, and here the weakness, of vice is represented. Thus in *Eth.* vii. viii. the bad man is described as unrepentant, abiding by his purpose (§ 1), having the major premiss of his mind corrupted (§ 4), and therefore having no wish for the good, even in the universal. The account in Book vii., which makes ἀκολασία or abandoned vice free from all weakness, is more theoretical and less drawn from nature than the above description. All that is said here has a close relation to, and was probably suggested by, the words in the *Lysis* of Plato, p. 214 C: τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς, ὅπερ καὶ λέγεται

δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθὼν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι· οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, μισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ 9 μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιμερεύουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἐτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐθέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐθέν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν, τὸ δ' ἡδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκείσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδῆσθαι, 10 ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρὸν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἦσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπικεῖ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

Ἡ δ' εὖνοια φιλίᾳ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἐστὶ γε φιλία· 5 γίνεται γὰρ εὖνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώστας καὶ λανθάνουσα,

περὶ αὐτῶν, μηδέποτε ὁμοίους μὴδ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους.

9-10 στασιάζει — γέμουσιν] 'For their soul is in tumult, the one part of it, through viciousness, grieves at abstaining from certain things, but the other part is pleased (at this abstinence), and the one pulls this way, the other that way, as though tearing (the man) in pieces. If it is not possible to feel pain and pleasure at the same moment, at all events after a little while (the bad man) is pained that he felt pleasure, and he "could have wished that those pleasures had not

happened to him;" for the wicked are full of repentance.' This picture of the mental struggles of the bad does not recall either the phraseology or the doctrines of Book VII., where μοχθηρία is contrasted with, and opposed to, ἀκρασία (cf. VII. VIII. 1). The metaphor στασιάζει occurs repeatedly in Plato's *Republic*, cf. I. p. 352 A: (ἡ ἀδικία) ἐν ἐνι—ἐνούσα—πρώτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμοιοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. Cf. *Eth.* I. xiii. 15.

V. 1 Ἡ δ' εὖνοια—ἀκολουθεῖ] 'Now

- φιλία δ' οὐ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταύτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλησις ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ
 2 φίλῃσει δὲ ταύτ' ἀκολουθεῖ. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ
 συνηθείας, ἡ δ' εὖνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἶον καὶ περὶ τοὺς
 ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συν-
 θέλουσιν, συμπράττειν δ' ἂν οὐθέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν,
 3 εἴκοι δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς
 ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθéis τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐθεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ
 χαίρων τῷ εἶδει οὐθέν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα

good-will is like friendship, but yet it is not friendship, for good-will is exercised both towards unknown persons, and when its own existence is unknown (to the object), which is not the case with friendship. But all this has been said already. It is not even the same as loving; for it exhibits neither violence nor longing, which are the accompaniments of loving.' The Saxon word 'Good-will,' and not the Latin 'Benevolence,' which is too abstract and general, is the representative of *εὖνοια*. Good-will, says Aristotle, is engendered by the appearance of noble qualities; it is rapidly conceived, but is passive in its character, and is only the prelude of friendship. There being no correspondent adjective to the substantive 'Good-will,' we must express *εὖνα* by 'Well-disposed.' Just as in *Eth.* III. the cognate faculties to Purpose, and in *Eth.* VI. the cognate qualities to Thought are discussed, so Aristotle here introduces a discussion of the feelings which are cognate to Friendship.

καὶ πρότερον δὲ] VIII. ii. 3-4.

διάτασιν] 'Intensity,' 'straining,' 'violence.' In the previous section *διατεταμένως* means 'strenuously.' Cf. *Ar. Pol.* VII. xvii. 6: τὰς διατάσεις τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμούς, 'the violent passions and cryings of children.'

2 ἡ δ' εὖνοια — συμβαίνει] While loving implies acquaintance and familiarity, good-will is conceived instantaneously; thus men conceive good-will towards particular competitors in the games from their appearance, and are inclined to wish them success.

3 Good-will, says Aristotle, is the prelude of Friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the prelude of love. This however does not constitute love. The test of love is longing for a person in absence. Cf. *Ar. Rh.* I. xi. 11: where the same test is given. In accordance with the unhappy notions of the Greeks, *ἀπόντα* is here put in the masculine gender.

ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως] In Plato's *Cratylus*, p. 420 A, it is suggested that *Ἔρως* is derived from *εἰσπεῖν*. — *Ἔρως οὐτι εἰσπεῖ ἐξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οὐκεία ἐστίν ἡ βοή αὐτῇ τῷ ἔχοντι, ἀλλ' ἐπελσάκτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰσπεῖν ἔσρος τό γε παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο.* Cf. *Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice*, Act. III. Sc. ii.

'It is engendered in the eyes,
By gazing fed.'

And *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I. Sc. iii.
'I'll look to like, if looking liking move.'

οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον] 'Good-will' is essentially disinterested in its character.

ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷον τ' εἶναι μὴ εὖνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐθὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τὰγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράττειν δ' ἂν οὐθέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονίζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὖνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλούμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινα χρῆσιν. ὅλως δ' ἡ εὖνοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιεικείαν τινα γίνεται, 4 ὅταν τῷ φανῇ καλὸς τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται· διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν 6 ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν ἄν. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁπουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτα προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ 2 πρακτὰ δὲ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν.

VI. 1 φιλικὸν δὲ—ὁμοδοξία] 'Unanimity also appears to be of the nature of friendship; therefore it is not the same as agreement of opinion.' On φιλικόν, cf. *Eth.* VIII. i. 4; VIII. xiii. 6.

οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων] Cf. *Eth.* III. iii. 3: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀίδιων οὐδεὶς βουλευεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. Aristotle arrives at his definition of ὁμόνοια inductively, saying that we do not find the name applied to agreement of opinion in general, nor again to agree-

ment of opinion about every particular subject, but we do find it used of states whose citizens are unanimous on the measures to be adopted for the common weal. Hence we get the idea that unanimity is 'political friendship.' Cf. *Eth.* VIII. i. 4, where ὁμόνοια is used as the opposite of στάσις.

2 ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν] 'Or (if all agree) that Pittacus shall rule, (supposing this to be) during the period when he himself was willing to rule.' Pittacus, having held his

- ὅταν δ' ἐκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστ' ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν. οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίγνεται οὐ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ 3 ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπικεῖσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν· τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὐριπος, βουλονται τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, 4 τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαῦλους οὐχ οἶόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.
- 7 Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὐ παθόντες τοὺς δρᾶσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ

elective monarchy for ten years, resigned. Had the citizens *after* this period wished him to reign, his own will would have been wanting to make unanimity in the state.

οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις] Eteocles and Polynices. Cf. Eurip. *Phœnissæ*, vv. 588, sqq.

τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδῆποτε] The commentators illustrate this by the joke of the man who said 'that he and his wife had always perfectly agreed—in wishing to govern the house.'

3 ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, ὡς εἰπεῖν] 'Being on the same moorings, as it were,' as opposed to the ebbings and flowings of a Euripus. Cf. Demosthenes, *De Corona*, p. 319, § 281, οὐκ

ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμῇ τοῖς πολλοῖς, *sc. ἀγκύρας*.

4 This is a picture of the discord produced by evil passions, where every one grasping at the larger share in good things, and shirking his part in labours and services, watches (*ἐξετάζει*) his neighbour to prevent him encroaching. Thus men force each other to do what is right, while unwilling to do it themselves.

VII. Aristotle says, it is noticed as something extraordinary (ὡς παρὰ λόγον ἐπιζητεῖται) that benefactors seem to love those to whom they have done a kindness more than the benefited persons love them. The common explanation of the paradox

λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητείται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμέλονται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιυμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελές τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῶ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονητότας, κἂν μηθὲν ὥσι χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἂν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθεῖν ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου. μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεία

is, that benefactors look forward to obtaining a return for their kindness, they thus cherish the persons of those who are indebted to them. This selfish theory views mankind on the dark side (*ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους*), but is not altogether devoid of truth. A deeper (*φυσικώτερον*) reason, however, may be assigned for the phenomenon in question, namely, that as we can only be said to exist when we are conscious of our vital powers (*ἐσμέν ἐνεργεῖα*), so anything which gives or increases the sense of those powers is dear to us. The benefited person stands to the benefactor in the relation of a work to the artist, he is an exponent of the benefactor's self, and is thus regarded with feelings of affection, as being associated by the benefactor with the sense of his own existence (*στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι*). These

feelings, of course, cannot be reciprocated by the benefited person. Again, the benefactor associates an idea of the beautiful (*τὸ καλόν*) with the recipient of his good deeds; the other associates with him only an idea of the profitable, and this is a less loveable idea, especially when viewed in the past, and become a matter of memory. Again, the active part taken by the benefactor has more affinity to the active principle of loving.

1 *τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις*] This explanation is put by Thucydides (II. 40) into the mouth of Pericles: *βεβαίωτερος δὲ ὁ δρόσας τὴν χάριν ὥστε ὀφειλομένην δι' εὐνοίας ᾧ δέδωκε σώζειν. ὁ δ' ἀντοφελῶν ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ εἰς χάριν, ἀλλ' εἰς ὀφειλῆμα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσων.*

'*Επίχαρμος*] The words *ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους* seem to have been taken

4 ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔουκε
καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν
αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιή-
σαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἰρετὸν καὶ
φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργεῖα· τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν.
ἐνεργεῖα δὴ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ
ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶ
5 δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖα τὸ ἔργον μὴνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ
μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν
ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐθὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δρᾶσαντι, ἀλλ'
6 εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἦττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν. ἡδεῖα
δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἢ
ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἢ μνήμη. ἡδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ

out of some iambic or trochaic verse of the Sicilian poet, but the verse itself has not been preserved.

4 ταιούτῳ δὴ—μὴνύει] 'The case of benefactors seems then something of the same kind. For the object benefited is their "work;" they love this therefore more than the work loves him who made it. The cause of this is that existence is desired and loved by all, but we exist by consciousness, that is to say, by living and acting. Thus he who has made the work in question exists consciously, and therefore he loves the work, because he loves his existence. And this is a principle of nature; for that which exists potentially, the work proves to exist actually.' On this mode of paraphrasing *ἐνέργεια*, see Vol. I. Essay IV. Any work of art, or creation of the mind, or moral achievement, is here said to show us externally to ourselves. It causes us to exist *ἐνεργεῖα*, that is, not only *in* ourselves, but *for* ourselves. It thus becomes a union of the objective and the subjective. And this philosophical principle explains a whole class of homogeneous facts, not only the

feelings of benefactors towards the benefited, but of poets towards their poems, of parents, and especially mothers, towards their children; and of those who have made fortunes towards their property. These facts were brought together, without being analysed, by Plato, cf. *Republic*, p. 330 B-C. Cf. *Eth.* iv. i. 20.

ἐνεργεῖα δὴ—πως] Many commentators understand these words to mean 'Therefore by means of conscious activity the maker is in a sense his work,' in which they are supported by Eustratius and the Paraphrast. This would not materially alter the general drift of the passage.

6 ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ—μνήμη] 'Now of the present the living reality is sweet, of the future the hope, of the past the memory.' In two clauses of this sentence subjective words are used (*ἐλπίς* and *μνήμη*), but *ἐνέργεια* in the remaining clause hovers between the objective and the subjective. Cf. *Ar. De Memoria*, i. 4, where *αἰσθησις* is used in an analogous sentence: τοῦ μὲν παρόντος (*ἐστὶν*) αἰσθησις, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γενομένου μνήμη.

τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιη-
κότη μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ
παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν
καλῶν ἡδεΐα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάντῃ ἢ ἥττον· ἢ προσ-
δοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν φιλῆσις
ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν. τοῖς ὑπερ-
έχουσι δὴ περὶ τὴν πράξιν ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ
φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γινόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον 7
στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν
παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι,
τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες
φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον
ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις
οἰκεῖον εἶναι.

Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα 8
ἢ ἄλλον τινά· ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστα ἀγα-
πῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχροῦ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ
τε ὁ μὲν φῶλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ
ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον· ἐγκαλοῦσι δὲ αὐτῷ
ὅτι οὐθὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπικηρὶς διὰ τὸ καλόν,
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου
ἕνεκα· τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ 2

VIII. In this interesting chapter, Aristotle discusses the difficulty as to 'whether one ought to love oneself especially, or some one else.' On the one hand, 'self-loving' is used as a term of reproach; on the other hand, one's feelings towards oneself are made the standard for one's feelings towards friends. These two points of view require reconciliation, which may be effected by a distinction of terms. For the word 'self' has two senses—the lower and the higher self, the one consisting in appetites and passions, the other in the intellect and the higher moral faculties. He that gratifies his lower self at the expense of others is 'self-loving' in the bad sense of the term. He that ministers to his higher

self promotes at the same time the good of others, and is worthy of all praise. Such self-love as this may lead a man even to die for his friends or for his country. A man, grasping at the noble, may give up honour, power, life itself; and thus the greatest self-sacrifice will be identical with the greatest self-love. These considerations show in what sense one ought, and in what sense one ought not, to 'love oneself.'

ἢ ὡς ἐν αἰσχροῦ] 'As a term of reproach.'

οὐθὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει] 'He does nothing apart from himself.' 'Nihil a suis rationibus alienum.'

2 τοῖς λόγοις δὲ—οὐκ ἀλόγως] 'With these theories men's actions, not un-

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ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηθεὶς εἴσεται. ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ' ὧς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμῖαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογενωμονοῦσιν, οἶον τὸ 'μία ψυχὴ' καὶ 'κοινὰ τὰ φίλων' καὶ 'ἰσότης φιλότης' καὶ 'γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον.' πάντα γὰρ παῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλισθ' ὑτάρχει· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ, καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεὼν ἔπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων τὸ πιστόν.

3 ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φιλαντον πῶς ἐκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν

4 γένοιτο δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητὰ ἐστίν. οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος. δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδί-

5 ζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασιν λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδελον· εἰ γὰρ τις αἰὲς σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σῶφρονα ἢ ὅποια οὖν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς, καὶ ὅλως αἰὲς τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐθεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον

6 φιλαντον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φιλαντος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα

reasonably, are at variance.' To the list of the meanings of the word *ἔργον* given in the note on *Eth.* I. vii. 11, we must add the above use of τὰ ἔργα to mean 'actions' as opposed to theory. Cf. *Eth.* x. i. 3: οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν

εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων. x. viii. 12: τὸ δ' ἀληθές ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται. Aristotle says that men do not 'act' as if they considered self-love to be wholly bad, and he proves this by quoting popular proverbs, which support the contrary view.

τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστα· εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πεπραγένοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοῖ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπικὴς μάλιστα τούτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστα ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκούντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς 7 πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμειψόμενων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινόμενων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει· τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάπτει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φανλοῖς πάθεσιν ἐπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ 8 ἂ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἂ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπικὴς, ἂ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοὺς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ 9 σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἔνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέη ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχῃτα ἀγαθὰ,

6 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις—ἄνθρωπος] 'But as the predominant part (in a state) seems before all things to be the state, and as the predominant part in every other system seems to be that system, so (the predominant part in man seems, above all things, to be) man.' Cf. *Eth.* I. vii. 9: *δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον*. On the uses of the word *κύριος* cf. note on *Eth.* I. ii. 4; in the above passage τὸ κυριώτατον means

the 'most absolute,' the 'ruling' part. Cf. *Ar. Politics*, III. vii. 2: *πολιτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλοὺς*.

7 εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν] 'If virtue is one of the greatest of goods.'

8-10 The sentiments expressed in these sections may be compared with the elevated description of the self-sacrifice of the brave man in *Eth.* III.

- περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλοιτ' ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἡρέμα, καὶ βιώσαι καλῶς ἑνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πράξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἰροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοίντ' ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήφονται οἱ φίλοι· γίγνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ
 10 ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀρχᾶς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ τῶτα προήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προῖσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν
 11 πρᾶξαι τὸ αἷτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαντον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὥς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χροί.
 9 Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δέησεται φίλων ἢ μὴ. οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις

ix. 4-5. But we may particularly note here the delicacy of thought which suggests that the good man may on occasion give up to his friend the doing of noble acts, and thus acquire to himself a still greater nobility. A comparison is sometimes instituted between the *φιλανθία* of Aristotle and the 'self-love' of Bishop Butler. But the 'self-love' described by Butler is a creeping quality; it deals with means rather than with ends, and considers the 'interest' of man in this world or the next. Aristotle's *φιλανθία* is simply a devotion to what is great and noble.

IX. Does the happy man, who is all-sufficient in himself, need friends or not? To prove the affirmative of this question, Aristotle uses the following arguments:—

1 *A priori*, we might assume that, as happiness is the sum of all human goods, the possession of friends, one of the greatest of external goods, would necessarily be included (§ 2).

2 Friends will be required by the happy man, not so much as the givers, but rather as the recipients, of kindness.

3 We might assume also that the happy man should neither be condemned to be a solitary, nor to live with strangers and chance people (§ 3).

4 Those who take the negative side in the question have an unworthy conception of friends, as persons affording profit or pleasure. The happy man is almost independent of such (§ 4), but yet he may want friends in a higher sense. Happiness consists in the play of life (*ἐνέργεια*), and he that sees before his eyes the virtuous

καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰγαθὰ· αὐτάρκει-
 οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν
 ὄντα, πορίζειν ἅ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν τὸ

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δι' φίλων;

ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαί-
 2 μωνι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν
 μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ
 πᾶσχειν, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐερ-
 γετέιν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισο-
 μένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον
 ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὥς καὶ τοῦ
 ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν εὐτυ-
 χούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώ-
 3 την ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὐτὸν
 τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ
 συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ
 γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. δῆλον δ' ὥς μετὰ φίλων
 καὶ ἐπικειῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων

acts of a friend has a delightful sense of the play of life, seeing harmonious action and identifying it with himself (*ἐπικεῖς καὶ οἰκίας*, § 5).

5 Again, the sympathy and excitement of friends enables a man to prolong that vivid action and glow of the mind which is the essence of happiness (§§ 5-6).

6 It also confirms him in the practice of virtue (§§ 6-7).

7 Finally, a deeper reason may be assigned for the necessity of friends to the happy man; it depends on our love of life. That sympathetic consciousness (*συναίσθησθαι*) which we have of a friend's existence, by means of intercourse with him, is, only in a secondary degree (*παρὰ πρῶτον*), the same as the sense of our own existence.

1 αὐτάρκεσιν] The quality αὐτάρκεια is claimed for happiness, *Εἰλ.* i. vii. 6,

where Aristotle guards himself against the supposition that it implies a lonely life, and where he promises to return to the subject. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην' κ.τ.λ. 'Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον.

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων] from the *Orestes* of Euripides, 665, sqq.:

τοὺς φίλους
 ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρη τοῖς φιλοῖσιν ὠφελεῖν·
 ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;
 ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ὠφελεῖν θεῶν.

2 ἀπονέμοντας] 'Us who allot,' cf. *Εἰλ.* i. vii. 8, where happiness is said to be *τελείων τι καὶ αὐτάρκες*. The form of expression here used is similar to that in *Εἰλ.* i. x. 2: 'Ἡ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἀτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειαν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν;

- 4 συνημερεύειν· δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἶονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐθέν δεῖσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ. οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν· ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὧν οὐθέν δέεται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς. οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων
- 5 φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὴ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἄμφοι γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα. ὁ μακάριος δὴ

4 ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς] 'Adventitious pleasure,' 'pleasure introduced from without;' cf. *Eth.* I. viii. 12: οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Cf. *Eth.* X. vii. 3. The word *ἐπεισάκτος* occurs in Plato's *Cratylus*, p. 420 B, quoted above in the note on IX. v. 3.

5 ἐν ἀρχῇ—βῆῶν] 'For we said at the outset (*Eth.* I. vii. 14) that happiness is a kind of vital action, and it is plain that this arises in us, and does not exist in us like a possession. But if being happy consists in the play of life, and the actions of the good man are good and essentially pleasurable, as we said before (*Eth.* I. viii. 13), and also the sense of a thing being identified with oneself is one of the sources of pleasure, but we are able to contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves, and their actions better than our own, then the actions of good men being their friends are pleasurable to the good; for (such actions) contain both the two elements that

are essentially pleasurable. The supremely happy man then will require friends of this character, if he wishes to contemplate actions which are good and also identified with himself: and such are the actions of the good man being his friend. Again, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasurably, whereas life is painful to the solitary man, for by oneself it is difficult to maintain long a vivid state of the mind, but with others and in relation to others this is easier.'

The first part of this sentence contains a complex protasis, to which the apodosis is αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὴ, κ.τ.λ.

τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια] In the passage referred to (*Eth.* I. viii. 13) the words are αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, which may justify the above translation.

ἄμφοι γὰρ ἔχουσι] Some of the commentators take ἄμφοι as though it were the nominative case to ἔχουσι, and meant 'both the good man and

φίλων τοιούτων δεῖσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. οἴονται τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥίδιον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἐτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥῆον. ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὐτήν, 6 ὃ δὲ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἢ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ 7 ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεογνίς φησιν. φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἰρετὸς εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ' αὐτό· τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως·

his friend.' But it would be irrelevant to speak of the feelings of the friend. The question is, what advantage does the happy man get out of having friends? *ἄμφω* here evidently applies to τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα, as is further proved by the words *ἐπικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας* in the next sentence; it refers to what has gone before, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ—οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων.

6-7 ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος—φησιν] The good man, feeling the same sort of pleasure in the moral acts reciprocated between himself and his friend which the musical man feels in good music, will prolong and enjoy that reciprocation, and, as Theognis says, 'will learn what is good by associating with the good.' The advantage here attributed to friendship is that, by adding the element of pleasure to the best functions of our nature, it assists and develops them. Cf. *Eth. x. v. 2*: συναῖξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοκοδόμοι

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόσιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ.

καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς] On the 'moral sense' in its analogy to the 'musical ear,' cf. *Eth. x. iii. 10*.

7 τὸ δὲ ζῆν—νοεῖν] 'People define "living" in the case of animals by the power of sensation, in the case of men by the power of sensation or thought. But the word "power" has its whole meaning in reference to the exercise of that power, and the distinctive part of the conception lies in the "exercise." Thus the act of living appears distinctively to be an act of perceiving or thinking.' The train of reasoning in this latter part of the chapter is, that life consists in consciousness; life is good and sweet; consciousness is intensified, and life therefore is made better and sweeter, by intercourse with friends.

τοῖς ζῴοις] On the ascending scale of life from the plant to the man, cf. *De Animā, II. iii. 1-9, Eth. i. vii. 12*, and Vol. I. Essay V. p. 295.

ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὲ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὠρισμένοι γάρ, τὸ δ' ὠρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως. τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπικεικί· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ 8 εἶναι. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. † ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης 9 ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπικεικίς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανό-

ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται.] Cf. *Metaphysics*, VIII. ix. 5 : φανερόν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμεις οὗτα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὐρίσκειται.

διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι.] 'Wherefore it appears to be sweet to all,' i.e. of course ordinary individuals love life, in which there is a certain physical sweetness; cf. *Ar. Politics*, III. vi. 5 : Δῆλον δ' ὡς καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπαθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς. This Greek view of the sweetness of life contrasts with the philosophy of the Hindoos, which represents life as a burden, and individuality as a curse.

8 Οὐ δεῖ δὲ—φανερώτερον.] 'But one must not take (as an instance) a vicious and corrupt life, nor one in pain; for such a life is unharmonised, like its characteristics. In the following discourse the nature of pain will be made more clear.'

ἀόριστος.] 'Unlimited;' 'without law, balance, order, harmony.' On the use made by Aristotle of this Pythagorean formula, see *Εἰλ.* II.

vi. 14, and Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 252-257.

† Ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις.] This must be, after all (see Vol. I. p. 49), undoubtedly an interpolation. The editor probably had in his mind a confused reference to x. iii. 2.

9 Εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθόν.] This is the beginning of a complex protasis, which goes on prolonging itself, ὁ δ' ὁρῶν—τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, &c., till at last it finds its apodosis in § 10; καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φῶλον, ἢ παραπλησίως.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων—νοεῖν.] 'And with respect to all the other functions, in like manner there is something which perceives that we are exercising them, so then we can perceive that we perceive, and think that we think. But this (perceiving) that we perceive or think, is perceiving that we exist; for existing, as we said (§ 7), consists in perceiving or thinking.' *ἐνεργοῦμεν* is here used in a purely objective sense; the *ἐνέργεια* is here distinguished from the consciousness which necessarily accompanies it, and with

μενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ νοοῖμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν. τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό· φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζῶν, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ. αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ· συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡδονται. ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ ¹⁰ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετὸν ἐστὶν ἐκάστω, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἰρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος. ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἐστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνετο' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετὸν ἐστὶ καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὄν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν ἂν εἴη. ὁ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἰρετὸν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται. δείξει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.

*Ἀρ' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ ¹⁰ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρησθαι δοκεῖ

μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξιος,

which it is frequently identified. See Vol. I. Essay IV. The absolute unity of existence with thought here laid down anticipates the 'cogito ergo sum' of Descartes.

¹⁰ Συναισθάνεσθαι-νέμεσθαι] 'Therefore we ought to have a sympathetic consciousness of the existence of our friend, and this can arise by means of living together with him, and sharing words and thoughts with him, which is the true meaning of "living together" in the case of men; it does not mean, as with cattle, simply herd-

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ing in the same spot.' This view of the importance of 'intercourse,' and of the advantages to be derived from it, is repeated and summarised in ch. xii., and forms the conclusion of the treatise.

X. The question of the plurality of friends is brought under analysis in this chapter. The number of one's friends for use or for pleasure is shown to be limited by convenience. The number of one's friends, properly so called, is shown to be limited by one's

Q Q

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μήτ' ἀφελον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ
 2 πολύφilon καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὲ πρὸς χρῆσιν καὶ
 πάνν δοξοῖεν ἂν ἀρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπη-
 ρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς τοῦτο πρᾶτ-
 ται. οἱ πλείους δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶς
 περιεργοὶ καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθεν οὖν δεῖ
 αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκούσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν
 3 τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἡδυσμα. τοῖς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείσ-
 τους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλῆθος,
 ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ'
 ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ
 ποσὺν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν
 ὠρισμένων. καὶ φίλων δὲ ἔστι πλῆθος ὠρισμένον, καὶ
 ἴσως οἱ πλείστοι, μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν· τοῦτο
 4 γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι, ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἶον τε πολ-
 λοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ

incapacity to feel the highest kind of affection (*ὑπερβολή τις φιλίας*) for many individuals, and by the practical difficulties which would attend a close intercourse (*συζῆν*) with many persons at once, who would also have to associate harmoniously with each other. On the whole the question is answered in the negative.

1 *ἑμμελῶς εἰρησθαι*] 'Neatly expressed.'

μήτε πολύξεινος] From Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 713.

μηδὲ πολύξεινον μηδ' ἄξεινον καλέεσθαι.

The line is untranslatable into English, as we have no word (like the German *Gastfreund*) to express both 'host' and guest,' as *ξένος* does.

2 This section may be said to retract, upon further consideration, what was admitted, *Éth.* VIII. vi. 3: *Διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοιοί, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.*

ἱκανῶς] This reading, adopted by Bekker from a majority of MSS., is surprising; *ἱκανῶς περιεργοὶ* would not be a natural phrase, whereas the context really requires *οἱ πλείους δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν.*

3 *οὔτε γὰρ—πόλις ἐστίν*] 'For a state could not consist of ten men, nor again if consisting of a hundred thousand does it still continue to be a state.' This extremely limited idea of the size of a state is based on the Greek notion that each citizen must personally take part in the administration of affairs. On this hypothesis, a state consisting of a hundred thousand citizens might easily appear unwieldy. Aristotle in the *Politics*, VII. iv. 9, represents the state as an organism of limited size: *ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζώων, φυτῶν, ὀργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔχει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, κ.τ.λ.*

κίκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν. τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγκαίρειν καὶ 5 τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνηδесθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθесθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλότατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχесθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν 6 ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίγνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν

5 διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων] This is almost a *verbatim* repetition of *Eth.* VIII. vi. 2, which passage contains the germ of the present chapter.

6 οὕτω δ'—τοιοῦτον] 'And this seems to be practically the case; for we do not find that people have many friends (together) on the footing of companionship. And the 'classical friendships of story are recorded to have been between pairs. But they who have many friends, and who associate familiarly with all, seem to be friends to none, except in a civil way, and men call them "over-complaisant." In a civil way indeed it is possible to be a friend to many without being over-complaisant, but being really kind; but on a moral and personal footing this is not possible in relation to many; one must be content to find even a few worthy of this.'

ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων] Opposed to τοῖς λόγοις implied in τὸ λεχθέν above. Cf. the use of τὰ ἔργα, *Eth.* IX. viii. 2.

ἐταιρικῇ] Cf. *Eth.* VIII. xii. 1-6, and VIII. v. 3. 'Companionship,'

which Aristotle compares to the feeling between brothers, is much more akin to the perfect and ideal friendship than it is to either of the lower forms of friendship (for gain or for pleasure). It is essentially based on personal considerations (δι' αὐτούς), though not necessarily on moral considerations (δι' ἀρετὴν).

αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι] Fritzsche quotes Plutarch, *De Am. Mult.* 2: τὸν μακρὸν καὶ παλαιὸν αἰῶνα μάρτυρα ἅμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ σύμβουλον λάβωμεν, ἐν ᾧ κατὰ ζεῦγος φιλίας λέγονται Θησεὺς καὶ Περικλῆς, Ἀχιλλεὺς καὶ Πάτροκλος, Ὀρέστης καὶ Πυλάδης, Φωτίης καὶ Δάμωνα, Ἐπαμῶνδας καὶ Πελοπίδας.

οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι—οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι] Cf. *Eudemian Ethics*, VII. xii. 17: τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῶν καὶ εὐχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἀμφω λέγεται ὀρθῶς, which sentence reconciles the above passage with *Eth.* VIII. i. 5. In an external way (πολιτικῶς) a man should have many friends, personally (δι' αὐτούς) a few.

ἀρέσκους] Cf. *Eth.* II. vii. 13, IV. vi. 9.

- καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ
 2 πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν καὶ
 πάνυ δόξειεν ἂν ἀρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπη-
 ρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς τοῦτο πράτ-
 τειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶς
 περιέργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθέν οὖν δεῖ
 αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν
 3 τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἡδυσμα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πλείσ-
 τους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἣ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικῷ πλήθους,
 ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ'
 ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ
 ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἔν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν
 ὠρισμένων. καὶ φίλων δὴ ἔστι πλῆθος ὠρισμένον, καὶ
 ἴσως οἱ πλείστοι, μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν· τοῦτο
 4 γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι, ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολ-
 λοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἄδελον. ἔτι δὲ

incapacity to feel the highest kind of affection (*ὑπερβολή τις φιλίας*) for many individuals, and by the practical difficulties which would attend a close intercourse (*συσῆν*) with many persons at once, who would also have to associate harmoniously with each other. On the whole the question is answered in the negative.

1 *ἑμμελῶς εἰρησθαι*] 'Neatly expressed.'

μήτε πολύλεινος] From Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 713.

μηδὲ πολύλεινον μηδ' ἀξίων καλέεσθαι.

The line is untranslatable into English, as we have no word (like the German *Gastfreund*) to express both 'host' and guest, as *ξένος* does.

2 This section may be said to retract, upon further consideration, what was admitted, *Εἰθ.* viii. vi. 3: Διὰ τὸ χρησίμων δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ ταιστοὶ, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

ικανῶς] This reading, adopted by Bekker from a majority of MSS., is surprising; *ικανῶς περιέργοι* would not be a natural phrase, whereas the context really requires *οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ικανῶν*.

3 *οὔτε γὰρ—πόλις ἐστίν*] 'For a state could not consist of ten men, nor again if consisting of a hundred thousand does it still continue to be a state.' This extremely limited idea of the size of a state is based on the Greek notion that each citizen must personally take part in the administration of affairs. On this hypothesis, a state consisting of a hundred thousand citizens might easily appear unwieldy. Aristotle in the *Politics*, vii. iv. 9, represents the state as an organism of limited size: *ἐστι τι καὶ πόλεσι μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζώων, φυτῶν, ὀργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔχει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν*, κ.τ.λ.

καίκεινους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν. τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ 5 τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὥς πολυφιλότατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν 6 ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν

5 διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων] This is almost a *verbatim* repetition of *Eth.* VIII. vi. 2, which passage contains the germ of the present chapter.

6 οὕτω δ'—τοιούτους] 'And this seems to be practically the case; for we do not find that people have many friends (together) on the footing of companionship. And the 'classical friendships of story are recorded to have been between pairs. But they who have many friends, and who associate familiarly with all, seem to be friends to none, except in a civil way, and men call them "over-complaisant." In a civil way indeed it is possible to be a friend to many without being over-complaisant, but being really kind; but on a moral and personal footing this is not possible in relation to many; one must be content to find even a few worthy of this.'

ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων] Opposed to τοῖς λόγοις implied in τὸ λεχθέν above. Cf. the use of τὰ ἔργα, *Eth.* IX. viii. 2.

ἐταιρικῇ] Cf. *Eth.* VIII. xii. 1-6, and VIII. v. 3. 'Companionship,'

which Aristotle compares to the feeling between brothers, is much more akin to the perfect and ideal friendship than it is to either of the lower forms of friendship (for gain or for pleasure). It is essentially based on personal considerations (δὲ αὐτούς), though not necessarily on moral considerations (δὲ ἀρετῇ).

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οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι—οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι] Cf. *Eudemian Ethics*, VII. xii. 17: τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῶν καὶ εὐχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐθεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἀμφω λέγεται ὁρθῶς, which sentence reconciles the above passage with *Eth.* VIII. i. 5. In an external way (πολιτικῶς) a man should have many friends, personally (δὲ αὐτούς) a few.

ἀρέσκους] Cf. *Eth.* II. vii. 13, IV. vi. 9.

ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπικεῖ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλοὺς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιοῦτους.

- 11 Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἳ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἳ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐπικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετῆν
- 2 καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτῇ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις· κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειεν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἡ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω·
- 3 συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε δ' ἡ παρουσία μικτὴ τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεται τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι· παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῇ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾗ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἥθος
- 4 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἡδεται καὶ λυπεῖται. τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πῶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἷτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν

δι' αὐτοὺς] Cf. *Eth.* ix. i. 7, and note.

τοιοῦτους] i.e. capable of being made personal friends.

XI. The question whether friends are most needed in adversity or prosperity is here answered by saying, that in adversity friendship is more necessary, and in prosperity more beautiful. Some remarks are added on the exact operation of friendship in alleviating sorrow, and some practical rules are deduced.

2 ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν] 'Whether they take part of the burden, as it were.' This is the ordinary metaphor. Cf. Xenophon, *Memor.* ii. vii. 1. (Σωκράτης) Ἀριστάρχῳ ποτε ὁρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα· ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὡς Ἀριστάρχη, βαρὺς φέρειν τι· χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν. Aristotle hints at, without fully giving, a more psychological account of the operation of friendship in adversity.

3 μικτὴ τις] Cf. *Eth.* iii. i. 6, iv. ix. 8.

ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἄλυπία, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινόμενην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μὴδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμείσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις 5 τῶν φίλων παρουσία τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἡδοναὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς. διὸ δόξειεν αὖν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμους· εὐεργετητικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν· εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ

ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.

μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσκειν. ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως 6 ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμους (φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρεῖᾳ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἡδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμους (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεῖα φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως· οὐ

4 κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἄλυπία—*θρηνητικός*] 'And (such a one), unless he be excessively impassive, cannot endure the pain which is brought upon them; and altogether he does not like sympathetic wailers, not being given to wailing himself.' The words κἂν μὴ κ.τ.λ. have troubled the commentators. The Paraphrast explains them as if meaning:—'And unless (the sympathetic presence of friends) be exceedingly painless to them.' But evidently the clause is brought in in reference to οἱ ἀνδρώδεις. 'Manly natures' are not at all unlikely to be somewhat blunt and callous, and deficient in sensibility for the feelings of others. One might almost fancy that

Aristotle was thinking of the Ajax of Sophocles, vv. 319, 320:

πρὸς γὰρ κακοῦ τε καὶ βαρυψύχου γόους τοιοῦσδ' δεῖ ποτ' ἀνδρὸς ἐξηγεῖ' ἔχειν.

5 ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν] These words are not to be found in any extant play or fragment. The nearest approach to them is in Sophocles, *Œd. Tyr.* 1061: ἄλις νοσοῦσ' ἐγώ.

6 φίλου γὰρ—ἡδιον] 'For it behoves a friend to benefit (his friends), and especially those who are in need, and to (benefit) them when they have not asked. For this is nobler and sweeter for both parties.' With καὶ τὸ, εὖ ποιεῖν is to be repeated. Some editions, against the MSS., read καὶ τοὺς.

γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμείσθαι ὠφελείσθαι. δόξαν δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὲ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἰρετὴ φαίνεται.

- 12 Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρώσι τὸ ὀράν ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἰρούνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς, ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον. περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἐστὶν αἰρετὴ· καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δὴ. ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται.
- 2 καὶ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰρούνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὃ τί περ μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται
- 3 συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά· κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ

δόξαν δ'—συμβαίνει] 'But one should beware perhaps of getting the reputation of churlishness in rejecting (benefits); for this sometimes happens.' ἀηδία answers to the 'insuavis, acerbis,' of Horace, *Sat.* i. iii. 85.

XII. In conclusion, the best thing in friendship is—intercourse. This gives vividness to the pursuits of life; and when good men have intercourse with each other, they mutually strengthen and increase the good that is in them.

1 ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζῆν] 'But it is by living together that they attain the fulness of life.' The word ἐνέργεια here has evident reference to ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἐστὶν in the preceding sentence. Zell and

Cardwell follow some of the MSS. in reading αὐτῆς, i.e. τῆς αἰσθήσεως. But ἡ ἐνέργεια stands naturally alone (cf. *Eth.* ix. ix. 6), meaning 'the vivid sense of life.' And a similar collocation occurs *Eth.* viii. iii. 5: γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν οὖτως.

3 κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ—ἀλλήλους] 'For, being of an unstable nature, they have fellowship in evil, and become bad by assimilation to each other.' Cf. *Eth.* ix. i. 7: τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν. The word ἀβέβαιοι here is not connected with the use of βέβαιοι in *Eth.* viii. viii. 5: Οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν. Aristotle is not talking here of the instability of the friendship between bad men, but of its evil results mutually. Throughout the treatise on Friendship

γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπικεικῶν ἐπικεικὴς, συκαυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν

ἰσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἰσθλά.

† περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν 4 εἶη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

he speaks of the *weakness* of vice (cf. note on ix. iv. 9), and here he says that bad men, from the weakness and instability of their natures, imbibe evil example.

ἀπομάττονται — ἀρέσκονται] 'For they take the stamp of one another in those things which they like.' Cf. Aristophanes, *Rane*, v. 1040:

ὅθεν ἡ 'μὴ φρὴν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐποίησεν.

ἰσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ] On this passage of

Theognis, which is referred to above, *Eth.* ix. ix. 7, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 93. It is after Aristotle's manner to end a treatise with a line of poetry; cf. *Metaphysics*, xi. x. 14, where the book ends with the verse

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίῃ· εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω.

Accordingly the unnecessary paragraph περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας κ.τ.λ. is probably the interpolation of an editor.

PLAN OF BOOK X.

THIS book,—beginning with a treatise on Pleasure (which subject is introduced (1) because of its connection with Morals; (2) because of the controversies about it), and rising from the critical examination of extreme views to Aristotle's own theory of Pleasure, namely, that it is the sense of the vital functions, or, in other words, of the harmonious action of some one faculty—proceeds, almost without transition, to declare that Happiness in the truest sense of the term must consist in the action of the highest faculty, and that, this highest faculty being Reason, Philosophy must, beyond all comparison with anything else, whether idle amusement, or even the exercise of the moral virtues, constitute Happiness, or that Practical Chief Good which is the end of Man, and the province of the ethical branch of Politics.

Thus far this branch of Science, having obtained a definite conception, might be thought to be complete. But it still remains, says Aristotle, to ask whether something cannot be added towards its practical realisation, and, as habits of life are clearly necessary for the attainment of human excellence, on which the Chief Good depends, it follows that we shall require such domestic institutions as may be favourable to the cultivation of human excellence. These institutions, whether of public or private ordinance, can only be rightly conceived after a scientific study of the principles of Legislation, i.e. of Politics in its highest form. To this, then, Aristotle proposes to address himself, considering it to be a branch of science which has hitherto been neglected. He roughly sketches out the plan of his works on Politics, with a transition to which the ethical treatise concludes.

This tenth book then shows us the *Ethics* as a rounded whole. It is written in close connection with Book I. (cf. X. vi. 1), and it

sums up referentially the contents of Books I. II. III. IV. VIII. IX. But while the *Ethics* are thus rounded off in their beginning and end, and as to part of their contents, it is clear on the other hand that they contain a *lacuna* which has been artificially filled up.

It is very significant that the present book makes no reference to the contents of Books V. VI. VII.; and it seems impossible to avoid thinking that Aristotle wrote the conclusion to his ethical treatise at a time when he had not as yet composed certain parts which were meant to be introduced into it. Whether he afterwards ever composed those parts in literary form, or whether he merely gave materials for them in his oral discourses, we have now no means of knowing. That Books V. VI. and VII. were not actually composed by Aristotle we have seen many reasons for believing.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ X.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται διελεῖν· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνφκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν· διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ· διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ ² λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετεόν εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεῖν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τὸνναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως

I. The treatise on Pleasure opens analogously to that on the Voluntary (*Eth.* III. i. 1), and that on Friendship (VIII. i. 1, 6), justifying the introduction of the subject, (1) as connected with Ethics, (2) as having been made matter of controversy.

1 μάλιστα γὰρ—ἡμῶν] 'For it seems to be most intimately connected with the human race.' *Omni sed non soli*, see below v. 8.

διὸ παιδεύουσι κ.τ.λ.] This is all taken from Plato's *Laws*, II. p. 653. See note on *Eth.* II. iii. 2, where the passage is quoted.

πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν] Some MSS. read ἀρχὴν, which it is strange

that the commentators should have thought a natural reading, supported by αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαί (below, VIII. 3). Because φρόνησις is regarded by Aristotle as a syllogism, or set of syllogisms, having ἀρχαί or major premisses,—it does not follow that the phrase ἡ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρχή is admissible.

2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ—μέσων] 'For some call pleasure the chief good, others on the contrary call it exceedingly evil, (of these latter) some perhaps believing it to be so, but others thinking it for the interests of morality to declare pleasure to be an evil, even if it be not so, because most men incline

ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ 3
 γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν
 εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ
 τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τἀληθεὺς προσαναρου-
 σιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὀφθείῃς ποτ' ἐφιεμένος, ἀπο-
 κλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην οὔσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ
 διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. εἰόκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀλη- 4
 θεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἶδέναι χρησιμώτατοι
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῶδοι γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς
 ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοῖς ξυνιέντας ζῆν
 κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἅλις, τὰ δ' εἰρημένα
 περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

towards it, and are enslaved to pleasures, and so one ought to lead men in the opposite direction, for thus they will arrive at the mean.'

In all probability Aristotle here alludes immediately to two sections of the Platonists, (1) the party represented by Eudoxus, whose arguments are quoted; (2) that headed by Speusippus, whose anti-hedonistic arguments were contained in two books mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, under the titles *Περὶ ἡδονῆς α'*· '*Ἀριστιππος α'*, and which are now passed under review. Under the class of those who 'call pleasure the chief good,' Aristotle less directly refers to Aristippus, who, though he belonged to a bygone era, still lived in the pages of Plato's *Philebus*, and in the book of Speusippus bearing his name.

ἐλθεῖν γὰρ—μέσῳ] Cf. *Eth.* ii. ix. 5, where it is said that by going counter to one's natural bias one may attain the mean. Aristotle does not approve of this being done by means of a sacrifice of truth.

3 μή ποτε—λέγεται] 'But perhaps this is not rightly said.' Cf. Plato, *Μενο*, p. 89 c: ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογήσαμεν. This use of

μήποτε became very common in the later Greek.

ὁ γὰρ ψέγων—πολλῶν] 'For he who blames pleasure (unreservedly), and yet is seen occasionally desiring it, is thought to incline towards it as being altogether good; for ordinary persons cannot discriminate.' *τοιαύτην* here, as *τοιούτος* does frequently in Aristotle, takes its sense from the context. Cf. *Eth.* viii. vi. 6, x. ii. 4, &c. From what is above stated we learn that, the decline of philosophy having commenced, some of the Platonists enunciated theories which were meant to be practically useful, rather than true. Thus they overstated what they believed to be the truth about pleasure, in order to counteract men's universal tendency towards it. Aristotle 'doubts whether this is good policy.' Their whole theory is likely to be upset by their occasionally indulging in the higher kinds of pleasure.

τοὺς ξυνιέντας] 'Those who comprehend them,' i.e. appreciating the truth of the theories, as shown by their agreement with men's actions. Cf. *Eth.* vi. x. 1, note. On τοῖς ἔργοις cf. ix. viii. 2.

- 2 Εὐδόξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν φετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ πᾶνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα· ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτ' φέρεσθαι μὲν εἰναι ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον· ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν· τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθὸν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τὰγαθὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡδονῶν ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ

II. This chapter contains the grounds on which Eudoxus 'used to think that pleasure is the chief good;' and an examination of three objections, which had been started to those reasonings. The arguments of Eudoxus are: (1) that all things seek pleasure; (2) that pain is essentially (*καθ' αὐτό*) an object of aversion, and therefore pleasure, its contrary, must be essentially an object of desire; (3) that pleasure is always desired as an end-in-itself, and not as a means to anything; (4) that pleasure when added to any other good makes it more desirable. The objections to these arguments are: (1) the opinion of Plato (which serves as an objection to argument 4th), that the chief good must be incapable of being added to any other good, and so made better. This objection Aristotle allows as valid. (2) An objection to the 1st argument, probably suggested by Plato's *Philebus*, p. 67, and repeated by Speusippus,—that the testimony of irrational creatures is of no value. This objection is disallowed. (3) The counter-argument of Speusippus to the 2nd argument of Eudoxus,—that not pleasure, but the neutral state, is the true contrary to pain. This is refuted.

1 τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικές] We have here a quotation of the very words of Eudoxus. In § 4, Aristotle generally approves of the present argument. His whole conclusion is to be found *Eth.* x. iii. 13:—that Eudoxus was

more right than his opponents, but wrong in not discriminating between the different kinds of pleasure, and in going so far as to say that pleasure is the chief good. The term τὸ αἰρετὸν, in opposition to τὸ φευκτόν, seems to have played a great part in the reasonings of Eudoxus. It is admitted by Plato, *Philebus*, p. 20, as a necessary attribute of the chief good, and so also by Aristotle, *Eth.* i. vii. 8; x. ii. 4. Here it is implied in the word ἐφιέμενα. It appears simply to mean 'that which is a reasonable object of desire,' cf. *Eth.* viii. viii. 2: ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετή, and x. iii. 13, ἡδονὴ οὐ πᾶσα αἰρετή. As implying will and choice, it is applicable in a relative, as well as an absolute sense, to means as well as to ends. Book III. of the *Topics* contains hints on the method of dealing with this term, and throws light on its use, which fluctuates between a reference to the good, the useful, and the pleasant (cf. *Top.* iii. iii. 7).

ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι] This is a pleasing allusion to the personal character of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who lived about 366 B.C., and who enjoyed great fame as an astronomer. He appears to have introduced the sphere from Egypt into Greece. The poem of Aratus is a versification of his *Φαινόμενα*. Certain stories in Diogenes would leave the impression that, being Plato's pupil, he quarrelled with his

ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἦπτον ² δ' ἔφ' εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τοῦναντίον αἰρετόν. μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδὲνα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ᾗδεται, ὡς καθ' αὐτὴν οὔσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. προστιθεμένην τε ὁψοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· καὶ αὔξεσθαι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ. ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, ³ καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτὸ τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετὰ τινος

master. Aristotle (or, as Diogenes says, 'Nicomachus') is the only authority for his ethical opinions.

² ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον] The end is better than the means, but this does not prove anything as to the comparative superiority of pleasure to the rest of the whole class of ends. Thus the argument of Eudoxus overshot the mark. A similar argument of his is mentioned with careless approbation, *Eth.* i. xii. 5: Δοκεῖ καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι, says Aristotle, 'Eudoxus is thought to have pleaded well' in favour of pleasure being the chief good, because it is never praised. This argument would only prove that it belongs to the class of τὰ τίμα.

προστιθεμένην] It is suggested as a commonplace of reasoning. *Topics*, III. ii. 2, that you may say 'Justice and courage are better *with* pleasure than *without*.'

³ πᾶν γὰρ—χωρίς] 'For that "every good is better in combination with another good than alone." This is indeed the very argument by which Plato proves pleasure *not* to be the highest good. For the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without.' Cf. *Philebus*, pp. 21-22, where however the proposition οὐδένος προστεθέντος—γίνεσθαι is not to be found. Plato only argued that, as the highest conception of human good implied a combination of both pleasure and knowledge, pleasure separately could not be the chief good. It is a deduction of Aristotle's from the terms *καλὸν καὶ τέλειον*, used by Plato, that the chief good is incapable of addition or improvement. Cf. *Topics*, III. ii. 2, where it is said that the end *plus* the means cannot be called more desirable than the end by itself; cf. *Eth.* i. vii. 8, where the same

- 4 τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὥς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν· ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναι φάμεν. ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὠρέγετο αὐτῶν, ἦν ἂν τι τὸ λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἂν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ
- 5 καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακὸν ἐστὶ, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικείσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ, λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὥς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἰρούμενοι ὥς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται.
- 3 Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι

opinion seems to be conveyed, though that interpretation of the passage has been disputed.

4 τί οὖν—ἐπιζητεῖται] 'What is there then which has these characteristics (i.e. supreme goodness without the capability of addition) which we men can partake of? For such is the very object of our inquiries.' That is, not a transcendental good, but something to be practically realised. Cf. *Eth.* I. vi. 13.

ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ] This acceptance of the testimony of instinct occurs also in the Eudemian book, *Eth.* VII. xiii. 5.

ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν] Probably Speusippus, taking up a suggestion from Plato, *Philebus*, p. 67.

τοῖς φαύλοις] In the neuter gender, 'the lower creatures';—alluding to

the *θηρία* mentioned by Plato, *Philebus*, l.c.

5 οὐ γὰρ φασιν] As we learn from the Eudemian book, *Eth.* VII. xiii. 1, Speusippus was the author of this objection.

III. Aristotle investigates remaining arguments used by the Platonists to prove that pleasure is not a good: (1) that it is 'not a quality.' This argument would prove too much, as it would be equally decisive against happiness, or the actions of virtue; (2) that it is 'unlimited.' But (a) in one sense this will apply to virtue also, (b) in another sense it is only applicable to the 'mixed pleasures,' which are analogous to health, i.e. a proportion variable according to circumstances; (3) that it is 'not final'

ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν 2
ἀγαθὸν ὠρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται
τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδῆσθαι
τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
ἀρετάς, καθ' ὧς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς
ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται τὸ αὐτό·
δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρείοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ
δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. εἰ δ'
ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μὴ ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὧσιν

or perfect, but in some sort 'a transition.' Against which Aristotle argues, (a) that it cannot be a *motion*, because not admitting the idea of speed, (b) that it cannot be a *creation*, because not capable of being resolved into its component parts, (c) that it cannot be a *filling up*, for this is merely corporeal, and even in the case of bodily pleasure it is not the body that feels; (4) that there are many disgraceful pleasures. To which it may be answered, that pleasures differ in kind, and even if some be bad, others may be absolutely good.

1 εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων] This seems to be the only record of an argument, probably occurring in the works of Speusippus, that 'pleasure is not a good, because it is not a quality.' It points to the moralising tendency, above noticed, of this school of Platonists, as if they said that nothing could be called 'good' which did not form part of man's moral character.

2 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδῆσθαι] Pleasure may be said to admit of degrees, first, in reference to men's different capacities of feeling it; but in this respect it will stand on the same footing as courage and justice.

εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς—μικταί] 'In the second place, if (they predicate this attribute of "unlimited" as existing, not in the recipients of

pleasure, but) in the pleasures themselves, perhaps they omit to state the reason of the fact, namely, that while some pleasures are unmixed, others are mixed.' Plato in the *Philebus* divides pleasures into mixed and unmixed. Of each he makes three classes. Mixed pleasures are: (1) bodily pleasures, the restoration of harmony in the animal frame, where the bodily pain of want or desire is mixed up with the bodily pleasure of gratification; (2) the pleasure of expecting this restoration, where the bodily pain of want is mixed up with the mental pleasure of the idea of relief; (3) the pleasure which we feel in the ludicrous, where the mental pain of seeing the un-beautiful is mixed with the mental pleasure of laughing at it. The unmixed pleasures, i.e. in which no pain is implied, are (1) those of smell; (2) those of sight and hearing; (3) those that belong to the intellect. Of these two classes Plato confines the attribute of *ἀμετρία*, 'want of measure,' to the first class. The unmixed or pure pleasures necessarily possess *ἐμμετρία*, cf. *Phileb.* p. 52 c. The same doctrine is given *Eth.* vii. xiv. 6: αἱ δ' ἀνευ λυπῶν (ἡδοναὶ) οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. Speusippus, forgetful of this distinction, appears to have made *ἀμετρία* (ἀόριστον εἶναι) a universal predicate of pleasure.

- 3 αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. τί γὰρ κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὠρισμένη οὐσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιευμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.
- 4 τέλειόν τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' εἰκόασι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν· πάση γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο.

3 τί γὰρ κωλύει κ.τ.λ.] Even the mixed pleasures, says Aristotle, admit the idea of proportion (*συμετρία*), just as health is a proportion, though a relative and variable one, of the elements in the human body. In the *Topics*, vi. ii. 1, the words ἡ ὑγίεια *συμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν* are given as an instance of an ambiguous definition, *συμετρία* being used in more senses than one.

οὐ γὰρ—ἥττον] 'Health is not the same proportion of elements in all men, nor even in the same man always, but with a certain laxity of variation it still remains health, though admitting of difference in the degrees (according to which the elements are compounded).'

4 τέλειόν τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες κ.τ.λ.] Plato, in the *Philebus*, p. 53 c, accepted the doctrine of the Cyrenaics, ὡς αἰεὶ γένεσις ἐστίν (ἡ ἡδονή), and then, by the contrast of means and end, γένεσις and οὐσία, he proved that pleasure could not be the chief good. As said above, Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 249, Plato seems to have recognised a class of pleasures above those which were mere states of transition, but to have had no formula to express them. Speusippus probably applied the argument drawn from the Cyrenaic

definition not merely *ad homines*, as Plato had done, but as if absolutely valid.

οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου] i.e. οὐκ ἐστὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής καθ' αὐτήν. 'All motion has speed and slowness properly belonging to it, if not relatively to itself—as, for instance, the motion of the universe has no speed or slowness in itself (because it moves equably),—at all events in relation to other things.' Aristotle argues that though it is possible 'to be pleased' (*ἡσθῆναι*—*μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἡδονήν*) more or less quickly, it is not possible to 'feel pleasure' (*ἡδεσθαι*) either quickly or slowly. This argument seems a verbal one, like some of those in *Eth.* i. vi. against Plato's doctrine of ideas. If pleasure be identified with *κίνησις*, the argument holds good. But if it only be held to have the same relation to *κίνησις* as Aristotle himself makes it to have to *ἐνέργεια*, *Eth.* x. viii. 4, the argument falls to the ground. This argument and the one in § 6 really only apply to the want of a sufficiently subjective formula to express pleasure. If pleasure were defined as 'the consciousness of a transition,' there might then be degrees of speed in the transition, though not in the consciousness of it.

τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει· ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἡδεσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἡδεσθαι. γένεσις τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ 5 τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι. καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ 6 φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὴ ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδοίτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδοίτ' ἂν τις, καὶ τεμνόμενος λυποίτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη

Aristotle's real objection to the term *κίνησις* lies deeper than these mere dialectical skirmishings, and has been explained, Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 247-50.

5 γένεσις τε—φθορά] 'And how can it be a creation? For it does not seem to be the case that *anything* can be created out of *anything*; a thing is resolved into that out of which it is created. And (as the Platonists say) pain is the destruction of that of which pleasure is the creation.' This elliptical argument seems to require for its conclusion, 'Where then are the elements out of which our perfect nature (*οὐσία*) is created by the process called pleasure, and into which it is resolved by the destructive process called pain?' We find pain called a destruction in the *Philebus*, p. 31 E: *διψος δ' αὖ φθορά καὶ λύπη καὶ λύσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὕγρου πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθῆναι πληροῖσα δύναμις ἡδονή*. Aristotle, arguing polemically, says, 'Where then are the elements with which the creative and the destructive process must begin and end?'

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He afterwards reasonably substitutes *ἐνέργεια* for *γένεσις* as a better formula, but the above polemic seems not to have much value.

6 οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα—λυποίτο] 'Neither is pleasure therefore a replenishment, though one may feel pleasure while replenishment is taking place, just as one may feel pain while one is being cut.' Pleasure, says Aristotle, may be synchronous with replenishment, but cannot be identical with it, for pleasure is a state of the mind, and not of the body, cf. *Eth.* i. viii. 10: *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν*. All that is proved here is that a more subjective formula than *ἀναπλήρωσις* is required to express the nature of pleasure. Plato had used the formula *πλήρωσις*, *Philebus*, p. 31 E, and Speusippus probably repeated it.

τεμνόμενος] The words *τομαὶ καὶ καύσεις* were commonly used by Plato, as instances of bodily pain. Cf. *Timaeus*, p. 65 B: *ταῦτα δ' αὖ περὶ τὰς καύσεις καὶ τομὰς τοῦ σώματος γιγνόμενά ἐστι κατάδηλα*.

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δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γινομένους καὶ πολυληθέντας ἡδεσθαι
 7 τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλλοι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνδεια
 8 γεγένηται, οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἷητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν
 9 τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς
 10 ὀφθαλμοῖσιν. ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτ' ἂν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὅτι οὖν
 11 φαγόντι. ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
 11 ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κολακος, οὐκ οὔσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἶδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν

7 ἄλλοι γὰρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ κ.τ.λ.] This is all admitted in so many words by Plato, *Phileb.* p. 52 A: *ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῖσιν τούτοις* (i.e. to the pleasures of smell, sight, and hearing) *προσθαύμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μαρθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀληθῆναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένης.*

8 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας κ.τ.λ.] This argument of the Platonists is quoted *Eth.* VII. xi. 5.

10 τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ] Cf. *Eth.* IX. ix. 6; X. iv. 10. The arguments here given to prove that pleasures differ in kind are (a) that some men are in-

capable of feeling certain pleasures; (b) that the flatterer is different from the friend; (c) that the pleasures of childhood differ from those of maturity. The whole reasoning is repeated in better form in chap. v.

11 ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος] The term 'friend' is used here in a distinctive sense to denote 'the true friend,' just as it is in *Eth.* VIII. xiii. 9: *ἀκοῦσα γὰρ φίλον οὐ παῖντέον.* Common language, which contrasts the flatterer who ministers pleasure, from the friend who ministers good, testifies to the non-identity of pleasure (in all forms) with good.

ὄνειδιζέται, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ¹² ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησάμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέρει ἡδονήν, οἶον ὄραν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἐλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν τὰυτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοντ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τὰγαθὸν ἢ ¹³ ἡδονή οὔτε πᾶσα αἶρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς διαφέρονσαι τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποιόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ⁴ ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καθ' ὄντι-

12 *περὶ πολλά τε*] If pleasure, according to Eudoxus, were the chief good, all pursuits would be prized in proportion to their affording pleasure, but this Aristotle shows not to be the case.

IV. Having finished his critical remarks on existing theories (τὰ λεγόμενα) about pleasure, Aristotle proceeds synthetically to state his own views, as follows: (1) Pleasure is, like sight, something whole and entire, not gradually arrived at, but a moment of consciousness, at once perfect, independent of the conditions of time, §§ 1-4. (2) It arises from any faculty obtaining its proper object, but is better in proportion to the excellence of the faculty exercised, §§ 5-7. (3) It is thus the perfection of our functions, but is distinct from the functions themselves, § 8. (4) It cannot be continuously maintained, owing to the weakness of our powers, our functions being soon blunted by fatigue, § 9. (5) Pleasure, in short, results from the sense of life, and is inseparably

connected with the idea of life, §§ 10-11.

1 *τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποιόν τι*] Cf. *Éth.* II. v. 1: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέω. *Id.* vi. 1: δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποῖα τις. The genus (τί ἐστι) of pleasure here given is that it is *ὅλον τι*, one of those moments of consciousness which are complete in themselves; the differentia (ποιόν τι) is that it results from the exercise of any faculty upon its proper object. It may be said that this definition would leave pleasure undefined; but in fact it is a simple sensation, not admitting of entire explication.

ἡ μὲν ὄρασις] Modern researches in optics would tend to modify this view of the entirely *simple* nature of an act of sight. But it may be conceded that any 'process' which takes place in sight is too swift to be noticed by the mind. Cf. Locke, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, Book II. ch. xiv. § 10. 'Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that which we may call an instant, and is that which takes up

νοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενός, ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γενόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ὅλον γάρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείῳ χρόνον
 2 γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστίν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τελεία, ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται. ἡ ἐν ἅπαντι δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τῇ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως. καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία· οὐδενός γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον· ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὅτῳ χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει,
 3 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν· εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἶδη, πτήσις βάδις αἰσι καὶ

the time of only one idea in our minds without the succession of another, wherein therefore we perceive no succession at all.'

2 διόπερ—ἅπαντι.] 'Therefore it is not a process; for every process is under conditions of time and aims at some end; as, for instance, the (process of) architecture is perfect when it has effected what it aims at. May we not say (ἡ) then that it is perfect in the particular (τούτῳ) time viewed as a whole? But in the separate parts of the time occupied all processes are imperfect, and are different in species, both from the whole process, and from each other. For the collection of the stones is different from the fluting of the pillars, and both from the making of the temple. And the making the temple is a perfect process, for it wants nothing towards its proposed object; but that of the basement and the triglyph are imperfect, for they are

each the making of a part. Therefore they differ in species, and it is not possible to find a process perfect in species in any time whatsoever, unless it be in the time occupied viewed as a whole.' With Michelet, who follows two MSS., ἡ has been omitted above before τούτῳ. The reading ἡ τούτῳ makes no sense, unless one which would be opposed to what is said afterwards (οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν ὅτῳ κ.τ.λ.)

ἡ ἐν ἅπαντι.] The form ἡ with a question, used for conveying Aristotle's opinion on any subject, occurs again in § 9 of this chapter, ἡ κέμνει; In the illustration given, two of the processes mentioned are merely preparatory, the collection of the stones for building, and the fluting of the pillars before they are set up; two others are substantive parts of the building, the laying of the foundation (the first act), and the adding the triglyph, which was a

τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ ταῦτ' ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κακείνην· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὔσαν, ἐν ἐτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις φέρεται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεῖα εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσιν τῷ εἶδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁπωσὺν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἴεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἢ ἡδονῇ. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἡδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ

fluted tablet added as an ornament to the frieze (perhaps the last act in the creation of the temple). The creation of the temple as a whole, regarded in the whole time which it occupies, is alone to be regarded as a perfect process.

3-4 ὁμοίως δὲ—εἶδος] 'So too in the case of walking, and all other processes. For if passage be a process from place to place, even of this there are different species, flying, walking, jumping, and the like. And not only this, but even in walking itself (there are different species), for the whence and the whither are not the same in the whole course and in the part of the course, and in one part and the other part; nor is it the same thing to cross this line and that. For a person not only passes a line, but a line in space, and this line is in different space from that line. We shall treat exactly of process elsewhere, but it seems not to be perfect in every time, but the majority of processes seem imperfect and differing in species, if the whence and the whither con-

stitute a differentia. But pleasure seems perfect in kind in any time (of its existence) whatsoever.' Every process is under conditions of time, and its parts being under a law of succession are essentially different from each other: the *ὑστερον* from the *πρότερον*, the beginning, middle, and end, from one another. In pleasure nothing of the kind is to be found. One moment of pleasure does not lead up, as a preparative, to another more advanced moment. Pleasure, when felt, is, *ipse facto*, complete.

ἐν ἄλλοις † ἐρηται] Cf. *Physics*, IV. and V. But as the *Physics* were probably a later work, *ἐρηται* may be here a mis-reading for *ἐρήσεται*, as in the instance given, Vol. I. Essay I. p. 69, note.

οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι] 'Non in quolibet tempore:' this is of course different from ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, and ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι, in the preceding section.

ἐν ὁπωσὺν] 'In quolibet,' but above, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁπωσὺν means 'in nullo potest.'

4 δῆλον οὖν—ἡδονῇ] 'It is clear

ὄλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ
 μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κινήσεις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ
 5 ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθη-
 τὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλ-
 λιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν· τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ'
 εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἡ
 ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω· καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ βελτίστη
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κρά-
 τιστον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτήν. αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ
 ἡδίστη· κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἐστὶν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ
 καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειο-
 τάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν
 6 ὑφ' αὐτήν. τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε
 καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ
 7 ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. καθ' ἑκάστην
 δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον· φαμέν γὰρ ὁρά-
 ματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι
 μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἢ τε αἴσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς
 τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ
 τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ
 8 ποιήσαντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέρ-
 γειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπι-
 γιγνόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα· ἕως ἂν
 οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον

then that (process and pleasure) must be different from one another, and that pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and perfect.'

6 τελειοὶ δὲ—*ὕγιαίνειν*] 'Pleasure renders the exercise of a faculty perfect, but not in the same way in which the goodness of the faculty itself and of its object does so, just as health and the physician are in different ways the cause of one's being well;' i.e. pleasure is the formal, and not the efficient, cause of a perfect function. 'Cause' in this Aristotelian usage becomes equivalent to 'result.' The

illustration used here is given also, with a slight confusion of terms, in the Eudemian book, *Eth.* vi. xii. 5, 'Ἐπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια.

7 τοιούτων δ' ὄντων—*πεισομένου*] 'But if the object and the percipient be in this (highest) condition, there always will be pleasure, as long as subject and object remain.' The relative terms *τὸ ποιοῦν* and *τὸ πάσχον* take their meaning from the way in which they are applied. Thus, *Eth.* v. v. 9, they are used for 'producer and consumer.' Here *τὸ ποιοῦν* is used

ἢ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ ἡδονῇ· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἡδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ 9 τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καὶνὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως διὰ ταῦτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἢ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς 10 οἰηθεὶς τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἢ δὲ ζῶν ἐνεργείᾳ τίς ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἶον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. ἢ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δέ, οὐ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοὶ γὰρ ἐκάστω τὸ ζῆν, αἰρετὸν ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν 11 αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ

for the percipient, τὸ πᾶσιν for the object perceived.

8 ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων—γίνεσθαι] 'For from similar pairs of relatives, bearing the same relation to one another, i.e. the active and passive, the same result is naturally produced.' This appears to be an abstract and *a priori* way of stating the universality of pleasure attendant on the harmony between a faculty and its proper object.

9 πῶς οὖν—ἀμαυροῦται] 'How is it then that no one is continuously in a state of pleasure? The reason must be that one grows weary. For all human things are incapable of continuous activity. Pleasure, therefore, ceases to be produced, for it depends on the activity of the faculties. It is on this same account that some

things please us while they are new, but afterwards not in the same way. For at first the intellect is excited and acts strenuously on the objects in question (as in the case of sight, when one first fixes one's glance), but afterwards the action is not equally vivid, but relaxed, and so one's pleasure also fades.' On this doctrine, cf. Vol. I. Essay IV., and Ar. *Metaph.* VIII. viii. 18, there quoted, p. 251.

10 It is natural to say that all desire pleasure, from its inseparable connection with the sense of life, and with each of the vital functions. Thus far Eudoxus was right, but he was wrong in not recognising a difference in kind between different pleasures, and this point is demonstrated in the ensuing chapter.

παρόντι. συνεζεύχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνεργείαν τελειοὶ ἢ ἡδονή.

- 5 "Ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν· τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὑφ' ἐτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι. οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῶα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκευὸς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ 2 διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί. φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνφκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοί. συναύζει γὰρ τὴν ἐνεργείαν ἢ οἰκεία ἡδονή·

V. Pleasures may be thought to differ in kind: (1) Because our several functions (mental and others) differ from each other in kind, and things different in kind, are perfected by things different in kind, §§ 1-2. (2) Because while its *own* pleasure promotes any particular exercise of the faculties, an *alien* pleasure impedes it, §§ 3-5. (3) Because the human functions differ from each other in a moral point of view, and the pleasures therefore which are so closely connected with them as almost to be identical must differ in the same way from each other, §§ 6-7. (4) Creatures different in kind must have, and by common consent do have, different pleasures, § 8. (5) The pleasures of man when in a morbid state must differ from the pleasures of man when in a healthy state. As a corollary to the last argument it may be added, that reasonings against pleasure from a reference to the morbid pleasures have no weight. The answer to them would be, that such are not pleasures at all.

1 καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης] The *ἐνεργεῖαι* mentioned in this section

must be those of the rational faculty. Thus we have the classification of things capable of being made perfect, into nature, art, and the moral and intellectual life of man. Cf. *Eth.* III. iii. 7: *αἷτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἐτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου.*

2 φανείη δ'—τελειοῖ] 'This would also seem to be shown by the intimate connection existing between each pleasure and the function which it perfects.' Cf. *Eth.* X. i. 1: *μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνφκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν.* Pleasure, generally speaking, is proper to the human race; from another point of view, each function has its own proper pleasure, and the pleasure 'proper' to one function is 'alien' to other functions. This distinction of *οἰκεία* and *ἀλλοτρία ἡδονή* was perhaps suggested by a passage in the *Republic* of Plato, IX. 587 A, where these terms are used, though not with quite the same application. It is there said that in the philosopher each part of his soul does its proper work and attains its proper pleasure; but when some lower passion has the predominance, that passion, causing

μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργούντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοί γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετερεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοκοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύζοντα οἰκεῖα. τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. ἔτι δὲ 3 μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίου τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ φίλανθοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσῃσιν αἰλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴν τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνεργεῖαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 4 συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἢ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁτ' οὖν σφόδρα οὐ πᾶν δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φανῶσι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὥσι, τότε μάλιστα αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεῖα 5 ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δηλον ὡς πολὺν διεστῶσιν· σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυτον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρῶς οὖσης τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τὰς

disturbance, does not itself attain its own pleasure, and compels the other faculties to pursue a pleasure which is alien to them: *ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἑτέρων τι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν ἐξευρίσκειν τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀναγκάζειν ἀλλοτρίαν καὶ μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν διώκειν.*

ἐξακριβοῦσιν] 'They work out.' Cf. note on *Eth.* i. vii. 18. The word *ἐξακριβοῦν* is used transitively *Eth.* i. xii. 7, and below, x. v. 5, where from

the analogy of the arts it means to 'give the last finish to.' It is used intransitively *Eth.* i. vi. 13: *ἐξακριβοῦν ὑπὲρ τούτων*, 'to refine.'

4 καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις — *δρῶσιν*] 'And those who munch sweetmeats in the theatres do so especially when the actors are bad.' This is one of those illustrations from common life which are richly strewn about the writings of Aristotle.

ἐνεργείας τούναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκείαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδوناὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. 6 διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεία καὶ φαυλότῃ, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικῆς, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰς καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν 7 ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν εὐκὲ γὰρ ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις· ἄτοπον γάρ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται ἰσὶ ταῦτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἀφ᾽ ἧς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις γούσεως· ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ 8 τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ζῶντι ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνον σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἥδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν

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οὖν τῶν ἐτέρων τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι. διαλλάττονσι δ' οὐ μικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ ἐστὶ τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγαιῖνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν 10 ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκείνου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ τοιούτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χιίρει. τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῇ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλὰ γὰρ φθορὰ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακει- 11 μένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχυρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποῖαν ἢ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μίᾳ ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως

Heraclitus says that "an ass would prefer hay to gold,"—the reason being that he is an *ass*. This saying of Heraclitus, which reminds us of the Æsopic fable of the Cock and the Jewel, was probably meant to satirise the low desires of the human race. It forms the *pendant* to that other saying, 'Zeus looks on the wisest man as we look on an ape.'

10 ἔστιν ἐκείνου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός] That there is a definite standard of pleasure and of taste, as of other apparently variable things, is most clearly laid down in Aristotle's discussion upon the saying of Protagoras, that 'man is the measure of all things.' Cf. *Metaphysics*, x. vi. 6: *φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων*

κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὸ οὗτὸ φαίνεται τοῖς μὲν γλυκί, τοῖς δὲ τούναντίον, μὴ διεφθαρμένων καὶ λεω-
βημένων τῶν ἐτέρων τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χυμῶν. τούτου δ' ὄντος τοιούτου τοὺς ἐτέροις μὲν ὑποληπτέον μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἐτέροις οὐχ ὑποληπτέον. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχυροῦ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. Those who are vicious and corrupt are to be pronounced not to be right judges of what is good or pleasant. Their pleasures are to be pronounced not pleasures at all. Cf. Plato, *Philebus*, p. 40 c: *ψευδέσιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.*

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6 διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεία καὶ φανυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονή ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχροῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν

7 ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἔοικε γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις· ἄτοπον γάρ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται ἰσὶ ταυτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὥψις ἀφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὁσφρησις γεύσεως· ὁμοίως δὴ διαφερούσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ

8 τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκάστω ζῶντι ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστω δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνον σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἡδίων γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφή ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν

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7 καθαριότητι] On the superior purity of sight, hearing, and smell over taste, cf. Plato, *Philebus*, p. 51, and *Eth.* iii. x. 3-11.

8 ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον] Cf. Plato, *Republic*, p. 352 E: 'Ἀρα οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὄνουσιν ἔργον, δ' ἂν ἡ μόνῃ ἐκείνῃ ποιῇ τις ἡ ἀριστα; καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος—χρυσόν]' 'As

οὖν τῶν ἐτέρων τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι. διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ μικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ ἐστὶ τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν 10 ἅσασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῇ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλὰ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακει- 11 μένοισιν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχροὺς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως

Heraclitus says that "an ass would prefer hay to gold,"—the reason being that he is an *ass*. This saying of Heraclitus, which reminds us of the Æsopic fable of the Cock and the Jewel, was probably meant to satirise the low desires of the human race. It forms the *pendant* to that other saying, 'Zeus looks on the wisest man as we look on an ape.'

IO ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός] That there is a definite standard of pleasure and of taste, as of other apparently variable things, is most clearly laid down in Aristotle's discussion upon the saying of Protagoras, that 'man is the measure of all things.' Cf. *Metaphysics*, x. vi. 6: φανερόν δὲ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων

κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὸ οὐτὸ φαίνεται τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ, τοῖς δὲ τούναντιον, μὴ διεφθαρμένων καὶ λεω-βημένων τῶν ἐτέρων τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χυμῶν. τούτου δ' ὅπως τοιούτου τοὺς ἐτέρους μὲν ὑποληπτέον μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἐτέρους οὐχ ὑποληπτέον. . ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. Those who are vicious and corrupt are to be pronounced not to be right judges of what is good or pleasant. Their pleasures are to be pronounced not pleasures at all. Cf. Plato, *Philebus*, p. 40 c: ψευδέσιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθείας.

λέγουντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

- 6 Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ
2 προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἶπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἰρη-
ται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταί, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δηλὸν ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς αἰρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. καθ' αὐτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἰρεταί, ἀφ' ὧν μὴδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ
3 γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδέϊαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἰροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. κατα-
φεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονι-

VI. Aristotle having concluded his treatise upon the nature of pleasure, reverts now to the general question of the nature of happiness, or the chief good for man. He takes up from the first book the following fundamental propositions: (1) that happiness must be an action (*ἐνέργεια*) and not a state (*ἔξις*) of the faculties; (2) that it must be final and satisfying; (3) that it must consist in some development of the faculties sought for its own sake. The remainder of the chapter is occupied with excluding games and amusements from the above definition. Though exercises of the faculties sought for their own sake, these are (a) patronised by unworthy judges,—tyrants, children, and the like; (b) after all, they are rather

the means to working, than ends in themselves; (c) they do not represent the higher faculties in man.

1 *εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς*] Cf. *Eth.* i. xiii. 1, where the analysis of *ἀρετή*, or human excellence (the most important part of the conception of happiness, *Eth.* i. x. 9) is introduced; *Eth.* viii. i. 1, where the discussion of friendship partly as connected with virtue and partly as an external blessing, is justified; *Eth.* x. i. 1, where a treatise on pleasure is added on account of the human interest of the topic, and the controversies which have been raised about it.

2 *εἶπομεν δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*] Cf. *Eth.* i. vii. 13; i. v. 6.

3 *τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων*] 'Of those

ζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκίμοιςιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς· δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ 4 ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὔτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοὺς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἶονται εἶναι. εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φάυλοις καὶ ἐπικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, 5 καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα. ἐκάστῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ἕξιν αἰρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ 6 ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παῖζεν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐτέρου ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λῖαν παιδικόν· παῖζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχυρ-σιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιὰ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ

who are called happy,' cf. *Eth.* i. ix. 11: *τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.*

3-4 *δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν — ἐνέργειαι*] 'These things are fancied to be constitutives of happiness because monarchs spend their leisure in them. But perhaps after all monarchs are no evidence, for neither virtue nor reason, on which the higher functions of man depend, are involved in kingly power.' Cf. *Eth.* i. v. 3, where it is said that brutish pleasures 'obtain consideration' owing to potentates, who have everything at their command, devoting themselves to such.

4 *ἀγευστοι*] This reminds one of the saying about greedy and corrupt kings in Hesiod, *Works and Days*, vv. 40, 81:

*νήπιοι' οὐδὲ ἴσασιεν ὅσῳ πλέον ἤμισυ πάντος,
οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μάλαχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ μέγ' ὄνειρα.*

6 *οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία*] With the whole of the present chapter we may compare the interesting discussion in *Ar. Politics*, viii. v. 12-14. On the relation of amusements to happiness, see Vol. I. *Essay IV.* p. 226.

δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἔνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαιμόνων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ 7 σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος αἰεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνεργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικω- 8 τέρα ἤδη. ἀπαλαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἦττον τοῦ ἀρίστου. εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

7 Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θείον ὄν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θεϊότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεῖα εὐδαι- 2 μονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ

8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς—βίου] 'For no one allows a slave to share in happiness, any more than in the social life of a citizen.' In *Politics*, i. xiii. 13, it is said that the slave, as distinguished from the artisan, is *κοινωνὸς ζωῆς*, i.e. he 'lives with the family,' but he is not *κοινωνὸς βίου*, he does not share in the career of his master.

VII. Aristotle's argument now culminates in the declaration that happiness, in the highest sense, consists in philosophy: (1) because this is the function of the most excellent part of our nature; (2) because it most admits of continuance; (3) because it affords most pure and solid pleasure; (4) because it has pre-eminently the character of being self-sufficient; (5) because it is above all things an end-in-itself, and not a means to ulterior results; (6) because it is a sort of repose, and

as it were the fruit of our exertions. It is indeed something higher than man regarded as a composite being, and is only attainable by him through virtue of a divine element which is in him. But we must not listen to those who would preach down our divine aspirations. On the contrary, we should encourage them, and endeavour to live in harmony with our noblest part, which is in fact our proper self.

1 εἴτε θεῖον—θεϊότατον] 'Whether it be, itself too, absolutely divine, or relatively speaking the divinest thing in our nature.' Philosophy is said in the *Metaphysics*, i. ii. 14, to be most divine in two ways, first, as being kindred to the thought of God; second, as being knowledge of things divine. *τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνον· ἢν τε γὰρ μάλιστα ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, καὶ εἰ τις τῶν θείων εἴη.* Cf. the note on *Eth.* i. ii. 8.

τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ.
 κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς
 τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοῦς. ἔτι δὲ
 συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον
 ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν, οἰόμεθ' αὖτε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι 3
 τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἥδιστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ
 κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ
 φιλοσοφία θανμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ
 βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδῶ τὴν
 διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἢ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεω- 4
 ρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγ-
 καίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς
 δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δέεται

2 ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικῇ, εἰρηται] It is difficult to point out a precise passage corresponding to this reference (cf. *Eth.* ix. iii. 1, where a similar vague reference occurs); but perhaps it partly is meant to recall *Eth.* i. xiii. 20: διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς, partly *Eth.* i. v. 7: τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικὸς, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. There is nothing in Book VI. which corresponds.

3 εὐλογον δὲ—εἶναι] 'And it is reasonable to suppose that those who know pass their time more pleasantly than those who are inquiring.' This is opposed to the often-repeated saying that 'the search for truth is more precious than truth itself.' Thus Bishop Butler says, 'Knowledge is not our proper happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having of it, which is the entertainment of the mind. Indeed, if the proper happiness of man consisted in knowledge considered as a possession or treasure, men who are possessed of the largest share would have a very ill

time of it; as they would be infinitely more sensible than others of their poverty in this respect. Thus *he who increases knowledge* would eminently *increase sorrow*' (*Sermon XV.*) In one respect these two views are reconcilable; for Aristotle never meant to say that the *ἔξις* or *κτῆσις τῆς σοφίας* constitutes happiness, but the *ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*, 'the play of the mind under the guidance of philosophy.' He contrasts the peace and repose of conviction with the restlessness of doubt. In the same spirit Bacon said (*Essay I.*): 'Certainly, it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.' But in another respect the views of Aristotle are irreconcilable with those above quoted from Butler. The one over-states, nearly as much as the other under-states, the blessings of knowledge. And Aristotle strangely leaves out of account that sense of ignorance which the wisest man will always retain. His statement is chargeable with philosophic pride, from which Socrates and Plato were free. (See Vol. I. *Essay III.* p. 216.)

πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
 σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ
 σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
 σοφώτερος ἢ μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων,
 5 ἀλλ' ὅμως ἀνταρκέστατος. δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτῇ μόνῃ δι'
 αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ
 θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν ἢ πλείον ἢ ἔλαττον περι-
 6 ποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πράξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ
 σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ
 πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν
 ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια·
 αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοὶ εἶναι, αἱ μὲν
 πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν
 τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι
 γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πο-
 λεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνυντο. ἔστι δὲ
 καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύ-
 εσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμᾶς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαι-
 7 μονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἐτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολι-
 τικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἐτέραν οὖσαν. εἰ δὴ
 τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ
 πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ'
 ἀσχολοὶ καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς
 αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν
 δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι
 τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν αἰκείαν, αὕτη δὲ συναυξίει τὴν
 ἐνέργειαν, καὶ τὸ αὐταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ
 ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέ-
 μεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα. ἡ
 τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα

6 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ—ἐτέραν οὖσαν] 'But moreover the (function) of the politician also is restless, and beyond mere administration it aims at power and distinctions, or, if happiness for the man himself and his citizens, at all events a happiness which is something distinct from the

exercise of the political art; nay, we are in search of this happiness—plainly as something distinct.' σοφία, while producing happiness, is identical with it: but πολιτικὴ is to happiness as means to end. Cf. *Eth.* vi. xii. 5: οὐχ ὡς λατρικὴ ὑγίεια, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία (ποιεῖ) εὐδαιμονίαν. The

μήκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γάρ ἀτελές ἐστε τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' 8
ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γάρ ἢ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ'
ἢ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ
συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρε-
τήν. εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ
τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ
κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα
οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν
καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν
αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμώ-
τητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι 9
ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν
γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου.

words ἦν καὶ ζητούμεν may be referred to *Eth.* I. ii. 9: ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὐσα.

8 κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας] The moralists, says Aristotle, take a shallow view in bidding us tame down our aspirations to our mortal condition. Cf. *Rhet.* II. xxi. 6, where the gnome, *θανὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν*, is quoted from Epicharmus. Isocrates (*Ad Dem.* p. 9 b) gives a sort of reconciliation of the views: *ἀθάνατα μὲν φρόνει τῷ μεγάλῳ ψυχῇ εἶναι· θνητὰ δὲ τῷ συμμέτρῳ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀπολαύειν*, which reminds one of George Herbert's quaint lines:

'Pitch thy behaviour low, thy projects high :

So shalt thou humble and magnanimous be :

Sink not in spirit : who aimeth at the sky

Shoots higher much than he that means a tree.

A grain of glorie mixt with humble-
ness

Cures both a fever and lethargick-
ness.'

εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ—ὑπερέχει] 'For
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though (this noblest part) be small in proportionate bulk, yet in power and dignity it far surpasses all the other parts of our nature.' Aristotle here signifies that the divine particle (νοῦς) bears a small proportion to the whole of our composite nature. And in accordance with this he elsewhere intimates that only at short and rare intervals can man enjoy the fruition of his diviner nature. Cf. *Metaph.* XI. vii. 9 : *εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὥς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ θαυμάσιόν.* *Pol.* VIII. v. 12 : *ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίγνεσθαι.* With which we may compare the saying of Spinoza (*De Intellectus Emendatione*, II.), that at first he found himself only able to rest in the idea of 'the truly good' for short intervals, yet that these intervals became longer and more frequent as he went on. 'Et quamvis in initio hæc intervalla essent rara et per admodum exiguum temporis durarent, postquam tamen Verum Bonum magis ac magis mihi innotuit, intervalla ista frequentiora et longiora fuerunt.' Aristotle idealises these moments of the philosopher, suppos-

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τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστω τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

- 8 Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεαίαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίοις ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω. ταῦτα δ' 2 εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἓνα δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνακείωσθαι 3 τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἡθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετὰς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἡθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συ-

ing them to extend throughout life, ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἀν εἰῆ ἀνθρώπου, λαβούσα μήκος βίου τελειῶν.

VIII. Aristotle, pursuing this theme, declares further the paramount excellence of the philosophic life, by showing that the life of practical morality holds a merely secondary place, (1) because it is bound up with man's composite nature, that is, with the passions; (2) because it is more dependent on external circumstances; (3) because such a life cannot possibly be attributed to the gods. He adds that though the philosopher will certainly require a degree of external prosperity, this will only be a very moderate degree, as the sayings of ancient sages testify. And if there be any providence of the gods watching over men, it may be presumed that this will especially watch over the philosopher, who loves and honours that which is divine.

3 συνέζευκται δὲ — ἀνθρωπικαί] 'Thought, moreover, seems inseparably connected with excellence of the

moral nature, and this with thought, since the major premisses of thought are in accordance with the moral virtues, and the "right" in morals is that which is in accordance with thought. But as thought and moral virtue are bound up with the passions, they must be concerned with our composite nature; and the virtues of the composite nature must be purely human.' And therefore secondary to philosophy, which is more than human. This passage appears to contain the germ of much that is expanded in the Eudemian books; cf. *Εὐθ.* vi. xii. 9-10, xiii. 4. But we may observe, 1st, that thought (*φρόνησις*) is here as if for the first time coming forward in opposition to philosophy (*σοφία*), and not in that recognised opposition which would have been the case had Book VI. been previously written; 2nd, that there is no reference to any previous discussions on the moral syllogism.

συνέζευκται] 'Thought' and moral virtue are here said to be reciprocally connected, just as it is said of pleasure

νηρτημέναι δ' αὐται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί. καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατ' αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς 4 χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἑλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἡθικῆς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιούτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέροι· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δέήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἀδῆλοι, προσποιῶνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον 5 κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὕσης. τὸ δὲ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη. πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ καλλίους, πλείονων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς 6

and life, chap. iv. 11: συνεξεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐδέχασθαι.

τὸ σύνθετον] Cf. chap. vii. 8. The term occurs repeatedly in the *Phaedo* of Plato, cf. p. 86 A: αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ζύνετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενή. Cf. *Eth.* vii. xiv. 3.

4 τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων—διοίσει] 'For though on the one hand both (the philosopher and the practical man) will have an equal need of the ordinary means of life, even if the practical man takes more trouble about the concerns of the body and such like—for there will be but little difference in this respect—on the other hand there will be a wide difference with regard to the discharge of their respective functions.' The term ὁ

πολιτικός here appears to be used in opposition to ὁ σοφός (§ 13), not as distinctively indicating 'the politician,' but as representing the whole class of the active virtues, which are subsequently analysed. Thus, *Eth.* i. v. 4, we find οἱ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ given as equivalents for οἱ πολιτικοί.

τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει] δύναμις here seems used in a sense exactly corresponding to 'physical power.' In modern warfare, a weak body may often be accompanied by the highest personal courage, but in the ancient mode of fighting this would have been impossible or useless.

τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας] 'The temperate man will require full liberty of gratification. Cf. *Eth.* i. v. 3: διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοσπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάδω. viii. vi. 5: οἱ δ' ἐν

τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρὸς γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῆ, αἰρεῖται τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν·
 7 δεῖσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονείμει χρεῶν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνοι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιούτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμῖωνα. τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρονσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτη συγγενεστάτη
 8 εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας

ταῖς ἐξουσίαις. The use of the article and of the plural number makes a slight difference in signification.

7 διεξιούσι δὲ—θεῶν] 'And if we went through all the virtues, we should see that whatever relates to moral action is petty and unworthy of the gods.' Aristotle argues here that we cannot attribute morality to the Deity without falling into mere anthropomorphism; but it might be replied that there is the same difficulty in conceiving of God as engaged in philosophic thought. Aristotle himself felt this difficulty, and elsewhere

defined the thought of God as 'the thinking upon thought' (*Μετaph.* xi. ix. 4), which would not only deprive the Deity of all those fatherly and tender functions which the human race is prone to attribute to Him, but would also remove Him from the conditions of all human thinking. If it be conceded that the life of God is only *analogous* to that of the philosopher; we might then ask, why not also analogous to the life of the good man? Plato, by placing the 'idea of justice' in the suprasensible world, allowed a more than mortal interest to morality.

ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῶων οὐδέν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὐτὴ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις. δεῖσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπων 9 ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεῖσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πράξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ 10 ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλὰ· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναται ἂν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἡττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπικεῖν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ' ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργούντος. καὶ Σό- 11 λων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνους· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κекτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ

And he speaks of the just man, by the practice of virtue, being 'made like to God.' *Rep.* 613 A, quoted below.

10 Aristotle seems to lose no opportunity of expressing his contempt for great potentates. 'Reason is not implied in kingly power,' *Eth.* x. vi. 4. 'One may do noble deeds without ruling over land and sea,' &c. We may again refer to George Herbert, who in his verses on Church Music, says,—

'Now I in you without a bodie move,
Rising and falling with your wings;
We both together sweetly live and love,'

Yet say sometimes, *God help poore kings.*

ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ' ὑπάρχειν] i.e. τὰ μέτρια, referring to ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων above.

κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν] i.e. whether philosophic or moral excellence.

11 καὶ Σόλων δὲ] Referring to the well-known story in Herodotus, i. c. 30 sq., where Solon pronounces Tellus, the Athenian citizen, to have been the happiest man he had ever known.

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας — μόνον] 'Anaxagoras, moreover, seems not to have conceived of "the happy man" as a rich man or a potentate, when he said that he should not be surprised if (his "happy man") appeared a strange person to the crowd, for they judge by externals, having no sense

Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον, οὐδὲ δυναστὴν ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων
 12 αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκάσιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθές ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων
 13 δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τούτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον χαίρειν

of aught beside.' Anaxagoras, being asked to define 'the happy man,' said that his opinion, if he declared it, would be thought paradoxical.

12 συμφωνεῖν δὴ—ὑποληπτέον] 'The opinions of the philosophers appear then to coincide with our arguments. Authority of this kind affords a certain ground of belief. But truth in practical matters is settled by an appeal to facts and human life, for in them rests the decision. We ought then to consider previous sayings with a reference to facts and life; if those sayings agree with facts, we should accept them; if they differ, we must account them mere theories.' Cf. *Eth.* i. viii. 1.

13 θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι] The term *θεοφιλής* occurs repeatedly in Plato; cf. especially the interesting passage in *Republic*, p. 613A: where it is said that 'all things work together' for the good of those whom the gods love. οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ' ἐν πενία γίγνηται ἐάν τ' ἐν νόσοις ἢ τι καὶ ἄλλῃ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὥς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθὸν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται

δὲ ἂν προθυμείσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ.

εἰ γάρ τις—ὥσπερ δοκεῖ] 'For if there be any care of human affairs by the gods, as men think there is.' We may compare Shakespeare's

'If powers divine
Behold our human actions, as they do.'

Aristotle expresses here no opinion, one way or the other, as to the reality of a Divine Providence. δοκεῖ merely indicates that an opinion is held; the word is frequently used to indicate a false opinion or fancy. Cf. *Eth.* vii. xii. 3: δοκεῖ δὲ γέρεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν. x. vi. 3: δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Plato had said that moral virtue (see the last note) placed men peculiarly under the care of the gods. Aristotle, differing from Plato in his conception of the Deity, says, if there be any care of men by the gods, it must surely be extended in an especial degree not to the just man, but to the philosopher, since philosophy is most akin to the life of the Deity Himself.

τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ, καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντενποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

Ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ 9
φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος
ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἣ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ
ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ
γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ 2

κἂν οὕτως] 'Even on this supposition.' It seems probable that Aristotle had in his mind the very words of Plato, above quoted.

IX. The theory of human life now being complete, Aristotle asks if anything more is wanting? The answer is Yes, since theory is not by itself enough to make men good. For virtue three things are required, nature, teaching, and custom. The first is beyond man's control; the second may be identified with theory, which we have now supplied; the third requires institutions for the regulation of life, which may either be (1) of public, or (2) of private ordinance. As a fact, the state too much neglects (§ 14) the arrangement of daily life, and therefore private individuals must address themselves to the task in a scientific spirit, and must first learn the principles of legislation. Whence are these principles to be learnt? On the one hand we find that practical politicians neither write nor speak on the principles of their art. On the other hand the Sophists, who profess to teach politics, are far from understanding even what they are, and their mode of

teaching is merely empirical. So far from imparting principles, they go to work in an eclectic way, collecting laws, which are mere results, lying, as it were, on the surface. Legislation, as a science, has in short been neglected hitherto, and must now be essayed. We must enter at once upon the whole theory of the state, examining former speculations and existing constitutions, and developing a conception of the best form of government.

According to the sequence of ideas in this chapter, it would appear that the connecting link between ethics and politics is to be found in the word *ἔθος*, custom, or mode of life. As custom has great influence upon men's power of attaining virtue and the chief good, and on the other hand as the institutions of individual life have a close connection with those of the state, it follows that politics are the complement of ethics.

Ἰ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά] Under the head of 'doing' are of course included the functions of thought, which, as we have just been told, are the highest forms of action in man. Cf. *Pol.* VII. iii. 8: ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς

ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πει-
 3 ρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικείς, πολ-
 λούς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν
 Θεόγνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι. νῦν δὲ φαίνον-
 ται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς
 ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἥθός τ' εὐγενές καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλό-
 4 καλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ
 πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ
 γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσ-
 θαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχροὺς ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας·
 πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν
 αὐταὶ ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ
 δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοϊαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγε-
 5 στοι ὄντες. τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθ-
 μίσαι; οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ
 τοῖς ἥθεσι κατελημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι, ἀγαπητὸν
 δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων, δι' ὧν ἐπιεικείς
 6 δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ'
 ἀγαθοὺς οἶονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ
 μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει,
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν

ἐτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς
 διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς
 τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένας
 ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς
 αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας
 καὶ διανοήσεις. So too under ἀρετῇ,
 σοφία is included in its highest form.

3 πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς] The saying
 of Theognis (v. 432) was that the
 Asclepiadæ would have deserved great
 reward had they known how to heal
 the minds of men.

Εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτο ἔδωκε θεός,
 Ἰᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀνθρώπων φρένας
 ἀνδρῶν,
 Πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους
 ἔφερον.

The last line is quoted in the *Meno*

of Plato, p. 95 E, to indicate that
 Theognis held teaching inefficacious
 to produce virtue. Aristotle borrows
 the application. On Theognis see
 Vol. I. Essay II. p. 92 sqq.

κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς] 'Under
 the influence of virtue.' This word,
 which is also written κατακώχιμον,
 seems derived from κατέχειν, with a
 reduplication. In *Ar. Pol.* II. ix. 8,
 we find κατακώχιμοι πρὸς, and *ib.* VIII.
 vii. 4, κατακώχιμοι ὑπὲρ.

5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἥθεσι κατελημ-
 μένα] 'What has long been fastened
 in the character.'

6 τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν] 'To
 those who are in the most ideal sense
 of the term to be called fortunate.'
Cf. Eth. III. v. 17: καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ

ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μὴ ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν
 ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δέη προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ
 ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ
 γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου 7
 ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' ᾧ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ'
 οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπέισαι; ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ
 λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προῦ- 8
 πάρχειν πῶς οἰκείον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ
 δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρον. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις·
 τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολ-
 λοῖς, ἀλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν
 τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ
 συνήθη γινόμενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς 9
 καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας
 δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ'
 ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολ-
 λοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ
 τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἰονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν 10
 μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ
 καλοῦ χάριν, ὥς ὑπακουσσομένων τῶν ἐπεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι
 προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυστέρους οὔσι κολάσεις

καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ
 ἀληθινῇ ἂν εἴη εὐφυία.

9 οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ'—τὸν βίον] 'It is
 not enough perhaps that, while young,
 people should meet with right nurture
 and superintendence, but, as when
 grown up they must practise the things
 in question, and accustom themselves
 to them, so we shall need laws about
 these things, and in general about the
 whole of life.' In a spirit the very
 opposite of this remark, Pericles is
 reported (Thucyd. ii. 37) to have
 boasted of the freedom enjoyed by
 the Athenians from all vexatious in-
 terference with the daily conduct of
 individuals: ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς
 τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς

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ἀλλήλων τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευ-
 μάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι' ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας,
 εἰ καθ' ἡδονὴν τι ὀργῇ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ
 ἀζημίους μὲν λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὁψεί ἀχθῆ-
 δόνας προστιθέμενοι. On the one hand
 Thucydides praised the free system of
 Athens; on the other hand Aristotle
 praised the organised and educational
 system of Sparta; see below, § 13,
 and cf. *Eth.* i. xiii. 3, and note. He
 was probably led into this political
 mistake, partly by the state of society
 in Athens itself, partly by the influence
 of Plato, from whom he imbibed one
 of the essential ideas of communism,
 —namely, that the state should ar-
 range as much as possible, instead of
 as little as possible.

X X

- τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσῃ, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπη κολλάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καὶ φασὶ δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται
- 11 ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἶρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἰθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίγνεται ἂν βιούμενοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύιν.
- 12 ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, κὰν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς
- 13 τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέλῃται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῆ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢδ' ἀλόχου.
- 14 κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθήν καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων ἐκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. μάλιστα δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι

13 κυκλωπικῶς] Referring to Homer, *Odys.* IX. 114 :

θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἢδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν.

Aristotle considers that any people among whom the state does not settle by law the customs of daily life is unworthy to be called a society at all. He ignores that element called 'public

opinion,' which in so many respects, and more naturally, supplies the place of legislation.

14 καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι.] 'And that it should have power to effect the object in question.' This apparently refers to § 12: ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν κ.τ.λ.

μάλιστα δ'—γενόμενος] 'But from what we have said it would appear that a person would best be able to

δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίνονται, ἐπιεικείς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων. γεγραμμένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν εἰς ἡ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἔθνη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθνη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον 15 παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἱατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὐ, ὃ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθῃσιν. ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθεῖη μὲν ἄριστα καθ' ἐν καὶ ἱατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδὼς ὅτι πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε· τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονται τε καὶ εἰσίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ 16 καὶ ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἱατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἦττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῶ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κακείνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ 17

do this (i.e. to help his children and friends towards virtue) after learning the principles of legislation.' As we find from *Eth.* vi. viii. 2, legislation was considered by the Peripatetics to be the superior (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*) form of political thought. A person possessing the general principles of scientific legislation (see below, § 16) would be best able to deduce rules for the guidance of his family, and at the same time to allow of such exceptions as individual peculiarities might call

for. That the family is a deduction from the state, which is prior in point of idea, we know to have been Aristotle's opinion, *Pol.* i. ii. 12.

16 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἐμπειρίαν] 'And yet perhaps nothing hinders a man even without scientific knowledge treating well some particular case, from an accurate observation, empirically, of what results on each thing being tried.' Cf. *Metaph.* i. i. 7: πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ

βουλομένη δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῶ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γανοίμεθ' ἅν. ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμελεία τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο
 18 ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἅν τις, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μῦριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργούντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἱατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτενόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μᾶλλον ἢ διανοία· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικοὺς τε καὶ δημηγορικοὺς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινας
 19 ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἅν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλουντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὲν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἢ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίγνωнт' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις
 20 περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ

μᾶλλον ἐπιτυχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἔχοντων.

17 ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα] 'Any one you like to propose.' Cf. *Εἰλ.* i. iii. 8: τί προτιθέμεθα, 'what we propose to ourselves.'

18 μῦριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι] 'For, as we said, legislation is generally considered to be a branch of politics.' This probably refers to *Εἰλ.* i. ii. 7: χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἐτι δὲ νομοθετοῦσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ

τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι. In vi. viii. 2-3, the point of view is different, πολιτικὴ not being there treated as a science.

ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί] Cf. Plato, *Meno*, p. 95 v: οἱ σοφισταὶ σοὶ οὗτοι, ὡς περὶ μόνου ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλα εἶναι ἀρετῆς; The whole of the present discussion on the teaching of political science is evidently suggested by that on the teaching of virtue in the *Meno*, where it was shown that the great statesmen do not attempt to teach their sons virtue, and that the Sophists, who

σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τί ἐστίν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρω ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὔσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικὴν· οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνάδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργους εἰκόασιν· πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἱατρικοὶ ²¹ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἔξεις.

profess to teach it, are doubtful instructors.

20 οἱ δὲ νόμοι—*εἰκόασιν*] 'But laws are as it were the results of political science.' Aristotle's account of the Sophists' method of teaching politics is precisely analogous to his account of the way in which they taught dialectic. He here speaks of their taking a shallow view of politics, and making it an inferior branch of rhetoric; and he adds that they adopted a superficial eclecticism, making collections of laws without touching upon the principles from which legislation must depend. They thus imparted mere results, which to those who are uninstructed in principles are wholly useless. In the same way (*Soph. Elench.* xxxiii. 16) he says they gave various specimens of argument to be learnt by heart, and that this was no more use than if a person who undertook to teach shoemaking were to provide his pupils with an assortment

of shoes. λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδουσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλείστακις ἐμπέπτειν ᾤθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. Διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἀτεχνος δ' ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ' αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδῶσκει ἐπὶ τὸ μὴδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἰτα σκυτομοκὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκει, μὴδ' ὅθεν δυνησεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δόη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων.

21 οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται—*ἐξεῖς*] 'For men do not appear to learn the physician's art from treatises, though (they who write such treatises) aim at stating not only modes of treatment, but how people can be cured, and how each person is to be treated, according to a classification of habits (of body).' *συγγραμμάτων* here is frequently translated 'prescriptions,' but from what Aristotle says about them clearly something more is meant. In the *Minos*

- ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τούναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει, εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ἔξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γένοιοντο.
- 22 παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ
- 23 ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεω-

which bears Plato's name we find *συγγράμματα* used as a generic word, of which several species, *ιατρικά*, *γεωργικά*, *μαγειρικά*, &c., are mentioned, and are compared (as here) with 'laws.' Cf. *Minos*, p. 316 C sqq.: *ἤδη ποτὲ ἐνέτυχες συγγράμματι περὶ ὑγίειας τῶν καμνόντων*; *Ἐγώ γε*.—*Ἰατρικά* ἄρα καὶ *ιατρικοὶ νόμοι* ταῦτα τὰ *συγγράμματα* ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν *ιατρῶν*; *Ἰατρικά μέντοι*.—*Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργοὶ νόμοι εἰσὶν*; κ.τ.λ. The *συγγράμματα* here mentioned were perhaps 'reports of cases,' or monographs on particular diseases.

τοῖς δ' ἄνευ—*γένοιοντο*] 'But those who without proper training study such things would not be able to judge of them correctly (except by mere accident), though they might gain an appreciative faculty with regard to the subject.' *ἔξ* is here denotes the state of mind formed by scientific training. Such a training especially produces 'judgment' (*τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς*). Cf. *Pol.* III. xi. 14: *ἐστὶ γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτὴς τῶν εἰδόντων*. *Eth.* I. iii. 5, and note. This kind of judgment, as being deep and original, is distinguished above

from *σύνεσις*, the power of appreciation, but in *Eth.* VI. x. 2, *σύνεσις* is called *κριτική*, in a lower sense, and as contrasted with 'thought,' which is *πρακτική*.

22 *παραλιπόντων οὖν*] One must be struck with the disdainful way in which Aristotle here quite sets aside the *Republic* and *Laws* of Plato, by which he had been himself so much influenced, as if they were not to be reckoned as even attempts at founding the science of politics. Below, he alludes to them as 'perhaps on some particular points having made good remarks.'

23 *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν*] A rough outline of the *Politics* is here given, as Aristotle conceived it before writing it. The sketch is so very general that it omits the subject of Book I., and yet critics have thought that this passage may be taken as evidence of what the order of books in Aristotle's *Politics* should be.

ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν] 'From my collection of constitutions.' Cf. Cicero, *De Finibus*, v. iv.: 'Omnium fere civitatum, non Græciæ solum, sed etiam barbariæ, ab Aristotele mores,

ρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα
 ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας αἱ μὲν
 καλῶς αἱ δὲ τούναντίον πολιτεύονται· θεωρηθέντων γὰρ
 τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία
 ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ
 ἔθεσι χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξέμενοι.

instituta, disciplinas; a Theophrasto
 leges etiam cognovimus.' Diogenes
 Laertius, in his list of the works of
 Aristotle, mentions (v. i. 12): πολιτεῖαι
 πόλεων δυοῖν δεούσαι ἐξήκοντα καὶ
 ἑκατόν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ δημοκρατικά, ὀλιγαρχι-

καὶ ἀριστοκρατικά, καὶ τυραννικά. The
 fragments of this work have been
 collected by C. F. Neumann, and may
 be found in the Oxford reprint of
 Bekker's edition of Aristotle.

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